Transcriber's note:

 Right-hand-page heads have been set right-justified before the appropriate paragraphs. 

 Footnotes are at the end of the chapter. Asterisks have been added to show where the notes occur in the text (unless at end of chapter). Four notes from the Errata to Vol. I (in Vol. II) have been added, and the other corrections indicated there made. 

 The statistical tables in the Appendices have been rearranged for . TXT format, using long lines when required and joining tables split across pages. 

 Lines set as caps and small caps have been transcribed as upper-and- lower-case (except some table headings). 

 The typographic fist is transcribed by the right guillamet (»). 

 LoC call number: E661. B6 v. 1

 2nd proof completed Apr. 11th, 2007. Errata corrected Apr. 13th. Submitted Apr. 13th. 

[Frontispiece: v1. Jpg]

[Signature] James G. Blaine

TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS:FROMLINCOLN TO GARFIELD. WITH A REVIEW OFTHE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF 1860. 

BYJAMES G. BLAINE. 

VOLUME I. 

NORWICH, CONN. :THE HENRY BILL PUBLISHING COMPANY. 1884. 

COPYRIGHT, 1884, BY JAMES G. BLAINE. 

_All rights reserved. _

ELECTROTYPED AND PRINTEDBY RAND, AVERY, AND COMPANY, BOSTON, MASS. 

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 

CHAPTER I. A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF1860. Original Compromises between the North and the South embodied inthe Constitution. --Early Dissatisfaction with National Boundaries. --Acquisition of Louisiana from France by President Jefferson. --Bonaparte's Action and Motive in ceding Louisiana. --State ofLouisiana admitted to the Union against Opposition in the North. --Agitation of the Slavery Question in Connection with the Admissionof Missouri to the Union. --The Two Missouri Compromises of 1820and 1821. --Origin and Development of the Abolition Party. --Struggleover the Right of Petition. 

CHAPTER II. Review of events before 1860 (_continued_). --Early Efforts toacquire Texas. --Course of President Tyler. --Mr. Calhoun appointedSecretary of State. --His Successful Management of the Texas Question. --His Hostility to Mr. Van Buren. --Letters of Mr. Clay and Mr. VanBuren opposing the Annexation of Texas. --Mr. Clay nominated as theWhig Candidate for the President in 1844. --Van Buren's Nominationdefeated. --Mr. Polk selected as the Democratic Candidate. --Disquietudeof Mr. Clay. --His Change of Ground. --His Defeat. --Prolonged Rivalrybetween Mr. Clay and General Jackson. --Texas formally annexed tothe Union. 

CHAPTER III. Review (_continued_). --Triumph of the Democratic Party. --ImpendingTroubles with Mexico. --Position of Parties. --Struggle for theEquality of Free and Slave States. --Character of the SouthernLeaders. --Their Efforts to control the Government. --ConservativeCourse of Secretaries Buchanan and Marcy. --Reluctant to engage inWar with Mexico. --The Oregon Question, 54° 40´, or 49°. --CriticalRelations with the British Government. --Treaty of 1846. --Characterof the Adjustment. --Our Probable Loss by Unwise Policy of theDemocratic Party. 

CHAPTER IV. Review (_continued_). --Relations with Mexico. --General Taylormarches his Army to the Rio Grande. --First Encounter with theMexican Army. --Excitement in the United States. --Congress declaresWar against Mexico. --Ill Temper of the Whigs. --Defeat of theDemocrats in the Congressional Elections of 1846. --Policy of Mr. Polk in Regard to Acquisition of Territory from Mexico. --Three-Million Bill. --The Famous Anti-slavery Proviso moved by DavidWilmot. --John Quincy Adams. --His Public Service. --Robert C. Winthropchosen Speaker. --Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. --Presidential Electionof 1848. --Effort of the Administration to make a Democratic Heroout of the Mexican War. --Thomas H. Benton for Lieutenant-General. --Bill defeated. --Nomination of General Taylor for the Presidencyby the Whigs. --Nomination of General Cass by the Democratic Party. --Van Buren refuses to support him. --Democratic Bolt in New York. --Buffalo Convention and the Organization of the Free-soil Party. --Nomination of Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams. --Mr. Clay'sDiscontent. --Mr. Webster's Speech at Marshfield. --General Taylorelected. --The Barnburners of New York. --Character and Public Servicesof Mr. Van Buren. 

CHAPTER V. Review (_continued_). --Contrast between General Taylor and GeneralCass. --The Cabinet of President Taylor. --Political Condition ofthe Country. --Effect produced by the Discovery of Gold in California. --Convening of Thirty-first Congress. --Election of Howell Cobb asSpeaker. --President Taylor's Message. --His Recommendations Distastefulto the South. --Illustrious Membership of the Senate. --Mr. Clay andthe Taylor Administration. --Mr. Calhoun's Last Speech in the Senate. --His Death. --His Character and Public Services. --Mr. Webster's7th of March Speech. --Its Effect upon the Public and upon Mr. Webster. --Mr. Clay's Committee of Thirteen. --The Omnibus Bill. --Conflict with General Taylor's Administration. --Death of thePresident. --Mr. Fillmore reverses Taylor's Policy and supports theCompromise Measures. --Defeat of Compromise Bill. --Passage of theMeasures separately. --Memorable Session of Congress. --Whig andDemocratic Parties sustain the Compromise Measures. --NationalConventions. --Whigs nominate Winfield Scott over Fillmore. --Mr. Clay supports Fillmore. --Mr. Webster's Friends. --Democrats nominateFranklin Pierce. --Character of the Campaign. --Overwhelming Defeatof Scott. --Destruction of the Whig Party. --Death of Mr. Clay. --Death of Mr. Webster. --Their Public Characters and Servicescompared. 

CHAPTER VI. Review (_continued_). --The Strength of the Democratic Party in1853. --Popular Strength not so great as Electoral Strength. --TheNew President's Pledge not to re-open the Slavery Question. --Howhe failed to maintain that Pledge. --The North-west Territory. --Anti-slavery Restriction of the Missouri Compromise. --Movement to repealit by Mr. Clay's Successor in the Senate. --Mr. Douglas adopts thepolicy of repealing the Restriction. --It is made an AdministrationMeasure and carried through Congress. --Colonel Benton's Position. --Anti-slavery Excitement developed in the Country. --Destructionof the Whig Party. --New Political Alliances. --American Party. --Know-Nothings. --Origin and Growth of the Republican Party. --Pro-slaveryDevelopment in the South. --Contest for the Possession of Kansas. --Prolonged Struggle. --Disunion Tendencies developing in the South. --Election of N. P. Banks to the Speakership of the House. --ThePresidential Election of 1856. --Buchanan. --Frémont. --Fillmore. --The Slavery Question the Absorbing Issue. --Triumph of Buchanan. --Dred Scott Decision. --Mr. Lincoln's Version of it. --Chief JusticeTaney. 

CHAPTER VII. Review (_continued_). --Continuance of the Struggle for Kansas. --List of Governors. --Robert J. Walker appointed Governor by PresidentBuchanan. --His Failure. --The Lecompton Constitution fraudulentlyadopted. --Its Character. --Is transmitted to Congress by PresidentBuchanan. --He recommends the Admission of Kansas under its Provisions. --Pronounces Kansas a Slave State. --Gives Full Scope and Effect tothe Dred Scott Decision. --Senator Douglas refuses to sustain theLecompton Iniquity. --His Political Embarrassment. --Breaks with theAdministration. --Value of his Influence against Slavery in Kansas. --Lecompton Bill passes the Senate. --Could not be forced throughthe House. --The English Bill substituted and passed. --Kansas spurnsthe Bribe. --Douglas regains his Popularity with Northern Democrats. --Illinois Republicans bitterly hostile to him. --Abraham Lincolnnominated to contest the Re-election of Douglas to the Senate. --Lincoln challenges Douglas to a Public Discussion. --Character ofEach as a Debater. --They meet Seven Times in Debate. --Douglas re-elected. --Southern Senators arraign Douglas. --His Defiant Answer. --Danger of Sectional Division in the Democratic Party. 

CHAPTER VIII. Excited Condition of the South. --The John Brown Raid at Harper'sFerry. --Character of Brown. --Governor Wise. --Hot Temper. --Courseof Republicans in Regard to John Brown. --Misunderstanding of theTwo Sections. --Assembling of the Charleston Convention. --Positionof Douglas and his Friends. --Imperious Demands of Southern Democrats. --Caleb Cushing selected for Chairman of the Convention. --The Southhas Control of the Committee on Resolutions. --Resistance of theDouglas Delegates. --They defeat the Report of the Committee. --Delegates from Seven Southern States withdraw. --Convention unableto make a Nomination. --Adjourns to Baltimore. --Convention divides. --Nomination of both Douglas and Breckinridge. --ConstitutionalUnion Convention. --Nomination of Bell and Everett. --The ChicagoConvention. --Its Membership and Character. --Mr. Seward's Position. --His Disabilities. --Work of his Friends, Thurlow Weed and WilliamM. Evarts. --Opposition of Horace Greeley. --Objections from DoubtfulStates. --Various Candidates. --Nomination of Lincoln and Hamlin. --Four Presidential Tickets in the Field. --Animated Canvass. --TheLong Struggle over. --The South defeated. --Election of Lincoln. --Political Revolution of 1860 complete. 

CHAPTER IX. The Tariff Question in its Relation to the Political Revolution of1860. --A Century's Experience as to Best Mode of levying Duties. --Original Course of Federal Government in Regard to Revenue. --FirstTariff Act. --The Objects defined in a Preamble. --ConstitutionalPower to adopt Protective Measure. --Character of Early Discussions. --The Illustrious Men who participated. --Mr. Madison the Leader. --The War Tariff of 1812. --Its High Duties. --The Tariff of 1816. --Interesting Debate upon its Provisions. --Clay, Webster, and Calhountake part. --Business Depression throughout the Country. --Continuesuntil the Enactment of the Tariff of 1824. --Protective Characterof that Tariff. --Still Higher Duties levied by the Tariff of 1828. --Southern Resistance to the Protective Principle. --Mr. Calhounleads the Nullification Movement in South Carolina. --Compromiseeffected on the Tariff Question. --Financial Depression follows. --Panic of 1837. --Protective Tariff passed in 1842. --Free-tradePrinciples triumph with the Election of President Polk. --Tariff of1846. --Prosperous Condition of the Country. --Differences of Opinionas to the Causes. --Surplus Revenue. --Plethoric Condition of theTreasury. --Enactment of the Tariff of 1857. --Both Parties supportit in Congress. --Duties lower than at Any Time since the War of1812. --Panic of 1857. --Dispute as to its causes. --Protective andFree-trade Theories as presented by their Advocates. --Connectionof the Tariff with the Election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency. --General Review. 

CHAPTER X. Presidential Election of 1860. --The Electoral and Popular Vote. --Wide Divergence between the Two. --Mr. Lincoln has a Large Majorityof Electors. --In a Minority of 1, 000, 000 on Popular Vote. --Beginningof Secession. --Rash Course of South Carolina. --Reluctance on thePart of Many Southern States. --Unfortunate Meeting of South-CarolinaLegislature. --Hasty Action of South-Carolina Convention. --The Word"Ordinance. "--Meeting of Southern Senators in Washington to promoteSecession. --Unwillingness in the South to submit the Question toPopular Vote. --Georgia not eager to Secede. --Action of Other States. --Meeting of Congress in December, 1860. --Position of Mr. Buchanan. --His Attachment to the Union as a Pennsylvanian. --Sinister Influencesin his Cabinet. --His Evil Message to Congress. --Analysis of theMessage. --Its Position destructive to the Union. --The President'sPosition Illogical and Untenable. --Full of Contradictions. --Extremistsof the South approve the Message. --Demoralizing Effect of theMessage in the North and in the South. --General Cass resigns fromState Department. --Judge Black succeeds him. --Character of JudgeBlack. --Secretaries Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson. --Their CensurableConduct in the Cabinet. --Their Resignation. --Re-organization ofCabinet. --Dix, Holt, Stanton. --Close of Mr. Buchanan's Administration. --Change in the President's Course. --The New Influences. --Analysisof the President's Course. --There were two Mr. Buchanans. --Personaland Public Character of Mr. Buchanan. 

CHAPTER XI. Congress during the Winter of 1860-61. --Leave-taking of Senatorsand Representatives. --South Carolina the First to secede. --HerDelegation in the House publish a Card withdrawing. --Other Statesfollow. --Mr. Lamar of Mississippi. --Speeches of Seceding Senators. --Mr. Yulee and Mr. Mallory of Florida. --Mr. Clay and Mr. Fitzpatrickof Alabama. --Jefferson Davis. --His Distinction between Secessionand Nullification. --Important Speech by Mr. Toombs. --He definesConditions on which the Union might be allowed to survive. --Mr. Iverson's Speech. --Georgia Senators withdraw. --Insolent Speech ofMr. Slidell of Louisiana. --Mr. Judah P. Benjamin's Special Pleafor his State. --His Doctrine of "A Sovereignty held in Trust. "--Same Argument of Mr. Yulee for his State. --Principle of StateSovereignty. --Disproved by the Treaty of 1783. --Notable Omissionby Secession Senators. --Grievances not stated. --Secession Conventionsin States. --Failure to state Justifying Grounds of Action. --Confederate Government fail likewise to do it. --Contrast with theCourse of the Colonies. --Congress had given no Cause. --Had notdisturbed Slavery by Adverse Legislation. --List of Measures Favorableto Slavery. --Policy of Federal Government steadily in that Direction. --Mr. Davis quoted Menaces, not Acts. --Governing Class in the South. --Division of Society there. --Republic ruled by an Oligarchy. --Overthrown by Election of Lincoln. --South refuses to acquiesce. 

CHAPTER XII. Congress in the Winter of 1860-61. --The North offers Many Concessionsto the South. --Spirit of Conciliation. --Committee of Thirteen inthe Senate. --Committee of Thirty-three in the House. --Disagreementof Senate Committee. --Propositions submitted to House Committee. --Thomas Corwin's Measure. --Henry Winter Davis. --Justin S. Morrill--Mr. Houston of Alabama. --Constitutional Amendment proposed byCharles Francis Adams. --Report of the Committee of Thirty-three. --Objectionable Measures proposed. --Minority Report by SouthernMembers. --The Crittenden Compromise proposed. --Details of thatCompromise. --Mr. Adams's Double Change of Ground. --An Old Resolutionof the Massachusetts Legislature. --Mr. Webster's Criticism Pertinent. --Various Minority Reports. --The California Members. --Washburn andTappan. --Amendment to the Constitution passed by the House. --Bythe Senate also. --New Mexico. --The Fugitive-slave Law. --Mr. Clarkof New Hampshire. --Peace Congress. --Invited by Virginia. --Assemblesin Washington. --Peace Measures proposed. --They meet no Favor inCongress. --Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada originated. --Prohibition of Slavery abandoned. --Republicans in Congress donot ask it. --Explanation required. --James S. Green of Missouri. --His Character as a Debater. --Northern Republicans frightened attheir own Success. --Anxious for a Compromise. --Dread of Disunion. --Northern Democrats. --Dangerous Course pursued by them. --GeneralDemoralization of Northern Sentiment. 

CHAPTER XIII. Mr. Lincoln's Journey from Springfield to Washington. --Speeches onthe Way. --Reaches Washington. --His Secret Journey. --Afterwardsregretted. --Precautions for his Safety. --President Buchanan. --Secretary Holt. --Troops for the Protection of Washington. --Inaugurationof Mr. Lincoln. --Relief to the Public Anxiety. --Inaugural Address. --Hopefulness and Security in the North. --Mr. Lincoln's Appeal tothe South. --Fails to appease Southern Wrath. --Dilemma of the South. --The New Cabinet. --The "Easy Accession" of Former Times. --SewardSecretary of State. --Chase at the Head of the Treasury. --RadicalRepublicans dissatisfied. --Influence of the Blairs. --Comment ofThaddeus Stevens. --The National Flag in the Confederacy. --Flyingat only Three Points. --Defenseless Condition of the Government. --Confidence of Disunion Leaders. --Extra Session of the Senate. --Douglas and Breckinridge. --Their Notable Debate. --Douglas's Replyto Wigfall. --His Answer to Mason. --Condition of the Territories. --Slavery not excluded by Law. --Public Opinion in Maine, 1861. --Mr. Lincoln's Difficult Task. --His Wise Policy. --His Careful Preparation. --Statesmanship of his Administration. 

CHAPTER XIV. President Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners. --MisleadingAssurance given by Judge Campbell. --Mr. Seward's Answer to Messrs. Forsythe and Crawford. --An Interview with the President is desiredby the Commissioners. --Rage in the South. --Condition of the MontgomeryGovernment. --Roger A. Pryor's Speech. --President determines to sendProvisions to Fort Sumter. --Advises Governor Pickens. --Conflictprecipitated. --The Fort surrenders. --Effect of the Conflict on theNorth. --President's Proclamation and Call for Troops. --Responsesof Loyal States. --Popular Uprising. --Democratic Party. --Patriotismof Senator Douglas. --His Relations with Mr. Lincoln. --His Death. --Public Service and Character. --Effect of the President's Call onSouthern States. --North Carolina. --Tennessee. --Virginia. --SenatorMason's Letter. --Responses of Southern Governors to the President'sCall for Troops. --All decline to comply. --Some of them with InsolentDefiance. --Governors of the Free States. --John A. Andrew, E. D. Morgan, Andrew G. Curtin, Oliver P. Morton. --Energetic and PatrioticAction of all Northern Governors. --Exceptional Preparation inPennsylvania for the Conflict. --Governors of Free States allRepublicans except in California and Oregon. --Critical Situationon Pacific Coast. --Loyalty of its People. --President's Reasons forpostponing Session of Congress. --Election in Kentucky. --UnionVictory. --John J. Crittenden and Garrett Davis. --John Bell. --Disappoints Expectation of Union Men. --Responsibility of SouthernWhigs. --Their Power to arrest the Madness. --Audacity overcomesNumbers. --Whig Party of the South. --Its Brilliant Array of Leaders. --Its Destruction. 

CHAPTER XV. Thirty-Seventh Congress assembles. --Military Situation. --List ofSenators: Fessenden, Sumner, Collamer, Wade, Chandler, Hale, Trumbull, Breckinridge, Baker of Oregon. --List of Members of theHouse of Representatives: Thaddeus Stevens, Crittenden, Lovejoy, Washburne, Bingham, Conkling, Shellabarger. --Mr. Grow electedSpeaker. --Message of President Lincoln. --Its Leading Recommendations. --His Account of the Outbreak of the Rebellion. --Effect of theMessage on the Northern People. --Battle of Bull Run. --Its Effecton Congress and the Country. --The Crittenden Resolution adopted. --Its Significance. --Interesting Debate upon it in the Senate. --FirstAction by Congress Adverse to Slavery. --Confiscation of CertainSlaves. --Large Amount of Business dispatched by Congress. --Strikingand Important Debate between Baker and Breckinridge. --Expulsion ofMr. Breckinridge from the Senate. --His Character. --Credit due toUnion Men of Kentucky. --Effect produced in the South of ConfederateSuccess at Bull Run. --Rigorous Policy adopted by the ConfederateGovernment. --Law respecting "Alien Enemies. "--Law sequestratingtheir Estates. --Rigidly enforced by Attorney-General Benjamin. --AnInjudicious Policy. 

CHAPTER XVI. Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress. --The Military Situation. --Disaster at Ball's Bluff. --Death of Colonel E. D. Baker. --ThePresident's Message. --Capital and Labor. --Their Relation discussedby the President. --Agitation of the Slavery Question. --The Houserefuses to re-affirm the Crittenden Resolution. --Secretary Cameronresigns. --Sent on Russian Mission. --Succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton. --His Vigorous War Measures. --Victories in the Field. --Battle ofMill Spring. --General Order of the President for a Forward Movement. --Capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. --Prestige and Popularityof General Grant. --Illinois Troops. --General Burnside's Victory inNorth Carolina. --Effect of the Victories upon the Country. --ContinuedSuccess for the Union in the South-West. --Proposed Celebration. --The Monitor and the Merrimac. --Ericsson. --Worden. --Capture of NewOrleans by Farragut. --The Navy. --Its Sudden and Great Popularity. --Legislation in its Favor. --Battle of Shiloh. --Anxiety in theNorth. --Death of Albert Sidney Johnston. --General Halleck takesthe Field. --Military Situation in the East. --The President andGeneral McClellan. --The Peninsular Campaign. --Stonewall Jackson'sRaid. --Its Disastrous Effect. --Fear for Safety of Washington. --Anti-Slavery Legislation. --District of Columbia. --Compensated Emancipation. --Colonization. --Confiscation. --Punishment of Treason. 

CHAPTER XVII. Ball's Bluff Disaster. --Mr. Conkling's Resolution of Inquiry. --Unsatisfactory Reply of Secretary Cameron. --Second Resolution. --Second Reply. --Incidental Debate on Slavery. --Arrest of GeneralCharles P. Stone. --His History. --His Response to Criticisms madeupon him. --Responsibility of Colonel Baker. --General Stone beforethe Committee on the Conduct of the War. --His Examination. --Testimonyof Officers. --General Stone appears before the Committee a SecondTime. --His Arrest by Order of the War Department. --No Cause assigned. --Imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. --Solitary Confinement. --Sees Nobody. --His Wife denied Access to him. --Subject brought into Congress. --A Search for the Responsibility of the Arrest. --Groundless Assumptionof Mr. Sumner's Connection with it. --Mr. Lincoln's Message in Regardto the Case. --General Stone's Final Release by an Act of Congress. --Imprisoned for One Hundred and Eighty-nine Days. --Never told theCause. --Never allowed a Trial. --Appears a Third Time before theCommittee. --The True Responsibility for the Arrest. --His Restorationto Service. --His Resignation. --Joins the Khedive's Service. 

CHAPTER XVIII. The National Finances. --Debt when the Civil War began. --Deadly Blowto Public Credit. --Treasury Notes due in 1861. --$10, 000, 000 required. --An Empty Treasury. --Recommendation by Secretary Dix. --SecretaryThomas recommends a Pledge of the Public Lands. --Strange Suggestions. --Heavy Burdens upon the Treasury. --Embarrassment of Legislators. --First Receipts in the Treasury in 1861. --Chief Dependence hadalways been on Customs. --Morrill Tariff goes into Effect. --It meetsFinancial Exigencies. --Mr. Vallandigham puts our Revenue at$50, 000, 000, our Expenditures at $500, 000, 000. --Annual Deficiencyunder Mr. Buchanan. --Extra Session in July, 1861. --Secretary Chaserecommends $80, 000, 000 by Taxation, and $240, 000, 000 by Loans. --Loan Bill of July 17, 1861. --Its Provisions. --Demand Notes. --Seven-thirties. --Secretary Chase's Report, December, 1861. --SituationSerious. --Sales of Public Lands. --Suspension of Specie Payment. --The Loss of our Coin. --Its Steady Export to Europe. 

CHAPTER XIX. The Legal-tender Bill. --National Finances at the Opening of theYear 1862. --A Threefold Contest. --The Country thrown upon its ownResources. --A Good Currency demanded. --Government takes Control ofthe Question. --Authorizes the Issue of $150, 000, 000 of Legal-tenderNotes. --Mr. Spaulding the Author of the Measure. --His Speech. --Opposed by Mr. Pendleton. --Position of Secretary Chase. --Urges theMeasure upon Congress. --Speeches by Thaddeus Stevens, Mr. Vallandigham, Mr. V. B. Horton, Mr. Lovejoy, Mr. Conkling, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Morrill, Mr. Bingham, Mr. Shellabarger, Mr. Pike and Others. --Spirited andAble Debate. --Bill passes the House. --Its Consideration by theSenate. --Speeches by Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Collamer and Others. --Bill passes the Senate. --ItsWeighty Provisions. --Secretary Chase on State Banks. --Policy ofthe Legal-tender Bill. --Its Effect upon the Business and Prosperityof the Country. --Internal Revenue Act. --Necessity of Large Sumsfrom Taxation. --Public Credit dependent on it. --ConstitutionalProvisions. --Financial Policy of Alexander Hamilton. --ExcisesUnpopular. --Whiskey Insurrection. --Resistance by Law. --SupremeCourt Decision. --Case of Hylton. --Provisions of New Act. --SearchingCharacter. --Great Revenue desired. --Credit due to Secretary Chase. 

CHAPTER XX. Elections of 1862. --Mr. Lincoln advances to Aggressive Position onSlavery. --Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress adjourns. --Democratic Hostility to Administration. --Democratic State Conventions. --Platforms in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. --Nominationof Horatio Seymour for Governor of New York. --The President preparesfor a Serious Political Contest. --The Issue shall be the Union orSlavery. --Conversation with Mr. Boutwell. --Proclamation ofEmancipation. --Meeting of Governors at Altoona. --CompensatedEmancipation proposed for Border States. --Declined by their Senatorsand Representatives. --Anti-slavery Policy apparently Disastrousfor a Time. --October Elections Discouraging. --General James S. Wadsworth nominated against Mr. Seymour. --Illinois votes againstthe President. --Five Leading States against the President. --Administration saved in Part by Border States. --Last Session ofThirty-seventh Congress. --President urges Compensated Emancipationagain. --Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863. --Long Controversyover Question of Compensation for Slaves. --Test Case of Missouri. --Fourteen Million Dollars offered her. --General Pope's Campaign. --Army of the Potomac. --Battle of Antietam. --McClellan removed. --Burnside succeeds him. --Defeat at Fredericksburg. --Hooker succeedsBurnside. --General Situation. --Arming of Slaves. --Habeas Corpus. --Conscription Law. --Depressed and Depressing Period. 

CHAPTER XXI. The President's Border-State Policy. --Loyal Government erected inVirginia. --Recognized by Congress and Senators admitted. --Desirefor a New State. --The Long Dissatisfaction of the People of WesternVirginia. --The Character of the People and of their Section. --TheirOpportunity had come. --Organization of the Pierpont Government. --State Convention and Constitution. --Application to Congress forAdmission. --Anti-slavery Amendment. --Senate Debate: Sumner, Wade, Powell, Willey, and Others. --House Debate: Stevens, Conway, Bingham, Segar. --Passage of Bill in Both Branches. --Heavy Blow to the OldState. --Her Claims deserve Consideration. --Should be treated asgenerously at least as Mexico. 

CHAPTER XXII. National Currency and State Bank Currency. --In Competition. --Legal-tender Bill tended to expand State Bank Circulation. --SecretaryChase's Recommendation. --Favorably received. --State Bank Circulation, $150, 000, 000. --Preliminary Bill to establish National Banks. --Fessenden. --Sherman. --Hooper. --National Bank System in 1862. --Discussed among the People. --Recommended by the President. --Mr. Chase urges it. --Bill introduced and discussed in Senate. --Discussionin the House. --Bill passed. --Hugh McCulloch of Indiana appointedComptroller of the Currency. --Amended Bank Act. --To remedy Defects, Circulation limited to $500, 000, 000. --National Power. --State Rights. --Taxation. --Renewed Debate in Senate and House. --Bill passed. --Merits of the System. --Former Systems. --First Bank of the UnitedStates. --Charters of United-States Banks, 1791-1816. --NationalBanks compared with United-States Banks. --One Defective Element. --Founded on National Debt. 

CHAPTER XXIII. Depression among the People in 1863. --Military Situation. --Hostilityto the Administration. --Determination to break it down. --Vallandigham'sDisloyal Speech. --Two Rebellions threatened. --General Burnsidetakes Command of the Department of the Ohio. --Arrests Vallandigham. --Tries him by Military Commission. --His Sentence commuted by Mr. Lincoln. --Habeas Corpus refused. --Democratic Party protests. --Meeting in Albany. --Letter of Governor Seymour. --Ohio Democratssend a Committee to Washington. --Mr. Lincoln's Replies to AlbanyMeeting and to the Ohio Committee. --Effect of his Words upon theCountry. --Army of the Potomac. --General Hooker's Defeat atChancellorsville. --Gloom in the Country. --The President's Lettersto General Hooker. --General Meade succeeds Hooker in Command ofthe Army. --Battle of Gettysburg. --Important Victory for the Union. --Relief to the Country. --General Grant's Victory at Vicksburg. --Fourth of July. --Notable Coincidence. --State Elections favorableto the Administration. --Meeting of Thirty-eighth Congress. --SchuylerColfax elected Speaker. --Prominent New Members in Each Branch. --E. D. Morgan, Alexander Ramsey, John Conness, Reverdy Johnson, ThomasA. Hendricks, Henry Winter Davis, Robert C. Schenck, James A. Garfield, William B. Allison. --President's Message. --ThirteenthAmendment to the Constitution. --First proposed by James M. Ashley. --John B. Henderson proposes Amendment which passes the Senate. --Debate in Both Branches. --Aid to the Pacific Railroads. --Lieutenant-General Grant. 

CHAPTER XXIV. Presidential Election of 1864. --Preliminary Movements. --GeneralSentiment favors Mr. Lincoln. --Some Opposition to his Renomination. --Secretary Chase a Candidate. --The "Pomeroy Circular. "--Mr. Chasewithdraws. --Republican National Convention. --Baltimore, June 7. --Frémont and Cochrane nominated. --Speech of Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. --Mr. Lincoln renominated. --Candidates for Vice-President. --AndrewJohnson of Tennessee nominated. --Democratic National Convention. --Chicago, August 29. --Military Situation discouraging. --Characterof the Convention. --Peace Party prevails. --Speeches of Belmont, Bigler, Hunt, Long, Seymour. --Nomination of General McClellan forPresident. --George H. Pendleton for Vice-President. --Platform. --Suits Vallandigham. --General McClellan accepts, but evades thePlatform. --General Frémont withdraws. --Success of the Union Army. --Mr. Lincoln's Popularity. --General McClellan steadily losesGround. --Sheridan's Brilliant Victories. --General McClellan receivesthe Votes of only Three States. --Governor Seymour defeated in NewYork. 

CHAPTER XXV. President's Message, December, 1864. --General Sherman's March. --Compensated Emancipation abandoned. --Thirteenth Amendment. --Earnestlyrecommended by the President. --He appeals to the Democratic Members. --Mr. Ashley's Energetic Work. --Democratic Opportunity. --Unwiselyneglected. --Mr. Pendleton's Argument. --Final Vote. --Amendmentadopted. --Cases arising under it. --Supreme Court. --Change of Judgesat Different Periods. --Peace Conference at Fortress Monroe. --Secretary Chase resigns. --Mr. Fessenden succeeds him. --Mr. Fessenden'sReport. --Surrender of Lee. --General Grant's Military Character. --Assassination of President Lincoln. --His Characteristics. --Cost ofthe War. --Compared with Wars of Other Nations. --Our Navy. --Createdduring the War. --Effective Blockade. --Its Effect upon the South. --Its Influence upon the Struggle. --Relative Numbers in Loyal andDisloyal States. --Comparison of Union and Confederate Armies. --Confederate Army at the Close of the War. --Union Armies comparedwith Armies of Foreign Countries. --Area of the War. --Its Effectupon the Cost. --Character of Edwin M. Stanton. 

CHAPTER XXVI. Relations with Great Britain. --Close of the Year 1860. --Prince ofWales's Visit to the United States. --Exchange of CongratulatoryNotes. --Dawn of the Rebellion. --Lord Lyons' Dispatch. --Mr. Seward'sViews. --Lord John Russell's Threats. --Condition of Affairs at Mr. Lincoln's Inauguration. --Unfriendly Manifestations by Great Britain. --Recognizes Belligerency of Southern States. --Discourtesy toAmerican Minister. --England and France make Propositions to theConfederate States. --Unfriendly in their Character to the UnitedStates. --Full Details given. --Motives inquired into. --Trent Affair. --Lord John Russell. --Lord Lyons. --Mr. Seward. --Mason and Slidellreleased. --Doubtful Grounds assigned. --Greater Wrongs against usby Great Britain. --Queen Victoria's Friendship. --Isolation of UnitedStates. --Foreign Aid to Confederates on the Sea. --Details given. --So-called Neutrality. --French Attempt to establish an Empire inMexico. --Lord Palmerston in 1848, in 1859, in 1861. --ConclusiveObservations. 

ADDENDUM

ERRATUM

APPENDICES

LIST OF STEEL PORTRAITS. 

THE AUTHORABRAHAM LINCOLNCHARLES SUMNERSTEPHEN A. DOUGLASWILLIAM PITT FESSENDENJOHN C. BRECKINRIDGEHENRY WINTER DAVISTHADDEUS STEVENSBENJAMIN F. WADEELIHU B. WASHBURNEROBERT C. SCHENCKWILLIAM D. KELLEYSAMUEL SHELLABARGERJUSTIN S. MORRILLGEORGE S. BOUTWELLREUBEN E. FENTONOLIVER P. MORTONZACHARIAH CHANDLERHENRY B. ANTHONYTHOMAS A. HENDRICKSSIMON CAMERONJAMES W. GRIMESJOHN P. HALEJOHN SHERMANWILLIAM WINDOMJOHN B. HENDERSONJOHN J. INGALLSFREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSENCARL SCHURZJOHN A. LOGAN

MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES

TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS. 

CHAPTER I. 

Original Compromises between the North and the South embodied inthe Constitution. --Early Dissatisfaction with National Boundaries. --Acquisition of Louisiana from France by President Jefferson. --Bonaparte's Action and Motive in ceding Louisiana. --State ofLouisiana admitted to the Union against Opposition in the North. --Agitation of the Slavery Question in Connection with the Admissionof Missouri to the Union. --The Two Missouri Compromises of 1820and 1821. --Origin and Development of the Abolition Party. --Struggleover the Right of Petition. 

The compromises on the Slavery question, inserted in the Constitution, were among the essential conditions upon which the Federal Governmentwas organized. If the African slave-trade had not been permittedto continue for twenty years, if it had not been conceded thatthree-fifths of the slaves should be counted in the apportionmentof representatives in Congress, if it had not been agreed thatfugitives from service should be returned to their owners, theThirteen States would not have been able in 1787 "to form a moreperfect union. " These adjustments in the Constitution were effectedafter the Congress of the old Confederation had dedicated the entireNorth-west Territory to freedom. The ancient commonwealth ofVirginia had, for the good of all, generously and patrioticallysurrendered her title to the great country north of the Ohio andeast of the Mississippi, which to-day constitutes five prosperousand powerful States and a not inconsiderable portion of a sixth. This was the first territory of which the General Government hadexclusive control, and the prompt prohibition of slavery thereinby the Ordinance of 1787 is an important and significant fact. The anti-slavery restriction would doubtless have been applied tothe territory south of the Ohio had the power existed to imposeit. The founders of the government not only looked to the speedyextinction of slavery, but they especially abhorred the idea of ageographical line, with freedom decreed on one side, and slaveryestablished on the other. But the territory south of the Ohiobelonged to the Southern States of the Union, --Kentucky to Virginia;Tennessee to North Carolina; Alabama and Mississippi to Georgia, with certain co-extensive claims put forth by South Carolina. Whencessions of this Southern territory were made to the GeneralGovernment, the States owning it exacted in every case a stipulationthat slavery should not be prohibited. It thus came to pass thatthe Ohio River was the dividing-line. North of it freedom wasforever decreed. South of it slavery was firmly established. Within the limits of the Union as originally formed the slaveryquestion had therefore been compromised, the common territorypartitioned, and the Republic, half slave, half free, organizedand sent forth upon its mission. 

The Thirteen States whose independence had been acknowledged byGeorge III. , occupied with their outlying territories a vast area, exceeding in the aggregate eight hundred thousand square miles. Extended as was this domain, the early statesmen of the Uniondiscovered that its boundaries were unsatisfactory, --hostile toour commercial interests in time of peace, and menacing our safetyin time of war. The Mississippi River was our western limit. Onits farther shore, from the Lake of the Woods to the Balize, wemet the flag of Spain. Our southern border was the 31st parallelof latitude; and the Spanish Floridas, stretching across to theMississippi, lay between us and the Gulf of Mexico. We acquiredfrom Spain the right of deposit for exports and imports at NewOrleans, but the citizens of the Union who lived west of theAlleganies were discontented and irritated to find a foreign powerpractically controlling their trade by intercepting their accessto the sea. One of the great problems imposed upon the foundersof the Union was to remove the burdens and embarrassments whichobstructed the development of the Western States, and thus to rendertheir inhabitants as loyal by reason of material prosperity as theyalready were in patriotic sympathy. The opportunity for reliefcame from remote and foreign causes, without our own agency; butthe courageous statesmanship which discerned and grasped theopportunity, deserved, as it has received, the commemoration ofthree generations. The boundaries of the Union were vastly enlarged, but the geographical change was not greater than the effect producedupon the political and social condition of the people. The ambitionsdeveloped by the acquisition of new territory led to seriousconflicts of opinion between North and South, --conflicts whichsteadily grew in intensity until, by the convulsion of war, slaverywas finally extinguished. 

 TERRITORIAL CESSIONS IN AMERICA. 

A great European struggle, which ended twelve years before ourRevolution began, had wrought important changes in the politicalcontrol of North America. The Seven Years' War, identical in timewith the French and Indian War in America, was closed in 1763 bynumerous treaties to which every great power in Europe was in somesense a party. One of the most striking results of these treatieson this side of the Atlantic was the cession of Florida to GreatBritain by Spain in exchange for the release of Cuba, which theEnglish and colonial forces under Lord Albemarle had wrested fromSpanish authority the preceding year. England held Florida fortwenty years, when among the disasters brought upon her by ourRevolution was its retrocession to Spain in 1783, --a result whichwas accounted by our forefathers a great gain to the new Republic. Still more striking were the losses of France. Fifty years before, by the Treaty of Utrecht, France had surrendered to England theisland of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia (then including New Brunswick), and the Hudson-bay Territory. She now gave up Canada and CapeBreton, acknowledged the sovereignty of Great Britain in the originalthirteen Colonies as extending to the Mississippi, and, by a separatetreaty, surrendered Louisiana on the west side of the Mississippi, with New Orleans on the east side, to Spain. Thus, in 1763, Frenchpower disappeared from North American. The last square mile ofthe most valuable colonial territory ever possessed by a Europeansovereign was lost under the weak and effeminate rule of Louis XV. , a reign not fitted for successful war, but distinguished only, asone of its historians says, for "easy-mannered joyance, and thebrilliant charm of fashionable and philosophical society. "

The country which France surrendered to Spain was of vast butindefinite extent. Added to her other North-American colonies, itgave to Spain control of more than half the continent. She continuedin possession of Louisiana until the year 1800, when, during someEuropean negotiations, Bonaparte concluded a treaty at San Ildefonsowith Charles IV. , by which the entire territory was retroceded toFrance. When the First Consul acquired Louisiana, he appeared tolook forward to a career of peace, --an impression greatly strengthenedby the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens the ensuing year. Headded to his prestige as a ruler when he regained from Spain theAmerican empire which the Bourbons had weakly surrendered thirty-seven years before, and he expected a large and valuable additionto the trade and resources of France from the vast colonialpossession. The formal transfer of so great a territory on adistant continent was necessarily delayed; and, before the Captain-general of France reached New Orleans in 1803, the Spanish authorities, still in possession, had become so odious to the inhabitants ofthe western section of the Union by their suspension of the rightof deposit at New Orleans, that there was constant danger of anarmed collision. Mr. Ross of Pennsylvania, an able and conservativestatesman, moved in the Senate of the United States that thegovernment be instructed to seize New Orleans. Gouverneur Morris, a statesman of the Revolutionary period, then a senator from NewYork, seconded Mr. Ross. So intense was the feeling among thepeople that a large army of volunteers could have been easily raisedin the Mississippi valley to march against New Orleans; but theprudence of Mr. Jefferson restrained every movement that mightinvolve us in a war with Spain, from which nothing was to be gained, and by which every thing would be risked. 

 THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA. 

Meanwhile Mr. Robert R. Livingston, our minister at Paris, waspressing the French Government for concessions touching the freenavigation of the Mississippi and the right of deposit at NewOrleans, and was speaking to the First Consul, as a French historianobserves, in a tone which "arrested his attention, and aroused himto a sense of the new power that was growing beyond the sea. " Mr. Livingston was re-enforced by Mr. Monroe, sent out by PresidentJefferson as a special envoy in the spring of 1803, in order toeffect some adjustment of the irritating questions which wereseriously endangering the relations between France and the UnitedStates. The instructions of Mr. Madison, then secretary of State, to Mr. Monroe, show that the utmost he expected was to acquire fromFrance the city of New Orleans and the Floridas, of which he believedFrance either then was, or was about to become, the actual owner. Indeed, the treaty by which France had acquired Louisiana was butimperfectly understood; and, in the slowness and difficulty ofcommunication, Mr. Madison could not accurately know the full extentof the cession made at San Ildefonso. But Mr. Jefferson did notwait to learn the exact provisions of that treaty. He knewinstinctively that they deeply concerned the United States. Hesaw with clear vision that by the commercial disability upon thewestern section of the Union its progress would be obstructed, itsalready attained prosperity checked; and that possibly its population, drawn first into discontent with the existing order of things, might be seduced into new and dangerous alliances. He determined, therefore, to acquire the control of the left bank of the Mississippito its mouth, and by the purchase of the Floridas to give to Georgiaand the Mississippi territory (now constituting the States ofAlabama and Mississippi) unobstructed access to the Gulf. 

But events beyond the ocean were working more rapidly for theinterest of the United States than any influence which the governmentitself could exert. Before Mr. Monroe reached France in the springof 1803, another war-cloud of portentous magnitude was hanging overEurope. The treaty of Amiens had proved only a truce. Awkwardlyconstructed, misconstrued and violated by both parties, it wasabout to be formally broken. Neither of the plenipotentiaries whosigned the treaty was skilled in diplomacy. Joseph Bonaparte actedfor his brother; England was represented by Lord Cornwallis, whotwenty years before had surrendered the British army at Yorktown. The wits of London described him afterwards as a general who couldneither conduct a war nor conclude a peace. 

Fearing that, in the threatened conflict, England, by her superiornaval force, would deprive him of his newly acquired colonialempire, and greatly enhance her own prestige by securing all theAmerican possessions which France had owned prior to 1763, Bonaparte, by a dash in diplomacy as quick and as brilliant as his tactics onthe field of battle, placed Louisiana beyond the reach of Britishpower. After returning to St. Cloud from the religious servicesof Easter Sunday, April 10, 1803, he called two of his most trustedadvisers, and, in a tone of vehemence and passion, said, --

"I know the full value of Louisiana, and have been desirous ofrepairing the fault of the French negotiators who lost it in 1763. A few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and now I mustexpect to lose it. . . . The English wish to take possession ofit, and it is thus they will begin the war. . . . They have alreadytwenty ships of the line in the Gulf of Mexico. . . . The conquestof Louisiana would be easy. I have not a moment to lose in puttingit out of their reach. . . . The English have successively takenfrom France the Canadas, Cape Breton, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the richest portions of Asia. But they shall not have theMississippi, which they covet. "

The discussion went far into the night. The two ministers differedwidely in the advice which they gave the First Consul; one was infavor of holding Louisiana at all hazards; the other urged itsprudent cession rather than its inevitable loss by war. They bothremained at St. Cloud for the night. At daybreak the minister whohad advised the cession was summoned by Bonaparte to read dispatchesfrom London, that moment received, which certainly foreshadowedwar, as the English were making military and naval preparationswith extraordinary rapidity. After reading the dispatches, theFirst Consul said, "Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounceLouisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is thewhole colony without any reservation. I know the value of what Iabandon. It renounce it with the gravest regret. To attemptobstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiatethis affair with the envoy of the United States. Do not even waitthe arrival of Mr. Monroe. Have an interview this very day withMr. Livingston. . . . But I require a great deal of money for thiswar. I will be moderate. I want fifty millions for Louisiana. "

The minister, who was opposed to the sale, interposed, in a subsequentinterview, some observations "upon what the Germans call the _souls_, as to whether they could be the subject of a contract or sale. "Bonaparte replied with undisguised sarcasm, --

"You are giving me the ideology of the law of nature. But I requiremoney to make war on the richest nation in the world. Send yourmaxims to London. I am sure they will be greatly admired there. "

The First Consul afterwards added, "Perhaps it will be objectedthat the Americans will be found too powerful for Europe in two orthree centuries; but my foresight does not embrace such remotefears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the membersof the Union. The confederations, which are called perpetual, onlylast till one of the contracting parties finds it in his interestto break them. "

 SUCCESS OF JEFFERSON'S DIPLOMACY. 

Two days after this conversation Mr. Monroe opportunely arrived, and on the 30th of April the treaty ceding Louisiana to the UnitedStates was formally concluded. Mr. Monroe and Mr. Livingston hadno authority to negotiate for so vast an extent of territory; butthe former was fully possessed of President Jefferson's views, andfelt assured that his instructions would have been ample if thecondition of France had been foreseen when he sailed from America. Communication with Washington was impossible. Under the mostfavorable circumstances, an answer could not be expected in lessthen three months. By that time British ships would probably holdthe mouths of the Mississippi, and the flag of St. George be wavingover New Orleans. Monroe and Livingston both realized that hesitationwould be fatal; and they boldly took the responsibility of purchasinga territory of unknown but prodigious extent, and of pledging thecredit of the government for a sum which, rated by the ability topay, was larger than a similar pledge to-day for five hundredmillions of dollars. 

The price agreed upon was eleven million two hundred and fiftythousand dollars in six per cent United States bonds, the interestof which was made payable in London, Amsterdam, and Paris, and theprincipal at the treasury in Washington in sums of three millionsper annum, beginning fifteen years after the bonds were issued. In a separate treaty made the same day, the United States agreedto pay twenty million francs additional, to be applied by Franceto the satisfaction of certain claims owed to American citizens. Thus the total cost of Louisiana was eighty millions of francs, or, in round numbers, fifteen millions of dollars. 

No difficulty was experienced in putting the United States inpossession of the territory and of its chief emporium, New Orleans. The French Government had regarded the possession of so muchconsequence, that Bernadotte, afterwards King of Sweden, was atone time gazetted as Captain-general; and, some obstacles supervening, the eminent General Victor, afterwards Marshal of France and Dukeof Belluno, was named in his stead. But all these plans werebrushed aside by one stroke of Bonaparte's pen; and the UnitedStates, in consequence of favoring circumstances growing out ofEuropean complications, and the bold and competent statesmanshipof Jefferson, obtained a territory larger in area than that whichwas wrested from the British crown by the Revolutionary war. 

It seems scarcely credible that the acquisition of Louisiana byJefferson was denounced with a bitterness surpassing the partisanrancor with which later generations have been familiar. No abusewas too malignant, no epithet too coarse, no imprecation too savage, to be employed by the assailants of the great philosophic statesmanwho laid so broad and deep the foundations of his country's growthand grandeur. President of a feeble republic, contending for aprize which was held by the greatest military power of Europe, andwhose possession was coveted by the greatest naval power of theworld, Mr. Jefferson, through his chosen and trusted agents, soconducted his important negotiation that the ambition of the UnitedStates was successfully interposed between the necessities of theone and the aggressive designs of the other. Willing to side witheither of these great powers, for the advantage of his own country, not underrating the dangers of war, yet ready to engage in it forthe control of the great water-way to the Gulf, the President madethe largest conquest ever peacefully achieved, and at a cost sosmall that the total sum expended for the entire territory doesnot equal the revenue which has since been collected on its soilin a single month in time of great public peril. The country thusacquired forms to-day the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota west of the Mississippi, Coloradonorth of the Arkansas, besides the Indian Territory and theTerritories of Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. Texas was also includedin the transfer, but the Oregon country was not. The Louisianapurchase did not extend beyond the main range of the Rocky Mountains, and our title to that large area which is included in the State ofOregon and in the Territories of Washington and Idaho rests upona different foundation, or, rather, upon a series of claims, eachof which was strong under the law of nations. We claimed it firstby right of original discovery of the Columbia River by an Americannavigator in 1792; second, by original exploration in 1805; third, by original settlement in 1810, by the enterprising company ofwhich John Jacob Astor was the head; and, lastly and principally, by the transfer of the Spanish title in 1819, many years after theLouisiana purchase was accomplished. It is not, however, probablethat we should have been able to maintain our title to Oregon ifwe had not secured the intervening country. It was certainly ourpurchase of Louisiana that enabled us to secure the Spanish titleto the shores of the Pacific, and without that title we could hardlyhave maintained our claim. As against England our title seemed tous to be perfect, but as against Spain our case was not so strong. The purchase of Louisiana may therefore be fairly said to havecarried with it and secured to us our possession of Oregon. 

The acquisition of Louisiana brought incalculable wealth, power, and prestige to the Union, and must always be regarded as the master-stroke of policy which advanced the United States from a comparativelyfeeble nation, lying between the Atlantic and the Mississippi, toa continental power of assured strength and boundless promise. The _coup d'état_ of the First Consul was an overwhelming surpriseand disappointment to the English Government. Bonaparte was rightin assuming that prompt action on his part was necessary to saveLouisiana from the hands of the English. Twelve days after thetreaty ceding Louisiana to the United States was signed, the Britishambassador at Paris, Lord Whitworth, demanded his passports. AtDover he met the French ambassador to England, General Andreossy, who had likewise demanded his passports. Lord Whitworth loadedGeneral Andreossy with tokens of esteem, and conducted him to theship which was to bear him back to France. According to an eminenthistorian, "the two ambassadors parted in the presence of a greatconcourse of people, agitated, uneasy, sorrowful. On the eve ofso important a determination, the warlike passion subsided; andmen were seized with a dread of the consequences of a desperateconflict. At this solemn moment the two nations seemed to bid eachother adieu, not to meet again till after a tremendous war and theconvulsion of the world. "

 THE DESIGNS OF ENGLAND FOILED. 

England's acquisition of Louisiana would have proved in the highestdegree embarrassing, if not disastrous, to the Union. At that timethe forts of Spain, transferred to France, and thence to the UnitedStates, were on the east side of the Mississippi, hundreds of milesfrom its mouth. If England had seized Louisiana, as Bonapartefeared, the Floridas, cut off from the other colonies of Spain, would certainly have fallen into her hands by easy and promptnegotiation, as they did, a few years later, into the hands of theUnited States. England would thus have had her colonies plantedon the three land-sides of the Union, while on the ocean-side herformidable navy confronted the young republic. No colonialacquisition ever made by her on any continent has been so profitableto her commerce, and so strengthening her military position, asthat of Louisiana would have proved. This fact was clearly seenby Bonaparte when he hastily made the treaty ceding it to the UnitedStates. That England did not at once attempt to seize it, indisregard of Bonaparte's cession, has been a source of surprise tomany historians. The obvious reason is that she dreaded thecomplication of a war in America when she was about to assume soheavy a burden in the impending European conflict. The inhabitantsof the Union in 1803 were six millions in number, of great energyand confidence. A large proportion of them were accustomed to thesea and could send swarms of privateers to prey on British commerce. Independent citizens would be even more formidable than were therebellious colonists in the earlier struggle with the mother country, and, acting in conjunction with France, could effectively maintaina contest. Considerations of this nature doubtless induced theAddington ministry to acquiesce quietly in a treaty whose originand whose assured results were in every way distasteful, and evenoffensive, to the British Government. 

The extent and boundaries of the territory thus ceded by Francewere ill-defined, and, in fact, unknown. The French negotiatorwho conferred with Monroe and Livingston, declared a large portionof the country transferred to be no better known at the time "thanwhen Columbus landed at the Bahamas. " There was no way by whichaccurate metes and bounds could be described. This fact disturbedthe upright and conscientious Marbois, who thought that "treatiesof territorial cession should contain a guaranty from the grantor. "He was especially anxious, moreover, that no ambiguous clausesshould be introduced in the treaty. He communicated his troubleson this point to the First Consul, advising him that it seemedimpossible to construct the treaty so as to free it from obscurityon the important matter of boundaries. Far from exhibiting anysympathy with his faithful minister's solicitude on this point, Bonaparte quietly informed him that, "if an obscurity did notalready exist, it would perhaps be good policy to put one in thetreaty. " In the possibilities of the First Consul's future, theacquisition of Spanish America may have been expected, or at leastdreamed of, by him; and an ill-defined, uncertain boundary forLouisiana might possibly, in a few years, be turned greatly to hisadvantage. 

 EXPANSION OF OUR BOUNDARIES. 

There was certainly obscurity enough in the transfer to satisfythe fullest desire of Bonaparte. France ceded Louisiana to theUnited States "with all its rights and appurtenances, " as acquiredby the retrocession from Spain under the treaty of San Ildefonso, Oct. 1, 1800; and by that treaty Spain had "transferred it to Francewith the same extent it then had in the hands of Spain, and thatit had when France previously possessed it, and such as it shouldbe with the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain andother States. " This was simply giving to us what Spain had givento France, and that was only what France had before given to Spain, --complicated with such treaties as Spain might have made duringthe thirty-seven years of her ownership. It was evident, therefore, from the very hour of the acquisition, that we should have abundanttrouble with our only remaining neighbors in North America, Spainand Great Britain, in adjusting the boundaries of the vast countrywhich we had so successfully acquired from France. 

Fortunately for the United States, the patriotic and far-seeingadministration of Mr. Jefferson was as energetic in confirming asit had been in acquiring our title to the invaluable domain. Assoon as the treaty was received the President called an extrasession of Congress, which assembled on the 17th of October, 1803. Before the month had expired the treaty was confirmed, and thePresident was authorized to take possession of the territory ofLouisiana, and to maintain therein the authority of the UnitedStates. This was not a mere paper warrant for exhibiting a nominalsupremacy by floating our flag, but it gave to the President thefull power to employ the army and navy of the United States andthe militia of the several States to the number of eighty thousand. It was a wise and energetic measure for the defense of our newlyacquired territory, which in the disturbed condition of Europe, with all the Great Powers arming from Gibraltar to the Baltic, might at any moment be invaded or imperiled. The conflict of armsdid not occur until nine years after; and it is a curious and notunimportant fact, that the most notable defeat of the British troopsin the second war of Independence, as the struggle of 1812 has beenwell named, occurred on the soil of the territory for whose protectionthe original precaution had been taken by Jefferson. 

With all these preparations for defense, Mr. Jefferson did not waitto have our title to Louisiana questioned or limited. He set towork at once to proclaim it throughout the length and breadth ofthe territory which had been ceded, and to the treaty of cessionhe gave the most liberal construction. According to the President, Louisiana stretched as far to the northward as the Lake of theWoods; towards the west as far as the Rio Grande in the lower part, and, in the upper part, to the main chain of mountains dividingthe waters of the Pacific from the waters of the Atlantic. Toestablish our sovereignty to the shores of the Pacific became amatter of instant solicitude with the watchful and patrioticPresident. In the previous session he had obtained from Congressan appropriation of two millions of dollars "for the purpose ofdefraying any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in theintercourse between the United States and foreign nations. " Inthe confidential message which so promptly secured the money, thePresident suggested that the object to be accomplished was a betterunderstanding with the Indian tribes, and the fitting out of anexploring and scientific expedition across the continent, thoughour own domain at the time was terminated on the west by theMississippi. It was believed, that, between the lines of themessage, Congress could read that our negotiations with France andSpain touching the free navigation of the Mississippi might soonreach a crisis. Hence the prompt appropriation of a sum of moneywhich for the national treasury of that day was very large. 

 LEWIS AND CLARKE EXPEDITION. 

The two men selected to conduct the expedition across the continent, Meriwether Lewis and William Clarke, were especially fitted fortheir arduous task. Both were officers in the army, holding therank of captain. Lewis had been private secretary to the President, and Clarke was brother to the heroic George Rogers Clarke, whoseservices were of peculiar value in the Revolutionary struggle. Before they could complete the preparations for their long anddangerous journey, the territory to be traversed had been transferredto the United States, and the expedition at once assumed a significanceand importance little dreamed of when Jefferson first conceivedit. The original design had been a favorite one with Mr. Jeffersonfor many years. When he resided at Paris as our minister, beforethe Federal Government was organized, he encouraged a similarexpedition, to be fitted out in Kamtchatka, to sail to our westerncoast, and thence to come eastward across the continent. Thisdesign was to be executed by the somewhat noted John Ledyard, aroving and adventurous man from Connecticut, who had accompaniedCaptain Cook on his famous voyage to the Pacific, and whom Jeffersonafterwards met in Paris. The necessary authority was obtained fromthe Russian Government; but, after Ledyard had reached the bordersof Kamtchatka, he was suddenly recalled, driven with speed day andnight in a closed carriage, on a return journey of several thousandmiles, and set down in Poland, penniless, and utterly broken inhealth. This strange action was the offspring of jealousy on thepart of the Empress Catharine, who feared that the energy of theyoung and vigorous government of the United States would absorbthe north-west coast of America, upon which the Russian Governmenthad already set its ambition. 

The success of the Lewis and Clarke expedition aided greatly insustaining our title to the Oregon country. The joint leaders ofit became celebrated by their arduous achievement, and were rewardedaccordingly. Lewis was appointed governor of Louisiana territoryin 1807, and held the position until his death in 1809; while Clarkewas for a long period governor of the territory of Missouri, servingin that capacity when the State was admitted to the Union. Butwhile the Lewis and Clarke expedition largely increased our knowledgeof the country, and added to the strength of our title, it did notdefinitely settle any disputed question. With Spain we had constanttrouble in regard to the boundaries of Louisiana, both on the westin the direction of Texas, and on the east along the confines ofFlorida. She had always been dissatisfied with Bonaparte's transferof Louisiana to the United States. If that result could have beenforeseen, the treaty of San Ildefonso would never have been made. The government of the United States believed that Louisiana, asheld by France, had bordered on the Rio Grande, and that, by thetreaty with Bonaparte, we were entitled to territory in the directionof Florida as far as the Perdido. In the vexatious war with theSeminoles, General Jackson did not hesitate to march across theline, capture Pensacola, and seize the Barancas. The comments, official and personal, which were made on that rash exploit, ledto controversies and estrangements which affected political partiesfor many years after. Jackson's hostility to John Quincy Adams, his exasperating quarrel with Clay, his implacable hatred forCalhoun, all had their origin in events connected with the Floridacampaign of 1818. 

To compose the boundary troubles with Spain, a treaty was negotiatedin 1819, which, with many gains, entailed some signal losses uponthe United States. The whole of Florida was ceded by Spain, anacquisition which proved of great value to us in every point ofview. As Florida had become separated from the other Spanishcolonies by the cession of Louisiana, the government at Madridfound difficulty in satisfactorily administering its affairs andguarding its safety. South of the United States, to the Straitsof Magellan, the Spanish flag floated over every foot of thecontinent except the Empire of Brazil and some small colonies inGuiana. The cession of Louisiana to Bonaparte involved the lossof Florida which was now formally transferred to the United States. But Spain received more than an equivalent. The whole of Texaswas fairly included in the Louisiana purchase, --if the well-studiedopinion of such eminent statesmen as Clay, John Quincy Adams, VanBuren, and Benton may be accepted, --and we paid dearly for Floridaby agreeing to retreat from the Rio Grande to the Sabine as oursouth-western frontier, thus surrendering Texas to Mexico. Thewestern boundary of the Louisiana territory was defined as beginningat the mouth of the Sabine (which is the boundary of the State ofLouisiana to-day), continuing along its western bank to the 32° ofnorth latitude, thence by a line due north to the Red River, thenceup the Red River to the 100th meridian west from Greenwich, or the23d west from Washington, thence due north to the Arkansas, thencefollowing the Arkansas to its source in latitude 42°, and thenceby that parallel to the Pacific Ocean. Should the Arkansas fallshort of the 42°, a due north line to that parallel was to be taken. The United States solemnly renounced all claim to territories westor south of the line just mentioned, and Spain renounced all claimto territory east or north of it. Thus all boundary disputes withSpain were ended, and peace was secured, though at a great cost;as events in after years so fully proved. 

 LOUISIANA ADMITTED AS A STATE. 

Meanwhile territorial government had been established over a largesection of the country acquired from France; and it was rapidlypeopled by an enterprising emigration, almost wholly from theSouthern States. Louisiana sought to enter the Union in 1811, andthen for the first time occurred an agitation in Congress over theadmission of a slave State. Opposition to it was not, however, grounded so much upon the existence of slavery as upon the allegedviolation of the Constitution in forming a State from territorynot included in the original government of the Union. Josiah Quincyof Massachusetts made a violent speech against it, declaring thatif Louisiana were admitted, "the bonds of this Union are virtuallydissolved; that the States which compose it are free from theirmoral obligations; and that, as it will be right of all, so it willbe the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation, amicablyif they can, violently if they must. " Mr. Quincy was disquietedat the mere thought of extending the Union beyond its originallimits. He had "heard with alarm that six States might grow upbeyond the Mississippi, and that the mouth of the Ohio might beeast of the centre of a contemplated empire. " He declared that"it was not for these men that our fathers fought, not for themthat the Constitution was adopted. Our fathers were not madmen:they had not taken degrees at the hospital of idiocy. " He maintainedwith great vehemence that there was "no authority to throw therights and liberties of this people into 'hotchpot' with the wildmen of the Missouri, nor with the mixed, though more respectable, race of Anglo-Hispano-Gallo-Americans who bask on the sands in themouth of the Mississippi. " Mr. Quincy's sentiments were far moreradical than those held by the mass of Northern or New-Englandpeople, yet there was undoubtedly a strong opposition to theadmission of Louisiana. Many Northern men had opposed the purchaseof the territory from France, believing it to be unconstitutional;and they dreaded the introduction of senators and representativesfrom territory which they considered foreign. Nevertheless thebill admitting the State passed the House by a vote of two-thirdsof the members. The opposition was wholly from the North, andlargely from New England. The contest was confined to Congress--the issue failing to excite popular interest. A majority of thepeople, both North and South, were convinced that the ownership ofthe mouth of the Mississippi was of inestimable value to the Union, and that it could not be permanently secured except by admittingas a State the territory which included and controlled it. Thisconclusion was strengthened by the near approach of war with GreatBritain, soon after formally declared. The advantage of a loyaland devoted population at New Orleans, identified in interest andin sympathy with the government, was too evident to need argument. If the weight of reason had not already been on the side of admittingLouisiana, the necessities of war would have enforced it. 

Six years after Louisiana entered the Union, Missouri applied foradmission as a slave State. A violent agitation at once arose, continued for two years, and was finally allayed by the famouscompromise of 1820. The outbreak was so sudden, its course soturbulent, and its subsidence so complete, that for many years itwas regarded as phenomenal in our politics, and its repetition inthe highest degree improbable if not impossible. The "Missouriquestion, " as it was popularly termed, formally appeared in Congressin the month of December, 1818; though during the preceding sessionpetitions for a State government had been received from theinhabitants of that territory. When the bill proposing to admitthe State came before the House, Mr. James Tallmadege, jun. , ofNew York, moved to amend it by providing that "the further introductionof slavery be prohibited in said State of Missouri, and that allchildren born in that State after its admission to the Union shallbe free at the age of twenty-five years. " The discussion whichfollowed was able, excited, and even acrimonious. Mr. Clay tookan active part against the amendment, but his great influence wasunavailing in the face of the strong anti-slavery sentiment whichwas so suddenly developed in the North. Both branches of Mr. Tallmadge's amendment were adopted and the bill was passed. Inthe Senate the anti-slavery amendment encountered a furious oppositionand was rejected by a large majority. The House refused to recede;and, amid great excitement in the country and no little temper inCongress, each branch voted to adhere to its position. Thus forthe time Missouri was kept out of the Union. 

On the second day after the opening of the next Congress, December, 1819, Mr. John Holmes presented a memorial in the House ofRepresentatives from a convention which had been lately held inthe District of Maine, praying for the admission of said districtinto the Union "as a separate and independent State, on an equalfooting with the original States. " On the same day, and immediatelyafter Mr. Holmes had taken his seat, Mr. John Scott, territorialdelegate, brought before the House the memorial presented in theprevious Congress for the admission of Missouri on the same termsof independence and equality with the old States as prayed for byMaine. From that hour it was found impossible to consider theadmission of Maine and Missouri separately. Geographically remote, differing in soil, climate, and products, incapable of competingwith each other in any pursuit, they were thrown into rivalry bythe influence of the one absorbing question of negro slavery. Southern men were unwilling that Maine should be admitted unlessthe enabling Act for Missouri should be passed at the same time, and Northern men were unwilling that any enabling Act should bepassed for Missouri which did not contain an anti-slavery restriction. Mr. Clay, then an accepted leader of Southern sentiment, --which inhis later life he ceased to be, --made an earnest, almost fiery, speech on the question. He declared that before the Maine billshould be finally acted on, he wanted to know "whether certaindoctrines of an alarming character, with respect to a restrictionon the admission of new States west of the Mississippi, were to besustained on this floor. " He wanted to know "what conditionsCongress could annex to the admission of a new State; whether, indeed, there could be a partition of its sovereignty. "

 THE FIRST MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 

Despite the eloquence and the great influence of the Speaker, theSouthern representatives were overborne and the House adopted theanti-slavery restriction. The Senate refused to concur, unitedMaine and Missouri in one bill, and passed it with an entirely newfeature, which was proposed by Mr. Jesse B. Thomas, a senator fromIllinois. That feature was simply the provision, since so widelyknown as the Missouri Compromise, which forever prohibited slaverynorth of 36° 30´ in all the territory acquired from France by theLouisiana purchase. The House would not consent to admit the twoStates in the same bill, but finally agreed to the compromise; andin the early part of March, 1820, Maine became a member of theUnion without condition. A separate bill was passed, permittingMissouri to form a constitution preparatory to her admission, subject to the compromise, which, indeed, formed one section ofthe enabling Act. Missouri was thus granted permission to enterthe Union as a slave State. But she was discontented with theprospect of having free States on three sides, --east, north, andwest. 

Although the Missouri Compromise was thus nominally perfected, andthe agitation apparently ended, the most exciting, and in somerespects the most dangerous, phase of the question was yet to bereached. After the enabling Act was passed, the Missouri Conventionassembled to frame a constitution for the new State. The inhabitantsof the Territory had become angered by the long delay imposed uponthem, caused, as they believed, by the introduction of a questionwhich concerned only themselves, and which Congress had no rightto control. In this resentful mood they were led by the extremistsof the convention to insert a provision in the constitution, declaring that "it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, assoon as may be, to pass such laws as may be necessary to preventfree negroes or mulattoes from coming to or settling in this Stateunder any pretext whatever. " As soon as the constitution with thisobnoxious clause was transmitted to Congress by the President, theexcitement broke forth with increased intensity and the lines ofthe old controversy were at once re-formed. 

The parliamentary struggle which ensued was bitter beyond precedent;threats of dissolving the Union were frequent, and apprehension ofan impending calamity was felt throughout the country. The discussioncontinued with unabated vigor and ardor until the middle of February, and the Congress was to terminate on the ensuing fourth of March. The House had twice refused to pass the bill admitting Missouri, declaring that the objectionable clause in her organic law was notonly an insult to every State in which colored men were citizens, but was in flat contradiction of that provision in the FederalConstitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shallbe entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens inthe several States. "

 THE SECOND MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 

The defeat, apparently final, of the admission of Missouri, createdintense indignation. Southern senators and representatives chargedthat they were treated unjustly by the North, and dealt with unfairlyin Congress. In pursuance of the compromise of the year before, Maine had been admitted and her senators were in their seats. Theorgans of Southern opinion accused the North of overreaching theSouth in securing, under the name of a compromise, the admissionof Maine, while still retaining the power to exclude Missouri. Afeeling that bad faith had been practiced is sure to createbitterness, and the accusation of it produces increased bitternessin return. The North could easily justify itself by argument, butthe statement without argument apparently showed that the Southhad been deceived. The course pursued by the senators from Maine, --John Holmes and John Chandler, --in voting steadily for theadmission of Missouri, tended greatly to check recrimination andrelieve asperity of feeling. Mr. Holmes was a man of ability, ofexperience in public affairs, and of eminent distinction at home. With a rare gift of humor, and with conversational talent almostunrivaled, he exerted an influence over men in private and socialintercourse which gave him singular power in shaping public questions. He was an intimate friend and political supporter of Mr. Clay, andtheir cordial co-operation at this crisis evoked harmony from chaos, and brought a happy solution to a question that was troubling everypatriotic heart. They united in a final effort, and through theinstrumentality of a joint committee of seven senators and twenty-three representatives, --of which Mr. Holmes was chairman on thepart of the Senate, and Mr. Clay on the part of the House, --a secondand final compromise was effected, and the admission of Missourisecured. This compromise declared that Missouri should be admittedto the Union upon the fundamental condition that no law should everbe passed by her Legislature enforcing the objectionable provisionin her constitution, and that by a solemn public act the Stateshould declare and record her assent to this condition, and transmitto the President of the United States an authentic copy of the Act. Missouri accepted the condition promptly but not cheerfully, feelingthat she entered the Union under a severe discipline, and with hardand humiliating conditions. It was in this compromise, not in theone of the preceding session, that Mr. Clay was the leading spirit. Though the first was the more important, and dealt with largerquestions of a more enduring nature, it did not at the time createso great an impression on the public mind as the second, nor didits discussion produce so much antagonism between the North andthe South. Thirty years after these events Mr. Clay called attentionto the fact that he had received undeserved credit for the MissouriCompromise of 1820, which he had supported but not originated. Onthe other hand, he had received only the slightest mention for hisagency in the second compromise, which he had really originatedand carried through Congress. The second compromise had passedout of general recollection before Mr. Clay's death, though it hadmade him a Presidential candidate at forty-three years of age. 

The most remarkable fact connected with the excitement over theMissouri question, which engrossed the country for more than twoyears, was the absence of any premonition of its coming. Therehad been no severe political struggle in the nation since thecontest between Madison and De Witt Clinton in 1812. Monroe hadbeen chosen almost without opposition in 1816, and, even while theMissouri controversy was at its height, he was re-elected in 1820by a practically unanimous vote, the North and the South beingequally cordial in supporting him. In the House of Representatives, where the battle was so fierce, and the combatants were so evenlydivided, Mr. Clay had been chosen speaker with only eight adversevotes, and these were given by men who acted from personal prejudice, and not from political difference. But the outbreak indicated, and indeed heralded, the re-forming of old party lines. The apparentunanimity only concealed a division that was already fatallydeveloped. The party of Jefferson by its very success involveditself in ruin. Its ancient foe, the eminent and honorable partyof Federalists, made but a feeble struggle in 1816, and completelydisappeared from the national political field four years later, and even from State contests after the notable defeat of HarrisonGray Otis by William Eustis for governor of Massachusetts in 1823. But no political organization can live without opposition. Thedisappearance of the Federalists was the signal for factionaldivisions among their opponents; and the old Republican party, which had overthrown the administration of John Adams in 1800, which had laid the embargo, and forced a war with England, was nownearing its end. It divided into four parts in the Presidentialelection of 1824, and with its ancient creed and organization neverre-appeared in a national contest. Jefferson had combined andindeed largely created its elements. He beheld it everywherevictorious for a quarter of a century, and he lived to see itshattered into fragments by the jealousy of its new leaders. TheDemocratic and Whig parties were constructed upon the ruins of theold organizations. In each were to be found representatives ofthe Republicanism of Jefferson and the Federalism of Hamilton. The ambition of both to trace their lineage to the former was astriking proof of its popular strength. 

The Missouri question marked a distinct era in the political thoughtof the country, and made a profound impression on the minds ofpatriotic men. Suddenly, without warning, the North and the South, the free States and the slave States, found themselves arrayedagainst each other in violent and absorbing conflict. During theinterval between the adoption of the Federal Constitution and theadmission of Missouri, there had been a great change in the Southernmind, both as to the moral and the economic aspects of slavery. This revolution of opinion had been wrought in large degree by thecotton-plant. When the National Government was organized in 1789, the annual export of cotton did not exceed three hundred bales. It was reckoned only among our experimental products. But, stimulatedby the invention of the gin, production increased so rapidly, that, at the time of Missouri's application for admission to the Union, cotton-planting was the most remunerative industry in the country. The export alone exceeded three hundred thousand bales annually. But this highly profitable culture was in regions so warm thatoutdoor labor was unwelcome to the white race. The immediateconsequence was a large advance in the value of slave-labor, andin the price of slaves. This fact had its quick and decisiveinfluence, even in those slave-holding States which could not raisecotton. The inevitable and speedy result was a consolidation ofthe political power necessary to protect an interest at once sovast and so liable to assault. 

It was not unnatural that this condition should lead to a violentoutburst on the slavery question, but it was nevertheless whollyunexpected. The causes which let to it had not been understoodand analyzed. The older class of statesmen, who had come down fromthe period of the Revolution, from the great work of cementing theUnion and framing the Constitution, deplored the agitation, andviewed the results with the gravest apprehension. The compromiseby a geographical line, dividing the slave States from the free, was regarded by this class of patriots as full of danger, --a constantmenace to the peace and perpetuity of the Union. To Mr. Jefferson, still living in vigorous old age, the trouble sounded like an alarm-bell rung at midnight. While the measure was pending in Congress, he wrote to a member of the House of Representatives, that "theMissouri question is the most portentous one which has ever threatenedthe Union. In the gloomiest hour of the Revolutionary war I neverhad any apprehensions equal to those which I feel from this source. "Men on both sides of the controversy began to realize its significanceand to dread its probable results. They likened the partition ofthe country by a geographical line unto the ancient agreementbetween Abraham and Lot, where one should go to the right, and theother to the left, with the certainty of becoming aliens, and thepossibility of becoming enemies. 

 THE MISSOURI ADJUSTMENT SATISFACTORY. 

With the settlement of the Missouri question, the anti-slaveryagitation subsided as rapidly as it had arisen. This was a secondsurprise to thinking men. The results can, however, be readilyexplained. The Northern States felt that they had absolutelysecured to freedom a large territory west and north of Missouri. The Southern States believed that they had an implied and honorableunderstanding, --outside and beyond the explicit letter of the law, --that new States south of the Missouri line could be admitted withslavery if they desired. The great political parties then dividingthe country accepted the result and for the next twenty years noagitation of the slavery question appeared in any politicalconvention, or affected any considerable body of the people. 

Within that period, however, there grew up a school of anti-slaverymen far more radical and progressive than those who had resistedthe admission of Missouri as a slave State. They formed what wasknown as the Abolition party, and they devoted themselves to theutter destruction of slavery by every instrumentality which theycould lawfully employ. Acutely trained in the political as wellas the ethical principles of the great controversy, they clearlydistinguished between the powers which Congress might and mightnot exercise under the limitations of the Constitution. They began, therefore, by demanding the abolition of slavery in the Districtof Columbia, and in all the national forts, arsenals, and dock-yards, where, without question or cavil, the exclusive jurisdictionbelonged to Congress; they asked that Congress, under its constitutionalauthority to regulate commerce between the States, would prohibitthe inter-State slave-trade; and they prayed that our ships sailingon the high-seas should not be permitted by the government to carryslaves as part of their cargo, under the free flag of the UnitedStates, and outside the local jurisdiction that held them in bondage. They denied that a man should aid in executing any law whoseenforcement did violence to his conscience and trampled under footthe Divine commands. Hence they would not assist in the surrenderand return of fugitive slaves, holding it rather to be their dutyto resist such violation of the natural rights of man by everypeaceful method, and justifying their resistance by the truthsembodied in the Declaration of Independence, and, still moreimpressively, by the precepts taught in the New Testament. 

While encountering, on these issues, the active hostility of thegreat mass of the people in all sections of the Union, theAbolitionists challenged the respect of thinking men, and evencompelled the admiration of some of their most pronounced opponents. The party was small in number, but its membership was distinguishedfor intellectual ability, for high character, for pure philanthropy, for unquailing courage both moral and physical, and for a controversialtalent which has never been excelled in the history of moral reforms. It would not be practicable to give the names of all who wereconspicuous in this great struggle, but the mention of James G. Birney, of Benjamin Lundy, of Arthur Tappan, of the brothers Lovejoy, of Gerrit Smith, of John G. Whittier, of William Lloyd Garrison, of Wendell Phillips, and of Gamaliel Bailey, will indicate theclass who are entitled to be held in remembrance so long as thepossession of great mental and moral attributes gives enduring andhonorable fame. Nor would the list of bold and powerful agitatorsbe complete or just if confined to the white race. Among thecolored men--often denied the simplest rights of citizenship inthe States where they resided--were found many who had receivedthe gift of tongues, orators by nature, who bravely presented thewrongs and upheld the rights of the oppressed. Among these FrederickDouglass was especially and richly endowed not only with the strengthbut with the graces of speech; and for many years, from the stumpand from the platform, he exerted a wide and beneficent influenceupon popular opinion. 

 THE ABOLITION PARTY ORGANIZED. 

In the early days of this agitation, the Abolitionists were aproscribed and persecuted class, denounced with unsparing severityby both the great political parties, condemned by many of theleading churches, libeled in the public press, and maltreated byfurious mobs. In no part of the country did they constitute morethan a handful of the population, but they worked against everydiscouragement with a zeal and firmness which bespoke intensity ofmoral conviction. They were in large degree recruited from thesociety of Friends, who brought to the support of the organizationthe same calm and consistent courage which had always distinguishedthem in upholding before the world their peculiar tenets of religiousfaith. Caring nothing for prejudice, meeting opprobrium withsilence, shaming the authors of violence by meek non-resistance, relying on moral agencies alone, appealing simply to the reasonand the conscience of men, they arrested the attention of the nationby arraigning it before the public opinion of the world, andproclaiming its responsibility to the judgment of God. 

These apostles of universal liberty besieged Congress with memorialspraying for such legislative measures as would carry out theirdesigns. Failure after failure only served to inspire them withfresh courage and more vigorous determination. They were met withthe most resolute resistance by representative from the slave-holding States, who sought to deny them a hearing, and declaredthat the mere consideration of their propositions by Congress wouldnot only justify, but would inevitably precipitate, a dissolutionof the Union. Undaunted by any form of opposition, the Abolitionistsstubbornly maintained their ground, and finally succeeded in creatinga great popular excitement by insisting on the simple right ofpetition as inseparable from free government and free citizenship. On this issue John Quincy Adams, who had entered the House ofRepresentatives in 1831, two years after his retirement from thePresidency, waged a memorable warfare. Not fully sympathizing withthe Abolitionists in their measures or their methods, Mr. Adamsmaintained that they had the right to be heard. On this incidentalissue he forced the controversy until it enlisted the attentionof the entire country. He finally drove the opponents of freediscussion to seek shelter under the adoption of an odious rule inthe House of Representatives, popularly named the "Atherton gag, "from Mr. Charles G. Atherton, a Democratic representative from NewHampshire, who reported it to the House in December, 1838. Therule was originally devised, however, in a caucus of SouthernDemocratic members. In the light of the present day, when slaveryno longer exists in the land, when speech is absolutely free, inand out of Congress, it is hard to believe that during the Presidencyof Mr. Van Buren, and under the speakership of Mr. Polk, the Houseof Representatives voted that "every petition, memorial, resolution, proposition, or paper, touching or relating in any way or to anyextent whatever to slavery or the abolition thereof, shall onpresentation, without any further action thereon, be laid upon thetable, without being debated, printed, or referred. "

The Southern representatives, both Democrats and Whigs, and theNorthern Democrats, sustained this extraordinary resolution, whichbecame widely known as the 21st Rule of the House. The NorthernWhigs, to their honor be it said, were steadily against it. Thereal design of the measure was to take from Mr. Adams the power ofprecipitating a discussion on the slavery question, but the mostunskilled should have seen that in this it would fail. It resembledin its character the re-actionary and tyrannical edicts so frequentlyemployed in absolute governments, and was unsuited to the temper, ran counter to the judgment, and proved offensive to the conscience, of the American people. 

Profoundly opposed as were many citizens to a denial of the rightof petition, very few wished to become identified with the causeof the Abolitionists. In truth it required no small degree ofmoral courage to take position in the ranks of that despisedpolitical sect forty-five years ago. Persecutions of a petty andsocial character were almost sure to follow, and not infrequentlygrievous wrongs were inflicted, for which, in the absence of adisposition among the people to see justice done, the law affordedno redress. Indeed, by an apparent contradiction not difficult toreconcile, many of those who fought bravely for the right of theAbolitionists to be heard in Congress by petition, were yet enragedwith them for continually and, as they thought, causelessly, raisingand pressing the issue. They were willing to fight for the rightof the Abolitionists to do a certain thing, and then willing tofight the Abolitionists for aimlessly and uselessly doing it. Themen who were governed by these complex motives were chiefly Whigs. They felt that an increase of popular strength to the Abolitionistsmust be at the expense of the party which, continuing to make Clayits idol, was about to make Harrison its candidate. The announcement, therefore, on the eve of the national contest of 1840, that theAbolitionists had nominated James G. Birney of Michigan for President, and Francis J. Le Moyne of Pennsylvania for Vice-President, wasangrily received by the Whigs, and denunciations of the movementwere loud and frequent. The support received by these candidateswas unexpectedly small, and showed little ground, in the judgmentof the Whigs, for the course taken by the Abolitionists. Theirstrength was almost wholly confined to New England, Western NewYork, and the Western Reserve of Ohio. It was plainly seen, that, in a large majority of the free States, the Abolitionists had asyet made no impression on public opinion. 

 THE COLONIZATION SOCIETY. 

Any less earnest body of men would have been discouraged, but theAbolition party was composed of devotees possessing the true martyrspirit, and, instead of being appalled by defeat, they were inspiredwith fresh zeal, and incited to new effort. They had not failedto observe, that, while few were disposed to unite in extreme anti-slavery measures, there was a growing number whose conscience wasaroused on the general subject of human bondage. The emancipationof negroes with a view to their settlement in Africa, as advocatedby the Colonization Society, received the support of conservativeopponents of slavery, the sympathy of the Churches, and the patronageof leading men among the slave-holders of the Border States. TheNational Government was repeatedly urged to give its aid to thescheme; and, during the excitement on the Missouri question, Congressappropriated $100, 000, nominally for the return of Africans whohad been unlawfully landed in the United States after the slavetrade was prohibited, but really as an indirect mode of promotingthe project of colonization. As a scheme for the destruction ofdomestic slavery it was ridiculed by the Abolitionists, who in theend violently opposed it as tending to deaden the public conscienceto the more imperative duty of universal emancipation. Thephilanthropic efforts of the Society were abundantly rewarded, however, by the establishment of the Republic of Liberia, whosecareer has been eminently creditable and advantageous to the Africanrace. 

CHAPTER II. 

Review of events before 1860 (_continued_). --Early Efforts toacquire Texas. --Course of President Tyler. --Mr. Calhoun appointedSecretary of State. --His Successful Management of the Texas Question. --His Hostility to Mr. Van Buren. --Letters of Mr. Clay and Mr. VanBuren opposing the Annexation of Texas. --Mr. Clay nominated as theWhig Candidate for the President in 1844. --Van Buren's Nominationdefeated. --Mr. Polk selected as the Democratic Candidate. --Disquietudeof Mr. Clay. --His Change of Ground. --His Defeat. --Prolonged Rivalrybetween Mr. Clay and General Jackson. --Texas formally annexed tothe Union. 

Soon after the failure of the Abolitionists to exhibit popularstrength, the slavery question was forced upon public attentionindependently of their efforts, and by causes whose operation andeffect were not distinctly forseen by those who set them in motion. The Americans who, in a spirit of adventure, migrated to Texasafter that province had revolted from Mexico, became the controllingpower in the young republic, and under the lead of General SamHouston, in the month of April, 1836, won a memorable victory overthe Mexican army at San Jacinto. Thenceforward, in differingdegrees of earnestness, the annexation of Texas became a subjectof consideration in the United States, but it was never incorporatedin the creed of either of the great parties until the Presidentialcanvass of 1844. Not long after the death of President Harrisonin April, 1841, his successor, John Tyler, had serious disagreementswith the leading Whigs, both in his cabinet and in Congress, respecting the establishment of a national bank. Mr. Clay led theattack upon him openly and almost savagely, arraigning him as atraitor to the principles upon which he had been elected, andpursuing the quarrel so violently, that in September, five monthsafter Tyler's accession, every member of his cabinet resigned exceptMr. Webster. He lingered, unwelcome if not distrusted, until July, 1843, for the purpose of conducting the negotiations in regard tothe North-eastern boundary, which he brought to a termination bythe Ashburton Treaty. The new secretary of State, Abel P. Upshurof Virginia, --who had been at the head of the Navy Department fora few months, --was a man of strong parts and brilliant attainments, but not well known outside of his own commonwealth, and subjecttherefore to disparagement as the successor of a man so illustriousas Mr. Webster. He grasped his new duties, however, with the handof a master, and actively and avowedly pursued the policy ofacquiring Texas. His efforts were warmly seconded by the President, whose friends believed with all confidence that this question couldbe so presented as to make Mr. Tyler the Democratic candidate inthe approaching Presidential election. What Mr. Upshur's successmight have been in the difficult field of negotiation upon whichhe had entered, must be left to conjecture, for his life was suddenlydestroyed by the terrible accident on board the United-Statessteamer "Princeton, " in February, 1844, but little more than sevenmonths after he had entered upon his important and engrossingduties. 

 ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT TYLER. 

Mr. Tyler's administration being now fully committed to the schemeof Texas annexation, the selection of a new secretary of State wasa matter of extreme importance. The President had been finallyseparated from all sympathy with the party that elected him, whenMr. Webster left the cabinet the preceding summer. But he had notsecured the confidence or the support of the Democracy. The membersof that party were willing to fill his offices throughout thecountry, and to absorb the honors and emoluments of his administration;but the leaders of positive influence, men of the grade of VanBuren, Buchanan, Cass, Dallas, and Silas Wright, held aloof, andleft the government to be guided by Democrats who had less to risk, and by Whigs of the type of Henry A. Wise of Virginia and CalebCushing of Massachusetts, who had revolted from the rule of Mr. Clay. It was the sagacity of Wise, rather than the judgment ofTyler, which indicated the immense advantage of securing Mr. Calhounfor the head of the cabinet. The great Southern leader was thenin retirement, having resigned from the Senate the preceding year. By a coincidence worth nothing, Webster, Clay, and Calhoun wereall at that moment absent from the Senate, each having voluntarilyretired. In later life, chastened by political adversity, theyreturned to the chamber where, before their advent and since theirdeparture, there have been no rivals to their fame. 

Naturally, Mr. Calhoun would have been reluctant to take officeunder Tyler at any time, and especially for the brief remainder ofan administration which had been continually under the ban of publicopinion, and which had not the slightest prospect of renewal. Withquick observation and keen insight, however, he perceived a greatopportunity to serve the South, and to serve the South was withhim not only a principle, but a passion. He realized, moreover, that the hour was at hand for an historic revenge which the noblestof minds might indulge. He saw intuitively that the Texas questionwas one of vast importance, with untold possibilities. He saw withequal clearness that it had never been presented in such manner asto appeal to the popular judgment, and become an active, aggressiveissue in the struggle for the Presidency. A large section of theDemocratic party had looked favorably upon annexation ever since1836, but the leaders had dared not to include the scheme in theavowed designs of party policy. They had omitted it purposely inmaking up the issues for the Van Buren campaign of 1840, and, upto the hour when Mr. Calhoun entered the State Department, theintention of the managers was to omit it in the contest of 1844against Mr. Clay. Mr. Tyler's advocacy of Texas annexation hadinjured rather than promoted it in the estimation of the Democraticparty; but when Mr. Calhoun, with his astute management, and hislarge influence in the slave-holding States, espoused it, the wholetenor of Southern opinion was changed, and the Democracy of thatsection received a new inspiration. 

Mr. Van Buren, aspiring again to the Presidency, desired to avoidthe Texas issue. Mr. Calhoun determined that he should meet it. He had every motive for distrusting, opposing, even hating, VanBuren. The contest between them had been long and unrelenting. When Van Buren, as secretary of State, was seized with the ambitionto succeed Jackson, he saw Calhoun in the Vice-Presidency, stronglyintrenched as heir-apparent; and he set to work to destroy thefriendship and confidence that existed between him and the President. The rash course of Jackson in the Seminole campaign of 1818 hadbeen severely criticised in the cabinet of Monroe, and Mr. Calhoun, as secretary of War, had talked of a court of inquiry. Nothing, however, was done and the mere suggestion had been ten yearsforgotten, when Jackson entered upon the Presidency, entertainingthe strongest friendship, both personal and political, for Calhoun. But the damaging fact was unearthed and the jealousy of Jacksonwas aroused. Calhoun was driven into a deadly quarrel, resignedthe Vice-Presidency, and went back to South Carolina to engage inthe nullification contest. Van Buren quickly usurped his place inthe regard and confidence of Jackson, and succeeded to the Presidency. Calhoun, denounced in every paper under the control of theadministration, was threatened with prosecution, and robbed for atime of the confidence of the Democratic party. By the strangelyand rapidly changing fortunes of politics, it was now in his powerto inflict a just retribution upon Van Bren. He did not neglectthe opportunity. 

 SECRETARY CALHOUN'S DIPLOMACY. 

Mr. Calhoun urged the scheme of annexation with intense earnestness. Taking up the subject where Mr. Upshur had left it, he conductedthe negotiation with zeal and skill. His diplomatic correspondencewas able and exhaustive. It was practically a frank avowal thatTexas must be incorporated in the Union. He feared that Europeaninfluence might become dominant in the new republic, and, as aconsequence, that anti-slavery ideas might take root, and thenceinjuriously affect the interests, and to some extent the safety, of the Southern States. In an instruction to William R. King, ourminister at Paris, Mr. Calhoun called his attention to the factthat England regarded the defeat of annexation "as indispensableto the abolition of slavery in Texas. " He believed that Englandwas "too sagacious not to see what a fatal blow abolition in Texaswould give to slavery in the United States. " Then, contemplatingthe effect of the general abolition of slavery, he declared that"to this continent it would be calamitous beyond description. " Itwould "destroy in a great measure the cultivation and productionof the great tropical staples, amounting annually in value to nearly$300, 000, 000. " It is a suggestive commentary on Mr. Calhoun's evilforeboding, that the great tropical staple of the South has steadilyincreased in growth under free labor, and that the development ofTexas never fairly began until slavery was banished from her soil. 

Discussing the right of Texas to independence, in an instructionto Wilson Shannon, our minister to Mexico, Mr. Calhoun averred that"Texas had never stood in relation to Mexico as a rebellious provincestruggling to obtain independence. The true relation between themis that of independent members of a federal government, the weakerof which has successfully resisted the attempts of the stronger toconquer and subject her to its power. " This was applying to theconstitution of Mexico the same construction which he had so longand so ably demanded for our own. It was, indeed, but a paraphraseof the State-sovereignty and State-rights theory, with which hehad persistently indoctrinated the Southern mind. Ten years afterMr. Calhoun was in his grave, the same doctrine, in almost the sameform of expression, became familiar to the country as the Southernjustification for resorting to civil war. 

The prompt result of Mr. Calhoun's efforts was a treaty of annexationwhich had been discussed but not concluded under Mr. Upshur. Itwas communicated to the Senate by the President on the 12th ofApril, 1844. The effect which this treaty produced on the politicalfortunes of two leading statesmen, one in each party, was extraordinary. Prior to its negotiation, the Democrats throughout the Union wereapparently well united in support of Mr. Van Buren as theirPresidential candidate. Mr. Clay was universally accepted by theWhigs, --his nomination by a national convention being indeed buta matter of form. Relations of personal courtesy and confidence, if not of intimate friendship, had always subsisted between Mr. Clay and Mr. Van Buren during their prolonged public service. Itwas now believed that they had come to an understanding, throughthe negotiation of friends, to eliminate the Texas question fromthe campaign of 1844 by defeating the Tyler-Calhoun treaty, andagreeing to a general postponement of the subject, on the groundthat immediate annexation would plunge the country into war. Verysoon after the treaty was sent to the Senate by the President, Mr. Clay published in the "National Intelligencer" his famous Raleighletter against annexation. The "Globe" of the same day containeda more guarded communication from Mr. Van Buren, practically takingthe same ground. Considering the widely different characteristicsof the two men, the letters were singularly alike in argument andinference. This fact, in connection with the identical time ofpublication, strengthened the suspicion, if not the conclusion, that there was a pre-arranged understanding between the eminentauthors. 

The letter of Mr. Van Buren was fatal to his prospects. He wascaught in the toils prepared by Mr. Calhoun's diplomacy. Hisdisastrous defeat four years before by General Harrison had notinjured him within the lines of his own party, or shorn him of hisprestige in the nation. He still retained the undiminished confidenceof his old adherents in the North, and a large support from theSouthern Democracy outside of the States in which Mr. Calhoun'sinfluence was dominant. But the leading Democrats of the South, now inflamed with the fever of annexation, determined upon VanBuren's defeat as soon as his letter opposing the acquisition ofTexas appeared. They went to work industriously and skillfully tocompass that end. It was not a light task. The force of New York, as has been so frequently and so signally demonstrated, is difficultto overcome in a Democratic National Convention; and New York wasnot only unanimously, but enthusiastically, for Mr. Van Buren. Hitherto New York and the South had been in alliance, and theirjoint decrees were the rule of action inside the Democratic party. They were now separated and hostile, and the trial of strength thatensued was one of the most interesting political contests everwitnessed in the country. The Democratic masses had so long followedSouthern lead that they were bewildered by this new and unexpecteddevelopment. From the organization of the Federal Government tothat hour, a period of fifty-six years, Mr. Van Buren was the onlyNorthern man whom the Democracy had supported for the Presidency;and Mr. Van Buren had been forced upon the party by General Jackson. His title to his political estate, therefore, came from the South. It remained strong because his supporters believed that Jacksonwas still behind him. One word from the great chief at the Hermitagewould have compelled Mr. Van Buren to retire from the field. Butthe name of Jackson was powerful with the Democratic masses. Against all the deep plots laid for Van Buren's overthrow, he wasstill able, when the national convention assembled at Baltimore inMay, 1844, to count a majority of the delegates in favor of hisnomination. 

 VAN BUREN AND THE TWO-THIRDS RULE. 

The Texas treaty of annexation was still pending in the Senate witha decided majority committed against its confirmation, both uponpublic and partisan grounds. The Whig senators and the friends ofVan Buren had coalesced for its defeat after their respective chiefshad pronounced against it. Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky and ColonelBenton were the leaders under whose joint efforts the work ofCalhoun was to be set at naught. But, in fact, the work of Calhounhad already been effectually done and he could afford to disregardthe fate of the treaty. He had consolidated the Democratic delegatesfrom the slave-holding States against Mr. Van Buren, and the decreehad gone forth for his political destruction. Mr. Van Buren, withthe aid of the more populous North, had indeed secured a majorityof the convention, but an instrumentality was at hand to overcomethis apparent advantage. In the two preceding national conventionsof the Democratic party, the rule requiring a two-thirds vote ofall the delegates to make a nomination had been adopted at theinstance of Mr. Van Buren's friends in order to insure his victory. It was now to be used for his defeat. Forseeing the result, thesame zealous and devoted friends of Mr. Van Buren resisted itsadoption. Romulus M. Sanders of North Carolina introduced therule, and was sustained with great vigor by Robert J. Walker ofMississippi, and George W. Hopkins of Virginia. The leadingopponents of the rule were Marcus Morton of Massachusetts, NathanClifford of Maine, and Daniel S. Dickinson of New York. Thediscussion was conducted by Southern men on one side and by Northernmen on the other, --the first division of the kind in the Democraticparty. Slavery was the ominous cause! The South triumphed andthe rule was fastened upon the convention. 

Immediately after this action Mr. Van Buren received a majority ofthe votes on the first ballot, and it was not unnaturally chargedthat many of those supporting him must have been insincere, inasmuchas they had the full right, until self-restrained by the two-thirdsrule, to declare him the nominee. But this conclusion does notnecessarily follow. Mr. Van Buren had been nominated in the NationalDemocratic Conventions of 1835 and 1839 with the two-thirds rulein operation; and now to force his nomination for a third time bya mere slender majority was, in the judgment of wise and considerateparty leaders among his own friends, a dangerous experiment. Theyinstinctively feared to disregard a powerful and aggressive minoritystubbornly demanding that Mr. Van Buren should be subjected to thesame test which his friends had enforced in previous conventions. Their argument was not satisfactorily answered, the rule was adopted, and Mr. Van Buren's fate was sealed. 

 CALHOUN DEFEATS VAN BUREN. 

The Southern men who insisted upon the rule had the courage to useit. They had absolute control of more than one-third of theconvention; and, whatever might come, they were determined thatMr. Van Buren should not be nominated. As the most effective modeof assailing his strength, they supported a Northern candidateagainst him, and gave a large vote for General Cass. This wroughtthe intended result. It demoralized the friends of Mr. Van Burenand prepared the way for a final concentration upon Mr. Polk, whichfrom the first had been the secret design of the Southern managers. It was skillfully done, and was the direct result of the Texaspolicy which Mr. Calhoun had forced the Democratic party to adopt. To Mr. Van Buren it was a great blow, and some of his friends wereindisposed to submit to a result which they considered unfair. For the first time in history of any convention, of either party, a candidate supported by a majority of the delegates failed to benominated. The two-thirds rule, as Colonel Benton declared, hadbeen originally framed, "not to thwart a majority, but to strengthenit. " But it was remorselessly used to defeat the majority by menwho intended, not only to force a Southern policy on the government, but to intrust that policy to the hands of a Southern President. The support of Cass was not sincere, but it served for the momentto embarrass the friends of Van Buren, to make the triumph of whatBenton called the Texas conspiracy more easy and more sure, and inthe end to lay up wrath against the day of wrath for General Casshimself. Calhoun's triumph was complete. Politically he had gaineda great victory for the South. Personally he had inflicted uponMr. Van Buren a most humiliating defeat, literally destroying himas a factor in the Democratic party, of which he had so long andso successfully been the leader. 

The details of Mr. Van Buren's defeat are presented because of itslarge influence on the subsequent development of anti-slaverystrength in the North. He was sacrificed because he was opposedto the immediate annexation of Texas. Had he taken ground in favorof annexation, he would in all probability have been nominated witha fair prospect of election; though the general judgment at thattime was that Mr. Clay would have defeated him. The overthrow ofMr. Van Buren was a crisis in the history of the Democratic party, and implanted dissensions which rapidly ripened into disaster. The one leading feature, the forerunner of important politicalchanges, was the division of delegates on the geographical line ofNorth and South. Though receiving a clear majority of the entireconvention on the first ballot, Mr. Van Buren had but nine votesfrom the slave States; and these votes, singularly enough, camefrom the northern side of the line of the Missouri Compromise. This division in a Democratic National Convention was, in many ofits relations and aspects, more significant than a similar divisionin the two Houses of Congress. 

Though cruelly wronged by the convention, as many of his supportersthought, Mr. Van Buren did not himself show resentment, buteffectively sustained his successful competitor. His confidentialfriend, Silas Wright, had refused to go on the ticket with Mr. Polk, and George M. Dallas was substituted by the quick and competentmanagement of Mr. Robert J. Walker. The refusal of Mr. Wright ledthe Whigs to hope for distraction in the ranks of the New-YorkDemocracy; but that delusion was soon dispelled by Wright's acceptanceof the nomination for governor, and his entrance into the canvasswith unusual energy and spirit. It was widely believed thatJackson's great influence with Van Buren was actively exerted inaid of Polk's election. It would have cruelly embittered the fewremaining days of the venerable ex-president to witness Clay'striumph, and Van Buren owed so much to Jackson that he could notbe indifferent to Polk's success without showing ingratitude tothe great benefactor who had made him his successor in the Executivechair. Motives of this kind evidently influenced Mr. Van Buren;for his course in after years showed how keenly he felt his defeat, and how unreconciled he was to the men chiefly engaged in compassingit. The cooler temperament which he inherited from his Dutchancestry enabled him to bide his time more patiently than men ofScotch-Irish blood, like Calhoun; but subsequent events plainlyshowed that he was capable of nursing his anger, and of inflictinga revenge as significant and as fatal as that of which he had beenmade the victim, --a revenge which would have been perfect in itsgratification had it included Mr. Calhoun personally, as it didpolitically, with General Cass. 

Mr. Clay's letter opposing the annexation of Texas, unlike theletter of Mr. Van Buren, brought its author strength and prestigein the section upon which he chiefly relied for support in theelection. He was nominated with unbounded manifestations ofenthusiasm at Baltimore, on the first of May, with no platformexcept a brief extract from one of his own letters embraced in asingle resolution, and containing no reference whatever to theTexas question. His prospects were considered most brilliant, andhis supporters throughout the Union were absolutely confident ofhis election. But the nomination of Mr. Polk, four weeks later, surprised and disquieted Mr. Clay. More quickly than his ardentand blinded advocates, he perceived the danger to himself whichthe candidacy of Mr. Polk inevitably involved; and he at once becamerestless and dissatisfied with the drift and tendency of thecampaign. The convention which nominated Mr. Polk took bold groundfor the immediate re-annexation of Texas and re-occupation ofOregon. This peculiar form of expression was used to indicate thatTexas had already belonged to us under the Louisiana purchase, andthat Oregon had been wholly ours prior to the treaty of jointoccupancy with Great Britain. It further declared, that our titleto the whole of Oregon, up to 54° 40´ north latitude, was "clearand indisputable"; thus carrying our claim to the borders of theRussian possessions, and utterly denying and defying the pretensionof Great Britain to the ownership of any territory bordering onthe Pacific. 

 FATAL CHANGE IN MR. CLAY'S POSITION. 

By this aggressive policy the Democratic party called forth theenthusiasm of the people, both North and South, in favor ofterritorial acquisition, --always popular with men of Anglo-Saxonblood, and appealing in an especial manner to the young, the brave, and the adventurous, in all sections of the country. Mr. Clay, aman of most generous and daring nature, suddenly discovered thathe was on the timid side of all the prominent questions before thepeople, --a position occupied by him for the first time. He hadled public sentiment in urging the war of 1812 against Great Britain;had served with distinction in negotiating the Treaty of Peace atGhent; had forced the country into an early recognition of theSouth-American republics at the risk of war with Spain; had fiercelyattacked the Florida Treaty of 1819, for surrendering our rightfulclaim to Texas as part of the Louisiana purchase; and had, whensecretary of State, held high ground on the Oregon question in hiscorrespondence with the British Government. With this splendidrecord of fearless policy throughout his long public career, adefensive position, suddenly thrust upon him by circumstances whichhe had not foreseen, betrayed him into anger, and thence naturallyinto imprudence. All his expectations had been based upon a contestwith Mr. Van Buren. The issues he anticipated were those of nationalbank, of protective tariff, of internal improvements, and thedistribution of the proceeds from the sale of the public lands, --on all of which he believed he would have the advantage before thepeople. The substitution of Mr. Polk changed the entire characterof the contest, as the sagacious leaders of the Southern Democracyhad foreseen. To extricate himself from the embarrassment intowhich he was thrown, Mr. Clay resorted to the dangerous experimentof modifying the position which he had so recently taken on theTexas question. Apparently underrating the hostility of the NorthernWhigs to the scheme of annexation, he saw only the disadvantage inwhich the Southern Whigs were placed, especially in the Gulf region, and, in a less degree, in the northern tier of slave-holding States. Even in Kentucky--which had for years followed Mr. Clay with immensepopular majorities--the contest grew animated and exciting as theTexas question was pressed. The State was to vote in August; andthe gubernatorial canvass between Judge Owsley, the Whig candidate, and General William O. Butler, the nominee of the Democrats, wasattracting the attention of the whole nation. This local contestnot only enlisted Mr. Clay's interest, but aroused his deep personalfeeling. In a private letter, since made public, he urged theeditors of the Whig press "to lash Butler" for some politicalshortcoming which he pointed out. In a tone of unrestrained anger, he declared that "we should have a pretty time of it with one ofJackson's lieutenants at Washington, and another at Frankfort, andthe old man in his dotage at the Hermitage dictating to both. " Tolose Kentucky was, for the Whigs, to lose every thing. To reducethe Whig majority in Mr. Clay's own State would be a great victoryfor the Democracy, and to that end the leaders of the party werestraining every nerve. 

Mr. Clay realized that it was his position on the Texas question, as defined in the Raleigh letter, which was endangering his prestigein Kentucky. This fact, added to the pressure upon him from everyother slave-holding State, precipitated him into the blunder whichprobably cost him his election. A few weeks after the nominationof Mr. Polk, on the first day of July, 1844, Mr. Clay, while restingquietly at Ashland, wrote to Stephen Miller of Tuscaloosa what hassince been known as his Alabama letter. It was written to relievethe Southern Whigs, without anticipation of its effect upon thefortunes of Northern Whigs. Mr. Clay was surrounded by men of theSouth only, breathed their atmosphere, heard their arguments; and, unmindful of the unrepresented Northern sentiment, he took thefatal step. He declared, that, "far from having any personalobjection to the annexation of Texas, " he "would be glad to see itannexed, without dishonor, without war, with the common consent ofthe Union, and upon just and fair terms. " This letter receivedthe popular designation of Mr. Clay's political "death-warrant, "from the disastrous effect it produced on his prospects in certainfree States where before its appearance he had been consideredirresistibly strong. 

 TRIUMPH OF POLK OVER CLAY. 

The immediate and palpable effect of the Alabama letter in theNorth was an increase of power and numbers to the Abolitionists. To Mr. Clay this was its most destructive result. Prior to 1840the Abolitionists had been so few and so scattered that they hadnot attempted a national organization, or taken any part in thepolitical contests of the country. In that year, however, theynamed James G. Birney as their candidate for the Presidency, andcast for him only 6, 745 votes out of a total of 2, 410, 778. In 1844the Abolitionists again named Mr. Birney as their Presidentialcandidate; and, until the appearance of the Alabama letter, thegeneral impression was that their vote would not be larger than in1840. Indeed, so long as Mr. Clay held firmly to his oppositionto Texas annexation, the tendency of the Abolitionists was to preferhim to Mr. Polk. But the moment the letter of surrender appearedthousands of anti-slavery Whigs who had loyally supported Mr. Claywent over at once to the Abolitionists. To the popular apprehension, Mr. Clay had changed his ground, and his new position really leftlittle difference between himself and his opponent on the absorbingquestion of Texas annexation, but it still gave to Mr. Polk allthe advantage of boldness. The latter was outspoken for theannexation of Texas, and the former, with a few timid qualifications, declared that he would be glad to see Texas annexed. Besides this, Mr. Polk's position on the Oregon question afforded some compensationby proposing to add a large area of free territory to offset theincrease of slave territory in Texas. Under such arguments theAbolition party grew rapidly and steadily until, at the election, they polled for Mr. Birney 58, 879 votes. This vast increase overthe vote of 1840 was very largely at the expense of the Whig party, and its specific injury to Mr. Clay is almost a matter of mathematicaldemonstration. In New York the vote stood for Polk 237, 588, forClay 232, 482, for Birney, 15, 812. The plurality for Mr. Polk wasonly 5, 106. In 1840 the vote for Mr. Birney in New York was2, 798. * But for the Alabama letter it has always been believedthat Mr. Clay would have received a sufficient number of the Birneyvotes to give him a plurality. The election hinged on the resultin New York. One hundred and thirty-eight electoral votes werenecessary to a choice. With New York, Mr. Clay would have had atotal of one hundred and forty-one. Mr. Polk, with New York addedto his vote, received a total of one hundred and seventy, and waselected President of the United States. 

No contest for the Presidency, either before or since, has beenconducted with such intense energy and such deep feeling. Mr. Clay's followers were not ordinary political supporters. They hadthe profound personal attachment which is looked for only inhereditary governments, where loyalty becomes a passion, and isblind and unreasoning in its adherence and its devotion. Thelogical complement of such ardent fidelity is an opposition markedby unscrupulous rancor. This case proved no exception. The loveof Mr. Clay's friends was equaled by the hatred of his foes. Thezeal of his supporters did not surpass the zeal of his opponents. All the enmities and exasperations which began in the memorablecontest for the Presidency when John Quincy Adams was chosen, andhad grown into great proportions during the long intervening period, were fought out on the angry field of 1844. Mr. Polk, a moderateand amiable man, did not represent the acrimonious character ofthe controversy. He stood only as the passive representative ofits principles. Behind him was Jackson, aged and infirm in body, but strong in mind, and unbroken in spirit. With him the strugglewas not only one of principle, but of pride; not merely of judgment, but of temper; and he communicated to the legions throughout thecountry, who regarded him with reverence and gratitude, a fullmeasure of his own animosity against Clay. In its progress thestruggle absorbed the thought, the action, the passion, of thewhole people. When its result was known, the Whigs regarded thedefeat of Mr. Clay, not only as a calamity of untold magnitude tothe country, but as a personal and profound grief, which touchedthe heart as deeply as the understanding. It was Jackson's finaltriumph over Clay. The iron-nerved old hero died in seven monthsafter this crowning gratification of his life. 

 GENERAL JACKSON AND MR. CLAY. 

For twenty years these two great, brave men headed the opposingpolitical forces of the Union. Whoever might be candidates, theywere the actual leaders. John Quincy Adams was more learned thaneither; Mr. Webster was stronger in logic and in speech; Calhounmore acute, refined, and philosophic; Van Buren better skilled incombining and directing political forces; but to no one of thesewas given the sublime attribute of leadership, the faculty ofdrawing men unto him. That is natural, not acquired. There wasnot in the whole country, during the long period of their rivalry, a single citizen of intelligence who was indifferent to Clay or toJackson. For the one without qualification, against the otherwithout reservation, was the rule of division from the northernmosttownship of New England to the mouths of the Mississippi. Bothleaders had the highest courage; physical and moral, in equaldegree. Clay held the advantage of a rare eloquence; but Jacksonhad a splendid military record, which spoke to the hearts of thepeople more effectively than words. Members for twenty years ofthe same party, they differed slightly, if at all, in politicalprinciples when the contest began; but Jackson enjoyed the prestigeof a more lineal heirship to the creed of Jefferson, Madison, andMonroe; while Clay, by his imprudence in becoming secretary ofState, incurred not only the odium of the "bargain and sale, " buta share of the general unpopularity which at that time attached tothe name of Adams. It is not in retrospect difficult to measurethe advantages which Jackson possessed in the long contest, and tosee clearly the reasons of his final triumph over the boldest ofleaders, the noblest of foes. Still less is it difficult to seehow largely the personality of the two men entered into the struggle, and how in the end the effect upon the politics and prosperity ofthe country would have been nearly the same had the winner and theloser exchanged places. In each of them patriotism was a passion. There never was a moment in their prolonged enmity and theirrancorous contests when a real danger to the country would not haveunited them as heartily as in 1812, when Clay in the House andJackson on the field co-operated in defending the national honoragainst the aggressions of Great Britain. 

The election of Mr. Polk was an unquestionable verdict from thepeople in favor of the annexation of Texas. Mr. Clay and Mr. VanBuren had been able to defeat the treaty negotiated by Mr. Calhoun;but the popular vote overruled them, and pronounced in favor ofthe Democratic position after full and fair hearing. Mr. Tylerwas anxious that the scheme so energetically initiated by him shouldbe fully accomplished during his term. The short method of jointresolution was therefore devised by the ever fertile brain of Mr. Calhoun, and its passage through Congress intrusted to the skilfulmanagement of Robert J. Walker, then a senator from Mississippi, and already indicated for the portfolio of the Treasury in the newadministration. Mr. Polk was in consultation with Mr. Tyler duringthe closing weeks of the latter's administration, and the annexationby joint resolution had his full concurrence. It was passed inseason to receive the approval of President Tyler on the first dayof March, three days before the eventful administration of Mr. Polkwas installed in power. Its terms were promptly accepted by Texas, and at the next session of Congress, beginning December, 1845, theconstitution of the new State was approved. Historic interestattached to the appearance of Sam Houston and Thomas J. Rusk asthe first senators from the great State which they had torn fromMexico and added to the Union. 

The lapse of forty years and the important events of interveninghistory give the opportunity for impartial judgment concerning thepolicy of acquiring Texas. We were not guiltless towards Mexicoin originally permitting if not encouraging our citizens to joinin the revolt of one of the States of that Republic. But Texashad passed definitely and finally beyond the control of Mexico, and the practical issue was, whether we should incorporate her inthe Union or leave her to drift in uncertain currents--possibly toform European alliances which we should afterwards be compelled, in self-defense, to destroy. An astute statesman of that periodsummed up the whole case when he declared that it was wiser policyto annex Texas, and accept the issue of immediate war with Mexico, than to leave Texas in nominal independence to involve us probablyin ultimate war with England. The entire history of subsequentevents has vindicated the wisdom, the courage, and the statesmanshipwith which the Democratic party dealt with this question in 1844. 

[* Total vote cast for James G. Birney, Abolition candidate forPresident, in 1840 and in 1844:--

 1840. 1844. 1840. 1844. Connecticut . . . . 179 1, 943 New York . . . . 2, 798 15, 812Illinois . . . . . -- 149 Ohio . . . . . . 903 8, 050Indiana . . . . . . -- 2, 106 Pennsylvania . . 343 3, 138Maine . . . . . . . 194 4, 836 Rhode Island . . 42 107Massachusetts . . . 1, 621 10, 860 Vermont . . . . 319 3, 954Michigan . . . . . 321 3, 632New Hampshire . . . 126 4, 161 6, 745 58, 879New Jersey . . . . 69 131 ]

CHAPTER III. 

Review (_continued_). --Triumph of the Democratic Party. --ImpendingTroubles with Mexico. --Position of Parties. --Struggle for theEquality of Free and Slave States. --Character of the SouthernLeaders. --Their Efforts to control the Government. --ConservativeCourse of Secretaries Buchanan and Marcy. --Reluctant to engage inWar with Mexico. --The Oregon Question, 54°, 40´, or 49°. --CriticalRelations with the British Government. --Treaty of 1846. --Characterof the Adjustment. --Our Probable Loss by Unwise Policy of theDemocratic Party. 

The annexation of Texas being accomplished, the next step was lookedfor with absorbing interest. In the spring of 1845 the Democraticparty stood victor. Its policy had been approved by the people, its administration was in power. But success had brought heavyresponsibilities, and imposed upon the statesmanship of Mr. Polkthe severest of tasks. Texas came to us with undefined boundaries, and with a state of war at that moment existing between herselfand Mexico. We had annexed a province that had indeed maintaineda revolt for years against the central government of a neighboringrepublic; but its independence had never been conceded, the hopeof its subjugation had never been abandoned. When Congress passedthe joint resolution of annexation, the Mexican minister entereda formal protest against the proceeding, demanded his passports, and left the United States. By this course, Mexico placed herselfin an unfriendly, though not necessarily hostile, attitude. Thegeneral apprehension however was that we should drift into war, and the first message of Mr. Polk aroused the country to theimpending danger. He devoted a large space to the Texas question, informing Congress that "Mexico had been marshaling and organizingarmies, issuing proclamations, and avowing the intention to makewar on the United States, either by open declaration, or by invadingTexas. " He had therefore "deemed it proper, as a precautionarymeasure, to order a strong squadron to the coast of Mexico, and toconcentrate an efficient military force on the western frontier ofTexas. " Every one could see what this condition of affairs portended, and there was at once great excitement throughout the country. Inthe North, the belief of a large majority of the people was thatthe administration intended to precipitate war, not merely to coerceMexico into the acknowledgment of the Rio Grande as the boundaryof Texas, but also to acquire further territory for the purpose ofcreating additional slave States. As soon as this impression, orsuspicion, got abroad, the effect was an anti-slavery revival whichenlisted the feelings and influenced the political action of manywho had never sympathized with the Abolitionists, and of many whohad steadily opposed them. 

These men came from both the old political parties, but the largernumber from the Whigs. Indeed, during almost the entire period ofthe anti-slavery agitation by the Abolitionists, there had existeda body of men in the Whig ranks who were profoundly impressed withthe evils of slavery, and who yet thought they could be moreinfluential in checking its progress by remaining in their oldparty, and, in many sections of the country, maintaining theircontrol of it. Of these men, John Quincy Adams stood undeniablyat the head; and with him were associated, in and out of Congress, Mr. Seward, Mr. Benjamin F. Wade, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Giddings, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, besides a large number of able and resolute menof less public distinction, but of equal earnestness, in all partsof the North. Subsequent events have led men to forget that MillardFillmore, then a representative from New York, was one of Mr. Adams's early co-laborers in the anti-slavery cause, and that inthe important debate on the admission of Arkansas, with a constitutionmaking slavery perpetual, Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts led theradical free sentiment of New England. A large number of distinguishedDemocrats in the North also entertained the strongest anti-slaveryconvictions, and were determined, at the risk of separating fromtheir party associates, to resist the spread of slavery into freeterritory. Among the most conspicuous of these were Salmon P. Chase, John P. Hale, Hannibal Hamlin, Preston King, John M. Niles, David Wilmot, David K. Cartter, and John Wentworth. They had manyco-laborers and a band of determined and courageous followers. They were especially strong in the State of New York, and, underthe name of Barnburners, wrought changes which affected the politicalhistory of the entire country. 

The two great parties on the eve of the Mexican war were thussomewhat similarly situated. In the South all the members of bothwere, by the supposed necessity of their situation, upholders ofslavery, though the Democrats were on this question more aggressive, more truculent, and more menacing, than the Whigs. The SouthernWhigs, under the lead of Mr. Clay, had been taught that slaverywas an evil, to be removed in some practicable way at some distantperiod, but not to be interfered with, in the States where itexisted, by outside influence or force. The Democrats, under thehead of Mr. Calhoun, defended the institution of slavery as rightin itself, as scripturally authorized, as essential in the economyof labor, and as a blessing to both races. In the North bothparties were divided on the question; each had its anti-slaverywing and its pro-slavery wing, with many local names to distinguishthem. Between the two a relentless controversy began, --a controversymarked as much by epithet as by argument, and conducted with suchexasperation of feeling as clearly foreshadowed a break of existingparty lines, and the formation of new associations, through which, in the phrase of that day, "men who thought alike could acttogether. "

 THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY. 

This being the condition of the two great parties which dividedthe country, it was evident that the acquisition of territory fromMexico must lead to an agitation of the slavery question, of whichno man could measure the extent, or foresee the consequences. Itwas the old Missouri struggle renewed, with more numerous combatants, a stronger influence of the press, a mightier enginery of publicopinion. It arose as suddenly as the agitation of 1820, but gaveindications of deeper feeling and more prolonged controversy. Theable and ambitious men who had come into power at the South werewielding the whole force of the national administration, and theywielded it with commanding ability and unflinching energy. TheFree-soil sentiment which so largely pervaded the ranks of theNorthern Democracy had no representative in the cabinet, and a manof pronounced anti-slavery views was as severely proscribed inWashington as a Roundhead was in London after the coronation ofCharles II. 

The policy of maintaining an equality of slave States with freeStates was to be pursued, as it had already been from the foundationof the government, with unceasing vigilance and untiring energy. The balancing of forces between the new States added to the Unionhad been so skillfully arranged, that for a long period two Stateswere admitted at nearly the same time, --one from the South, andone from the North. Thus Kentucky and Vermont, Tennessee and Ohio, Mississippi and Indiana, Alabama and Illinois, Missouri and Maine, Arkansas and Michigan, Florida and Iowa, came into the Union inpairs, not indeed at precisely the same moment in every case, butalways with reference each to the other in the order named. Onthe admission of Florida and Iowa, Colonel Benton remarked that"it seemed strange that two territories so different in age, sodistant from each other, so antagonistic in natural features andpolitical institutions, should ripen into States at the same time, and come into the Union by a single Act; but these very antagonisms--that is, the antagonistic provisions on the subject of slavery--made the conjunction, and gave to the two young States an inseparableadmission. " During the entire period from the formation of theFederal Government to the inauguration of Mr. Polk, the onlyvariation from this twin birth of States--the one free, the otherslave--was in the case of Louisiana, which was admitted in 1812, with no corresponding State from the North. Of the original ThirteenStates, seven had become free, and six maintained slavery. Of thefifteen that were added to the Union, prior to the annexation ofTexas, eight were slave, and seven were free; so that, when Mr. Polk took the oath of office, the Union consisted of twenty-eightStates, equally divided between slave-holding and free. So nicean adjustment had certainly required constant watchfulness and theclosest calculation of political forces. It was in pursuit of thisadjustment that the admission of Louisiana was secured, as anevident compensation for the loss which had accrued to the slave-holding interest in the unequal though voluntary partition of theOld Thirteen between North and South. 

The more rapid growth of the free States in population made thecontest for the House of Representatives, or for a majority in theElectoral college, utterly hopeless to the South; but the constitutionalequality of all the States in the Senate enabled the slave interestto defeat any hostile legislation, and to defeat also any nominationsby the President of men who were offensive to the South by reasonof their anti-slavery character. The courts of the United States, both supreme and district, throughout the Union, including theclerks and the marshals who summoned the juries and served theprocesses, were therefore filled with men acceptable to the South. Cabinets were constituted in the same way. Representatives of thegovernment in foreign countries were necessarily taken from theclass approved by the same power. Mr. Webster, speaking in hismost conservative tone in the famous speech of March 7, 1850, declared that, from the formation of the Union to that hour, theSouth had monopolized three-fourths of the places of honor andemolument under the Federal Government. It was an accepted factthat the class interest of slavery, by holding a tie in the Senate, could defeat any measure or any nomination to which its leadersmight be opposed; and thus, banded together by an absolutely cohesivepolitical force, they could and did dictate terms. A tie-votecannot carry measures, but it can always defeat them; and anycombination of votes that possesses the negative power will in theend, if it can be firmly held, direct and control the positiveaction of the body to which it belongs. A strong minority, sodisciplined that it cannot be divided, will, in the hands ofcompetent leaders, annoy, distract, and often defeat, the majorityof a parliamentary body. Much more can one absolute half of alegislative assembly, compactly united, succeed in dividing andcontrolling the other half, which has no class interest to consolidateit, and no tyrannical public opinion behind it, decreeing politicaldeath to any member who doubts or halts in his devotion to onesupreme idea. 

 THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE SOUTH. 

With one-half of the Senate under the control of the slave-holdingStates, and with the Constitution declaring that no amendment toit should ever destroy the equality of the States in the Senate, the Southern leaders occupied a commanding position. Those leadersconstituted a remarkable body of men. Having before them theexample of Jefferson, of Madison, and of George Mason in Virginia, of Nathaniel Macon in North Carolina, and of the Pinckneys andRutledges in South Carolina, they gave deep study to the scienceof government. They were admirably trained as debaters, and theybecame highly skilled in the management of parliamentary bodies. As a rule, they were liberally educated, many of them graduates ofNorthern colleges, a still larger number taking their degrees atTransylvania in Kentucky, at Chapel Hill in North Carolina, and atMr. Jefferson's peculiar but admirable institution in Virginia. Their secluded life on the plantation gave them leisure for readingand reflection. They took pride in their libraries, pursued thelaw so far as it increased their equipment for a public career, and devoted themselves to political affairs with an absorbingambition. Their domestic relations imparted manners that werehaughty and sometimes offensive; they were quick to take affront, and they not infrequently brought needless personal disputationinto the discussion of public questions; but they were, almostwithout exception, men of high integrity, and they were especiallyand jealously careful of the public money. Too often ruinouslylavish in their personal expenditures, they believed in an economicalgovernment, and, throughout the long period of their domination, they guarded the Treasury with rigid and unceasing vigilance againstevery attempt at extravagance, and against every form of corruption. 

Looking into the future, the Southern men took alarm lest theequality of their section should be lost in the Senate, and theirlong control of the Federal Government ended. Even with Texasadded to the Union, this equality was barely maintained, forWisconsin was already seeking admission; and the clause in thearticles of annexation providing that four new States might becarved out of the territory of Texas whenever she asked it, gaveno promise of speedy help to the South. Its operation would, inany event, be distant, and subject to contingencies which couldnot be accurately measured. There was not another foot of territorysouth of 36° 30´, save that which was devoted to the Indians bysolemn compact, from which another slave State could be formed. North of 36° 30´ the Missouri Compromise had dedicated the entirecountry to freedom. In extent it was, to the Southern view, alarmingly great, including at least a million square miles ofterritory. Except along its river boundaries it was little known. Its value was underrated, and a large portion of it was designatedon our maps as the Great American Desert. At the time Texas wasannexed, and for several years afterwards, not a single foot ofthat vast area was organized under any form of civil government. Had the Southern statesmen foreseen the immense wealth, population, and value of this imperial domain in the five great States and fourTerritories into which it is to-day divided, they would haveabandoned the struggle for equality. But the most that was hoped, even in the North, within any near period, was one State north ofIowa, one west of Missouri, and one from the Oregon country. Theremainder, in the popular judgment, was divided among mountaingorges, the arid plains of the middle, and the uninviting regionin the north, which the French _voyaguers_ had classed under thecomprehensive and significant title of _mauvaises terres_. Withonly three States anticipated from the great area of the north-west, it was the evident expectation of the Southern men who then hadcontrol of the government, that, if war with Mexico should ensue, the result would inevitably be the acquisition of sufficientterritory to form slave States south of the line of the MissouriCompromise as rapidly as free States could be formed north of it;and that in this way the ancient equality between North and Southcould be maintained. 

 OUR RELATIONS WITH MEXICO. 

But the scheme of war did not develop as rapidly as was desired bythe hot advocates of territorial expansion. A show of negotiationfor peace was kept up by dispatching Mr. John Slidell as ministerto Mexico upon the hint that that government might be willing torenew diplomatic relations. When Mr. Slidell reached the city ofMexico he found a violent contest raging over the Presidency ofthe republic, the principal issue being between the war and anti-war parties. Mr. Slidell was not received. The Mexican Governmentdeclared, with somewhat of reason and consistency, that they hadbeen willing to listen to a special envoy who would treat singlyand promptly of the grave questions between the two republics, butthey would not accept a minister plenipotentiary who would sit downnear their government in a leisurely manner, as if friendly relationsexisted, and select his own time for negotiation, --urging orpostponing, threatening or temporizing, as the pressure of politicalinterests in the United States might suggest. Mr. Slidell returnedhome; but still the conflict of arms, though so imminent, was notimmediately precipitated. Mr. Polk's cautious and somewhat timidcourse represented the resultant between the aggressive Democratof the South who was for war regardless of consequences, and theFree-soil Democrat of the North who was for peace regardless ofconsequences; the one feeling sure that war would strengthen theinstitution of slavery, the other confident that peace would favorthe growth of freedom. As not infrequently happens in the evolutionof human events, each was mistaken in the final issue. The war, undertaken for the extension of slavery, led in the end to itsdestruction. 

The leading influence in Mr. Polk's cabinet was divided betweenMr. Buchanan, secretary of State, and Mr. Marcy, secretary of War. Both were men of conservative minds, of acute judgment in politicalaffairs of long experience in public life; and each was ambitiousfor the succession to the Presidency. Neither could afford todisregard the dominant opinion of the Southern Democracy; stillless could either countenance a reckless policy, which mightseriously embarrass our foreign affairs, and precipitate a dangerouscrisis in our relations with England. These eminent statesmenquickly perceived that the long-standing issue touching our north-western boundary, commonly known as the Oregon question, wassurrounded with embarrassments which, by mismanagement, mightrapidly develop into perils of great magnitude in connection withthe impending war with Mexico. 

The Oregon question, which now became associated, if not complicated, with the Texas question, originated many years before. By ourtreaty with Spain in 1819, the southern boundary of our possessionson the Pacific had been accurately defined. Our northern boundarywas still unadjusted, and had been matter of dispute with GreatBritain ever since we acquired the country. By the treaty of Oct. 20, 1818, the 49th parallel of north latitude was established asthe boundary between the United States and British America, fromthe Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, as the Rocky Mountainswere then termed. In the same treaty it was agreed that any countryclaimed by either the United States or Great Britain westward ofthe Stony Mountains should, with its harbors, bays, and rivers, beopen for the term of ten years to the vessels, citizens, and subjectsof either power. This agreement was entered into solely for thepurpose of preventing disputes pending final settlement, and wasnot to be construed to the prejudice of either party. This wasthe beginning of the joint occupancy of the Oregon country, Englandhaving with prompt and characteristic enterprise forced her wayacross the continent after she had acquired Canada in 1763. Stimulated by certain alleged discoveries of her navigators on thenorth-west coast, Great Britain urged and maintained her title toa frontage on the Pacific, and made a bold claim to sovereignty, as far south as the mouth of the Columbia River, nearly, indeed, to the northern border of California. 

 OUR CLAIM TO THE OREGON COUNTRY. 

Nothing had been done towards an adjustment during the ten yearsof joint occupancy, and when the term was about to expire, thearrangement was renewed by special convention in 1827, for anindefinite period, --each power reserving the right to terminatethe convention by giving twelve-months' notice to the other. ThePresident, John Quincy Adams, made the briefest possible referenceto the subject in his message to Congress, December, 1827; speakingof it as a temporary compromise of the respective rights and claimsof Great Britain and the United States to territory westward ofthe Rocky Mountains. For many years thereafter, the subject, thoughlanguidly pursued in our diplomatic correspondence, was not alludedto in a President's message, or discussed in Congress. Thecontracting parties rested content with the power to join issueand try titles at any time by simply giving the required notice. The subject was also overshadowed by more urgent disputes betweenGreat Britain and the United States, especially that relating tothe North-eastern boundary, and that touching the suppression ofthe African slave-trade. The latter involved the old question ofthe right of search. The two governments came to an agreement onthese differences in 1842 by the negotiation of the conventionknown as the Ashburton Treaty. In transmitting the treaty toCongress, President Tyler made, for the first time since theagreement for a joint occupancy was renewed in 1827, a specificreference to the Oregon question. He informed Congress, that theterritory of the United States commonly called the Oregon countrywas beginning to attract the attention of our fellow-citizens, andthat "the tide of our population, having reclaimed from the wildernessthe more contiguous regions, was preparing to flow over those vastdistricts which stretch from the Rocky Mountains to the PacificOcean;" that Great Britain "laid claim to a portion of the countryand that the question could not be well included in the recenttreaty without postponing other more pressing matters. " Hesignificantly added, that though the difficulty might not forseveral years involve the peace of the two countries, yet he shouldurge upon Great Britain the importance of its early settlement. 

As this paragraph was undoubtedly suggested and probably writtenby Mr. Webster, it attracted wide attention on both sides of theAtlantic; and from that moment, in varying degrees of interest andurgency, the Oregon question became an active political issue. Before the next annual meeting of Congress, Mr. Upshur had succeededMr. Webster in the State department; and the message of the Presidenttook still more advanced ground respecting Oregon. For politicalreasons, there was an obvious desire to keep the action of thegovernment on this issue well abreast of its aggressive movementsin the matter of acquiring Texas. Emboldened by Mr. Webster'sposition of the preceding year, Mr. Upshur, with younger blood, and with more reason for a demonstrative course, was evidentlydisposed to force the discussion of the question with the BritishGovernment. Under his influence and advice, President Tylerdeclared, in his message of December, 1843, that "after the mostrigid, and, as far as practicable, unbiased, examination of thesubject, the United States have always contended that their rightsappertain to the entire region of country lying on the Pacific, and embraced between latitude 42° and 54° 40´. " Mr. Edward Everett, at that time our minister in London, was instructed to presentthese views to the British Government. 

Before the President could send another annual message to Congress, Mr. Calhoun had been for several months at the head of the StateDepartment, engaged in promoting, with singular skill and ability, his scheme for the annexation of Texas. With his quick perception, he discerned that if the policy apparently indicated by Mr. Websterand aggressively pursued by Mr. Upshur, on the Oregon question, should be followed, and that issue sharply pressed upon GreatBritain, complications of a most embarrassing nature might arise, involving in their sweep the plans, already well matured, foracquiring Texas. In order to avert all danger of that kind, Mr. Calhoun opened a negotiation with the British minister in Washington, conducting it himself, for the settlement of the Oregon question;and at the very moment when the Democratic National Conventionwhich nominated Mr. Polk was declaring our title to the whole ofOregon as far as 54° 40´ to be "clear and unquestionable, " theDemocratic secretary of State was proposing to Her Majesty'srepresentative to settle the entire controversy by the adoption ofthe 49th parallel as the boundary!

The negotiation was very nearly completed, and was suspended onlyby some dispute in regard to the right of navigating the ColumbiaRiver. It is not improbable that Mr. Calhoun, after disclosing tothe British Government his willingness to accept the 49th parallelas our northern boundary, was anxious to have the negotiationtemporarily postponed. If the treaty had been concluded at thattime, it would have seriously interfered with the success of Mr. Polk's candidacy by destroying the prestige of the "Fifty-fourforties, " as Colonel Benton termed them. In Mr. Polk's election, Mr. Calhoun was deeply and indeed doubly interested; first, becauseof his earnest desire to defeat Mr. Clay, with whom he was at swords'points on all public issues; and again, because, having assumedthe responsibility of defeating the nomination of Mr. Van Buren, he was naturally desirous that his judgment should be vindicatedby the election of the candidate whom his Southern friends had putforward. Urgently solicitous for the annexation of Texas, thosefriends were indifferent to the fate of the Oregon question, thoughwilling that it should be made a leading issue in the North, whereit was presented with popular effect. The patriotic spirit of thecountry was appealed to, and to a considerable extent aroused andinflamed by the ardent and energetic declaration of our title tothe whole of Oregon. "Fifty-four forty or fight" became a Democraticwatchword; and the Whigs who attempted to argue against theextravagance or inexpediency of the claim continually lost ground, and were branded as cowards who were awed into silence by the fearof British power. All the prejudice against the British Governmentwhich had descended from the Revolution and from the war of 1812was successfully evoked by the Democratic party, and they gainedimmeasurably by keeping an issue before the people which many oftheir leaders knew would be abandoned when the pressure of actualnegotiation should be felt by our government. 

 PRESIDENT POLK ON THE OREGON QUESTION. 

Mr. Polk, however, in his Inaugural address, carefully re-examinedthe position respecting Oregon which his party had taken in thenational canvass, and quoted part of the phrase used in the platformput forth by the convention which nominated him. The issue hadbeen made so broadly, that it must be squarely met, and finallyadjusted. The Democrats in their eagerness had left no road forhonorable retreat, and had cut themselves off from the resourcesand convenient postponements of diplomacy. Dangerous as it was tothe new administration to confront the issue, it would have beenstill more dangerous to attempt to avoid it. The decisive step, in the policy to which the administration was committed, was togive formal notice to Great Britain that the joint occupancy ofthe Oregon country under the treaty of 1827 must cease. A certaindegree of moral strength was unexpectedly imparted to the Democraticposition by the fact that the venerable John Quincy Adams wasdecidedly in favor of the notice, and ably supported, in a uniqueand powerful speech in the House of Representatives, our title tothe country up to 54° 40´. The first convention for joint occupancyhad been negotiated while Mr. Adams was secretary of State, andthe second while he was President; so that, in addition to theweight of authority with which he always spoke, his words seemedentitled to special confidence on a question with which he wasnecessarily so familiar. His great influence brought many Whigsto the support of the resolution; and on the 9th of February, 1846, the House, by the large vote of 163 to 54, declared in favor ofgiving the treaty notice to Great Britain. 

The country at once became alarmed by the growing rumors that theresolution of the House was a direct challenge to Great Britainfor a trial of strength as to the superior title to the Oregoncountry, and it was soon apparent that the Senate would proceedwith more circumspection and conservatism. Events were rapidlytending toward hostilities with Mexico, and the aggrandizement ofterritory likely to result from a war with that country was notviewed with a friendly eye, either by Great Britain or France. Indeed, the annexation of Texas, which had been accomplished thepreceding year, was known to be distasteful to those governments. They desired that Texas might remain an independent republic, undermore liberal trade relations than could be secured from the UnitedStates with its steady policy of fostering and advancing its ownmanufacturing interests. The directors of the administration sawtherefore more and more clearly that, if a war with Mexico wereimpeding, it would be sheer madness to open a quarrel with GreatBritain, and force her into an alliance against us. Mr. Adams andthose who voted with him did not believe that the notice to theBritish Government would provoke a war, but that firmness on ourpart, in the negotiation which should ensue, would induce Englandto yield her pretensions to any part of Oregon; to which Mr. Adamsmaintained, with elaboration of argument and demonstration, shehad no shadow of right. 

Mr. Adams was opposed to war with Mexico, and therefore did notdraw his conclusions from the premises laid down by those who werecharged with the policy of the administration. They naturallyargued that a war with Great Britain might end in our losing thewhole of Oregon, without acquiring any territory on our south-western border. The bare possibility of such a result would defeatthe policy which they were seeking to uphold, and would at the sametime destroy their party. In short, it became apparent that whatmight be termed the Texas policy of the administration, and whatmight be termed the Oregon policy, could not both be carried out. It required no prophet to foresee which would be maintained andwhich would be abandoned. "Fifty-four forty or fight" had been agood cry for the political campaign; but, when the fight was to bewith Great Britain, the issue became too serious to be settled bysuch international law as is dispensed on the stump. 

 COMPROMISE ON THE OREGON QUESTION. 

A very bitter controversy over the question began in the Senate assoon as the House resolution was received. But from the outset itwas apparent that those who adhered to the 54° 40´ policy, on whichMr. Polk had been elected, were in a small minority. That minoritywas led by General Cass; but its most brilliant advocate in debatewas Edward A. Hannegan, Democratic senator from Indiana, who angrilyreproached his party for playing false to the pledges on which ithad won a victory over the greatest political leader of the country. He measured the situation accurately, read with discrimination themotives which underlay the change of policy on the part of theadministration and its Southern supporters, and stated the wholecase in a quick and curt reply to an interruption from a pro-slaverysenator, --"If Oregon were good for the production of sugar andcotton, it would not have encountered this opposition. Its possessionwould have been at once secured. " The change in the Democraticposition was greatly aided by the attitude of the Whig senators, who almost unanimously opposed the resolution of notice to GreatBritain, as passed by the House. Mr. Webster, for the first ifnot the only time in his senatorial career, read a carefully preparedspeech, in which he did not argue the question of rightful boundary, but urged that a settlement on the line of the 49th parallel wouldbe honorable to both countries, would avert hostile feeling, andrestore amity and harmony. Mr. Berrien of Georgia made an exhaustivespeech, inquiring into the rightfulness of title, and urged theline of 49°. Mr. Crittenden followed in the same vein, and in areply to Senator William Allen of Ohio, chairman of Foreign Affairs, made a speech abounding in sarcasm and ridicule. The Whigs havingin the campaign taken no part in the boastful demand for 54° 40´, were not subjected to the humiliation of retracing imprudent stepsand retracting unwise declarations. 

Under the influences at work in the Senate, events developed rapidly. The House resolution of notice was defeated; and the Senate passeda substitute of a less aggressive type, in which the House, throughthe instrumentality of a conference committee, substantiallyconcurred. The resolution as finally adopted authorized thePresident "at his discretion" to give notice for the terminationof the treaty to Great Britain. The preamble further softened theaction of Congress by declaring that the notice was given in orderthat "the attention of the governments of both countries may bethe more earnestly directed to the adoption of all proper measuresfor a speedy and amicable adjustment of the differences and disputesin regard to said territory. "

The Southern Democrats in the House receded from their action, andthe modified resolution was carried by nearly as large a vote ashad been the previous one for decided and peremptory notice. Inshort, the great mass of the Southern Democrats in both Housesprecipitately threw the Oregon issue aside. They had not failedto perceive that the hesitation of the administration in forcingan issue with Mexico was due to the apprehension of trouble withGreat Britain, and they made haste to promote schemes of territorialacquisition in the South-West by withdrawing the pretensions soimprudently put forth in regard to our claims in the North-West. Only forty-six votes were given in the House against what was termeda disgraceful surrender. These were almost entirely from NorthernDemocrats, though a few Southern Democrats refused to recede. Among those who thus remained firm were Andrew Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas, Howell Cobb, Preston King, and Allen G. Thurman. 

The passage of the modified and friendly resolution of noticedispelled all danger of trouble with Great Britain, and restoreda sense of security in the United States. Immediately after itsadoption, Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, under direction of thePresident, concluded a treaty with the British minister on thebasis discussed by Mr. Calhoun two years before. The 49th parallelwas agreed upon as the boundary between the two countries, withcertain concessions for a defined period, touching the rights ofthe Hudson-bay Company, and the navigation of the Columbia Riverby the British. This treaty was promptly confirmed by the Senate, and the long controversy over the Oregon question was at rest. Ithad created a deep and wide-spread excitement in the country, andcame very near precipitating hostilities with Great Britain. Thereis no doubt whatever that the English Government would have goneto war rather than surrender the territory north of the 49thparallel. This fact had made the winter and early spring of 1846one of profound anxiety to all the people of the United States, and more especially to those who were interested in the largemercantile marine which then sailed under the American flag. 

 UNWISE AGITATION OF THE QUESTION. 

In simple truth, the country was not prepared to go to war withGreat Britain in support of "our clear and unquestionable title"to the whole of Oregon. With her strong naval force on the Pacific, and her military force in Australasia, Great Britain could morereadily and more easily take possession of the country in disputethan could the United States. We had no way of reaching Oregonexcept by doubling Cape Horn, and making a dangerous sea-voyage ofmany thousand miles. We could communicate across the continentonly by the emigrant trail over rugged mountains and almost tracklessplains. Our railway system was in its infancy in 1846. New-YorkCity did not have a continuous road to Buffalo. Philadelphia wasnot connected with Pittsburg. Baltimore's projected line to theOhio had only reached Cumberland, among the eastern foot-hills ofthe Alleghanies. The entire Union had but five thousand miles ofrailway. There was scarcely a spot on the globe, outside of theUnited Kingdom, where we could not have fought England with greateradvantage than on the north-west coast of America at that time. The war-cry of the Presidential campaign of 1844 was, therefore, in any event, absurd; and it proved to be mischievous. It is notimprobable, that, if the Oregon question had been allowed to restfor the time under the provisions of the treaty of 1827, the wholecountry would ultimately have fallen into our hands, and the Americanflag might to-day be waving over British Columbia. The course ofevents and the lapse of time were working steadily to our advantage. In 1826 Great Britain declined to accept the 49th parallel, butdemanded the Columbia River as the boundary. Twenty years afterwardsshe accepted the line previously rejected. American settlers hadforced her back. With the sweep of our emigration and civilizationto the Pacific coast two years after the treaty of 1846, when goldwas discovered in California, the tendency would have been stillmore strongly in our favor. Time, as Mr. Calhoun said, "would haveeffected every thing for us" if we could only have been patientand peaceful. 

Taking the question, however, as it stood in 1846, the settlementmust, upon full consideration and review, be adjudged honorable toboth countries. Wise statesmen of that day felt, as wise statesmenof subsequent years have more and more realized, that a war betweenGreat Britain and the United States would not only be a terriblecalamity to both nations, but that it would stay the progress ofcivilization throughout the world. Future generations would holdthe governing power in both countries guilty of a crime if warshould ever be permitted except upon the failure of every otherarbitrament. The harmless laugh of one political party at theexpense of the other forty years ago, the somewhat awkward recedingfrom pretensions which could not be maintained by the Executive ofthe nation, have passed into oblivion. But a striking and usefullesson would be lost if it should be forgotten that the countrywas brought to the verge of war by the proclamation of a policywhich could not be, and was not intended to be, enforced. It wasoriginated as a cry to catch votes; and except with the ignorant, and the few whose judgment was carried away by enthusiasm, it wasfrom the first thoroughly insincere. If the punishment could havefallen only upon those who raised the cry, perfect justice wouldhave been done. But the entire country suffered, and probablyendured a serious and permanent loss, from the false step taken bymen who claimed what they could not defend and did not mean todefend. 

The Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, gained much credit for hisconduct of the Oregon question, both diplomatically and politically. His correspondence with Mr. Pakenham, the British minister atWashington, was conspicuously able. It strengthened Mr. Buchananat home, and gave him an enviable reputation in Europe. Hispolitical management of the question was especially adroit. Hisparty was in sore trouble over the issue, and naturally looked tohim for relief and escape. To extricate the Administration fromthe embarrassment caused by its ill-timed and boastful pretensionsto the line of 54° 40´ was a difficult and delicate task. Toaccomplish it, Mr. Buchanan had recourse to the original and longdisused habit of asking the Senate's advice in advance of negotiatingthe treaty, instead of taking the ordinary but at that time perilousresponsibility of first negotiating the treaty, and then submittingit to the Senate for approval. As a leading Northern Democrat, with an established reputation and a promising future, Mr. Buchananwas instinctively reluctant to take the lead in surrendering theposition which his party had so defiantly maintained during thecanvass for the Presidency in 1844, and which he had, as Secretaryof State, re-affirmed in a diplomatic paper of marked ability. When the necessity came to retreat, Mr. Buchanan was anxious thatthe duty of publicly lowering the colors should not be left to him. His device, therefore, shifted the burden from his own shoulders, and placed it on the broader ones of the Senate. 

Political management could not have been more clever. It savedMr. Buchanan in large degree from the opprobrium visited on so manyleading Democrats for their precipitate retreat on the Oregonquestion, and commended him at the same time to a class of Democratswho had never before been his supporters. General Cass, in orderto save himself as a senator from the responsibility of surrenderingour claim to 54° 40´, assumed a very warlike attitude, erroneouslysupposing that popularity might be gained by the advocacy of arupture with England. Mr. Buchanan was wiser. He held the middlecourse. He had ably sustained our claim to the whole of Oregon, and now, in the interest of peace, gracefully yielded to a compromisewhich the Senate, after mature deliberation, had advised. Hiscourse saved the administration, not indeed from a mortifyingposition, but from a continually increasing embarrassment whichseemed to force upon the country the cruel alternatives of war ordishonor. 

 THE PRESIDENT AND MR. BUCHANAN. 

Mr. Polk was, from some cause, incapable of judging Mr. Buchanangenerously. He seems to have regarded his Secretary of State asalways willing to save himself at the expense of others. He didnot fail to perceive that Mr. Buchanan had come out of the Oregontrouble with more credit, at least with less loss, than any otherman prominently identified with its agitation and settlement. Thiswas not pleasing to the President. He had evidently not concealedhis distrust from the outset, and had cumbered his offer of acabinet position with conditions which seemed derogatory to thedignity of Mr. Buchanan, --conditions which a man of spirit mightwell have resented. He informed Mr. Buchanan that, as he should"take no part himself between gentlemen of the Democratic partywho might become aspirants to the Presidency, " he desired that "nomember of the cabinet should do so. " He indeed expressed himselfto Mr. Buchanan in a manner so peremptory as to be offensive:"Should any member of my cabinet become a candidate for the Presidencyor Vice-Presidency of the United States, it will be expected onthe happening of such an event that he will retire from the cabinet. "Remembering that Madison, Monroe and John Quincy Adams had eachbeen nominated for the Presidency while holding the position ofSecretary of State in the cabinet of his predecessor, Mr. Polk wasattaching a new and degrading condition to the incumbency of thatoffice. 

Mr. Polk did not stop with one exaction. Addressing Mr. Buchananas if he were about to become a department clerk, he informed himthat he disapproved "the practice which has sometimes prevailed ofcabinet officers absenting themselves for long periods from theseat of government, " and practically demanded a pledge that Mr. Buchanan would remain at his post, and be punctual in the dischargeof his official duties. In reading Mr. Polk's letter, the inferenceseems natural that he felt under some pressing obligation to tenderto Mr. Buchanan the appointment of secretary of State, but desiredto accompany it with conditions which would subordinate him in thegeneral conduct of the administration. With a spirit of docility, if not humility, altogether incomprehensible, Mr. Buchanan "acceptedthe position cheerfully and cordially _on the terms on which theoffer was made. _"

It is not surprising that, after agreeing to enter Mr. Polk'scabinet on these conditions, Mr. Buchanan had abundant reason tocomplain afterwards that the President did not treat him with"delicacy and confidence. " On several occasions he was on thepoint of resigning his position. He was especially aggrieved thatthe President refused to nominate him to the Supreme Bench in 1846as the successor of Henry Baldwin. In view of Mr. Buchanan'scareer, both before and after that time, it seems strange that heshould have desired the position. It seems stranger still thatMr. Polk, after refusing to appoint him, should have nominatedGeorge W. Woodward, a Pennsylvania Democrat, who was unacceptableto Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Polk, however, appreciated the temperamentof Mr. Buchanan, and apparently knew how much he would endurewithout resentment. While his presence in the cabinet was evidentlynot a source of pleasure to the President, he realized that itbrought character, strength, and power to the administration. Mr. Buchanan was an older man than Mr. Polk, was superior to himintellectually, had seen a longer and more varied public service, and enjoyed a higher personal standing throughout the country. 

The timidity of Mr. Buchanan's nature made him the servant of theadministration when, with boldness, he might have been its master. Had he chosen to tender his resignation in resentment of histreatment by Mr. Polk, the administration would have been seriouslyembarrassed. There was, at the time, no Northern Democrat of thesame rank to succeed him, except General Cass, and he was ineligibleby reason of his uncompromising attitude on the Oregon question. Mr. Polk could not call a Southern man to the State Department solong as Robert J. Walker was at the head of the Treasury. He couldnot promote Mr. Marcy from the War Department without increasingthe discontent already dangerously developed in the ranks of theNew-York Democracy. Mr. Buchanan, therefore, held absolute controlof the situation had he chosen to assert himself. This he failedto do, and continued to lend his aid to an administration whosepolicy was destroying him in his own State, and whose patronagewas persistently used to promote the fortunes of his rivals andhis enemies. 

Mr. Polk was by singular fortune placed at the head of one of themost vigorous and important administrations in the history of thegovernment. He had not been trained in the higher duties ofstatesmanship, and was not personally equal to the weightyresponsibilities which devolved upon him. He was overshadowed bythe ability of at least three members of his cabinet, and was keenlysensible of their superiority. He had, however, a certain aptitudefor affairs, was industrious, and in personal character abovereproach. Mr. Webster described him with accuracy when he spokeof him as "respectable but never eminent. "

 EARLY CAREER OF JAMES K. POLK. 

When first elected to the House of Representatives in 1824, Mr. Polk was but twenty-nine years of age. He was re-elected continuouslyfor fourteen years. He was one of the most pronounced adherentsof Jackson, and joined in the extreme and unreasonable oppositionto the administration of John Quincy Adams. The period of hisservice in the House was distinguished by partisanship of a morebigoted and vindictive type than prevailed at any other time inthe history of that body. He was Speaker during the last Congressof Jackson's Presidency and during the first under the administrationof Van Buren. When the Whig members forced an inquiry in to theconduct of Samuel Swartwout, the defaulting collector of customsfor the port of New York, --a case which figured prominently in theexciting Presidential canvass of 1840, --they would not trust Mr. Polk with the duty of naming the committee of investigation. TheHouse itself exercised the power of appointment, to the greatdisparagement of the Speaker. 

When Mr. Polk closed his service in the Chair, at the end of theTwenty-fifth Congress, no Whig member could be found who was willingto move the customary resolution of thanks, --an act of courtesywhich derives its chief grace by coming from a political opponent. When the resolution was presented by a Democratic Representativefrom the South, it was opposed in debate by prominent Whig members. Henry A. Wise, who five years later supported Mr. Polk for thePresidency, desired to have the resolution peremptorily ruled outon a point of order. Sergeant S. Prentiss, the incomparablybrilliant member from Mississippi, attacked it most violently. His impassioned invective did not stop short of personal indignityand insult to Mr. Polk. He denied with emphatic iteration thatthe Speaker had been "impartial. " On the contrary he had been "thetool of the Executive, the tool of his party. " He analyzed Mr. Polk's course in the appointment of committees, and with much detaillabored to prove his narrowness, his unfairness, his injustice asa presiding officer. For one, he said, he was "not wiling to giveto Mr. Polk a certificate of good behaviour, to aid him in hiscanvass for the governorship of Tennessee, for which he is knownto be a candidate. " He believed "this vote of thanks was to beused as so much capital, on which to do political business, " andhe declared with much vehemence that he "was not disposed to furnishit. "

The opprobrious language of Prentiss did not wound Mr. Polk soseriously as did the vote of the House on the resolution of thanks. The Whigs, as a party, resisted its adoption. The Democrats couldnot even bring the House to a vote upon the resolution without theuse of the _previous question_, and this, as a witty observerremarked, was about as humiliating as to be compelled to call the_previous question_ on resolutions of respect for a deceased member. When the demand was made for "the main question to be put, " theWhigs, apparently eager to force the issue to the bitter end, calledfor the _ayes_ and _noes_. John Quincy Adams, who headed the roll, led off in the negative, and was sustained by such able andconservative members as John Bell from Mr. Polk's own State, McKennanof Pennsylvania, Evans of Maine, Corwin of Ohio, Menifee from theAshland district in Kentucky, and William Cost Johnson of Maryland. The vote stood 92 to 75. Mr. Polk had been chosen Speaker by amajority of thirteen. The Whigs had thus practically consolidatedtheir party against a vote of courtesy to the presiding officer ofthe House. 

Mr. Polk's situation was in the highest degree embarrassing, buthe behaved with admirable coolness and self-possession. He returnedhis thanks to the "majority of the House, " which had adopted theresolution, significantly emphasizing the word "majority. " He saidhe regarded the vote just given "as of infinitely more value thanthe common, matter-of-course, customary resolution which, in thecourtesy usually prevailing in parliamentary bodies, is passed atthe close of their deliberations. " His reference "to the courtesyusually prevailing in parliamentary bodies" was made, as an eye-witness relates, with "telling accent, and with a manner that wasvery disconcerting to the Whigs. " His address was scrupulouslyconfined to "the majority of the House, " and to the end Mr. Polkexhibited, as was said at the time, "a magnificent contempt forthe insulting discourtesy of the Whigs. "

 EARLY CAREER OF JAMES K. POLK. 

The incident was made very prominent in the ensuing canvass inTennessee, where Mr. Polk won a signal victory, and was installedas governor. The Democrats treated the action of the House as adeliberate insult, not merely to the Speaker, but to his State, and not only to his State, but to the venerable ex-president, whoseresidence at the Hermitage, in the judgment of his devoted followers, made Tennessee illustrious and almost sacred ground. Jacksonhimself was roused to intense indignation, and, though beyondthreescore and ten, was active and unceasing in his efforts toinsure a victory to Mr. Polk. The contest, though local in itsessential character, attracted observation and interest far beyondthe borders of the State. 

The political importance of Mr. Polk was enhanced by the proscriptivecourse of his opponents in the House of Representatives. Therefusal to join in the resolution of thanks operated in a mannerquite contrary to the expectations of the Whigs, and was indeedeffectively turned against them. The generous instincts of thepeople condemned an attempt to destroy the honorable fame of apublic man by what they considered to be an act of spitefulpersecution. It was the opinion of John Bell, who of all men hadthe best opportunity for impartial judgment in the premises, thatthe vote of himself and his fellow Whigs on the resolution was anindirect but potential cause of Mr. Polk's nomination and electionto the Presidency. It gave him prominence as a friend of Jackson, and made him available as a candidate against Van Buren for theDemocratic nomination. The opponents of the latter instinctivelyknew that it would be dangerous to defeat him with any one who didnot stand well with Van Buren's powerful patron. The events of1839 and 1844 in the life of Mr. Polk have therefore an interestingrelation to each other. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Review (_continued_). --Relations with Mexico. --General Taylormarches his Army to the Rio Grande. --First Encounter with theMexican Army. --Excitement in the United States. --Congress declaresWar against Mexico. --Ill Temper of the Whigs. --Defeat of theDemocrats in the Congressional Elections of 1846. --Policy of Mr. Polk in Regard to Acquisition of Territory from Mexico. --Three-Million Bill. --The Famous Anti-slavery Proviso moved by DavidWilmot. --John Quincy Adams. --His Public Service. --Robert C. Winthropchosen Speaker. --Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. --Presidential Electionof 1848. --Effort of the Administration to make a Democratic Heroout of the Mexican War. --Thomas H. Benton for Lieutenant-General. --Bill defeated. --Nomination of General Taylor for the Presidencyby the Whigs. --Nomination of General Cass by the Democratic Party. --Van Buren refuses to support him. --Democratic Bolt in New York. --Buffalo Convention and the Organization of the Free-soil Party. --Nomination of Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams. --Mr. Clay'sDiscontent. --Mr. Webster's Speech at Marshfield. --General Taylorelected. --The Barnburners of New York. --Character and Public Servicesof Mr. Van Buren. 

By a suggestive coincidence, the practical abandonment of the lineof 54° 40´ by the administration was contemporaneous with theoutbreak of the Mexican war. The modified resolution of notice toGreat Britain was finally passed in both branches of Congress onthe 23d of April, and on the succeeding day the first blood wasshed in that contest between the two Republics which was destinedto work such important results in the future and fortunes of both. 

The army of occupation in Texas, commanded by General ZacharyTaylor, had, during the preceding winter, been moving westward withthe view of encamping in the valley of the Rio Grande. On the 28thof March General Tyler took up his position on the banks of theriver, opposite Matamoros, and strengthened himself by the erectionfield-works. General Ampudia, in command of the Mexican armystationed at Matamoros, was highly excited by the arrival of theAmerican army, and on the 12th of April notified General Taylor tobreak up his camp within twenty-four hours, and to retire beyondthe Nueces River. In the event of his failure to comply with thesedemands, Ampudia announced that "arms, and arms alone, must decidethe question. " According to the persistent claim of the MexicanGovernment, the Nueces River was the western boundary of Texas;and the territory between that river and the Rio Grande--a breadthof one hundred and fifty miles on the coast--was held by Mexico tobe a part of her domain, and General Taylor consequently an invaderof her soil. No reply was made to Ampudia; and on the 24th ofApril General Arista, who had succeeded to the command of theMexican army, advised General Taylor that "he considered hostilitiescommenced, and should prosecute them. "

 BEGINNING OF MEXICAN WAR. 

Directly after this notification was received, General Taylordispatched a party of dragoons, sixty-three in number, officersand men, up the valley of the Rio Grande, to ascertain whether theMexicans had crossed the river. They encountered a force muchlarger than their own, and after a short engagement, in which someseventeen were killed and wounded, the Americans were surrounded, and compelled to surrender. When intelligence of this affairreached the United States, the war-spirit rose high among thepeople. "Our country has been invaded, " and "American blood spilledon American soil, " were the cries heard on every side. In the veryheight of this first excitement, without waiting to know whetherthe Mexican Government would avow or disavow the hostile act, President Polk, on the 11th of May, sent a most aggressive messageto Congress, "invoking its prompt action to recognize the existenceof war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the meansof prosecuting the contest with vigor, and thus hastening therestoration of peace. " As soon as the message was read in theHouse, a bill was introduced authorizing the President to call outa force of fifty thousand men, and giving him all the requisitepower to organize, arm, and equip them. The preamble declared that"war existed by the act of Mexico, " and this gave rise to an animatedand somewhat angry discussion. The Whigs felt that they were placedin an embarrassing attitude. They must either vote for what theydid not believe, or, by voting against the bill, incur the odiumwhich always attaches to the party that fails by a hair's-breadthto come to the defense of the country when war is imminent. 

Prominent Whigs believed, that, as an historical and geographicalfact, the river Nueces was the western boundary of Texas, and thatthe President, by assuming the responsibility of sending an armyof occupation into the country west of that river, pending negotiationswith Mexico, had taken a hostile and indefensible step. But allagreed that it was too late to consider any thing except the honorof the country, now that actual hostilities had begun. The positionof the Whigs was as clearly defined by their speakers as waspracticable in the brief space allowed for discussion of the warbill. Against the protest of many, it was forced to a vote, aftera two hours' debate. The administration expected the declarationto be unanimous; but there were fourteen members of the House whoaccepted the responsibility of defying the war feeling of thecountry by voting "no"--an act which required no small degree ofmoral courage and personal independence. John Quincy Adams headedthe list. The other gentlemen were all Northern Whigs, or pronouncedFree-Soilers. 

The Senate considered the bill on the ensuing day, and passed itafter a very able debate, in which Mr. Calhoun bore a leading part. He earnestly deprecated the necessity of the war, though accusedby Benton of plotting to bring it on. Forty senators voted forit, and but two against it, --Thomas Clayton of Delaware and JohnDavis of Massachusetts. Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky and Mr. Uphamof Vermont, when their names were called, responded, "Ay, exceptthe preamble. " The bill was promptly approved by the President, and on the 13th of May, 1846, the two Republics were declared tobe at war. In the South and West, from the beginning, the war waspopular. In the North and East it was unpopular. The gallantbearing of our army, however, changed in large degree the feelingin sections where the war had been opposed. No finer body of menever enlisted in an heroic enterprise than those who volunteeredto bear the flag in Mexico. They were young, ardent, enthusiastic, brave almost to recklessness, with a fervor of devotion to theircountry's honor. The march of Taylor from the Rio Grande, endingwith the unexpected victory against superior numbers at Buena Vista, kept the country in a state of excitement and elation, and in thesucceeding year elevated him to the Presidency. Not less splendidin its succession of victories was the march of Scott from VeraCruz to the city of Mexico, where he closed his triumphal journeyby taking possession of the capital, and enabling his governmentto dictate terms of peace. 

 DEMOCRATIC DEFEAT IN 1846. 

For the first and only time in our political history, an administrationconducting a war victorious at every step, steadily lost ground inthe country. The House of Representatives which declared war onthe 11th of May, 1846, was Democratic by a large majority. TheHouse, elected in the ensuing autumn, amid the resounding acclamationsof Taylor's memorable victory at Monterey, had a decided Whigmajority. This political reverse was due to three causes, --theenactment of the tariff of 1846, which offended the manufacturinginterest of the country; the receding of the administration on theOregon question, which embarrassed the position and wounded thepride of the Northern Democrats; and the wide-spread apprehensionthat the war was undertaken for the purpose of extending andperpetuating slavery. The almost unanimous Southern vote for thehasty surrender of the line of 54° 40´, on which so much had beenstaked in the Presidential campaign, gave the Whigs an advantagein the popular canvass. The contrast between the boldness withwhich the Polk administration had marched our army upon the territoryclaimed by Mexico, and the prudence with which it had retreatedfrom a contest with Great Britain, after all our antecedent boasting, exposed the Democrats to merciless ridicule. Clever speakers whowere numerous in the Whig party at that day did not fail to seeand seize their advantage. 

The Mexican war had scarcely begun when the President justifiedthe popular suspicion by making known to Congress that one of itsobjects was to be the acquisition of territory beyond the RioGrande. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that he expected suchacquisition to be one of its results. He ably vindicated the policyof marching a military force into the territory between the Nuecesand the Rio Grande, by the fact that he was memorialized to do soby the still existing Congress of Texas, on the urgent plea thatMexico was preparing to move upon the territory with a view to itsrecapture. In this Congress of Texas, the same body that completedthe annexation, there were representatives from the territory indispute beyond the Nueces; and the President felt that they werein an eminent degree entitled to the protection of our government. Events were so hurried that in three months from the formaldeclaration of war, and before any victory of decisive significancehad been achieved, the President sent a special message to Congress, in which he suggested that "the chief obstacle to be surmounted insecuring peace would be the adjustment of a boundary that wouldprove satisfactory and convenient to both republics. " He admittedthat we ought to pay a fair equivalent for any concessions whichmight be made by Mexico, and asked that a sum of money should beplaced in his hands to be paid to Mexico immediately upon theratification of a treaty of peace. As a precedent for this unusualrequest, the President cited the example of Mr. Jefferson in askingand receiving from Congress, in 1803, a special appropriation ofmoney, to be expended at his discretion. As soon as the readingof the message was concluded, Mr. McKay of North Carolina, chairmanof the committee of ways and means, introduced a bill, withoutpreamble or explanation, directing that two millions of dollars beappropriated, to be "applied under the direction of the Presidentto any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in our foreignintercourse. " The war was not referred to, Mexico was not named, and the simple phraseology of the Jefferson Act of 1803 was repeatedword for word. 

A very animated debate followed, in which Northern men took thelead. Mr. Robert C. Winthrop spoke of the administration withunwonted harshness, declaring that "it and its friends had thoughtfit, during the present session, to frame more than one of theseimportant measures, so as to leave their opponents in a falseposition whichever way they voted. " . . . He "could not and wouldnot vote for this bill as it now stood. . . . It was a vote ofunlimited confidence in an administration in which, he was sorryto say, there was very little confidence to be placed. " Mr. JohnQuincy Adams differed from Mr. Winthrop, and could not refrain froma pardonable thrust at that gentleman for his previous vote that"war existed by act of Mexico. " He differed from his colleague, Mr. Adams demurely affirmed, with a regret equal to that with whichhe had differed from him on the bill by which war was declared. He should not vote for this bill in any form, but suggested thatit be so amended as to specify expressly that the money is grantedfor the purpose of negotiating peace with Mexico. 

 THE WILMOT PROVISO. 

The bill was promptly modified in accordance with the desires ofMr. Adams, and at the moment when its passage seemed secure it wasarrested by an amendment of momentous character, submitted by ayoung member from Pennsylvania. David Wilmot represented a districtwhich had always given Democratic majorities, and was himself anintense partisan of that political school. He was a man of strong_physique_ and strong common sense; of phlegmatic temperament, without any pretension to genius; a sensible speaker, with no claimto eloquence or oratory. But he had courage, determination, andhonesty. He believed the time had come to arrest the progress andextension of slavery. He knew that the two-million bill was urgedby the President because he wished to use the money to promote theacquisition of territory, and he determined then and there to makea stand in favor of free soil. He thereupon, on the 8th of August, 1846, moved a _proviso_ to the two-million bill, declaring it tobe "an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of anyterritory from Mexico, that neither slavery nor involuntary servitudeshall ever exist therein. "

Mr. Wilmot was in the first session of his first Congress, was butthirty-three years of age, and up to that moment had not been knownbeyond his district. His amendment made his name familiar at oncethroughout the length and breadth of the Republic. No questionhad arisen since the slavery agitation of 1820 that was so elaboratelydebated. The Wilmot Proviso absorbed the attention of Congressfor a longer time than the Missouri Compromise: it produced a widerand deeper excitement in the country, and it threatened a moreserious danger to the peace and integrity of the Union. Theconsecration of the territory of the United States to freedom becamefrom that day a rallying cry for every shade of anti-slaverysentiment. If it did not go as far as the Abolitionists in theirextreme and uncompromising faith might demand, it yet took a longstep forward, and afforded the ground on which the battle of thegiants was to be waged, and possibly decided. The feeling in allsections became intense on the issue thus presented, and it proveda sword which cleft asunder political associations that had beenclose and intimate for a lifetime. Both the old parties werelargely represented on each side of the question. The NorthernWhigs, at the outset, generally sustained the proviso, and theNorthern Democrats divided, with the majority against it. In theslave States both parties were against it, only two men south ofMason and Dixon's line voting for free soil, --John M. Clayton ofDelaware in the Senate, and Henry Grider of Kentucky in the House. Mr. Grider re-entered Congress as a Republican after the war. Among the conspicuous Whigs who voted for the proviso were JosephR. Ingersoll and James Pollock of Pennsylvania, Washington Hunt ofNew York, Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, Robert C. Schenckof Ohio, and Truman Smith of Connecticut. Among the Democrats wereHannibal Hamlin, and all his colleagues from Maine, Simon Cameronof Pennsylvania, Preston King of New York, John Wentworth ofIllinois, Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, and Robert McClelland ofMichigan, afterwards Secretary of the Interior under PresidentPierce. 

Mr. Webster voted for the proviso, but with gloomy apprehensions. He could "see little of the future, and that little gave him nosatisfaction. " He spoke with portentous gravity, and arrested theattention of the country by the solemnity of his closing words:"All I can scan is contention, strife, and agitation. The futureis full of difficulties and full of dangers. We appear to berushing on perils headlong, and with our eyes all open. " Therewas a singular disagreement between the speech and the vote of Mr. Webster. The speech indicated his real position. His vote was indeference to the opinion of Massachusetts. The most conspicuousNorthern Whigs who voted against the proviso were Alexander Ramseyof Pennsylvania, since the distinguished Republican senator fromMinnesota, and Secretary of War under President Hayes; and SamuelF. Vinton of Ohio, one of the oldest and ablest representatives inCongress. 

The House attached the proviso to the two-million bill, and thusdefeated it for the session. The Democratic Senate took it up onthe day fixed for final adjournment. The majority were not willingto accept the appropriation with the anti-slavery condition uponit, and John Davis of Massachusetts, fearing if the bill went backto the House the proviso might on reconsideration be defeated, deliberately held the floor until the session expired. In the nextsession the two-million bill, increased to three millions, waspassed without the proviso, the administration being strong enough, with the persuasions of its patronage, to defeat the anti-slaveryamendment in both branches. 

During the proceedings on the three-million bill, an interestingand instructive incident occurred. The venerable John Quincy Adamsappeared in the House for the first time during the session, onthe 13th of February (1847), having been detained by a very severeillness. As he passed inside the door the entire House voluntarilyrose, business was suspended, and Mr. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee(afterwards President of the United States), addressing the Chair, said, that in compliance with the understanding with which heselected a seat at the beginning of the session, he now tenderedit to the venerable member from Massachusetts, and congratulatedhim on being spared to return to the House. Mr. Adams, enfeebledby disease, tremulous with age, returned his thanks, regrettingthat he had not "voice to respond to the congratulations of hisfriends for the honor which had been done him. " Among those whopaid this unusual, indeed unprecedented, mark of respect to a fellow-member, were many from the South, who within a few years had votedto censure Mr. Adams, and had endeavored in every way to heapobloquy upon him for his persistent course in presenting anti-slavery petitions. Spontaneous in impulse, momentary in duration, simple in form, it was yet one of the most striking tributes everpaid to moral dignity and lofty character. 

 PUBLIC LIFE OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. 

Mr. Adams was nearing the end of his illustrious life, and a yearlater was stricken down in the seat which had been so graciouslytendered him. His career was in many respects remarkable. He hadbeen minister to five different European courts, senator of theUnited States, appointed to the Supreme Bench, had been eight yearsSecretary of State, and four years President. His opportunitieswere great, his advantages rare, his natural abilities strong. Tothose he added a high standard of morality, and a love and enduranceof labor possessed by few. But it may fairly be doubted whether, if his Presidency had closed his public life, his fame would haveattracted special observation. He would scarcely have ranked aboveMonroe, and would have borne no comparison with Madison. In theSenate he had made no impression. His service abroad was one ofindustrious routine. His career as Secretary of State was notspecially distinguished. The only two treaties of marked importancethat were negotiated during his incumbency, were carried, on testquestions, by the Cabinet against his judgment. His dispatcheshave been little quoted as precedents. His diplomatic discussionswere not triumphs. Indeed, he was not felicitous with his pen, and suffers by contrast with some who preceded him and many whofollowed him in that office. But in his sixty-fifth year, whenthe public life of the most favored draws to a close, the nobleand shining career of Mr. Adams began. He entered the House ofRepresentatives in 1831, and for the remainder of his life, a periodof seventeen years, he was the one grand figure in that assembly. His warfare against those who would suppress free speech, his heroiccontest in favor of the right of the humblest to petition forredress of grievances, are among the memorable events in theparliamentary history of the United States. The amplitude of hisknowledge, his industry, his unflagging zeal, his biting sarcasm, his power to sting and destroy without himself showing passion, made a combination of qualities as rare as it was formidable. Hisprevious career had been one of eminent respectability, to be coldlyadmired and forgotten. His service in the House gave him a nameas enduring as the Republic whose history he adorned. 

In breadth and thoroughness of learning, Mr. Adams surpassed allhis contemporaries in public life. His essays, orations, andaddresses were surprisingly numerous, and upon a great variety ofsubjects. It cannot be said, however, that he contributed anything to the permanent literature of the country. Nor, in a trueestimate of his extraordinary career in Congress, can it be assertedthat he attained the first rank as a parliamentary debater. Itmust be borne in mind that much of his fame in the House ofRepresentatives was derived from the nature of the one questionwith which he became so conspicuously identified. It was in largedegree the moral courage of his position which first fixed theattention of the country and then attracted its admiration. Themen with whom he had exciting scenes in regard to the "right ofpetition" and its cognate issues were in no case the leadingstatesmen of the day. Wise, Bynum, Dromgoole, Pinckney, Lewis, Thomas F. Marshall, and the other Southern representatives withwhom Mr. Adams came in conflict, were ready and brilliant men, butwere far below the first rank of debaters. Indeed, with fewexceptions, the really eminent debaters were in the Senate duringthe period of Mr. Adams's service in the House. Mr. Clay, Mr. Webster, Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Benton, Mr. Hayne, Mr. Silas Wright, Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Watkins Leigh, Mr. Rives, Mr. Choate, Mr. John M. Clayton, Mr. Berrien, were an altogether higher andabler class of men than those with whom Mr. Adams had his frequentwrangles in the House. The weapons which he so successfully employedagainst the young "fire-eaters" would have proved pointless andvalueless in a contest with any one of the eminent men who in thatlong period gave character to the Senate. 

The only time Mr. Adams ever crossed swords in the House with aman of commanding power was in the famous discussion of January, 1836, with George Evans of Maine. Mr. Adams had made a covert butangry attack on Mr. Webster for his opposition to the FortificationBill in the preceding Congress, when President Jackson was makingsuch energetic demonstrations of his readiness to go to war withFrance. To the surprise of his best friends, Mr. Adams warmlysustained Jackson in his belligerent correspondence with thegovernment of Louis Philippe. His position probably cost him aseat in the United States Senate for which he was then a candidate. Mr. Webster preferred John Davis, who had the preceding year beatenMr. Adams in the contest for governor of Massachusetts. Thesecircumstances were believed at the time to be the inciting causefor the assault on Mr. Webster. The duty of replying devolved onMr. Evans. The debate attracted general attention, and the victoryof Mr. Evans was everywhere recognized. The _Globe_ for the Twenty-fourth Congress contains a full report of both speeches. Thestirring events of forty years have not destroyed their interestor their freshness. The superior strength, the higher order ofeloquence, the greater mastery of the art of debate, will be foundin the speech of Mr. Evans. 

 GEORGE EVANS AS A DEBATER. 

As a parliamentary debater, using that term in its true significationand with its proper limitations, George Evans is entitled to highrank. He entered the House in 1829, at thirty-two years of age, and served until 1841, when he was transferred to the Senate. Heretired from that body in 1847. Upon entering the Senate, he wascomplimented with a distinction never before or since conferred ona new member. He was placed at the head of the Committee on Finance, taking rank above the long list of prominent Whigs, who then composedthe majority in the chamber. The tenacity with which the rightsof seniority are usually maintained by senators enhances the valueof the compliment to Mr. Evans. Mr. Clay, who had been serving aschairman of the committee, declined in his favor with the remarkthat "Mr. Evans knew more about the finances than any other publicman in the United States. " The ability and skill displayed by Mr. Evans in carrying the tariff bill of 1842 through the Senate, fullyjustified the high encomiums bestowed by Mr. Clay. The oppositionwhich he led four years after to the tariff bill of 1846 gave Mr. Evans still higher reputation, though the measure was unexpectedlycarried by the casting vote of the Vice-President. 

When Mr. Evans's term of service drew near to its close, Mr. Websterpaid him the extraordinary commendation of saying in the Senatethat "his retirement would be a serious loss to the government andthe country. " He pronounced the speech just then delivered by Mr. Evans, on the finances, to be "incomparable. " The "senator fromMaine, " continued Mr. Webster, "has devoted himself especially tostudying and comprehending the revenue and finances of the country, and he understand that subject as well as any gentleman connectedwith the government since the days of Gallatin and Crawford, --nay, as well as either of those gentlemen understood it. " This was thehighest praise from the highest source! Of all who have representedNew England in the Senate, Mr. Evans, as a debater, is entitled torank next to Mr. Webster!

The next Congress met in December, 1847. Besides the venerable ex-president, there were two future Presidents among its members--Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. Mr. Robert C. Winthrop waschosen Speaker. He was nominated in the Whig caucus over SamuelF. Vinton of Ohio, because he had voted for the Wilmot Proviso, and Mr. Vinton against it. * Mr. Vinton was senior in age and longsenior in service to Mr. Winthrop. Mr. Vinton had entered theHouse in 1823 and Mr. Winthrop in 1840. Mr. Vinton had moreoverbeen selected as the Whig candidate for Speaker in the precedingCongress, when that party was in minority. The decision againsthim now created no little feeling in Whig circles, especially inthe West where he was widely known and highly esteemed. But, whileMr. Winthrop was rewarded by this nomination for his vote in favorof the Wilmot Proviso, the more pronounced anti-slavery men werehostile to him. In the end he owed his election to timely aid fromSouthern Whigs. This fact, no doubt, had its effect on Mr. Winthrop'smind, and with other influences tended to separate him rapidly andconclusively from the anti-slavery wing of the Whig party. 

It would, however, be unjust to Mr. Winthrop not to recognize thatthe chief reason for his selection as Speaker was his pre-eminentfitness for the important post. He was a young man, and, otherconditions being equal, young men have been uniformly preferredfor the arduous duties of the Chair. From the organization of thegovernment the speakers, at the time of their first election, havebeen under forty-five years of age, --many, indeed, under forty. In only four instances have men been selected beyond the age offifty. Mr. Clay when first chosen was but thirty-four, Mr. Polkthirty-nine, Mr. John Bell thirty-seven, Mr. Howell Cobb thirty-three, and Mr. Robert M. T. Hunter, the youngest man ever electedSpeaker, was but thirty. Mr. Winthrop was thirty-eight. He wasbred to the law in the office of Mr. Webster, but at twenty-fiveyears of age entered political life as a member of the MassachusettsHouse of Representatives. He was soon after promoted to thespeakership of that body, where he earned so valuable a reputationas a presiding officer that some of his decisions have been quotedas precedents in the National House, and have been incorporated inpermanent works on Parliamentary Law. He was chosen in Congresswhen he was but thirty, and was in his fifth term in the House whenhe was advanced to the Speakership. As an orator he was alwaysgraceful and effective, but never took high rank in the House asa debater. His early life gave promise of a long public career inMassachusetts as the successor of the older Whig leaders who werepassing off the stage. He followed Mr. Webster in the Senate fora brief period, when the latter became Secretary of State underMr. Fillmore. His conservative tendencies on the Slavery question, however, were not in harmony with the demands of public opinion inMassachusetts, and in 1851 he was defeated for the governorship byGeorge S. Boutwell, and for the senatorship by Charles Sumner. Mr. Winthrop's political career closed when he was forty-two yearsof age. 

 WHIGS ABANDON THE WILMOT PROVISO. 

The events of the year 1847 had persuaded the Whig leaders that, if they persisted in the policy embodied in the Wilmot Proviso, they would surrender all power to control the ensuing Presidentialelection. By clever management and the avoidance of issues whichinvolved the slavery question, they felt reasonably sure of thevotes of Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee, with a probability of securing Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida. To throw these States away by an anti-slavery crusade was to acceptinevitable defeat, and disband the Whig party. Mr. Winthrop wastherefore representing the prevailing wishes of Northern Whigs whenhe used his influence to restrain rather than promote the developmentof the anti-slavery policy which had been initiated with such vigor. The result of this change was soon visible. In the preceding House, with a large Democratic majority, the Wilmot Proviso had beenadopted. In the Whig House, over which Mr. Winthrop presided, itwas found impossible to repeat the vote during the preparationsfor the national contest then impending. The treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, by which we acquired a vast territory from Mexico, wasratified by the Senate, and the House voted the fifteen millionsdemanded by it without adding a restriction of any kind on thesubject of slavery. Every acre of the nine hundred thousand squaremiles was free territory while under the rule of Mexico, and theCommissioners of that government were extremely anxious that theUnited States should give a guaranty that its character in thisrespect should not be changed. They urged that to see slaveryrecognized upon soil once owned by Mexico would be so abhorrent tothat government as it would be to the United States to see theSpanish Inquisition established upon it. Mr. Nicholas F. Trist, the American commissioner, gave a reply which a free Republic readswith increasing amazement. He declared that if the territoryproposed to be ceded "were increased tenfold in value, and, inaddition to that, covered a foot thick with pure gold, on the singlecondition that slavery should be forever excluded, " he would not"entertain the offer for a moment, nor even think of sending it tohis government. No American President would dare to submit sucha treaty to the Senate. "

With this suppression, if not indeed re-action, of the popularfeeling in the North, on the subject of slavery, the two greatparties approached the Presidential election of 1848. Each wasunder peculiar embarrassment in the selection of a candidate, andthe presentation of the principles on which support was to be asked. The anomaly presented in the Congressional election of 1846, wherean administration conducting a successful war was defeated beforethe people, promised to be repeated. The Democratic party hadprecipitated the war, had organized the military force that prosecutedit, had controlled its immense patronage, and had brought it to avictorious conclusion, yet had gained no political strength in thecountry. The two gallant soldiers who had so largely shared, ifindeed they had not absorbed, its glory, were Whigs, and both werein ill-humor with the administration. After the battle of BuenaVista, Taylor's victorious progress had been checked and his armycrippled by orders from Washington, which reduced his force, andturned the Regulars over to Scott. Scott ended his brilliantcampaign in a flagrant quarrel with the Secretary of War, and wassummoned home peremptorily with the prospect of a court-martial. He was ordered to leave General William O. Butler, a Democraticgeneral, in command of the army in the city of Mexico after resistancehad ceased. 

 DEMOCRATIC OFFICERS IN MEXICAN WAR. 

The administration had obviously endeavored from the first to createa Democratic hero out of the war. Authorized to appoint a largenumber of officers in the increased military force, raised directlyby the United States, an unjust discrimination was made in favorof Democrats. Thus William O. Butler, John A. Quitman, and GideonJ. Pillow, prominent Democratic leaders in their respective States, were appointed Major-generals directly from civil life. JosephLane, James Shields, Franklin Pierce, George Cadwalader, CalebCushing, Enos D. Hopping, and Sterling Price, were selected forthe high rank of Brigadier-general. Not one Whig was included, and not one of the Democratic appointees had seen service in thefield, or possessed the slightest pretension to military education. Such able graduates of West Point as Henry Clay, jun. , and WilliamR. McKee, were compelled to seek service through State appointmentsin volunteer regiments, while Albert Sidney Johnston, subsequentlyproved to be one of the ablest commanders ever sent from the MilitaryAcademy, could not obtain a commission from the General Government. In the war between Mexico and Texas, by which the latter had securedits independence, Johnston had held high command, and was perhapsthe best equipped soldier, both by education and service, to befound in the entire country outside the regular army at the timeof the Mexican war. General Taylor urged the President to giveJohnston command of one of the ten new regiments. Johnston tookno part in politics; but his eminent brother, Josiah StoddardJohnston, long a senator from Louisiana, was Mr. Clay's most intimatefriend in public life, and General Taylor's letter was not evenanswered. The places were wanted for adherents of the administration, and Tibbatts of Kentucky, Jere Clemens of Alabama, Milledge L. Bonham of South Carolina, Seymour of Connecticut, and men of thatgrade, --eminent in civil life, active partisans, but with no militarytraining, --were preferred to the most experienced soldiers. Thisfact disfigures the energetic record of Mr. Marcy as secretary ofWar, and was eminently discreditable to the President and all hisadvisers. 

Perhaps the most inexcusable blunder of the administration was theattempt to take Thomas H. Benton from the Senate, where he washonored, eminent, and useful, make him Lieutenant-general, and sendhim out to Mexico to supersede both Scott and Taylor in command ofthe army. The bill to enable this to be done actually passed theHouse. When under discussion in that branch, a prominent Democraticmember from Ohio declared, as one reason for passing the bill, thattwo of the generals are opposed politically to the Democratic party, and "by their own acts or those of their friends are candidatesfor the Presidency. " The evident basis of this argument was, thatthe Mexican war being a Democratic venture, no Whig had the rightto profit by it. The bill was fortunately stopped in the Senate, though that body at the time had a Democratic majority. The measurewas killed by one convincing speech from Mr. Badger of NorthCarolina. The senators knew Colonel Benton's temper and temperament, and understood how completely unfitted he was for military command, and how his appointment would demoralize and practically destroythe army. To the end of his life, however, Colonel Benton himselfbelieved a serious mistake had been made. He had been commissionedcolonel in the war of 1812, but though of unquestioned bravery, and deeply read in military science, it had never been his fortuneto engage in battle, or to see the face of an enemy. Yet in theautobiographical sketch which precedes his "Thirty Years' View, "he complacently assured himself that his appointment as Lieutenant-general over Scott and Taylor "could not have wounded professionalhonor, " as at the time of his retiring from the army he "rankedall those who have since reached its head. "

 WHIG OPPOSITION TO GENERAL TAYLOR. 

But all the efforts to make a Democratic hero out of the war failed. The line-officers appointed from civil life behaved gallantly. The volunteers under their command were exceptionally excellent, --almost competent themselves to the conduct of a campaign. Thepolitical generals who vaulted from law-offices into the commandof brigades and divisions were furnished by the War Department withstaff-officers carefully chosen from the best educated and mostskillful of the regular army. All would not suffice, however, todisplace Taylor and Scott from the post of chief heroes. "OldRough and Ready, " as Taylor was called by his troops, became apopular favorite of irresistible strength, and in the Whig conventionof 1848 was chosen over Mr. Clay as the standard-bearer of hisparty. He was placed before the people on his record as a soldier, unhampered by the political declarations which make up the modernplatform. Mr. Clay had expected the nomination, and General Scotthad offered to run on the same ticket as Vice-President; but againstthe constantly rising tide of Taylor's popularity both ordinaryand extraordinary political combinations gave way. Even the Kentuckydelegation divided, --in accordance with Mr. Crittenden's judgment, though not by his advice. To the overwhelming chagrin andmortification of Mr. Clay, a man unknown in political circles waspreferred as the candidate of the party of which he felt himselfto have been the creator. Mr. Clay was enraged by the result, andnever became reconciled to it. Though he gave in the end a quietvote at the polls for Taylor, he stubbornly refused during thecampaign to open his lips or write a word in favor of his election. Mr. Webster, though without the keen personal disappointment ofMr. Clay, was equally discontented with the nomination. He hadspoken in a semi-public way for several months previous to theconvention, of the folly of nominating "a swearing, swaggering, frontier colonel" for the Presidency, --an allusion to GeneralTaylor, which was scandalously unjust, and which was contradictedby his whole life. When Taylor was finally nominated, Mr. Websterresented the selection as an indignity to the statesmen of the Whigparty. His only ray of comfort was the defeat of Abbott Lawrencefor the Vice-Presidency by Millard Fillmore. Mr. Lawrence was aman of wealth, the most prominent manufacturer at the time in thecountry, of high personal character, and of wide political influence. He was the leading Taylor-Whig in New England, and his course hadgiven offense to Mr. Webster to such an extent indeed, that on apublic occasion, after the Presidential election, he referred toMr. Lawrence in an unfriendly and discourteous manner. 

The situation became still further complicated. The Whigs believedthey had avoided the responsibility of positive declaration oneither side of the issue embodied in the Wilmot Proviso, by selectinga military hero as their candidate. In the phrase of the day, hecould make a "Star and Stripe" canvass, with fair chance of success, on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line. There was loss to beincurred by either course. The Whig managers saw plainly that ananti-slavery policy would give almost the entire South to theDemocrats, and a pro-slavery policy would rend the Whig partythroughout the North. They wisely concluded, if the canvass weremerely a game to win votes, that the non-committal plan was thesafe one. But this evasive course was not wholly successful. There was a considerable body of men in New England, and especiallyin Massachusetts, known as "Conscience Whigs, " who had deepconvictions on the subject of slavery, and refused to supportGeneral Taylor. Conspicuous among these were Henry Wilson, E. Rockwood Hoar, and Charles Francis Adams. A defection of the samekind among the Whigs of New York was prevented by the activeinfluence of Mr. Seward, but it developed rapidly in the northernsection of Ohio. Throughout the country the Whigs began to fearthat a mistake had been made, and that the old leaders had beenthrown overboard without due thought of the consequences. Mr. Clay's private correspondence exhibited unmistakable gratificationat this aspect of affairs, for he felt assured that the influentialWhigs who were now organizing against Taylor would have supportedhim as cordially as they had done in 1844. 

These troubles in the Whig ranks tended, of course, to encouragethe Democrats, and to give them for a time great promise of success. The selection of their own candidate, however, had not been unattendedwith difficulty and dissension. Mr. Polk was from the first outof the question, --verifying the Scripture that those who draw thesword shall perish by the sword. The war inaugurated by him hadbeen completely successful; "a glorious peace, " as it was termed, had been conquered; a vast addition to our territory had beenaccomplished. Yet by common consent, in which Mr. Polk had gracefullyconcurred in advance, it was admitted that he was not availablefor re-election. He had sown the dragon's teeth, and the armedmen who sprang forth wrested his sceptre from him. But it wouldnot be candid to ascribe his disability solely to events connectedwith the war. He had pursued the most unwise course in dealingwith the New-York Democracy, and had for himself hopelessly dividedthe party. He made the great blunder of not recognizing the strengthand leadership of Van Buren and Silas Wright. He had been led todistrust them, had always felt aggrieved that Wright refused torun on his ticket as Vice-President, and was annoyed by the factthat, as candidate for governor, Wright received several thousandvotes more than the electoral ticket which represented his ownfortunes. This fact came to him in a manner which deeply impressedit upon his memory. At that time, before railroad or telegraphhad hastened the transmission of news beyond the Alleghanies, Mr. Polk in his Tennessee home was in an agony of doubt as to the resultin New York. The first intelligence that reached him announcedthe certain victory of Wright, but left the electoral ticketundecided, with very unpleasant rumors of his own defeat. When atlast the returns showed that he had a plurality of five thousandin New York, and was chosen President, it did not suffice to removethe deep impressions of those few days in which, either in thegloom of defeat or in the torture of suspense, he feared that hehad been betrayed by the Barnburners of New York as a revenge forVan Buren's overthrow at Baltimore. As matter of fact the suspicionwas absolutely groundless. The contest for governor between SilasWright and Millard Fillmore called out intense feeling, and theformer had the advantage of personal popularity over the latterjust as Mr. Clay had over Mr. Polk. Mr. Wright's plurality wasbut five thousand greater than Mr. Polk's, and this only provedthat among half a million voters there may have been twenty-fivehundred who preferred Mr. Clay for President and Mr. Wright forgovernor. 

 PRESIDENT POLK AND MR. VAN BUREN. 

But there was no manifestation of feeling or apparent withholdingof confidence on the part of Mr. Polk when the result was finallyproclaimed. On the contrary he offered the Treasury Department toMr. Wright, feeling assured in advance, as the uncharitable thought, that Wright could not leave the governorship to accept it. Whenthe office was declined, Mr. Polk again wrote Mr. Wright, askinghis advice as to the New-York member of the cabinet. Mr. Wrightsubmitted the names of three men from whom wise choice could bemade, --Benjamin F. Butler, who had been attorney-general underPresident Jackson; John A. Dix, then recently chosen to the United-States Senate; and Azariah C. Flagg, eminent in the party, andespecially distinguished for his administration of financial trust. Mr. Polk, under other and adverse influence, saw fit to disregardMr. Wright's counsel, and selected William L. Marcy, who was hostileto Wright, and distrusted by Van Buren, for Secretary of War. Fromthat moment the fate of Mr. Polk as candidate for re-election wassealed. The cause might seem inadequate, but the effect wasundeniable. The Democratic party at the outbreak of the civil war, sixteen years afterwards, had not wholly recovered from the divisionsand strifes which sprung from the disregard of Mr. Van Buren'swishes at that crisis. No appointment to Mr. Polk's cabinet couldhave been more distasteful than that of Mr. Marcy. He had lostthe State during Mr. Van Buren's Presidency in the contest for thegovernorship against Mr. Seward in 1838, and thus laid the foundation, as Mr. Van Buren believed, for his own disastrous defeat in 1840. The disputes which arose from Marcy's appointment in the cabinetled to Wright's defeat for re-election in 1846, when John Young, the Whig candidate, was chosen governor of New York. To three menin the cabinet the friends of Mr. Wright ascribed the Democraticoverthrow, --Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Robert J. Walker, and Mr. Marcy, --each anxious for the Presidency, and each feeling that Mr. Wrightwas in his way. Mr. Wright died suddenly the year after his defeat, and it was supposed for a time that harmony in the New-York Democracymight be restored over his grave. But his friends survived, andtheir grief was the measure of their resentment. 

The course of events which disabled Mr. Polk as a candidate provedequally decisive against all the members of his cabinet; and bythe process of exclusion rather than by an enthusiastic desireamong the people, and still less among the leaders, General Casswas selected by the Democratic Convention as candidate for thePresidency, and William O. Butler of Kentucky for the Vice-Presidency. The Democracy of New York, in consequence of the divisions arisingunder the governorship of Mr. Wright, sent two full delegations tothe convention, bearing credentials from separate organizations. The friends of Mr. Marcy bore the name of Hunkers; the followersof Mr. Wright ranged themselves under the title of Barnburners, --distinctions which had prevailed for some years in New York. Itwas in fact the old division on the annexation of Texas, and nowrepresented the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery wing of theDemocratic party. The National Convention sought in vain to bridgethe difficulty by admitting both delegations, giving to them unitedthe right to cast the vote of the State. But the Barnburnersdeclined thus to compromise a principle. On a question of bread, the half-loaf is preferable to starvation, but when political honorand deep personal feeling are involved, so material an adjustmentis not practicable. The Barnburners retired from the convention, disclaimed all responsibility for its conclusions, and proceededin due time to organize against the ticket of Cass and Butler. The Hunkers, left in the convention as the sole representatives ofthe New-York Democracy, were startled at the situation and declinedto vote. They were anxious that the nomination of Cass should notappear to be forced on the Barnburners by the rival faction. Itthus happened that New York, which for twenty years under theskillful leadership of Mr. Van Buren had dictated the course ofthe Democracy, was now so shorn of influence through the factionsengendered by his defeat, that a Presidential nomination was made, not only without her lead, but without her aid or participation. 

 CASS BOLTED BY VAN BUREN'S FRIENDS. 

The Democratic candidate was a man of high character. He had servedcreditably in the early part of the war of 1812, had been governorof Michigan Territory from 1813 to 1831, had been five yearsSecretary of War under General Jackson, and had gone to France asminister in 1836. He remained at the court of Louis Philippe, where he received eminent consideration, for six years. When hereturned to this country in 1842, at sixty years of age, heundoubtedly intended to re-enter political life. He landed atBoston, and was received with enthusiasm by the New-England Democrats, especially of that class who had not been in special favor duringthe long rule of Jackson and his successor. Popular ovations werearranged for him as he journeyed westward, and, by the time hereached his home in Detroit, General Cass was publicly recognizedas a candidate for the Presidency. These facts did not escape thejealous and watchful eye of Mr. Van Buren. He was aggrieved bythe course of General Cass, feeling assured that its direct effectwould be to injure himself, and not to promote the political fortunesof the General. But the rivalry continued to develop. Cass remainedin the field, a persistent candidate for nomination, and in theend proved to be, perhaps, the most powerful factor in the combinationwhich secured the triumph of Polk. He had deeply wounded Mr. VanBuren, and, as the latter thought, causelessly and cruelly. Hehad disregarded a personal and political friendship of thirty years'duration, and had sundered ties which life was too short to re-unite. Cass had gained no victory. He had only defeated oldfriends, and the hour of retribution was at hand. 

When the delegation of Barnburners withdrew from the BaltimoreConvention of 1848, they were obviously acting in harmony with Mr. Van Buren's wishes. Had they been admitted, according to theirperemptory demand, as the sole delegation from New York, they couldhave defeated Cass in the convention, and forced the nomination ofsome new man unconnected with the grievances and enmities of 1844. But when the demand of the Barnburners was denied, and they wereasked to make common cause with the assassins of Wright, as JamesS. Wadsworth had denominated the Hunkers, the indignantly shookthe dust of the city from off their feet, returned to New York, and forthwith called a Democratic convention to meet at Utica onthe 22d of June. 

Before the time arrived for the Utica Convention to assemble, theanti-slavery revolt was widely extended, and was, apparently, noless against Taylor than against Cass. There was agitation in manyStates, and the Barnburners found that by uniting with the oppositionagainst both the old parties, a most effective combination couldbe made. It was certain to profit them in New York, and it promisedthe special revenge which they desired in the defeat of Cass. Thevarious local and State movements were merged in one great convention, which met at Buffalo on the 9th of August, with imposing demonstrations. Many of those composing it had held high rank in the old parties. Salmon P. Chase of Ohio was selected as president. The conventionrepresented a genuine anti-slavery sentiment, and amid excitementand enthusiasm Martin Van Buren was nominated for President, andCharles Francis Adams for Vice-President. The Barnburners, theanti-slavery Whigs, and the old Abolitionists, co-operated withapparent harmony under the general name of the Free-soil party;and the impression with many when the convention adjourned was, that Mr. Van Buren would have a plurality over both Cass and Taylorin the State of New York. The management of the popular canvasswas intrusted to Democratic partisans of the Silas Wright school, and this fact had a significant and unexpected influence upon theminds of anti-slavery Whigs. 

In the first flush of the excitement, the supporters of the regularDemocratic nominee were not alarmed. They argued, not illogically, that the Free-soil ticket would draw more largely from the Whigsthan from the Democrats, and thus very probably injure Taylor morethan Cass. But in a few weeks this hope was dispelled. The Whigsof the country had been engaged for a long period in an earnestpolitical warfare against Mr. Van Buren. In New York the contesthad been personal and acrimonious to the last degree, and ordinaryhuman nature could hardly be expected the bury at once the grievancesand resentments of a generation. Nor did the Whigs confide in thesincerity of Mr. Van Buren's anti-slavery conversion. His repentancewas late, and even the most charitable suspected that his desireto punish Cass had entered largely into the motives which suddenlyaroused him to the evils of slavery after forty years of quietacquiescence in all the demands of the South. Mr. Seward, whopossessed the unbounded confidence of the anti-slavery men of NewYork, led a most earnest canvass in favor of General Taylor, andwas especially successful in influencing Whigs against Van Buren. In this he was aided by the organizing skill of Thurlow Weed, andby the editorial power of Horace Greeley. Perhaps in no otherNational election did three men so completely control the result. They gave the vote of New York to General Taylor, and made himPresident of the United States. 

 MR. WEBSTER'S MARSHFIELD SPEECH. 

At an opportune moment for the success of the Whigs, Mr. Websterdecided to support General Taylor. He thoroughly distrusted Cass, --not in point of integrity, but of discretion and sound judgmentas a statesman. He had rebuked Cass severely in a diplomaticcorrespondence touching the Treaty of Washington, when he wasSecretary of State and Cass minister to France. The impressionthen derived had convinced him that the Democratic candidate wasnot the man whom a Whig could desire to see in the Presidentialchair. In Mr. Van Buren's anti-slavery professions, Mr. Websterhad no confidence. He said pleasantly, but significantly, that"if he and Mr. Van Buren should meet under the Free-soil flag, thelatter with his accustomed good-nature would laugh. " He added, with a touch of characteristic humor, "that the leader of the Free-spoil party suddenly becoming the leader of the Free-soil party isa joke to shake his sides and mine. " Distrusting him sincerely onthe anti-slavery issue, Mr. Webster showed that on every otherquestion Mr. Van Buren was throughly objectionable to the Whigs. 

The Marshfield speech, as this effort was popularly known at thetime, had great influence with the Northern Whigs. Mr. Websterdid not conceal his belief that General Taylor's nomination was"one not fit to be made, " but by the clearest of logic he demonstratedthat he was infinitely to be preferred to either of his competitors. Mr. Webster at that time had the confidence of the anti-slaveryWhigs in a large degree; he had voted for the Wilmot Proviso, andhis public course had been that of a just and conservative expositorof their advanced opinion. From the day of the Marshfield speech, the belief was general that Van Buren would draw far more largelyfrom the Democrats than from the Whigs; that his candidacy wouldgive the State of New York to Taylor, and thus elect him President. The loss of Whig votes was not distasteful to Mr. Van Buren afterthe prospect of his securing the electors of New York had vanished. Had he drawn in equal proportion from the two parties, his candidacywould have had no effect. It would have neutralized itself, andleft the contest between Cass and Taylor as though he had notentered the race. By a rule of influence, whose working is obvious, the tenacity of the Democratic adherents of Van Buren increased asthe Whigs withdrew. The contest between Cass and Van Buren finallybecame in New York, in very large degree, a struggle betweenDemocratic factions, in which the anti-slavery profession was aninstrumentality to be temporarily used, and not a principle to bepermanently upheld. As the Whigs left Van Buren, the Democratsleft Cass, and the end of the canvass gave a full measure ofsatisfaction, not only to the supporters of Taylor, but to thefollowers of Van Buren, who polled a larger vote for him than wasgiven to Cass. New York, as in 1844, decided the contest. Thefriends of Van Buren had not simply beaten Cass at the polls, theyhad discredited him as a party leader. In the pithy phrase of JohnVan Buren, they had exposed him to the country as the candidate"powerful for mischief, powerless for good. "

The total vote of New York was, for Taylor, 218, 603; for Cass, 114, 318; for Van Buren, 120, 510. The canvass for the governorshipwas scarcely less exciting than that for the Presidency. HamiltonFish was the Whig candidate; John A. Dix, then a senator of theUnited States, ran as the representative of Mr. Van Buren's Free-soil party; while the eminent Chancellor Walworth, who had recentlylost his judicial position, was nominated as a supporter of Cassby the Regular Democracy. Mr. Fish had been candidate for Lieutenant-governor two years before on the Whig ticket with John Young, andwas defeated because of his outspoken views against the Anti-Renters. Those radical agitators instinctively knew that the descendant ofStuyvesant would support the inherited rights of the Van Rensselaers, and therefore defeated Mr. Fish while they elected the Whig candidatesfor other offices. Mr. Fish now had his abundant reward in receivingas large a vote as General Taylor, and securing nearly one hundredthousand plurality over the Van Buren candidate, while he in turnreceived a small plurality over the representative of General Cass. 

The result of the two contests left the Van Buren wing, or theBarnburners, in majority over the Hunkers, and gave them an advantagein future contests for supremacy, inside the party. Truthfulhistory will hold this to have been the chief object of the strugglewith many who vowed allegiance at Buffalo to an anti-slavery creedstrong enough to satisfy Joshua R. Giddings and Charles Sumner. With Cass defeated, and the Marcy wing of the party severelydisciplined, the great mass of the Van Buren host of 1848 wereready to disavow their political escapade at Buffalo. Dean Richmond, Samuel J. Tilden, John Van Buren, C. C. Cambreleng, and Sanford E. Church, forgot their anti-slavery professions, reunited with theold party, and vowed afresh their fidelity to every principleagainst which they had so earnestly protested. Mr. Van Burenhimself went with them, and to the end of his life maintained aconsistent pro-slavery record, which, throughout a long publiccareer was varied only by the insincere professions which he foundit necessary to make in order to be revenged on Cass. But it wouldbe unjust to include in this condemnation all the New-York Democratswho went into the Buffalo movement. Many were honest and earnest, and in after life followed the principles which they had thenprofessed. Chief among these may be reckoned Preston King, whoexerted a powerful influence in the anti-slavery advances of afteryears, and James S. Wadsworth, who gave his name, and generouslyof his wealth, to the cause, and finally sealed his devotion withhis blood on the battle-field of the Wilderness. 

 CHARACTER OF MR. VAN BUREN. 

Mr. Van Buren spent the remainder of his life in dignified retirement--surviving until his eightieth year, in 1862. In point of mereintellectual force, he must rank below the really eminent men withwhom he was so long associated in public life. But he was able, industrious, and, in political management, clever beyond any manwho has thus far appeared in American politics. He had extraordinarytact in commending himself to the favor and confidence of thepeople. Succeeding to political primacy in New York on the deathof De Witt Clinton in 1828, he held absolute control of his partyfor twenty years, and was finally overthrown by causes whose originwas beyond the limits of his personal influence. He stood on thedividing-line between the mere politician and the statesman, --perfect in the arts of the one, possessing largely the comprehensivepower of the other. His active career began in 1812, and ended in1848. During the intervening period he had served in the Legislatureof New York, had been a member of the Constitutional Convention of1820, had been attorney-general of the State, and had been chosenits governor. In the national field he had been senator of theUnited States, Secretary of State, minister to England, Vice-President, and President. No other man in the country has held somany great places. He filled them all with competency and withpower, but marred his illustrious record by the political episodeof 1848, in which, though he may have had some justification forrevenge on unfaithful associates in his old party, he had none forhis lack of fidelity to new friends, and for his abandonment of asacred principle which he had pledged himself to uphold. 

[* NOTE. --An error of statement occurs on page 72, Volume I, inregard to the action of the Whig caucus for Speaker in December, 1847. Mr. Winthrop was chosen after Mr. Vinton had declined, andwas warmly supported by Mr. Vinton. The error came from anincorrect account of the caucus in a newspaper of that time. ]

CHAPTER V. 

Review (_continued_). --Contrast between General Taylor and GeneralCass. --The Cabinet of President Taylor. --Political Condition ofthe Country. --Effect produced by the Discovery of Gold in California. --Convening of Thirty-first Congress. --Election of Howell Cobb asSpeaker. --President Taylor's Message. --His Recommendations Distastefulto the South. --Illustrious Membership of the Senate. --Mr. Clay andthe Taylor Administration. --Mr. Calhoun's Last Speech in the Senate. --His Death. --His Character and Public Services. --Mr. Webster's7th of March Speech. --Its Effect upon the Public and upon Mr. Webster. --Mr. Clay's Committee of Thirteen. --The Omnibus Bill. --Conflict with General Taylor's Administration. --Death of thePresident. --Mr. Fillmore reverses Taylor's Policy and supports theCompromise Measures. --Defeat of Compromise Bill. --Passage of theMeasures separately. --Memorable Session of Congress. --Whig andDemocratic Parties sustain the Compromise Measures. --NationalConventions. --Whigs nominate Winfield Scott over Fillmore. --Mr. Clay supports Fillmore. --Mr. Webster's Friends. --Democrats nominateFranklin Pierce. --Character of the Campaign. --Overwhelming Defeatof Scott. --Destruction of the Whig Party. --Death of Mr. Clay. --Death of Mr. Webster. --Their Public Characters and Servicescompared. 

With the election of General Taylor, the various issues of theslavery question were left undecided and unchanged. Indeed, theprogress of the canvass had presented a political anomaly. GeneralCass was born in New England of Puritan stock. All his mature lifehad been spent in the free North-West. He was a lawyer, a statesman, always a civilian, except for a single year in the volunteer serviceof 1812. General Taylor was born in Virginia, was reared inKentucky, was a soldier by profession from his earliest years ofmanhood, had passed all his life in the South, was a resident ofLouisiana, engaged in planting, and was the owner of a large numberof slaves. Yet in the face of these facts General Cass ran as thedistinctively pro-slavery candidate, and General Taylor receivedthree-fourths of the votes of New England, and was supportedthroughout the North by the anti-slavery Whigs, who accepted WilliamH. Seward as a leader and Horace Greeley as an exponent. But hiscontradiction was apparent, not real. It was soon found that theconfidence of the Northern men who voted for Taylor had not beenmisplaced. 

 CABINET OF PRESIDENT TAYLOR. 

As his inauguration approached, the anxiety in regard to his publicpolicy grew almost painfully intense throughout the country. Therehad never been a cabinet organized in which so deep an interestwas felt, --an interest which did not attach so much to the personswho might compose it as to the side--pro-slavery or anti-slavery--to which the balance might incline. When the names were announced, it was found that four were from the south side of Mason and Dixon'sline, and three from the north side. But a review of the politicalcharacter of the members showed that the decided weight of influencewas with the North. John M. Clayton of Delaware, Secretary ofState, nominally from the South, had voted for the Wilmot Proviso, and had defended his action with commanding ability. William M. Meredith of Pennsylvania was one of the ablest lawyers of thecountry, a scholar, a wit, an orator; his training had not, however, fitted him for the Treasury Department to which he was called. Thomas Ewing of Ohio, selected to organize the Department of theInterior, just then authorized by law, was a man of intellectualpower, a lawyer of the first rank, possessing a stainless character, great moral courage, unbending will, an incisive style, both withtongue and pen, and a breadth of reading and wealth of informationnever surpassed by any public man in America. Jacob Collamer ofVermont, Postmaster-general, was an able, wise, just, and firm man, stern in principle, conservative in action. The Attorney-generalwas Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, an ardent Whig partisan, distinguishedin his profession, born and living in a slave State, but firmlydevoted to the Union, as in later life he abundantly proved. Thepronounced Southern sentiment, as represented by Toombs and Stephens, had but two representatives in the cabinet, --George W. Crawford ofGeorgia (nephew of the eminent William H. Crawford), Secretary ofWar; and William Ballard Preston of Virginia, Secretary of theNavy, --able and upright men, but less distinguished than theirassociates. 

The country was in an expectant and restless condition. The pro-slavery leaders, who had counted upon large political gain to theirsection by the acquisition of territory from Mexico, were somewhatdiscouraged, and began to fear that the South had sown, and thatthe North would reap. They had hoped to establish their right bypositive legislation to enter all the territories with slaveproperty. If they should fail in this, they believed with allconfidence, and had good reason at the time for their faith, thatthey would be able to carry the line of 36° 30´ to the Pacific byan extension of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and that in thisway the political strength of their section would be vastly enhanced. But not long after the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, an event happened which put to naught the anticipations of Southernstatesmen. Gold was discovered in California late in the autumnof 1848, and by one of those marvels of emigration which the Anglo-Saxon race have more than once achieved, the Pacific slope wasimmediately filled with a hardy, resolute, intelligent population. In less than a year they organized a State government, adopted aconstitution in which slavery was forever prohibited, and wereready by the close of 1849 to apply for admission to the Union. The inhabitants had no powers of civil government conferred byCongress; the only authority exercised by the United States beingthat of Colonel Bennett Riley of the regular army, who had beenplaced in command immediately after the Treaty of Peace by PresidentPolk, and who was left undisturbed by President Taylor. 

Congress convened on the first Monday of December, 1849, amid deepfeeling, rapidly growing into excitement throughout the country. For three weeks the House was unable to organize by the choice ofa speaker. The Democratic candidate was Howell Cobb; the Whigcandidate, Robert C. Winthrop. The contest was finally settled onthe sixty-third ballot, in accordance with a previous agreementthat a plurality should elect. Mr. Cobb received one hundred andtwo votes; Mr. Winthrop ninety-nine, with twenty votes scattering, principally anti-slavery Whigs and Free-Soilers. It was the firsttime that such a step had been taken; and its constitutionalitywas so doubtful, that after the ballot, a resolution declaring Mr. Cobb to be speaker was adopted by general concurrence on a yea andnay vote. 

The message of the President was immediately transmitted, and proveda tower of strength to the friends of the Union, and a heavy blowto the secession element, which was rampant in Congress. ThePresident recommended that California, with her constitution, already known to be anti-slavery, be promptly admitted to the Union. He also suggested that New Mexico, already better protected inproperty, life, liberty, and religion than she had ever been before, be quietly left under her existing military government until sheshould form a State constitution, and apply for admission, --anevent deemed probable in the very near future. That accomplished, as he added in a special message a few days later, the claims ofTexas to a portion of New Mexico could be judicially determined, which could not be done while New Mexico remained a territory, organized or unorganized. These recommendations were intenselydistasteful to the South, and grew to be correspondingly popularin the North. The sectional feeling rapidly developed and theagitation in Congress communicated itself to the entire country. 

 THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN 1850. 

The character and eminence of the men who took part in the discussiongave it an intense, almost dramatic interest. Mr. Clay in hisseventy-third year was again in the Senate by the unanimous voteof the Kentucky Legislature, in the belief that his patrioticinfluence was needed in the impending crisis. Webster and Cass, natives of the same New-England State, Benton and Calhoun, nativesof the Carolinas, all born the same year and now approachingthreescore and ten, represented in their own persons almost everyphase of the impending contest. Stephen A. Douglas had enteredthe preceding Congress at the early age of thirty-four, and theardent young Irish soldier, James Shields, was now his colleague. Jefferson Davis had come from Mississippi with the brilliant recordof his achievements in the Mexican war, already ambitious to succeedMr. Calhoun as the leader of the extreme South, but foiled in hisDisunion schemes by his eloquent but erratic colleague, Henry S. Foote. William H. Seward of New York was for the first time takingposition under the National Government, at the age of forty-nine, and Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, five years younger, was beginning hispolitical career as the colleague of Thomas Corwin. John Bell wasstill honorably serving Tennessee, and John McPherson Berrien wasstill honoring Georgia by his service. The amiable and excellentWilliam R. King, who had entered the Senate when Alabama was admittedin 1819, and who was Colonel Benton's senior in service by twoyears when he resigned in 1844 to accept the French mission, nowreturned, and remained until he was chosen Vice-President in 1852. Hannibal Hamlin had entered the preceding year, and was stillleading a bitter fight on the slavery question against a formidableelement in his own party headed at home by Nathan Clifford andrepresented in the Senate by his colleague, James W. Bradbury. John P. Hale, a New-Hampshire Democrat whom Franklin Pierce hadattempted to discipline because as representative in Congress hehad opposed the annexation of Texas, had beaten Pierce before thepeople, defied the Democratic party, and was promoted to the Senatean outspoken Free-Soiler. Willie P. Mangum and George E. Badger, able, graceful, experienced statesmen, represented the steadfastUnion sentiment of the "Old North State" Whigs; while Andrew P. Butler, impulsive and generous, learned and able, embodied all theheresies of the South-Carolina Nullifiers. James M. Mason, whoseemed to court the hatred of the North, and Robert M. T. Hunter, who had the cordial respect of all sections, spoke for Virginia. Pierre Soulé came from Louisiana, eloquent even in a language hecould not pronounce, but better fitted by temperament for theturbulence of a revolutionary assembly in his native land than forthe decorous conservatism of the American Senate. Sam Houston waspresent from Texas, with a history full of adventure and singularfortune, while his colleague, Thomas J. Rusk, was daily increasinga reputation which had already marked him in the judgment of Mr. Webster as first among the younger statesmen of the South. Dodgeof Wisconsin and Dodge of Iowa, father and son, represented theDemocracy of the remotest outposts in the North-West, and, moststriking of all, William M. Gwin and John C. Frémont, men of Southernbirth and pro-slavery training, stood at the door of the Senatewith the constitution of California in their hands to demand heradmission to the Union as a free State. At no time before or sincein the history of the Senate has its membership been so illustrious, its weight of character and ability so great. The period markedthe meeting and dividing line between two generations of statesmen. The eminent men who had succeeded the leaders of the Revolutionaryera were passing away, but the most brilliant of their number werestill lingering, unabated in natural force, resplendent in personalfame. Their successors in public responsibility, if not theirequals in public regard and confidence, were already upon the stagepreparing for, and destined to act in, the bloodiest and mostmemorable of civil struggles. 

Mr. Clay had re-entered the Senate with no cordial feelings towardPresident Taylor's administration. The events of the precedingyear were too fresh, the wounds too deep, to be readily forgottenor quickly healed. But he desired no quarrel and was incapable ofshowing petty resentment. His mind was intent on harmonizing theserious differences between North and South, and he believed thePresident's plan would fall short and fail. He desired, in thesame spirit of compromise which had been so distinguishing a markof his statesmanship in former crises, to secure "an amicablearrangement of _all_ questions in controversy between the free andslave States growing out of the subject of slavery. " He was soaccustomed to lead, that the senators involuntarily waited for himto open the discussion and point the way. He as naturally acceptedthe responsibility, and in January (1850) began by submitting aseries of resolutions reciting the measures which were necessaryfor the pacification of all strife in the country. These resolutionsembraced the admission of California; governments for the territoryacquired from Mexico without prohibition or permission of slavery;adjustment of the disputed boundary of Texas and the allowance often millions of dollars to that State for the payment of her debt;the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia; moreeffectual provision for the restitution of fugitive slaves. 

 DEATH OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

It was on these resolutions that Mr. Calhoun prepared his lastformal speech. He attempted to deliver it in the Senate on the4th of March, but was so weak that he requested Mr. Mason of Virginiato read it for him. On two or three subsequent occasions Mr. Calhoun made brief extempore remarks showing each time a gradualdecay of strength. He died on the last day of March. Most touchingand appreciative eulogies were delivered by Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, after his death had been announced by his colleague, Judge Butler. Mr. Clay spoke of his "transcendent talents, " of his "clear, concise, compact logic, " of his "felicity in generalization surpassed by noone. " He intimated that he would have been glad to see Mr. Calhounsucceed Mr. Monroe in the Presidency in 1820. Mr. Webster, whoalways measured his words, spoke of him as "a man of undoubtedgenius and commanding talent, of unspotted integrity, of unimpeachedhonor. " Mr. Calhoun had been driven by his controversies withJackson into a position where he was deprived of popular strengthin the free States. But this very fact enhanced his power withthe South, and increased his hold upon his own people. To themajority of the people in the slave-holding States he was as aninspired leader for more than twenty years. He taught the philosophyand supplied the arguments to the ambitious generation of publicmen who came after him, and who were prepared, as he was not, toforce the issue to the arbitrament of arms. Deplorable as was theend to which his teachings led, he could not have acquired theinfluence he wielded over millions of men unless he had been giftedwith acute intellect, distinguished by moral excellence, and inspiredby the sincerest belief in the righteousness of his cause. Historywill adjudge him to have been single-hearted and honest in hispolitical creed. It will equally adjudge him to have been wrongin his theory of the Federal Government, and dead to the awakenedsentiment of Christendom in his views concerning the enslavementof man. 

Mr. Calhoun's published works show the extent of his participationin the national councils. They exhibit his zeal, the intensity ofhis convictions, and at the same time the clearness and strengthof his logic. His premises once admitted, it is difficult to resistthe force of his conclusions. Mr. Webster assailed his premises, and in their debate of February 16, 1833, defeated him, as anothersenator remarked, "by the acuteness of his definitions, "--thusmeeting Mr. Calhoun on his own ground. The war and its resultshave in large degree remanded the theories of Mr. Calhoun to thepast, but no intelligent student of the institutions of the UnitedStates can afford to neglect his elaborate, conscientious, ablediscussions. Taken with Mr. Webster's works they exhibit the mostcomplete examination, the most comprehensive analysis of the oftentortuous and ill-defined line which separates the powers of theNational Government from the functions which properly belong tothe States. Mr. Calhoun's public service may be regarded ascontinuous from 1810, when he was elected to Congress at twenty-eight years of age, till his death, --a period of forty years. Hetook his seat in the House in December, 1811, and was placed bythe speaker, Mr. Clay (with whom he was then in accord), on theCommittee of Foreign Affairs. He was earnest and influential insupporting the war policy of the Madison administration, and gainedso rapidly in public estimation that six years later he was appointedsecretary of War by President Monroe. Thenceforward his careerwas illustrious. As Vice-President, as secretary of State, aboveall as senator from South Carolina, he gained lasting renown. Hislife was eminently pure, his career exceptional, his fame establishedbeyond the reach of calumny, beyond the power of detraction. 

 MR. WEBSTER'S 7TH OF MARCH SPEECH. 

Continuing the discussion invited by Mr. Clay's resolutions, Mr. Webster delivered, on the 7th of March, the memorable speech whichcost him the loss of so many of his staunch and lifelong friends. The anti-slavery Whigs of the North, who, as the discussion wenton, had waited to be vindicated by the commanding argument of Mr. Webster, were dismayed and cast down by his unexpected utterance. Instead of arraigning the propagandists of slavery, he arraignedits opponents. Instead of indicting the Disunionists of the South, the poured out his wrath upon the Abolitionists of the North. Hemaintained that the North had unduly exaggerated the dangers ofslavery extension at this crisis. California was coming in as afree State. Texas, north of 36° 30´, if her boundary should extendso far, had been declared free in the articles of annexation. Inthe mountainous and sterile character of New Mexico and Utah hefound a stronger prohibition of slavery than in any possibleordinance, enactment, or proviso placed on the statute-book byCongress. He would not, therefore, "re-enact the Law of God. " Hewould not force a quarrel with the South when nothing was to begained. He would not irritate or causelessly wound the feelingsof those who were just beginning to realize that they had lost inthe issue put at stake in the Mexican war. The speech undoubtedlyhad great influence in the North, and caused many anti-slavery mento turn back. But on the other hand, it embittered thousands whopressed forward with sturdy principle and with a quickened zeal, not unmixed with resentment and a sense of betrayal. In many partsof the country, and especially in the Middle and Southern States, the speech was received with enthusiastic approval. But in NewEngland, the loss of whose good opinion could not be compensatedto Mr. Webster by the applause of a world outside, he never regainedhis hold upon the popular affection. New friends came to him, butthey did not supply the place of the old friends, who for a lifetimehad stood by him with unswerving principle and with ever-increasingpride. 

Excitement and passion do not, however, always issue decrees andpronounce judgments of absolute right. In the zeal of that hour, Northern anti-slavery opinion failed to appreciate the influencewhich wrought so powerfully on the mind of Mr. Webster. He belongedwith those who could remember the first President, who personallyknew much of the hardships and sorrows of the Revolutionary period, who were born to poverty and reared in privation. To these, theformation of the Federal Government had come as a gift from Heaven, and they had heard from the lips of the living Washington in hisfarewell words, that "the Union is the edifice of our realindependence, the support of our tranquillity at home, our peaceabroad, our prosperity, our safety, and of the very liberty whichwe so highly prize, that for this Union we should cherish a cordial, habitual, immovable attachment, and should discountenance whatevermay suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned. "Mr. Webster had in his own lifetime seen the thirteen colonies growinto thirty powerful States. He had seen three millions of people, enfeebled and impoverished by a long struggle, increased eightfoldin number, surrounded by all the comforts, charms, and securitiesof life. All this spoke to him of the Union and of its pricelessblessings. He now heard its advantages discussed, its perpetuitydoubted, its existence threatened. A convention of slave-holdingStates had been called, to meet at Nashville, for the purpose ofconsidering the possible separation of the sections. Mr. Websterfelt that a generation had been born who were undervaluing theirinheritance, and who might, by temerity, destroy it. Under motivesinspired by these surroundings, he spoke for the preservation ofthe Union. He believed it to be seriously endangered. Hisapprehensions were ridiculed by many who, ten years after Mr. Webster was in his grave, saw for the first time how real and howterrible were the perils upon which those apprehensions werefounded. 

When the hour of actual conflict came, every patriot realized thata great magazine of strength for the Union was stored in theteachings of Mr. Webster. For thirty years preceding the Nullificationtroubles in South Carolina, the government had been administeredon the States'-rights theory, in which the power of the nation wassubordinated, and its capacity to subdue the revolt of secedingStates was dangerously weakened. His speech in reply to Hayne in1830 was like an amendment to the Constitution. It correctedtraditions, changed convictions, revolutionized conclusions. Itgave to the friends of the Union the abundant logic which establishedthe right and the power of the government to preserve itself. Afame so lofty, a work so grand, cannot be marred by one mistake, if mistake it be conceded. The thoughtful reconsideration of hisseverest critics must allow that Mr. Webster saw before him adivided duty, and that he chose the part which in his patrioticjudgment was demanded by the supreme danger of the hour. 

Mr. Clay's resolutions were referred to a special committee ofthirteen, of which he was made chairman. They reported a billembracing the principal objects contemplated in his original speech. The discussion on this composite measure was earnest and prolonged, and between certain senators became exasperating. The Administration, through its newspapers, through the declarations of its Cabinetminsters, through the unreserved expressions of President Taylorhimself, showed persistent hostility to Mr. Clay's Omnibus Bill, as it was derisively and offensively called. Mr. Clay, in turn, did not conceal his hostility to the mode of adjustment proposedin the messages of the President, and defended his own with vigorand eloquence. Reciting the measures demanded for a fair andlasting settlement, he said there were five wounds, bleeding andthreatening the body politic, all needing to be healed, while thePresident proposed to heal but one. He described the wounds, numbering them carefully on his fingers as he spoke. ColonelBenton, who was vindictively opposed to the Omnibus Bill, madesport of the five gaping wounds, and believed that Mr. Clay wouldhave found more wounds if he had had more fingers. This strifenaturally grew more and more severe, making for a time a somewhatserious division among the Democrats, and rending the Whig partyasunder, one section following Mr. Clay with great zeal, the otheradhering with tenacity to the administration. 

 DEATH OF PRESIDENT TAYLOR. 

The quarrel was growing fiercer day by day, and involving all shadesof political opinion, when it was suddenly arrested by the deathof General Taylor on the 9th of July (1850). This sad event gavethe opportunity for the success of the Compromise measures. HadGeneral Taylor lived, their defeat was assured. As a Southern man, coming from a Gulf State, personally interested in the institutionof slavery, he had a vantage-ground in the struggle which a NorthernPresident could never attain. He had, moreover, the courage andthe intelligence to uphold his principles, even in a controversywith Mr. Clay. His ignorance of political and civil affairs hasbeen grossly exaggerated. Without taking part in politics, he hadbeen a close observer of events, and his prolonged services atfrontier posts had afforded the leisure and enforced the taste forreading. He knew not only the public measures, but the public menof his time closely and appreciatively. He surprised a member ofhis cabinet on a certain occasion, by objecting to a proposedappointment on the ground that the man designated had voted forBenton's expunging resolution at the close of Jackson's administration, --an offense which the President would not condone. The sevenmembers of his cabinet, actively engaged in politics all theirlives, had forgotten an important fact which the Presidentinstinctively remembered. 

Long before General Taylor's death it was known that Mr. Fillmoredid not sympathize with the policy of the administration. He hadbeen among the most advanced of anti-slavery Whigs during hisservice in the House of Representatives, and was placed on theTaylor ticket as a conciliatory candidate, to hold to their allegiancethat large class of Whigs who resented the nomination of a Louisianaslave-holder. But from the day he was sworn in as Vice-Presidenthis antipathy to Mr. Seward began to develop. With the concededability of the latter, and with his constant opportunity on thefloor of the Senate, where he won laurels from the day of hisentrance, Mr. Fillmore felt that he would himself be subordinatedand lost in the crowd of followers if he coincided with Seward. Older in years, long senior to Mr. Seward in the national service, he apparently could not endure to see himself displaced by a morebrilliant and more capable leader. The two men, therefore, graduallyseparated; Mr. Fillmore using what influence he possessed as Vice-President in favor of Mr. Clay's plan of compromise, while Mr. Seward became the Northern leader of the Administration Whigs, --aremarkable if not unprecedented advance for a senator in the firstsession of his service. 

In succeeding to the Presidency, Mr. Fillmore naturally gave thefull influence of his administration to the Compromise. To signalizehis position, he appointed Mr. Webster secretary of State, andplaced Mr. Corwin of Ohio at the head of the Treasury. Mr. Corwin, with a strong anti-slavery record, had been recently drifting inthe opposite direction, and his appointment was significant. Itwas too late, however, to save the Omnibus Bill as a whole. TheTaylor administration had damaged it too seriously to permit aneffectual revival in its favor. It was finally destroyed the lastweek in July by striking out in detail every provision except thebill for the organization of the Territory of Utah. After the Utahbill had been enacted, separate bills followed;--for the admissionof California; for the organization of New Mexico, with the samecondition respecting slavery which had been applied to Utah; forthe adjustment of the Texas boundary, and the payment to that Stateof ten millions indemnity; for the more effectual recovery offugitive slaves; for the abolition of the slave trade in the Districtof Columbia. Congress thus enacted separately the bills which itrefused to enact together, and the policy outlined by Mr. Clay atthe beginning of the session had triumphed. Several Southernsenators joined Jefferson Davis in strenuous resistance to theadmission of California with the boundaries prescribed. Afterseeking ineffectually to make the line of 36° 30´ the southernlimit of the State, they attempted with equal lack of successto enter a solemn protest on the journal of the Senate againstthe wrong done to the slave-holding States in giving theentire Pacific coast to freedom. It was a last and hopeless movementof the Southern Hotspurs. The protest, at first discredited, wasspeedily forgotten, and California entered the Union after tenmonths of angry controversy, with slavery forever excluded fromher imperial domain. 

 THE FINALITY OF THE COMPROMISE. 

The session had been in all respects important and memorable. Inthe judgment of many it had been critical, and the dangers attendingits action were increased by the death of General Taylor. TheSouth would endure from him what they would resent and possiblyresist if imposed by an anti-slavery Whig from the North. Thisfact had, doubtless, great influence in shaping the policy of Mr. Fillmore, both as Vice-President and President. The events of thesession marred and made the reputation of many. Four senatorsespecially, of the younger class, had laid the foundation of theirprominence in the struggles of after years, --Mr. Seward as an anti-slavery Whig, Mr. Chase as a Free-Soiler, previously of Democraticaffiliations, Mr. Jefferson Davis as a Southern Democrat, and Mr. Douglas as a Northern Democrat. Calhoun was dead. Clay and Websterand Cass and Benton were near the end of their illustrious careers. New men were thenceforth to guide the policy of the Republic, andamong the new men in a Senate of exceptional ability these fourattained the largest fame, secured the strongest constituencies, and exerted the widest influence. 

Both political parties began at once to take ground in favor ofthe Compromise measures as a final and complete adjustment of theslavery question. The Southern Whigs under Mr. Clay's lead eagerlyassumed that conclusion. Mr. Fillmore, having approved all thebills separately which taken together formed the Compromise, wasof course strongly in favor of regarding these measures as afinality. Mr. Webster took the same view, though from a bill hehad prepared before he left the Senate for the rendition of fugitiveslaves, guaranteeing jury-trial to the fugitive, it is hardlyconceivable that he would have voted for the harsh measure thatwas enacted. Mr. Corwin to the surprise of his friends had passedover from the most radical to the ultra-conservative side on theslavery question, and it was his change, in addition to that ofMr. Webster, which had given so brilliant an opportunity to Mr. Seward as the leader of the Northern Whigs. Mr. Corwin wasirretrievably injured by a course so flatly in contradiction ofhis previous action. He lost the support and largely forfeitedthe confidence of the Ohio Whigs, who in 1848 had looked upon himas a possible if not probable candidate for the Presidency. 

But against this surrender to the Compromise measures of 1850, theWhigs who followed Seward and Wade and Thaddeus Stevens and Fessendenwere earnest and active. Stevens was then a member of the Houseand had waged bitter war against the measures. Wade and Fessendenhad not yet entered the Senate, but were powerful leaders in theirrespective States. These men had not given up the creed whichdemanded an anti-slavery restriction on every inch of soil ownedby the United States. They viewed with abhorrence the legislationwhich had placed freedom and slavery on the same plane in theTerritories of Utah and New Mexico. They believed that Texas hadbeen paid for a baseless claim ten millions of dollars, one-halfof which, as a sharp critic declared, was hush-money, the otherhalf blood-money. They regarded the cruel law for the return offugitive slaves as an abomination in the sight of God and man. Intheir judgment it violated every principle of right. It allowedthe personal liberty of a man to be peremptorily decided by a United-States commissioner, acting with absolute power and without appeal. For a claim exceeding twenty dollars in value, every citizen hasthe right to a trial by jury; but by this law the body, the life, the very soul of a man, possibly a free-born citizen, might beconsigned to perpetual enslavement on the fallible judgment of asingle official. An apparently slight, yet especially odiousfeature of the law which served in large degree to render itinoperative was that the United-States commissioner, in the eventof his remanding the alleged fugitive to slavery, received a feeof ten dollars, and, if he adjudged him to be free, received onlyfive dollars. 

It soon became evident that with the Whigs divided and the Democratscompactly united upon the finality of the Compromise, the latterwould have the advantage in the ensuing Presidential election. The tendency would naturally be to consolidate the slave-holdingStates in support of the Democratic candidates, because that partyhad a large, well-organized force throughout the North cherishingthe same principles, co-operating for the same candidates, andcontrolling many, if not a majority, of the free States. TheSouthern Whigs, equally earnest with the Democrats for the Compromise, were constantly injured at home by the outspoken anti-slaveryprinciples of leading Northern Whigs. Just at that point of timeand from the cause indicated began the formation of parties dividedon the geographical line between North and South. But this resultwas as yet only foreshadowed, not developed. Both the old partiesheld their national conventions as usual, in 1852, with every Staterepresented in both by full delegations. There were peculiartroubles in each. In the Democratic convention the dissensionshad been in large part inherited, and had reference more to personsthan to principles, more to the candidate than to the platform. While something of the same trouble was visible in the Whig ranks, the chief source of contention and of party weakness was found inthe irreconcilable difference of principle between all the SouthernWhigs and a large number of the Northern Whigs. In the South theywere unanimous in support of the Compromise. In the North theywere divided. 

 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION. 

The Democratic National Convention met in Baltimore on the firstday of June, 1852. General Cass, though he had reached his seventiethyear, was again in the field. Mr. Buchanan, then sixty-one yearsof age, was the candidate next in strength, and Stephen A. Douglaswas third. Douglas was but thirty-nine years old, the youngestman ever formally presented for the Presidency by a State delegationin a National convention. Governor Marcy was fourth in the orderof strength. There were scattering votes for other candidates, but these four were seriously and hopefully urged by their respectivesupporters. Marcy was in many respects the fittest man to benominated, but the fear was that the old dissensions of the New-York Democracy, now seemingly healed, would open afresh if thechief of one of the clans should be imposed on the other. Douglaswas injured by his partial committal to what was known as thedoctrine of "manifest destiny, "--the indefinite acquisition ofterritory southward, especially in the direction of the West Indies. Cass was too old. Buchanan lacked personal popularity; and, whilehe had the Pennsylvania delegation in his favor, a host of enemiesfrom that State, outside the convention, warred against him mostbitterly. No one of these eminent men could secure two-thirds ofthe delegates as required by the iron rule, and on the forty-ninthballot Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, who had been among the"scattering" on several preceding votes, was unanimously nominated. The suggestion of Pierce's name was not so spontaneous and suddenas it was made to appear. The precise condition of affairs wasdiscerned before the convention met, and some sagacious and far-seeing men, among whom the late Caleb Cushing was one, and GeneralBenjamin F. Butler another, had canvassed the merits of Piercebefore the convention met. They saw that from his record in Congresshe would be entirely acceptable to the South, and at the opportunemoment their plans were perfected and Pierce was nominated with agreat show of enthusiasm. William R. King of Alabama was selectedto run as Vice-President. 

General Pierce had many qualities that rendered him a strongcandidate. He had served with credit if not distinction both inthe House and the Senate. He was elected to the House in 1832, when he was but twenty-eight years of age, and resigned his seatin the Senate in 1842. In the ten years which intervened beforehis nomination for the Presidency, he had devoted himself to thelaw with brilliant success, leaving it only for his short servicein the Mexican war. He was still a young man when he was preferredto all the prominent statesmen of his party as a Presidentialcandidate. He was remarkably attractive in personal appearance, prepossessing in manner, ready and even eloquent as a public speaker, fluent and graceful in conversation. He presented thus a rarecombination of the qualities which attach friends and win popularsupport. 

The platform of principles enunciated by the convention was justwhat the South desired and demanded. The entire interest centredin the slavery question. Indeed, the declarations upon other issueswere not listened to by the delegates, and were scarcely read bythe public. Without a dissenting voice the convention resolvedthat "all efforts of the Abolitionists or others to induce Congressto interfere with questions of slavery or to take incipient stepsin relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarmingand dangerous consequences. " The Compromise measures, includingthe fugitive-slave law, which was specially named, were most heartilyindorsed, and were regarded as an adjustment of the whole controversy. By way of indicting how full, complete, and final the settlementwas, the convention with unrestrained enthusiasm declared that "theDemocratic party will resist all attempts at renewing, in Congressor out of it, the agitation of the slavery question, under whatevershape or color the attempts may be made. " Among the men who joinedin these declarations were not a few who had supported Van Burenand Adams in the canvass of 1848. One of the prominent officersof the convention was the author of many of the most extreme anti-slavery declarations put forth at Buffalo. 

 WHIG NATIONAL CONVENTION. 

The Whigs met at Baltimore a fortnight after the Democratic conventionhad adjourned. The slavery question, upon which the Democrats ofall shades had so cordially coalesced, was to the Whigs a dividingsword. Mr. Fillmore was a candidate, supported with almost entireunanimity by the Southern Whigs. Mr. Webster was a candidate, andthough in his fear for the Union he had sacrificed more than anyother man for the South, he could secure no Southern support. General Scott was a candidate, and though born and reared inVirginia, he was supported by anti-slavery Whigs of every shade inthe North, against the two men of Northern birth and Northernassociations. On the first ballot, Fillmore received 133 votes, Scott 131, Webster 23. Fillmore received every Southern vote, except one from Virginia given to Scott by John Minor Botts. Scottreceived every Northern vote except twenty-nine given to Webster, and sixteen given to Fillmore. The friends of Mr. Webster, andMr. Webster himself, were pained and mortified by the result. Rufus Choate was at the head of the Massachusetts delegation, andeloquently, even passionately, pleaded with the Southern men tosupport Mr. Webster on a single ballot. But the Southern menstubbornly adhered to Fillmore, and were in turn enraged becausethe twenty-nine votes thrown away, as they said, on Mr. Webster, would at once renominate the President in whose cabinet Mr. Websterwas at that moment serving as Premier. This threefold contest hadbeen well developed before the convention assembled, and one featureof special bitterness had been added to it by a letter from Mr. Clay, who was on his death-bed in Washington. He urged his friendsto support Mr. Fillmore. This was regarded by many as a lack ofgenerosity on Mr. Clay's part, after the warm support which Mr. Webster had given him in his contest with Mr. Polk in 1844. Butthere had been for years an absence of cordiality between theseWhig leaders, and many who were familiar with both declared thatMr. Clay had never forgiven Mr. Webster for remaining in Tyler'scabinet after the resignation of the other Whig members. Mr. Webster's association with Tyler had undoubtedly given to thePresident a measure of protection against the hot wrath of Mr. Clayin the memorable contest of 1841-2, and by natural reaction hadimpaired the force of Mr. Clay's attack. And now ten years afterthe event its memory rose to influence the Presidential nominationof 1852. 

Another explanation is more in consonance with Mr. Clay's magnanimityof character. He was extremely anxious that an outspoken friendof the Compromise should be nominated. He knew when he wrote hisletter that the Democrats would pledge themselves to the finalityof the Compromise, and he knew the Southern Whigs would be overwhelmedif there should be halting or hesitation on this issue either intheir candidate or in their platform. He felt, as the responsibleauthor of the Compromise, that he was himself on trial, and itwould be a peculiar mortification if the party which he had led solong should fail to sustain him in this final crisis of his publiclife. He had been sufficiently humiliated by Taylor's triumph overhim in the convention of 1848. It would be an absolutely intolerablerebuke if in 1852 Taylor's policy should be preferred to his ownby a Whig national convention. Taylor, indeed, was in his grave, but his old military compatriot, Scott, was a candidate for thePresidency, and the anti-Compromise Whigs under Seward's lead wererallying to his support. Mr. Clay believed that Fillmore, withthe force of the national administration in his hands, could defeatGeneral Scott, and that Mr. Webster's candidacy was a needlessdivision of friends. Hence he sustained Fillmore, not from hostilityto Webster, but as the sure and only means of securing an indorsementof the Compromise measures, and of doing justice to a NorthernPresident who had risked every thing in support of Mr. Clay'spolicy. 

The contest was long and earnest. Mr. Webster's friends, offendedby what they considered the ingratitude of Southern Whigs, persistentlyrefused to go over to Fillmore, though by so doing they could atany moment secure his nomination. They cared nothing for Fillmore'slead in votes, obtained as they thought in large degree from theuse of patronage. They scouted it as an argument not fit to beaddressed to the friends of Mr. Webster. Such considerationsbelonged only to men of the lower grades, struggling in the dirtypools of political strife, and were not to be applied to a statesmanof Mr. Webster's rank and character. They felt, moreover, thatall the popularity which Fillmore had secured in the South, and toa certain degree with the conservative and commercial classes ofthe whole country, had come from Mr. Webster's presence and pre-eminent service in his cabinet. In short, Mr. Webster's supportersfelt that Mr. Fillmore, so far from earning their respect anddeserving their applause, was merely strutting in borrowed plumage, and deriving all his strength from their own illustrious chief. This jealousy was of course stimulated with consummate art and tactby the supporters of Scott. They expressed, as they reallyentertained, the highest admiration for Webster, and no less franklymade known their dislike, if not their contempt, for Fillmore. Webster, as they pointed out, was supported by the voice of hisown great State. Massachusetts had sent a delegation composed ofher best men, with the most brilliant orator of the nation, toplead their cause at the bar of the convention. In contrast withthis, Fillmore had no support from New York. The Whigs of thatState had sent a delegation to impeach him before the nation forfaithlessness to principle, and to demand that votes of other Statesshould not impose on New York a recreant son to confound and destroythe party. 

 NOMINATION OF GENERAL SCOTT. 

From this attrition and conflict the natural result was Scott'striumph. It was not reached, however, until the fifty-third ballotand until the fifth day of the convention. It was brought aboutby the votes of some Fillmore delegates, both in the North and theSouth, who felt that the long contest should be ended. The gossipof the day--with perhaps a shadow of foundation--was, that in thecouncils of an inner and governing circle of delegates it wasfinally agreed that the North might have the candidate, and theSouth should have the platform, and that thus a bold fight couldbe made in both sections. William A. Graham of North Carolina, formerly a senator in Congress from that State, subsequently itsgovernor, and at the time secretary of the Navy in Mr. Fillmore'scabinet, was nominated for Vice-President, as a wise concession tothe defeated party. The platform adopted was strongly Southern, and this fact served to confirm in the minds of many the existenceof the suspected agreement for the division of honors between Northand South. The convention resolved that the Compromise measures, including the fugitive-slave law (specially designated after theexample of the Democratic convention), "are received and acquiescedin by the Whig party of the United States as a settlement inprinciple and in substance of the dangerous and exciting questionswhich they embrace. " They further declared that this position was"essential to the nationality of the Whig party and the integrityof the Union. " Alexander H. Stephens has stated that this resolutionwas shown to him by Mr. Webster before the convention assembled, and while Mr. Choate was his guest. The inference apparentlyintended was that Mr. Choate carried it to the convention as theexpression of the Northern Whigs, who believed in the Compromisemeasures. The agreement--if one existed--that this resolutionshould be adopted, did not involve all the Northern Whigs. Sturdyresistance was made by many, and the final vote disclosed a powerfulminority opposed to the resolution. 

For the first few weeks of the canvass the Whigs had strong hopeof success. The name of General Scott evoked much enthusiasm, andhis splendid military reputation, acquired in two wars, was favorablycontrasted with that of General Pierce, who was one of PresidentPolk's political brigadiers. But these indications were the bubblesand froth that floated on the surface. The personal characteristicsof the candidates were lost sight of in the face of the great issuesinvolved. The people soon perceived that if there was indeed meritin the Compromise measures, it would be wise to intrust them tothe keeping of the party that was unreservedly--North and South--in favor of upholding and enforcing them. On this point there wasabsolutely no division in the Democratic ranks. In New York thefriends of Marcy and the political heirs of Wright cordiallyharmonized in favor of the Compromise. Mr. Van Buren returned toTammany Hall as fresh and buoyant as if his allegiance had neverbeen broken; and in a great convocation of the Democracy, theprodigal was welcomed, Pierce's nomination applauded, the platformcheered, the anti-slavery creed forsworn, the Whig party roundlyabused, and word sent forth to the uttermost parts of the Unionthat the Empire State had resumed her place at the head of theDemocratic line. 

The Whigs soon found to their dismay that the platform and thecandidate were inseparable. They could not make a canvass uponthe one in the South and upon the other in the North. GeneralScott had indeed heartily assented to all the principles proclaimedat the convention, but so long as Horace Greeley was eulogizinghim in the "Tribune, " and Seward supporting him on the stump, itwas idle to present him as an acceptable candidate to slave-holdingWhigs in the South. Supporting the candidate and spitting on theplatform became the expressive if inelegant watchword of manyNorthern Whigs, but for every Whig vote which this phrase kept tohis party allegiance in the free States, it drove two over to theDemocracy in the slave States. Moreover, spitting on the platform, however effective as an indication of contempt, would not satisfythe conscience or the prejudices of large numbers of Whigs whovoted directly for the candidates of the Free-soil party, John P. Hale of New Hampshire for President, and George W. Julian of Indianafor Vice-President. 

 DEFEAT OF THE WHIG PARTY. 

Weakened by personal strife, hopelessly divided on questions ofprinciple, the Whig party was led to the slaughter. Carrying in1840 every State but seven for Harrison, failing to elect Mr. Clayin 1844 only by the loss of New York, triumphantly installing Taylorin 1848, the Whigs were astounded to find that their candidate hadbeen successful in but four States of the Union, and that twenty-seven States had by large majorities pronounced for General Pierce. Massachusetts and Vermont in the North, Kentucky and Tennessee inthe South, had alone remained true to the Whig standard. All theother Whig States that had stood staunch and strong in the fiercecontests of the past now gave way. Connecticut and Rhode Island, which never but once failed either Federalist or Whig from thefoundation of the government, now voted for a pro-slavery States'-rights Democrat. Delaware, which never in a single instance votedfor the Democratic candidate except when Monroe had no oppositionin 1820; which had fought against Jefferson and Madison; which hadstood firmly against Jackson and Van Buren and Polk and Cass whenthe Bayards were Whigs and co-operated with the Claytons, nowswelled the general acclaim for Pierce. Of 296 electors Piercereceived 254 and General Scott only 42. The wide sweep of theDemocratic victory was a surprise to both sides, though for severalweeks before the election the defeat of Scott was anticipated. Hereceived no support from Mr. Fillmore's administration, was indeedsecretly betrayed by it everywhere, and quite openly by its officialsin the Southern States. He did not receive the strength of hisparty, and the strength of his party would have been insufficientto elect him. But overwhelming as was the defeat, it did notnecessarily involve destruction. The Whigs had been beaten almostas badly when Clay ran against Jackson in 1832, and yet the partyhad rallied to four earnest contests and to two signal victories. The Democracy, now so triumphant, had been disastrously beaten inthe contest of 1840, but in the next election had regained strengthenough to defeat Mr. Clay. The precedents, therefore, permittedthe Whigs to be of good cheer and bade them wait the issues of thefuture. They were not, however, consoled by the philosophy ofdefeat, and were disposed to gloomy anticipations. 

 MR. CLAY AND MR. WEBSTER COMPARED. 

As if to emphasize the disaster to the Whigs, Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster both died during the canvass; Mr. Clay in June, a few daysafter Scott's nomination, Mr. Webster in October, a few days beforehis defeat. They had both lived long enough to see the work oftheir political life imperiled if not destroyed. They had heldthe same relation to the Whigs that the elder Adams and Hamiltonhad held to the Federalists, that Jefferson and Madison had heldto the Republicans. Comparison between them could not be fairlymade, their inherent qualities and personal characteristics differedso widely. Each was superior to the other in certain traits, andin our public annals thus far each stands unequaled in his sphere. Their points of contrast were salient and numerous. Mr. Clay wasborn in Virginia. Mr. Webster was born in New England. Mr. Claywas a devoted follower of Jefferson. Mr. Webster was bred in theschool of Hamilton. Mr. Clay was an earnest advocate of the secondwar with Great Britain. Mr. Webster was its steady opponent. Mr. Clay supported Madison in 1812 with great energy. Mr. Websterthrew all his strength for De Witt Clinton. Mr. Clay was from thefirst deeply imbued with the doctrine of protection. Mr. Websterentered public life as a pronounced free-trader. They were notmembers of the same political organization until after the destructionof the old Federal party to which Mr. Webster belonged, and thehopeless divisions of the old Republican party to which Mr. Claybelonged. They gradually harmonized towards the close of Monroe'ssecond term, and became firmly united under the administration ofJohn Quincy Adams. Modern political designations had their originin the Presidential election of 1824. The candidates all belongedto the party of Jefferson, which had been called Democratic-Republican. In the new divisions, the followers of Jackson tookthe name of Democrats: the supporters of Adams called themselvesNational Republicans. They had thus divided the old name, eachclaiming the inheritance. The unpopularity of Mr. Adams'sadministration had destroyed the prospects of the National-Republicanparty, and the name was soon displaced by the new and more acceptabletitle of Whig. To the joint efforts of Mr. Clay and Mr. Webstermore than to all others the formation of the Whig party was due. It was not, however, in Mr. Webster's nature to become a partisanchief. Mr. Clay on the other hand was naturally and inevitably aleader. In all the discussions of the Senate in which constitutionalquestions were involved, Mr. Clay instinctively deferred to Mr. Webster. In the parliamentary debates which concerned the positionof parties and the fate of measures, which enchained the Senateand led captive the people, Mr. Clay was _facile princeps_. Mr. Webster argued the principle. Mr. Clay embodied it in a statute. Mr. Webster's speeches are still read with interest and studiedwith profit. Mr. Clay's speeches swayed listening senates andmoved multitudes, but reading them is a disappointment. Betweenthe two the difference is much the same as that between Burke andCharles James Fox. Fox was the parliamentary debater of England, the consummate leader of his party. His speeches, always listenedto and cheered by a crowded House of Commons, perished with theirdelivery. Burke could never command a body of followers, but hisparliamentary orations form brilliant and permanent chapters inthe political literature of two continents. 

While Mr. Webster's name is so honorably perpetuated by his elaborateand masterly discussion of great principles in the Senate, he didnot connect himself with a single historic measure. While Mr. Clay's speeches remain unread, his memory is lastingly identifiedwith issues that are still vital and powerful. He advanced thedoctrine of protection to the stately dignity of the Americansystem. Discarding theories and overthrowing the dogma of strictconstruction, he committed the General Government irrevocably tointernal improvements. Condemning the worthless system of papermoney imposed upon the people by irresponsible State banks, hestood firmly for a national currency, and he foreshadowed if hedid not reach the paper money which is based to-day on the creditand the strength of the government. 

Mr. Clay possessed extraordinary sagacity in public affairs, seeingand foreseeing where others were blinded by ignorance or prejudice. He was a statesman by intuition, finding a remedy before otherscould discover the disease. His contemporaries appreciated hisrare endowments. On the day of his first entrance into the Houseof Representatives he was chosen Speaker, though but thirty-fouryears of age. This was all the more remarkable because the Housewas filled with men of recognized ability, who had been long inthe public service. It was rendered still more striking by thefact that Mr. Clay was from the far West, from one of the only twoStates whose frontiers reached the Mississippi. In the entireHouse there were only fifteen members from the Western side of theAlleghanies. He was re-elected Speaker in every Congress so longas he served as representative. He entered the Senate at thirty, and died a member of it in his seventy-sixth year. He began hiscareer in that body during the Presidency of Jefferson in 1806, and closed it under the Presidency of Fillmore in 1852. Othersenators have served a longer time than Mr. Clay, but he alone atperiods so widely separated. Other men have excelled him in specificpowers, but in the rare combination of qualities which constituteat once the matchless leader of party and the statesman of consummateability and inexhaustible resource, he has never been surpassed byany man speaking the English tongue. 

[NOTE. --The Committee of Thirteen, to which reference is made onp. 94, and which attained such extraordinary importance at thetime, was originally suggested by Senator Foote of Mississippi. His first proposition was somewhat novel from its distinct recognitionof the sectional character of the issues involved. He proposedthat the committee be chosen by ballot, that six members of itshould be taken from the free States and six members from the slaveStates, and that the twelve thus chosen should select a thirteenthmember who should be chairman of the committee. All propositionstouching any of the questions at issue between the North and theSouth were to be referred to this committee with the view of securinga general and comprehensive compromise. The subject was debatedfor several weeks. Mr. Foote submitted his proposition on the 25thof February, 1850, and it was not adopted until the 18th of April. The committee was chosen on the 19th. Mr. Clay had objected tothe open avowal of a division of the committee on the line of Northand South, and the proposition was so modified as to simply providefor a committee of thirteen to be chosen by ballot, --the chairmanto be first selected, and the other twelve members on a secondballot. The change of the resolution was one of form only; for, when the Senate came to select the members, they adhered to theplan originally suggested by Mr. Foote. Mr. Clay was made chairman, which had been the design from the first, and then six senatorswere taken from the free States and six from the slave States, --the first, if not the only, time this mode of appointment wasadopted. The membership of the committee was highly distinguished. From the free States the Senate selected Mr. Webster, General Cass, Mr. Dickinson of New York, Mr. Bright of Indiana, Mr. Phelps ofVermont, and Mr. Cooper of Pennsylvania. From the slave States, Mr. King of Alabama, Mr. Mason of Virginia, Mr. Downs of Louisiana, Mr. Mangum of North Carolina, Mr. Bell of Tennessee, and Mr. Berrienof Georgia. The twelve were equally divided between the Whigs andthe Democrats, so that, with Mr. Clay as chairman, the Whigs hadthe majority in numbers as they had the overwhelming superiorityin weight and ability. The composition of the committee wasremarkable when it is remembered that the Democrats had a majorityof ten in the Senate. ]

CHAPTER VI. 

Review (_continued_). --The Strength of the Democratic Party in1853. --Popular Strength not so great as Electoral Strength. --TheNew President's Pledge not to re-open the Slavery Question. --Howhe failed to maintain that Pledge. --The North-west Territory. --Anti-slavery Restriction of the Missouri Compromise. --Movement to repealit by Mr. Clay's Successor in the Senate. --Mr. Douglas adopts thepolicy of repealing the Restriction. --It is made an AdministrationMeasure and carried through Congress. --Colonel Benton's Position. --Anti-slavery Excitement developed in the Country. --Destructionof the Whig Party. --New Political Alliances. --American Party. --Know-Nothings. --Origin and Growth of the Republican Party. --Pro-slaveryDevelopment in the South. --Contest for the Possession of Kansas. --Prolonged Struggle. --Disunion Tendencies developing in the South. --Election of N. P. Banks to the Speakership of the House. --ThePresidential Election of 1856. --Buchanan. --Frémont. --Fillmore. --The Slavery Question the Absorbing Issue. --Triumph of Buchanan. --Dred Scott Decision. --Mr. Lincoln's Version of it. --Chief JusticeTaney. 

The Democratic party, seeing their old Whig rival prostrate, naturally concluded that a long lease of power was granted them. The victory of Pierce was so complete that his supporters couldnot with closest scrutiny descry an opponent worthy of the slightestconsideration. If the leaders of that party, however, had deignedto look below the surface, they would have learned a fact which, if not disquieting, was at least serious and significant. Thisfact was contained in the popular vote, which told an entirelydifferent story from that disclosed by the Presidential electors. From the people Pierce received a total of 1, 601, 274 votes, Scott1, 386, 580, Hale 155, 825. It will be noted that, while receivingonly one-sixth as many electoral votes as Pierce, Scott receivedmore than five-sixths as many votes at the polls. Adding the voteof Hale, it will be observed that out of a total exceeding threemillions, Pierce's absolute majority was but 58, 896. Thoughtfulmen, wise in the administration of government, skilled in themanagement of parties, would have found in these figures food forreflection and abundant reason for hoisting cautionary signalsalong the shores of the political sea. The Democratic leaders werenot, however, disturbed by facts or figures, but were rather madestronger in the confidence of their own strength. They beheld thecountry prosperous in all its material interests, and they saw themass of the people content in both sections with the settlement ofthe slavery question. Since the Compromise measures were enactedin 1850, and especially since the two political parties had pledgedthemselves in 1852 to accept those measures as a finality, theslavery agitation had to a very large extent subsided. Disturbancewas not indeed infrequently caused by the summary arrest of fugitiveslaves in various parts of the North, under the stringent and harshprovisions of the new law on that subject. But though thesepeculiarly odious transactions exerted a deeper influence on publicopinion than the Democratic leaders imagined, they were local andapparently under control. There was no national disquietude onthe vexed question of slavery when Franklin Pierce was installedas President. 

In his Inaugural address General Pierce pledged himself with evidentzeal to the upholding of the Compromise measures and to the rigidenforcement of the laws. There is no doubt that a large majorityof the people of the United States--North and South--were satisfiedwith the situation and bade God-speed to the popular Presidentwhose administration opened so auspiciously. The year 1853 waspolitically as quiet as Monroe's era of good feeling, and whenCongress came together in its closing month, the President dweltimpressively upon the dangers we had passed and upon the blessingsthat were in store for us. In tones of solemnity he declared thatwhen "the grave shall have closed over all who are now endeavoringto meet the obligations of duty, the year 1850 will be recurred toas a period of anxious apprehension. " With high praise of theCompromise legislation of that year he said "it had given renewedvigor to our institutions and restored a sense of repose and securityto the public mind. " Evidently remembering the pledge given bythe convention which nominated him "to resist all attempts atrenewing the agitation of the slavery question in or out of Congress, "the President gave emphatic assurance that this "repose" shouldsuffer no shock during his term if he "had the power to avert it. "These words were addressed to Congress on the fifth day of December, 1853, and it would be uncandid to deny that even in the North theywere heartily approved by a large majority of the people, --perhapsby a majority in every State. 

 OMINOUS MOVEMENT IN CONGRESS. 

In precisely one month from the delivery of these words by thePresident an ominous movement was made in Congress. Notwithstandingall the vows of fealty to the Compromise of 1850, the pro-slaveryleaders of the South were not contented with the aspect of affairs. The result of the Mexican war had deeply disappointed them. Itsmost striking political effect thus far was the addition to theUnion of a large and imposing free State on the Pacific, --an empireindeed in prospective wealth and power. In the battle between freeinstitutions and slave institutions, California represented a strongflank movement threatening destruction to slavery. Her vote inthe Senate gave a majority of two to the free States. The equalityof the sections had been steadily maintained in the Senate sincethe admission of Louisiana in 1812. The break now was ominous;the claim of equality had been disregarded; the superstition whichupheld it was dispelled, and the defenders of slavery could seeonly a long procession of free States marching from the North-Westto re-enforce a power already irresistibly strong. From whatquarter of the Union could this anti-slavery aggression be offset?By what process could its growth be checked? Texas might, if shechose to ask for her own partition, re-enforce the slave-power inthe Senate by four new States, as guaranteed in the articles ofannexation. But the very majesty of her dimensions protestedagainst dismemberment. Texas was as large as France, and from theSabine to the Rio Grande there was not a cotton-planter or a cattle-herder who did not have this fact before his eyes to inflame hispride and guide his vote against parting with a single square mileof her magnificent domain. New Mexico and Utah were mountainousand arid, inviting only the miner and the grazier and offering noinducement for the labor of the slave. The right guaranteed tothese territories in the Compromise of 1850 to come in as slaveStates was, therefore, as Mr. Webster had maintained, a concessionof form and not of substance to the South. Seeing slavery thushemmed in on all sides by nature as well as law, and sincerelybelieving that in such a position its final extinction was but aquestion of time, the Southern leaders determined to break thebonds that bound them. From their own point of reasoning they werecorrect. To stand still was certain though slow destruction toslavery. To move was indeed hazardous, but it gave them a chanceto re-establish their equality in the administration of thegovernment, and for this they determined to risk every thing. 

To the westward and north-westward of Missouri and Iowa lay a vastterritory which in 1854 was not only unsettled but had no form ofcivil government whatever. It stretched from the north line ofArkansas to the border of British America, --twelve and a halfdegrees of latitude, --and westward over great plains and acrossmountain ranges till it reached the confines of Utah and Oregon. It was the unorganized remainder of the territory of Louisiana, acquired from France in 1803, and in extent was ten times as largeas the combined area of New York and Pennsylvania. By the MissouriCompromise every square mile of this domain had been honorablydevoted to freedom. At the period named Indian tribes roamed atwill throughout its whole extent and lighted their camp-fires onthe very borders of Missouri and Iowa. Herds of buffalo grazedundisturbed on lands which to-day constitute the sites of largecities. Fort Leavenworth was a far-western outpost, Council Bluffswas on the frontier of civilization, and Omaha had not been named. Adventurous merchants passed over the plains to the South-West withlong caravans, engaged in the Santa-Fé trade, and towards the North-West, hunters, trappers, and a few hardy emigrants penetrated the"Platte country, " and through mountain passes pointed out by thetrail of the Indian and the buffalo had in many instances safelycrossed to Oregon. The tide of emigration which had filled Iowaand Wisconsin, and which by the gold excitement of California hadfor a time been drawn to the Pacific slope, now set again morestrongly then ever to the Mississippi valley, demanding and needingnew lands for settlement and cultivation. To answer this requirementa movement was made during the closing weeks of Mr. Fillmore'sadministration to establish the territory of Nebraska. A bill tothat effect was passed by a two-thirds vote in the House. Theslight opposition that was made came from the South, but itssignificance was not perceived. When the bill reached the SenateMr. Douglas, as chairman of the committee on territories, promptlyreported it, and made an apparently sincere effort to pass it. Hedid not succeed. Every senator from the slave-holding States, except those from Missouri, --which was locally interested in havingthe territory organized, --voted against it;--and the measure, antagonizing other business in which Northern senators were moreimmediately interested, was laid upon the table two days beforePresident Pierce was inaugurated. The bill had fully recognizedthe binding force of the Missouri Compromise, and if it had passed, there could have been no pretense for the introduction of slaveryin the territory of Nebraska. 

 REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 

Directly after the assurance so impressively given by the Presidentthat the "repose" of the country on the slavery question "shouldsuffer no shock during his administration, " the bill to organizethe Territory of Nebraska was again introduced in the Senate. Themotive for its defeat the preceding session was soon made apparent. Mr. Archibald Dixon of Kentucky, the last Whig governor of thatState, had been chosen to succeed Mr. Clay in the Senate. But hedid not succeed to Mr. Clay's political principles. He belongedto a class of men that had been recently and rapidly growing inthe South, --men avowedly and aggressively pro-slavery. Mr. Dixonwas the first to strike an open blow against the Missouri Compromise. Mr. Clay had been honorably identified with the pacific work of1820, and throughout his life believed that it had been effectualin allaying the strife which in his judgment had endangered theUnion. It was an alarming fact that his own successor in the Senate--less than two years after Mr. Clay's death--was the first toassail his work and to re-open a controversy which was not to ceasetill a continent was drenched in blood. Mr. Dixon made no concealmentof his motive and his purpose, declaring that he wished therestriction removed because he was a pro-slavery man. He gavenotice early in January, 1854, that when the bill to organize theTerritory of Nebraska should come before the Senate, he would movethat "the Missouri Compromise be repealed, and that the citizensof the several States shall be at liberty to take and hold theirslaves within any of the Territories. " It was very soon found thatthis was not a capricious movement by Mr. Dixon alone, but thatbehind him there was a settled determination on the part of thepro-slavery men to break down the ancient barrier and to removethe honored landmark of 1820. 

The Senate had a large Democratic majority, and there was probablynot one among them all who had not in the Presidential contest of1852 publicly and solemnly vowed that the Compromise measures of1850 were a final settlement of the slavery question, not in anyevent, nor upon any pretext, to be disturbed. It was speciallyembarrassing and perilous for Northern senators to violate pledgesso recently made, so frequently repeated. It much resembled thebreaking of a personal promise, and seemed to the mass of peoplein the free State to be a gross breach of national honor. To escapethe sharp edge of condemnation, sure to follow such a transaction, a pretense was put forth that the Compromise of 1820 was in conflictwith the Compromise of 1850, and that it was necessary to repealthe former in order that the doctrine of non-intervention withslavery in the Territories should become the recognized policy forall the public domain of the United States. Mr. Douglas was thefirst to adopt this construction. Indeed, to him may fairly beascribed the credit or the discredit of inventing it. He had astrong hold on the South, and in his Congressional life had steadilyvoted on the pro-slavery side of all public questions. But heinstinctively foresaw that his political future would be endangeredby advocating the repeal of the Missouri Compromise on the basisand for the reason announced by Mr. Dixon. Hence the resort tothe doctrine of non-intervention under which the South should getall they wished by having the right to carry their slaves into theterritory, and the North could be conciliated by the presentationof another final settlement of all issues which threatened theperpetuity of the Union. 

Instead of the single Territory of Nebraska, Mr. Douglas reporteda measure to organize both Kansas and Nebraska; and in one of thesections of the bill the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was declaredto be inoperative and void, because "inconsistent with the principleof non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States andTerritories as recognized by the Compromise measures of 1850. "The bill further declared that "its true intent and meaning wasnot to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, and not toexclude it therefrom, but to leave the people perfectly free toregulate their domestic institutions in their own way. " The Northwas fairly stunned by the proposition made by Mr. Douglas. Had heproposed to abolish the Constitution itself the surprise couldscarcely have been greater. The acting generation had grown tomanhood with profound respect and even reverence for the MissouriCompromise, and had come to regard it almost as sacredly as thoughit were part of the organic law of the Republic. If a Southernman talked of its repeal it was regarded as the mere bravado of anextremist. But now a Northern senator of remarkable ability, aparty leader, a candidate for the Presidency, had reported themeasure, and made it a test of Democratic faith, of administrationfealty. The contest that followed was severe and prolonged. Thebill was before Congress for a period of four months, and wasfinally forced through to the utter destruction of good faithbetween the sections. More than forty Democratic representativesfrom the North flatly defied party discipline and voted againstthe repeal. The Democratic representatives from the slave Stateswere consolidated in its favor, with the exception of John Millson, an able member from Virginia, and the venerable Thomas H. Bentonof Missouri. 

 REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 

After Colonel Benton's thirty years' service in the Senate hadterminated, the city of St. Louis sent him to the House in the autumnof 1852. He had entered the Senate when Missouri came into theUnion as the result of the Compromise of 1820. He had remainedthere until after the Compromise of 1850 was adopted. He denouncedthe proceeding of Douglas with unsparing severity, and gave hisbest efforts, but in vain, to defeat the bill. He pointed out thefact that the original Compromise had been forced upon the Northby the South, and that the present proposition to repeal it hadbeen initiated "without a memorial, without a petition, without arequest from any human being. It was simply and only a contrivanceof political leaders, who were using the institution of slavery asa weapon, and rushing the country forward to excitements andconflicts in which there was no profit to either section, andpossibly great harm to both. " Colonel Benton belonged to a classof Southern Democrats who were passing away, --of whom he, indeed, was the last in conspicuous stature. He represented the Democracyof Andrew Jackson and of Nathaniel Macon, --not the Democracy ofMr. Calhoun. He placed the value of the Union above the value ofslavery, and was a relentless foe to all who plotted against theintegrity of the government. But his day was past, his power wasbroken, his influence was gone. Even in his own State he had beenbeaten, and David R. Atchison installed as leader of the Democraticparty. His efforts were vain, his protest unheard; and amid thesorrow and gloom of thinking men, and the riotous rejoicings ofthose who could not measure the evil of their work, the DouglasBill was passed. On the thirtieth of May, 1854, the wise andpatriotic Compromise of March 6, 1820, was declared to be at anend, and the advocates and the opponents of slavery were invitedto a trial of strength on the public domain of the United States. 

No previous anti-slavery excitement bore any comparison with thatwhich spread over the North as the discussion progressed, andespecially after the bill became a law. It did not merely callforth opposition; it produced almost a frenzy of wrath on the partof thousands and tens of thousands in both the old parties, whohad never before taken any part whatever in anti-slavery agitation. So conservative a statesman as Edward Everett, who had succeededJohn Davis as senator from Massachusetts, pointed out the fallacynot to say the falsehood of the plea that the Compromise measuresof 1850 required or involved this legislation. This plea was anafterthought, a pretense, contradicted by the discussion of 1850in its entire length and breadth. In the North, conservative menfelt that no compromise could acquire weight or sanction orsacredness, if one that had stood for a whole generation could bebrushed aside by partisan caprice or by the demands of sectionalnecessity. The popular fury was further stimulated by the factthat from the territory included in the Louisiana purchase, threeslave States had been added to the Union, and as yet only one freeState; and that the solemn guaranty securing all the domain northof 36° 30´ was now to be trodden under foot when its operation waslikely to prove hostile to slavery and favorable to freedom. Fromthe beginning of the government the slave-holding interest hadsecured the advantage in the number of States formed from territoryadded to the original Union. The South had Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri out of the purchase from France in 1803, Florida fromthe purchase from Spain in 1819, and Texas, with its possibilityof being divided into four additional States, from the annexationof 1845. The North had only Iowa from the Louisiana purchase andCalifornia from the territory ceded by Mexico. The North wouldnot stop to consider its prospective advantages in the territoryyet to be settled, while the South could see nothing else. TheSouth realized that although it had secured five States and theNorth only two, Southern territory was exhausted, while the creationof free States in the North-West had just begun. Stripped of allthe disguises with which it was surrounded by the specious cry ofnon-intervention by Congress, the majority in the North came tosee that it was in reality nothing but a struggle between the slaveStates and the free States, growing more and more intense and moreand more dangerous day by day. 

 REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 

The most striking result in the political field, produced by therepeal of the Missouri Compromise, was the utter destruction ofthe Whig party. Had the Southern Whigs in Congress maintained thesacredness of the work of 1820, the party throughout the countrywould have been able to make a sturdy contest, notwithstanding thecrushing defeat of Scott two years before. Not improbably in thepeculiar state of public opinion, the Whigs, by maintaining theCompromise, might have been able to carry the Presidential electionof 1856. But with the exception of John Bell in the Senate andseven members of the House, the entire Whig party of the Southjoined the Democrats in repealing the Compromise. Of these seven, Emerson Etheridge of Tennessee and Theodore G. Hunt of Louisianadeserve especial and honorable mention for the courage with whichthey maintained their position. But when John M. Clayton ofDelaware, who had voted to prohibit slavery in all the Territories, now voted to strike down the only legal barrier to its extension;when Badger of North Carolina, who had been the very soul ofconservatism, now joined in the wild cry of the pro-slavery Democrats;when James Alfred Pearce of Maryland and James C. Jones of Tennesseeunited with Jefferson Davis, the Whig party of the South ceased toexist. Indeed, before this final blow large numbers of SouthernWhigs had gone over to the Democracy. Toombs and Stephens andJudah P. Benjamin had been among the foremost supporters of Pierce, and had been specially influential in consolidating the South inhis favor. But the great body of Whigs both in the South and inthe North did not lose hope of a strong re-organization of theirold party until the destruction of the Missouri Compromise had beeneffected. That was seen and felt by all to be the end. 

Thenceforward new alliances were rapidly formed. In the Souththose Whigs who, though still unwilling to profess an anti-slaverycreed, would not unite with the Democrats, were re-organized underthe name of the American party, with Humphrey Marshall, Henry WinterDavis, Horace Maynard, and men of that class, for leaders. Thisparty was founded on proscription of foreigners, and with specialhostility to the Roman-Catholic Church. It had a fitful and feverishsuccess, and in 1845-5, under the name of _Know-Nothings_, enrolledtens of thousands in secret lodges. But its creed was narrow, itsprinciples were illiberal, and its methods of procedure boyish andundignified. The great body of thinking men in the North saw thatthe real contest impending was against slavery and not againstnaturalization laws and ecclesiastical dogmas. The Know-Nothings, therefore, speedily disappeared, and a new party sprang intoexistence composed of anti-slavery Whigs and anti-slavery Democrats. The latter infused into the ranks of the new organization a spiritand an energy which Whig traditions could never inspire. The samename was not at once adopted in all the free States in 1854, butby the ensuing year there was a general recognition throughout theNorth that all who intended to make a serious fight against thepro-slavery Democracy would unite under the flag of the Republicanparty. In its very first effort, without compact organization, without discipline, it rallied the anti-slavery sentiment sosuccessfully as to carry nearly all the free States and to securea plurality of the members of the House of Representatives. Theindignation of the people knew no bounds. Old political landmarksdisappeared, and party prejudices of three generations were sweptaside in a day. With such success in the outset, the Republicansprepared for a vigorous struggle in the approaching Presidentialelection. 

The anti-slavery development of the North was not more intense thanthe pro-slavery development of the South. Every other issue wasmerged in the one absorbing demand by Southern slave-holders forwhat they sincerely believed to be their rights in the Territories. It was not viewed on either side as an ordinary political contest. It was felt to be a question not of expediency but of morality, not of policy but of honor. It did not merely enlist men. Womentook large part in the agitation. It did not end with absorbingthe laity. The clergy were as profoundly concerned. The power ofthe Church on both sides of the dividing-line was used with greateffect in shaping public opinion and directing political action. The Missouri Compromise was repealed in May. Before the end ofthe year a large majority of the people of the North and a largemajority of the people of the South were distinctly arrayed againsteach other on a question which touched the interest, the pride, the conscience, and the religion of all who were concerned in thecontroversy. Had either side been insincere there would have beenvoluntary yielding or enforced adjustment. But each felt itselfto be altogether in the right and its opponent altogether in thewrong. Thus they stood confronting each other at the close of theyear 1854. 

It was soon perceived by all, as the sagacious had seen from thefirst, that the Missouri Compromise had not been repealed merelyto exhibit unity in the scope of the United-States statutes respectingslavery in the Territories. This was the euphuistic plea of thoseNorthern senators and representatives who had given dire offenseto their constituents by voting for it. It was the clever artificeof Douglas which suggested that construction. It was a deception, and it was contradicted and exposed by the logic of argument inthe North and by the logic of action in the South. No double-dealing was attempted by the Southern men. They understood thequestion perfectly and left the apologies and explanations toNorthern men, who were hard pressed by anti-slavery constituents. Southern men knew that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise gavethem a privilege which they had not before enjoyed, --the privilegeof settling with their slaves on the rich plains and in the fertilevalleys that stretched westward from the Missouri River. Inmaintaining this privilege, they felt sure of aid from the Executiveof the United States, and they had the fullest confidence that inany legal controversy the Federal judiciary would be on their side. 

 THE SOUTHERN STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 

Thus panoplied they made a desperate contest for the possession ofKansas. They had found that all the crops grown in Missouri byslave labor could be as profitably cultivated in Kansas. SecuringKansas, they would gain more than the mere material advantage ofan enlarged field for slave labor. New Mexico at that time includedall of Arizona; Utah included all of Nevada; Kansas, as organized, absorbed a large part of what is now Colorado, stretched along theeastern and northern boundary of New Mexico, and, crossing theRocky Mountains, reached the confines of Utah. If Kansas could bemade a slave State it would control New Mexico and Utah, and theSouth could again be placed in a position of political equality ifnot of command. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had shownthem for the first time that they could absolutely consolidate theSouthern vote in Congress in defense of slavery, regardless ofdifferences on all other issues. But this power was of no avail, unless they could regain their equality in the Senate which hadbeen lost by what they considered the mishap of California'sadmission. While Clay and Benton were in the Senate with theirold reverence for the Union and their desire for the ultimateextinction of slavery, California could neither be kept out nordivided on the line of 36° 30´. But the new South, the South ofJefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens, of Robert Toombs andJudah P. Benjamin, of James M. Mason and John C. Breckinridge, hadmade new advances, was inspired by new ambitions, and was determinedupon the consolidation of sectional power. The one supreme needwas another slave State. If this could be acquired they feltassured that so long as the Union should exist no free State couldbe admitted without the corresponding admission of another slaveState. They would perhaps have been disappointed. Possibly theydid not give sufficient heed to the influences which were steadilyworking against slavery in such States as Delaware and Maryland, threatening desertion in the rear, while the defenders of slaverywere battling at the front. They argued, however, and not unnaturally, that prejudice can hold a long contest with principle, and that inthe general uprising of the South the tendency of all their oldallies would be to remain firm. They reckoned that States withfew slaves would continue to stand for Southern institutions asstubbornly as States with many slaves. In all the States of theSouth emancipation had been made difficult, and free negroes weretolerated, if at all, with great reluctance and with constantprotest. 

The struggle for Kansas was therefore to be maintained and possessionsecured at all hazards. Although, as the Southern leaders realized, the free States had flanked them by the admission of Californiawith an anti-slavery constitution, the Southern acquisition ofKansas would pierce the very centre of the army of freedom, andwould enable the South thenceforth to dictate terms to the North. Instead of the line of 36° 30´, upon which they had so frequentlyoffered to compromise, as a permanent continental division, theywould have carried the northern boundary of slave territory to the40th parallel of latitude and even beyond. They slave States inpursuing this policy were directed by men who had other designsthan those which lay on the surface. Since the struggle of 1850the dissolution of the Union had been in the minds of many Southernleaders, and, as the older class of statesmen passed away, thisdesign grew and strengthened until it became a fixed policy. Theyfelt that when the time came to strike, it was of the first importancethat they should have support and popular strength beyond theMississippi. California, they were confident, could be carried intheir interest, if they could but plant supporting colonies betweenthe Missouri and the Sierras. The Democratic party was dominantin the State, and the Democracy was of the type personated byWilliam M. Gwin. Both her senators voted for the repeal of theMissouri Compromise, and stood by the extremists of the South assteadily as if California bordered on the Gulf of Mexico. Dissolutionof the Union on the scale thus projected would, as the authors ofthe scheme persuaded themselves, be certain of success. From theMississippi to the Missouri they would carry the new confederacyto the southern line of Iowa. From the Missouri to the line ofUtah they would have the 40th degree of latitude; from Utah westwardthey would have the 42d parallel, leaving the line of Oregon asthe southern boundary of the United States on the Pacific. 

 THE SOUTHERN STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 

This policy was not absolute but alternative. If the slave-holderscould maintain their supremacy in the Union, they would prefer toremain. If they were to be outvoted and, as they thought, outragedby free-State majorities, then they would break up the governmentand form a confederacy of their own. To make such a confederacyeffective, they must not take from the Union a relatively smallsection, but must divide it from ocean to ocean. They could notacquire a majority of the total population, but they aimed to secureby far the larger share of the vast domain comprised in the UnitedStates. The design was audacious, but from the stand-point of themen who were committed to it, it was not illogical. Their entireindustrial system was founded upon an institution which was bitterlyopposed in the free States. They could see no way, and they nolonger desired to see a way, by which they might rid themselves ofthe servile labor which was at once their strength and theirweakness. To abandon the institution was to sacrifice four thousandmillions of property specially protected by law. It was for theexisting generation of the governing class in the South to votethemselves into bankruptcy and penury. Far beyond this, it was intheir judgment to blight their land with ignorance and indolence, to be followed by crime and anarchy. Their point of view was soradically different from that held by a large number of Northernpeople that it left no common ground for action, --scarcely, indeed, an opportunity for reasoning together. In the South they saw andfelt their danger, and they determined at all hazards to defendthemselves against policies which involved the total destructionof their social and industrial fabric. They were not mere malcontents. They were not pretenders. They did not aim at small things. Theyhad ability and they had courage. They had determined upon masterywithin the Union, or a Continental Empire outside of it. 

While the South had thus resolved to acquire control of the largeTerritory of Kansas, the North had equally resolved to save it tofreedom. The strife that ensued upon the fertile plains beyondthe Missouri might almost be regarded as the opening battle of thecivil war. The proximity of a slave State gave to the South anobvious advantage at the beginning of the contest. Many of theNorthern emigrants were from New England, and the distance theywere compelled to travel exceeded two thousand miles. There wereno railroads across Iowa, none across Missouri. But despite allimpediments and all discouragements, the free-State emigrants, stimulated by anti-slavery societies organized for the purpose, far outnumbered those from the slave States. Had the vexed questionin the Territory been left to actual settlers it would have beenat once decided adversely to slavery. But the neighboring inhabitantsof Missouri, as the first election approached, invaded the Territoryin large numbers, and, with boisterous disturbance and threats ofviolence, seized the polls, fraudulently elected a pro-slaveryLegislature, and chose one of their leaders named Whitfield asdelegate to Congress. Over six thousand votes were polled, ofwhich some eight hundred only were cast by actual settlers. Therewere about three thousand legal voters in the Territory. The totalpopulation was somewhat in excess of eight thousand, and there werebetween two and three hundred slaves. The governor of the Territory, Andrew H. Reeder, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, tried faithfullyand earnestly to arrest the progress of fraud and violence; but hewas removed by President Pierce, and Wilson Shannon of Ohio wassent out in his stead. The free-State settlers, defrauded at theregular election, organized an independent movement and choseGovernor Reeder their delegate to Congress to contest the seat ofWhitfield. These events, rapidly following each other, causedgreat indignation throughout the country, in the midst of whichthe Thirty-fourth Congress assembled in December, 1855. After aprolonged struggle, Nathaniel P. Banks was chosen Speaker overWilliam Aiken. It was a significant circumstance, noted at thetime, that the successful candidate came from Massachusetts, andthe defeated one from South Carolina. It was a still more ominousfact that Banks was chosen by votes wholly from the free States, and that every vote from the slave States was given to Mr. Aiken, except that of Mr. Cullen of Delaware, and that of Henry WinterDavis of Maryland, who declined to vote for either candidate. Itwas the first instance in the history of the government in whicha candidate for Speaker had been chosen without support from bothsections. It was a distinctive victory of the free States overthe consolidated power of the slave States. It marked an epoch. 

 CANVASS FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 

The year 1856 opened with this critical, this unprecedented conditionof affairs. In all classes there was deep excitement. Withthoughtful men, both North and South, there was serious solicitude. The country approached the strife of another Presidential electionwith the consciences of men thoroughly aroused, with their passionsprofoundly stirred. Three parties were coming into the field, andit seemed impossible that any candidate could secure the approvalof a majority of the voters in the Union. In the Democratic ranksthere was angry contention. President Pierce, who had risked everything for the South, and had received unmeasured obloquy in theNorth, was naturally anxious that his administration should beapproved by his own party. With all the patronage at his command, he vigorously sought a renomination. But the party desired victory, and they feared a contest which involved an approval of thePresident's recreancy to solemn pledges voluntarily given. He hadbeen inaugurated with the applause and confidence of a nation. Hewas sustained in the end by a helpless faction of a disorganizedparty. 

The distinguished secretary of State suffered with the President. Mr. Marcy had personally disapproved the repeal of the MissouriCompromise, but he made no opposition, and the people held himequally if not doubly guilty. It was said at the time that New-York friends urged him to save his high reputation by resigninghis seat in the cabinet. But he remained, in the delusive hopethat he should receive credit for the evil he might prevent. Hewas pertinently reminded that the evil he might prevent would neverbe known, whereas the evil to which he consented would be read ofall men. New York had hopelessly revolted from Democratic control, and Mr. Marcy's name was not presented as a Presidential candidate, though he was at that time the ablest statesman of the Democraticparty. Mr. Douglas was also unavailable. He had gained greatpopularity in the South by his course in repealing the MissouriCompromise, but he had been visited with signal condemnation inthe North. His own State, always Democratic, which had stood firmlyfor the party even in the overthrow of 1840, had now failed tosustain him, --had, indeed, pointedly rebuked him by choosing anopposition Legislature and sending Lyman Trumbull, then an anti-slavery Republican, as his colleague in the Senate. General Casswas seventy-four years old, and he was under the same condemnationwith Pierce and Marcy and Douglas. He had voted to repeal theMissouri Compromise, and Michigan, which had never before falteredin his support, now turned against him and embittered his decliningyears by an expression of popular disapproval, which could not havebeen more emphatic. 

The candidates urged for the nomination were all from the North. By a tacit but general understanding, the South repressed theambition of its leaders and refused to present any one of theprominent statesmen from that section. Southern men designed toput the North to a test, and they wished to give Northern Democratsevery possible advantage in waging a waging a warfare in which thefruits of victory were to be wholly enjoyed by the South. If theyhad wished it, they could have nominated a Southern candidate whowas at that moment far stronger than any other man in the Democraticparty. General Sam Houston had a personal history as romantic asthat of an ancient crusader. He was a native of Virginia, arepresentative in Congress from Tennessee, and Governor of thatState before he was thirty-five. He was the intimate and trustedfriend of Jackson. Having resigned his governorship on account ofdomestic trouble, he fled from civilized life, joined the Indiansof the Western plains, roved with them for years, adopted theirhabits, and was made chief of a tribe. Returning to associationwith white men, he emigrated to Texas and led the revolt againstMexico, fought battles and was victorious, organized a new republicand was made its President. Then he turned to his native land, bearing in his hand the gift of a great dominion. Once more underthe Union flag, he sat in the Capitol as a senator of the UnitedStates from Texas. At threescore years he was still in the fullvigor of life. Always a member of the Democratic party he was adevoted adherent of the Union, and his love for it had but increasedin exile. He stood by Mr. Clay against the Southern Democrats inthe angry contest of 1850, declaring that "if the Union must bedismembered" he "prayed God that its ruins might be the monumentof his own grave. " He "desired no epitaph to tell that he survivedit. " Against the madness of repealing the Missouri Compromise heentered a protest and a warning. He notified his Southern friendsthat the dissolution of the Union might be involved in the dangerousstep. He alone, of the Southern Democrats in the Senate, votedagainst the mischievous measure. When three thousand clergymen ofNew England sent their remonstrance against the repeal, they werefiercely attacked and denounced by Douglas and by senators fromthe South. Houston vindicated their right to speak and did battlefor them with a warmth and zeal which specially commended him toNorthern sympathy. All these facts combined--his romantic history, his unflinching steadiness of purpose, his unswerving devotion tothe Union--would have made him an irresistibly strong candidatehad he been presented. But the very sources of his strength werethe sources of his weakness. His nomination would have been arebuke to every man who had voted for the repeal of the MissouriCompromise, and, rather than submit to that, the Southern Democrats, and Northern Democrats like Pierce and Douglas and Cass, wouldaccept defeat. Victory with Houston would be their condemnation. But in rejecting him they lost in large degree the opportunity torecover the strength and popularity and power of the Democraticparty which had all been forfeited by the maladministration ofPierce. 

 NOMINATION OF JAMES BUCHANAN. 

With Houston impracticable, other Southern candidates purposelywithheld, and all the Northern candidates in Congress or of theadministration disabled, the necessity of the situation pointed toone man. The Democratic managers in whose hands the power lay werenot long in descrying him. Mr. Buchanan had gone to England asminister directly after the inauguration of Pierce. He had beenabsent from the country during all the troubles and the blundersof the Democracy, and never before was an _alibi_ so potential inacquitting a man of actual or imputed guilt. He had been a candidatefor the Presidency ever since 1844, but had not shown much strength. He was originally a Federalist. He was somewhat cold in temperamentand austere in manners, but of upright character and blamelesslife. He lacked the affability of Cass, the gracious heartinessof Pierce, the bluff cordiality of Douglas. But he was a man ofability, and had held high rank as a senator and as secretary ofState. Above all he had never given a vote offensive to the South. Indeed, his Virginia friend, Henry A. Wise, boasted that his recordwas as spotless as that of Calhoun. 

Buchanan's hour had come. He was a necessity to the South, anecessity to his party; and against the combined force of all theambitious men who sought the place, he was nominated. But he hada severe struggle. President Pierce and Senator Douglas each madea persistent effort. On the first ballot Buchanan received 135votes, Pierce 122, Douglas 33. Through sixteen ballots the contestwas stubbornly maintained, Buchanan gaining steadily but slowly. Pierce was at last withdrawn, and the convention gave Buchanan 168, Douglas 121. No further resistance was made, and, amid acclamationand rejoicing, Buchanan was declared to be the unanimous choice ofthe convention. Major John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, a youngman of popularity and promise, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency. 

Before the nomination of Buchanan and Breckinridge another Presidentialticket had been placed in the field. The pro-slavery section ofthe American party and the ghastly remnant of the Whigs had presentedMr. Fillmore for the Presidency, and had associated with him AndrewJackson Donelson of Tennessee as candidate for the Vice-Presidency. On the engrossing question of the day Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Fillmoredid not represent antagonistic ideas, and between them there couldbe no contest to arouse enthusiasm or even to enlist interest inthe North. The movement for Fillmore afforded a convenient shelterfor that large class of men who had not yet made up their minds asto the real issue of slavery extension or slavery prohibition. 

The Republican party had meanwhile been organizing and consolidating. During the years 1854 and 1855 it had acquired control of thegovernments in a majority of the free States, and it promptly calleda national convention to meet in Philadelphia in June, 1856. TheDemocracy saw at once that a new and dangerous opponent was in thefield, --an opponent that stood upon principle and shunned expediency, that brought to its standard a great host of young men, and thatwon to its service a very large proportion of the talent, thecourage, and the eloquence of the North. The convention met fora purpose and it spoke boldly. It accepted the issue as presentedby the men of the South, and it offered no compromise. In itsranks were all shades of anti-slavery opinion, --the patientAbolitionist, the Free-Soiler of the Buffalo platform, the Democratswho had supported the Wilmot Proviso, the Whigs who had followedSeward. 

 NOMINATION OF JOHN C. FRÉMONT. 

There was no strife about candidates. Mr. Seward was the recognizedhead of the party, but he did not desire the nomination. He agreedwith his faithful mentor, Thurlow Weed, that his time had not come, and that his sphere of duty was still in the Senate. Salmon P. Chase was Governor of Ohio, waiting re-election to the Senate, and, like Seward, not anxious for a nomination where election was regardedas improbable if not impossible. The more conservative and timidsection of the party advocated the nomination of Judge McLean ofthe Supreme Court, who for many years had enjoyed a shadowy mentionfor the Presidency in Whig journals of a certain type. But JudgeMcLean was old and the Republican party was young. He belonged tothe past, the party was looking to the future. It demanded a moreenergetic and attractive candidate, and John C. Frémont was chosenon the first ballot. He was forty-three years of age, with acreditable record in the Regular Army, and wide fame as a scientificexplorer in the Western mountain ranges, then the _terra incognita_of the continent. He was a native of South Carolina, and hadmarried the brilliant and accomplished daughter of Colonel Benton. Always a member of the Democratic party, he was so closely identifiedwith the early settlement of California that he was elected one ofher first senators. To the tinge of romance in his history wereadded the attractions of a winning address and an auspicious name. 

The movement in his behalf had been quietly and effectively organizedfor several months preceding the convention. It had been essentiallyaided if not indeed originated by the elder Francis P. Blair, whohad the skill derived from long experience in political management. Mr. Blair was a devoted friend of Benton, had been intimate withJackson, and intensely hostile to Calhoun. As editor of the _Globe_, he had exercised wide influence during the Presidential terms ofJackson and Van Buren, but when Polk was inaugurated he was supplantedin administration confidence by Thomas Ritchie of the State-rights'school, who was brought from Virginia to found another paper. Mr. Blair was a firm Union man, and, though he had never formallywithdrawn from the Democratic party, he was now ready to leave itbecause of the Disunion tendencies of its Southern leaders. Hewas a valuable friend to Frémont, and gave to him the full advantageof his experience and his sagacity. 

William L. Dayton of New Jersey, who had served with distinctionin the Senate, was selected for the Vice-Presidency. His principalcompetitor in the only ballot which was taken was Abraham Lincolnof Illinois. This was the first time that Mr. Lincoln wasconspicuously named outside of his own State. He had been a memberof the Thirtieth Congress, 1847-9, but being a modest man he hadso little forced himself into notice that when his name was proposedfor Vice-President, inquiries as to who he was were heard from allparts of the convention. 

The principles enunciated by the Democratic and Republican partieson the slavery question formed the only subject for discussionduring the canvass in the free States. From the beginning no doubtwas expressed that Mr. Buchanan would find the South practicallyconsolidated in his favor. Electoral tickets for Frémont were notpresented in the slave States, and Fillmore's support in thatsection was weakened by his obvious inability to carry any of thefree States. The canvass, therefore, rapidly narrowed to a contestbetween Buchanan and Frémont in the North. The Republican Conventionhad declared it to be "both the right and imperative duty of Congressto prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, --polygamy and slavery. " The Democratic Convention had presented avery elaborate and exhaustive series of resolutions touching theslavery question. They indorsed the repeal of the MissouriCompromise, and recognized the "right of the people of all theterritories to form a constitution with or without domestic slavery. "The resolution was artfully constructed. Read in one way it gaveto the people of the Territories the right to determine the questionfor themselves. It thus upheld the doctrine of "popular sovereignty"which Mr. Douglas had announced as the very spirit of the Actorganizing Kansas and Nebraska. A closer analysis of the Democraticdeclaration, however, showed that this "popular sovereignty" wasnot to be exercised until the people of the Territory were sufficientlynumerous to form a State constitution and apply for admission tothe Union, and that meanwhile in all the Territories the slave-holder had the right to settle and to be protected in the possessionof his peculiar species of property. In fine, the Republicansdeclared in plain terms that slavery should by positive law of thenation be excluded from the Territories. The Democrats flatlyopposed the doctrine of Congressional prohibition, but left a marginfor doubt as to the true construction of the Constitution, and ofthe Act repealing the Missouri Compromise, thus enabling theirpartisans to present one issue in the North, and another in theSouth. 

The Democratic candidate in his letter of acceptance did not seekto resolve the mystery of the platform, but left the question justas he found it in the resolutions of the convention. The resultwas that Northern people supported Mr. Buchanan in the belief, soenergetically urged by Mr. Douglas, that the people of the Territorieshad the right to determine the slavery question for themselves atany time. The Southern people supported Mr. Buchanan in the fullfaith that slavery was to be protected in the Territories until aState government should be formed and admission to the Union secured. The Democratic doctrine of the North and the Democratic doctrineof the South were, therefore, in logic and in fact, irreconcilablyhostile. By the one, slavery could never enter a Territory unlessthe inhabitants thereof desired and approved it. By the otherslavery had a foot-hold in the Territories under the Constitutionof the United States, and could not be dislodged or disturbed bythe inhabitants of a Territory even though ninety-nine out of everyhundred were opposed to it. In the Territorial Legislatures lawsmight be passed to protect slavery but not to exclude it. Fromsuch contradictory constructions in the same party, conflicts werecertain to arise. 

 MR. BUCHANAN ELECTED PRESIDENT. 

The Democrats of the North sought, not unsuccessfully, to avoidthe slavery question altogether. They urged other considerationsupon popular attention. Mr. Buchanan was presented as a Nationalcandidate, supported by troops of friends in every State of theUnion. Frémont was denounced as a sectional candidate, whoseelection by Northern votes on an anti-slavery platform would dissolvethe Union. This incessant cry exerted a wide influence in theNorth and was especially powerful in commercial circles. But inspite of it, Frémont gained rapidly in the free States. Thecondition of affairs in Kansas imparted to his supporters a desperateenergy, based on principle and roused to anger. An elaborate andexciting speech on the "Crime against Kansas, " by Senator Sumner, was followed by an assault from Preston S. Brooks, a member of theHouse from South Carolina, which seriously injured Mr. Sumner, andsensibly increased the exasperation of the North. When a resolutionof the House to expel Brooks was under consideration, he boastedthat "a blow struck by him then would be followed by a revolution. "This but added fuel to a Northern flame already burning to white-heat. Votes by tens of thousands declared that they did not desirea Union which was held together by the forbearance or permissionof any man or body of men, and they welcomed a test of any characterthat should determine the supremacy of the Constitution and thestrength of the government. 

The canvass grew in animation and earnestness to the end, theRepublicans gaining strength before the people of the North everyday. But Buchanan's election was not a surprise. Indeed, it hadbeen generally expected. He received the electoral votes of everySouthern State except Maryland, which pronounced for Fillmore. Inthe North, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Californiavoted for Buchanan. The other eleven free States, beginning withMaine and ending with Iowa, declared for Frémont. The popular votewas for Buchanan 1, 838, 169, Frémont 1, 341, 264, Fillmore 874, 534. With the people, therefore, Mr. Buchanan was in a minority, thecombined opposition outnumbering his vote by nearly four hundredthousand. 

The Republicans, far from being discouraged, felt and acted as menwho had won the battle. Indeed, the moral triumph was theirs, andthey believed that the actual victory at the polls was only postponed. The Democrats were mortified and astounded by the large popularvote against them. The loss of New York and Ohio, the narrow escapefrom defeat in Pennsylvania, the rebuke of Michigan to their veteranleader General Cass, intensified by the choice of Chandler as hissuccessor in the Senate, the absolute consolidation of New Englandagainst them, all tended to humiliate and discourage the party. They had lost ten States which General Pierce had carried in 1852, and they had a watchful, determined foe in the field, eager foranother trial of strength. The issue was made, the lines of battleswere drawn. Freedom or slavery in the Territories was to be foughtto the end, without flinching, and without compromise. 

Mr. Buchanan came to the Presidency under very different auspicesfrom those which had attended the inauguration of President Pierce. The intervening four years had written important chapters in thehistory of the slavery contest. In 1853 there was no organizedopposition that could command even a respectable minority in asingle State. In 1857 a party distinctly and unequivocally pledgedto resist the extension of slavery into free territory had controlof eleven free States and was hotly contesting the possession ofthe others. The distinct and avowed marshalling of a solid Northagainst a solid South had begun, and the result of the Presidentialelection of 1856 settled nothing except that a mightier strugglewas in the future. 

 DECISION IN THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT. 

After Buchanan's inauguration events developed rapidly. TheDemocrats had carried the House, and therefore had control of everydepartment of the government. The effort to force slavery uponKansas was resumed with increased zeal. Strafford's policy of"thorough" was not more resolute or more absolute than that nowadopted by the Southern leaders with a new lease of power confirmedto them by the result of the election. The Supreme Court came totheir aid, and, not long after the new administration was installed, delivered their famous decision in the Dred Scott case. This caseinvolved the freedom of a single family that had been held asslaves, but it gave occasion to the Court for an exhaustive treatmentof the political question which was engrossing public attention. The conclusion of the best legal minds of the country was that theopinion of the Court went far beyond the real question at issue, and that many of its most important points were to be regarded as_obiter dicta_. The Court declared that the Act of Congressprohibiting slavery in the Territories north of 36° 30´ wasunconstitutional and void. The repeal of the Missouri Compromisewas therefore approved by the highest judicial tribunal. Not onlywas the repeal approved, its re-enactment was forbidden. No matterhow large a majority might be returned to Congress in favor ofagain setting up the old landmark which had stood in peace and inhonor for thirty-four years, with the sanction of all departmentsof the government, the Supreme Court had issued an edict that itcould not be done. The Court had declared that slavery was as muchentitled to protection on the national domain as any other speciesof property, and that it was unconstitutional for Congress to decreefreedom for a Territory of the United States. The pro-slaveryinterest had apparently won a great triumph. They naturally claimedthat the whole question was settled in their favor. But in factthe decision of the Court had only rendered the contest more intenseand more bitter. It was received throughout the North with scornand indignation. It entered at once into the political discussionsof the people, and remained there until, with all other issues onthe slavery question, it was remanded to the arbitrament of war. 

Five of the judges--an absolute majority of the court--were Southernmen, and had always been partisan Democrats of the State-rights'school. People at once remembered that every other class of lawyersin the South had for thirty years been rigidly excluded from thebench. John J. Crittenden had been nominated and rejected by aDemocratic Senate. George E. Badger of North Carolina had sharedthe same fate. They were followers of Clay, and not to be trustedby the new South in any exigency where the interests of slaveryand the perpetuity of the Union should come in conflict. Instead, therefore, of strengthening the Democratic party, the whole effectof the Dred Scott decision was to develop a more determined typeof anti-slavery agitation. This tendency was promoted by the lucidand exhaustive opinion of Benjamin R. Curtis, one of the twodissenting judges. Judge Curtis was not a Republican. He had beena Whig of the most conservative type, appointed to the bench byPresident Fillmore through the influence of Mr. Webster and theadvice of Rufus Choate. In legal learning, and in dignity andpurity of character, he was unsurpassed. His opinion became, therefore, of inestimable value to the cause of freedom. Itrepresented the well-settled conclusion of the most learned jurists, was in harmony with the enlightened conscience of the North, andgave a powerful rallying-cry to the opponents of slavery. It upheldwith unanswerable arguments the absolute right of Congress toprohibit slavery in all the Territories of the Union. Every judgedelivered his views separately, but the dissenting opinion of JudgeMcLean, as well as of the six who sustained the views of the ChiefJustice, arrested but a small share of public attention. Theargument for the South had been made by the venerable and learnedChief Justice. The argument for the North had been made by JusticeCurtis. Perhaps in the whole history of judicial decisions no twoopinions were ever so widely read by the mass of people outsidethe legal profession. 

 DECISION IN THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT. 

It was popularly believed that the whole case was made up in orderto afford an opportunity for the political opinions delivered bythe Court. This was an extreme view not justified by the facts. But in the judgment of many conservative men there was a delay inrendering the decision which had its origin in motives that shouldnot have influenced a judicial tribunal. The purport and scope ofthe decision were undoubtedly known to President Pierce before theend of his term, and Mr. Buchanan imprudently announced in hisInaugural address that "the point of time when the people of aTerritory can decide the question of slavery for themselves" will"be speedily and finally settled by the Supreme Court, before whomit is now pending. " How Mr. Buchanan could know, or how he wasentitled to know, that a question not directly or necessarilyinvolved in a case pending before the Supreme Court "would bespeedily and finally settled" became a subject of popular inquiry. Anti-slavery speakers and anti-slavery papers indulged in severecriticism both of Mr. Buchanan and the Court, declaring that theindependence of the co-ordinate branches of the government wasdangerously invaded when the Executive was privately advised of ajudicial decision in advance of its delivery by the Court. WilliamPitt Fessenden, who always spoke with precision and never withpassion, asserted in the Senate that the Court, after hearing theargument, had reserved its judgment until the Presidential electionwas decided. He avowed his belief that Mr. Buchanan would havebeen defeated if the decision had not been withheld, and that inthe event of Frémont's election "we should never have heard of adoctrine so utterly at variance with all truth, so utterly destituteof all legal logic, so founded on error, and so unsupported by anything resembling argument. "

Mr. Lincoln, whose singular powers were beginning to be appreciated, severely attacked the decision in a public speech in Illinois, notmerely for its doctrine, but for the mode in which the decisionhad been brought about, and the obvious political intent of thejudges. He showed how the Kansas-Nebraska Act left the people ofthe Territories perfectly free to settle the slavery question forthemselves, "subject only to the Constitution of the United States!"That qualification he said was "the exactly fitted niche for theDred Scott decision to come in and declare the perfect freedom tobe no freedom at all. " He then gave a humorous illustration byasking in homely but telling phrase, "if we saw a lot of framedtimbers gotten out at different times and places by differentworkmen, --Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James, --and if we sawthese timbers joined together and exactly make the frame of a house, with tenons and mortises all fitting, what is the conclusion? Wefind it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin andRoger and James all understood one another from the beginning, andall worked upon a common plan before the first blow was struck. "This quaint mode of arraigning the two President, the Chief Justiceand Senator Douglas, was extraordinarily effective with the masses. In a single paragraph, humorously expressed, he had framed anindictment against four men upon which he lived to secure a convictionbefore the jury of the American people. 

The decision was rendered especially odious throughout the Northby the use of certain unfortunate expressions which in the heat ofthe hour were somewhat distorted by the anti-slavery press, andmade to appear unwarrantably offensive. But there was nomisrepresentation and no misunderstanding of the essential positionof the Court on the political question. It was unmistakably heldthat ownership in slaves was as much entitled to protection underthe Constitution in the Territories of the United States as anyother species of property, and that Congress possessed no powerover the subject except the power to legislate in aid of slavery. The decision was at war with the practice and traditions of thegovernment from its foundation, and set aside the matured convictionsof two generations of conservative statesmen from the South as wellas from the North. It proved injurious to the Court, whichthenceforward was assailed most bitterly in the North and defendedwith intemperate zeal in the South. Personally upright and honorableas the judges were individually known to be, there was a convictionin the minds of a majority of Northern people, that on all issuesaffecting the institution of slavery they were unable to delivera just judgment; that an Abolitionist was, in their sight, thechief of sinners, deserving to be suppressed by law; that the anti-slavery agitation was conducted, according to their belief, by twoclasses, --fanatics and knaves, --both of whom should be promptlydealt with; the fanatics in strait-jackets and the knaves at thecart's tail. 

Chief Justice Taney, who delivered the opinion which proved soobnoxious throughout the North, was not only a man of greatattainments, but was singularly pure and upright in his life andconversation. Had his personal character been less exalted, orhis legal learning less eminent, there would have been less surpriseand less indignation. But the same qualities which rendered hisjudgment of apparent value to the South, called out intense hostilityin the North. The lapse of years, however, cools the passions andtempers the judgment. It has brought many anti-slavery men to seethat an unmerited share of the obloquy properly attaching to thedecision has been visited on the Chief Justice, and that it wasunfair to place him under such condemnation, while two associateJustices in the North, Grier and Nelson, joined in the decisionwithout incurring special censure, and lived in honor and venerationto the end of their judicial careers. While, therefore, time hasin no degree abated Northern hostility to the Dred Scott decision, it has thrown a more generous light upon the character and actionof the eminent Chief Justice who pronounced it. More allowance ismade for the excitement and for what he believed to be the exigencyof the hour, for the sentiments in which he had been educated, forthe force of association, and for his genuine belief that he wasdoing a valuable work towards the preservation of the Union. Hisviews were held by millions of people around him, and he was sweptalong by a current which with so many had proved irresistible. Coming to the Bench from Jackson's Cabinet, fresh from the angrycontroversies of that partisan era, he had proved a most acceptableand impartial judge, earning renown and escaping censure until hedealt directly with the question of slavery. Whatever harm he mayhave done in that decision was speedily overruled by war, and thecountry can now contemplate a venerable jurist, in robes that werenever soiled by corruption, leading a long life of labor andsacrifice, and achieving a fame in his profession second only tothat of Marshall. 

 CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY AND MR. SUMNER. 

The aversion with which the extreme anti-slavery men regarded ChiefJustice Taney was strikingly exhibited during the session of Congressfollowing his death. The customary mark of respect in providinga marble bust of the deceased to be placed in the Supreme Courtroom was ordered by the House without comment or objection. Inthe Senate the bill was regularly reported from the JudiciaryCommittee by the chairman, Mr. Trumbull of Illinois, who was atthat time a recognized leader in the Republican party. Theproposition to pay respect to the memory of the judge who hadpronounced the Dred Scott decision was at once savagely attackedby Mr. Sumner. Mr. Trumbull in reply warmly defended the characterof the Chief Justice, declaring that he "had added reputation tothe Judiciary of the United States throughout the world, and thathe was not to be hooted down by exclamations about an emancipatedcountry. Suppose he did make a wrong decision. No man is infallible. He was a great, learned, able judge. "

Mr. Sumner rejoined with much temper. He said that "Taney wouldbe hooted down the pages of history, and that an emancipated countrywould fix upon his name the stigma it deserved. He had administeredjustice wickedly, had degraded the Judiciary, and had degraded theage. " Mr. Wilson followed Mr. Sumner in a somewhat impassionedspeech, denouncing the Dred Scott decision "as the greatest crimein the judicial annals of the Republic, " and declaring it to be"the abhorrence, the scoff, the jeer, of the patriotic hearts ofAmerica. " Mr. Reverdy Johnson answered Mr. Sumner with spirit, and pronounced an eloquent eulogium upon Judge Taney. He said, "the senator from Massachusetts will be happy if his name shallstand as high upon the historic page as that of the learned judgewho is now no more. " Mr. Johnson directed attention to the factthat, whether wrong or right, the Dred Scott decision was one inwhich a majority of the Supreme Court had concurred, and thereforeno special odium should be attached to the name of the venerableChief Justice. Mr. Johnson believed the decision to be right, andfelt that his opinion on a question of law was at least entitledto as much respect as that of either of the senators from Massachusetts, "one of whom did not pretend to be a lawyer at all, while the otherwas a lawyer for only a few months. " He proceeded to vindicatethe historical accuracy of the Chief Justice, and answered Mr. Sumner with that amplitude and readiness which Mr. Johnson displayedin every discussion involving legal questions. 

Mr. Sumner's protest was vigorously seconded by Mr. Hale of NewHampshire and Mr. Wade of Ohio. The former said that a monumentto Taney "would give the lie to all that had been said by thefriends of justice, liberty, and down-trodden humanity, " respectingthe iniquity of the Dred Scott decision. Mr. Wade violently opposedthe proposition. He avowed his belief that the "Dred Scott casewas got up to give judicial sanction to the enormous iniquity thatprevailed in every branch of our government at that period. " Hedeclared that "the greater you make Judge Taney's legal acumen themore you dishonor his memory by showing that he sinned againstlight and knowledge. " He insisted that the people of Ohio, whoseopinion he professed to represent, "would pay two thousand dollarsto hang the late Chief Justice in effigy rather than one thousanddollars for a bust to commemorate his merits. "

Mr. McDougall of California spoke in favor of the bill, and commentedon the rudeness of Mr. Sumner's speech. Mr. Carlile of West Virginiaspoke very effectively in praise of the Chief Justice. If thedecision was harsh, he said, no one was justified in attributingit to the personal feelings or desires of the Chief Justice. Itwas the law he was expounding, and he did it ably and conscientiously. Mr. Sumner concluded the debate by a reply to Reverdy Johnson. Hesaid that, in listening to the senator from Maryland, he was"reminded of a character, known to the Roman Church, who alwaysfigures at the canonization of a saint as the _Devil's advocate_. "He added that, if he could help it, "Taney should never be recognizedas a saint by any vote of Congress. " The incidents of the debateand the names of the participants are given as affording a goodillustration of the tone and temper of the times. It was madeevident that the opponents of the bill, under Mr. Sumner's lead, would not permit it to come to a vote. It was therefore abandonedon the 23d of February, 1865. 

 HONORS TO TWO CHIEF JUSTICES. 

Nine years after these proceedings, in January, 1874, the name ofanother Chief Justice, who had died during the recess, came beforeCongress for honor and commemoration. The Senate was still controlledby a large Republican majority, though many changes had taken place. All the senators who had spoken in the previous debate were gone, except Mr. Sumner, who had meanwhile been chosen for his fourthterm, and Mr. Wilson, who had been elevated to the Vice-Presidency. Mr. Howe of Wisconsin, a more radical Republican than Mr. Trumbull, reported from the Judiciary Committee a bill originally proposedby Senator Stevenson of Kentucky, paying the same tribute of respectto Roger Brooke Taney and Salmon Portland Chase. The bill waspassed without debate and with the unanimous consent of the Senate. 

Mr. Taney was appointed Chief Justice in 1836, when in his sixtiethyear. He presided over the court until his death in October, 1864, a period of twenty-eight years. The Dred Scott decision receivedno respect after Mr. Lincoln became President, and, without reversalby the court, was utterly disregarded. When Mr. Chase became ChiefJustice, colored persons were admitted to practice in the courtsof the United States. When President Lincoln, in 1861, authorizedthe denial of the writ of _habeas corpus_ to persons arrested ona charge of treason, Chief Justice Taney delivered an opinion inthe case of John Merryman, denying the President's power to suspendthe writ, declaring that Congress only was competent to do it. The Executive Department paid no attention to the decision, andCongress, at the ensuing session, added its sanction to thesuspension. The Chief Justice, though loyal to the Union, was notin sympathy with the policy or the measures of Mr. Lincoln'sadministration. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Review (_continued_). --Continuance of the Struggle for Kansas. --List of Governors. --Robert J. Walker appointed Governor by PresidentBuchanan. --His Failure. --The Lecompton Constitution fraudulentlyadopted. --Its Character. --Is transmitted to Congress by PresidentBuchanan. --He recommends the Admission of Kansas under its Provisions. --Pronounces Kansas a Slave State. --Gives Full Scope and Effect tothe Dred Scott Decision. --Senator Douglas refuses to sustain theLecompton Iniquity. --His Political Embarrassment. --Breaks with theAdministration. --Value of his Influence against Slavery in Kansas. --Lecompton Bill passes the Senate. --Could not be forced throughthe House. --The English Bill substituted and passed. --Kansas spurnsthe Bribe. --Douglas regains his Popularity with Northern Democrats. --Illinois Republicans bitterly hostile to him. --Abraham Lincolnnominated to contest the Re-election of Douglas to the Senate. --Lincoln challenges Douglas to a Public Discussion. --Character ofEach as a Debater. --They meet Seven Times in Debate. --Douglas re-elected. --Southern Senators arraign Douglas. --His Defiant Answer. --Danger of Sectional Division in the Democratic Party. 

The Dred Scott decision, in connection with the Democratic triumphin the national election, had a marked effect upon the strugglefor Kansas. The pro-slavery men felt fresh courage for the work, as they found themselves assured of support from the administration, and upheld by the dogmas of the Supreme Court. The Territory thusfar had been one continued scene of disorder and violence. Forobvious reasons, the administration of President Pierce had selectedits governors from the North, and each, in succession, failed toplacate the men who were bent on making Kansas a slave State. Andrew H. Reeder, Wilson Shannon, John W. Geary, had, each in turn, tried, and each in turn failed. Mr. Buchanan now selected RobertJ. Walker for the difficult task. Mr. Walker was a Southern manin all his relations, though by birth a Pennsylvanian. He had heldhigh stations, and possessed great ability. It was believed thathe, if any one, could govern the Territory in the interest of theSouth, and, at the same time, retain a decent degree of respectand confidence in the North. As an effective aid to this policy, Frederick P. Stanton, who had acquired an honorable reputation asrepresentative in Congress from Tennessee, was sent out as secretaryof the Territory. 

 THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION. 

Governor Walker failed. He could do much, but he could not placatean element that was implacable. Contrary to his desires, andagainst his authority, a convention, called by the fraudulentLegislature, and meeting at Lecompton, submitted a pro-slaveryconstitution to the people, preparatory to asking the admission ofKansas as a State. The people were not permitted to vote for oragainst the constitution, but were narrowed to the choice of takingthe constitution with slavery or the constitution without slavery. If the decision should be adverse to slavery, there were still someprovisions in the constitution, not submitted to popular decision, which would postpone the operation of the free clause. The wholecontrivance was fraudulent, wicked, and in retrospect incredible. Naturally the Free-state men refused to have any thing to do withthe scandalous device, intended to deceive and betray them. Theconstitution with slavery was, therefore, adopted by an almostunanimous vote of those who were not citizens of Kansas. Manythousands of votes were returned which were never cast at all, either by citizens of Kansas or marauders from Missouri. It isnot possible, without using language that would seem immoderate, to describe the enormity of the whole transaction. The constitutionno more represented the will or the wishes of the people of Kansasthan of the people of Ohio or Vermont. 

Shameful and shameless as was the entire procedure, it was approvedby Mr. Buchanan. The Lecompton Constitution was transmitted toCongress, accompanied by a message from the President recommendingthe prompt admission of the State. He treated the anti-slaverypopulation of Kansas as in rebellion against lawful authority, recognized the invaders from Missouri as rightfully entitled toform a constitution for the State, and declared that "Kansas is atthis moment (Feb. 2, 1858) as much a slave State as Georgia orSouth Carolina. " The Dred Scott decision occupied a prominentplace in this extraordinary message and received the most liberalinterpretation in favor of slavery. The President declared that"it has been solemnly adjudged by the highest judicial tribunalknown to our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of theConstitution of the United States. " This was giving the fullestscope to the extreme and revolting doctrine put forward by theadvocates of slavery, and, had it been made effective respectingthe Territories, there are many reasons for believing that a stillmore offensive step might have been taken respecting the anti-slavery action of the States. 

The attempt to admit Kansas, under the Lecompton Constitution, proved disastrous to the Democratic party. The first decided breakwas that of Senator Douglas. He refused to sustain the iniquity. He had gone far with the pro-slavery men, but he refused to takethis step. He had borne great burdens in their interest, but thiswas the additional pound that broke the back of his endurance. When the Dred Scott decision was delivered, Mr. Douglas had applaudedit, and, as Mr. Lincoln charged, had assented to it before it waspronounced. With his talent for political device, he had doubtlesscontrived some argument or fallacy by which he could reconcile thatjudicial edict with his doctrine of "popular sovereignty, " and thusmaintain his standing with the Northern Democracy without losinghis hold on the South. But events traveled too rapidly for him. The pro-slavery men were so eager for the possession of Kansas thatthey could not adjust their measures to the needs of Mr. Douglas'spolitical situation. They looked at the question from one point, Mr. Douglas from another. They saw that if Kansas could be forcedinto the Union with the Lecompton Constitution they would gain aslave State. Mr. Douglas saw that if he should aid in that politicalcrime he would lose Illinois. It was more important to the Southto secure Kansas as a slave State than to carry Illinois for Mr. Douglas. It was more important for Mr. Douglas to hold Illinoisfor himself than to give the control of Kansas to the South. Indeed, his Northern friends had been for some time persuaded thathis only escape from the dangerous embarrassments surrounding himwas in the admission of Kansas as a free State. If the MissouriCompromise had not been repealed, a free State was assured. IfKansas should become a slave State in consequence of that repeal, it would, in the excited condition of the popular mind, crushDouglas in the North, and bring his political career to a discreditableend. 

Mr. Douglas had come, therefore, to the parting of the ways. Herealized that he was rushing on political destruction, and that, if he supported the vulgar swindle perpetrated at Lecompton, hewould be repudiated by the great State which had exalted him andalmost idolized him as a political leader. He determined, therefore, to take a bold stand against the administration on this issue. Itwas an important event, not only to himself, but to his party; notonly to his party, but to the country. Rarely, in our history, has the action of a single person been attended by a public interestas universal; by applause so hearty in the North, by denunciationso bitter in the South. In the debate which followed, Douglasexhibited great power. He had a tortuous record to defend, but hedefended it with extraordinary ability and adroitness. From timeto time, during the progress of the contest, he was on the pointof yielding to some compromise which would have destroyed theheroism and value of his position. But he was sustained by thestrong will of others when he himself wavered--appalled, as heoften was, by the sacrifice he was making of the Southern support, for which he had labored so long, and endured so much. 

 SENATOR BRODERICK'S DEATH. 

Senator Broderick of California imparted largely of his own courageand enthusiasm to Douglas at the critical juncture, and perhapssaved him from a surrender of his proud position. Throughout theentire contest Broderick showed remarkable vigor and determination. Considering the defects of his intellectual training in early life, he displayed unusual power as a political leader and public speaker. He was a native of Washington, born of Irish parents, and wasbrought up to the trade of a stone-mason. He went to Californiaamong the pioneers of 1849, and soon after took part in the fiercepolitical contests of the Pacific coast. Though a Democrat, heinstinctively took the Northern side against the arrogant dominationof the Southern wing of the party, led by William H. Gwin. Broderickwas elected to the United States Senate as Gwin's colleague in1856, and at once joined Douglas in opposition to the Lecomptonpolicy of the administration. His position aroused fierce hostilityon the part of the Democratic leaders of California. The contestgrew so bitter in the autumn of 1859, when Broderick was canvassinghis State, as to lead to a duel with Judge Terry, a prominentDemocrat of Southern birth. Broderick was killed at the firstfire. The excitement was greater in the country than ever attendeda duel, except when Hamilton fell at the hands of Burr in 1804. The Graves and Cilley duel of 1838, with its fatal ending, affectedthe whole nation, but not so profoundly as did the death of Broderick. The oration of Senator Baker, delivered in San Francisco at thefuneral, so stirred the people that violence was feared. The bloodytragedy influenced political parties, and contributed in no smalldegree to Lincoln's triumph in California the ensuing year. 

In the peculiar position in which Douglas was placed, stillmaintaining his membership of the Democratic party while opposingthe administration on the Lecompton question, he naturally resortedto arguments which were not always of a character to enlist theapproval of men conscientiously opposed to slavery. The effect ofthe arguments, however, was invaluable to those who were resistingthe imposition of slavery upon Kansas against the wish of a majorityof her people, and Republicans could be content with the end withoutjustifying the means. Douglas frankly avowed that he did not carewhether slavery was voted up or voted down, but he demanded thatan honest, untrammeled ballot should be secured to the citizens ofthe Territory. Without the aid of Douglas, the "Crime againstKansas, " so eloquently depicted by Mr. Sumner, would have beencomplete. With his aid, it was prevented. 

The Lecompton Bill passed the Senate by a vote of 33 to 25. BesidesBroderick, Douglas carried with him only two Democratic senators, --Stuart of Michigan, and Pugh of Ohio. The two remaining membersof the old Whig party from the South, who had been wandering aspolitical orphans since the disastrous defeat of 1852, --Bell ofTennessee, and Crittenden of Kentucky, --honored themselves and theancient Whig traditions by voting against the bill. In view ofthe events of the preceding four years, it was a significantspectacle in the Senate when Douglas voted steadily with Sewardand Sumner and Fessenden and Wade against the political associationsof a lifetime. It meant, to the far-seeing, more than a temporaryestrangement, and it foretold results in the political field moreimportant than any which had been developed since the foundationof the Republican party. 

The resistance to the Lecompton Bill in the House was unconquerable. The Administration could not, with all its power and patronage, enforce its passage. Anxious to avert the mortification of anabsolute and unqualified defeat, the supporters of the schemechanged their ground, and offered a new measure, moved by Mr. William H. English of Indiana, submitting the entire constitutionto a vote of the people. If adopted, the constitution carried withit a generous land grant to the new State. If rejected, thealternative was not only the withdrawal of the land grant, butindefinite postponement of the whole question of admission. Itwas simply a bribe, cunningly and unscrupulously contrived, toinduce the people of Kansas to accept a pro-slavery constitution. It was not so outrageous as it would have been to force theconstitution upon the people without allowing them to vote upon itat all, and it gave a shadow of excuse to certain Democrats, whodid not wish to separate from their party, for returning to theranks. The bill was at last forced through the House by 112 votesto 103. Twelve Democrats, to their honor be it said, refused toyield. Douglas held all his political associates from Illinois, while the President failed to consolidate the Democrats fromPennsylvania. John Hickman and Henry Chapman honorably andtenaciously held their ground to the last against every phase ofthe outrage. In New York, John B. Haskin and Horace F. Clarkerefused to yield, though great efforts were made to induce them tosupport the administration. The Senate promptly concurred in theEnglish proposition. 

 LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION REJECTED. 

But Kansas would not sell her birthright for a mess of pottage. She had fought too long for freedom to be bribed to the support ofslavery. She had at last a free vote, and rejected the LecomptonConstitution, land grant and all, by a majority of more than tenthousand. The struggle was over. The pro-slavery men were defeated. The North was victorious. The repeal of the Missouri Compromisehad not brought profit or honor to those who planned it. It hadonly produced strife, anger, heart-burning, hatred. It had addedmany drops to the cup of bitterness between North and South, andhad filled it to overflowing. It produced evil only, and thatcontinually. The repeal, in the judgment of the North, was a greatconspiracy against human freedom. In the Southern States it wasviewed as an honest effort to recover rights of which they had beenunjustly deprived. Each section held with firmness to its ownbelief, and the four years of agitation had separated them so widelythat a return to fraternal feeling seemed impossible. Confidence, the plant of slowest growth, had been destroyed. Who could restoreit to life and strength?

Douglas had, in large degree, redeemed himself in the North fromthe obloquy to which he had been subjected since the repeal of theMissouri Compromise. The victory for free Kansas was perhaps toan undue extent ascribed to him. The completeness of that victorywas everywhere recognized, and the lawless intruders who had workedso hard to inflict slavery on the new Territory gradually withdrew. In the South, Douglas was covered with maledictions. But for hisinfluence, Southern men felt that Kansas would have been admittedwith a pro-slavery constitution, and the senatorial equality ofthe South firmly re-established. Northern Republicans, outside ofIllinois, were in a forgiving frame of mind toward Douglas; and hehad undoubtedly regained a very large share of his old popularity. But Illinois Republicans were less amiable towards him. They wouldnot forget that he had broken down an anti-slavery barrier whichhad been reared with toil and sanctified by time. He had not, asthey alleged, turned back from any test exacted by the South, untilhe had reached the point where another step forward involvedpolitical death to himself. They would not credit his hostilityto the Lecompton Constitution to any nobler motive than the instinctof self-preservation. This was a harsh judgment, and yet a mostnatural one. It inspired the Republicans of Illinois, and theyprepared to contest the return of Douglas to the Senate by formallynominating Abraham Lincoln as an opposing candidate. 

The contest that ensued was memorable. Douglas had an herculeantask before him. The Republican party was young, strong, united, conscious of its power, popular, growing. The Democratic partywas rent with faction, and the Administration was irrevocablyopposed to the return of Douglas to the Senate. He entered thefield, therefore, with a powerful opponent in front, and withdefection and betrayal in the rear. He was everywhere known as adebater of singular skill. His mind was fertile in resources. Hewas master of logic. No man perceived more quickly than he thestrength or the weakness of an argument, and no one excelled himin the use of sophistry and fallacy. Where he could not elucidatea point to his own advantage, he would fatally becloud it for hisopponent. In that peculiar style of debate, which, in its intensity, resembles a physical contest, he had no equal. He spoke withextraordinary readiness. There was no halting in his phrase. Heused good English, terse, vigorous, pointed. He disregarded theadornments of rhetoric, --rarely used a simile. He was utterlydestitute of humor, and had slight appreciation of wit. He nevercited historical precedents except from the domain of Americanpolitics. Inside that field his knowledge was comprehensive, minute, critical. Beyond it his learning was limited. He was nota reader. His recreations were not in literature. In the wholerange of his voluminous speaking it would be difficult to findeither a line of poetry or a classical allusion. But he was bynature an orator; and by long practice a debater. He could leada crowd almost irresistibly to his own conclusions. He could, ifhe wished, incite a mob to desperate deeds. He was, in short, anable, audacious, almost unconquerable opponent in public discussion. 

 LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS AS DEBATERS. 

It would have been impossible to find any man of the same type ableto meet him before the people of Illinois. Whoever attempted itwould probably have been destroyed in the first encounter. Butthe man who was chosen to meet him, who challenged him to thecombat, was radically different in every phase of character. Scarcely could two men be more unlike, in mental and moralconstitutions, than Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas. Mr. Lincoln was calm and philosophic. He loved the truth for thetruth's sake. He would not argue from a false premise, or bedeceived himself or deceive others by a false conclusion. He hadpondered deeply on the issues which aroused him to action. He hadgiven anxious thought to the problems of free government, and tothe destiny of the Republic. He had for himself marked out a pathof duty, and he walked in it fearlessly. His mental processes wereslower but more profound than those of Douglas. He did not seekto say merely the thing which was best for that day's debate, butthe thing which would stand the test of time and square itself witheternal justice. He wished nothing to appear white unless it waswhite. His logic was severe and faultless. He did not resort tofallacy, and could detect it in his opponent, and expose it withmerciless directness. He had an abounding sense of humor, andalways employed it in illustration of his argument, --never for themere sake of provoking merriment. In this respect he had thewonderful aptness of Franklin. He often taught a great truth withthe felicitous brevity of an AEsop fable. His words did not flowin an impetuous torrent as did those of Douglas, but they werealways well chosen, deliberate, and conclusive. 

Thus fitted for the contest, these men proceeded to a discussionwhich at the time was so interesting so as to enchain the attentionof the nation, --in its immediate effect so striking as to affectthe organization of parties, in its subsequent effect so powerfulas to change the fate of millions. Mr. Lincoln had opened his owncanvass by a carefully prepared speech in which, after quoting themaxim that a house divided against itself cannot stand, he utteredthese weighty words: "I believe this government cannot endurepermanently half slave, half free. I do not expect the Union tobe dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expectit will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or allthe other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the fartherspread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in thebelief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or itsadvocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawfulin all the States, old as well as new, north as well as south. "

Mr. Lincoln had been warned by intimate friends to whom he hadcommunicated the contents of his speech, in advance of its delivery, that he was treading on dangerous ground, that he would bemisrepresented as a disunionist, and that he might fatally damagethe Republican party by making its existence synonymous with adestruction of the government. But he was persistent. It wasborne into his mind that he was announcing a great truth, and thathe would be wronging his own conscience, and to the extent of hisinfluence injuring his country, by withholding it, or in any degreequalifying its declaration. If there was a disposition to avoidthe true significance of the contest with the South, he would notbe a party to it. He believed he could discern the scope and readthe destiny of the impending sectional controversy. He was surehe could see far beyond the present, and hear the voice of thefuture. He would not close the book; he would not shut his eyes;he would not stop his ears. He avowed his faith, and stood firmlyto his creed. 

Mr. Douglas naturally, indeed inevitably, made his first and leadingspeech against these averments of Mr. Lincoln. He had returned toIllinois, after the adjournment of Congress, with a disturbed andrestless mind. He had one great ambition, --to re-instate himselfas a leader of the national Democracy, and, as incidental andnecessary to that end, to carry Illinois against Mr. Lincoln. Theissue embodied in Mr. Lincoln's speech afforded him the occasionwhich he had coveted. His quick eye discerned an opportunity toexclude from the canvass the disagreeable features in his ownpolitical career by arraigning Mr. Lincoln as an enemy of the Unionand as an advocate of an internecine conflict in which the freeStates and the slave States should wrestle in deadly encounter. Douglas presented his indictment artfully and with singular force. The two speeches were in all respects characteristic. Each hadmade a strong presentation of his case, but the superior candorand directness of Mr. Lincoln had made a deep impression on thepopular mind. 

 THE LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS DEBATE. 

In the seven public debates which were held as the result of thesepreliminary speeches, the questions at issue were elaborately andexhaustively treated. The friends of each naturally claimed thevictory for their own champion. The speeches were listened to bytens of thousands of eager auditors; but absorbing, indeedunprecedented, as was the interest, the vast throngs behaved withmoderation and decorum. The discussion from beginning to end wasan amplification of the position which each had taken at the outset. The arguments were held close to the subject, relating solely tothe slavery question, and not even incidentally referring to anyother political issue. Protection, free trade, internal improvements, the sub-treasury, all the issues, in short, which had dividedparties for a long series of years, and on which both speakersentertained very decided views, were omitted from the discussion. The public mind saw but one issue; every thing else was irrelevant. At the first meeting, Douglas addressed a series of questions toMr. Lincoln, skillfully prepared and well adapted to entrap him incontradictions, or commit him to such extreme doctrine as wouldruin his canvass. Mr. Lincoln's answers at the second meeting, held at Freeport, were both frank and adroit. Douglas had failedto gain a point by his resort to the Socratic mode of argument. He had indeed only given Mr. Lincoln an opportunity to exhibit bothhis candor and his skill. After he had answered, he assumed theoffensive, and addressed a series of questions to Mr. Douglas whichwere constructed with the design of forcing the latter to anunmistakable declaration of his creed. Douglas had been a partyto the duplex construction of the Cincinnati platform of 1856, inwhich the people of the South had been comforted with the doctrinethat slavery was protected in the Territories by the Constitutionagainst the authority of Congress and against the power of theTerritorial citizens, until the period should be reached, when, under an enabling act to form a constitution for a State government, the majority might decide the question of slavery. Of this doctrineMr. Breckinridge was the Southern representative, and he had forthat very reason been associated with Mr. Buchanan on the Presidentialticket. On the other hand, the North was consoled, it would notbe unfair to say cajoled, with the doctrine of popular sovereigntyas defined by Mr. Douglas; and this gave to the people of theTerritories the absolute right to settle the question of slaveryfor themselves at any time. The doctrine had, however, been utterlydestroyed by the Dred Scott decision, and, to the confusion of alllines of division and distinction, Mr. Douglas had approved theopinion of the Supreme Court. 

Douglas had little trouble in making answer in an _ad captandum_manner to all Mr. Lincoln's questions save one. The crucial testwas applied when Mr. Lincoln asked him "if the people of a Territorycan, in any lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of theUnited States, exclude slavery from their limits prior to theformation of a State constitution?" In the first debate, whenDouglas had the opening, he had, in the popular judgment, ratherworsted Mr. Lincoln. His greater familiarity with the arts if notthe tricks of the stump had given him an advantage. But now Mr. Lincoln had the opening, and he threw Mr. Douglas upon the defensiveby the question which reached the very marrow of the controversy. Mr. Lincoln had measured the force of his question, and saw thedilemma in which it would place Douglas. Before the meeting hesaid, in private, that "Douglas could not answer that question insuch way as to be elected both Senator and President. He might soanswer it as to carry Illinois, but, in doing so, he wouldirretrievably injure his standing with the Southern Democracy. "Douglas quickly realized his own embarrassment. He could not, inthe face of the Supreme-Court decision, declare that the people ofthe Territory could exclude slavery by direct enactment. To admit, on the other hand, that slavery was fastened upon the Territories, --past all hope of resistance or protest on the part of a majorityof the citizens--would be to concede the victory to Mr. Lincolnwithout further struggle. Between these impossible roads Douglassought a third. He answered that, regardless of the decision ofthe Supreme Court, "the people of a Territory have the lawful meansto introduce or exclude slavery as they choose, for the reason thatslavery cannot exist unless supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the locallegislature; and, if the people are opposed to slavery, they will, by unfriendly legislation, effectually prevent the introduction. "

This was a lame, illogical, evasive answer; but it was put forthby Douglas with an air of sincerity and urged in a tone of defiantconfidence. It gave to his supporters a plausible answer. ButMr. Lincoln's analysis of the position was thorough, his ridiculeof it effective. Douglas's invention for destroying a right underthe Constitution by a police regulation was admirably exposed, andhis new theory that a thing "may be lawfully driven away from aplace where it has a lawful right to go" was keenly reviewed byMr. Lincoln. The debate of that day was the important one of theseries. Mr. Lincoln had secured an advantage in the nationalrelations of the contest which he held to the end. At the sametime Douglas had escaped a danger which threatened his destructionin the State canvass, and secured his return to the Senate. As tothe respective merits of the contestants, it would be idle to expectan agreement among contemporary partisans. But a careful readingof the discussion a quarter of a century after it was held willconvince the impartial that in principle, in candor, in the enduringforce of logic, Mr. Lincoln had the advantage. It is due to fairnessto add that probably not another man in the country, with thedisabilities surrounding his position, could have maintained himselfso ably, so fearlessly, so effectively, as Douglas. 

 BUCHANAN'S OPPOSITION TO DOUGLAS. 

Douglas was aided in his canvass by the undisguised opposition ofthe administration. The hostility of President Buchanan and hisSouthern supporters was the best possible proof to the people ofIllinois that Douglas was representing a doctrine which was notrelished by the pro-slavery party. The courage with which he foughtthe administration gave an air of heroism to his canvass and prestigeto his position. It secured to him thousands of votes that wouldotherwise have gone to Mr. Lincoln. For every vote which theadministration was able to withhold from Douglas, it added five tohis supporters. The result of the contest was, that, while Douglaswas enabled to secure a majority of eight in the Legislature inconsequence of an apportionment that was favorable to his side, Mr. Lincoln received a plurality of four thousand in the popularvote. In a certain sense, therefore, each had won a victory, andeach had incurred defeat. But the victory of Douglas and the meansby which it was won proved to be his destruction in the wider fieldof his ambition. Mr. Lincoln's victory and defeat combined in theend to promote his political fortunes, and to open to him theillustrious career which followed. 

This debate was not a mere incident in American politics. It markedan era. Its influence and effect were co-extensive with theRepublic. It introduced a new and distinct phase in the controversythat was engrossing all minds. The position of Douglas separatedhim from the Southern Democracy, and this, of itself, was a factof great significance. The South saw that the ablest leader ofthe Northern Democracy had been compelled, in order to save himselfat home, to abjure the very doctrine on which the safety of slaveinstitutions depended. The propositions enunciated by Douglas inanswer to the questions of Mr. Lincoln, in the Freeport debate, were as distasteful to the Southern mind as the position of Mr. Lincoln himself. Lincoln advocated a positive inhibition of slaveryby the General Government. Mr. Douglas proposed to submit Southernrights under the Constitution to the decision of the first mob orrabble that might get possession of a Territorial legislature, andpass a police regulation hostile to slavery. Against this constructionof the Constitution the South protested, and the protest carriedwith it implacable hostility to Douglas. 

The separation of the Democratic party into warring factions was, therefore, inevitable. The line of division was the same on whichthe Republican party had been founded. It was the North againstthe South, the South against the North. The great mass of NorthernDemocrats began to consolidate in support of Douglas as determinedlyas the mass of Northern Whigs had followed Seward. The SouthernDemocrats began, at the same time, to organize their States againstDouglas. Until his break from the regular ranks in his oppositionto the Lecompton Constitution, Douglas had enjoyed boundlesspopularity with his party in the South. In every slave State, there was still a small number of his old supporters who remainedtrue to him. But the great host had left him. He could not betrusted. He had failed to stand by the extreme faith; he hadrefused to respond to its last requirement. Even at the risk ofpermanently dissevering the Democratic party, the Southern leadersresolved to destroy Douglas. 

To this end, in the session of Congress following the debate withMr. Lincoln, the Democratic senators laid down, in a series ofresolutions, the true exposition of the creed of their party. Douglas was not personally referred to, but the resolutions wereaimed so pointedly at what they regarded his heretical opinions, that his name might as well have been incorporated. The resolutionswere adopted during the absence of Douglas from the Senate, on ahealth-seeking tour, after his laborious canvass. With only thedissenting vote of Mr. Pugh of Ohio among the Democrats, it wasdeclared that "neither Congress nor a territorial legislature, whether by direct legislation, or legislation of an indirect orunfriendly character, possesses the power to impair the right ofany citizen of the United States to take his slave property intothe common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same whilethe territorial condition exists. " Not satisfied with this utterdestruction of the whole doctrine of popular sovereignty, theDemocratic senators gave one more turn to the wrench, by declaringthat if "the territorial government should fail or refuse to provideadequate protection to the rights of the slave-holder, it will bethe duty of Congress to supply such deficiency. " The doctrine thuslaid down by the Democratic senators was, in plain terms, that theterritorial legislature might protect slavery, but could not prohibitit; and that even the Congress of the United States could onlyintervene on the side of bondage, and never on the side of freedom. 

 DOUGLAS AND THE SOUTHERN DEMOCRACY. 

Anxious as Douglas was to be re-established in full relations withhis party, he had not failed to see the obstacles in his way. Henow realized that a desperate fight was to be made against him;that he was to be humiliated and driven from the Democratic ranks. The creed laid down by the Southern senators was such as no mancould indorse without forfeiting his political life in free States. Douglas did not propose to rush on self-destruction to oblige theDemocracy of the slave States; nor was he of the type of men who, when the right cheek is smitten, will meekly turn the other for asecond blow. When his Democratic associates in the Senate proceededto read him out of the party, they apparently failed to see thatthey were reading the Northern Democracy out with him. JeffersonDavis and Judah P. Benjamin might construct resolutions adapted tothe latitude of the Gulf, and dragoon them through the Senate, withaid and pressure from Buchanan's administration; but Douglascommanded the votes of the Northern Democracy, and to the edict ofa pro-slavery caucus he defiantly opposed the solid millions whofollowed his lead in the free States. 

Without wrangling over the resolutions in the Senate, Douglas madeanswer to the whole series in a public letter of June 22, 1859, inwhich he said that "if it shall become the policy of the Democraticparty to repudiate their time-honored principles, and interpolatesuch new issues as the revival of the African slave-trade, or thedoctrine that the Constitution carries slavery into the Territoriesbeyond the power of the people to legally control it as otherproperty, " he would not "accept a nomination for the Presidency iftendered him. " The aggressiveness of Southern opinion on theslavery question was thus shown by Douglas in a negative or indirectview. It is a remarkable fact, that, in still another letter, Douglas argued quite elaborately against the revival of the Africanslave-trade, which he believed to be among the designs of the mostadvanced class of pro-slavery advocates. So acute a statesman asDouglas could not fail to see, that, at every step of his controversywith Southern Democrats, he was justifying the philosophy of Lincolnwhen he maintained that the country was to become wholly free, orwholly under the control of the slave power. 

The controversy thus precipitated between Douglas and the Souththreatened the disruption of the Democratic party. That was anevent of very serious significance. It would bring the conflictof sections still nearer by sundering a tie which had for so longa period bound together vast numbers from the North and the Southin common sympathy and fraternal co-operation. Even those who weremost opposed to the Democratic party beheld its peril with a certainfeeling of regret not unmixed with apprehension. The Whig partyhad been destroyed; and its Northern and Southern members, who, but a few years before, had worked harmoniously for Harrison, forClay, for Taylor, were now enrolled in rival and hostile organizations. A similar dissolution of the Democratic party would sweep away theonly common basis of political action still existing for men ofthe free States and men of the slave States. The separation ofthe Methodist church into Northern and Southern organizations, afew years before, had been regarded by Mr. Webster as a portent ofevil for the Union. The division of the Democratic party would bestill more ominous. The possibility of such an event showed howdeeply the slavery question had affected all ranks, --social, religious, and political. It showed, too, how the spirit of Calhounnow inspired the party in whose councils the slightest word ofJackson had once been law. This change, beginning with the defeatof Van Buren in 1844, was at first slow; but it had afterwardsmoved so rapidly and so far, that men in the North, who wished toremain in the ranks of the Democracy, were compelled to trample onthe principles, and surrender the prejudices, of a lifetime. Efforts to harmonize proved futile. In Congress the breach wascontinually widening. 

 FACTIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. 

The situation was cause of solicitude, and even grief, with thousandsto whom the old party was peculiarly endeared. The traditions ofJefferson, of Madison, of Jackson, were devoutly treasured; andthe splendid achievements of the American Democracy were recountedwith the pride which attaches to an honorable family inheritance. The fact was recalled that the Republic had grown to its imperialdimensions under Democratic statesmanship. It was remembered thatLouisiana had been acquired from France, Florida from Spain, theindependent Republic of Texas annexed, and California, with itsvast dependencies, and its myriad millions of treasure, ceded byMexico, all under Democratic administrations, and in spite of theresistance of their opponents. That a party whose history wasinwoven with the glory of the Republic should now come to its endin a quarrel over the status of the negro, in a region where hislabor was not wanted, was, to many of its members, as incomprehensibleas it was sorrowful and exasperating. They protested, but theycould not prevent. Anger was aroused, and men refused to listento reason. They were borne along, they knew not whither or by whatforce. Time might have restored the party to harmony, but at thevery height of the factional contest the representatives of bothsections were hurried forward to the National Convention of 1860, with principle subordinated to passion, with judgment displaced bya desire for revenge. 

[NOTE. --The following are the questions, referred to on p. 147, which were propounded to Mr. Douglas by Mr. Lincoln in their debateat Freeport. The popular interest was centred in the secondquestion. 

_First_, If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirelyunobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it before they have therequisite number of inhabitants, according to the English bill--some ninety-three thousand--will you vote to admit them?

_Second_, Can the people of a United-States Territory, in any lawfulway, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, excludeslavery from its limits prior to the formation of a StateConstitution?

_Third_, If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decidethat States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you infavor or acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision asa rule of political action?

_Fourth_, Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, indisregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on theslavery question?]

CHAPTER VIII. 

Excited Condition of the South. --The John Brown Raid at Harper'sFerry. --Character of Brown. --Governor Wise. --Hot Temper. --Courseof Republicans in Regard to John Brown. --Misunderstanding of theTwo Sections. --Assembling of the Charleston Convention. --Positionof Douglas and his Friends. --Imperious Demands of Southern Democrats. --Caleb Cushing selected for Chairman of the Convention. --The Southhas Control of the Committee on Resolutions. --Resistance of theDouglas Delegates. --They defeat the Report of the Committee. --Delegates from Seven Southern States withdraw. --Convention unableto make a Nomination. --Adjourns to Baltimore. --Convention divides. --Nomination of both Douglas and Breckinridge. --ConstitutionalUnion Convention. --Nomination of Bell and Everett. --The ChicagoConvention. --Its Membership and Character. --Mr. Seward's Position. --His Disabilities. --Work of his Friends, Thurlow Weed and WilliamM. Evarts. --Opposition of Horace Greeley. --Objections from DoubtfulStates. --Various Candidates. --Nomination of Lincoln and Hamlin. --Four Presidential Tickets in the Field. --Animated Canvass. --TheLong Struggle over. --The South defeated. --Election of Lincoln. --Political Revolution of 1860 complete. 

The South was unnaturally and unjustifiably excited. The peopleof the slave States could not see the situation accurately, but, like a man with disordered nerves, they exaggerated every thing. Their sense of proportion seemed to be destroyed, so that theycould no longer perceive the intrinsic relation which one incidenthad to another. In this condition of mind, when the most ordinaryevents were misapprehended and mismeasured, they were startled andalarmed by an occurrence of extraordinary and exceptional character. On the quiet morning of October, 1859, with no warning whatever tothe inhabitants, the United-States arsenal, at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, was found to be in the possession of an invading mob. The town was besieged, many of its citizens made prisoners, telegraphwires cut, railway-trains stopped by a force which the people, asthey were aroused from sleep, had no means of estimating. Aresisting body was soon organized, militia came in from thesurrounding country, regular troops were hurried up from Washington. By the opening of the second day, a force of fifteen hundred mensurrounded the arsenal, and, when the insurgents surrendered, itwas found that there had been but twenty-two in all. Four werestill alive, including their leader, John Brown. 

 JOHN BROWN AT HARPER'S FERRY. 

Brown was a man of singular courage, perseverance, and zeal, butwas entirely misguided and misinformed. He had conceived theutterly impracticable scheme of liberating the slaves of the Southby calling on them to rise, putting arms in their hands, and aidingthem to gain their freedom. He had borne a very conspicuous andcourageous part in the Kansas struggles, and had been a terror tothe slave-holders on the Missouri border. His bravery was of arare type. He had no sense of fear. Governor Wise stated thatduring the fight, while Brown held the arsenal, with one of hissons lying dead beside him, another gasping with a mortal wound, he felt the pulse of the dying boy, used his own musket, and coollycommanded his men, all amid a shower of bullets from the attackingforce. While of sound mind on most subjects, Brown had evidentlylost his mental balance on the one topic of slavery. His schememiscarried the moment its execution was attempted, as any one notblinded by fanaticism could have from the first foreseen. 

The matter was taken up in hot wrath by the South, with GovernorWise in the lead. The design was not known to or approved by anybody of men in the North; but an investigation was moved in theSenate, by Mr. Mason of Virginia, with the evident view of fixingthe responsibility on the Northern people, or, at least, upon theRepublican party. These men affected to see in John Brown, andhis handful of followers, only the advance guard of another irruptionof Goths and Vandals from the North, bent on inciting servileinsurrection, on plunder, pillage, and devastation. Mr. Mason'scommittee found no sentiment in the North justifying Brown, butthe irritating and offensive course of the Virginia senator calledforth a great deal of defiant anti-slavery expression which, inhis judgment, was tantamount to treason. Brown was tried andexecuted. He would not permit the plea of unsound mind to be madeon his behalf, and to the end he behaved with that calm couragewhich always attracts respect and admiration. Much was made ofthe deliverance of the South, from a great peril, and every thingindicated that the John Brown episode was to be drawn into thepolitical campaign as an indictment against anti-slavery men. Itwas loudly charged by the South, and by their partisans throughoutthe North, that such insurrections were the legitimate outgrowthof Republican teaching, and that the national safety demanded thedefeat and dissolution of the Republican party. Thus challenged, the Republican party did not stand on the defensive. Many of itsmembers openly expressed their pity for the zealot, whose rashnesshad led him to indefensible deeds and thence to the scaffold. Onthe day of his execution, bells were tolled in many Northern towns--not in approval of what Brown had done, but from compassion forthe fate of an old man whose mind had become distempered by suffering, and by morbid reflection on the suffering of others; from a feelingthat his sentence, in view of this fact, was severe; and lastly, and more markedly, as a Northern rebuke to the attempt on the partof the South to make a political issue from an occurrence whichwas as unforeseen and exceptional as it was deplorable. 

The fear and agitation in the South were not feigned but real. Instead of injuring the Republican party, this very fact increasedits strength in the North. The terror of the South at the bareprospect of a negro insurrection led many who had not before studiedthe slavery question to give serious heed to this phase of it. The least reflection led men to see that a domestic institutionmust be very undesirable which could keep an entire community ofbrave men in dread of some indefinable tragedy. Mobs and riots ofmuch greater magnitude than the John Brown uprising had frequentlyoccurred in the free States, and they were put down by the firmauthority of law, without the dread hand of a spectre behind whichmight in a moment light the horizon with the conflagration of homes, and subject wives and daughters to a fate of nameless horror. Instead, therefore, of arresting the spread of Republican principles, the mad scheme of John Brown tended to develop and strengthen them. The conviction grew rapidly that if slavery could produce suchalarm and such demoralization in a strong State like Virginia, inhabited by a race of white men whose courage was never surpassed, it was not an institution to be encouraged, but that its growthshould be prohibited in the new communities where its weakeningand baleful influence was not yet felt. 

Sentiment of this kind could not be properly comprehended in theSouth. It was honestly misrepresented by some, willfully misrepresentedby others. All construed it into a belief, on the part of a largeproportion of the Northern people, that John Brown was entirelyjustifiable. His wild invasion of the South, they apprehended, would be repeated as opportunity offered on a larger scale and withmore deadly purpose. This opinion was stimulated and developedfor political ends by many whose intelligence should have led themto more enlightened views. False charges being constantly repeatedand plied with incessant zeal, the most radical misconception becamefixed in the Southern mind. It was idle for the Republican partyto declare that their aim was only to prevent the extension ofslavery to free territory, and that they were pledged not tointerfere with its existence in the States. Such distinctions werenot accepted by the Southern people. Their leaders had taught themthat the one necessarily involved the other, and that a man whowas in favor of the Wilmot Proviso was as bitter an enemy to theSouth as one who incited a servile insurrection. These views wereunceasingly pressed upon the South by the Northern Democracy, who, in their zeal to defeat the Republicans at home, did not scrupleto misrepresent their aims in the most reckless manner. They wereconstantly misleading the public opinion of the slave States, untilat last the South recognized no difference between the creed ofSeward and the creed of Gerrit Smith, and held Lincoln responsiblefor all the views and expressions of William Lloyd Garrison andWendell Phillips. The calling of a National Republican Conventionwas to their disordered imagination a threat of destruction. Thesuccess of its candidates would, in their view, be just cause forresistance outside the pale of the Constitution. 

 MEETING OF CHARLESTON CONVENTION. 

It was at the height of this overwrought condition of the Southernmind, that the National Convention of the Democratic party met atCharleston on the 23d of April, 1860. The convention had beenassembled in South Carolina, as the most discontented and extremeof Southern States, in order to signify that the Democracy couldharmonize on her soil, and speak peace to the nation through thevoice which had so often spoken peace before. But the NorthernDemocrats failed to comprehend their Southern allies. In theiranxiety to impress the slave-holders with the depth and malignityof Northern anti-slavery feeling, they had unwittingly implicatedthemselves as accessories to the crime they charged on others. Ifthey were, in fact, the friends to the South which they so loudlyproclaimed themselves to be, now was the time to show their faithby their works. The Southern delegates had come to the conventionin a truculent spirit, --as men who felt that they were enduringwrongs which must then and there be righted. They had a grievancefor which they demanded redress, as a preliminary step to furtherconference. They wanted no evasion, they would accept no delay. The Northern delegates begged for the nomination of Douglas as thecertain method of defeating the Republicans, and asked that theymight not be borne down by a platform which they could not carryin the North. The Southern delegates demanded a platform whichshould embody the Constitutional rights of the slave-holder, andthey would not qualify or conceal their requirements. If the Northwould sustain those rights, all would be well. If the North wouldnot sustain them, it was of infinite moment to the South to bepromptly and definitely advised of the fact. The Southern delegateswere not presenting a particular man as candidate. On that pointthey would be liberal and conciliatory. But they were fightingfor a principle, and would not surrender it or compromise it. 

The supporters of Douglas from the North saw that they would beutterly destroyed at home if they consented to the extreme Southerndemand. Their destruction would be equally sure even with Douglasas their candidate if the platform should announce principles whichhe had been controverting ever since his revolt against the Lecomptonbill. For the first time in the history of national Democraticconventions the Northern delegates refused to submit to the exactionsof the South. Hitherto platforms had been constructed just asSouthern men dictated. Candidates had been taken as their preferencedirected. But now the Northern men, pressed by the rising tide ofRepublicanism in every free State, demanded some ground on whichthey could stand and make a contest at home. 

 PROCEEDINGS OF CHARLESTON CONVENTION. 

Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts was chosen President of the Convention. The political career of Mr. Cushing had not been distinguished forsteady adherence to party. He was elected to Congress in 1834, asrepresentative from the Essex district in Massachusetts. He wasat that time a zealous member of the Whig party, and was active onthe Northern or anti-slavery side in the discussions relating tothe "right of petition. " He served in the House for eight years. After the triumph of Harrison in 1840, Mr. Cushing evidently aspiredto be a party leader. In the quarrel which ensued between PresidentTyler and Mr. Clay, he saw an opportunity to gratify his ambitionby adhering to the administration. This brought him into veryclose relations with Mr. Webster, who remained in Tyler's Cabinetafter his colleagues retired, and threw him at the same time intorank antagonism with Mr. Clay, to whose political fortunes he hadpreviously been devoted. In view of the retirement of Mr. Websterfrom the State Department in 1843, President Tyler nominated Mr. Cushing for Secretary of the Treasury, but the Whig senators, appreciating his power and influence in that important position, procured his rejection. Some Democratic votes from the South weresecured against him because of his course in the House ofRepresentatives. The President then nominated him as Commissionerto China, and he was promptly confirmed. Oriental diplomatistsnever encountered a minister better fitted to meet them with theirown weapons. 

Upon his return home, Mr. Cushing found that Mr. Webster had resumedhis place as the leader of the Northern Whigs. Mr. Clay hadmeanwhile been defeated for the Presidency, his followers werediscouraged, the administration of Mr. Polk was in power. Mr. Cushing at once joined the Democracy, and was made a Brigadier-General in the army raised for the war with Mexico. From that timeonward he became a partisan of the extreme State-rights school ofthe Southern Democracy, and was appropriately selected for Attorney-General by President Pierce in 1853. In conjunction with JeffersonDavis, he was considered to be the guiding and controlling forcein the administration. His thorough education, his remarkableattainments, his eminence in the law, his ability as an advocate, rendered his active co-operation of great value to the pro-slaveryDemocrats of the South. He was naturally selected for the importantand difficult duty of presiding over the convention whose deliberationswere to affect the interests of the Government, and possibly thefate of the Union. 

It was soon evident that the South would have every advantage inthe convention which an intelligent and skillful administration ofparliamentary law could afford. Without showing unfairness, thepresiding officer, especially in a large and boisterous assembly, can impart confidence and strength to the side with which he maysympathize. But, apart from any power to be derived from havingthe chairman of the convention, the South had a more palpableadvantage from the mode in which the standing committees must, according to precedent, be constituted. As one member must betaken from each State, the Southern men obtained the control ofall the committees, from the fact that the delegates from Californiaand Oregon steadily voted with them. There were thirty-three Statesin the Union in 1860, --eighteen free and fifteen slave-holding. California and Oregon, uniting with the South, gave to that sectionseventeen, and left to the North but sixteen on all the committees. The Democratic delegates from the Pacific States assumed a weightyresponsibility in thus giving to the Disunionists of the Southpreliminary control of the convention, by permitting them to shapeauthoritatively all the business to be submitted. It left the realmajority of the convention in the attitude of a protesting minority. The Southern majority of one on the committees was fatal to Democraticsuccess. In a still more important aspect its influence was inthe highest degree prejudicial to the Union of the States. 

Constituted in the manner just indicated, the Committee on Resolutionspromptly and unanimously agreed on every article of the Democraticcreed, except that relating to slavery. Here they divided, stubbornlyand irreconcilably. The fifteen slave States, re-enforced byCalifornia and Oregon, gave to the Southern interest a majority ofone vote on the committee. The other free States, sixteen in all, were hostile to the extreme Southern demands, and reported aresolution, which they were willing to accept. The South requiredan explicit assertion of the right of citizens to settle in theTerritories with their slaves, --a right not "to be destroyed orimpaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation. " They requiredthe further declaration that it is the duty of the Federal Government, when necessary, to protect slavery "in the Territories, and whereverelse its constitutional authority extends. " This was in substance, and almost identically in language, the extreme creed put forth bythe Southern Democratic senators in the winter of 1858-59, afterthe "popular sovereignty" campaign of Douglas against Lincoln. Itwas the most advanced ground ever taken by the statesmen of theSouth, and its authorship was generally ascribed to Judah F. Benjamin, senator from Louisiana. Its introduction in the Charlestonplatform was intended apparently as an insult to Douglas. Theevident purpose was to lay down doctrines and prescribe tests whichDouglas could not accept, and thus to exclude him, not only fromcandidacy, but from further participation in the councils of theparty. 

 QUARREL OF DEMOCRATIC FACTIONS. 

The courage of the Northern Democrats was more conspicuously shownin their resistance to these demands than in the declarations whichthey desired to substitute. They quietly abandoned all theirassertions in regard to popular sovereignty, refrained from anyprotest against the doctrine that the Constitution carried slaveryas far as its jurisdiction extended, and contented themselves witha resolution that "inasmuch as differences of opinion exist in theDemocratic party as to the nature and extent of the powers of aTerritorial Legislature, and as to the powers and duties of Congressunder the Constitution of the United States over the institutionof slavery within the Territories, the Democratic party will abideby the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States uponquestions of Constitutional law. " This was perhaps the best devicepracticable at the time; and had it been adopted with Douglas asthe candidate, and a united Democracy supporting him, it is notimprobable that a successful campaign might have been made. Butit was a makeshift, uncandid, unfair, cunningly contrived to evadethe full responsibility of the situation. It was a temporizingexpedient, and did not frankly meet the question which was engagingthe thoughts of the people. Had it succeeded, nothing would havebeen settled. Every thing would have been postponed, and the crisiswould have inevitably recurred. So far as the Supreme Court coulddetermine the questions at issue, it had already been done in theDred Scott decision; and that decision, so far from being final, was a part of the current controversy. There was, therefore, neither logic nor principle in the proposition of the Douglasminority. The Southern delegates keenly realized this fact, andrefused to accept the compromise. They could not endure the thoughtof being placed in a position which was not only evasive, but mightbe deemed cowardly. They were brave men, and wished to meet thequestion bravely. They knew that the Republicans in their forthcomingconvention would explicitly demand the prohibition of slavery inthe Territories. To hesitate or falter in making an equally explicitassertion of their own faith would subject them to fatal assaultfrom their slave-holding constituencies. 

The Douglas men would not yield. They were enraged by the domineeringcourse of the Southern Democrats. They could not comprehend whythey should higgle about the language of the platform when theycould carry the slave States on the one form of expression as wellas the other. In the North it was impossible for the Democrats tosucceed with the Southern platform, but in the South it was, intheir judgment, entirely easy to carry the Douglas platform. Fromthe committee the contest was transferred to the convention, andthere the Douglas men were in a majority. They did not hesitateto use their strength, and by a vote of 165 to 138 they substitutedthe minority platform for that of the majority. It was skillfullyaccomplished under the lead of Henry B. Payne of Ohio and BenjaminSamuels of Iowa. The total vote of the convention was 303, --thenumber of Presidential electors; and every vote had been cast onthe test question. The South voted solidly in the negative, andwas aided by the vote of California and Oregon, and a few scatteringdelegates from Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The other fourteenStates of the North voted unanimously on the side of Douglas, andgave him a majority of twenty-seven. 

The Northern victory brought with it a defeat. A large number ofthe Southern delegates, though fairly and honorably outvoted, refused to abide by the decision. Seven States--Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas--withdrewfrom the convention, and organized a separate assemblage, presidedover by Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware. By this defectionthe Douglas men were left in absolute control of the convention. But the friends of Douglas fatally obstructed his program byconsenting to the two-thirds rule, so worded as to required thatproportion of a full convention to secure a nomination. The firstvote disclosed the full strength of Douglas to be 152. He required202 to be declared the nominee. After an indefinite number ofballots, it was found impossible to make a nomination; and on the3d of May the convention adjourned to meet in Baltimore on the 18thof June. In the intervening weeks it was hoped that a more harmoniousspirit would return to the party. But the expectation was vain. The differences were more pronounced than ever when the conventionre-assembled, and, all efforts to find a common basis of actionhaving failed, the convention divided. The Southern delegates withCalifornia and Oregon, and with some scattering members from otherStates, among whom were Caleb Cushing and Benjamin F. Butler ofMassachusetts, nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky forPresident, and Joseph Lane of Oregon for Vice-President. TheNorthern convention, with a few scattering votes from the South, nominated Stephen A. Douglas for President, and Herschel V. Johnsonof Georgia for Vice-President. Of the seventeen States that madeup the Breckinridge convention, it was deemed probable that hecould carry all. Of the sixteen that voted for Douglas, it wasdifficult to name one in which with a divided party he could besure of victory. United in support of either candidate, the partycould have made a formidable contest, stronger in the North withDouglas, stronger in the South with Breckinridge. Had the Democracypresented Douglas and Breckinridge as their National nominees, theywould have combined all the elements of strength in their party. But passion and prejudice prevented. The South was implacabletoward Douglas, and deliberately resolved to accept defeat ratherthan secure a victory under his lead. 

 DISRUPTION OF THE DEMOCRACY. 

The disruption of the Democracy was undoubtedly hastened by thepolitical events which had occurred since the adjournment atCharleston. An organization, styling itself the Constitutional-Union Party, representing the successors of the Old Whigs andAmericans, had met in Baltimore, and nominated John Bell of Tennesseefor President, and Edward Everett of Massachusetts for Vice-President. The strength of the party was in the South. In the slave Statesit formed the only opposition to the Democratic party, and was asfirm in defense of the rights of the slave-holder as its rival. Its members had not been so ready to repeal the Missouri Compromiseas the Democrats, and they were unrelenting in their hostility toDouglas, and severe in their exposure of his dogma of popularsovereignty. They had effectively aided in bringing both thedoctrine and its author into disrepute in the South, and, if theDemocrats had ventured to nominate Douglas, they had their weaponsready for vigorous warfare against him. 

With a Southern slave-holder like Mr. Bell at the head of theticket, and a Northern man of Mr. Everett's well-known conservatismassociated with him, the Constitutional-Union Party was in a positionto make a strong canvass against Douglas in the South. It was thisfact which, on the re-assembling of the Democratic convention atBaltimore, had increased the hostility of the South to Douglas, and made their leaders firm in their resolution not to accept him. Had the Union party nominated a Northern man instead of Mr. Bellfor President, the case might have been different for Douglas; butthe Southern Democrats feared that their party would be endangeredin half the slave States if they should present Douglas as acandidate against a native Southerner and slave-holder of Bell'scharacter and standing. If they were to be beaten in the contestfor the Presidency, they were determined to retain, if possible, the control of their States, and not to risk their seats in theSenate and the House in a desperate struggle for Douglas. It wouldbe poor recompense to them to recover certain Northern States fromthe Republicans, if at the same time, and by co-ordinate causes, an equal number of Southern States should be carried by Bell, andthe destiny of the South be committed to a conservative party, which would abandon threats and cultivate harmony. Bell's nominationhad, therefore, proved the final argument against the acceptanceof Douglas by the Southern Democracy. 

Meanwhile, between the adjournment of the Democratic convention atCharleston, and its re-assembling at Baltimore, the Republicanshad held their national convention at Chicago. It was a representativemeeting of the active and able men of both the old parties in theNorth, who had come together on the one overshadowing issue of thehour. Differing widely on many other questions, inheriting theircreeds from antagonistic organizations of the past, they thoughtalike on the one subject of putting a stop to the extension ofslavery. Those who wished to go farther were restrained, and anabsolute control of opinion and action was commanded on this oneline. In the entire history of party conventions, not one can befound so characteristic, so earnest, so determined to do the wisestthing, so little governed by personal consideration, so entirelydevoted to one absorbing idea. It was made up in great part ofyoung men, though there were gray-haired veterans in sufficientnumber to temper action with discretion. A large proportion ofthe delegates were afterwards prominent in public life. At leastsixty of them, till then unknown beyond their districts, were sentto Congress. Many became governors of their States, and in otherways received marks of popular favor. It was essentially a conventionof the free States--undisguisedly sectional in the politicalnomenclature of the day. The invitation was general, but, in thelarger portion of the South, no one could be found who would riskhis life by attending as a delegate. Nevertheless, there weredelegates present from the five slave States which bordered on thefree States, besides a partial and irregular representation fromTexas. 

 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. 

The anti-slavery character of the assemblage was typified by theselection of David Wilmot for temporary chairman, and its conservativeside by the choice of an old Webster Whig, in the person of GeorgeAshmun of Massachusetts, for permanent president. This tendencyto interweave the radical and conservative elements, and, wherepracticable, those of Whig with those of Democratic antecedents, was seen in many delegations. John A. Andrew and George S. Boutwellcame from Massachusetts, William M. Evarts and Preston King fromNew York, Thaddeus Stevens and Andrew H. Reeder from Pennsylvania, Thomas Corwin and Joshua R. Giddings from Ohio, David Davis and N. B. Judd from Illinois. Outside of the regular delegations, therewere great crowds of earnest men in Chicago, all from the freeStates. The number in attendance was reckoned by tens of thousands. Considering the restricted facilities for travel at that time, themultitude was surprising and significant. The whole mass wasinspired with energy, and believed, without shadow of doubt, thatthey had come to witness the nomination of the next President ofthe United States. Confidence of strength is as potential anelement in a political canvass as in a military campaign, and neverwas a more defiant sense of power exhibited than by the Chicagoconvention of 1860 and by the vast throng which surrounded itsmeetings. Such a feeling is contagious, and it spread from thatcentre until it enveloped the free States. 

The impression in the country, for a year preceding the convention, was that Mr. Seward would be nominated. As the time drew nigh, however, symptoms of dissent appeared in quarters where it had notbeen expected. New parties are proverbially free from faction andjealousy. Personal antagonisms, which come with years, had notthen been developed in the Republican ranks. It was not primarilya desire to promote the cause of other candidates which led to thequestioning of Mr. Seward's availability, nor was there anywithholding of generous recognition and appreciation of all thathe had done for Republican principles. His high character wasgladly acknowledged, his eminent ability conceded, the magnitudeand unselfishness of his work were everywhere praised. Withouthis aid, the party could not have been organized. But for his wiseleadership, it would have been wrecked in the first years of itsexistence. He was wholly devoted to its principles. He had stakedevery thing upon its success. 

Mr. Seward had, however, some weak points as a candidate. A largeproportion of the Republicans had been connected with the Americanorganization, and still cherished some of its principles. Mr. Seward had been the determined foe of that party. In battling forthe rights of the negro, he deemed it unwise and inconsistent toincrease the disabilities of the foreign-born citizen. His influence, more than that of any other man, had broken down the proscriptivecreed of the American party, and turned its members into theRepublican ranks. But many of them came reluctantly, and in acomplaining mood against Mr. Seward. This led political managersto fear that Mr. Seward would lose votes which another candidatemight secure. Others though that the radicalism of Mr. Sewardwould make him weak, where a more conservative representative ofRepublican principles might be strong. He had been at the forefrontof the battle for twelve years in the Senate, and every extremething he had said was remembered to his injury. He had preachedthe doctrine of an "irrepressible conflict" between the forces ofslavery and the forces of freedom, and timid men dreaded such atrial as his nomination would presage. The South had made continuousassault on this speech, and on the particular phrase whichdistinguished it, and had impressed many Northern men with thebelief that Mr. Seward had gone too far. In short, he had beentoo conspicuous, and too many men had conceived predilectionsagainst him. 

When the convention assembled, notwithstanding all adverse influences, Mr. Seward was still the leading and most formidable candidate. His case was in strong and skillful hands. Mr. Thurlow Weed, whohad been his lifelong confidential friend, presented his claims, before the formal assembling of the convention, with infinite tact. Mr. Weed, though unable to make a public speech, was the mostpersuasive of men in private conversation. He was quiet, gentle, and deferential in manner. He grasped a subject with a giant'sstrength, presented its strong points, and marshaled its detailswith extraordinary power. Whatever Mr. Weed might lack was morethan supplied by the eloquent tongue of William M. Evarts. Seldomif ever in the whole field of political oratory have the speechesof Mr. Evarts at Chicago been equaled. Even those who most decidedlydiffered from him followed him from one delegation to anotherallured by the charm of his words. He pleaded for the Republic, for the party that could save it, for the great statesman who hadfounded the party, and knew where and how to lead it. He spoke asone friend for another, and the great career of Mr. Seward wasnever so illumined as by the brilliant painting of Mr. Evarts. 

 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. 

With all the potential efforts and influences in his behalf, Mr. Seward was confronted with obstacles which were insuperable. Hewas seriously injured by the open defection of Horace Greeley. Not able, or even desirous, to appear on the New-York delegation, Mr. Greeley sat in the convention as a representative from Oregon. The old firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley, according to his ownhumorous expression, had been dissolved by the withdrawal of thejunior partner; and a bitter dissension had in fact existed forsix years without public knowledge. With his great influence inthe agricultural regions of the country, Mr. Greeley was enabledto turn a strong current of popular feeling against the eminentsenator from New York. Mr. Seward sustained further injury by theaction of the States which were regarded as politically doubtful. Pennsylvania and Indiana took part against him. Henry S. Lane hadjust been nominated for governor of Indiana, with Oliver P. Morton--not then known beyond his State--for lieutenant-governor. Itwas understood that Lane would be sent to the Senate if theRepublicans should carry the State, and that Morton, whose strengthof character was known and appreciated at home, would becomegovernor. Both candidates, having each a personal stake in thecontest, united in declaring that the nomination of Mr. Sewardmeant a Democratic victory in Indiana. Andrew G. Curtin, who hadbeen nominated for governor of Pennsylvania, gave the same testimonyrespecting that State; and his judgment was sustained by his faithfulfriend and adviser, Alexander K. McClure. Delegates from otherStates, where the contest was close, sympathized with the views ofPennsylvania and Indiana, and there was a rapid and formidablecombination against Mr. Seward. The reformer and his creed rarelytriumph at the same time, and the fate of Mr. Seward was about toadd one more illustration of this truth. 

But if not Mr. Seward, who? The Blairs and Horace Greeley answered, "Edward Bates of Missouri, "--an old Whig, a lawyer of ability, agentleman of character. Though still in vigorous life, he had satin the convention which framed the constitution of Missouri in1820. He had revered the Compromise of that year, and had joinedthe Republicans in resentment of its repeal. Ohio, in a half-hearted manner, presented Salmon P. Chase, who, with great abilityand spotless fame, lacked the elements of personal popularity. Pennsylvania, with an imposing delegation, named Simon Cameron;New Jersey desired William L. Dayton; Vermont wanted Jacob Collamer;and delegates here and there suggested Judge McLean or BenjaminF. Wade. The popular candidate of 1856, John C. Frémont, hadforbidden the use of his name. 

Illinois had a candidate. He was held back with sound discretion, and at the opportune moment presented with great enthusiasm. Eversince the discussion with Douglas, Mr. Lincoln had occupied aprominent place before the public; but there had been little mentionof his name for the Presidency. His friends at home had apparentlyhoped to nominate him for Vice-President on the ticket with Mr. Seward. But as the proofs of hostility to Seward multiplied, speculation was busy as to the man who could be taken in his stead. At the moment when doubts of Seward's success were most prevalent, and when excitement in regard to the nomination was deepest, theRepublicans of Illinois met in State convention. It was but a fewdays in advance of the assembling of the National convention. Bya spontaneous movement they nominated Mr. Lincoln for President. It was a surprise to the convention that did it. The man whocreated the great outburst for Mr. Lincoln in that Illinoisassemblage, who interpreted the feelings of delegates to themselves, was Richard J. Oglesby, a speaker of force and eloquence, afterwardhonorably prominent and popular in military and civil life. Hewas seconded with unanimity, and with boisterous demonstrations ofapplause. The whole State was instantly alive and ablaze forLincoln. A delegation competent for its work was sent to theconvention. David Davis, O. H. Browning, Burton C. Cook, GustavusKoerner, and their associates, met no abler body of men in aconvention remarkable for its ability. They succeeded in thedifficult task assigned to them. They did not in their canvasspresent Mr. Lincoln as a rival to Mr. Seward, but rather as anadmirer and friend. The votes which were given to Mr. Lincoln onthe first ballot were, in large part, from delegations that couldnot be induced in any event to vote for Mr. Seward. The presentationof Mr. Lincoln's name kept these delegates from going to a candidateless acceptable to the immediate friends of Mr. Seward. No managementcould have been more skillful, no tact more admirable. The resultattested the vigor and wisdom of those who had Mr. Lincoln's fortunesin charge. 

Mr. Seward's support, however, after all the assaults made uponit, was still very formidable. On the first ballot he received175˝ votes, while Mr. Lincoln received but 102. Delegates to thenumber of 190 divided their votes between Bates, Chase, Cameron, Dayton, McLean, and Collamer. They held the balance of power, andon the second ballot it was disclosed that the mass of them favoredMr. Lincoln as against Mr. Seward. The latter gained but ninevotes, carrying his total up to 184˝, while Mr. Lincoln received181. On the third ballot, Mr. Lincoln was nominated by generalconsent. 

 NOMINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

It is one of the contradictions not infrequently exhibited in themovement of partisan bodies, that Mr. Seward was defeated becauseof his radical expressions on the slavery questions, while Mr. Lincoln was chosen in spite of expressions far more radical thanthose of Mr. Seward. The "irrepressible conflict" announced byMr. Seward at Rochester did not go so far as Mr. Lincoln's declarationat Springfield, that "the Union could not exist half slave, halffree. " Neither Mr. Seward nor Mr. Lincoln contemplated thedestruction of the government, and yet thousands had been made tobelieve that Mr. Seward made the existence of the Union depend onthe abolition of slavery. Mr Lincoln had announced the same doctrinein advance of Mr. Seward, with a directness and bluntness whichcould not be found in the more polished phrase of the New-Yorksenator. Despite these facts, a large number of delegates fromdoubtful States--delegates who held the control of the convention--supported Mr. Lincoln, on the distinct ground that the anti-slavery sentiment which they represented was not sufficientlyradical to support the author of the speech in which had beenproclaimed the doctrine of an "irrepressible conflict" betweenfreedom and slavery. 

In a final analysis of the causes and forces which nominated Mr. Lincoln, great weight must be given to the influence which camefrom the place where the convention was held, and from the sympathyand pressure of the surrounding crowd. Illinois Republicans, fromCairo to the Wisconsin line, were present in uncounted thousands. The power of the mob in controlling public opinion is immeasurable. In monarchical governments it has dethroned kings, and in republicsit dictates candidates. Had the conditions been changed and theNational convention of the Republicans assembled in Albany, it isscarcely to be doubted that Mr. Seward would have been nominated. It is quite certain that Mr. Lincoln would not have been nominated. The great achievement at Chicago was the nomination of Mr. Lincolnwithout offending the supporters of Seward. This happy resultsecured victory for the party in the national contest. No woundswere inflicted, no hatreds planted, no harmonies disturbed. Thedevotion to the cause was so sincere and so dominant, that thepersonal ambitions of a lifetime were subordinated in an instantupon the demand of the popular tribunal whose decision was final. The discipline of defeat was endured with grace, and self-abnegationwas accepted as the supreme duty of the hour. 

A wise selection was made for Vice-President. Hannibal Hamlinbelonged originally to the school of Democrats who supported Jackson, and who took Silas Wright as their model. After the repeal of theMissouri Compromise he separated himself from his old associates, and proved to be a powerful factor in the formation of the Republicanparty. His candidacy for Governor of Maine, in 1856, broke downthe Democratic party in that State, and gave a great impulse tothe Republican campaign throughout the country. In strong commonsense, in sagacity and sound judgment, in rugged integrity ofcharacter, Mr. Hamlin has had no superior among public men. It isgenerally fortunate for a political party if the nominee for Vice-President does not prove a source of weakness in the popular canvass. Mr. Hamlin proved a source of strength, and the imparted confidenceand courage to the great movement against the Democratic party. 

In the four Presidential tickets in the field, every shade ofpolitical opinion was represented, but only two of the candidatesembodied positive policies. Mr. Lincoln was in favor of prohibitingthe extension of slavery by law. Mr. Breckinridge was in favor ofprotecting its extension by law. No issue could have been morepronounced than the one thus presented. Mr. Douglas desired toevade it, and advocated his doctrine of non-intervention which wasfull of contradictions, and was in any event offensive to the anti-slavery conscience. It permitted what was considered a grievousmoral wrong to be upheld, if a majority of white men would vote infavor of upholding it. Mr. Bell desired to avoid the one questionthat was in the popular mind, and to lead the people away fromevery issue except the abstract one of preserving the Union. Bywhat means the Union could be preserved against the efforts ofSouthern secessionists, Mr. Bell's party did not explain. Thepopular apprehension was that Mr. Bell would concede all they asked, and insure the preservation of the Union by yielding to the demandsof the only body of men who threatened to destroy it. 

 ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

As the canvass grew animated, and the questions at issue wereelaborately discussed before the people, the conviction becamegeneral that the supporters of Breckinridge contemplated thedestruction of the government. This was not simply the belief ofthe Republicans. It was quite as general among the supporters ofDouglas and the supporters of Bell. In an earlier stage of theanti-slavery contest, this fact would have created great alarm inthe Northern States, but now the people would not yield to such afear. They were not only inspired by the principles they upheld, but there was a general desire to test the question thus presented. If a President, constitutionally elected, could not be inaugurated, it was better then and there to ascertain the fact than to postponethe issue by an evasion or a surrender. The Republicans wereconstantly strengthened by recruits from the Douglas ranks. Manyof the friends of Douglas had become enraged by the course of theSouthern Democrats, and now joined the Republicans, in order toforce the issue upon the men who had been so domineering andoffensive in the Charleston and Baltimore conventions. Mr. Lincolngained steadily and derived great strength from the division ofhis opponents. But their union could not have defeated him. InNew York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, but one electoral ticketwas presented against Mr. Lincoln, his opponents having coalescedin a joint effort to defeat him. In New Jersey, the "Fusion"ticket, as the combination was termed, was made up of three Douglas, two Bell, and two Breckinridge representatives. Owing to the factthat some of the supporters of Douglas refused to vote for theBreckinridge and Bell candidates, Mr. Lincoln received four electoralvotes in New Jersey, though, in the aggregate popular vote, themajority was against him. In California and Oregon he receivedpluralities. In every other free State he had an absolute majority. Breckinridge carried every slave State except four, --Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee voting for Bell, and Missouri voting forDouglas. 

The long political struggle was over. A more serious one was aboutto begin. For the first time in the history of the government, the South was defeated in a Presidential election where an issueaffecting the slavery question was involved. There had been graveconflicts before, sometimes followed by compromise, oftener byvictory for the South. But the election of 1860 was the culminationof a contest which was foreshadowed by the Louisiana question of1812; which became active and angry over the admission of Missouri;which was revived by the annexation of Texas, and still furtherinflamed by the Mexican war; which was partially allayed by thecompromises of 1850; which was precipitated for final settlementby the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, by the consequent strugglefor mastery in Kansas, and by the aggressive intervention of theSupreme Court in the case of Dred Scott. These are the eventswhich led, often slowly, but always with directness, to the politicalrevolution of 1860. The contest was inevitable, and the men whoseinfluence developed and encouraged it may charitably be regardedas the blind agents of fate. But if personal responsibility forprematurely forcing the conflict belongs to any body of men, itattaches to those who, in 1854, broke down the adjustments of 1820and of 1850. If the compromises of those years could not bemaintained, the North believed that all compromise was impossible;and they prepared for the struggle which this fact foreshadowed. They had come to believe that the house divided against itselfcould not stand; that the Republic half slave, half free, couldnot endure. They accepted as their leader the man who proclaimedthese truths. The peaceful revolution was complete when AbrahamLincoln was chosen President of the United States. 

In the closing and more embittered period of the political struggleover the question of Slavery, public opinion in the South grewnarrow, intolerant, and cruel. The mass of the Southern peoplerefused to see any thing in the anti-slavery movement exceptfanaticism; they classed Abolitionists with the worst of malefactors;they endeavored to shut out by the criminal code and by personalviolence the enlightened and progressive sentiment of the world. Their success in arousing the prejudice and unifying the action ofthe people in fifteen States against the surging opinion ofChristendom is without parallel. Philanthropic movements elsewherewere regarded with jealousy and distrust. Southern statesmen ofthe highest rank looked upon British emancipation in the West Indiesas designedly hostile to the prosperity and safety of their ownsection, and as a plot for the ultimate destruction of the Republic. Each year the hatred against the North deepened, and the boundarybetween the free States and the slave States was becoming as markedas a line of fire. The South would see no way of dealing withSlavery except to strengthen and fortify it at every point. Itsextinction they would not contemplate. Even a suggestion for itsamelioration was regarded as dangerous to the safety of the Stateand to the sacredness of the family. 

 BRITISH SUPPORT OF THE SLAVE-TRADE. 

Southern opinion had not always been of this type. It had changedwith the increase in the number of slaves, and with the increasedprofit from their labor. Before the Revolutionary war, Virginiahad earnestly petitioned George III. To prohibit the importationof slaves from Africa, and the answer of His Majesty was a peremptoryinstruction to the Royal Governor at Williamsburg, "not to assentto any law of the Colonial Legislature by which the importation ofslaves should in any respect be prohibited or obstructed. " Anti-slavery opinion was developed in a far greater degree in the AmericanColonies than in the mother country. When the Convention of 1787inserted in the Federal Constitution a clause giving to Congressthe power to abolish the slave-trade after the year 1808, they tooka step far in advance of European opinion. A society was formedin London, in the year 1787, for the suppression of the slave-trade. Although it was organized under the auspices of the distinguishedphilanthropists, William Clarkson and Granville Sharp, it had atthe time as little influence upon the popular opinion of Englandas the early efforts of William Lloyd Garrison and the Society forthe Abolition of Domestic Slavery had upon the public opinion ofthe United States. It was not until 1791 that Mr. Wilberforceintroduced in Parliament his first bill for the suppression of theslave-trade, and though he had the enlightened sympathy of Mr. Pitt, the eminent premier did not dare to make it a ministerialmeasure. The bill was rejected by a large vote. It was not untilfifteen years later that the conscience of England won a victoryover the organized capital engaged in the infamous traffic. Itwas the young and struggling Republic in America that led the way, and she led the way under the counsel and direction of Southernstatesmen. American slave-holders were urging the abolition ofthe traffic while London merchants were using every effort tocontinue it, and while Bristol, the very headquarters of the trade, was represented in Parliament by Edmund Burke. Even among theliterary men of England, --if Boswell's gossip may be trusted, --Dr. Johnson was peculiar in his hatred of the infamy--a hatred whichis obsequious biographer mollifies to an "unfavorable notion, " andofficiously ascribes to "prejudice and imperfect or false information. "The anti-slavery work of England was originally inspired fromAmerica, and the action of the British Parliament was really sodirected as to make the prohibition of the slave-trade correspondin time with that prescribed in the Federal Constitution. TheAmerican wits and critics of that day did not fail to note thesignificance of the date, and to appreciate the statesmanship andphilosophy which led the British Parliament to terminate the tradeat the precise moment when the American Congress closed the market. 

The slaves in the United States numbered about seven hundred thousandwhen Washington's administration was organized. They had increasedto four millions when Lincoln was chosen President. Their numberin 1860 was less in proportion to the white population than it wasin 1789. The immigration of whites had changed the ratio. Butthe more marked and important change had been in the value of slavelabor. In 1789 the slaves produced little or no surplus, and inmany States were regarded as a burden. In 1860 they produced asurplus of at least three hundred millions of dollars. The powerof agricultural production in the Southern States had apparentlyno limit. If the institution of Slavery could be rendered secure, the dominant minds of the South saw political power and boundlesswealth within their grasp. They saw that they could control theproduct and regulate the price of a staple in constant demand amongevery people on the globe. The investment of the South in slavesrepresented a capital of two thousand millions of dollars, reckonedonly upon the salable value of the chattel. Estimated by itscapacity to produce wealth, the institution of Slavery representedto the white population of the South a sum vastly in excess of twothousand millions. Without slave-labor, the cotton, rice, andsugar lands were, in the view of Southern men, absolutely valueless. With the labor of the slave, they could produce three hundredmillions a year in excess of the food required for the population. Three hundred millions a year represented a remunerative intereston a capital of five thousand millions of dollars. In the historyof the world there has perhaps never been so vast an amount ofproductive capital firmly consolidated under one power, subject tothe ultimate control and direction of so small a number of men. 

 THE SOUTH AND THE SLAVE-TRADE. 

With such extraordinary results attained, the natural desire ofslave-holders was to strive for development and expansion. Theyhad in the South more land than could be cultivated by the slavesthey then owned, or by their natural increase within any calculableperiod. So great was the excess of land that, at the time Texaswas annexed, Senator Ashley of Arkansas declared that his Statealone could, with the requisite labor, produce a larger cotton-cropthan had ever been grown in the whole country. In the minds ofthe extreme men of the South the remedy was to be found in re-opening the African slave-trade. So considerate and withal soconservative a man as Alexander H. Stephens recognized the situation. When he retired from public service, at the close of the Thirty-sixth Congress, in 1859, he delivered an address to his constituents, which was in effect a full review of the Slavery question. He toldthem plainly that they could not keep up the race with the Northin the occupation of new territory "unless they could get moreAfricans. " He did not avowedly advocate the re-opening of theslave-trade, but the logic of his speech plainly pointed to thatend. 

John Forsythe of Alabama, an aggressive leader of the most radicalpro-slavery type, carried the argument beyond the point where theprudence of Mr. Stephens permitted him to go. In recounting thetriumphs of the South, he avowed that one stronghold remained tobe carried, "the abrogation of the prohibition of the slave-trade. "So eminent a man as William L. Yancey formally proposed in a Southerncommercial convention, in 1858, that the South should demand therepeal of the laws "declaring the slave-trade to be piracy;" andGovernor Adams of South Carolina pronounced those laws to be "afraud upon the slave-holders of the South. " The Governor ofMississippi went still farther, and exhibited a confidence in thescheme which was startling. He believed that "the North would notrefuse so just a demand if the South should unitedly ask it. "Jefferson Davis did not join in the movement, but expressed a heartycontempt for those "who prate of the inhumanity and sinfulness ofthe slave-trade. "

Quotations of this character might be indefinitely multiplied. The leaders of public opinion in the Cotton States were generallytending in the same direction, and, in the language of JeffersonDavis, were basing their conclusion on "the interest of the South, and not on the interest of the African. " Newspapers and literaryreviews in the Gulf States were seconding and enforcing the positionof their public men, and were gradually but surely leading the mindof the South to a formal demand for the privilege of importingAfricans. A speaker in the Democratic National Convention atCharleston, personally engaged in the domestic slave-trade, franklydeclared that the traffic in native Africans would be far morehumane. The thirty thousand slaves annually taken from the borderStates to the cotton-belt represented so great an aggregation ofmisery, that the men engaged in conducting it were, even by thebetter class of slave-holders, regarded with abhorrence, and spokenof as infamous. 

It is worthy of observation that the re-opening of the Africanslave-trade was not proposed in the South until after the DredScott decision. This affords a measure of the importance whichpro-slavery statesmen attached to the position of the Supreme Court. In the light of these facts, the repeated protests of SenatorDouglas "against such schemes as the re-opening of the Africanslave-trade" were full of significance; nor could any developmentof Southern opinion have vindicated more completely the truthproclaimed by Mr. Lincoln, that the country was destined to becomewholly anti-slavery or wholly pro-slavery. The financial interestat stake in the fate of the institution was so vast, that Southernmen felt impelled to seek every possible safeguard against theinnumerable dangers which surrounded it. The revival of the Africanslave-trade was the last suggestion for its protection, and wasthe immediate precursor of its destruction. 

In reckoning the wealth-producing power of the Southern States, the field of slave labor has been confined to the cotton-belt. Inthe more northern of the slave-holding States, free labor was moreprofitable, and hence the interest in Slavery was not so vital orso enduring as in the extreme South. There can be little doubtthat the slave States of the border would have abolished theinstitution at an early period except for the fact that their slavesbecame a steady and valuable source of labor-supply for the increaseddemand which came from the constantly expanding area of cotton. But his did not create so palpable or so pressing an interest aswas felt in the Gulf States, and the resentment caused by theelection of Lincoln was proportionately less. The border Stateswould perhaps have quietly accepted the result, however distasteful, except for the influence brought upon them from the extreme South, where the maintenance of Slavery was deemed vital to prosperityand to safety. 

In the passions aroused by the agitation over slavery, Southernmen failed to see (what in cooler moments they could readilyperceive) that the existence of the Union and the guaranties ofthe Constitution were the shield and safeguard of the South. Thelong contest they had been waging with the anti-slavery men of thefree States had blinded Southern zealots to the essential strengthof their position so long as their States continued to be membersof the Federal Union. But for the constant presence of nationalpower, and its constant exercise under the provisions of theConstitution, the South would have had no protection against theanti-slavery assaults of the civilized world. Abolitionists fromthe very beginning of their energetic crusade against slavery hadseen the Constitution standing in their way, and with the unsparingseverity of their logic had denounced it as "a league with helland a covenant with death. " The men who were directing publicopinion in the South were trying to persuade themselves, and hadactually persuaded many of their followers, that the election ofLincoln was the overthrow of the Constitution, and that their safetyin the Union was at an end. They frightened the people by Lincoln'sdeclaration that the Republic could not exist half slave, halffree. They would not hear his own lucid and candid explanation ofhis meaning, but chose rather to accept the most extreme constructionwhich the pro-slavery literature and the excited harangues of aPresidential canvass had given to Mr. Lincoln's language. 

 SOUTHERN CONFIDENCE IN SECESSION. 

The confidence of Southern men in their power to achieve whateverend they should propose was unbounded. They apparently did notstop to contemplate the effect upon slavery which a reckless courseon their part might produce. Having been schooled to the utmostconservatism in affairs of government, they suddenly became rashand adventurous. They were apparently ready to put every thing tohazard, professing to believe that nothing could be as fatal as toremain under what they termed the "Government of Lincoln. " Theybelieved they could maintain themselves against physical force, but they took no heed of a stronger power which was sure to workagainst them. They disregarded the enlightened philanthropy andthe awakened conscience which had abolished slavery in every otherRepublic of America, which had thrown the protection of law overthe helpless millions of India, which had moved even the RussianAutocracy to consider the enfranchisement of the serf. They wouldnot realize that the contest they were rashly inviting was notalone with the anti-slavery men of the free States, not alone withthe spirit of loyalty to the Republic, but that it carried with ita challenge to the progress of civilization, and was a fight againstthe nineteenth century. 

CHAPTER IX. 

The Tariff Question in its Relation to the Political Revolution of1860. --A Century's Experience as to Best Mode of levying Duties. --Original Course of Federal Government in Regard to Revenue. --FirstTariff Act. --The Objects defined in a Preamble. --ConstitutionalPower to adopt Protective Measure. --Character of Early Discussions. --The Illustrious Men who participated. --Mr. Madison the Leader. --The War Tariff of 1812. --Its High Duties. --The Tariff of 1816. --Interesting Debate upon its Provisions. --Clay, Webster, and Calhountake part. --Business Depression throughout the Country. --Continuesuntil the Enactment of the Tariff of 1824. --Protective Characterof that Tariff. --Still Higher Duties levied by the Tariff of 1828. --Southern Resistance to the Protective Principle. --Mr. Calhounleads the Nullification Movement in South Carolina. --Compromiseeffected on the Tariff Question. --Financial Depression follows. --Panic of 1837. --Protective Tariff passed in 1842. --Free-tradePrinciples triumph with the Election of President Polk. --Tariff of1846. --Prosperous Condition of the Country. --Differences of Opinionas to the Causes. --Surplus Revenue. --Plethoric Condition of theTreasury. --Enactment of the Tariff of 1857. --Both Parties supportit in Congress. --Duties lower than at Any Time since the War of1812. --Panic of 1857. --Dispute as to its causes. --Protective andFree-trade Theories as presented by their Advocates. --Connectionof the Tariff with the Election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency. --General Review. 

The Slavery question was not the only one which developed into achronic controversy between certain elements of Northern opinionand certain elements of Southern opinion. A review of the sectionalstruggle would be incomplete if it did not embrace a narrative ofthose differences on the tariff which at times led to seriousdisturbance, and, on one memorable occasion, to an actual threatof resistance to the authority of the government. The divisionupon the tariff was never so accurately defined by geographicallines as was the division upon slavery; but the aggressive elementson each side of both questions finally coalesced in the same States, North and South. Massachusetts and South Carolina marched in thevanguard of both controversies; and the States which respectivelyfollowed on the tariff issue were, in large part, the same whichfollowed on the slavery question, on both sides of Mason and Dixon'sline. Anti-slavery zeal and a tariff for protection went hand inhand in New England, while pro-slavery principles became nearlyidentical with free-trade in the Cotton States. If the rule hadits exception, it was in localities where the strong pressure ofspecial interest was operating, as in the case of the sugar-planterof Louisiana, who was willing to concede generous protection tothe cotton-spinner of Lowell if he could thereby secure an equallystrong protection, in his own field of enterprise, against thepressing competition of the island of Cuba. 

 PROTECTION AND FREE-TRADE SECTIONAL. 

The general rule, after years of experimental legislation, resolveditself into protection in the one section and free-trade in theother. And this was not an unnatural distinction. Zeal againstslavery was necessarily accompanied by an appreciation of thedignity of free labor; and free labor was more generously remuneratedunder the stimulus of protective laws. The same considerationsproduced a directly opposite conclusion in the South, where thoseinterest in slave labor could not afford to build up a class offree laborers with high wages and independent opinions. The questionwas indeed one of the kind not infrequently occurring in theadjustment of public policies where the same cause is continuallyproducing different and apparently contradictory effects when thefield of its operation is changed. 

The issues growing out of the subject of the tariff were, however, in many respects entirely distinct from the slavery question. Theone involved the highest moral considerations, the other was governedsolely by expediency. Whether one man could hold property inanother was a question which took deep hold of the consciences ofmen, and was either right or wrong in itself. But whether the rateof duty upon a foreign import should be increased or lowered wasa question to be settled solely by business and financialconsiderations. Slavery in the United States, as long experiencehad proved, could be most profitably employed in the cultivationof cotton. The cost of its production, in the judgment of thoseengaged in it, was increased by the operation of a tariff, whereasits price, being determined by the markets of the world, derivedno benefit from protective duties. The clothing of the slave, theharness for the horses and mules, the ploughs, the rope, the bagging, the iron ties, were all, they contended, increased in price to theplanter without any corresponding advance in the market value ofthe product. In the beginning of the controversy it was expectedthat the manufacture of cotton would grow up side by side with itsproduction, and that thus the community which produced the fibrewould share in the profit of the fabric. During this period therepresentatives from the Cotton States favored high duties; but astime wore on, and it became evident that slave-labor was not adaptedto the factory, and that it was undesirable if not impossible tointroduce free white labor with remunerative wages side by sidewith unpaid slave-labor, the leading minds of the South were turnedagainst the manufacturing interest, and desired to legislate solelyin aid of the agricultural interest. 

It was this change in the South that produced the irritatingdiscussions in Congress, --discussions always resulting in sectionalbitterness and sometimes threatening the public safety. The tariffquestion has in fact been more frequently and more elaboratelydebated than any other issue since the foundation of the FederalGovernment. The present generation is more familiar with questionsrelating to slavery, to war, to reconstruction; but as thesedisappear by permanent adjustment the tariff returns, and is eagerlyseized upon by both sides to the controversy. More than any otherissue, it represents the enduring and persistent line of divisionbetween the two parties which in a generic sense have always existedin the United States;--the party of strict construction and theparty of liberal construction, the party of State Rights and theparty of National Supremacy, the party of stinted revenue andrestricted expenditure, and the party of generous income with itswise application to public improvement; the part, in short, ofJefferson as against the party of Hamilton, the party of Jacksonas against that of Clay, the party of Buchanan and Douglas asagainst that of Lincoln and Seward. Taxes, whether direct orindirect, always interest the mass of mankind, and the differencesof the systems by which they shall be levied and collected willalways present an absorbing political issue. Public attention maybe temporarily engrossed by some exigent subject of controversy, but the tariff alone steadily and persistently recurs for agitation, and for what is termed settlement. Thus far in our history, settlement has only been the basis of new agitation, and eachsuccessive agitation leads again to new settlement. 

 EXPERIENCE IN TARIFF LEGISLATION. 

After the experience of nearly a century on the absorbing questionof the best mode of levying duties on imports, the divergence ofopinion is as wide and as pronounced as when the subject firstengaged the attention of the Federal Government. Theories on theside of high duties and theories on the side of low duties aremaintained with just as great vigor as in 1789. In no question ofa material or financial character has there been so much interestdisplayed as in this. On a question of sentiment and of sympathylike that of slavery, feeling is inevitable; but it has been matterof surprise that the adjustment of a scale of duties on importationsof foreign merchandise should be accompanied, as it often has been, by displays of excitement often amounting to passion. 

The cause is readily apprehended when it is remembered that thetariff question is always presented as one not merely affectingthe general prosperity, but as specifically involving the questionof bread to the millions who are intrusted with the suffrage. Theindustrial classes study the question closely; and, in many of themanufacturing establishments of the country, the man who is workingfor day wages will be found as keenly alive to the effect of achange in the protective duty as the stockholder whose dividendsare to be affected. Thus capital and labor coalesce in favor ofhigh duties to protect the manufacturer, and, united, they form apolitical force which has been engaged in an economic battle fromthe foundation of the government. Sometimes they have sufferedsignal defeat, and sometimes they have gained signal victories. 

The landmarks which have been left in a century of discussion andof legislative experiment deserve a brief reference for a betterunderstanding of the subject to-day. Our financial experience hasbeen practically as extended as that of the older nations of Europe. When the Republic was organized, Political Economy as understoodin the modern sense was in its elementary stage, and indeed couldhardly be called a science. Systems of taxation were everywherecrude and ruthless, and were in large degree fashioned after theOriental practice of mulcting the man who will pay the most andresist the least. Adam Smith had published his "Enquiry into theNature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" in the year of theDeclaration of Independence. Between that time and the formationof the Federal Government his views had exerted no perceptibleinfluence on the financial system of England. British industrieswere protected by the most stringent enactments of Parliament, andEngland was the determined enemy not only of free trade but of fairtrade. The emancipated Colonies found therefore in the mothercountry the most resolute foe to their manufacturing and commercialprogress. American statesmen exhibited wisdom, moderation, andforesight in overcoming the obstacles to the material prosperityof the new Republic. 

When the administration of Washington was organized in 1789, thegovernment which he represented did not command a single dollar ofrevenue. They inherited a mountain of debt from the Revolutionarystruggle, they had no credit, and the only representative of valuewhich they controlled was the vast body of public land in the North-west Territory. But this was unavailable as a resource for presentneeds, and called for expenditure in the extensive surveys whichwere a prerequisite to sale and settlement. In addition thereforeto every other form of poverty, the new government was burdened inthe manner so expressively described as _land poor_, which impliesthe ownership of a large extent of real estate constantly callingfor heavy outlay, and yielding no revenue. The Federal Governmenthad one crying need, one imperative demand, --money!

An immediate system of taxation was therefore required, and thenewly organized Congress lost no time in proceeding to theconsideration of ways and means. As soon as a quorum of each branchof Congress was found to be present, the House gave its attentionto the pressing demand for money. They did not even wait for theinauguration of President Washington, but began nearly a monthbefore that important event to prepare a revenue bill which might, at the earliest moment, be ready for the Executive approval. Dutieson imports obviously afforded the readiest resource, and Congressdevoted itself with assiduous industry to the consideration of thatform of revenue. With the exception of an essential law directingthe form of oath to be taken by the Federal officers, the tariffAct was the first passed by the new government. It was enactedindeed two months in advance of the law creating a TreasuryDepartment, and providing for a Secretary thereof. The need ofmoney was indeed so urgent that provision was made for raising itby duties on imports before the appointment of a single officer ofthe Cabinet was authorized. Even a Secretary of State, whose firstduty it was to announce the organization of the government toforeign nations, was not nominated for a full month after the Actimposing duties had been passed. 

 THE TARIFF ENACTED BY FIRST CONGRESS. 

All the issues involved in the new Act were elaborately andintelligently debated. The first Congress contained a largeproportion of the men who had just before been engaged in framingthe Federal Constitution, and who were therefore fresh from thecouncils which had carefully considered and accurately measuredthe force of every provision of that great charter of government. It is therefore a fact of lasting importance that the first tarifflaw enacted under the Federal Government set forth its object inthe most succinct and explicit language. It opened, after theexcellent fashion of that day, with a stately preamble beginningwith the emphatic "whereas, " and declaring that "it is necessaryfor the support of government, for the discharge of the debts ofthe United States, _and for the encouragement and protection ofmanufactures_, that duties be laid on imported goods, wares, andmerchandise. " Among the men who agreed to that declaration weresome of the most eminent in our history. James Madison, then youngenough to add junior to his name, was the most conspicuous; andassociated with him were Richard Henry Lee, Theodorick Bland, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Rufus King, George Clymer, OliverEllsworth, Elias Boudinot, Fisher Ames, Elbridge Gerry, RogerSherman, Jonathan Trumbull, Lambert Cadwalader, Thomas Fitzsimons, the two Muhlenbergs, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Hugh Williamson, AbrahamBaldwin, Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, and many other leading men, bothfrom the North and the South. 

It is a circumstance of curious interest that nearly, if not quite, all the arguments used by the supporters and opponents of a protectivesystem were presented at that time and with a directness and abilitywhich have not been surpassed in any subsequent discussion. The"_ad valorem_" system of levying duties was maintained against"specific" rates in almost the same language employed in thediscussions of recent years. The "infant manufactures, " the needof the "fostering care of the government" for the protection of"home industry, " the advantages derived from "diversified pursuits, "the competition of "cheap labor in Europe, " were all rehearsed witha familiarity and ease which implied their previous and constantuse in the legislative halls of the different States before thepower to levy imposts was remitted to the jurisdiction of Congress. A picture of the industrial condition of the country at that daycan be inferred from the tariff bill first passed; and the manufacturesthat were deemed worthy of encouragement are clearly outlined inthe debate. Mr. Clymer of Pennsylvania asked for a protective dutyon steel, stating that a furnace in Philadelphia "had producedthree hundred tons in two years, and with a little encouragementwould supply enough for the consumption of the whole Union. " ThePennsylvania members at the same time strenuously opposed a dutyon coal which they wished to import as cheaply as possible to aidin the development of their iron ores. The manufacture of glasshad been started in Maryland, and the members from that Statesecured a duty on the foreign article after considerable discussion, and with the significant reservation, in deference to popularhabits, that "black quart-bottles" should be admitted free. 

Mr. Madison opposed a tax on cordage, and "questioned the proprietyof raising the price of any article that entered materially intothe structure of vessels, " making in effect the same argument onthat subject which has been repeated without improvement so frequentlyin later years. Indigo and tobacco, two special products of theSouth, were protected by prohibitory duties, while the raising ofcotton was encouraged by a duty of three cents per pound on theimported article. Mr. Burke of South Carolina said the culture ofcotton was contemplated on a large scale in the South, "if goodseed could be procured. " The manufacture of iron, wool, leather, paper, already in some degree developed, was stimulated by thebill. The fisheries were aided by a bounty on every barrel caught;and the navigation interest received a remarkable encouragement byproviding that "a discount of ten per cent on all duties imposedby this Act shall be allowed on such goods, wares, and merchandiseas shall be imported in vessels built in the United States, andwholly the property of a citizen or citizens thereof. " The billthroughout was an American measure, designed to promote Americaninterests; and as a first step in a wide field of legislation, itwas characterized in an eminent degree by wisdom, by moderation, and by a keen insight into the immediate and the distant future ofthe country. The ability which framed the Constitution was notgreater than that displayed by the first generation of Americanstatesmen who were called to legislate under its generous provisionsand its wise restrictions. 

These great statesmen proceeded in the light of facts which taughtthem that, though politically separated from the mother country, we were still in many ways dependent upon her, in as large a degreeas when we were Colonies, subject to her will and governed for heradvantage. The younger Pitt boasted that he had conquered theColonies as commercial dependencies, contributing more absolutelyand in larger degree to England's prosperity than before thepolitical connection was severed. He treated the States, afterthe close of the peace of 1783, with a haughty assumption ofsuperiority, if not indeed with contempt--not even condescendingto accredit a diplomatic representative to the country, though JohnAdams was in London as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinaryfrom the United States. English laws of protection under the Pittadministration were steadily framed against the development ofmanufactures and navigation in America, and the tendency when theFederal Constitution was adopted had been, in the planting Statesespecially, towards a species of commercial dependence which wasenabling England to absorb our trade. 

 TARIFF ACT APPROVED BY WASHINGTON. 

The first tariff Act was therefore in a certain sense a secondDeclaration of Independence; and by a coincidence which could nothave been more striking or more significant, it was approved byPresident Washington on the fourth day of July, 1789. Slow as werethe modes of communicating intelligence in those days, this Act ofCongress did, in a suggestive way, arouse the attention of bothcontinents. The words of the preamble were ominous. The dutieslevied were exceedingly moderate, scarcely any of them above fifteenper cent, the majority not higher than ten. But the beginning wasmade; and the English manufacturers and carriers saw that the powerto levy ten per cent. Could at any time levy a hundred per cent. If the interest of the new government should demand it. The separateStates had indeed possessed the power to levy imposts, but theyhad never exercised it in any comprehensive manner, and had usuallyadapted the rate of duty to English trade rather than to theprotection of manufacturing interests at home. The action of theFederal Government was a new departure, of portentous magnitude, and was so recognized at home and abroad. 

It was not the percentage which aroused and disturbed England. Itwas the power to levy the duty at all. In his famous speech onAmerican taxation in the House of Commons fifteen years before, Mr. Burke asserted that it was "not the weight of the duty, butthe weight of the preamble, which the Americans were unable andunwilling to bear. " The tax actually imposed was not oppressive, but the preamble implied the power to levy upon the Colonies whatevertax the British Government might deem expedient, and this led toresistance and to revolution. The force of the preamble was nowturned against Great Britain. She saw that the extent to whichthe principle of protective duties might be carried was entirelya matter of discretion with the young Republic whose people hadlately been her subjects and might now become her rivals. Theprinciple of protecting the manufactures and encouraging thenavigation of America had been distinctly proclaimed in the firstlaw enacted by the new government, and was thus made in a suggestiveand emphatic sense the very corner-stone of the republican edificewhich the patriots of the Revolution were aiming to construct. 

The opinions of Mr. Madison as thus shown in the first legislationby Congress are the more significant from the fact that he belongedin the Jeffersonian school, believed in the strictest constructionof granted power, was a zealous Republican in the partisan divisionsof the day, and was always opposed to the more liberal, or, as hewould regard them, the more latitudinarian views of the Federalparty. In regard to the protection and encouragement of manufacturesthere seemed to be no radical difference between parties in theearly period of the government. On that issue, to quote a phraseused on another occasion, "they were all Federalists and allRepublicans. " Mr. Hamilton's celebrated report on Manufactures, submitted in answer to a request from the House of Representativesof December, 1790, sustained and elaborated the views on whichCongress had already acted, and brought the whole influence of theExecutive Department to the support of a Protective Tariff. Up tothat period no minister of finance among the oldest and most advancedcountries of Europe had so ably discussed the principles on whichnational prosperity was based. The report has long been familiarto students of political economy, and has had, like all Mr. Hamilton'swork, a remarkable value and a singular application in the developmentsof subsequent years. 

 MR. HAMILTON'S PROTECTION VIEWS. 

Mr. Hamilton sustained the plan of encouraging home manufacturesby protective duties, even to the point in some instances of makingthose "duties equivalent to prohibition. " He did not contemplatea prohibitive duty as the means of encouraging a manufacture notalready domesticated, but declared it "only fit to be employed whena manufacture has made such a progress, and is in so many hands, as to insure a due competition and an adequate supply on reasonableterms. " This argument did not seem to follow the beaten path whichleads to the protection of "infant manufactures, " but rather aimedto secure the home market for the strong and well-developedenterprises. Mr. Hamilton did not turn back from the consequenceswhich his argument involved. He perceived its logical conclusionsand frankly accepted them. He considered "the monopoly of thedomestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy ofmanufacturing nations, " and declared that "a similar policy on thepart of the United States in every proper instance was dictated bythe principles of distributive justice, certainly by the duty ofendeavoring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity ofadvantages. " He avowed his belief that "the internal competitionwhich takes place, soon does away with every thing like monopoly, and by degrees reduces the price of the article to the _minimum_of a reasonable profit on the capital employed. This accords withthe reason of the thing and with experience. " He contended that"a reduction has in several instances immediately succeeded theestablishment of domestic manufacture. " But even if this resultshould not follow, he maintained that "in a national view a temporaryenhancement of price must always be well compensated by a permanentreduction of it. " The doctrine of protection, even with the enlargedexperience of subsequent years, has never been more succinctly ormore felicitously stated. 

Objections to the enforcement of the "protective" principle foundedon a lack of constitutional power were summarily dismissed by Mr. Hamilton as "having no good foundation. " He had been a member ofthe convention that formed the Constitution, and had given attentionbeyond any other member to the clauses relating to the collectionand appropriation of revenue. He said the "power to raise money"as embodied in the Constitution "is plenary and indefinite, " and"the objects for which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensivethan the payment of the public debts, the providing for the commondefense and the _general welfare_. " He gives the widest scope tothe phrase "general welfare, " and declares that "it is of necessityleft to the discretion of the national Legislature to pronounceupon the objects which concern the general welfare, and for whichunder that description an appropriation of money is requisite andproper. " Mr. Hamilton elaborates his argument on this head withconsummate power, and declares that "the only qualification" tothe power of appropriation under the phrase "general welfare" isthat the purpose for which the money is applied shall "be _general_, and not _local_, its operation extending in fact throughout theUnion, and not being confined to a particular spot. " The limitationsand hypercritical objections to the powers conferred by theConstitution, both in the raising and appropriating of money, originated in large part after the authors of that great charterhad passed away, and have been uniformly stimulated by classinterests which were not developed when the organic law was enacted. 

Some details of Mr. Hamilton's report are especially interestingin view of the subsequent development of manufacturing enterprises. "Iron works" he represents as "greatly increasing in the UnitedStates, " and so great is the demand that "iron furnished beforethe Revolution at an average of sixty-four dollars per ton" wasthen sold at "eighty. " Nails and spikes, made in large part byboys, needed further "protection, " as 1, 800, 000 pounds had beenimported the previous year. Iron was wholly made by "charcoal, "but there were several mines of "fossil coal" already "worked inVirginia, " and "a copious supply of it would be of great value tothe iron industry. " Respecting "cotton" Mr. Hamilton attached farmore consideration to its manufacture than to its culture. Hedistrusted the quality of that grown at home because so far fromthe equator, and he wished the new factories in Rhode Island andMassachusetts to have the best article at the cheapest possiblerate. To this end the repeal of the three-cent duty on cottonlevied the preceding year was "indispensable. " He argued that "notbeing, like hemp, an universal production of the country, cottonaffords less assurance of an adequate internal supply. " If theduty levied on glass should not prove sufficient inducement to itsmanufacture, he would stimulate it "by a direct bounty. "

Mr. Hamilton's conceptions of an enlarged plan of "protection"included not only "prohibitive duties, " but when necessary a systemof "bounties and premiums" in addition. He was earnestly opposedto "a capitation-tax, " and declared such levies as an income-taxto be "unavoidably hurtful to industry. " Indirect taxes wereobviously preferred by him whenever they were practicable. Indeedupon any other system of taxation he believed it would proveimpossible for the Republic of 1790 to endure the burden imposedupon the public treasury by the funding of the debt of the Revolution. More promptly than any other financier of that century he saw thatten dollars could be more easily collected by indirect tax thanone dollar by direct levy, and that he could thus avoid thoseburdensome exactions from the people which had proved so onerousin Europe, and which had just aided in precipitating France intobloody revolution. 

 THE WAR TARIFF ENACTED IN 1812. 

Important and radical additions to the revenue system promptlyfollowed Mr. Hamilton's recommendations. From that time onward, for a period of more than twenty years, additional tariff laws werepassed by each succeeding Congress, modifying and generally increasingthe rate of duties first imposed, and adding many new articles tothe dutiable list. When the war of 1812 was reached, a great buttemporary change was made in the tariff laws by increasing theentire list of duties one hundred per cent. --simply doubling therate in every case. Not content with this sweeping and wholesaleincrease of duty, the law provided an additional ten per cent. Uponall goods imported in foreign vessels, besides collecting anadditional tonnage-tax of one dollar and a half per ton on thevessel. Of course this was war-legislation, and the Act was toexpire within one year after a treaty of peace should be concludedwith Great Britain. With the experience of recent days before him, the reader does not need to be reminded that, under the stimulusof this extraordinary rate of duties, manufactures rapidly developedthroughout the country. Importations from England being absolutelystopped by reason of the war, and in large part excluded from othercountries by high duties, the American market was for the firsttime left substantially, or in large degree, to the Americanmanufacturers. 

With all the disadvantages which so sudden and so extreme a policyimposed on the people, the progress for the four years of theseextravagant and exceptional duties was very rapid, and undoubtedlyexerted a lasting influence on the industrial interests of theUnited States. But the policy was not one which commanded generalsupport. Other interests came forward in opposition. New Englandwas radically hostile to high duties, for the reason that theyseriously interfered with the shipping and commercial interest inwhich her people were largely engaged. The natural result moreoverwas a sharp re-action, in which the protective principle suffered. Soon after the Treaty of Ghent was signed, movements were made fora reduction of duties, and the famous tariff of 1816 was the result. 

In examining the debates on that important Act, it is worthy ofnotice that Mr. Clay, from an extreme Western State, was urging ahigh rate of duties on cotton fabrics, while his chief opponentwas Daniel Webster, then a representative from Massachusetts. Anadditional and still stranger feature of the debate is found whenMr. Calhoun, co-operating with Mr. Clay, replied to Mr. Webster'sfree-trade speech in an elaborate defense of the doctrine ofprotection to our manufactures. 

Mr. Calhoun spoke with enthusiasm, and gave an interesting _résumé_of the condition of the country as affected by the war with GreatBritain. He believed that the vital deficiency in our financialcondition was the lack of manufactures, and to supply that deficiencyhe was willing to extend the protecting arm of the government. "When our manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as theysoon will be under the fostering care of the government, we shallno longer experience these evils. The farmer will find a readymarket for his surplus products, and, what is almost of equalconsequence, a certain and cheap supply for all his wants. Hisprosperity will diffuse itself through every class in the community. "Not satisfied with this unqualified support of the protectivesystem, Mr. Calhoun supplemented it by declaring that "to giveperfection to this state of things, it will be necessary to add assoon as possible a system of internal improvements. " Mr. Webster'sopposition to protection was based on the fact that it tended todepress commerce and curtail the profits of the carrying-trade. 

The tariff of 1816 was termed "moderately protective, " but even inthat form it encountered the opposition of the commercial interest. It was followed in the country by severe depression in all departmentsof trade, not because the duties were not in themselves sufficientlyhigh, but from the fact that it followed the war tariff, and thechange was so great as to produce not only a re-action but arevolution in the financial condition of the country. All forcesof industry languished. Bankruptcy was wide-spread, and the distressbetween 1817 and 1824 was perhaps deeper and more general than atany other period of our history. There was no immigration offoreigners, and consequently no wealth from that source. Therewas no market for agricultural products, and the people weretherefore unable to indulge in liberal expenditure. Their smallsavings could be more profitably invested in foreign than in domesticgoods, and hence American manufactures received little patronage. The traditions of that period, as given by the generation thatlived through it, are sorrowful and depressing. The sacrifice ofgreat landed estates, worth many millions could they have beenpreserved for the heirs of the next generation, was a common featurein the general distress and desolation. The continuance of thiscondition of affairs had no small influence on the subsequentdivision of parties. It naturally led to a change in the financialsystem, and in 1824 a tariff Act was passed, materially enlargingthe scope of the Act of 1816. 

 THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF OF 1824. 

The Act of 1824 was avowedly protective in its character and wasadopted through the influence of Mr. Clay, then Speaker of theHouse of Representatives. His most efficient ally on the floorwas Mr. Buchanan of Pennsylvania who exerted himself vigorously inaid of the measure. Mr. Webster again appeared in the debate, arguing against the "obsolete and exploded notion of protection, "and carrying with him nearly the whole vote of Massachusetts inopposition. Mr. Clay was enabled to carry the entire Kentuckydelegation for the high protective tariff, and Mr. Calhoun's viewshaving meanwhile undergone a radical change, South Carolina wasfound to be unanimous in opposition, and cordially co-operatingwith Massachusetts in support of free-trade. The effect of thattariff was undoubtedly favorable to the general prosperity, andduring the administration of John Quincy Adams every materialinterest of the country improved. The result was that the supportersof the protective system, congratulating themselves upon the effectof the work of 1824, proceeded in 1828 to levy still higher duties. They applied the doctrine of protection to the raw materials ofthe country, the wool, the hemp, and all unmanufactured articleswhich by any possibility could meet with damaging competition fromabroad. 

It was indeed an era of high duties, of which, strange as it mayseem to the modern reader, Silas Wright of New York and JamesBuchanan of Pennsylvania appeared as the most strenuous defenders, and were personally opposed in debate by John Davis of Massachusettsand Peleg Sprague of Maine. To add to the entanglement of publicopinion, Mr. Webster passed over to the side of ultra-protectionand voted for the bill, finding himself in company with Martin VanBuren of New York, and Thomas H. Benton of Missouri. It was anextraordinary commingling of political elements, in which it isdifficult to find a line of partition logically consistent eitherwith geographical or political divisions. Mr. Webster carried withhim not more than two or three votes of the Massachusetts delegation. His colleague in the Senate, Nathaniel Silsbee, voted against him, and in the House such personal adherents as Edward Everett andIsaac C. Bates recorded themselves in the negative. There was agreat deal of what in modern phase would be called "fencing forposition" in the votes on this test question of the day. The namesof no less than five gentlemen who were afterwards Presidents ofthe United States were recorded in the yeas and nays on the passageof the bill in the two Houses, --Mr. Van Buren, General Harrison, John Tyler, in the Senate, and Mr. Polk and Mr. Buchanan in theHouse. 

There was a general feeling that the Act of 1828 marked a crisisin the history of tariff discussion, and that it would in some waylead to important results in the fate of political parties andpolitical leaders. Mr. Calhoun was this year elected Vice-Presidentof the United States, with General Jackson as President, and Mr. Van Buren was transferred from the Senate to the State Departmentas the head of Jackson's cabinet. When by his address and tact hehad turned the mind of the President against Calhoun as his successor, and fully ingratiated himself in executive favor, the quarrel beganwhich is elsewhere detailed at sufficient length. In this controversy, purely personal at the outset, springing from the clashing ambitionsof two aspiring men, the tariff of 1828, especially with the voteof Mr. Van Buren in favor of it, was made to play an importantpart. The quarrel rapidly culminated in Mr. Calhoun's resignationof the Vice-Presidency, his leadership of the Nullification contestin South Carolina, and his re-election to the Senate of the UnitedStates some time before the expiration of the Vice-Presidentialterm for which he had been chosen. The result was a reduction ofduties, first by the Act of July, 1832, and secondly by Mr. Clay'sfamous compromise Act of March 2, 1833, in which it was providedthat by a sliding-scale all the duties in excess of twenty percent. Should be abolished within a period of ten years. It wasthis Act which for the time calmed excitement in the South, broughtMr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay into kindly relations, and somewhatseparated Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, --at least producing one ofthose periods of estrangement which, throughout their public career, alternated with the cordial friendship they really entertained foreach other. 

 THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF OF 1842. 

During the operation of this Act, --which was really an abandonmentof the protective principle, --the financial crisis of 1837 cameupon the country, and a period of distress ensued, almost equal tothat which preceded the enactment of the tariff of 1824. Manypersons, still in active business, recall with something of horrorthe hardships and privations which were endured throughout thecountry from 1837 to 1842. The long-continued depression producedthe revolution against the Democratic party which ended in theoverthrow of Mr. Van Buren and the election of General Harrison asPresident of the United States in 1840. The Whig Congress thatcame into power at the same time, proceeded to enact the lawpopularly known as the tariff of 1842, which was strongly protectivein its character though not so extreme as the Act of 1828. Thevote in favor of the bill was not exclusively Whig, as some of theNorthern Democrats voted for it and some of the Southern Whigsagainst it. Conspicuous among the former were Mr. Buchanan ofPennsylvania and Mr. Wright of New York, who maintained a consistencywith their vote for the tariff of 1828. Conspicuous among SouthernWhigs against it were Berrien of Georgia, Clayton of Delaware, Mangum of North Carolina, Merrick of Maryland, and Rives of Virginia. The two men who above all others deserve honor for successfulmanagement of the bill were George Evans, the brilliant andaccomplished senator from Maine, and Thomas M. T. McKennan, formany years an able, upright, and popular representative fromPennsylvania. John Quincy Adams, in a public speech delivered in1843 in the town of Mr. McKennan's residence, ascribed to thatgentleman the chief credit of carrying the Protective Tariff Billthrough the House of Representatives. The vote showed, as alltariff bills before had, and as all since have shown, that thelocal interest of the constituency determines in large measure thevote of the representative; that planting sections grow more andmore towards free-trade and manufacturing sections more and moretowards protection. 

The friends of home industry have always referred with satisfactionto the effect of the tariff of 1842 as an explicit and undeniableproof of the value of protection. It raised the country from aslough of despond to happiness, cheerfulness, confidence. Itimparted to all sections a degree of prosperity which they had notknown since the repeal of the tariff of 1828. The most suggestiveproof of its strength and popularity was found in the contest of1844 between Mr. Polk and Mr. Clay, where the Democrats in thecritical Northern States assumed the advocacy of the tariff of 1842as loudly as the supporters of Mr. Clay. Other issues overshadowedthe tariff, which was really considered to be settled, and aPresident and Congress were chosen without any distinct knowledgeon the part of their constituents as to what their action might beupon this question. The popular mind had been engrossed with theannexation of Texas and with the dawn of the free-soil excitement;hence protection and free-trade were in many States scarcely debatedfrom lack of interest, and, in the States where interest prevailed, both parties took substantially the same side. 

A deception had however been practiced in the manufacturing Statesof the North, and when the administration of Mr. Polk was installed, the friends of protection were startled by the appointment of adetermined opponent of the tariff of 1842, as Secretary of theTreasury. Robert J. Walker was a senator from Mississippi whenthe Act was passed, and was bitterly opposed to it. He was a manof great originality, somewhat speculative in his views, and willingto experiment on questions of revenue to the point of rashness. He was not a believer in the doctrine of protection, was persuadedthat protective duties bore unjustly and severely upon the plantingsection with which he was identified; and he came to his officedetermined to overthrow the tariff Act, which he had been unableto defeat in the Senate. Mr. Walker was excessively ambitious tomake his term in the Treasury an era in the history of the country. He had a difficult task before him, --one from which a conservativeman would have shrunk. The tariff was undoubtedly producing avaluable revenue; and, as the administration of Mr. Polk was aboutto engage in war, revenue was what they most needed. Being aboutto enter upon a war, every dictate of prudence suggested thataggressive issues should not be multiplied in the country. ButMr. Walker was not Secretary of War or Secretary of State, and hewas unwilling to sit quietly down and collect the revenue under atariff imposed by a Whig Congress, against which he had voted, while Buchanan in directing our foreign relations, and Marcy inconducting a successful war, would far outstrip him in publicobservation and in acquiring the elements of popularity adapted tothe ambition which all three alike shared. 

Mr. Walker made an elaborate report on the question of revenue, and attacked the tariff of 1842 in a manner which might well betermed savage. He arraigned the manufacturers as enjoying unfairadvantages, --advantages held, as he endeavored to demonstrate, atthe expense and to the detriment of the agriculturist, the mechanic, the merchant, the ship-owner, the sailor, and indeed of almostevery industrial class. In reading Mr. Walker's report a third ofa century after it was made, one might imagine that the supportersof the tariff of 1842 were engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud, and that the manufacturers who profited by its duties were guiltyof some crime against the people. But extreme as were his declarationsand difficult as were the obstructions in his path, he was able tocarry his point. Mr. Buchanan, the head of the Cabinet, had votedfor the tariff of 1842, and Mr. Dallas, the Vice-President, hadsteadily and ably upheld the doctrine of protection when a memberof the Senate. It was the position of Buchanan and Dallas on thetariff that won the October election of 1844 for Francis R. Shunkfor governor of Pennsylvania, and thus assured the election of Mr. Polk. The administration of which Buchanan and Dallas were suchconspicuous and influential members could not forswear protectionand inflict a free-trade tariff on Pennsylvania, without apparentdishonor and the abandonment of that State to the Whigs. It wastherefore regarded not only as impracticable but as politicallyimpossible. 

 THE FREE-TRADE TARIFF OF 1846. 

It was soon ascertained however that Mr. Polk sympathized with Mr. Walker, and Mr. Buchanan was silenced and overridden. The free-trade tariff of 1846 was passed; and Mr. Dallas, who had beennominated because of his record as a protectionist, was subjectedto the humiliation of giving his casting vote as Vice-President infavor of a tariff which was execrated in Pennsylvania, and whichwas honestly believed to be inimical in the highest degree to theinterest of the American manufacturer and the American mechanic. The Act had no small influence in the overthrow of the Polkadministration at the elections for the next ensuing Congress, andin the defeat of General Cass for the Presidency in 1848. Assenator from Michigan, General Cass had voted for the bill, influencedthereto by his Southern associates, for whom he always did so much, and from whom he always received so little. Pennsylvania was atthat time really a Democratic State, but she punished General Cassfor his free-trade course by giving her electoral vote to Taylor. If she had given it to Cass he would have been chosen President. 

It was in connection with the tariff agitation of 1846 that SimonCameron originally obtained his strong hold upon the popular sympathyand support of Pennsylvania. He was a Democrat; had long beenconfidential adviser to Mr. Buchanan, and had supported Mr. Polk. But he was a believer in the doctrine of protection; and as he hadaided in carrying Pennsylvania by declaring himself a friend tothe tariff of 1842, he maintained his faith. When the Polkadministration was organized, a vacancy was created in the Senateby Mr. Buchanan's appointment as Secretary of State. George W. Woodward was the regular nominee of the Democratic party for theplace. But Cameron bolted, and with the aid of Whig votes waschosen senator. He resisted the passage of the tariff of 1846, stood firmly and consistently for the industrial interests of hisState, cultivated an alliance with the Whigs in the Senate, and bytheir aid thwarted all the attempts of the Polk administration tointerfere with his plans and purposes in Pennsylvania. The Presidentendeavored to heal Judge Woodward's wounds by placing him on thebench of the Supreme Court as the successor of the eminent HenryBaldwin. Cameron induced the Whigs to reject him, and then forcedthe administration to nominate Robert C. Grier whose appointmentwas personally acceptable and agreeable to him. In the successfultactics then employed by Cameron may be found the secret of hisremarkable career as a party manager in the field in which, for afull half-century, he was an active and indefatigable worker. 

The Whig victory of 1848 was not sufficiently decisive to warrantany attempt, even had there been desire, to change the tariff. General Taylor had been elected without subscribing to a platformor pledging himself to a specific measure, and he was therefore ina position to resist and reject appeals of the ordinary partisancharacter. Moreover the tariff of 1846 was yielding abundantrevenue, and the business of the country was in a flourishingcondition at the time his administration was organized. Moneybecame very abundant after the year 1849; large enterprises wereundertaken, speculation was prevalent, and for a considerable periodthe prosperity of the country was general and apparently genuine. After 1852 the Democrats had almost undisputed control of thegovernment, and had gradually become a free-trade party. Theprinciples embodied in the tariff of 1846 seemed for the time tobe so entirely vindicated and approved that resistance to it ceased, not only among the people but among the protective economists, andeven among the manufacturers to a large extent. So general wasthis acquiescence that in 1856 a protective tariff was not suggestedor even hinted by any one of the three parties which presentedPresidential candidates. 

 THE FREE-TRADE TARIFF OF 1857. 

It was not surprising therefore that with a plethoric condition ofthe National Treasury for two or three consecutive years, theDemocratic Congress, in the closing session of Pierce's administration, enacted what has since been known as the tariff of 1857. By thislaw the duties were placed lower then they had been at any timesince the war of 1812. The Act was well received by the people, and was indeed concurred in by a considerable proportion of theRepublican party. The Senate had a large Democratic majority, butin the House three parties divided the responsibility, --no one ofthem having an absolute majority. The Republicans had a pluralityand had chosen Mr. Banks Speaker, but the American party held thebalance of power in the House and on several of the leadingcommittees. Some prominent Republicans, however, remaining trueto their old Whig traditions, opposed the reduction of duties. Mr. Seward voted against it, but his colleague, Mr. Hamilton Fish, voted for it. Mr. Seward represented the protective tendencies ofthe country districts of New York, and Mr. Fish the free-tradetendencies of the city. Mr. Sumner and Mr. Wilson both voted forit, as did also Senator Allen of Rhode Island, the direct representativeof the manufacturers of that State. Mr. Bell of New Hampshirevoted for it, while Senators Collamer and Foote of Vermont votedagainst it. Mr. Fessenden did not oppose it, but his colleague, Mr. Nourse, voted against it. The Connecticut senators, Fosterand Toucey, one of each party, supported the measure. 

In the House, the New-England representatives generally voted forthe bill, but Mr. Morrill of Vermont opposed it. The Pennsylvaniadelegation, led by James H. Campbell and John Covode, did all intheir power to defeat it. The two Washburns, Colfax, and George G. Dunn headed a formidable opposition from the West. Humphrey Marshalland Samuel F. Swope of Kentucky were the only representatives fromslave States who voted in the negative; though in the Senate threeold and honored Whigs, John Bell of Tennessee, John B. Thompson ofKentucky, and Henry S. Geyer of Missouri maintained their ancientfaith and voted against lowering the duties. It was an extraordinarypolitical combination that brought the senators from Massachusettsand the senators from South Carolina, the representatives from NewEngland and the representatives from the cotton States, to supportthe same tariff bill, --a combination which had not before occurredsince the administration of Monroe. This singular coalitionportended one of two results: Either an entire and permanentacquiescence in the rule of free-trade, or an entire abrogation ofthat system, and the revival, with renewed strength, of the doctrineof protection. Which it should be was determined by the unfoldingof events not then foreseen, and the force of which it requiredyears to measure. 

The one excuse given for urging the passage of the Act of 1857 wasthat under the tariff of 1846 the revenues had become excessive, and the income of the government must be reduced. But it was soonfound to be a most expensive mode of reaching that end. The firstand most important result flowing from the new Act was a largeincrease in importations and a very heavy drain in consequence uponthe reserved specie of the country, to pay the balance which thereduced shipments of agricultural products failed to meet. In theautumn of 1857, half a year after the passage of the tariff Act, a disastrous financial panic swept over the country, prostratingfor the time all departments of business in about the same degree. The agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests werealike and equally involved. The distress for a time was severeand wide-spread. The stagnation which ensued was discouraging andlong continued, making the years from 1857 to 1860 extremely dulland dispiriting in business circles throughout the Union. Thecountry was not exhausted and depleted as it was after the panicof 1837, but the business community had no courage, energy wasparalyzed, and new enterprises were at a stand-still. 

It soon became evident that this condition of affairs would carrythe tariff questions once more into the political arena, as anactive issue between parties. Thus far, the new Republicanorganization had passively acquiesced in existing laws on thesubject; but the general distress caused great bodies of men, asis always the case, to look to the action of the Government forrelief. The Republicans found therefore a new ground for attackingthe Democracy, --holding them responsible for the financial depression, initiating a movement for returning to the principle and practiceof protection, and artfully identifying the struggle against slaverywith the efforts of the workingmen throughout the North to be freedfrom injurious competition with the cheapened labor of Europe. This phase of the question was presented with great force in certainStates, and the industrial classes, by a sort of instinct of self-preservation as it seemed to them, began to consolidate their votesin favor of the Republican party. They were made to see, by cleverand persuasive speakers, that the slave labor of the South and theill-paid labor of Europe were both hostile to the prosperity ofthe workingman in the free States of America, and that the Republicanparty was of necessity his friend, by its opposition to all theforms of labor which stood in the wy of his better remunerationand advancement. 

 REPUBLICAN PARTY FAVORS PROTECTION. 

The convention which nominated Mr. Lincoln met when the feelingagainst free-trade was growing, and in many States already deep-rooted. A majority of those who composed that convention hadinherited their political creed from the Whig party, and wereprofound believers in the protective teachings of Mr. Clay. Buta strong minority came from the radical school of Democrats, and, in joining the Republican party on the anti-slavery issue, hadretained their ancient creed on financial and industrial questions. Care was for that reason necessary in the introduction of new issuesand the imposition of new tests of party fellowship. The conventiontherefore avoided the use of the word "protection, " and was contentedwith the moderate declaration that "sound policy requires such anadjustment of imposts as will encourage the development of theindustrial interests of the whole country. " A more emphaticdeclaration might have provoked resistance from a minority of theconvention, and the friends of protection acted wisely in acceptingwhat was offered with unanimity, rather than continue the strugglefor a stronger creed which would have been morally weakened byparty division. They saw also that the mere form of expressionwas not important, so long as the convention was unanimous on whattheologians term the "substance of doctrine. " It was noted thatthe vast crowd which attended the convention cheered the tariffresolution as lustily as that which opposed the spread of slaveryinto free territory. From that hour the Republican party gravitatedsteadily and rapidly into the position of avowed advocacy of thedoctrine of protection. The national ticket which they presentedwas composed indeed of an original Whig protectionist and an originalDemocratic free-trader; but the drift of events, as will be seen, carried both alike into the new movement for a protective system. 

A review of the tariff legislation in the period between the warof 1812 and the political revolution of 1860 exhibits some suddenand extraordinary changes on the part of prominent political leadersin their relation to the question. The inconsistency involved ishowever more apparent than real. Perhaps it would be correct tosay that the inconsistency was justifiable in the eyes of thosewho found it necessary to be inconsistent. Mr. Webster was apersistent advocate of free-trade so long as Massachusetts was acommercial State. But when, by the operation of laws against theenactment of which he had in vain protested, Massachusetts becamea manufacturing State, Mr. Webster naturally and inevitably becamea protectionist. Mr. Calhoun began as a protectionist when hehoped for the diffusion and growth of manufactures throughout allsections alike. He became a free-trader when he realized that thedestiny of the South was to be purely agricultural, devoted toproducts whose market was not, in his judgment, to be enlarged bythe tariff, and whose production was enhanced in cost by itsoperation. Colonel Benton's change was similar to Mr. Calhoun's, though at a later period, and not so abrupt or so radical. Mr. VanBuren's shifting of position was that of a man eagerly seeking thecurrent of popular opinion, and ready to go with the majority ofhis party. Of all the great lights, but one burned steadily andclearly. Mr. Clay was always a protectionist, and, unlike Mr. VanBuren, he forced his party to go with him. But as a whole, therecord of tariff legislation, from the very origin of the government, is the record of enlightened selfishness; and enlightened selfishnessis the basis of much that is wisest in legislation. 

It is natural that both sides to the tariff controversy shouldendeavor to derive support for their principles from the experienceof the country. Nor can it be denied that each side can furnishmany arguments which apparently sustain its own views and theories. The difficulty in reaching a satisfactory and impartial conclusionarises from the inability or unwillingness of the disputants toagree upon a common basis of fact. If the premises could be candidlystated, there would be not trouble in finding a true conclusion. In the absence of an agreement as to the points established, it isthe part of fairness to give a succinct statement of the groundsmaintained by the two parties to the prolonged controversy, --groundswhich have not essentially changed in a century of legislation andpopular contention. 

It is maintained by free-traders that under the moderate tariffprevailing from the origin of the government to the war of 1812the country was prosperous, and manufactures were developing asrapidly as was desirable or healthful. Protectionists on the otherhand aver that the duty levied in 1789 was the first of uniformapplication throughout all the States, and that, regardless of itspercentage, its influence and effect were demonstrably protective;that it was the first barrier erected against the absolute commercialsupremacy of England, and that it effectually did its work inestablishing the foundation of the American system. In the absenceof that tariff, they maintain that England, under the influence ofactual free-trade, had monopolized our market and controlled ourindustries. Finally they declare that the free-traders yield thewhole case in acknowledging that the first tariff imparted animpetus to manufactures and to commercial independence whollyunknown while the States were under the Articles of Confederationand unable to levy uniform duties on imports. 

 COMPARISON OF REVENUE SYSTEMS. 

The free-traders point to the destructive effect of the war tariffof 1812, which unduly stimulated and then inevitably depressed thecountry. They assume this to be a pregnant illustration of a truth, otherwise logically deduced by them, as to the re-action sure tofollow an artificial stimulus given to any department of trade. The protectionists declining to defend the war duties as applicableto a normal condition, find in the too sudden dropping of war ratesthe mistake which precipitated the country into financial trouble. Depression, they say, would naturally have come; but it was hastenedand increased by the inconsiderate manner in which the duties werelowered in 1816. From that time onward the protectionists claimthat the experience of the country has favored their theories ofrevenue and financial administration. The country did not revive, or prosperity re-appear, until the protective tariff of 1824 wasenacted. The awakening of all branches of industry by that Actwas further promoted by the tariff of 1828, to which the protectionistspoint as the perfected wisdom of their school. Mr. Clay publiclyasserted that the severest depression he had witnessed in thecountry was during the seven years preceding the tariff of 1824, and that the highest prosperity was during the seven years followingthat Act. 

The free-traders affirm that the excitement in the South and thesectional resistance to the tariff of 1828 show the impossibilityof maintaining high duties. The protectionists reply that such anargument is begging the question, and is simply tantamount toadmitting that protection is valuable if it can be upheld. Theprotectionists point to the fact that their system was not abandonedin 1832 upon a fair consideration of its intrinsic merits, but asa peace-offering to those who were threatening the destruction ofthe government if the duties were not lowered. Many protectionistsbelieve that if Mr. Clay had been willing to give to General Jacksonthe glory of an absolute victory over the Nullifiers of SouthCarolina, the revenue system of the country would have been verydifferent. They think however that the temptation to settle thequestion by compromise instead of permitting Jackson to settle itby force was perhaps too strong to be resisted by one who had somany reasons for opposing and hating the President. 

A more reasonable view held by another school of protectionists isthat Mr. Clay did the wisest possible thing in withdrawing thetariff question from a controversy where it was complicated withso many other issues, --some of them bitter and personal. He justlyfeared that the protective principle might be irretrievably injuredin the collision thought to be impending. He believed moreoverthat the best protective lesson would be taught by permitting thefree-traders to enforce their theories for a season, trusting forpermanent triumph to the popular re-action certain to follow. There was nothing in the legislation to show that Mr. Clay or hisfollowers had in any degree abandoned or changed their faith inprotective duties of their confidence in the ultimate decision ofthe public judgment. The protectionists aver that the evils whichflowed from the free-trade tariff of 1833, thus forced on thecountry by extraneous considerations, were incalculably great, andnegatively established the value of the tariff of 1828 which hadbeen so unfairly destroyed. They maintain that it broke down themanufacturing interest, led to excessive importations, threw thebalance of trade heavily against us, drained us of our specie, anddirectly led to the financial disasters of 1837 and the yearsensuing. They further declare that this distressing situation wasnot relieved until the protective tariff of 1842 was passed, andthat thenceforward, for the four years in which that Act was allowedto remain in force, the country enjoyed general prosperity, --aprosperity so marked and wide-spread that the opposing party hadnot dared to make an issue against the tariff in States where therewas large investment in manufacturing. 

The free-traders consider the tariff of 1846 to be a conclusiveproof the beneficial effect of low duties. They challenge acomparison of the years of its operation, between 1846 and 1857, with any other equal period in the history of the country. Manufacturing, they say, was not forced by a hot-house process toproduce high-priced goods for popular consumption, but was graduallyencouraged and developed on a healthful and self-sustaining basis, not to be shaken as a reed in the wind by every change in thefinancial world. Commerce, as they point out, made great advances, and our carrying trade grew so rapidly that in ten years from theday the tariff of 1846 was passed our tonnage exceeded the tonnageof England. The free-traders refer with especial emphasis to whatthe term the symmetrical development of all the great interests ofthe country under this liberal tariff. Manufactures were notstimulated at the expense of the commercial interest. Both weredeveloped in harmony, while agriculture, the indispensable basisof all, was never more flourishing. The farmers and planters atno other period of our history were in receipt of such good prices, steadily paid to them in gold coin, for their surplus product, which they could send to the domestic market over our own railwaysand to the foreign market in our own ships. 

 COMPARISON OF REVENUE SYSTEMS. 

Assertions as to the progress of manufactures in the period underdiscussion are denied by the protectionists. While admitting thegeneral correctness of the free-trader's statements as to theprosperous condition of the country, they call attention to thefact that directly after the enactment of the tariff of 1846 thegreat famine occurred in Ireland, followed in the ensuing years byshort crops in Europe. The prosperity which came to the Americanagriculturist was therefore from causes beyond the sea and not athome, --causes which were transient, indeed almost accidental. Moreover an exceptional condition of affairs existed in the UnitedStates in consequence of our large acquisition of territory fromMexico at the close of the war and the subsequent and almostimmediate discovery of gold in California. A new and extendedfield of trade was thus opened in which we had the monopoly, andan enormous surplus of money was speedily created from the productsof the rich mines on the Pacific coast. At the same time Europewas in convulsion from the revolutions of 1848, and production wasmaterially hindered over a large part of the Continent. Thisdisturbance had scarcely subsided when three leading nations ofEurope, England, France, and Russia, engaged in the wasteful andexpensive war of the Crimea. This struggle began in 1853 and endedin 1856, and during those years it increased consumption anddecreased production abroad, and totally closed the grain-fieldsof Russia from any competition with the United States. 

The protectionists therefore hold that the boasted prosperity ofthe country under the tariff of 1846 was abnormal in origin and incharacter. It depended upon a series of events exceptional at homeand even more exceptional abroad, --events which by the doctrine ofprobabilities would not be repeated for centuries. When peace wasrestored in Europe, when foreign looms and forges were set goingwith renewed strength, when Russia resumed her export of wheat, and when at home the output of the gold-mines suddenly decreased, the country was thrown into distress, followed by a panic and bylong years of depression. The protectionists maintain that from1846 to 1857 the United States would have enjoyed prosperity underany form of tariff, but that the moment the exceptional conditionsin Europe and in America came to an end, the country was plungedheadlong into a disaster from which the conservative force of aprotective tariff would in large part have saved it. The protectionistsclaim moreover that in these averments they are not wise after thefact. They show a constant series of arguments and warnings fromleading teachers of their economic school, especially from HoraceGreeley and Henry C. Carey, accurately foretelling the disastrousresults which occurred at the height of what was assumed to be oursolid and enduring prosperity as a nation. These able writers wereprophets of adversity, and the inheritors of their faith claim thattheir predictions were startlingly verified. 

The free-traders, as an answer to this arraignment of their tariffpolicy, seek to charge responsibility for the financial disastersto the hasty and inconsiderate changes made in the tariff in 1857, for which both parties were in large degree if not indeed equallyanswerable. The protectionists will not admit the plea, and insistthat the cause was totally inadequate to the effect, consideringthe few months the new tariff had been in operation. They admitthat the low scale of duties in the new tariff perhaps may haveadded to the distress, by the very rapid increase of importationswhich it invited; but they declare that its period of operationwas entirely too brief to create a result so decided, if all theelements of disaster had not been in existence, and in rapiddevelopment, at the time the Act was passed. The tariff of 1846therefore under which there had been a very high degree of prosperity, was, in the judgment of the protectionists, successfully impeached, and a profound impression in consequence made on the public mindin favor of higher duties. 

 PROTECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA. 

The question of the tariff was of especial significance and influencein Pennsylvania. Important in that State, it became importanteverywhere. Pennsylvania had been continuously and tenaciouslyheld by the Democratic party. In the old political divisions shehad followed Jefferson and opposed Adams. In the new divisionsshe had followed Jackson and opposed Clay. She was Republican asagainst the Federalists, she was Democratic as against the Whigs. From the election of Jackson in 1828 to the year 1860, --a periodthat measured the lifetime of a generation, --she had, with veryfew exceptions, sustained the Democratic party. Joseph Ritner waselected governor by the Whigs in 1835, in consequence of Democraticdivisions. Harrison, in the political convulsion of 1840, triumphedin the State by the slight majority of three hundred. Taylorreceived her electoral vote, partly in consequence of dissensionsbetween Cass and Van Buren, and partly in consequence of the free-trade opinions of Cass. In 1854 James Pollock was chosen governorby the sudden uprising and astounding development of the Native-American excitement as organized by the _Know-Nothing_ party. Therepeal of the Missouri Compromise aided the canvass of Pollock, but that alone would not have loosened the strong moorings of thePennsylvania Democracy. Mr. Buchanan recovered the State two yearsafterwards, and would have held it firmly in his grasp but for thefinancial revulsion and the awakened demand for a protective tariff. 

Dissociated from the question of protection, opposition to theextension of slavery was a weak issue in Pennsylvania. This wasconclusively shown in the gubernatorial contest of 1857, when DavidWilmot, the personal embodiment of Free-soil principles, was theRepublican candidate for governor. Besides the general strengthof the Territorial issue, Mr. Wilmot had the advantage of all theanti-slavery zeal which was aroused by the announcement of the DredScott decision, with the censurable connection therewith of PresidentBuchanan. Thus an angry element was superadded for personalprejudice and effective agitation. Yet Mr. Wilmot was disastrouslybeaten by the Democratic candidate, Governor Parker, the adversemajority reaching indeed tens of thousands. 

The crushing Republican defeat received in the person of Wilmotoccurred on the very eve of the financial distress of 1857. TheDemocratic canvass had been made while there was yet no suspicionof impending panic and revulsion, --made indeed with constant boastsof the general prosperity and with constant ascription of thatprosperity to the well-defined and long-continued policy of theDemocratic party. From that time the Democratic party becameembarrassed in Pennsylvania. With a tariff of their own making, with a President of their own choice, with both branches of Congressand every department of the government under their control, aserious disaster had come upon the country. The promises ofDemocratic leaders had failed, their predictions had been falsified, and as a consequence their strength was shattered. The Republicansof Pennsylvania, seeing their advantage, pressed it by renewed andurgent demands for a protective tariff. On the other issues ofthe party they had been hopelessly beaten, but the moment thehostility to slave-labor in the Territories became identified withprotected labor in Pennsylvania, the party was inspired with newhopes, received indeed a new life. 

It was this condition of public opinion in Pennsylvania which madethe recognition of the protective system so essential in the Chicagoplatform of 1860. It was to that recognition that Mr. Lincoln inthe end owed his election. The memorable victory of Andrew G. Curtin, when he was chosen governor by a majority of thirty-twothousand, was largely due to his able and persuasive presentationof the tariff question, and to his effective appeals to the laboring-men in the coal and iron sections of the State. But for this issuethere was in fact no reason why Curtin should have been strongerin 1860 than Wilmot was in 1857. Indeed, but for that issue hemust have been weaker. The agitation over the repeal of the MissouriCompromise had somewhat subsided with the lapse of years: the free-State victory in Kansas was acknowledged and that angry issueremoved; while the Dred Scott decision, failing to arouse popularresentment at the time it was pronounced, could hardly be effectivefor an aggressive canvass three years later. If Governor Curtincould have presented no other issue to the voters of Pennsylvania, he would undoubtedly have shared the fate which Wilmot met when hehad these anti-slavery questions as his only platform. GovernorCurtin gave a far greater proportion of his time to the discussionof the tariff and financial issues than to all others combined, and he carried Pennsylvania because a majority of her voters believedthat the Democratic party tended to free-trade, and that theRepublican party would espouse and maintain the cause of protection. 

 PENNSYLVANIA'S INFLUENCE IN 1860. 

Had the Republicans failed to carry Pennsylvania, there can be nodoubt that Mr. Lincoln would have been defeated. An adverse resultin Pennsylvania in October would certainly have involved the lossof Indiana in November, besides California and Oregon and the fourvotes in New Jersey. The crisis of the national campaign wastherefore reached in the triumph of Governor Curtin in the Stateelection which preceded by four weeks the direct choice of President. It would be difficult to compute the possible demoralization inthe Republican ranks if Pennsylvania had been lost in October. The division among the Democrats was a fruitful source of encouragementand strength to the Republicans, but would probably have disappearedwith the positive assurance of success in the national struggle. Whether in the end Douglas or Breckinridge would have been chosenPresident is matter of speculation, but it is certain that Mr. Lincoln would have been defeated. The October election of Pennsylvaniawas for so long a period an unerring index to the result of thecontest for the Presidency, that a feeling almost akin to superstitionwas connected with it. Whichever party carried it was sure, inthe popular judgment, to elect the President. It foretold thecrushing defeat of John Quincy Adams in 1828; it heralded thedisaster to Mr. Clay in 1844; it foredoomed General Cass in 1848. The Republicans, having elected their candidate for governor in1854 by a large majority, confidently expected to carry the Stateagainst Mr. Buchanan in 1856. But the Democratic party prevailedin the October election, and the supporters of Frémont at oncerecognized the hopelessness of their cause. The triumph of GovernorCurtin was the sure precursor of Mr. Lincoln's election, and thatvery fact added immeasurably to his popular strength in the closingmonth of the prolonged and exciting struggle. 

In reviewing the agencies therefore which precipitated the politicalrevolution of 1860, large consideration must be given to theinfluence of the movement for Protection. To hundreds of thousandsof voters who took part in that memorable contest, the tariff wasnot even mentioned. Indeed this is probably the fact with respectto the majority of those who cast their suffrages for Mr. Lincoln. It is none the less true that these hundreds of thousands of ballots, cast in aid of free territory and as a general defiance to theaggressions of the pro-slavery leaders of the South, would havebeen utterly ineffectual if the central and critical contest inPennsylvania had not resulted in a victory for the Republicans inOctober. The tariff therefore had a controlling influence not onlyin deciding the contest for political supremacy but in that moremomentous struggle which was to involve the fate of the Union. Ithad obtained a stronger hold on the Republican party than even theleaders of that organization were aware, and it was destined to alarger influence upon popular opinion than the most sagacious couldforesee. 

In the foregoing summary of legislation upon the tariff, the termsFree-trade and Protection are used in their ordinary acceptationin this country, --not as accurately defining the difference inrevenue theories, but as indicating the rival policies which haveso long divided political parties. Strictly speaking, there hasnever been a proposition by any party in the United States for theadoption of free-trade. To be entirely free, trade must encounterno obstruction in the way of tax, either upon export or import. In that sense no nation has ever enjoyed free-trade. Ascontradistinguished from the theory of protection, England hasrealized freedom of trade by taxing only that class of importswhich meet no competition in home production, thus excluding allpretense of favor or advantage to any of her domestic industries. England came to this policy after having clogged and embarrassedtrade for a long period by the most unreasonable and tyrannicalrestrictions, ruthlessly enforced, without regard to the interestsor even the rights of others. She had more than four hundred Actsof Parliament, regulating the tax on imports, under the olddesignations of "tonnage and poundage, " adjusted, as the phraseindicates, to heavy and light commodities. Beyond these, she hada cumbersome system of laws regulating and in many cases prohibitingthe exportation of articles which might teach to other nations theskill by which she had herself so marvelously prospered. 

When by long experiment and persistent effort England had carriedher fabrics to perfection; when by the large accumulation of wealthand the force of reserved capital she could command facilitieswhich poorer nations could not rival; when by the talent of herinventors, developed under the stimulus of large reward, she hadsurpassed all other countries in the magnitude and effectivenessof her machinery, she proclaimed free-trade and persuasively urgedit upon all lands with which she had commercial intercourse. Maintaining the most arbitrary and most complicated system ofprotection so long as her statesmen considered that policyadvantageous, she resorted to free-trade only when she felt ableto invade the domestic markets of other countries and undersellthe fabrics produced by struggling artisans who were sustained byweaker capital and by less advanced skill. So long as there wasdanger that her own marts might be invaded, and the products ofher looms and forges undersold at home, she rigidly excluded thecompeting fabric and held her own market for her own wares. 

 FREE-TRADE POLICY OF ENGLAND. 

England was however neither consistent nor candid in her advocacyand establishment of free-trade. She did not apply it to alldepartments of her enterprise, but only to those in which she feltconfident that she could defy competition. Long after the triumphof free-trade in manufactures, as proclaimed in 1846, Englandcontinued to violate every principle of her own creed in theprotection she extended to her navigation interests. She hadnothing to fear from the United States in the domain of manufacturers, and she therefore asked us to give her the unrestricted benefit ofour markets in exchange for a similar privilege which she offeredto us in her markets. But on the sea we were steadily gaining uponher, and in 1850-55 were nearly equal to her in aggregate tonnage. We could build wooden vessels at less cost than England and ourships excelled hers in speed. When steam began to compete withsail she saw her advantage. She could build engines at less costthan we, and when, soon afterward, her ship-builders began toconstruct the entire steamer of iron, her advantages became evidentto the whole world. 

England was not content however with the superiority which thesecircumstances gave to her. She did not wait for her own theory ofFree-trade to work out its legitimate results, but forthwithstimulated the growth of her steam marine by the most enormousbounties ever paid by any nation to any enterprise. To a singleline of steamers running alternate weeks from Liverpool to Bostonand New York, she paid nine hundred thousand dollars annually, andcontinued to pay at this extravagant rate for at least twenty years. In all channels of trade where steam could be employed she paidlavish subsidies, and literally destroyed fair competition, andcreated for herself a practical monopoly in the building of ironsteamers, and a superior share in the ocean traffic of the world. But every step she took in the development of her steam marine bythe payment of bounty, was in flat contradiction of the creed whichshe was at the same time advocating in those departments of tradewhere she could conquer her competitors without bounty. 

With her superiority in navigation attained and made secure throughthe instrumentality of subsidies, England could afford to withdrawthem. Her ships no longer needed them. Thereupon, with a promptnesswhich would be amusing if it did not have so serious a side forAmerica, she proceeded to inveigh through all her organs of publicopinion against the discarded and condemned policy of grantingsubsidies to ocean steamers. Her course in effect is an exactrepetition of that in regard to protection of manufactures, but asit is exhibited before a new generation, the inconsistency is notso readily apprehended nor so keenly appreciated as it should beon this side of the Atlantic. Even now there is good reason forbelieving that many lines of English steamers, in their effort toseize the trade to the exclusion of rivals, are paid such extravagantrates for the carrying of letters as practically to amount to abounty, thus confirming to the present day (1884) the fact that nonation has ever been so persistently and so jealously protectivein her policy as England so long as the stimulus of protection isneeded to give her the command of trade. What is true of Englandis true in greater or less degree of all other European nations. They have each in turn regulated the adoption of free-trade by theratio of their progress towards the point where they could overcomecompetition. In all those departments of trade where competitioncould overcome them, they have been quick to interpose protectivemeasures for the benefit of their own people. 

The trade policy of the United States at the foundation of thegovernment had features of enlightened liberality which were unknownin any other country of the world. The new government was indeedas far in advance of European nations in the proper conception ofliberal commerce as it was on questions relating to the characterof the African slave-trade. The colonists had experienced theoppression of the English laws which prohibited export from themother country of the very articles which might advance theirmaterial interest and improve their social condition. They nowhad the opportunity, as citizens of a free Republic, to show thegenerous breadth of their statesmanship, and they did so by providingin their Constitution, that Congress should never possess the powerto levy "a tax or duty on articles exported from any State. "

At the same time trade was left absolutely free between all theStates of the Union, no one of them being permitted to levy anytax on exports or imports beyond what might be necessary for itsinspection laws. Still further to enforce this needful provision, the power to regulate commerce between the States was given to theGeneral Government. The effect of these provisions was to insureto the United States a freedom of trade beyond that enjoyed by anyother nation. Fifty-five millions of American people (in 1884), over an area nearly as large as the entire continent of Europe, carry on their exchanges by ocean, by lake, by river, by rail, without the exactions of the tax-gatherer, without the detentionof the custom house, without even the recognition of State lines. In these great channels, the domestic exchanges represent an annualvalue perhaps twenty-five times as great as the total of exportsand imports. It is the enjoyment of free-trade and protection atthe same time which has contributed to the unexampled developmentand marvelous prosperity of the United States. 

 OPERATION OF PROTECTIVE LAWS. 

The essential question which has grown up between political partiesin the United States respecting our foreign trade, is whether aduty should be laid upon any import for the direct object ofprotecting and encouraging the manufacture of the same article athome. The party opposed to this theory does not advocate theadmission of the article free, but insists upon such rate of dutyas will produce the largest revenue and at the same time affordwhat is termed "incidental protection. " The advocates of actualfree-trade according to the policy of England--taxing only thosearticles which are not produced at home--are few in number, andare principally confined to _doctrinaires_. The instincts of themasses of both parties are against them. But the nominal free-trader finds it very difficult to unite the largest revenue fromany article with "incidental protection" to the competing productat home. If the duty be so arranged as to produce the greatestamount of revenue, it must be placed at that point where the foreignarticle is able to undersell the domestic article and thus commandthe market to the exclusion of competition. This result goes beyondwhat the so-called American free-trader intends in practice, butnot beyond what he implies in theory. 

The American protectionist does not seek to evade the legitimateresults of his theory. He starts with the proposition that whateveris manufactured at home gives work and wages to our own people, and that if they duty is even put so high as to prohibit the importof the foreign article, the competition of home producers will, according to the doctrine of Mr. Hamilton, rapidly reduce the priceto the consumer. He gives numerous illustrations of articles whichunder the influence of home competition have fallen in price belowthe point at which the foreign article was furnished when therewas no protection. The free-trader replies that the fall in pricehas been still greater in the foreign market, and the protectionistrejoins that the reduction was made to compete with the Americanproduct, and that the former price would probably have been maintainedso long as the importer had the monopoly of our market. Thus ourprotective tariff reduced the price in both countries. This hasnotably been the result with respect to steel rails, the productionof which in America has reached a magnitude surpassing that ofEngland. Meanwhile rails have largely fallen in price to theconsumer, the home manufacture has disbursed countless millions ofmoney among American laborers, and has added largely to our industrialindependence and to the wealth of the country. 

While many fabrics have fallen to as low a price in the UnitedStates as elsewhere, it is not to be denied that articles of clothingand household use, metals and machinery, are on an average higherthan in Europe. The difference is due in large degree to the wagespaid to labor, and thus the question of reducing the tariff carrieswith it the very serious problem of a reduction in the pay of theartisan and the operative. This involves so many grave considerationsthat no party is prepared to advocate it openly. Free-traders donot, and apparently dare not, face the plain truth--which is thatthe lowest priced fabric means the lowest priced labor. On thispoint protectionists are more frank than their opponents; theyrealize that it constitutes indeed the most impregnable defense oftheir school. Free-traders have at times attempted to deny thetruth of the statement; but every impartial investigation thus farhas conclusively proved that labor is better paid, and the averagecondition of the laboring man more comfortable, in the United Statesthan in any European country. 

An adjustment of the protective duty to the point which representsthe average difference between wages of labor in Europe and inAmerica, will, in the judgment of protectionists, always proveimpracticable. The difference cannot be regulated by a scale ofaverages because it is constantly subject to arbitrary changes. If the duty be adjusted on that basis for any given date, a reductionof wages would at once be enforced abroad, and the Americanmanufacturer would in consequence be driven to the desperate choiceof surrendering the home market or reducing the pay of workmen. The theory of protection is not answered, nor can its realizationto attained by any such device. Protection, in the perfection ofits design as described by Mr. Hamilton, does not invite competitionfrom abroad, but is based on the controlling principle thatcompetition at home will always prevent monopoly on the part ofthe capitalist, assure good wages to the laborer, and defend theconsumer against the evils of extortion. 

 TENDENCY OF OVER-PRODUCTION. 

An argument much relied upon and strongly presented by the advocatesof free-trade is the alleged tendency to over-production of protectedarticles, followed uniformly by seasons of depression and at certainintervals by financial panic and wide-spread distress. Theseresults are unhappily too familiar in the United States, but theprotectionists deny that the cause is correctly given. They averindeed that a glut of manufactured articles is more frequently seenin England than in the United States, thus proving directly thereverse of the conclusion assumed by the free-traders, and establishingthe conservative and restraining power of a protective tariff. The protectionists direct attention to the fact that the firstthree instances in our history in which financial panic and prolongeddepression fell upon the country, followed the repeal of protectivetariffs and the substitution of mere revenue duties, --the depressionof 1819-24, that of 1837-42, and that of 1857-61. They directfurther attention to the complementary fact that, in each of thesecases, financial prosperity was regained through the agency of aprotective tariff, the operation of which was prompt and beneficent. 

On the other hand the panic of 1873 and the depression which lasteduntil 1879 undoubtedly occurred after a protective tariff had beenfor a long time in operation. Free-traders naturally make much ofthis circumstance. Protectionists, however, with confidence andwith strong array of argument, make answer that the panic of 1873was due to causes wholly unconnected with revenue systems, --thatit was the legitimate and the inevitable outgrowth of an exhaustingwar, a vitiated and redundant currency, and a long period of recklessspeculation directly induced by these conditions. They aver thatno system of revenue could have prevented the catastrophe. Theymaintain however that by the influence of a protective tariff thecrisis was long postponed; that under the reign of free-trade itwould have promptly followed the return of peace when the countrywas ill able to endure it. They claim that the influence ofprotection would have put off the re-action still longer if therebuilding of Chicago and Boston, after the fires of 1871 and 1872, had not enforced a sudden withdrawal of $250, 000, 000 of ready moneyfrom the ordinary channels of trade to repair the loss which thesecrushing disasters precipitated. 

The assailants of protection apparently overlook the fact thatexcessive production is due, both in England and in America, tocauses beyond the operation of duties either high or low. No causeis more potent than the prodigious capacity of machinery set inmotion by the agency of steam. It is asserted by an intelligenteconomist that, if performed by hand, the work done by machineryin Great Britain would require the labor of seven hundred millionsof men, --a far larger number of adults than inhabit the globe. Itis not strange that, with this vast enginery, the power to producehas a constant tendency to outrun the power to consume. Protectionistsfind in this a conclusive argument against surrendering the domesticmarket of the United States to the control of British capitalists, whose power of production has no apparent limit. When the harmoniousadjustment of international trade shall ultimately be establishedby "the Parliament of man" in "the Federation of the world, " thepower of production and the power of consumption will properlybalance each other; but in traversing the long road and enduringthe painful process by which that end shall be reached, theprotectionist claims that his theory of revenue preserves the newernations from being devoured by the older, and offers to human labora shield against the exactions of capital. 

CHAPTER X. 

Presidential Election of 1860. --The Electoral and Popular Vote. --Wide Divergence between the Two. --Mr. Lincoln has a Large Majorityof Electors. --In a Minority of 1, 000, 000 on Popular Vote. --Beginningof Secession. --Rash Course of South Carolina. --Reluctance on thePart of Many Southern States. --Unfortunate Meeting of South-CarolinaLegislature. --Hasty Action of South-Carolina Convention. --The Word"Ordinance. "--Meeting of Southern Senators in Washington to promoteSecession. --Unwillingness in the South to submit the Question toPopular Vote. --Georgia not eager to Secede. --Action of Other States. --Meeting of Congress in December, 1860. --Position of Mr. Buchanan. --His Attachment to the Union as a Pennsylvanian. --Sinister Influencesin his Cabinet. --His Evil Message to Congress. --Analysis of theMessage. --Its Position destructive to the Union. --The President'sPosition Illogical and Untenable. --Full of Contradictions. --Extremistsof the South approve the Message. --Demoralizing Effect of theMessage in the North and in the South. --General Cass resigns fromState Department. --Judge Black succeeds him. --Character of JudgeBlack. --Secretaries Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson. --Their CensurableConduct in the Cabinet. --Their Resignation. --Re-organization ofCabinet. --Dix, Holt, Stanton. --Close of Mr. Buchanan's Administration. --Change in the President's Course. --The New Influences. --Analysisof the President's Course. --There were two Mr. Buchanans. --Personaland Public Character of Mr. Buchanan. 

The winter following the election of Mr. Lincoln was filled withdeplorable events. In the whole history of the American people, there is no epoch which recalls so much that is worthy of regretand so little that gratifies pride. The result of the electionwas unfortunate in the wide divergence between the vote which Mr. Lincoln received in the electoral colleges and the vote which hereceived at the polls. In the electoral colleges he had an aggregateof 180. His opponents, united, had but 123. Of the popular vote, Lincoln received 1, 866, 452; Douglas, 1, 291, 547; Breckinridge, 850, 082; Bell, 646, 124. Mr. Lincoln's vote was wholly from thefree States, except some 26, 000 cast for him in the five borderslave States. In the other slave States his name was not presentedas a candidate. Mr. Douglas received in the South about 163, 000votes. In the North the votes cast distinctively for the Breckinridgeelectoral ticket were less than 100, 000, and distinctively for theBell electoral ticket about 80, 000. 

It was thus manifest that the two Northern Presidential candidates, Lincoln and Douglas, had absorbed almost the entire vote in thefree States, and the two Southern Presidential candidates, Breckinridgeand Bell, had absorbed almost the entire vote in the slave States. The Northern candidate received popular support in the South inabout the same degree that the Southern candidate received popularsupport in the North. In truth as well as in appearance it was asectional contest in which the North supported Northern candidates, and the South supported Southern candidates. It was the first timein the history of the government in which the President was chosenwithout electoral votes from both the free and the slave States. This result was undoubtedly a source of weakness to Mr. Lincoln, --weakness made more apparent by his signal failure to obtain apopular majority. He had a large plurality, but the combined voteof his opponents was nearly a million greater than the vote whichhe received. 

The time had now come when the Southern Disunionists were to beput to the test. The event had happened which they had declaredin advance to be cause of separation. It was perhaps the beliefthat their courage and determination were challenged, which forcedthem to action. Having so often pledged themselves not to endurethe election of an anti-slavery President, they were now persuadedthat, if they quietly submitted, they would thereby accept aninferior position in the government. This assumed obligation ofconsistency stimulated them to rash action; for upon everyconsideration of prudence and wise forecast, they would have quietlyaccepted a result which they acknowledged to be in strict accordancewith the Constitution. The South was enjoying exceptional prosperity. The advance of the slave States in wealth was more rapid then atany other period of their history. Their staple products commandedhigh prices and were continually growing in amount to meet thedemands of a market which represented the wants of the civilizedworld. In the decade between 1850 and 1860 the wealth of the Southhad increased three thousand millions of dollars, and this not froman overvalution of slaves, but from increased cultivation of land, the extension of railways, and all the aids and appliances of vastagricultural enterprises. Georgia alone had increased in wealthover three hundred millions of dollars, no small proportion ofwhich was from commercial and manufacturing ventures that had provedextremely profitable. There was never a community of the face ofthe globe whose condition so little justified revolution as thatof the slave States in the year 1860. Indeed, it was a sense ofstrength born of exceptional prosperity which led them to theirrash adventure of war. 

 THE FIRST EFFORT AT SECESSION. 

It would however be an injustice to the People of the South to saythat in November, 1860, they desired, unanimously, or by a majority, or on the part of any considerable minority, to engage in a schemeof violent resistance to the National authority. The slave-holderswere in the main peacefully disposed, and contented with thesituation. But slavery as an economical institution and slaveryas a political force were quite distinct. Those who viewed it andused it merely as a system of labor, naturally desired peace anddreaded commotion. Those who used it as a political engine forthe consolidation of political power had views and ambitionsinconsistent with the plans and hopes of law-abiding citizens. Itwas only by strenuous effort on the part of the latter class thatan apparent majority of the Southern people committed themselvesto the desperate design of destroying the National Government. 

The first effort at secession was made, as might have been expected, by South Carolina. She did not wait for the actual result of theelection, but early in October, on the assumption of Lincoln'ssuccess, began a correspondence with the other Cotton States. Thegeneral tenor of the responses did not indicate a decided wish orpurpose to separate from the Union. North Carolina was positivelyunwilling to take any hasty step. Louisiana, evidently rememberingthe importance and value of the Mississippi River and of its numeroustributaries to her commercial prosperity, expressed an utterdisinclination to separate from the North-West. Georgia was notready to make resistance, and at most advocated some form ofretaliatory legislation. It was evident that even in the Cotton-belt and the Gulf States there was in the minds of sober peoplethe gravest objection to revolutionary measures. 

It happened, most unfortunately, that the South-Carolina Legislatureassembled early in November for the purpose of choosing Presidentialelectors, who in that State were never submitted to the popularvote. While it might seem extravagant to ascribe the revolutionwhich convulsed the country to an event so disconnected and apparentlyso inadequate, it is nevertheless true that the sudden _furor_which seized a large number of the Southern people came directlyfrom that event. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to saythat the great civil war, which shook a continent, was precipitatedby the fact that the South-Carolina Legislature assembled at theunpropitious moment. Without taking time for reflection, withouta review of the situation, without stopping to count the cost, witha boldness born of passionate resentment against the North, therash men of South Carolina fired the train. In a single hour theycreated in their own State a public sentiment which would not brookdelay or contradiction or argument. The leaders of it knew thatthe sober second thought, even in South Carolina, would be dangerousto the scheme of a Southern confederacy. They knew that the feelingof resentment among the Southern people must be kept at white-heat, and that whoever wished to speak a word of caution or moderationmust be held as a public enemy, and subjected to the scorn and thevengeance of the people. 

In this temper a convention was ordered by the Legislature. Thedelegates were to be chosen directly by the people, and whenassembled were to determine the future relation of South Carolinato the Government of the United States. The election was to beheld in four weeks, and the convention was to assemble on the 17thof December. The unnatural and unprecedented haste of this action, by which South Carolina proceeded, as she proclaimed, to throw offher national relations, is more easily comprehended by recallingthe difficult mode provided in every State for a change in itsconstitution. In not a single State of the American Union can theorganic law be changed in less than a year, or without ampleopportunity for serious consideration by the people. At that verymoment the people of South Carolina were inhibited from making theslightest alteration in their own constitution except by slow andconservative processes which gave time for deliberation andreflection. In determining a question momentous beyond allcalculation to themselves and to their posterity, they were hurriedinto the election of delegates, and the delegates were hurried intoconvention, and the convention was hurried into secession by aterror of public opinion that would not endure resistance and wouldnot listen to reason. 

The few who were left in possession of coolness and sound judgmentamong the public men of South Carolina, desired to stay the rushof events by waiting for co-operation with the other slave-holdingStates. Their request was denied and their argument answered bythe declaration that co-operation had been tried in 1850, and hadended in defeating all measures looking to Disunion. One of themembers declared that if South Carolina again waited for co-operation, slavery and State-rights would be abandoned, State-sovereignty andthe cause of the South would be lost forever. The action of theconvention was still further stimulated by the resignation of Mr. Hammond and Mr. Chestnut, United-States senators from South Carolina, and by the action of Governor Pickens in appointing a cabinet ofthe same number and of the same division of departments that hadbeen adopted in the National Government. 

 THE ACTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 

South Carolina was urged forward in this course by leading Disunionistsin other States who needed the force of one bold example of secessionto furnish the requisite stimulus to their own communities. Themembers of the South Carolina convention, recognizing the embarrassmentand incongruity of basing their action simply upon the constitutionalelection of a President, declared that the public opinion of theirState "had for a long period been strengthening and ripening forDisunion. " Mr. Rhett, eminent in the public service of his State, asserted "that the secession of South Carolina was not produced byMr. Lincoln's election, or by the non-execution of the Fugitive-slave Law; that it was a matter which had been gathering head forthirty years, " and that they were now "determined upon their courseat whatever risk. "

Among the singular incidents of the South-Carolina secession, followed subsequently by other States, was the solemn import attachedto the word _ordinance_. The South gave it a significance whichelevated its authority above the Constitution, and above the lawsof their own State and of the United States. And yet, neither inlegal definition nor in any ordinary use of the word, was thereprecedent or authority for attaching to it such impressive meaning. An _ordinance_ of Parliament was but a temporary Act which theCommons might alter at their pleasure. An _Act_ of Parliamentcould not be changed except by the consent of king, lords, andcommons. In this country, aside from the use of the word indeclaring the freedom of the North-west Territory in 1787, _ordinance_has uniformly been applied to Acts of inferior bodies, to thecouncils of cities, to the authorities of towns, to the directorsof corporations, --rarely if ever to the Acts of legislative assemblieswhich represent the power of the State. 

It is still more singular that, in passing the ordinance of Secession, the convention worded it so that it should seem to be the repealof the ordinance of the 23d of May, 1788, whereby the Constitutionof the United States was ratified by South Carolina, when, in simpletruth, the Act of that State ratifying the Federal Constitutionwas never called an ordinance. Mirabeau said that words werethings; and this word was so used in the proceedings of Secessionconventions as to impress the mind of the Southern people with itsportentous weight and solemnity. With an amendment to theconstitutions of their States they had all been familiar. In theenactment of their laws thousands had participated. But no one ofthem had ever before seen or heard or dreamed of any thing of suchmomentous and decisive character as an Ordinance. Even to thisday, when disunion, secession, rebellion have all been destroyedby the shock of arms, and new institutions have been built overtheir common grave, the word "ordinance" has, in the minds of manypeople both in the North and in the South, a sound which representsthe very majesty of popular power. 

If the other Southern States would have been left to their owncounsels, South Carolina would have stood alone, and her Secessionof 1860 would have proved as abortive as her Nullification of 1832. The Disunion movement in the remaining States of the South originatedin Washington. Finding that the Cotton States, especially thosebordering on the Gulf of Mexico, were moving too slowly, the senatorsfrom Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, and Florida held a meeting in Washington on the 5th of January, 1861. The South had always contended for the right of States toinstruct their senators, but now the Southern senators proceededto instruct their States. In effect they sent out commands to thegoverning authorities and to the active political leaders, thatSouth Carolina must be sustained; that the Cotton States must standby her; and that the secession of each and all of them must beaccomplished in season for a general convention to be held atMontgomery, not later than Feb. 15, and, in any event, before theinauguration of Mr. Lincoln. The design was that the new Presidentof the United States should find a Southern Confederacy in actualexistence, with the ordinary departments of government in regularoperation, with a name and a flag and a great seal, and all theinsignia of national sovereignty visible. 

It is a suggestive fact that, in carrying out these designs, thepolitical leaders determined, as far as possible, to prevent thesubmission of the ordinances of Secession to the popular vote. Itis not indeed probable that, in the excited condition to which theyhad by this time brought the Southern mind, Secession would havebeen defeated; but the withholding of the question from populardecision is at least an indication that there was strong apprehensionof such a result, and that care was taken to prevent the divisionsand acrimonious contests which such submission might have caused. In the Georgia convention the resolution declaring it to be herright and her duty to secede was adopted only by a vote of 165 to130. A division of similar proportion in the popular vote wouldhave stripped the secession of Georgia of all moral force, andhence the people were not allowed to pass upon the question. 

 ACTION OF OTHER COTTON STATES. 

Georgia was really induced to secede, only upon the delusivesuggestion that better terms could be made with the NationalGovernment by going out for a season than by remaining steadfastlyloyal. The influence of Alexander H. Stephens, while he was stillloyal, was almost strong enough to hold the State in the Union;and but for the phantasm of securing better terms outside, theEmpire State of the South would have checked and destroyed theSecession movement at the very outset. Mississippi followedJefferson Davis with a vote amounting almost to unanimity. Florida, Louisiana, and Alabama followed with secession ordained by conventionsand no vote allowed to the people. Texas submitted the ordinance, after the other States had seceded, and by the force of theirexample carried it by a vote of about three to one. These werethe original seven States that formed the nucleus of the Confederacy. They had gone through what they deemed the complete process ofseparation from the Union, without the slightest obstruction fromany quarter and without the interposition of any authority fromthe National Government against their proceedings. 

Long before the Secession movement had been developed to the extentjust detailed, Congress was in session. It assembled one monthafter the Presidential election, and fifteen days before theDisunionists of South Carolina met in their ill-starred convention. Up to that time there had been excitement, threats of resistanceto the authority of the government in many sections of the South, and an earnest attempt in the Cotton States to promote co-operationin the fatal step which so many were bent on taking. But therehad been no overt act against the national authority. Federalofficers were still exercising their functions in all the States;the customs were still collected in Southern ports; the United-States mails were still carried without molestation from the Potomacto the Rio Grande. But the critical moment had come. The Disunionconspiracy had reached a point where it must go forward withboldness, or retreat before the displayed power and the upliftedflag of the Nation. The administration could adopt no policy sodangerous as to permit the enemies of the Union to proceed in theirconspiracy, and the hostile movement to gain perilous headway. Atthat juncture Mr. Buchanan confronted a graver responsibility thanhad ever before been imposed on a President of the United States. It devolved on him to arrest the mad outbreak of the South byjudicious firmness, or by irresolution and timidity to plunge theNation into dangers and horrors, the extent of which was mercifullyveiled from the vision of those who were to witness and share them. 

 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE UNION. 

There could be no doubt in the mind of any one that the destructionof the Union would be deplored by Mr. Buchanan as profoundly as byany living man. His birth and rearing as a Pennsylvanian leave noother presumption possible. In the original Union, Pennsylvaniawas appropriated denominated the Keystone of the arch, supportedby, and in turn supporting, the strength of all. Of the "oldthirteen" there were six free States north of her, and six slaveStates south of her. She was allied as warmly by ties of friendshipand of blood with her Maryland and Virginia neighbors on the oneside as with those of New Jersey and New York on the other. Herpolitical and social connection on both sides were not more intimatethan those of a business and commercial character. As the Uniongrew in power and increased in membership, Pennsylvania lost nothingof her prestige. She held to the new States as intimate relationsas she held to the old. The configuration of the country and thenatural channels of communication have bound her closely to allsections. Her northern border touching the great lakes, connectedher by sail and steam, before the era of the railway, with themagnificent domain which lies upon the shores of those inland seas. Her western rivers, whose junction marks the site of a great city, form part of the most extensive system of interior water-communicationson the globe, affording a commercial highway twenty thousand milesin length through seventeen States not included in the originalUnion. Patriotic tradition increased Pennsylvania's attachment tothe National Government. It was on her soil that the Declarationof Independence was proclaimed. It was in her Legislative hallsthat the Constitution was formed and the "more perfect Union" ofthe States ordained. From geographical position therefore, frommaterial interest, from inherited pride, from every associationand sympathy, from every aspiration, and from every hope, Pennsylvaniawas for the Union, inviolable and indissoluble. No threat of itsdestruction ever came from her councils, and no stress of circumstancescould ever seduce her into a calculation of its value, or driveher to the contemplation of its end. 

With all his attachment to the Union, Mr. Buchanan had been broughtunder influences which were hostile to it. In originally constitutinghis Cabinet, sinister agencies had controlled him, and far-seeingmen anticipated trouble when the names were announced. From theSouth he had selected Howell Cobb of Georgia for the Treasury, JohnB. Floyd of Virginia for Secretary of War, Jacob Thompson of Missourifor the Interior, and Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee for Postmaster-General. From the North he had selected Lewis Cass of Michiganfor the State Department, Isaac Toucey of Connecticut for the Navy, and Jeremiah S. Black of Pennsylvania for Attorney-General. Itseemed extraordinary that out of seven Cabinet officers four shouldbe given to the South, when the North had a vast preponderance ofpopulation and wealth. It was hardly less than audacious that thefour departments assigned to the South should be those which dealtmost intimately and most extensively with the finances, themanufactures, and the commerce of the country. The quiet mannerin which the North accepted this inequitable distribution ofpolitical power added only another proof of the complete ascendencywhich the South had acquired in the councils of the Democraticparty. 

Mr. Buchanan had always looked to the statesmen of the South as asuperior class; and after a political life wholly spent in closeassociation and constant service with them, it could not be expectedthat, even in a crisis threatening destruction to the Union, hewould break away from them in a day. They had fast hold of him, and against the influence of the better men in his Cabinet theyused him for a time to carry out their own ends. Secessionistsand Abolitionists Mr. Buchanan no doubt regarded as equally theenemies of the Union. But the Secessionists all came from theparty that elected him President, and the Abolitionists had allvoted against him. The Abolitionists, in which phrase Mr. Buchananincluded all men of anti-slavery conviction, had no opportunity, even if they had desired, to confer with the President, while theSecessionists from old and friendly association, were in daily andintimate relations with him. They undoubtedly persuaded thePresident by the most plausible arguments that they were not infault; that the whole responsibility lay at the door of the Northernanti-slavery men; and that, if these disturbers of the peace couldbe suppressed, all would be well. It was under these influences, artfully insinuated and persistently plied, that Mr. Buchanan wasinduced to write his mischievous and deplorable message of thefirst Monday of December, 1860, --a message whose evil effect cannever be estimated, and whose evil character can hardly beexaggerated. 

The President informed Congress that "the long-continued andintemperate interference of the Northern people with the questionof slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its naturaleffect. . . . The time has arrived so much dreaded by the Fatherof his Country, when hostile geographical parties have been formed. "He declared that he had "long foreseen and often forewarned" hiscountrymen of "the impending danger. " Apparently arguing the casefor the Southern extremists, the President believed that the danger"does not proceed solely from the attempt to exclude slavery fromthe Territories, nor from the efforts to defeat the execution ofthe Fugitive-slave Law. " Any or all of these evils, he said, "mighthave been endured by the South, " trusting to time and reflectionfor a remedy. "The immediate peril, " Mr. Buchanan informed thecountry, "arises from the fact that the long-continued agitationin the free States has at length produced its malign influence onthe slaves, and inspired them with vague notions of freedom. Hencea sense of security no longer exists around the family altar. Thefeeling of peace at home has given place to apprehensions of servileinsurrections, and many a matron throughout the South retires atnight in dread of what may befall herself and her children beforemorning. " The President was fully persuaded that "if this apprehensionof domestic danger should extend and intensify itself, disunionwill become inevitable. "

 PRESIDENT BUCHANAN AND THE SOUTH. 

Having thus stated what he believed to be the grievances of theSouth, Mr. Buchanan proceeded to give certain reasons why the slave-holders should not break up the government. His defensive pleafor the North was worse, if worse were possible, than his aggressivestatements on behalf of the South. "The election of any one ofour fellow-citizens to the office of President, " Mr. Buchanancomplacently asserted, "does not of itself afford just cause fordissolving the Union. " And then he adds an extraordinary qualification:"This is more especially true if his election has been effected bya mere plurality, and not a majority, of the people, and has resultedfrom transient and temporary causes, which may probably never againoccur. " Translated into plainer language, this was an assuranceto the Southern Disunionists that they need not break up thegovernment at that time, because Mr. Lincoln was a minority President, and was certain to be beaten at the next election. He remindedthe Southern leaders moreover that in the whole history of theFederal Government "no single Act had ever passed Congress, unlessthe Missouri Compromise be an exception, impairing in the slightestdegree the rights of the South to their property in slaves. " TheMissouri Compromise had been repealed, so that the entire body ofnational statutes, from the origin of the government to that hourwas, according to President Buchanan, guiltless of transgressionagainst the rights of slave-holders. Coming from such a source, the admission was one of great historic value. 

The President found that the chief grievance of the South was inthe enactments of the free States known as "personal liberty laws. "When the Fugitive-slave Law subjected the liberty of citizens tothe decision of a single commissioner, and denied jury trial to aman upon the question of sending him to lifelong and cruel servitude, the issue throughout the free States was made one of self-preservation. Without having the legal right to obstruct the return of a fugitiveslave to his servitude, they felt not only that they had the right, but that it was their duty, to protect free citizens in theirfreedom. Very likely these enactments, inspired by an earnestspirit of liberty, went in many cases too far, and tended to produceconflicts between National and State authority. That was a questionto be determined finally and exclusively by the Federal Judiciary. Unfortunately Mr. Buchanan carried his argument beyond that point, coupling it with a declaration and an admission fatal to theperpetuity of the Union. After reciting the statutes which heregarded as objectionable and hostile to the constitutional rightsof the South, and after urging their unconditional repeal upon theNorth, the President said: "The Southern States, standing on thebasis of the Constitution, have a right to demand this act ofjustice from the States of the North. Should it be refused, thenthe Constitution, to which all the States are parties, will havebeen willfully violated by one portion of them in a provisionessential to the domestic security and happiness of the remainder. In that event, the injured States, after having used all peacefuland constitutional means to obtain redress, would be justified inrevolutionary resistance to the government of the Union. "

By this declaration the President justified, and in effect advised, an appeal from the constitutional tribunals of the country to apopular judgment in the aggrieved States, and recognized the rightof those States, upon such popular judgment, to destroy theConstitution and Union. The "constitutional means" of redress werethe courts of the country, and to these the President must havereferred in the paragraph quoted. After an appeal to the courts, and a decision upon the questions presented, it would have beenthe plain duty of the parties to accept the decision as authoritativeand final. By the advice of the President, the States of the Southwere to accept the decision obtained by constitutional means, incase it was favorable to them, and to disregard it, and to destroyboth the Constitution and the Union, if it should prove to beadverse to the popular opinion in those States. 

It is not improbable that the President's language conveyed morethan his real meaning. He may have intended to affirm that if thefree States should refuse to repeal their obnoxious statutes aftera final decision against their constitutionality, then the slaveStates would be justified in revolutionary resistance. But he hadno right to make such an argument or suggest such an hypothesis, for never in the history of the Federal Government had the decisionof the Supreme judicial tribunal been disobeyed or disregarded byany State or by any individual. The right of "revolutionaryresistance" was not so foreign to the conception of the Americancitizen as to require suggestion and enforcement from Mr. Buchanan. His argument in support of the right at that crisis was prejudicialto the Union, and afforded a standing-ground for many Southern menwho were beginning to feel that the doctrine of Secession wasillogical, unsafe, untenable. They now had the argument of aNorthern President in justification of "revolutionary resistance. "Throughout the South, the right of Secession was abandoned by alarge class, and the right of Revolution substituted. 

 FATAL ADMISSION OF THE PRESIDENT. 

Having made his argument in favor of the right of "Revolution, "Mr. Buchanan proceeded to argue ably and earnestly against theassumption by any State of an inherent right to secede from thegovernment at its own will and pleasure. But he utterly destroyedthe force of his reasoning by declaring that "after much seriousreflection" he had arrived at "the conclusion that no power hasbeen delegated to Congress, or to any other department of theFederal Government, to coerce a State into submission which isattempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, " from the Union. He emphasized his position by further declaring that, "so far fromthis power having been delegated to Congress, it was expresslyrefused by the convention which framed the Constitution. " Congress"possesses many means, " Mr. Buchanan added, "of preserving theUnion by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their handsto preserve it by force. "

The fatal admission was thus evolved from the mind of the President, that any State which thought itself aggrieved and could not securethe concessions demanded, might bring the Government down in ruins. The power to destroy was in the State. The power to preserve wasnot in the Nation. The President apparently failed to see that ifthe Nation could not be preserved by force, its legal capacity forexistence was dependent upon the concurring and continuing will ofall the individual States. The original bond of union was, therefore, for the day only, and the provision of the Constitution which gaveto the Supreme Court jurisdiction in controversies between Stateswas binding no further than the States chose to accept the decisionsof the Court. 

The difference between the President and the Secessionists of theSouth was a difference of opinion as to the time for action, andas to the name by which that action should be called. In principlethere was concurrence. The President insisted that the injuredparty should appeal to the aggressor, and then to the courts, withthe reserved right of revolution always in view and to be exercisedif neither the aggressor nor the courts furnished satisfactoryredress. The President recognized the reserved right of revolutionin the States, and it was a necessary incident of that right thateach State might decide when the right should be exercised. Hesuggested that, as justification of revolution, the Federal Governmentmust be guilty of "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise"of powers not granted by the Constitution, quoting from the textof the State-rights declaration by Virginia in 1798. But in allhis arguments he left the State to be the ultimate judge of theconstitutionality of the Acts of the Federal Government. Underthese doctrines the Government of the United States was shorn ofall power to preserve its own existence, and the Union might crumbleand fall while its constituted authorities stood paralyzed andimpotent. 

This construction was all that the extremists of the South desired. With so much conceded, they had every thing in their own hands. They could march out of the Union at their own will and caprice, without resistance from the National Government, and they couldcome back upon such conditions as, with the President's aid, theymight extort from an alarmed and weakening North. Assured by thelanguage of the President that they could with impunity defy theconstitutional authority of the government, the Secessionists wereimmeasurably encouraged. The Southern men had for three generationsbeen cherishing the belief that they were as a class superior toNorthern men, and they were more than ever confirmed in this pleasingillusion when they saw a Northern President, with the power of thenation in his hands, deliberately affirming that he could exerciseno authority over or against them. 

Men who, under the wholesome restraint of executive power, wouldhave refrained from taking aggressive steps against the NationalGovernment, were by Mr. Buchanan's action forced into a positionof hostility. Men in the South, who were disposed to avoid extrememeasures, were by taunt and reproach driven into the ranks ofSecession. They were made to believe, after the President's message, that the South would be ruined if she did not assert a positionwhich the National authority confessed it had no right and no meansto contest. The Republicans had been taunting Southern men withthe intention of using only bluster and bravado, and if they shouldnow fail to take a decisive step in the direction of Disunion, theyfelt that it would be a humiliating retraction of all they had saidin the long struggle over slavery. It would be an invitation tothe Abolitionists and fanatics of the North, to deal hereafter withthe South, and with the question of slavery, in whatever mannermight seem good in their sight. No weapon of logic could have beenmore forcible; and, wielded as it was by Southern leaders withskill and courage, they were able to consolidate the public opinionand control the political action of their section. 

The evil effects of Mr. Buchanan's message were not confined tothe slave States. It did incalculable harm in the free States. It fixed in the minds of tens of thousands of Northern men who wereopposed to the Republican party, the belief that the South wasjustified in taking steps to break up the government, if what theytermed a war on Southern institutions should be continued. Thisfeeling had in turn a most injurious influence in the South, andstimulated thousands in that section to a point of rashness whichthey would never have reached but for the sympathy and supportconstantly extended to them from the North. Even if a conflict ofarms should be the ultimate result of the Secession movement, itsauthors and its deluded followers were made to believe that, againsta South entirely united, there would be opposed a North hopelesslydivided. They were confident that the Democratic party in the freeStates held the views expressed in Mr. Buchanan's message. Theyhad conclusively persuaded themselves that the Democrats, togetherwith a large proportion of the conservative men in the North whohad supported Mr. Bell for the Presidency, would oppose an "abolitionwar, " and would prove a distracting and destructive force in therear of the Union army if it should ever commence its marchSouthward. 

 THE SECRETARY OF STATE RESIGNS. 

The most alarming feature of the situation to reflecting men inthe North was that, so far as known, all the members of Mr. Buchanan'sCabinet approved the destructive doctrines of the message. But asthe position of the President was subjected to examination andcriticism by the Northern press, uneasiness was manifested inAdministration circles. It was seen that if the course foreshadowedby Mr. Buchanan should be followed, the authority of the Unionwould be compelled to retreat before the usurpations of secedingStates, and that a powerful government might be quietly overthrown, without striking one blow of resistance, or uttering one word ofprotest. General Cass was the first of the Cabinet to feel thepressure of loyalty from the North. The venerable Secretary ofState, whose whole life had been one of patriotic devotion to hiscountry, suddenly realized that he was in a false position. Whenit became known that the President would not insist upon thecollection of the national revenue in South Carolina, or upon thestrengthening of the United-States forts in the harbor of Charleston, General Cass concluded that justice to his own reputation requiredhim to separate from the Administration. He resigned on the twelfthof December, --nine days after Mr. Buchanan had sent his fatalmessage to Congress. 

 CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF JUDGE BLACK. 

Judge Black, who had from the beginning of the Administration beenMr. Buchanan's chief adviser, now became so by rank as the successorof General Cass in the State Department. He was a man of remarkablecharacter. He was endowed by nature with a strong understandingand a strong will. In the profession of the law he had attainedgreat eminence. His learning had been illustrated by a prolongedservice on the bench before the age at which men, even of exceptionalsuccess at the bar, usually attract public observation. He hadadded to his professional studies, which were laborious andconscientious, a wide acquaintance with our literature, and hadfound in its walks a delight which is yielded to few. In history, biography, criticism, romance, he had absorbed every thing in ourlanguage worthy of attention. Shakspeare, Milton, indeed all theEnglish poets, were his familiar companions. There was not adisputed passage or an obscure reading in any one of the greatplays upon which he could not off-hand quote the best renderings, and throw original light from his own illumined mind. Upon theologyhe had apparently bestowed years of investigation and reflection. A sincere Christian, he had been a devout and constant student ofthe Bible, and could quote its passages and apply its teachingswith singular readiness and felicity. To this generous store ofknowledge he added fluency of speech, both in public address andprivate communication, and a style of writing which was at onceunique, powerful, and attractive. He had attained unto everyexcellence of mental discipline described by Lord Byron. Readinghad made him a full man, talking a ready man, writing an exact man. The judicial literature of the English tongue may be sought in vainfor finer models than are found in the opinions of Judge Black whenhe sat, and was worthy to sit, as the associate of John BannisterGibson, on the Supreme Bench of Pennsylvania. 

In political opinion he was a Democrat, self-inspired and self-taught, for his father was a Whig who had served his State inCongress. He idolized Jefferson and revered Jackson as embodyingin their respective characters all the elements of the soundestpolitical philosophy, and all the requisites of the highest politicalleadership. He believed in the principles of Democracy as he didin a demonstration of Euclid, --all that might be said on the otherside was necessarily absurd. He applied to his own political creedthe literal teachings of the Bible. If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacobhad held slaves without condemnation or rebuke from the Lord ofhosts, he believed that Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia might dothe same. He found in the case of Onesiums, St. Paul's explicitapproval of the Fugutive-slave Law of 1850, and in the cruel caseof Passmore Williamson he believed himself to be enforcing thedoctrines of the New Testament. Personally unwilling to hold evena beast of burden in oppressive bondage, nothing could induce himto condemn slave-holding in those whose conscience permitted themto practice it. In the Abolitionists he found the chief disturbersof the Republic, and he held New England answerable to posterityand to God for all the heresies which afflicted either Church orState. He had an uncompromising hostility to what are termed New-England ideas, though the tenderest ties of his life were of New-England origin. "The New-Englander individually I greatly affect, "he often said, "but, in the mass, I judge them to be stark mad. ""I think, too, " he would add, "that if you are going to make muchof a New-Englander, he should, like Dr. Johnson's Scotchman, becaught young. "

To his native State Judge Black was devotedly attached. He inheritedthe blood of two strong elements of its population, --the Germanand the Scotch-Irish, --and he united the best characteristics ofboth in his own person. He had always looked upon Pennsylvania asthe guardian of the Federal Union, almost as the guarantor of itssafety and its perpetuity. He spoke of her as the break-water thatprotected the slave States from the waves of radicalism which werethreatening to ingulf Southern institutions. The success of theRepublican party in 1860 he regarded as a portent of direst evil, --indeed, as a present disaster, immeasurably sorrowful. Theexcitement in the Southern States over the probability of Mr. Lincoln's election he considered natural, their serious protestaltogether justifiable. He desired the free States to be awakenedto the gravity of the situation, to be thoroughly alarmed, and torepent of their sins against the South. He wished it understoodfrom ocean to ocean that the position of the Republican party wasinconsistent with loyalty to the Union, and that its permanentsuccess would lead to the destruction of the government. It wasnot unnatural that with these extreme views he should be carriedbeyond the bounds of prudence, and that, in his headlong desire torebuke the Republican party as enemies of the Union, he should aidin precipitating a dissolution of the government before theRepublicans could enter upon its administration. He thus becamein large degree responsible for the unsound position and thedangerous teachings of Mr. Buchanan. In truth some of the worstdoctrines embodied in the President's evil message came directlyfrom an opinion given by Judge Black as Attorney-General, and, madeby Mr. Buchanan still more odious and more dangerous by the quotationof a part and not the whole. 

It was soon manifest however to Judge Black, that he was playingwith fire, and that, while he was himself desirous only of arousingthe country to the dangers of anti-slavery agitation, Mr. Buchanan'sadministration was every day effectually aiding the Southernconspiracy for the destruction of the Union. This light dawned onJudge Black suddenly and irresistibly. He was personally intimatewith General Cass, and when that venerable statesman retired fromthe Cabinet to preserve his record of loyalty to the Union, JudgeBlack realized that he was himself confronted by an issue whichthreatened his political destruction. Could he afford, as Secretaryof State, to follow a policy which General Cass believed woulddestroy his own fame? General Cass was nearly fourscore years ofage, with his public career ended, his work done. Judge Black wasbut fifty, and he had before him possibly the most valuable andmost ambitious period of his life. He saw at a glance that ifGeneral Cass could not be sustained in the North-West, he couldnot be sustained in Pennsylvania. He possessed the moral courageto stand firm to the end, in defiance of opposition and regardlessof obloquy, if he could be sure he was right. But he had begun todoubt, and doubt led him to review with care the position of Mr. Buchanan, and to examine its inevitable tendencies. He did it withconscience and courage. He had none of that subserviency to Southernmen which had injured so many Northern Democrats. Until he enteredthe Cabinet in 1857, he had never come into personal associationwith men from the slave-holding States, and his keen observationcould not fail to discern the inferiority to himself of the fourSouthern members of the Cabinet. 

Judge Black entered upon his duties as Secretary of State on the17th of December, --the day on which the Disunion convention ofSouth Carolina assembled. He found the malign influence of Mr. Buchanan's message fully at work throughout the South. Under itsencouragement only three days were required by the convention atCharleston to pass the Ordinance of Secession, and four days laterGovernor Pickens issued a proclamation declaring "South Carolinaa separate, sovereign, free, and independent State, with the rightto levy war, conclude peace, and negotiate treaties. " From thatmoment Judge Black's position towards the Southern leaders wasradically changed. They were no longer fellow-Democrats. Theywere the enemies of the Union to which he was devoted: they wereconspirators against the government to which he had taken a solemnoath of fidelity and loyalty. 

Judge Black's change, however important to his own fame, wouldprove comparatively fruitless unless he could influence Mr. Buchananto break with the men who had been artfully using the power of hisadministration to destroy the Union. The opportunity and the testcame promptly. The new "sovereign, free, and independent" governmentof South Carolina sent commissioners to Washington to negotiatefor the surrender of the national forts, and the transfer of thenational property within her limits. Mr. Buchanan prepared ananswer to their request which was compromising to the honor of theExecutive and perilous to the integrity of the Union. Judge Blacktook a decided and irrevocable stand against the President'sposition. He advised Mr. Buchanan that upon the basis of thatfatal concession to the Disunion leaders he could not remain inhis Cabinet. It was a sharp issue, but was soon adjusted. Mr. Buchanan gave way, and permitted Judge Black, and his associatesHolt and Stanton, to frame a reply for the administration. 

 THE PRESIDENT AND THE SOUTHERN LEADERS. 

Jefferson Davis, Mr. Toombs, Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Slidell, who hadbeen Mr. Buchanan's intimate and confidential advisers, and whohad led him to the brink of ruin, found themselves suddenlysupplanted, and a new power installed at the White House. Foiled, and no longer able to use the National Administration as aninstrumentality to destroy the National life, the Secession leadersin Congress turned upon the President with angry reproaches. Intheir rage they lost all sense of the respect due to the ChiefMagistrate of the Nation, and assaulted Mr. Buchanan with coarsenessas well as violence. Senator Benjamin spoke of him as "a senileExecutive under the sinister influence of insane counsels. " Thisexhibition of malignity towards the misguided President affordedto the North the most convincing and satisfactory proof that therehad been a change for the better in the plans and purposes of theAdministration. They realized that it must be a deep sense ofimpending danger which could separate Mr. Buchanan from his politicalassociations with the South, and they recognized in his positiona significant proof of the desperate determination to which theenemies of the Union had come. 

The stand taken by Judge Black and his loyal associates was in thelast days of December, 1860. The re-organization of the Cabinetcame as a matter of necessity. Mr. John B. Floyd resigned fromthe War Department, making loud proclamation that his action wasbased on the President's refusal to surrender the national fortsin Charleston Harbor to the Secession government of South Carolina. This manifesto was not necessary to establish Floyd's treasonableintentions toward the government; but, in point of truth, the pleawas undoubtedly a pretense, to cover reasons of a more personalcharacter which would at once deprive him of Mr. Buchanan'sconfidence. There had been irregularities in the War Departmenttending to compromise Mr. Floyd, for which he was afterwards indictedin the District of Columbia. Mr. Floyd well knew that the firstknowledge of these shortcomings would lead to his dismissal fromthe Cabinet. Whatever Mr. Buchanan's faults as an Executive mayhave been, his honor in all transactions, both personal and public, was unquestionable, and he was the last man to tolerate the slightestdeviation from the path of rigid integrity. 

Mr. Thompson, the Secretary of the Interior, followed Mr. Floydafter a short interval. Mr. Cobb had left the Treasury a few daysbefore General Cass resigned from the Cabinet, and had gone toGeorgia to stimulate her laggard movements in the scheme of destroyingthe government. His successor was Philip Francis Thomas of Maryland, who entered the Cabinet as a representative of the principles whoseannouncement had forced General Cass to resign. The change ofpolicy to which the President was now fully committed, forced Mr. Thomas to retire, after a month's service. He frankly stated thathe was unable to agree with the President and his chief advisers"in reference to the condition of things in South Carolina, " andtherefore tendered his resignation. Mr. Thomas adhered to theUnion, and always maintained an upright and honorable character, but his course at that crisis deprived him subsequently of a seatin the United-States Senate, though at a later period he served inthe House as representative from Maryland. 

Mr. Cobb, Mr. Floyd, and Mr. Thompson had all remained in theCabinet after the Presidential election in November, in fullsympathy, and so far as was possible in full co-operation, withthe men in the South who were organizing resistance to the authorityof the Federal Government. Neither those gentlemen, nor any friendin their behalf, ever ventured to explain how, as sworn officersof the United States, they could remain at their posts consistentlywith the laws of honor, --laws obligatory upon them not only aspublic officials who had taken a solemn oath of fidelity to theConstitution, but also as private gentlemen whose good faith waspledged anew every hour they remained in control of the departmentswith whose administration they had been intrusted. Their courseis unfavorably contrasted with that of many Southern men (of whomGeneral Lee and the two Johnstons were conspicuous examples), whorefused to hold official positions under the National Governmenta single day after they had determined to take part in the schemeof Disunion. 

 BUCHANAN'S RECONSTRUCTED CABINET. 

By the re-organization of the Cabinet, the tone of Mr. Buchanan'sadministration was radically changed. Judge Black had used hisinfluence with the President to secure trustworthy friends of theUnion in every department. Edwin M. Stanton, little known at thetime to the public, but of high standing in his profession, wasappointed Attorney-General soon after Judge Black took charge ofthe State Department. Judge Black had been associated with Stantonpersonally and professionally, and was desirous of his aid in thedangerous period through which he was called to serve. 

Joseph Holt, who, since the death of Aaron V. Brown in 1859, hadbeen Postmaster-General, was now appointed Secretary of War, andHoratio King of Maine, for many years the upright first assistant, was justly promoted to the head of the Post-office Department. Mr. Holt was the only Southern man left in the Cabinet. He was anative of Kentucky, long a resident of Mississippi, always identifiedwith the Democratic party, and affiliated with its extreme Southernwing. Without a moment's hesitation he now broke all the associationsof a lifetime, and stood by the Union without qualification orcondition. His learning, his firmness, and his ability, wereinvaluable to Mr. Buchanan in the closing days of his administration. 

General John A. Dix of New York was called to the head of theTreasury. He was a man of excellent ability, of wide experiencein affairs, of spotless character, and a most zealous friend ofthe Union. He found the Treasury bankrupt, the discipline of itsofficers in the South gone, its orders disregarded in the Stateswhich were preparing for secession. He at once imparted spiritand energy into the service, --giving to the administration of thisdepartment a policy of pronounced loyalty to the government. Noact of his useful and honorable life has been so widely known orwill be so long remembered as his dispatch to the Treasury agentat New Orleans to take possession of a revenue cutter whose commanderwas suspected of disloyalty and of a design to transfer his vesselto the Confederate service. Lord Nelson's memorable order atTrafalgar was not more inspiring to the British navy than was theorder of General Dix to the American people, when, in the gloom ofthat depressing winter, he telegraphed South his peremptory words, "If any man attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him onthe spot. "

Thus reconstructed, the Cabinet as a whole was one of recognizedpower, --marked by high personal character, by intellectual training, by experience in affairs, and by aptitude for the public service. There have been Cabinets perhaps more widely known for the possessionof great qualities; but, if the history of successive administrationsfrom the origin of the government be closely studied, it will befound that the re-organized Cabinet of President Buchanan must takerank as one of exceptional ability. 

For the remaining two months of Mr. Buchanan's administration thedestinies of the country were in the keeping of these constitutionaladvisers. If in any respect they failed to come to the standardof a loyalty that was quickened by subsequent developments, theyno doubt fairly represented the demand of the Northern States atthe time. There was everywhere the most earnest desire to averta conflict, and an unwillingness to recognize the possibility ofactual war. The majority of the Republican party in both branchesof Congress was not advocating a more decided or more aggressivecourse with the South, during the months of January and February, than the Cabinet, with Judge Black at its head, was pursuing. Thetime for executive acts of a more pronounced character was directlyafter the Presidential election, when the first symptoms of resistanceto national authority were visible in the South. If the new Cabinethad been then in power, the history of the civil revolt might havebeen different. But the force that will arrest the first slowrevolution of a wheel cannot stand before it when, by uncheckedvelocity, it has acquired a destructive momentum. The measureswhich might have secured repression in November would only haveproduced explosion in January. 

 THE PRESIDENT'S NEW POSITION. 

The change of position on the part of Mr. Buchanan was not left toinference, or to the personal assurance of the loyal men who composedhis re-organized Cabinet. He announced it himself in a specialmessage to Congress on the 8th of January, 1861. The tone was sodifferent from the message of December, that it did not seem possiblethat the two could have been written by the same man. It wasevident from many passages in the second message that he was tryingto reconcile it with the first. This was the natural coursesuggested by the pride of one who overrated the virtue of consistency. The attempt was useless. The North with unaffected satisfaction, the South with unconcealed indignation, realized that the Presidenthad entirely escaped from the influences which dictated the firstmessage. He now asserted that, "as the Chief Executive under theConstitution of the United States, " he had no alternative but "tocollect the public revenues, and to protect the public property, so far as this might be practicable under existing laws. " Remarkingthat his province "was to execute, and not to make, the laws, " hethrew upon Congress the duty "of enlarging their provisions to meetexigencies as they may occur. " He declared it as his own convictionthat "the right and the duty to use military force defensivelyagainst those who resist the federal officers in the execution oftheir legal functions, and against those who assail the propertyof the Federal Government, are clear and undeniable. " Concedingso much, the mild denial which the President re-asserted, of "theright to make aggressive war upon any State, " may be charitablytolerated; for, under the defensive power which he so broadlyapproved, the whole force of national authority could be usedagainst a State aggressively bent upon Secession. 

The President did not fail to fortify his own position at everypoint with great force. The situation had become so serious, andhad "assumed such vast and alarming proportions, as to place thesubject entirely above and beyond Executive control. " He thereforecommended "the question, in all its various bearings, to Congress, as the only tribunal possessing the power to meet the existingexigency. " He reminded Congress that "to them belongs exclusivelythe power to declare war, or to authorize the employment of militaryforce in all cases contemplated by the Constitution. " Not abandoningthe hope of an amicable adjustment, the President pertinentlyinformed Congress that "they alone possess the power to removegrievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and union. "As a basis of settlement, he recommended a formal compromise bywhich "the North shall have exclusive control of the territoryabove a certain line, and Southern institutions shall have protectionbelow that line. " This plan, he believed, "ought to receiveuniversal approbation. " He maintained that on Congress, and "onCongress alone, rests the responsibility. " As Congress wouldcertainly in a few days be under the control of the Republicans inboth branches, --by the withdrawal of senators and representativesfrom the seceding States, --Mr. Buchanan's argument had a doubleforce. Not only was he vindicating the position of the Executiveand throwing the weight of responsibility on the LegislativeDepartment of the government, but he was protecting the positionof the Democratic party by saying, in effect, that the Presidentchosen by that party stood ready to approve and to execute any lawsfor the protection of the government and the safety of the Unionwhich a Republican Congress might enact. 

A certain significance attached to the date which the Presidenthad selected for communicating his message to Congress. It wasthe eighth day of January, the anniversary of the Battle of NewOrleans, celebrated that year with enthusiastic demonstrations inhonor of the memory of Andrew Jackson, who had, on a memorableoccasion not unlike the present, sworn an emphatic oath that "theFederal Union must and shall be preserved. " There was also markedsatisfaction throughout the loyal States with Mr. Buchanan'sassurance of the peace of the District of Columbia on the ensuing4th of March, on the occasion of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. Hedid not himself "share in the serious apprehensions that wereentertained of disturbance" on that occasion, but he made thisdeclaration, which was received in the North with hearty applause:"In any event, it will be my duty to preserve the peace, and thisduty shall be performed. "

The change of sentiment towards Mr. Buchanan after the delivery ofthe special message, was as marked in the North as it was in theSouth, though in the opposite direction. It would not be true tosay that any thing like popularity attended the President in hisnew position; but the change of feeling was so great that theLegislature of Massachusetts, on the 23d of January, 1861, adoptedresolutions in which they declared that they regarded "with unmingledsatisfaction the determination evinced in the recent firm andpatriotic special message of the President of the United States toamply and faithfully discharge his constitutional duty of enforcingthe laws, and preserving the integrity of the Union. " The Legislature"proffered to the President, through the Governor of the Commonwealth, such aid in men and money as he may require to maintain the authorityof the National Government. " These resolutions were forwarded toMr. Buchanan by Governor Andrew. They were only one of manymanifestations which the President received of approval of hiscourse. 

The Massachusetts Legislature was radically Republican in bothbranches, and even in making a reference to "men and money" asrequisite to maintain the Union, they had gone farther than thepublic sentiment at that time approved. Coercive measures weregenerally condemned. A few days after the action of the Legislature, a large meeting of the people of Boston, held in Faneuil Hall, declared that they "depended for the return of the seceding States, and the permanent preservation of the Union, on conciliatorycounsels, and a sense of the benefits which the Constitution conferson all the States, and not on military coercion. " They declaredthat they shrunk "with horror from the thought of civil war betweenthe North and the South. "

It must always be remembered that the disbelief in ultimate secessionwas nearly universal throughout the free States. The people ofthe North could not persuade themselves that the proceedings inthe Southern States would lead to any thing more serious thanhostile demonstrations, which would end, after coaxing and compromise, in a return to the Union. But with this hope of final securitythere was, on the part of the great mass of the people in the freeStates, the gravest solicitude throughout the winter of 1860-61, and a restless waiting and watching for a solution of the troubles. Partisan leaders were busy on both sides seeking for an advantagethat might survive the pending trials. Northern Democrats in manyinstances sought to turn the occasion to one of political advantageby pointing out the lamentable condition to which anti-slaveryagitation had brought the country. This was naturally answered byRepublicans with defiance, and with an affected contempt andcarelessness of what the South might do. Much that was writtenand much that was spoken throughout the North during that winter, both by Democrats and Republicans, would have remained unwrittenand unspoken if they had realized the seriousness and magnitude ofthe impending calamity. 

 FINAL ESTIMATE OF MR. BUCHANAN. 

In a final analysis and true estimate of Mr. Buchanan's conduct inthe first stages of the revolt, the condition of the popular mindas just described must be taken into account. The same influencesand expectations that wrought upon the people were working alsoupon him. There were indeed two Mr. Buchanans in the closing monthsof the administration. The first was Mr. Buchanan of November andDecember, angered by the decision of the Presidential election andmore than willing that the North, including his own State, shouldbe disciplined by fright to more conservative views and to a stricterobservance of what he considered solemn obligations imposed by theConstitution. If the Southern threat of resistance to the authorityof the Union had gone no farther than this, Mr. Buchanan would havebeen readily reconciled to its temporary violence, and would probablyhave considered it a national blessing in disguise. --The secondwas Mr. Buchanan of January and February, appalled by surroundingand increasing perils, grieved by the conduct of Southern men whomhe had implicitly trusted, overwhelmed by the realization of theevils which had obviously followed his official declarations, hopingearnestly for the safety of the Union, and yet more disturbed andharrowed in his mind than the mass of loyal people who did notstand so near the danger as he, or so accurately measure its alarminggrowth. The President of December with Cobb and Floyd and Thompsonin his Cabinet, and the President of January with Dix and Stantonand Holt for his councilors, were radically different men. No trueestimate of Mr. Buchanan in the crisis of his public career canever be reached if this vital distinction be overlooked. 

It was Mr. Buchanan's misfortune to be called to act in an emergencywhich demanded will, fortitude, and moral courage. In thesequalities he was deficient. He did not possess the executivefaculty. His life had been principally devoted to the practice oflaw in the most peaceful of communities, and to service in legislativebodies where he was borne along by the force of association. Hehad not been trained to prompt decision, had not been accustomedto exercise command. He was cautious and conservative to the pointof timidity. He possessed ability of a high order, and, though hethought slowly, he could master the most difficult subject withcomprehensive power. His service of ten years in the House and anequal period in the Senate was marked by a conscientious devotionto duty. He did not rank with the ablest members of either body, but always bore a prominent part in important discussions andmaintained himself with credit. 

 PERSONAL CHARACTER OF MR. BUCHANAN. 

It was said of Mr. Buchanan that he instinctively dreaded to assumeresponsibility of any kind. His keenest critic remarked that inthe tentative period of political issues assumed by his party, Mr. Buchanan could always be found two paces to the rear, but in thehour of triumph he marched proudly in the front rank. He was notgifted with independence or self-assertion. His bearing towardsSouthern statesmen was derogatory to him as a man of spirit. Histone towards administrations of his own party was so deferentialas almost to imply a lack of self-respect. He was not a leaderamong men. He was always led. He was led by Mason and Soulé intothe imprudence of signing the Ostend Manifesto; he was led by theSouthern members of his Cabinet into the inexplicable folly andblunder of indorsing the Lecompton iniquity; he was led by Disunionsenators into the deplorable mistake contained in his last annualmessage. Fortunately for him he was led a month later by Blackand Holt and Stanton to a radical change of his compromisingposition. 

If Mr. Buchanan had possessed the unconquerable will of Jackson orthe stubborn courage of Taylor, he could have changed the historyof the revolt against the Union. A great opportunity came to himbut he was not equal to it. Always an admirable adviser whereprudence and caution were the virtues required, he was fatallywanting in a situation which demanded prompt action and strongnerve. As representative in Congress, as senator, as ministerabroad, as Secretary of State, his career was honorable andsuccessful. His life was singularly free from personal fault orshort-coming. He was honest and pure-minded. His fame would havebeen more enviable if he had never been elevated to the Presidency. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Congress during the Winter of 1860-61. --Leave-taking of Senatorsand Representatives. --South Carolina the First to secede. --HerDelegation in the House publish a Card withdrawing. --Other Statesfollow. --Mr. Lamar of Mississippi. --Speeches of Seceding Senators. --Mr. Yulee and Mr. Mallory of Florida. --Mr. Clay and Mr. Fitzpatrickof Alabama. --Jefferson Davis. --His Distinction between Secessionand Nullification. --Important Speech by Mr. Toombs. --He definesConditions on which the Union might be allowed to survive. --Mr. Iverson's Speech. --Georgia Senators withdraw. --Insolent Speech ofMr. Slidell of Louisiana. --Mr. Judah P. Benjamin's Special Pleafor his State. --His Doctrine of "A Sovereignty held in Trust. "--Same Argument of Mr. Yulee for his State. --Principle of StateSovereignty. --Disproved by the Treaty of 1783. --Notable Omissionby Secession Senators. --Grievances not stated. --Secession Conventionsin States. --Failure to state Justifying Grounds of Action. --Confederate Government fail likewise to do it. --Contrast with theCourse of the Colonies. --Congress had given no Cause. --Had notdisturbed Slavery by Adverse Legislation. --List of Measures Favorableto Slavery. --Policy of Federal Government steadily in that Direction. --Mr. Davis quoted Menaces, not Acts. --Governing Class in the South. --Division of Society there. --Republic ruled by an Oligarchy. --Overthrown by Election of Lincoln. --South refuses to acquiesce. 

No feature of the extraordinary winter of 1860-61 is more singularin retrospect than the formal leave-taking of the Southern senatorsand representatives in their respective Houses. Members of theHouse from the seceding States, with few exceptions, refrained fromindividual addresses, either of farewell or defiance, but adopteda less demonstrative and more becoming mode. The South-Carolinarepresentatives withdrew on the 24th of December (1860), in a briefcard laid before the House by Speaker Pennington. They announcedthat, as the people of their State had "in their sovereign capacityresumed the powers delegated by them to the Federal Government ofthe United States, " their "connection with the House of Representativeswas thereby dissolved. " They "desired to take leave of those withwhom they had been associated in a common agency, with mutual regardand respect for the rights of each other. " They "cherished thehope" that in future relations they might "better enjoy the peaceand harmony essential to the happiness of a free and enlightenedpeople. "

 SOUTHERN REPRESENTATIVES WITHDRAW. 

Other delegations retired from the House in the order in whichtheir States seceded. The leave-taking, in the main, was notundignified. There was no defiance, no indulgence of bravado. The members from Mississippi "regretted the necessity" which impelledtheir State to the course adopted, but declared that it met "theirunqualified approval. " The card was no doubt written by Mr. L. Q. C. Lamar, and accurately described his emotions. He stood firmlyby his State in accordance with the political creed in which hehad been reared, but looked back with tender regret to the Unionwhose destiny he had wished to share and under the protection ofwhose broader nationality he had hoped to live and die. A fewSouthern representatives marked their retirement by speeches bitterlyreproaching the Federal Government, and bitterly accusing theRepublican party; but the large majority confined themselves tothe simpler form of the card. 

Whether the ease and confidence as to the future which these Southernrepresentatives manifested was really felt or only assumed, cannever be known. They were all men of intelligence, some of themconspicuously able; and it seems incredible that they could havepersuaded themselves that a great government could be dissolvedwithout shock and without resistance. They took leave with no moreformality than that with which a private gentleman, aggrieved bydiscourteous treatment, withdraws from a company in which he feelsthat he can no longer find enjoyment. Their confidence was basedon the declarations and admissions of Mr. Buchanan's message; butthey had, in effect, constructed that document themselves, and theslightest reflection should have warned them that, with the changeof administration to occur in a few weeks, there would be a differentunderstanding of Executive duty, and a different appeal to thereason of the South. 

The senators from the seceding States were more outspoken than therepresentatives. They took the opportunity of their retirement tosay many things which, even for their own personal fame, shouldhave been left unsaid. A clear analysis of these harangues isimpossible. They lacked the unity and directness of the simplenotifications with which the seceding representatives had withdrawnfrom the House. The valedictories in the Senate were a singularcompound of defiance and pity, of justification and recrimination. Some of the speeches have an insincere and mock-heroic tone to thereader twenty years after the event. They appear to be theexpressions of men who talked for effect, and who professed themselvesready for a shock of arms which they believed would never come. But the majority of the utterances were by men who meant all theysaid; who, if they did not anticipate a bloody conflict, were yetprepared for it, and who were too deeply stirred by resentment andpassion to give due heed to consequences. 

On the 21st of January the senators from Florida, Alabama, andMississippi formally withdrew from the Senate. Their speechesshowed little variety of thought, consisting chiefly of indictmentsagainst the free States for placing the government under the controlof an anti-slavery administration. Mr. Yulee was the first tospeak. He solemnly announced to the Senate that "the State ofFlorida, though a convention of her people, had decided to recallthe powers which she had delegated to the Federal Government, andto assume the full exercise of all her sovereign rights as anindependent and separate community. " At what particular period inthe history of the American continent Florida had enjoyed "sovereignrights, " by what process she had ever "delegated powers to theFederal Government, " or at what time she had ever been "an independentand separate community, " Mr. Yulee evidently preferred not to informthe Senate. His colleague, Mr. Mallory, implored the people ofthe North not to repeat the fatal folly of the Bourbons by imaginingthat "the South would submit to the degradation of a constrainedexistence under a violated Constitution. " Mr. Mallory regardedthe subjugation of the South by war as impossible. He warned theNorth that they were dealing with "a nation, and not with afaction. "

Mr. Clement C. Clay, Jr. , of Alabama, boasted that in the conventionwhich adopted the Ordinance of Secession in his State there wasnot one friend of the Union; and he resented with indignation whathe termed the offensive calumny of the Republicans in denouncingslavery and polygamy as twin relics of barbarism. The action ofAlabama, he said, was not from "sudden, spasmodic, and violentpassion. " It was the conclusion her people had reached "afteryears of enmity, injustice, and injury at the hands of their Northernbrethren. " Instead of causing surprise, "it is rather matter ofreproach that they have endured so much and so long, and havedeferred this act of self-defense until to-day. " Mr. Clay's speechwas insulting and exasperating to the last degree. His colleague, Mr. Fitzpatrick, a man of better tempter, showed reserve and anindisposition to discuss the situation. He contented himself withthe expression of a general concurrence in the views of Mr. Clay, adding no word of bitterness himself. He said that he "acknowledgedloyalty to no other power than to the sovereign State of Alabama. "But for the pressure brought upon him, Mr. Fitzpatrick would havebeen glad to retain his seat in the Senate and wait the course ofevents. He was not in his heart a Disunionist, as his colleaguewas. He would have accepted the nomination for the Vice-Presidencyon the ticket with Douglas the preceding year, if the whole politicalpower of the Cotton States had not opposed his wishes and forcedhim into the support of Breckinridge. 

 VALEDICTORY OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 

Jefferson Davis expressed his concurrence in the action of thepeople of Mississippi. He believed that action was necessary andproper, but would "have felt himself equally bound if his beliefhad been otherwise. " He presented an analysis of the differencebetween the remedies of nullification and secession. Nullificationwas a remedy inside of the Union; secession a remedy outside. Heexpressed himself as against the theory of nullification, andexplained that, so far from being identified with secession, thetwo are antagonistic principles. Mr. Calhoun's mistake, accordingto Mr. Davis, was in trying to "nullify" the laws of the Unionwhile continuing a member of it. He intimated that PresidentJackson would never have attempted to "execute the laws" in SouthCarolina as he did against the nullifiers in 1832, if the Statehad seceded, and that therefore his great example could not bequoted in favor of "coercion. " It is not believed that Mr. Davishad the slightest authority for this aspersion upon the memory ofJackson. It seems rather to have been a disingenuous and unwarrantedstatement of the kind so plentifully used at the time for thepurpose of "firing the Southern heart. "

There had been an impression in the country that Mr. Davis wasamong the most reluctant of those who engaged in the secessionmovement; but in his speech he declared that he had conferred withthe people of Mississippi before the step was taken, and counseledthem to the course which they had adopted. This declaration wasa great surprise to Northern Democrats, among whom Mr. Davis hadmany friends. For several years he had been growing in favor witha powerful element in the Democracy of the free States, and, butfor the exasperating quarrel of 1860, he might have been selectedas the Presidential candidate of his party. No man gave up morethan Mr. Davis in joining the revolt against the Union. In hisfarewell words to the Senate, there was a tone of moderation anddignity not unmixed with regretful and tender emotions. There wasalso apparent a spirit of confidence and defiance. He evidentlyhad full faith that he was going forth to victory and to power. 

Mr. Toombs of Georgia did not take formal leave, but on the 7th ofJanuary delivered a speech which, though addressed to the Senateof the United States, was apparently intended to influence publicsentiment in Georgia, where there was an uncomfortable halting inthe progress of secession. The speech had special interest, notalone from Mr. Toombs's well-known ability, but because it was theonly presentation of the conditions on which the scheme of Disunionmight be arrested, and the Cotton States held fast in their loyaltyto the government, --conditions which, in the language of Mr. Toombs, would "restore fraternity and peace and unity to all of us. " Itwas not believed that Mr. Toombs had the faintest expectation thathis proposition would receive favorable consideration in the freeStates. His point would be fully gained by showing that the freeStates would not accept conditions which Georgia had the right toexact as the basis of her remaining in the Union. Once firmlypersuaded that she was deprived of her constitutional rights, Georgia could the more easily be led or forced into secession. 

The first condition prescribed by Mr. Toombs was, that in all theterritory owned or to be acquired by the United States, slaveproperty should be securely protected until the period of theformation of a State government, when the people could determinethe question for themselves. The second condition was, that propertyin slaves should be entitled to the same protection from theGovernment of the United States in all its departments everywhere, which is extended to other property, provided that there should beno interference with the liberty of a State to prohibit or establishslavery within its limits. The third condition was, that personscommitting crimes against slave property in one State, and fleeingto another, should be delivered up in the same manner as personscommitting crimes against other forms of property, and that thelaws of the State from which such persons flee should be the testof the criminality of the act. The fourth condition was, thatfugitive slaves should be surrendered under the Act of 1850 withoutbeing entitled to a writ of _habeas corpus_, or trial by jury, orother obstructions in the States to which they might flee. Thefifth and last demand was, that Congress should pass efficient lawsfor the punishment of all persons in any of the States who shouldin any manner aid or abet invasion or insurrection in any otherState, or commit any other act against the law of nations tendingto disturb the tranquility of the people or government of any otherState. Without the concession of these points Mr. Toombs said theUnion could not be maintained. If some satisfactory arrangementshould not be made, he was for immediate action. "We are, " hesaid, "as ready to fight now as we ever shall be. I will haveequality or war. " He denounced Mr. Lincoln as "an enemy to thehuman race, deserving the execration of all mankind. "

 GEORGIA SENATORS WITHDRAW. 

Three weeks later the Georgia senators withdrew. Georgia had onthe 19th of January, after much dragooning, passed the Ordinanceof Secession, and on the 28th, Mr. Alfred Iverson, the colleagueof Mr. Toombs, communicated the fact to the Senate in a highlyinflammatory speech. He proclaimed that Georgia was the sixthState to secede, that a seventh was about to follow, and that "aconfederacy of their own would soon be established. " Provisionwould be made "for the admission of other States, " and Mr. Iversonassured the Senate that within a few months "all the slave-holdingStates of the late confederacy of the United States will be unitedtogether in a bond of union far more homogenous, and therefore morestable, than the one now being dissolved. " His boasting wasunrestrained, but his conception of the contest which he and hisassociates were inviting was pitiably inadequate. "Your conquest, "said he, addressing the Union senators, "will cost you a hundredthousand lives and a hundred millions of dollars. "

The conclusion of Mr. Iverson's harangue disclosed his fear thatafter all Georgia might prefer the old Union. "For myself, " saidhe, "unless my opinions greatly change, I shall never consent tothe reconstruction of the Federal Union. The Rubicon is passed, and with my consent shall never be recrossed. " But these bolddeclarations were materially qualified by Mr. Iverson when hereflected on the powerful minority of Union men in Georgia, andthe general feeling in that State against a conflict with theNational Government. "In this sentiment, " said he, "I may beoverruled by the people of my State and of the other SouthernStates. " . . . "Nothing, however, will bring Georgia back excepta full and explicit recognition and guaranty of the safety andprotection of the institution of domestic slavery. " This was thefinal indication of the original weakness of the secession causein Georgia, and of the extraordinary means which were taken toimpress the people of that State with the belief that secessionwould lead to reconstruction on a basis of more efficient protectionto the South and greater strength to the whole Union. 

On the 4th of February Mr. Slidell and Mr. Benjamin delivered theirvaledictories as senators from Louisiana. Mr. Slidell was aggressivelyinsolent. He informed the Senate that if any steps should be takento enforce the authority of the Union in the seceded States, theywould be resisted. "You may, " he said, "under color of enforcingyour laws and collecting your revenue, blockade our ports. Thiswill be war, and we shall meet it with different but equallyefficient weapons. We will not permit the consumption or introductionof any of your manufactures. Every sea will swarm with ourprivateers, the volunteer militia of the ocean. " He confidentlyexpected foreign aid. "How long, " he asked, "will the great navalpowers of Europe permit you to impede their free intercourse withtheir best customers, and to stop the supply of the great staplewhich is the most important basis of their manufacturing industry?""You were, " said he, adding taunt to argument, "with all the wealthof this once great confederacy, but a fourth or fifth rate navalpower. What will you be when emasculated by the withdrawal offifteen States, and warred upon by them with active and inveteratehostility?"

In a tone of patronizing liberality, Mr. Slidell gave assurancethat the new confederacy would recognize the rights of the inhabitantsof the valley of the Mississippi and its tributaries to freenavigation, and would guarantee to them "a free interchange ofagricultural production without impost, and the free transit fromforeign countries of every species of merchandise, subjected onlyto such regulations as may be necessary for a protection of therevenue system which we may establish. " Had Mr. Slidell been lessinspired by insolence, and more largely endowed with wisdom, hewould have remembered that when the Union contained but six millionsof people, they were willing to fight any one of three great Europeanpowers for freedom of access to the sea for the inhabitants of thevalley of the Mississippi, and that it was from the first a physicalimpossibility to close it or in any way restrict it against therights of the North-West. The people of that section, even withoutthe prestige of the national flag, were immeasurably stronger thanthe people of the South-West, and were, unaided, fully competentto fight their way to the ocean over any obstacles which the powersbehind Mr. Slidell could interpose. In the mere matching of localstrength, it was sheer folly for the States of the lower Mississippito attempt to control the mouth of that river. 

 SPEECHES OF BENJAMIN AND SLIDELL. 

Mr. Judah P. Benjamin spoke in a tone of moderation as contrastedwith the offensive dictation of Mr. Slidell. He devoted himselfmainly to answering an argument which came instinctively to everyman's mind, and which bore with particular severity upon the actionof Louisiana. Mr. Benjamin brought his eminent legal ability tothe discussion, but failed even to satisfy himself. The State ofLouisiana was formed from territory which had been bought and paidfor by the United States out of the common treasury of the wholepeople. Whatever specious plea might be made for the independentand separate sovereignty of the old thirteen States, the argumentcould not apply to Louisiana. No one could maintain that Louisianahad ever enjoyed a separate sovereignty of any kind, nominal orreal. She had been originally owned by France, had been sold toSpain, had been sold back again to France, and had been bought bythe United States. These sales had been made without protest fromany one, and the title conferred at each transfer was undisputed, the sovereignty of the purchasing power undeniable. 

Confronting these facts, and realizing the difficulty they presented, Mr. Benjamin was reduced to desperate straits for argument. "Withoutentering into the details of the negotiation, " he said, "the archivesof our State Department show the fact to be that although thedomain, the public lands and other property of France in the cededprovince, were conveyed by absolute title to the United States, the sovereignty was not conveyed _otherwise than in trust_. " Thispeculiar statement of a sovereignty that was "conveyed in trust"Mr. Benjamin attempted to sustain by quoting the clause in thetreaty which gave the right of the people of Louisiana to beincorporated into the Union "on terms of equality with the otherStates. " From this he argued that the sovereignty of the _Territory_of Louisiana held in trust by the Federal Government, and conveyedto the _State_ of Louisiana on her admission to the Union, wasnecessarily greater than the National sovereignty. Indeed, Mr. Benjamin recognized no "Nation" in the United States and no realsovereignty in the General Government which was but the agent ofthe sovereign States. It properly and logically followed, accordingto Mr. Benjamin, that the "sovereignty held in trust, " might, whenconferred, be immediately and rightfully employed to destroy thelife of the trustee. The United States might or might not admitLouisiana to the Union, for the General Government was sole judgeas to time and expediency--but when once admitted, the power ofthe State was greater than the power of the Government whichpermitted the State to come into existence. Such were thecontradictions and absurdities which the creed of the Secessionistsinevitably involved, and in which so clever a man as Mr. Benjaminwas compelled to blunder and flounder. 

Pursuing his argument, Mr. Benjamin wished to know whether thosewho asserted that Louisiana had been bought by the United Statesmeant that the United States had the right based on that fact tosell Louisiana? He denied in every form that there had ever beensuch a purchase of Louisiana as carried with it the right of sale. "I deny, " said he, "the fact on which the argument is founded. Ideny that the Province of Louisiana or the people of Louisiana wereever conveyed to the United States for a price as property thatcould be bought or sold at will. " However learned Mr. Benjaminmay have been in the law, he was evidently ill informed as to thehistory of the transaction of which he spoke so confidently. Heshould have known that the United States, sixteen years after itbought Louisiana from France, actually sold or exchanged a largepart of that province to the King of Spain as part of the considerationin the purchase of the Floridas. He should have known that at thetime the Government of the United States disposed of a part ofLouisiana, there was not an intelligent man in the world who didnot recognize its right and power to dispose of the whole. Thetheory that the United States acquired a less degree of sovereigntyover Louisiana than was held by France when she transferred it, orby Spain when she owned it, was never dreamed of when the negotiationwas made. It was an afterthought on the part of the hard-presseddefenders of the right of secession. It was the ingenious but lamedevice of an able lawyer who undertook to defend what wasindefensible. 

Mr. Yulee of Florida had endeavored to make the same argument onbehalf of his State, feeling the embarrassment as did Mr. Benjamin, and relying, as Mr. Benjamin did, upon the clause in the treatywith Spain entitling Florida to admission to the Union. Mr. Benjaminand Mr. Yulee should both have known that the guaranty which theyquoted was nothing more and nothing less than the ordinary conditionwhich every enlightened nation makes in parting with its subjectsor citizens, that they shall enter into the new relation withoutdiscrimination against them and with no lower degree of civil rightsthan had already been enjoyed by those who form the nation to whichthey are about to be annexed. Louisiana, when she was transferredto the United States, received no further guaranty than Napoleonin effect gave to Spain at the treaty of San Ildefonso, or thanthe Spanish Bourbons had given to the French Bourbons in the treatyof 1763 at the close of the Seven Years' War. In each of the threetransfers of the sovereignty of Louisiana, the same condition wasperfectly understood as to the rights of the inhabitants. Mr. Benjamin drew the conclusion which was not only diametrically wrongin morals, but diametrically erroneous in logic. Instead ofinferring that a State, situated as Louisiana was, should necessarilybecome greater than the power which purchased it, simply becauseother States in the Union which she joined had assumed such power, a discriminating mind of Mr. Benjamin's acuteness should have seenthat the very position proved the reverse of what he stated, anddemonstrated, in the absurdity of Louisiana's secession, the equalabsurdity of the secession of South Carolina and Georgia. 

 THE ARGUMENT OF MR. BENJAMIN. 

It seemed impossible for Mr. Benjamin or for any other leader ofSouthern opinion to argue the question of State rights fairly ordispassionately. They had been so persistently trained in theheresy that they could give no weight to the conclusive reasoningof the other side. The original thirteen, they averred, were "free, sovereign, and independent States, " acknowledged to be such by theKing of Great Britain in the Treaty of peace in 1783. The newStates, so the argument ran, were all admitted to the Union ofterms of equality with the old. Hence all were alike endowed withsovereignty. Even the historical part of this argument was strainedand fallacious. Much was made in the South of Mr. Toombs'sdeclaration that "the original thirteen" were as "independent ofeach other as Australia and Jamaica. " So indeed they were as longas they remained British Colonies. Their only connection in thatcondition was in their common dependence on the Crown. But thefirst step towards independence of the Crown was to unite. Fromthat day onward they were never separate. Nor did the King ofGreat Britain acknowledge the "independence and sovereignty" ofthe thirteen individual and separate States. The Treaty of peacedeclares that "His Majesty acknowledges the said United States[naming them] to be free, sovereign, and independent States. "--notseparately and individually, but the "said _United_ States. " TheKing then agrees that "the following are and shall be the boundariesof the said United States, "--proceeding to give, not the boundariesof each State, but the boundaries of the whole as one unit, onesovereignty, one nationality. Last of all, the commissioners whosigned the treaty with the King's commissioner were not acting forthe individual States, but for the _United_ States. Three of them, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay, were from the North, and Henry Laurens from the South. The separate sovereignties whoseexistence was so persistently alleged by Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Toombswere not represented when independence was conceded. Mr. Benjamin'sconclusion, therefore, was not only illogical, but was completelydisproved by plain historical facts. 

It seems never to have occurred to Mr. Benjamin, or to Mr. Yulee, or to the Texas senators, or to the Arkansas senators, that themoney paid from a common treasury of the nation gave any claim toNational sovereignty. Their philosophy seems to have been thatthe General Government had been paid in full by the privilege ofnurturing new States, of improving their rivers and harbors, ofbuilding their fortifications, of protecting them in peace, ofdefending them in war. The privilege of leading the new communitiesthrough the condition of Territorial existence up to the fullmajesty of States, was, according to secession argument, sufficientcompensation, and removed all shadow of the title or the sovereigntyof the National Government, the moment the inhabitants thus benefittedannounced their desire to form new connections. Louisiana had costfifteen millions of dollars at a time when that was a vast sum ofmoney. It had cost five millions of money and the surrender of aprovince, to purchase Florida, and nearly a hundred millions moreto extinguish the Indian title, and make the State habitable forwhite men. Texas cost the National Treasury ninety millions ofdollars in the war which was precipitated by her annexation, andten millions more paid to her in 1850, in adjustment of her boundarytrouble. All these States apparently regarded the tie that boundthem to the National Government as in no degree mutual, as imposingno duty upon them. By some mysterious process still unexplained, the more they gained from connection with the National authority, the less was their obligation thereto, the more perfect their rightto disregard and destroy the beneficent government which had createdthem and fostered them. 

 SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES NOT STATED. 

In all the speeches delivered by the senators from the secedingStates, there was no presentation of the grievances which, in theirown minds, justified secession. This fact elicited less notice atthe time than it calls forth in retrospect. Those senators heldin their hands in the beginning, the fate of the secession movement. If they had advised the Southern States that it was wiser and betterto abide in the Union, and at least to wait for some overt act ofwrong against the slave States, the whole movement would havecollapsed. But they evidently felt that this would be a shrinkingand cowardly policy after the numerous manifestoes they had issued. South Carolina had taken the fatal step, and to fail in sustainingher would be to co-operate in crushing her. While these motivesand aims are intelligible, it seems utterly incredible that notone of the senators gave a specification of the wrongs which ledthe South to her rash step. Mr. Toombs recounted the concessionson which the South would agree to remain; but these were newprovisions and new conditions, never intended by the framers ofthe Federal Constitution; and they were abhorrent to the civilizationof the nineteenth century. 

Mr. Toombs, Mr. Jefferson Davis, and Mr. Benjamin were the threeablest senators who spoke in favor of secession. Not one of themdeemed it necessary to justify his conduct by a recital of thegrounds on which so momentous a step could bear the test of historicexamination. They dealt wholly in generalities as to the past, and apparently based their action on something that was to happenin the future. Mr. John Slidell sought to give a strong reasonfor the movement, in the statement that, if Lincoln should beinaugurated with Southern assent, the 4th of March would witness, in various quarters, outbreaks among the slaves which, althoughthey would be promptly suppressed, would carry ruin and devastationto many a Southern home. It was from Mr. Slidell that Mr. Buchananreceived the information which induced him to dwell at length inhis annual message on this painful feature of the situation. Butit was probably an invention of Mr. Slidell's fertile brain--imposedupon the President and intended to influence public sentiment inthe North. It was in flat contradiction of the general faith inthe personal fealty of their slaves, so constantly boasted by theSouthern men, --a faith abundantly justified by the subsequent factthat four years of war passed without a single attempt to servileinsurrection. At the time of the John Brown disturbance the Southresented the imputation of fear, made upon it by the North. Ifnow the danger was especially imminent, Southern leaders were solelyto blame. They would not accept the honorable assurance of theRepublican party and of the President-elect that no interferencewith slavery in the States was designed. They insisted in alltheir public addresses that Mr. Lincoln was determined to uprootslavery everywhere, and they might well fear that these repeateddeclarations had been heard and might be accepted by their slaves. 

The omission by individual senators to present the grievances whichjustified secession is perhaps less notable then the same omissionby the conventions which ordained secession in the several States. South Carolina presented, as a special outrage, the enactment ofpersonal-liberty bills in the free States, and yet, from thefoundation of the Federal Government, she had probably never losta slave in consequence of these enactments. In Georgia the attemptat justification reached the ludicrous when solemn charge was madethat a bounty had been paid from the Federal Treasury to New-Englandfishermen. The tariff was complained of, the navigation laws weresneered at. But these were all public policies which had been inoperation with Southern consent and largely with Southern support, throughout the existence of the Republic. When South Carolinaattempted, somewhat after the illustrious model of the Declarationof Independence, to present justifying reasons for her course, thevery authors of the document must have seen that it amounted onlyto a parody. 

Finding no satisfactory exhibit of grievances, either in the speechesof senators or in the declarations of conventions, one naturallyinfers that the Confederate Government, when formally organized atMontgomery in February, must have given a full and lucid statementto the world of the reasons for this extraordinary movement. Whenour fathers were impelled to break their loyalty to the Englishking, and to establish an independent government, they declared inthe very fore-front of the document which contained their reasons, that "when it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve thepolitical bonds which have connected them with another, and toassume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal stationto which the laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, adecent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that _they shoulddeclare the causes which impel them to the separation_. " Theyfollowed this assertion with an exhibit of causes which, in thejudgment of the world, has been and ever will be, a completejustification of their revolutionary movement. 

 THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JEFFERSON DAVIS. 

The Confederate Government saw fit to do nothing of the kind. Their Congress put forth no declaration or manifesto, and JeffersonDavis in his Inaugural as President utterly failed--did not evenattempt--to enumerate the grounds of complaint upon which thedestruction of the American Union was based. He said that "thedeclared compact of the Union from which we have withdrawn was toestablish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for thecommon defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessingof liberty to ourselves and our posterity. And when, in the judgmentof the sovereign States now composing this confederacy, it has beenperverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceasesto answer the ends for which it was established, a peaceful appealto the ballot-box declared, that, so far as they were concerned, the government created by that compact should cease to exist. Inthis they merely assert the right which the Declaration of Independenceof 1776 defined to be inalienable. " But in what manner, at whattime, by what measure, "justice, domestic tranquillity, commondefense, the general welfare, " had been destroyed by the governmentof the Union, Mr. Jefferson Davis did not deign to inform the worldto whose opinion he appealed. 

Mr. Jefferson, in draughting the Declaration of Independence whichDavis quotes as his model, said "the history of the present Kingof Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyrannyover these States. " What would have been thought of Mr. Jeffersonif he had stopped there and adduced no instance and given no proofof his serious indictment against George III. ? But Mr. Jeffersonand his fellow-patriots in that great Act proceeded to submit theirproof to the judgment of a candid world. They recited twenty-eightdistinct charges of oppression and tyranny, depriving them of rightsto which they were entitled as subjects of the Crown under theBritish Constitution. From that hour to this, there has been nodisproval of the truth of these charges or of the righteousness ofthe resistance to which our forefathers resorted. It would havebeen well for the dignity of the Southern Confederacy in historyif one of its many able men had placed on record, in an authenticform, the grounds upon which, and the grievances for which, destruction of the Union could be justified. 

In his message to the Confederate Congress, Mr. Davis apparentlyattempted to cure the defects of his Inaugural address, and to givea list of measures which he declared to have been hostile to Southerninterests. But it is to be observed that not one of these measureshad been completed. They were merely menaced or foreshadowed. Asmatter of fact, emphasized by Mr. Buchanan in his message, andknown to no one better than to Mr. Davis, not a single measureadverse to the interests of slavery had been passed by the Congressof the United States from the foundation of the government. Ifthe Missouri Compromise of 1820 be alleged as an exception to thissweeping assertion, it must be remembered that that compromise wasa Southern and not a Northern measure, and was a triumph of thepro-slavery members of Congress over the anti-slavery members; andthat its constitutionality was upheld by the unanimous voice ofthe Cabinet in which Mr. Crawford of Georgia and Mr. Calhoun ofSouth Carolina were leading members. 

On the other hand, the policy of the government had been steadilyin favor of slavery; and the measures of Congress which wouldstrengthen it were not only numerous, but momentous in character. They are familiar to every one who knows the simplest elements ofour national history. The acquisition of Louisiana, the purchaseof Florida, the Mexican war, were all great national movementswhich resulted in strengthening the slave power. Every demandwhich the South made for protection had been conceded. Morestringent provisions for the return of fugitive slaves were asked, and a law was enacted trampling under foot the very spirit ofliberty, and putting in peril the freedom of men who were citizensof Northern States. The Missouri Compromise, passed with theconsent and support of the South, was repealed by Southern dictationthe moment its operation was found to be hostile to the spread ofslavery. The rights of slavery in the Territories required judicialconfirmation, and the Supreme Court complied by rendering the famousdecision in the case of Dred Scott. Against all these guarantiesand concessions for the support of slavery, Mr. Davis could quote, not anti-slavery aggressions which had been made, but only thosewhich might be made in the future. 

 SOUTHERN RESISTANCE TO LAW. 

This position disclosed the real though not the avowed cause ofthe secession movement. Its authors were not afraid of an immediateinvasion of the rights of the slave-holder in the States, but theywere conscious that the growth of the country, the progress ofcivilization, and the expansion of our population, were all hostileto their continued supremacy as the governing element in theRepublic. The South was the only section in which there wasdistinctively a governing class. The slave-holders ruled theirStates more positively than ever the aristocratic classes ruledEngland. Besides the distinction of free and slave, or black andwhite, there was another line of demarcation between white men thatwas as absolute as the division between patrician and plebeian. The nobles of Poland who dictated the policy of the kingdom wereas numerous in proportion to the whole population as the rich classof slave-holders whose decrees governed the policy of their States. It was, in short, an oligarchy which by its combined power ruledthe Republic. No President of any party had ever been elected whowas opposed to its supremacy. The political revolution of 1860had given to the Republic an anti-slavery President, and the Southernmen refused to accept the result. They had been too long accustomedto power to surrender it to an adverse majority, however lawful orconstitutional that majority might be. They had been trained tolead and not to follow. They were not disciplined to submission. They had been so long in command that they had become incapable ofobedience. Unwillingness to submit to Constitutional authoritywas the controlling consideration which drove the Southern Statesto the desperate design of a revolution, peaceful they hoped itwould be, but to a revolution even if it should be one of blood. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Congress in the Winter of 1860-61. --The North offers Many Concessionsto the South. --Spirit of Conciliation. --Committee of Thirteen inthe Senate. --Committee of Thirty-three in the House. --Disagreementof Senate Committee. --Propositions submitted to House Committee. --Thomas Corwin's Measure. --Henry Winter Davis. --Justin S. Morrill--Mr. Houston of Alabama. --Constitutional Amendment proposed byCharles Francis Adams. --Report of the Committee of Thirty-three. --Objectionable Measures proposed. --Minority Report by SouthernMembers. --The Crittenden Compromise proposed. --Details of thatCompromise. --Mr. Adams's Double Change of Ground. --An Old Resolutionof the Massachusetts Legislature. --Mr. Webster's Criticism Pertinent. --Various Minority Reports. --The California Members. --Washburn andTappan. --Amendment to the Constitution passed by the House. --Bythe Senate also. --New Mexico. --The Fugitive-slave Law. --Mr. Clarkof New Hampshire. --Peace Congress. --Invited by Virginia. --Assemblesin Washington. --Peace Measures proposed. --They meet no Favor inCongress. --Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada originated. --Prohibition of Slavery abandoned. --Republicans in Congress donot ask it. --Explanation required. --James S. Green of Missouri. --His Character as a Debater. --Northern Republicans frightened attheir own Success. --Anxious for a Compromise. --Dread of Disunion. --Northern Democrats. --Dangerous Course pursued by them. --GeneralDemoralization of Northern Sentiment. 

While the Secession leaders were engaged in their schemes for thedisruption of the National Government and the formation of a newconfederacy, Congress was employing every effort to arrest theDisunion tendency by making new concessions, and offering newguaranties to the offended power of the South. If the wildprecipitation of the Southern leaders must be condemned, thecompromising course of the majority in each branch of Congress willnot escape censure, --censure for misjudgment, not for wrong intention. The anxiety in both Senate and House to do something which shouldallay the excitement in the slave-holding section served only todevelop and increase its exasperation and its resolution. A manis never so aggressively bold as when he finds his opponent afraidof him; and the efforts, however well meant, of the National Congressin the winter of 1860-61 undoubtedly impressed the South with astill further conviction of the timidity of the North, and with acertainty that the new confederacy would be able to organize withoutresistance, and to dissolve the Union without war. 

 COMMITTEES OF CONCILIATION. 

Congress had no sooner convened in December, 1860, and receivedthe message of Mr. Buchanan, with its elaborate argument that theNational Government possessed no power to coerce a State, than ineach branch special committees of conciliation were appointed. They were not so termed in the resolutions of the Senate and House, but their mission was solely one of conciliation. They were chargedwith the duty of giving extraordinary assurances that Slavery wasnot to be disturbed, and of devising measures which might persuadeSouthern men against the rashness on which they seemed bent. Inthe Senate they raised a committee of thirteen, representing thenumber of the original States of the Union. In the House thecommittee was composed of thirty-three members, representing thenumber of States then existing. In the Senate, Mr. Powell ofKentucky was chairman of the committee of thirteen, which wascomposed of seven Democrats, five Republicans, and the venerableMr. Crittenden of Kentucky, who belonged to neither party. Itcontained the most eminent men in the Senate of all shades ofpolitical opinion. In the House, Thomas Corwin was made chairman, with a majority of Republicans of the more conservative type, aminority of Democrats, and Mr. Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, whoheld a position similar to that occupied by Mr. Crittenden in theSenate. 

The Senate committee promptly disagreed, and before the close ofDecember reported to the Senate their inability to come to anyconclusion. The committee of thirty-three was more fortunate, orperhaps unfortunate, in being able to arrive at a series ofconclusions which tended only to lower the tone of Northern opinionwithout in the least degree appeasing the wrath of the South. Therecord of that committee is one which cannot be reviewed with prideor satisfaction by any citizen of a State that was loyal to theUnion. Every form of compromise which could be suggested, everyconcession of Northern prejudice and every surrender of Northernpride, was urged upon the committee. The measures proposed to thecommittee by members of the House were very numerous, and thosesuggested by the members of the committee themselves seemed designedto meet every complaint made by the most extreme Southern agitators. The propositions submitted would in the aggregate fill a largevolume, but a selection from the mass will indicate the spiritwhich had taken possession of Congress. 

Mr. Corwin of Ohio wished a declaration from Congress that it was"highly inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbiaunless with the consent of the States of Maryland and Virginia. "Mr. Winter Davis suggested the Congress should request the Statesto revise their statutes with a view to repeal all personal-libertybills, and further that the Fugitive-slave Law be so amended as tosecure trial by jury to the fugitive slave, not in the free Statewhere he was arrested, but in the slave State to which he might betaken. Mr. Morrill of Vermont offered a resolution declaring thatall accessions of foreign territory shall hereafter be made bytreaty stipulation, and that no treaty shall be ratified until ithad received the legislative assent of two-thirds of all the Statesof the Union, and that neither Congress nor any TerritorialLegislature shall pass any law establishing or prohibiting slaveryin any Territory thus acquired until it shall have sufficientpopulation to entitle it to admission to the Union. Mr. Houstonof Alabama urged the restitution of the Missouri line of 36° 30´. There was in the judgment of many Southern men a better opportunityto effect an adjustment on this line of partition than upon anyother basis that had been suggested. But the plea carried with ita national guaranty and protection of slavery on the southern sideof the line, and its effect would inevitably have been in a fewyears to divide the Republic from ocean to ocean. Mr. Taylor ofLouisiana wanted the Constitution so amended that the rights ofthe slave-holder in the Territories could be guarantied, and furtheramended so that no person, "unless he was of the Caucasian raceand of pure and unmixed blood, " should ever be allowed to vote forany officer of the National Government. 

 PROPOSITIONS OF COMPROMISE. 

Mr. Charles Francis Adams proposed that the Constitution of theUnited States be so amended that no subsequent amendment thereto, "having for its object any interference with slavery, shall originatewith any State that does not recognize that relation within itsown limits, or shall be valid without the assent of every one ofthe States composing the Union. " No Southern man, during the longagitation of the slavery questions extending from 1820 to 1860, had ever submitted so extreme a proposition as that of Mr. Adams. The most precious muniment of personal liberty never had such deepembedment in the organic law of the Republic as Mr. Adams nowproposed for the protection of slavery. The well-grounded jealousyand fear of the smaller States had originally secured a provisionthat their right to equal representation in the Senate should neverbe taken from them even by an amendment of the Constitution. Mr. Adams now proposed to give an equal safeguard and protection tothe institution of slavery. Yet the proposition was opposed byonly three members of the committee of thirty-three, --Mason W. Tappan of New Hampshire, Cadwallader C. Washburn of Wisconsin, and William Kellogg of Illinois. 

After a consideration of the whole subject, the majority of thecommittee made a report embodying nearly every objectionableproposition which had been submitted. The report included aresolution asking the States to repeal all their personal-libertybills, in order that the recapture and return of fugitive slavesshould in no degree be obstructed. It included an amendment tothe Constitution as proposed by Mr. Adams. It offered to admitNew Mexico, which then embraced Arizona, immediately, with itsslave-code as adopted by the Territorial Legislature, --thus confirmingand assuring its permanent character as a slave State. It proposedto amend the Fugitive-slave Law by providing that the right tofreedom of an alleged fugitive should be tried in the slave Statefrom which he was accused of fleeing, rather than in the free Statewhere he was seized. It proposed, according to the demand of Mr. Toombs, that a law should be enacted in which all offenses againstslave property by persons fleeing to other States should be triedwhere the offense was committed, making the slave-code, in effect, the test of the criminality of the act, --an act which, in itsessential character, might frequently be one of charity and goodwill. 

These propositions had the precise effect which, in cooler moments, their authors would have anticipated. They humiliated the Northwithout appeasing or satisfying the South. Five Southern membersmade a minority report in which still further concessions weredemanded. They submitted what was known as the Crittenden Compromise, demanding six amendments to the Constitution for the avowed purposeof placing slavery under the guardianship and protection of theNational Government, and, after the example of Mr. Adams's proposedamendment, intrenching the institution where agitation could notdisturb it, where legislation could not affect it, where amendmentsto the Constitution would be powerless to touch it. 

--The first amendment proposed that in "all the territory of theUnited States south of the old Missouri line, either now held orto be hereafter acquired, the slavery of the African race isrecognized as existing, not to be interfered with by Congress, butto be protected as property by all the departments of the TerritorialGovernment during its continuance. "

--The second amendment declared that "Congress shall have no powerto interfere with slavery even in those places under its exclusivejurisdiction in the slave States. "

--The third amendment took away from Congress the exclusivejurisdiction over the District of Columbia, as guarantied in theConstitution, declaring that Congress should "never interfere withslavery in the District, except with the consent of Virginia andMaryland, so long as it exists in the State of Virginia or Maryland, nor without the consent of the inhabitants of the District, norwithout just compensation for the slaves. Nor shall Congressprohibit officers of the General Government nor members of Congressfrom bringing with them their slaves to the District, holding themthere during the time their duties may require them to remain, andafterwards taking them from the District. "

--The fourth amendment prohibited Congress from interfering withthe transportation of slaves from one State to another, or fromone State to any Territory south of the Missouri line, whether thattransportation be by land, by navigable river, or by the sea. 

--The fifth amendment conferred upon Congress the power, andprescribed its duty, to provide for the payment to the owner of afugitive slave his full value from the National Treasury, in allcases where the marshal was prevented from arresting said fugitiveby violence or intimidation, or where the fugitive, after arrest, was rescued by force. 

--The sixth amendment provided for a perpetual existence of thefive amendments just quoted, by placing them beyond the power ofthe people to change or revise--declaring that "no future amendmentto the Constitution shall ever be passed that shall affect anyprovision of the five amendments just recited; that the provisionin the original Constitution which guaranties the count of three-fifths of the slaves in the basis of representation, shall neverbe changed by any amendment; that no amendment shall ever be madewhich alters or impairs the original provision for the recovery offugitives from service; that no amendment shall be made that shallever permit Congress to interfere in any way with slavery in theState where it may be permitted. "

 PROPOSITIONS OF COMPROMISE. 

Before Mr. Corwin submitted his report, Mr. Charles Francis Adamsappears to have become disgusted with his own proposition for theamendment of the Constitution. This disgust was caused by therefusal of the Southern members of the committee to agree to thedeclaration that "peaceful acquiescence in the election of theChief Magistrate, accomplished in accordance with every legal andconstitutional requirement, is the paramount duty of every goodcitizen of the United States. " The proposition of Mr. Adams tothis effect was amended by Mr. Millson of Virginia, who substituted"high and imperative" for "paramount. " But even in this modifiedform, seven Southern members asked to be excused from voting uponit, and Mr. Adams seems wisely to have thought that "if there couldnot be agreement on a proposition so fundamental and essential asthat, it was of no use to seek any remedy for the existence ofevils by legislation of Congress. " Mr. Adams, therefore, made areport dissenting from the committee, stating that he had changedhis course, and now declined to recommend the very measures whichhe had in good faith offered. This was on the 14th of January. 

On the 31st of January Mr. Adams changed his course again, andreturned to the unqualified support of the measures proposed bythe committee. In his speech of that date, he asked, addressingthe South, "How stands the case, then? We offer to settle thequestion finally in all of the present territory that you claim, by giving you every chance of establishing Slavery that you haveany right to require of us. You decline to take the offer becauseyou fear it will do you no good. Slavery will not go there. Whyrequire protection where you will have nothing to protect? . . . All you appear to desire it is for New Mexico. Nothing else isleft. Yet you will not accept New Mexico at once, because tenyears of experience have proved to you that protection has been ofno use thus far. " These are somewhat extraordinary words in 1861from a man who in 1850 had, as a Conscience Whig, declined tosupport Mr. Webster for making in advance the same statements, andfor submitting arguments that were substantially identical. 

During the debate, in which Mr. Adams arraigned the Disunionistsof the South with considerable power, he was somewhat embarrassedby a Southern member who quoted resolutions which Mr. Adams hadintroduced in the Massachusetts Legislature in 1844, and which hadbeen passed by that body, respecting the annexation of Texas. Hehad declared therein, just as Josiah Quincy had declared withreference to the acquisition of Louisiana, "that the power to unitean independent foreign State with the United States is not amongthe powers delegated to the General Government by the Constitutionof the United States. " He declared, further, that "the Commonwealthof Massachusetts, faithful to the compact between the people ofthe United States, according to the plain meaning and intent inwhich it was understood and acceded to by them, is sincerely anxiousfor its preservation; and that it is determined, as it doubts notother States are, to submit to undelegated powers in no body ofmen on earth; and that the project of the annexation of Texas, unless resisted on the threshold, may tend to drive these Statesinto a dissolution of the Union. " This resolution of Mr. Adamswas unfortunate in every respect for his position in the debate onthat day, since it really included and justified every constitutionalheresy entertained by Mr. Calhoun, and claimed for the State ofMassachusetts every power of secession or dissolution which wasnow asserted by the Southern States. 

Mr. Webster, in one of his ablest speeches (in reply to Mr. Calhounin February, 1833), devoted his great powers to demonstrating thatthe Constitution was not "a compact, " and that the people of theStates had not "acceded" to it. Mr. Adams had unfortunately usedthe two words which, according to Mr. Webster, belonged only tothe lexicon of disloyalty. "If, " said Mr. Webster, "in adoptingthe Constitution nothing was done but _acceding to a compact_, nothing would seem necessary in order to break it up but to _secedefrom the same compact_. " "Accession, " as a word applied topolitical association, implies coming into a league, treaty, orconfederacy. "Secession" implied departing from such league orconfederacy. Mr. Adams had further declared that the people ofMassachusetts are "faithful to the compact according to the plainmeaning and intent in which it was understood by them. " Butaccording to Mr. Webster, and in accordance with the principlesabsolutely essential to maintain a constitutional government, Massachusetts had no part or lot in deciding the question whichMr. Adams's resolution covered. If Massachusetts reserved toherself the right to determine the sense in which she understoodher accession to the compact of the Federal Government, she gavefull warrant to South Carolina to determine for herself the senseof the compact to which she acceded, and therefore justified theaction of the Southern States. Whether Texas was constitutionallyor unconstitutionally annexed to the Union was no more to be decidedby Massachusetts than the constitutionality of the prohibition ofSlavery north of the Missouri line was to be decided by SouthCarolina. The position of Mr. Adams in 1844 had therefore returnedto plague its inventor in 1861, and in a certain sense to weakenthe position of the loyal States. 

 REPORT OF COMPROMISE COMMITTEE. 

Various reports were submitted by members of the minority, of nospecial significance, differing often on immaterial points. Themembers from California and Oregon who represented the Breckinridgeparty of the North, united in a recommendation for a generalconvention to be called under the authority of the Constitution, to propose such amendments as would heal all existing differences, and afford sufficient guaranties to the growing interests of thegovernment and people. The only bold words spoken were in the ablereport by Cadwallader C. Washburn of Wisconsin and Mason W. Tappanof New Hampshire. They made an exhaustive analysis of the situationin plain language. They reviewed ably and conclusively the reportmade by Mr. Corwin for the majority of the committee, and spoke asbecame men who represented the justice and the power of a greatRepublic. They vindicated the conduct of the General Government, and showed that the Union was not to be preserved by compromisesnor by sacrifice of principle. They regarded the discontent andhostility in the South as without just cause, and intimated thatthose States might purchase at a high price some valuable informationto be learned only in the school of experience. They embodiedtheir entire recommendations in a single resolution in which theydeclared that the provisions of the Constitution were ample forthe preservation of the Union; that it needed to be obeyed ratherthan amended; and that "our extrication from present difficultiesis to be looked for in efforts to preserve and protect the publicproperty and enforce the laws, rather than in new guaranties forparticular interests, or in compromises, or concessions to unreasonabledemands. "

When the report of the committee of thirty-three came before theHouse for action, the series of resolution were first tested by amotion to lay upon the table, which was defeated by a vote of nearlytwo to one; and after angry debate running through several days, the resolutions, which were only directory in their character, wereadopted by a large majority. When the constitutional amendment wasreached, Mr. Corwin substituted for that which was originallydraughted by Mr. Adams, an amendment declaring that "no amendmentshall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give toCongress the power to abolish, or interfere, within any State, withthe domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons heldto labor or service by the laws of said State. " This was adoptedby a vote of 133 to 65. It was numbered as the thirteenth amendmentto the Federal Constitution, and would have made slavery perpetualin the United States, so far as any influence or power of theNational Government could affect it. It intrenched slavery securelyin the organic law of the land, and elevated the privilege of theslave-holder beyond that of the owner of any other species ofproperty. It received the votes of a large number of Republicanswho were then and afterwards prominent in the councils of the party. Among the most distinguished were Mr. Sherman of Ohio, Mr. Colfax, Mr. C. F. Adams, Mr. Howard of Michigan, Mr. Windom of Minnesota, and Messrs. Moorhead and McPherson of Pennsylvania. The sixty-fivenegative votes were all Republicans whom the excitement of the hourdid not drag from their moorings, and many of whom have since done, as they had done before, signal service for their party and theircountry. Thaddeus Stevens was at their head, and he was sustainedby the two Washburns, by Bingham of Ohio, by Roscoe Conkling, byAnson Burlingame, by Owen Lovejoy, by Marston and Tappan of NewHampshire, by Galusha A. Grow, by Reuben E. Fenton, and by otherswho, if less conspicuous, were not less deserving. 

When the proposition reached the Senate, it was adopted by a voteof 24 to 12, precisely the requisite two-thirds. Among those whoaided in carrying it were Hunter of Virginia, Nicholson of Tennessee, Sebastian of Arkansas, and Gwin of California, who soon afterproceeded to join the Rebellion. Eight Republican senators, Anthonyof Rhode Island, Baker of Oregon, Dixon and Foster of Connecticut, Grimes and Harlan of Iowa, Morrill of Maine, and Ten Eyck of NewJersey, voted in the affirmative. Only twelve out of twenty-fiveRepublican senators voted in the negative. Mr. Seward, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Collamer, and others among the weightiest Republican leadersare not recorded as voting. As pairs were not announced, it maybe presumed that they consented to the passage of the amendment. Before the resolution could reach the States for concurrence, eitherby convention or Legislature, the evidences of Southern outbreakhad so increased that all such efforts at conciliation were seento be vain, and in the end they proved hurtful. Only two States, Maryland and Ohio, gave their assent to the amendment. In the New-England States it was rejected, and in many it was not acted upon. Whoever reads the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution as itnow stands, and compares it with the one which was proposed by theThirty-sixth Congress, will be struck with the rapid revolution ofpublic sentiment, and will not be at a loss to draw some usefullessons as to the course of public opinion and the conduct of publicmen in times of high excitement. 

 THE CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE. 

The propositions of the committee of thirty-three to admit NewMexico as a slave State, and to amend the Fugitive-slave Law, wereboth passed by the House, but were defeated or not acted upon inthe Senate. In that body the efforts of the friends of conciliationwere mainly confined to the Crittenden compromise which has alreadybeen outlined in the proceedings of the House. But for the eminentrespectability of the venerable senator from Kentucky, his propositionswould have had short consideration. They were of a character notto be entertained by a free people. They dealt wholly in thefinding of new guaranties for slavery, without attempting to intimatethe possible necessity of new guaranties for freedom. Perhaps themost vicious feature in this whole series of proposed amendmentsto the Constitution was the guaranty of slavery against the powerof Congress in all territory of the United States south of 36° 30´. This offered a premium upon the acquisition of territory, and wasan encouragement to schemes of aggression against friendly powerssouth of the United States, which would always have had the sympathyand support of one-half the Union, and could hardly have beenresisted by any moral power of the General Government. It wouldhave opened anew the old struggle for equality between free Statesand slave States, and would in all probability have led the countryto war within three years from its adoption, --war with Mexico forthe border States of that Republic, war with Spain for the acquisitionof Cuba. This would have followed as matter of policy with Southernleaders, whether they intended to abide in the Union, or whetherthey intended, at some more advantageous and opportune moment, tosecede from it. If they concluded to remain, their political powerin the National Government would have been greatly increased fromthe acquisition of new States. If they desired to secede, theywould have acquired a much more formidable strength and vastlylarger area by the addition of Southern territory to which theCrittenden propositions would not only have invited but driven them. 

While these propositions were under discussion, Mr. Clark of NewHampshire offered as a substitute the resolution with which Messrs. Washburn and Tappan had closed their report in the House, --aresolution of which Mr. Clark was the author, and which he hadpreviously submitted to the consideration of the Senate. The testquestion in the Senate was whether Mr. Clark's resolution shouldbe substituted for the Crittenden proposition, and this was carriedby a vote of 25 to 23. The twenty-five were all Republicans; thetwenty-three were all Democrats, except Mr. Crittenden of Kentuckyand Mr. Kennedy of Maryland, who had been supporters of Mr. Bellin the Presidential election. It is a fact worthy of note thatsix senators from the extreme Southern States sat in their seatsand refused to vote on the proposition. Had they chosen they couldhave defeated the action. But they believed, with a certainconsistency and wisdom, that no measure could be of value to theSouth unless it had the concurrence of senators from the North;and with this motive they imposed upon the Republicans of the Senatethe responsibility of deciding the Crittenden proposition. It wasmatter of congratulation with Republicans who did not lose theirjudgment in that trying season, that the Senate stood firmly againstthe fatal compromise which was urged by so many strong influences. Much was forgiven for other unwise concessions, so long as thiswas definitely rejected. 

 PROPOSITIONS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE. 

Meanwhile a body of men had assembled in the National Capital uponthe invitation of the State of Virginia, for the purpose of makingan earnest effort to adjust the unhappy controversy. The PeaceCongress, as it was termed, came together in the spirit in whichthe Constitution was originally formed. Its members professed, and no doubt felt, an earnest desire to afford to the slave-holdingStates, consistently with the principles of the Constitution, adequate guaranties for the security of their rights. Virginia'sproposition was brought to the National Capital by Ex-PresidentJohn Tyler, deputed by his State to that honorable duty. In responseto the invitation twenty-one States, fourteen free and seven slave, had sent delegates, who assembled in Washington on the 4th ofFebruary, 1861. After remaining in session some three weeks, thePeace Congress submitted an article of amendment to the Constitution, contained in seven sections, making as many distinct propositions. 

--The first section restored the line of the Missouri Compromiseas it was before the repeal in 1854. 

--The second provided that no further acquisition of territoryshould be made except by the consent of a majority of all thesenators from the slave-holding States and a majority of all thesenators from the free States. 

--The third declared that no amendment to the Constitution shallbe made interfering with Slavery in the States, nor shall Congressprohibit it in the District of Columbia, nor interfere with theinter-State slave-trade, nor place any higher rate of taxation onslaves than upon land. At the same time it abolished the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. 

--The fourth provided that no construction of the Constitutionshall prevent any of the States aiding, by appropriate legislation, in the arrest and delivery of fugitive slaves. 

--The fifth forever prohibited the foreign slave-trade. 

--The sixth declared that the amendments to the Constitution hereinproposed shall not be abolished or changed without the consent ofall the States. 

--The seventh provided for the payment from the National Treasuryfor all fugitive slaves whose recapture is prevented by violence. 

These propositions met with little favor in either branch of Congress. Mr. Crittenden, finding that he could not pass his own resolutions, endeavored to substitute these, but could induce only six senatorsto concur with him. In the House there was no action whatever uponthe report. The venerable Ex-President was chosen to preside overthe deliberations of the conference, but was understood not toapprove the recommendations. Far as they went, they had not gonefar enough to satisfy the demands of Virginia, and still less thedemands of the States which had already seceded. It is a curiouscircumstance that one of the delegates from Pennsylvania, Mr. J. Henry Puleston, was not a citizen of the United States, but asubject of Queen Victoria, and is now (1884), and has been forseveral years, a member of the British Parliament. 

To complete the anomalies and surprises of that session of Congress, it is necessary to recall the fact, that, with a Republican majorityin both branches, Acts organizing the Territories of Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada were passed without containing a word ofprohibition on the subject of slavery. From the day that theadministration of Mr. Polk began its career of foreign acquisition, the question of slavery in the Territories had been a subject ofcontroversy between political parties. When the Missouri Compromisewas repealed, and the Territories of the United States north ofthe line of 36° 30´ were left without slavery inhibition orrestriction, the agitation began which ended in the overthrow ofthe Democratic party and the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidencyof the United States. It will therefore always remain as one ofthe singular contradictions in the political history of the country, that, after seven years of almost exclusive agitation on this onequestion, the Republicans, the first time they had the power as adistinctive political organization to enforce the cardinal articleof their political creed, quietly and unanimously abandoned it. And the abandoned it without a word of explanation. Mr. Sumnerand Mr. Wade and Mr. Chandler, the most radical men in the Senateon the Republican side, sat still and allowed the bill to be passedprecisely as reported by James S. Green of Missouri, who had beenthe ablest defender of the Breckinridge Democracy in that body. In the House, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, Mr. Owen Lovejoy, the Washburns, and all the other radical Republicans vouchsafed no word explanatoryof this extraordinary change of position. 

 COLORADO, DAKOTA, AND NEVADA. 

If it be said in defense of this course that all the Territorieslay north of 36° 30´, and were therefore in no danger of slavery, it only introduces fresh embarrassment by discrediting the actionof the Republican party in regard to Kansas, and discrediting theearnest and persistent action of the anti-slavery Whigs and Free-Soilers, who in 1848 successfully insisted upon embodying the WilmotProviso in the Act organizing the Territory of Oregon. Surely, ifan anti-slavery restriction were needed for Oregon, it was neededfor Dakota which lay in the same latitude. Beyond doubt, if theTerritory of Kansas required a prohibition against slavery, theTerritory of Colorado and the Territory of Nevada, which lay asfar south, needed it also. To allege that they could secure thePresident's approval of the bills in the form in which they werepassed, and that Mr. Buchanan would veto each and every one of themif an anti-slavery proviso were embodied, is to give but a poorexcuse, for, five days after the bills received the Executivesignature, Mr. Buchanan went out of office, and Abraham Lincolnwas installed as President. 

If, indeed, it be fairly and frankly admitted, as was the fact, that receding from the anti-slavery position was part of theconciliation policy of the hour, and that the Republicans did itthe more readily because they had full faith that slavery nevercould secure a foothold in any of the Territories named, it mustbe likewise admitted that the Republican party took precisely thesame ground held by Mr. Webster in 1850, and acted from preciselythe same motives that inspired the 7th of March speech. Mr. Webstermaintained for New Mexico only what Mr. Sumner now admitted forColorado and Nevada. Mr. Webster acted from the same considerationsthat now influenced and controlled the judgment of Mr. Seward. Asmatter of historic justice, the Republicans who waived the anti-slavery restriction should at least have offered and recorded theirapology for any animadversions they had made upon the course ofMr. Webster ten years before. Every prominent Republican senatorwho agreed in 1861 to abandon the principle of the Wilmot Provisoin organizing the Territories of Colorado and Nevada, had, in 1850, heaped reproach upon Mr. Webster for not insisting upon the sameprinciple for the same territory. Between the words of Mr. Sewardand Mr. Sumner in the one crisis and their votes in the other, there is a discrepancy for which it would have been well to leaveon record an adequate explanation. The danger to the Union, inwhich they found a good reason for receding from the anti-slaveryrestriction on the Territories, had been cruelly denied to Mr. Webster as a justifying motive. They found in him only a guiltyrecreancy to sacred principle for the same act which in themselveswas inspired by devotion to the Union. 

It was certainly a day of triumph for Mr. Douglas. He was justifiedin his boast that, after all the bitter agitation which followedthe passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the Republicans adoptedhis principle and practically applied its provisions in the firstTerritory which they had the power to organize. Mr. Douglas hadbeen deprived of his chairmanship of the Committee of Territoriesby the Southern leaders, and his place had been given to James S. Green of Missouri. His victory therefore was complete when Mr. Seward waived the anti-slavery guaranty on behalf of the Republicans, and when Mr. Green waived the pro-slavery guaranty on behalf ofthe Breckinridge Democracy. It was the apotheosis of PopularSovereignty, and Mr. Douglas was pardonable even for an excessivedisplay of self-gratulation over an event so suggestive and soinstructive. Mr. Grow, the chairman of Territories in the House, frankly stated that he had agreed with Mr. Green, chairman ofTerritories in the Senate, that there should be no reference whateverto the question of slavery in any of the Territorial bills. Itcannot be denied that this action of the Republican party was asevere reflection upon that prolonged agitation for prohibition ofslavery in the Territories by Congressional enactment. A surrenderof the principle with due explanation of the reasons, properlyrecorded for the instruction of those who should come after, wouldhave left the Republican party in far better position than did theprecipitate retreat which they made without a word of apology, without an attempt at justification. 

If receding from the anti-slavery creed of the Republican partywas intended as a conciliation to the South, the men who made themovement ought to have seen that it would prove ineffectual. TheRepublicans no more clearly perceived that they risked nothing onthe question of slavery in organizing those Territories withoutrestriction, than the Southern leaders perceived that they wouldgain nothing by it. In vain is the net spread in the sight of anybird. The South had realized their inability to compete withNorthern emigration by their experience in attempting to wrestKansas from the control of free labor. They were not to be deludednow by a nominal equality of rights in Territories where, in a longcontest for supremacy, they were sure to be outnumbered, outvoted, and finally excluded by organic enactment. The political agitationand the sentimental feeling on this question were therefore exposedon both sides, --the North frankly confessing that they did notdesire a Congressional restriction against slavery, and the Southas frankly conceding that the demand they had so loudly made foradmission to the Territories was really worth nothing to theinstitution of slavery. The whole controversy over the Territories, as remarked by a witty representative from the South, related toan imaginary negro in an impossible place. 

James Stephens Green, who was so prominent in this legislation, who prepared and reported the bills, and who was followed by aunanimous Senate, terminated his public service on the day Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. He was then but forty-four years of age, and had served only four years in the Senate. He died soon after. No man among his contemporaries had made so profound an impressionin so short a time. He was a very strong debater. He had peers, but no master, in the Senate. Mr. Green on the one side and Mr. Fessenden on the other were the senators whom Douglas most dislikedto meet, and who were the best fitted in readiness, in accuracy, in logic, to meet him. Douglas rarely had a debate with either inwhich he did not lose his temper, and to lose one's temper in debateis generally to lose one's cause. Green had done more than anyother man in Missouri to break down the power of Thomas H. Bentonas a leader of the Democracy. His arraignment of Benton beforethe people of Missouri in 1849, when he was but thirty-two yearsof age, was one of the most aggressive and successful warfares inour political annals. His premature death was a loss to the country. He was endowed with rare powers which, rightly directed, would haveled him to eminence in the public service. 

 NORTHERN DEMORALIZATION. 

It would be unjust to the senators and representatives in Congressto leave the impression that their unavailing efforts at conciliatingthe South were any thing more or less than a compliance with apopular demand which overspread the free States. As soon as theelection was decided in favor of Mr. Lincoln, and the secessionmovement began to develop in the South, tens of thousands of thosewho had voted for the Republican candidates became affrighted atthe result of their work. This was especially true in the MiddleStates, and to a very considerable extent in New England. Municipalelections throughout the North during the ensuing winter showed agreat falling-off in Republican strength. There was, indeed, inevery free State what might, in the political nomenclature of theday, be termed an utter demoralization of the Republican party. The Southern States were going farther than the people had believedwas possible. The wolf which had been so long used to scare, seemedat last to have come. Disunion, which had been so much threatenedand so little executed, seemed now to the vision of the multitudean accomplished fact, --a fact which inspired a large majority ofthe Northern people with a sentiment of terror, and imparted totheir political faith an appearance of weakness and irresolution. 

Meetings to save the Union upon the basis of surrender of principlewere held throughout the free States, while a word of manly resistanceto the aggressive disposition of the South, or in re-affirmationof principles so long contended for, met no popular response. Evenin Boston, Wendell Phillips needed the protection of the police inreturning to his home after one of his eloquent and defiant harangues, and George William Curtis was advised by the Republican mayor ofPhiladelphia that his appearance as a lecturer in that city wouldbe extremely unwise. He had been engaged to speak on "The Policyof Honesty. " But so great had been the change in popular feelingin a city which Mr. Lincoln had carried by a vast majority, thatthe owner of the hall in which Mr. Curtis was to appear, warnedhim that a riot was anticipated if he should speak. Its doors wereclosed against him. This was less than five weeks after Mr. Lincolnwas elected, and the change of sentiment in Philadelphia was butan index to the change elsewhere in the North. 

The South, meanwhile, had been encouraged in the work of secessionby thousands of Democrats who did not desire or look for thedissolution of the Union, but wished to plot of secession to gofar enough, and the danger to the Union to become just imminentenough, to destroy their political opponents. Men who afterwardsattested their loyalty to the Union by their lives, took part inthis dangerous scheme of encouraging a revolt which they could notrepress. They apparently did not comprehend that lighted torchescannot be carried with safety through a magazine of powder; and, though they were innocent of intentional harm, they did much toincrease an evil which was rapidly growing beyond all power ofcontrol. As already indicated, the position of President Buchananand the doctrines of his message had aided in the development ofthis feeling in the North. It was further stimulated by thecommercial correspondence between the two sections. The merchantsand factors in the South did not as a class desire Disunion, andthey were made to believe that the suppression of Abolitionism inthe North would restore harmony and good feeling. Abolitionismwas but another name for the Republican party, and in businesscircles in the free State that party had come to represent thesource of all our trouble. These men did not yet measure the fullscope of the combination against the Union, and persisted inbelieving that its worst enemies were in the North. The main resultof these misconceptions was a steady and rapid growth of strengththroughout the slave States in the movement for Secession. 

 ENACTMENT OF THE MORRILL TARIFF. 

Fruitless and disappointing as were the proceedings of this sessionof Congress on the subjects which engrossed so large a share ofpublic attention, a most important change was accomplished in therevenue laws, --a change equivalent to a revolution in the economicand financial system of the government. The withdrawal of theSouthern senators and representatives left both branches of Congressunder the control of the North, and by a considerable majorityunder the direction of the Republican party. In the precedingsession of Congress the House, having a small Republican majority, had passed a bill advancing the rate of duties upon foreignimportations. This action was not taken as an avowed movement forprotection, but merely as a measure to increase the revenue. During Mr. Buchanan's entire term the receipts of the Treasury hadbeen inadequate to the payment of the annual appropriations byCongress, and as a result the government had been steadily incurringdebt at a rate which was afterwards found to affect the publiccredit at a critical juncture in our history. To check thisincreasing deficit the House insisted on a scale of duties thatwould yield a larger revenue, and on the 10th of May, 1860, passedthe bill. In the Senate, then under the control of the Democraticparty, with the South in the lead, the bill encountered opposition. Senators from the Cotton States thought they saw in it the hatedprinciple of protection, and protection meant in their view, strengthand prestige for the manufacturing States of the North. The billhad been prepared in committee and reported in the House by a New-England member, Mr. Morrill of Vermont, which of itself was sufficientin the eyes of many Southern men to determine its character andits fate. 

Mr. Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia was at the time Chairman ofthe Senate Committee of Finance. He was a man of sturdy commonsense, slow in his methods, but strong and honest in his processesof reasoning. He advanced rapidly in public esteem, and in 1839, at thirty years of age, was chosen Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives. He was a sympathizer with the South-Carolinaextremists, and coalesced with the Whigs to defeat the regularDemocrats who were sustaining the Administration of Mr. Van Buren. In 1847 Mr. Hunter was chosen senator from Virginia, and servedcontinuously till the outbreak of the war. He was a conservativeexample of that class of border State Democrats who were blindedto all interests except those of slavery. 

The true wealth of Virginia, in addition to her agriculture and inaid of it, lay in her vast deposits of coal and iron, in herextensive forests, in her unsurpassed water power. Her naturalresources were beyond computation, and suggested for her a greatcareer as a commercial and manufacturing State. Her rivers on theeastern slope connected her interior with the largest and finestharbor on the Atlantic coast of North America, and her jurisdictionextended over an empire beyond the Alleghanies. Her climate wassalubrious, and so temperate as to forbid the plea always used injustification of negro slavery in the Cotton States, that the whiteman could not perform agricultural labor. A recognition of Virginia'strue destiny would point to Northern alliances and Northernsympathies. Mr. Hunter's sympathies were by birth and rearing withthe South. The alliances he sought looked towards the Gulf andnot towards the Lakes. Any measure which was displeasing to SouthCarolina or Alabama was displeasing to Mr. Hunter, and he gave noheed to what might be the relations of Virginia with the New England, Middle, and Western States. He measured the policy of Virginia bythe policy of States whose geographical position, whose soil, climate, products, and capacities were totally different from hers. By Mr. Hunter's policy, Virginia could sell only slaves to theSouth. A more enlightened view would have enabled Virginia tofurnish a large proportion of the fabrics which the Southern Stateswere compelled to purchase in communities far to the north of her. Mr. Hunter was no doubt entirely honest in this course. He wasupright in all his personal and political relations, but he couldnot forget that he was born a Southern man and a slave-holder. Hehad a full measure of that pride in his State so deeply cherishedby Virginians. At the outset of his public career he becameassociated with Mr. Calhoun, and early imbibed the doctrines ofthat illustrious senator, who seldom failed to fascinate the youngmen who fell within the sphere of his personal influence. 

Mr. Hunter therefore naturally opposed the new tariff, and underhis lead all action upon it was defeated for the session. Thisconclusion was undoubtedly brought about by considerations outsideof the legitimate scope of the real question at issue. The strugglefor the Presidency was in progress, and any concession by the slaveStates on the tariff question would weaken the Democratic partyin the section where its chief strength lay, and would correspondinglyincrease the prestige of Lincoln's supporters in the North and ofMr. Fillmore's followers in the South. Mr. Hunter had himself justreceived a strong support in the Charleston convention for thePresidency, securing a vote almost equal to that given to Douglas. This was an additional tie binding him to the South, and he respondedto the wishes of that section by preventing all action on the tariffbill of the House pending the Presidential struggle of 1860. 

 SENATE VOTES ON THE MORRILL TARIFF. 

But the whole aspect of the question was changed when at the ensuingsession of Congress the senators and representatives from the CottonStates withdrew, and betook themselves to the business of establishinga Southern Confederacy. Mr. Hunter's opposition was not relaxed, but his supporters were gone. Opposition was thus rendered powerless, and the first important step towards changing the tariff systemfrom low duties to high duties, from free-trade to protection, wastaken by the passage of the Morrill Bill on the second day of March, 1861. Mr. Buchanan was within forty-eight hours of the close ofhis term and he promptly and cheerfully signed the bill. He hadby this time become not only emancipated from Southern thraldombut in some degree embittered against Southern men, and couldtherefore readily disregard objections from that source. His earlyinstincts and declarations in favor of a protective policy doubtlessaided him in a conclusion which a year before he could not havereached without a conflict in his Cabinet that would probably haveended in its disruption. 

The passage of the Morrill Tariff was an event which would almosthave marked an era in the history of the government if publicattention had not been at once absorbed in struggles which werefar more engrossing than those of legislative halls. It was howeverthe beginning of a series of enactments which deeply affected theinterests of the country, and which exerted no small influence uponthe financial ability of the government to endure the heavyexpenditure entailed by the war which immediately followed. Theorieswere put aside in the presence of a great necessity, and the beliefbecame general that in the impending strain on the resources ofthe country, protection to home industry would be a constant andincreasing strength to the government. 

On the passage of the bill in the Senate, on the 20th of February, the yeas were 25 and the nays 14. No Democratic senator voted inthe affirmative and no Republican senator in the negative. It wasnot only a sharp division on the party line but almost equally soon the sectional line. Mr. Douglas, Mr. Rice of Minnesota, Mr. Latham of California, and Mr. Lane of Oregon were the only Northernsenators who united with the compact South against the bill. Senators from Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansaswere still taking part in the proceedings. Mr. Crittenden ofKentucky and Mr. Kennedy of Maryland were favorable to the policyof protection, but on this bill they withheld their votes. Theyhad not abandoned all hope of an adjustment of the Disunion troubles, and deemed the pending measure too radical a change of policy tobe adopted in the absence of the senators and representatives fromseven States so deeply interested. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, sympathizing warmly with the Republicans on all questions relatingto the preservation of the Union, was too firmly wedded to thetheory of free-trade to appreciate the influence which this measurewould exert in aid of the national finances. 

The test vote in the House was taken on the 27th of February, ona motion made by Mr. Branch of North Carolina to lay the bill onthe table. Only 43 votes were given in favor, while 102 wererecorded against this summary destruction of the measure. Thesectional line was not so rigidly maintained as it was in the House. Of the hostile vote 28 were from the South and 15 from the North. The Virginia delegation, following Mr. Hunter's example, votedsolidly in opposition. The Southern men who voted for the billwere in nearly every instance distinguished for their hostility tosecession. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, Thomas A. R. Nelson, and William B. Stokes of Tennessee, William C. Anderson, FrancisM. Bristow, Green Adams, and Laban T. Moore of Kentucky, separatedfrom their section, and in their support of a protective tariffopenly affiliated with the North. 

The Morrill Tariff, as it has since been popularly known, was partof a bill whose title indicates a wider scope than the fixing ofduties on imports. It provided also for the payment of outstandingTreasury notes and authorized a loan. These additional featuresdid little to commend it to those who were looking to an alliancewith the Secessionists, nor did the obvious necessity of money forthe national Treasury induce the ultra disciples of free-trade inthe North to waive their opposition to a measure which distinctlylooked to the establishment of protection. It was a singularcombination of circumstances which on the eve of the Southern revoltled to the inauguration of a policy that gave such industrial andfinancial strength to the Union in its hour of dire necessity, inthe very crisis of its fate. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Mr. Lincoln's Journey from Springfield to Washington. --Speeches onthe Way. --Reaches Washington. --His Secret Journey. --Afterwardsregretted. --Precautions for his Safety. --President Buchanan. --Secretary Holt. --Troops for the Protection of Washington. --Inaugurationof Mr. Lincoln. --Relief to the Public Anxiety. --Inaugural Address. --Hopefulness and Security in the North. --Mr. Lincoln's Appeal tothe South. --Fails to appease Southern Wrath. --Dilemma of the South. --The New Cabinet. --The "Easy Accession" of Former Times. --SewardSecretary of State. --Chase at the Head of the Treasury. --RadicalRepublicans dissatisfied. --Influence of the Blairs. --Comment ofThaddeus Stevens. --The National Flag in the Confederacy. --Flyingat only Three Points. --Defenseless Condition of the Government. --Confidence of Disunion Leaders. --Extra Session of the Senate. --Douglas and Breckinridge. --Their Notable Debate. --Douglas's Replyto Wigfall. --His Answer to Mason. --Condition of the Territories. --Slavery not excluded by Law. --Public Opinion in Maine, 1861. --Mr. Lincoln's Difficult Task. --His Wise Policy. --His Careful Preparation. --Statesmanship of his Administration. 

When Southern confidence was at its height, and Northern courageat its lowest point, Mr. Lincoln began his journey from Springfieldto Washington to assume the government of a divided and disorganizedRepublic. His speeches on the way were noticeable for the absenceof all declaration of policy or purpose touching the impendingtroubles. This peculiarity gave rise to unfavorable comments inthe public press of the North, and to unfounded apprehensions inthe popular mind. There was fear that he was either indifferentto the peril, or that he failed to comprehend it. The people didnot understand Mr. Lincoln. The failure to comprehend was on theirpart, not on his. Had he on that journey gratified the aggressivefriends of the Union who had supported him for the Presidency, hewould have added immeasurably to the serious troubles which alreadyconfronted him. He had the practical faculty of discerning thechief point to be reached, and then bending every energy to reachit. He saw that the one thing needful was his regular, constitutionalinauguration as President of the United States. Policies bothgeneral and in detail would come after that. He could not affordby imprudent forwardness of speech or premature declaration ofmeasures to increase the embarrassment which already surroundedhim. "Let us do one thing at a time and the big things first" washis homely but expressive way of indicating the wisdom of hiscourse. 

A man of ordinary courage would have been overwhelmed by the taskbefore him. But Mr. Lincoln possessed a certain calmness, firmness, and faith that enabled him to meet any responsibility, and to standunappalled in any peril. He reached Washington by a night journey, taken secretly much against his own will and to his subsequentchagrin and mortification, but urged upon him by the advice ofthose in whose judgment and wisdom he was forced to confide. Itis the only instance in Mr. Lincoln's public career in which hedid not patiently face danger, and to the end of his life heregretted that he had not, according to his own desire, gone throughBaltimore in open day, trusting to the hospitality of the city, tothe loyalty of its people, to the rightfulness of his cause andthe righteousness of his aims and ends. He came as one appointedto a great duty, not with rashness, not with weakness, not withbravado, not with shrinking, but in the perfect confidence of ajust cause and with the stainless conscience of a good man. Threatsthat he never should be inaugurated had been numerous and serious, and it must be credited to the administration of Mr. Buchanan, thatample provision had been made for the protection of the rightfulruler of the nation. 

 PATRIOTIC CONDUCT OF JOSEPH HOLT. 

The active and practical loyalty of Joseph Holt in this crisisdeserves honorable mention. When, at the close of December, 1860, he succeeded Mr. Floyd as Secretary of War, no troops were stationedin Washington or its neighborhood. After consultation with GeneralScott, then in command of the army, and with the full approval ofPresident Buchanan, Secretary Holt thought it wise to make precautionsfor the safety of the National Capital. Seven companies of artilleryand one company of sappers and miners were accordingly brought toWashington. This movement gave offense to the Southern men whostill remained in Congress, and Mr. Branch of North Carolina offereda resolution declaring that "the quartering of troops around thecapital was impolitic and offensive, " and that, "if permitted, itwould be destructive of civil liberty, and therefore the troopsshould be forthwith removed. " The House laid the resolution onthe table by a vote of 125 to 35. Ex-President Tyler had formallycomplained to the President from the Peace Congress, that United-States troops were to march in the procession which was to celebratethe 22d of February. When so many of the Southern people wereengaged in seizing the forts and other property of the government, it was curious to witness their uneasiness at the least display ofpower on the part of the National Government. 

The tone of Secretary Holt's report to the President in regard tothe marshaling of troops in the National Capital was a manifestationof courage in refreshing contrast with the surrounding timidity. He stated in very plain language that "a revolution had been inprogress for the preceding three months in several of the SouthernStates;" that its history was one of "surprise, treacheries, andruthless spoliations;" that forts of the United States had beencaptured and garrisoned, and "hostile flags unfurled from theramparts;" that arsenals had been seized, and the arms which theycontained appropriated to the use of the captors; that more thanhalf a million of dollars, found in the mint of New Orleans, hadbeen unscrupulously applied to replenish the treasury of Louisiana;that a conspiracy had been entered into for the armed occupationof Washington as part of the revolutionary programme; and that hecould not fail to remember that, if the early admonitions in regardto the designs of lawless men in Charleston Harbor had been actedon, and "adequate re-enforcements sent there before the revolutionbegan, the disastrous political complications which ensued mightnot have occurred. "

The inauguration of Mr. Lincoln was an immense relief to the country. There had been an undefined dread throughout the Northern States, colored and heightened by imagination, that Mr. Lincoln would insome way, by some act of violence or of treachery, be deprived ofthe Presidency, and the government thrown into anarchy. Mr. Breckinridge was the Vice-President, and there had been a vaguefear that the count of the electoral votes, over which he presided, would in some way be obstructed or tampered with, and that theregularity of the succession might be interrupted, and its legitimacystained. But Mr. Breckinridge had performed his official duty withscrupulous fidelity, and Mr. Lincoln had been declared by him, inthe presence of the two Houses of Congress, to be lawfully andconstitutionally elected President of the United States. Anarchyand disorder in the North would at that time have proved soadvantageous to the leaders of Secession, that the apprehensionwas firmly fixed in the Northern mind that some attempt would bemade to bring it about. The very fact, therefore, that Mr. Lincolnwas in possession of the office, that he was quietly living in theExecutive mansion, that the Senate of the United States was insession, with a quorum present, ready to act upon his nominations, imported a new confidence and opened a new prospect to the friendsof the Union. 

The Inaugural address added to the feeling of hopefulness andsecurity in the North. It effectually removed every trace ofunfavorable impression which had been created by Mr. Lincoln'sspeeches, and gave at once a new view and an exalted estimate ofthe man. He argued to the South, with persuasive power, that theinstitution of Slavery in the States was not in danger by hiselection. He admitted the full obligation under the Constitutionfor the return of fugitive slaves. He neither affirmed nor deniedany position touching Slavery in the Territories. He was fullyaware that many worthy, patriotic citizens desired that the NationalConstitution should be amended; and, while he declined to make anyrecommendation, he recognized the full authority of the people overthe subject, and said he should favor rather than oppose a fairopportunity for them to act upon it. He expressed a preference, if the Constitution was to be amended, for a general conventionrather than for action through State Legislatures. He so fardeparted from his purpose not to speak of particular amendments asto allude to the one submitted by the late Congress, to the effectthat the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domesticinstitutions of the States; and he said that, holding such aprovision to be now implied in the Constitution, he had no objectionto its being made express and irrevocable. He pleaded earnestly, even tenderly, with those who would break up the Union. "In yourhands, " said he, "my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not inmine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government willnot assail you. You can have no conflict without yourselves beingthe aggressors. You can have no oath registered in heaven todestroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one topreserve, protect, and defend it. I am loath to close. We arenot enemies, but friends. Though passion may have strained, itmust not break, our bonds of affection. "

While the effect produced by the Inaugural in the North was soauspicious, no corresponding impression was made in the South. Mr. Lincoln's concise and candid statement of his opinions andpurposes in regard to Slavery, his majestic and unanswerable argumentagainst Secession, and his pathetic appeal to the people and Statesof the South, all alike failed to win back the disaffected communities. The leaders of the Secession movement were only the more enragedby witnessing the favor with which Mr. Lincoln's position wasreceived in the North. The declaration of the President that heshould execute the laws in all parts of the country, as requiredby his oath, and that the jurisdiction of the nation under theConstitution would be asserted everywhere and constantly, inspiredthe doubting with confidence, and gave to the people of the Northa common hope and a common purpose in the approaching struggle. The address left to the seceding States only the choice of retiringfrom the position they had taken, or of assuming the responsibilitiesof war. It was clear that the assertion of jurisdiction by twoseparate governments over the same territory and people must endin bloodshed. In this dilemma was the South placed by the Inauguraladdress of President Lincoln. Mr. Buchanan had admitted the rightof Secession, while denying the wisdom of its exercise; but theright when exercised carried jurisdiction with it. Hence it wasimpossible for Mr. Buchanan to assert jurisdiction and attempt itsexercise over the territory and people of the seceding States. But Mr. Lincoln, by his Inaugural address, set himself free fromall logical entanglements. His emphatic words were these: "Itherefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shalltake care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. . . . I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only asa declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defendand maintain itself. "

 THE CABINET OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Mr. Lincoln constituted his Cabinet in a manner at least unusualif not unprecedented. It had been the general practice of Presidents, from the first organization of the government, to tender the postof Secretary of State to the man considered to be next in prominenceto himself in the party to which both belonged. In the earlierhistory of the country, the expected successor in the Executiveoffice was selected. This was indeed for a long period so uniformthat the appointment to the State Department came to be regardedas a designation to the Presidency. In political phrase, this modeof reaching the coveted place was known as the "easy accession. "By its operation Madison succeeded Jefferson, Monroe succeededMadison, John Quincy Adams succeeded Monroe. After successfulapplication for a quarter of a century the custom fell into disfavorand, by bitter agitation, into disuse. The cause of its overthrowwas the appointment of Henry Clay to the State Department, and thebaseless scandal of a "bargain and sale" was invented to depriveMr. Clay of the "easy accession. " After a few years, when NationalConventions were introduced, it became the habit of the Presidentto tender the State Department to a leading or prominent competitorfor the Presidential nomination. Thus General Harrison offeredthe post to Mr. Clay, who declined; and then to Mr. Webster, whoaccepted. President Polk appointed Mr. Buchanan. President Pierceappointed Mr. Marcy. President Buchanan appointed General Cass. 

Following in the same line, Mr. Lincoln now invited his chief rival, Mr. Seward, to the State Department. But his courtesy did not stopthere. He was generous beyond all example to his rivals. He calledSalmon P. Chase to the Treasury, appointed Simon Cameron to theWar Department, and made Edward Bates of Missouri Attorney-General. These were the three who, next to Mr. Seward, received the largestvotes of the minority in the convention which nominated Mr. Lincoln. The Cabinet was completed by the appointment of Gideon Welles ofConnecticut Secretary of the Navy, Caleb B. Smith of IndianaSecretary of the Interior, and Montgomery Blair of Maryland Postmaster-General. 

The announcement of these names gave fair satisfaction to the party, though the most advanced and radical element of the Republicansregarded its composition with distrust. There had been strong hopeon the part of the conservative friends of the Union that someprominent man from the Cotton States would be included in theCabinet, and overtures were undoubtedly made to that effect directlyafter the election in November. But the rapidly developing revoltagainst the Union made such an appointment undesirable if notaltogether impracticable. By the time of the inauguration it wasfound that such an olive-branch from the President would exert noinfluence over the wild passions which had been aroused in theSouth. The name most frequently suggested was that of Mr. John A. Gilmer of North Carolina, who was a sincere friend of the Union, and did all in his power to avert a conflict; but his appointmentto the Cabinet would have destroyed him at home, without bringingstrength at that crisis to the National cause. 

The opinions and characteristics of each member of the Cabinet werevery closely scanned and criticised. Mr. Seward was known to befully committed to the policy of conciliation towards the South, and to the adoption of every measure consistent with the honor ofthe country to avert war and induce the return of the secedingStates. Mr. Chase was understood to favor a moderate policy, butdid not go so far as Mr. Seward. Mr. Cameron sympathized with Mr. Seward more than with Mr. Chase. Mr. Bates was extremely conservative, but a zealous friend of the Union, and a lifelong disciple of Mr. Clay. Mr. Welles was of Democratic antecedents, a follower of VanBuren and Wright, an associate of John M. Niles, anti-slavery inprinciple, a strict constructionist, instinctively opposed to Mr. Seward, readily co-operating with Mr. Chase. His appointment wasa surprise to New-England Republicans who expected a much moreprominent member of the party to be called to the Cabinet. It wasunderstood that the selection was due to the counsel of Vice-President Hamlin, who soon after had such serious differences withMr. Welles that a state of absolute non-intercourse existed betweenthem during the whole period of his incumbency of the Navy Department. Mr. Caleb B. Smith had been prominent in the House of Representativeswhen Mr. Lincoln was a member, had been popular as a public speakerin the West, but had no aptitude for so serious a task as theadministration of a great department, and did not long retain hisposition. 

 THE CABINET OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Mr. Blair was appointed as a citizen of Maryland. This gave seriousoffense to many of Mr. Lincoln's most valued supporters, and wasespecially distasteful to the Union men of Maryland, with HenryWinter Davis at their head. They regarded Mr. Blair as a non-resident, as not in any sense identified with them, and as disposedfrom the outset to foment disturbance where harmony was especiallydemanded. Mr. Bates had been appointed from Missouri largely bythe influence of Francis P. Blair, Jr. ; and the border-StateRepublicans were dissatisfied that the only two members of theCabinet from the slave States had been appointed apparently withoutany general consultation among those who were best fitted to givethe President advice on so important a matter. The extreme men inthe Republican party, of the type of Benjamin F. Wade and OwenLovejoy, believed that the Cabinet was so constituted as to insurewhat they termed "a disgraceful surrender to the South. " It wasa common saying at the time in Washington, among the radicalRepublicans, that Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet did not contain three asabsolute and strong defenders of the Union as Dix, Holt, and Stanton, who had just retired with Mr. Buchanan. Thaddeus Stevens, withhis accustomed sharpness of speech, said the Cabinet was composedof an assortment of rivals whom the President appointed fromcourtesy, one stump-speaker from Indiana, and two representativesof the Blair family. 

In the seven States which constituted the original SouthernConfederacy, the flag of the United States was flying at only threepoints on the day of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. The army of theUnited States still held Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston;Fort Pickens, opposite the Pensacola Navy Yard; and Key West, theextreme southern point of Florida. Every other fort, arsenal, dock-yard, mint, custom-house, and court-house had been seized by theConfederacy, and turned to hostile use. Fort Moultrie, CastlePinckney, and the United-States arsenal at Charleston had beenseized by the troops of South Carolina; Forts Jackson and Pulaski, and the United-States arsenal at Augusta, by the troops of Georgia;the Chattahoochee and St. Augustine arsenals and the Florida forts, by the troops of that State; the arsenal at Baton Rouge, and FortsJackson and St. Philip, together with the New-Orleans mint andcustom-house, by the troops of Louisiana; the Little-Rock arsenalby the troops of Arkansas; Forts Johnson and Caswell by the troopsof North Carolina; and General Twiggs had traitorously surrenderedto the State of Texas all the military stores in his command, amounting in value to a million and a half of dollars. By thesemeans the seceding States had come into possession of all theartillery, small arms, ammunition, and supplies of war needed forimmediate use, and were well prepared for the opening of thecampaign. On the part of the government there was no such preparation. Indeed the government did not at that moment have twelve thousandavailable troops against the most formidable rebellion in history. Its whole navy could not make one large squadron, and its mosteffective ships were at points remote from the scene of conflict. The revenues of the country were not then yielding more than thirtymillions per annum, and the credit was so low that one per cent. A month had been paid by the retiring administration for the fundsnecessary to close its unfortunate career. 

In view of all these facts, it cannot be matter of wonder that theDisunion leaders in the South laughed to scorn any efforts on thepart of the Government of the United States to arrest their progress, much less to subdue them, and enforce their return to the Union. North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas had not yetseceded. The Union sentiment was strong in each one of theseStates, and the design of Mr. Lincoln was to pursue a policy somild and conciliatory as to win them to the side of the government. Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri were excited by strong minoritieswho desired to aid the South, while no strong element in theirpopulation was ready to take decisive measures for the Union. Palliation, conciliation, concession, compromise, were the onlywords heard, and the almost universal opinion in the South, sharedlargely by the North, was that to precipitate war would be toabandon the last hope for restoration of the Union. 

 EXTRA SESSION OF THE SENATE. 

The extra session of the Senate, called by Mr. Buchanan for theconvenience of the new administration, assembled on the 4th ofMarch. All the Southern States were represented in full exceptthose which had members in the Confederate Congress at Montgomery, and from one of these--the State of Texas--both senators, JohnHemphill and Louis T. Wigfall, were present. Texas was indeedrepresented in the Congress of the Confederate States at Montgomeryand in the Congress of the United States at Washington at the sametime. Some excuse was given for the continuance of the senatorsby an alleged lack of completeness in the secession proceedings oftheir State; but to the apprehension of the ordinary mind, asecession that was complete enough to demand representation atMontgomery was complete enough to end it at Washington. The Texassenators, therefore, did not escape the imputation of seizing amere pretext for remaining at Washington somewhat in the characterof spies upon the new administration. John C. Breckinridge ofKentucky and Thomas L. Clingman of North Carolina took the usualoath to support the Constitution--Clingman for his second term, Breckinridge for his first. Salmon P. Chase was sworn in as senatorfrom Ohio, and retired the next day to the Treasury Department. John Sherman was his successor. Among the new senators who entered, and who afterwards became conspicuous, were Howe of Wisconsin andBaker of Oregon. The session was only for Executive purposes, andof course possessed no legislative power; but the debates were ofinterest and of value to the country. 

Mr. Douglas, with the characteristic boldness of a leader and witha patriotism which did him honor, defended the Inaugural addressof Mr. Lincoln against the assault of opposition senators. Inreply to Wigfall of Texas, who wished to know Douglas's views uponcertain points of policy, he said, "I do not choose to proclaimwhat my policy would be, in view of the fact that the senator doesnot regard himself as the guardian of the honor and the interestsof my country, but is looking to the interests of another which hethinks is in hostility. It would hardly be good policy or wisdomfor me to reveal what I think ought to be our policy to one whomay so soon be in the councils of the enemy and in the command ofhis armies. " Being pressed by Wigfall to know what he would advisethe President to do in the critical condition of Fort Sumter, Douglas sarcastically answered that he "should have no hesitancyin replying to the senator from Texas if that senator held himselfbound by his oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and to protect and aid the honor of the country instead ofcommunicating it to the enemy to be used against us. " It was avast gain to the Union that Douglas spoke so boldly in defense ofMr. Lincoln; and it was significant that Wigfall received imputationsupon his honor without threats of a duel, and without even usingthe language of resentment. 

Mr. Mason of Virginia came to the aid of Wigfall in the debate, but fared badly at the hands of Douglas. He asked Douglas to definewhat should be done in this crisis in regard to Fort Sumter. "Ifthe senator from Virginia, " said Douglas, "had voted right in thelast Presidential election, I should have been, perhaps, in aposition to-day to tell him authoritatively what ought to be done. Not occupying that position, I must refer the senator from Virginiato those who have been intrusted by the American people, accordingto the Constitution, with the decision of that question. " Thespeech of Wigfall had given great offense, and the castigationadministered by Douglas was heartily responded to throughout theNorth. Wigfall had boasted that he owed no allegiance to thegovernment; that he was a foreigner and owed allegiance to anothergovernment. On the next day, reciting these words as a preamble, Mr. Foster of Connecticut moved "that Louis T. Wigfall be and herebyis expelled from the Senate. " Mr. Clingman of North Carolina movedas a substitute a declaration that "Texas having seceded from theUnion, and being no longer one of the United States, is not entitledto be represented in this body. " After a brief debate, theresolutions were referred to the Judiciary by the votes of Republicansenators, who, not wishing to precipitate any issue prematurely, and persuaded that Wigfall's presence was helping rather thanharming the Union cause, concluded to let the matter rest. 

 BRECKINRIDGE AND DOUGLAS. 

A notable debate took place between Breckinridge and Douglas, inwhich the issues that had led to the disruption of the Democracyin the late Presidential election were, in a certain sense, foughtover again. Mr. Breckinridge's speech was carefully prepared, andpresented the Southern side in a tone of dignity and confidence;but the reply of Douglas exhibited his superiority as a debater. Breckinridge had declared that whatever settlement be made of otherquestions, there must be a concession to the South of the right toemigrate into all the Territories, or at least an equitable partitionof the National Domain. In reply, Douglas reminded him that theSouth had, by the action of a Republican Congress, the full rightto emigrate into all the territory of the United States; and that, with the consent of the Republican Congress, every inch of theterritory of the United States south of the thirty-seventh degreeof latitude was at that hour open to slavery. "So far, " said he, "as the doctrine of popular sovereignty and non-intervention isconcerned, the Colorado Bill and the Nevada Bill and the DakotaBill are identically the same with the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, andin its precise language. " The answer was at once a completedestruction of the argument of Breckinridge, and a severe indictmentof the Republican party. Never before in the existence of theFederal Government had its territory been so open, by Congressionalenactment and by judicial decision, to the slave-holder as on theday that Abraham Lincoln assumed the office of President of theUnited States. It is a singular fact that, on the eve of the utterdestruction of the institution of Slavery, its legal status wasstronger than ever before in the history of the government, andthe area over which it might lawfully spread was far larger thanat any previous period. Douglas showed in this debate how absolutelygroundless was the excuse of slave-holders for basing secession orrevolution upon the failure to acquire their rights in the Territories, when never before had their rights in the Territories been soabsolutely complete. 

Public opinion in March, 1861, was so unsettled, the popular mindso impressible, that a spirit of discontent soon began to spreadover the loyal States on the part of those who had hoped for whatthey termed a vigorous administration. For a few weeks the conductof the government fell under the animadversion of all classes inthe North. To those who wanted an instant settlement, and thereturn of the seceding States upon their own terms, the administrationseemed too radical. To those who demanded that the flag bemaintained, and Fort Sumter promptly re-enforced, who would besatisfied with nothing less than the recovery of every piece ofpublic property of which the Confederates had possessed themselves, the administration appeared altogether too conservative. Theoverwhelming public desire after all was for peace, and theoverwhelming public opinion was against the extremists who would, by any possibility, precipitate war. The administration thus beganits career with no firm footing beneath it, with an aggressive anddefiant enemy in front of it, with a public opinion divided, distrustful, and compromising, behind it. 

No more difficult task has ever been presented to any governmentthan that which Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet assumed in the monthof March, 1861. To judge it now by any appearance of irresolution, or by any seeming deficiency of courage, would be trying it by astandard totally inapplicable and unfair. Before and beyond allthings, Mr. Lincoln desired to prevent war, and he felt that everyday of peace gave fresh hope that bloodshed might be avoided. Inhis Inaugural address he had taken the strongest ground for thepreservation of the Union, and had carefully refrained from everyact and every expression which would justify, even in the publicopinion of the South, an outbreak of violence on the part of theConfederates. He believed that the Southern revolt had attainedits great proportions in consequence of Mr. Buchanan's assertionthat he had not power to coerce a seceding State. Mr. Lincoln hadannounced a different creed, and every week that the South continuedpeaceful, his hope of amicable adjustment grew stronger. He believedthat with the continuance of peace, the Secessionists could bebrought to see that Union was better than war for all interests, and that in an especial degree the institution of Slavery would beimperiled by a resort to arms. He had faith in the sober second-thought. If the South would deliberate, the Union would be saved. He feared that the Southern mind was in the condition in which asingle untoward circumstance might precipitate a conflict, and hedetermined that the blood of his brethren should not be on hishands. 

 STATESMANSHIP OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Mr. Lincoln saw, moreover, that war between a divided North and aunited South would be a remediless calamity. If, after all effortsat peace, war should be found unavoidable, the Administration haddetermined so to shape its policy, so to conduct its affairs, thatwhen the shock came it should leave the South entirely in the wrong, and the government of the Union entirely in the right. Consolidatedas might be the front which the Rebellion would present, theadministration was resolved that it should not be more solid, moreimmovable, more courageous, than that with which the supporters ofthe government would meet it. Statesmanship cannot be judged upontheories. It must be decided by results. When that conclusivetest is brought to bear, Mr. Lincoln's administration of thegovernment in the weeks immediately following his inaugurationdeserves the highest praise; and all the more because it wascompelled to disregard the clamor and disappoint the expectationsof many who had been conspicuously influential in bringing it intopower, and who therefore thought themselves entitled to givecounsel. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

President Lincoln and the Confederate Commissioners. --MisleadingAssurance given by Judge Campbell. --Mr. Seward's Answer to Messrs. Forsythe and Crawford. --An Interview with the President is desiredby the Commissioners. --Rage in the South. --Condition of the MontgomeryGovernment. --Roger A. Pryor's Speech. --President determines to sendProvisions to Fort Sumter. --Advises Governor Pickens. --Conflictprecipitated. --The Fort surrenders. --Effect of the Conflict on theNorth. --President's Proclamation and Call for Troops. --Responsesof Loyal States. --Popular Uprising. --Democratic Party. --Patriotismof Senator Douglas. --His Relations with Mr. Lincoln. --His Death. --Public Service and Character. --Effect of the President's Call onSouthern States. --North Carolina. --Tennessee. --Virginia. --SenatorMason's Letter. --Responses of Southern Governors to the President'sCall for Troops. --All decline to comply. --Some of them with InsolentDefiance. --Governors of the Free States. --John A. Andrew, E. D. Morgan, Andrew G. Curtin, Oliver P. Morton. --Energetic and PatrioticAction of all Northern Governors. --Exceptional Preparation inPennsylvania for the Conflict. --Governors of Free States allRepublicans except in California and Oregon. --Critical Situationon Pacific Coast. --Loyalty of its People. --President's Reasons forpostponing Session of Congress. --Election in Kentucky. --UnionVictory. --John J. Crittenden and Garrett Davis. --John Bell. --Disappoints Expectation of Union Men. --Responsibility of SouthernWhigs. --Their Power to arrest the Madness. --Audacity overcomesNumbers. --Whig Party of the South. --Its Brilliant Array of Leaders. --Its Destruction. 

The negotiation which the seceding State of South Carolina hadunsuccessfully attempted with President Buchanan, for the surrenderof Fort Sumter, was now formally renewed by the Confederate Governmentwith the administration of Mr. Lincoln. The week following theinauguration, John Forsythe of Alabama and Martin J. Crawford ofGeorgia appeared in Washington in the character of Commissionersfrom the Confederate States, "with a view, " as they defined it, "to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of the politicalseparation, upon such terms of amity and good will as the respectiveinterests, geographical contiguity, and future welfare of the twonations, may render necessary. " They addressed their communicationto the Secretary of State as a matter pertaining to the ForeignDepartment of the government, and waited with confidence for ananswer that would practically recognize the nationality which theyassumed to represent. Judge Campbell of the Supreme Court, acitizen of Alabama, had held some conferences with Mr. Seward, theresult of which was his personal assurance to the Commissionersthat Fort Sumter would be evacuated before the 25th of March; andhe urged them not to insist upon too prompt an answer to theirdemand. At his instance, the reply of Mr. Seward was withheld fromofficial delivery, and, though dated the 15th of March, was reallynot read by the Commissioners until the 7th or 8th of April. 

 THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS. 

Mr. Seward's answer threw the Commissioners and the entire Southinto a rage. He declined to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsythe and Crawford. He saw in them, "not a rightful andaccomplished revolution, not an independent nation with an establishedgovernment, but only the perversion of a temporary and partisanexcitement, and an inconsiderate purpose of unjustifiable andunconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vestedin the Federal Government. " Mr. Seward further advised them thathe "looked for the cure of evils which should result from proceedingsso unnecessary, so unwise, so unusual, so unnatural, not to irregularnegotiations having in view untried relations, but to regular, considerate action of the people of those States through the Congressof the United States, and through such extraordinary conventions, if there be need thereof, as the Federal Constitution contemplatesand authorizes to be assembled. " Under these circumstances, Mr. Seward informed the Commissioners that his official duties wereconfined to the conduct of the foreign relations of his country, and did not at all embrace domestic questions, or questions arisingbetween the several States and the Federal Government. 

The Secretary of State was unable, therefore, to comply with therequest of Messrs. Forsythe and Crawford, and declined to appointa day on which they might submit the objects of their visit to thePresident of the United States. He refused to recognize them asdiplomatic agents, and would not hold correspondence or furthercommunication with them. Lest the Commissioners might consolethemselves with the reflection that Mr. Seward was speaking onlyfor himself, and that the President might deal with them lesscurtly, he informed them that he had cheerfully submitted his answerto Mr. Lincoln, who coincided in the views it expressed, andsanctioned the Secretary's decision declining official intercoursewith Messrs. Forsythe and Crawford. The rejoinder of the ConfederateCommissioners to Mr. Seward was in a threatening tone, upbraidinghim with bad faith, and advising him that "Fort Sumter cannot beprovisioned without the effusion of blood;" reminding him also thatthey had not come to Washington to ask the Government of the UnitedStates to recognize the independence of the Confederacy, but foran "adjustment of new relations springing from a manifest andaccomplished revolution. "

Up to this time there had not been the slightest collision betweenthe forces of the Confederacy and the forces of the Union. Theplaces which had been seized, belonging to the Federal Government, had been taken without resistance; and the authorities of Montgomeryappeared to a great many Southern people to be going through blankmotions, and to be aping power rather than exercising it. Theirdefiant attitude had been demoralizing to the public sentiment inthe North, but their failure to accomplish any thing in the way ofconcession from the National Government, and their apparent timidityin refraining from a shock of arms, was weakening the Disunionsentiment in the States which composed the Confederacy. JeffersonDavis had been inaugurated with great pomp and pretension inFebruary, and now April had been reached with practically nothingdone but the issuing of manifestoes, and the maintenance of a mereshadow of government, without its substance. The Confederates hadas yet no revenue system and no money. They had no armed forceexcept some military companies in the larger cities, organized longbefore secession was contemplated. They had not the pretense ofa navy, or any power apparently to create one. While the administrationof Mr. Lincoln, therefore, was disappointing great numbers in theNorth by its failure to do something decisive towards re-establishingthe National authority in the rebellious States, the inhabitantsof those States were becoming daily dissatisfied with the fact thatthe administration of Mr. Davis was doing nothing to consolidateand protect the Confederacy. 

 DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CONFEDERACY. 

Ever since the inauguration of Jefferson Davis, the flag of theUnited States had been flying over the strongest fortress in theConfederacy, and no forcible effort had been made to displace it. The first flush of joy and congratulation was over, and re-actionhad begun throughout the revolting States. The Confederate Governmentwas reminded by many of the leading newspapers of the South thatunless some decisive step were taken to assert its authority andestablish its prestige, it would quietly crumble to pieces. Theapparent non-resistance of Mr. Lincoln's administration had, inmany minds, the effect of casting contempt upon the whole Southernmovement, and the refusal to recognize or receive commissioners ofMr. Davis's appointment was regarded as a direct insult to theirgovernment, which, unless met by some decisive step, would subjectthe leaders to the derision of public opinion throughout the newConfederacy. Mr. Buchanan had been willing to receive commissionersfrom seceding States, so far as to confer with them, even when hedeclared that he had no power to take any action in the premises. Mr. Lincoln had advanced beyond the position of Mr. Buchanan whenhe refused even to give audience to representatives bearing thecommission of the Confederate States. 

The situation therefore had become strained. The point had beenreached where it was necessary to go forward or go backward; wherethe Confederacy must assert itself, or the experiment of secessionbe abandoned. From all quarters of the seven States came the demandupon the Montgomery government to do something decisive. A prominentmember of the Alabama Legislature told Jefferson Davis that "unlesshe sprinkled blood in the face of the Southern people they wouldbe back in the old Union in less than ten days. " Public meetingswere held to urge the government to action. At Charleston, inanswer to a large crowd who came to pay him honor, Roger A. Pryor(whose attractive eloquence has since been used to better ends)told the people that only one thing was necessary to force Virginiainto the Southern Confederacy: "to strike a blow. " That done, hepromised them that "Virginia would secede in less than an hour byShrewsbury clock. "

The indifference of Mr. Lincoln's administration to the program ofthe Southern Confederacy was apparent and not real. In his Inauguralhe had declared that the power confided to him would be used tohold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to thegovernment, and to collect the duties and imposts, but, beyond whatwas necessary for those objects, there would be no invasion, nouse of force against or among the people anywhere. Influentialpersons connected with Mr. Lincoln's administration may have waveredin regard to the expediency of re-enforcing Major Anderson andholding possession of Fort Sumter, but the President himself wiselyconcluded that to retreat from that point would be an almost fatalstep. There was not a citizen in the North who had not becomeinterested in the fate of Major Anderson and the brave soldiersunder his command. Though many patriotic men of conservative ortimid nature advised a quiet withdrawal from Fort Sumter ratherthan an open conflict for its possession, there was an instinctiveundertone in the masses of the people in the Northern States againsta concession so humiliating. If prestige were needed for thegovernment at Montgomery, Mr. Lincoln felt that it was needed forthe government at Washington, and if he withdrew from Sumter hecould not see any point where he could make a stand. 

The President determined, therefore, to send supplies to MajorAnderson. He wisely saw that if he failed to do this he would bereceding from the temperate and conservative position taken in theInaugural, and that it would give to the Confederates a degree ofcourage, and to the North a degree of despondency, which wouldvastly increase the difficulty of restoring the Union. In Mr. Lincoln's own language: "the abandonment of Sumter would be utterlyruinous, under the circumstances. " . . . "At home it would discouragethe friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far toinsure to the latter a recognition abroad. In fact, it would beour national destruction consummated. " Having taken this determination, he communicated it to Governor Pickens of South Carolina just atthe time that Mr. Seward delivered to the commissioners of JeffersonDavis the government's refusal to receive them. The answer to thecommissioners, and the determination not to permit Anderson to bestarved out of Fort Sumter with the hostile guns of the Confederacypointed at him, brought on the conflict. As soon as the two eventswere made public, the Confederate Secretary of War instructedGeneral Beauregard that if the information conveyed to GovernorPickens was authentic, he should proceed to reduce the fort. Theconflict came on the 12th of April, and after a furious cannonadeof thirty-four hours, Major Anderson, being out of provisions, wascompelled to surrender. The fleet that was bringing him reliefarrived too late, and the flag of the United States was lowered tothe Confederacy. Those who had urged Mr. Davis to strike a blowand to sprinkle blood in the faces of the people as a means ofconsolidating Southern opinion, were undoubtedly successful. Throughout the States of the Confederacy the inhabitants were crazedwith success. They had taken from the National Government itsstrongest fortress on the South-Atlantic coast. They felt suddenlyawakened to a sense of power, and became wild with confidence intheir ability to defy the authority of the United States. 

 EFFECT OF FORT SUMTER'S FALL. 

The Confederate Government, however, had not anticipated the effectof an actual conflict on the people of the North. Until the hourof the assault on Sumter they had every reason for believing thatMr. Lincoln's administration was weak; that it had not a sustainingforce of public opinion behind it in the free States; that, inshort, Northern people were divided very much on the line of previousparty organizations, and that his opponents had been steadilygaining, his supporters as steadily losing, since the day of thePresidential election in November. The Confederates naturallycounted much on this condition of Northern sentiment, and took tothemselves the comforting assurance that vigorous war could neverbe made by a divided people. They had treasured all the extremesayings of Northern Democrats about resisting the march of a BlackRepublican army towards the South, and offering their dead bodiesas obstructions to its progress. They believed, and had good reasonfor believing, that half the population of the North was opposedto the policy of subjugation, and they accepted the creed of Mr. Buchanan that there was no power in the Constitution to coerce asovereign State. 

Never was popular delusion so suddenly and so completely dispelled. The effect of the assault on Sumter and the lowering of the Nationalflag to the forces of the Confederacy acted upon the North as aninspiration, consolidating public sentiment, dissipating alldifferences, bringing the whole people to an instant and unanimousdetermination to avenge the insult and re-establish the authorityof the Union. Yesterday there had been doubt and despondency; to-day had come assurance and confidence. Yesterday there had beendivision; to-day there was unity. The same issue of the morningpaper that gave intelligence of the fall of Sumter, brought alsoa call from the President of the United States for seventy-fivethousand men to aid him "in suppressing combinations against thelaw, too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicialproceedings. " He notified the people that "the first serviceassigned to the force hereby called forth will probably be torepossess the forts, places, and property which have been seizedfrom the Union;" and he concluded by convening an extra session ofCongress to assemble on the fourth day of the ensuing July. ThePresident stated, in his Proclamation, that the laws of the UnitedStates had been "for some time past opposed, and their executionobstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations toopowerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicialprocedure, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law. " Hehad therefore "called forth the militia to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. " He appealed to allloyal citizens "to aid in maintaining the honor, the integrity, and the existence of the National Union, and the perpetuity ofpopular government. " The Proclamation was general. The Call fortroops was issued specifically to every State except the sevenalready in revolt. 

The Proclamation was responded to in the loyal States with anunparalleled outburst of enthusiasm. On the day of its issuehundreds of public meetings were held, from the eastern border ofMaine to the extreme western frontier. Work was suspended on farmand in factory, and the whole people were roused to patriotic ardor, and to a determination to subdue the Rebellion and restore theUnion, whatever might be the expenditure of treasure or the sacrificeof life. Telegrams of congratulation and sympathy fell upon theWhite House like snow-flakes in a storm; and the President was madeto feel, after all the months of gloom and darkness through whichhe had passed since his election, that light had broken, that dayhad dawned, and that the open struggle for the Union, however severeand however sanguinary it might prove, was preferable to the sloughof despond in which the nation had been cast, and the valley ofhumiliation through which the government had been groping. 

In the history of popular uprisings and of manifestations of Nationalenthusiasm, there is perhaps no equal to that which was seen inthe free States of the Union in the weeks immediately followingthe rash attack on Fort Sumter. While the feeling was too deep tobrook resistance, or quietly to endure a word of opposition, itwas happily so tempered with discretion as to prevent personaloutrages upon the few who did not join in the general chorus forthe Union. Suspected men were waited upon and requested to speakfor the loyal cause, and newspapers, which before the firing ofSumter had been offensive in tone, were compelled to hoist theNational flag over their offices, and openly support the government. But these cases were few and exceptional; and it is due to theDemocracy of the North to say, that however strongly they hadopposed the election of Mr. Lincoln, and however hostile they hadbeen to the principles which he represented, the mass of the partyresponded with noble enthusiasm and with patriotic fidelity to theUnion. Their great leader, Senator Douglas, set a worthy exampleby promptly waiting on the President, and expressing his deepestsympathy and his most earnest co-operation in the struggle for thelife of the nation. 

 PATRIOTIC COURSE OF MR. DOUGLAS. 

The patriotic course of Mr. Douglas had been of invaluable serviceto the government from the hour of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. The old friendship between the illustrious rivals from Illinois, which had begun when each was in his youth, was now strongly revived. Differing always on political issues, they were at once in accordwhen the fate of the government was at stake. The position ofDouglas during the extra session of the Senate had given markedsatisfaction to Mr. Lincoln, and when the deliberations came to aclose, on the 28th of March, the President said that a great gainhad been made to the cause of the Union, by the direction whichthe speeches of Douglas would give to the sympathy and action ofthe Northern Democracy. From the hour of actual danger, Mr. Douglashad spoken no partisan word, had known no partisan division, hadlabored only for the government of the nation, had looked only toits safety and its honor. He had a larger following than any otherparty leader of his day. Nearly a million and a half of men believedin his principles, were devoted to him personally, trusted himimplicitly. The value of his active loyalty to the Union may bemeasured by the disaster which would have been caused by hesitationon his part. When he returned to his State, after the firing onSumter, the Republican Legislature of Illinois received him witha display of feeling as profound as that with which they would havewelcomed Mr. Lincoln. His address on that memorable occasion wasworthy of the loftiest patriot, and was of inestimable value tothe cause of the Union. Perhaps no words spoken carried confidenceto more hearts, or gave greater strength to the National cause. 

Mr. Douglas did not live to return to the Senate. The extra sessionof March closed his public service. He died in Chicago on thethird day of June, 1861, at the early age of forty-eight. His lastdays were his best days. The hour of his death was the hour ofhis greatest fame. In his political career he had experienced theextremes of popular odium and of popular approval. His name hadat different periods been attended with as great obloquy as everbeset a public man. It was his happy fate to have changed thisbefore his death, and to have secured the enthusiastic approbationof every lover of the Union. His career had been stormy, hispartisanship aggressive, his course often violent, his politicalmethods sometimes ruthless. He had sought favor at the South toolong to regain mastery of the North, and he had been defeated inthe Presidential struggle of 1860, --a struggle in which the ambitionof his life had been centred. But with danger to the Union hisearly affections and the associations of his young life had comeback. He remembered that he was a native of New England, that hehad been reared in New York, that he had been crowned with honorsby the generous and confiding people of Illinois. He believed inthe Union of the States, and he stood by his country with a fervorand energy of patriotism which enshrined his name in the historyand in the hearts of the American people. His death created theprofoundest impression in the country, and the Administration feltthat one of the mighty props of the Union had been torn away. 

The rank of Mr. Douglas as a statesman is not equal to his rank asa parliamentary leader. As a statesman, he was full of resources, fertile in expedients. But he lacked the truest form of conservatism, and more than once in his career carried partisan contests beyondthe point of safety. His participation in the repeal of the MissouriCompromise is an illustration, all the more pertinent and impressivebecause his own judgment was against the measure, and he allowedhimself to be controlled by the fear that another might usurp theplace in Southern regard so long held by himself. In parliamentarydiscussion it is not easy to overstate the power of Mr. Douglas. Indeed, it would be difficult to name his superior. He did notattain the dignity of Webster's stately style. He was not giftedwith the fire that burned through Clay's impulsive speech. But asa ready, comprehensive speaker, armed at all points and using hisweapons with deadliest effect, he was the equal of either. In therapidity with which he marshaled the facts favorable to his position, in the consummate skill with which he presented his argument, inthe dashing and daring manner by which he overcame an opponent morestrongly intrenched than himself, Mr. Douglas is entitled to rankwith the most eminent of parliamentary debaters. 

 ADDITIONS TO THE CONFEDERACY. 

The effect of Major Anderson's surrender of Sumter and of thePresident's call for troops proved prejudicial to the Union sentimentin the slave States which had not yet seceded. It would be morecorrect, perhaps, to say that Mr. Lincoln's Proclamation was a testof loyalty which revealed the actual character of public sentimentin those States, till then not known in the North. Mr. Lincolnhad done every thing in his power to conciliate them, and to holdthem fast in their loyalty to the Union. But the sympathy withthe South, engendered by the common danger to the institution ofSlavery, was too powerful to be resisted. North Carolina, whichhad always been moderate, conservative, and Union-loving, threwher fortunes with the Confederacy. Tennessee, distracted by theunforeseen defection of such staunch Union men as John Bell andBaillie Peyton, * went Southward with the general current. Virginiacould not be restrained, although she was warned and ought to haveseen, that if she joined the Rebellion she would inevitably becomethe battle-ground, and would consign her territory to devastationand her property to destruction. The Virginia convention whichwas in session before the firing on Fort Sumter, and which wasanimated by a strong friendship for the Union, was carried in tothe vortex of secession by the surrounding excitement. By a voteof 88 to 55 the State determined to join the Confederacy. Thewonder is that in the prevailing excitement and arrogant dictation, there could have been found fifty-five men to resist so powerfula tide of public opinion. The minority was strong enough, however, to command the submission of the ordinance to a vote of the people, --a submission which was in form and not in substance, for inreality no freedom of opinion was conceded. 

The ordinance which was passed on the 17th of April, three daysafter the fall of Sumter, declared that "it should take effect whenratified by a majority of the votes of the people of the State, cast at a poll to be taken thereon on the fourth Thursday in May. "The Convention did not submit its work to popular review and decisionin a fair and honorable way. Eight days after the act of submission, the Convention passed another ordinance, by which Virginia agreed"to adopt and ratify the Constitution of the Provisional Governmentof the Confederate States. " They provided that this second ordinanceshould have no effect if the first should be rejected by the people. It is not difficult to see that the action was taken in order torender the rejection of the first ordinance impossible. Under thesecond ordinance, the Convention at once entered into a formalalliance, offensive and defensive, with the Confederate States. Their Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, appeared in Richmondas commissioner of his government, and the Convention appointed Ex-President John Tyler, William Ballard Preston, James P. Holcombe, and other leading citizens, as commissioners for Virginia. Thesejoint commissioners made a formal compact between Virginia and theConfederate States on the 25th of April, the day after the Conventionhad adopted the Confederate Constitution. By this compact, Virginia, "looking to a speedy union with the Confederate States, " placed"the whole military force of the Commonwealth under the controland direction of the Confederate States, upon the same basis andfooting as if said Commonwealth were now a member of saidConfederacy. "

Without waiting for the decision of the people on the question ofsecession, the national flag was removed from the public buildings, and the Confederate flag was raised. All the property of theGeneral Government was seized and, by an article in the agreementwith the Confederate commissioner, was in due time to be turnedover to the Montgomery government. In short, the State Governmentof Virginia proceeded in its mad career of hostility to the Union, without the slightest regard to the future decision of the peopleon the important issue which in form had been submitted to them. They evidently intended to make a rejection of the Disunion ordinanceimpossible. For their own honor, the man who contrived and guidedthese proceedings would better have adopted the bold precedent ofthose States which refused altogether to submit the ordinance topopular vote. 

It ought not to escape notice that General Robert E. Lee is notentitled to the defense so often made for him, that in joining theDisunion movement he followed the voice of his State. General Leeresigned his commission in the army of the Union and assumed commandof Confederate troops, long before Virginia had voted upon theordinance of secession. He gave the influence of his eminent nameto the schemes of those who, by every agency, _fas aut nefas_, weredetermined to hurl Virginia into secession. The very fact thatGeneral Lee had assumed command of the troops in Virginia was apowerful incentive with many to vote against the Union. JeffersonDavis had anticipated and measured the full force of the effectwhich would be produced upon Virginians by General Lee's identificationwith the Confederate cause. Whether or not there be ground formaking General Lee the subject of exceptional censure, there issurely none for excusing him as one who reluctantly obeyed thevoice of his State. If he had remained in the national army untilthe people of Virginia voted on the ordinance of secession, thestrength of the Union cause in his State would have been greater. If he had chosen, as a citizen of Virginia, to stand by the Unionuntil his State decided against him, secession might have beendefeated. It is fair that his action should be clearly understood, and that his name should bear the just responsibility. 

 THE SECESSION OF VIRGINIA. 

All pretense of a fair submission of the question to popular votewas finally abandoned, and the abandonment practically proclaimedin a letter of Senator James M. Mason, which was published on the16th of May, some ten days in advance of the election. "If it beasked, " wrote Mr. Mason, "what those shall do who cannot in consciencevote to separate Virginia from the United States, the answer issimple and plain. Honor and duty alike require that they shouldnot vote on the question, and if they retain such opinions theymust leave the State. " Mr. Mason thus accurately defined what theSouth understood by the submission of secession ordinances topopular vote. It meant that a man might vote for an ordinance butnot against it; if he desired to vote against it, and persisted inthe desire, he should leave the State. It is rather a matter ofsurprise that of 161, 000 votes cast in Virginia on the question, 32, 000 were registered against secession. These friends of theGovernment were, it is true, in large part from the western sectionof the State where slaves were few and the loyal sentiment wasstrong. It is an interesting fact that along the mountain rangethrough Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and even as far Southas Georgia, the inhabitants generally sympathized with the Union. Though often forced to aid the Rebellion, they were at heart loyalto the government of their fathers, and on many important occasionsrendered the most valuable service to the National cause. Thedevotion of large numbers in East Tennessee to the Federal Governmentseriously embarrassed the new Confederacy. The remaining slaveStates, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, gave trouble to theadministration, but did not succeed in separating themselves fromthe Union. Large numbers of their people joined the Southern army, but the political power of those States was wielded in favor ofthe loyal cause. They desired to enact the part of neutrals; butthe National Government, from the first, took strong ground againsta policy so dishonorable in the States, so injurious to the Union. 

The responses made by the Southern governors to the President'scall for troops are so characteristic, and afford so true a pictureof the times, as to merit notice. Nearly every one returned ascornful and defiant message. Governor Magoffin replied thatKentucky "would furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduingher sister States of the South. " Governor Letcher declared that"the militia of Virginia would not be furnished to the powers atWashington for any such use or purpose as they had in view, whichwas the subjugation of the Southern States, " and that "the civilwar which the powers at Washington had chosen to inaugurate wouldbe met by the South in a spirit as determined. " Governor Jacksonconsidered "the call to be illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary;its objects to be inhuman and diabolical, " and it "would not becomplied with by Missouri. " Governor Harris said that Tennessee"would not furnish a single man for coercion, but would raise fiftythousand men for the defense of her rights, and those of her Southernbrethren. " Governor Ellis of North Carolina answered that he "couldbe no party to the wicked violation of the laws of the country andto the war upon the liberties of a free people. " Governor Rectordeclared that the President's call for troops was only "addinginsult to injury, and that the people of Arkansas would defend, tothe last extremity, their honor and their property against Northernmendacity and usurpation. " Governor Hicks for prudential reasonsexcused Maryland at the time from responding to the President'scall, and when a month afterwards he notified the War Departmentof his readiness to comply with the request of the Government, hewas informed that three-months' men were not needed, and thatarrangements had been made for accepting three-years' volunteersfrom Maryland. Governor Burton of Delaware replied that "therewas no organized militia in the State, and no law authorizing suchorganization. " Indisposition to respond to the President wastherefore in different degrees manifest in every part of the Unionwhere Slavery had wrought its demoralizing influence. Mr. Lincolnwas disappointed at this proof of the sectional character of thecontest, and he realized that if American nationality was to bepreserved, it must look for help to the abounding resources andthe patriotic loyalty of the free States. 

 THE GOVERNORS OF LOYAL STATES. 

It fortunately happened that the governors of the free States weredevoted to the Union in as great degree as the Southern governorswere devoted to the Confederacy. It may well be doubted whetherat any time in history of the government there had been so largea number of able men occupying the gubernatorial chairs of theNorthern States. They were not only eminent in an intellectualpoint of view, but they had a special fitness for the arduous andpatriotic duties so unexpectedly devolved upon them. They becamepopularly known as the "War Governors, " and they exercised abeneficent and decisive influence upon the fortunes of the Union. 

The Governor of Massachusetts, John A. Andrew, added fervor to thepatriotism of the whole people, and nobly led his State in hergenerous outpouring of aid and comfort to the loyal cause. Thevigor which Massachusetts had imparted to the Revolution againstthe Crown was surpassed by the ardor with which she now threwherself into the contest for the Union. She had been often reproachedfor urging forward the anti-slavery agitation, which was the excuseof the South for rebelling against the National authority. Asomewhat similar accusation had been lodged against her by theRoyal Governors and by the Tories a century before. But the menwho found this fault with Massachusetts--a fault wholly on virtue'sside--will not deny that when the hour of trial came, when convictionsof conscience were to be maintained by the strength of the rightarm, and faith in principle was to be attested by a costly sacrificeof blood, her sons added imperishable honor to their ancestralrecord of heroism in the cause of human Liberty and ConstitutionalGovernment. 

The other New-England States were not less ardent than Massachusetts. Israel Washburn, the Governor of Maine, impulsive, energetic, devoted to the cause of the Union, was sustained by the people ofthe State without regard to party and with the noblest enthusiasm. William A. Buckingham of Connecticut, of mature years and stainlesslife, was a young man once more when his country demanded his bestenergies. The young Governor of Rhode Island, William Sprague, laid aside the civilian's dress for the uniform of a soldier, andled the troops of his State to the National Capital. IchabodGoodwin of New Hampshire and Erastus Fairbanks of Vermont, two oftheir most honored and useful men, filled out the list of NewEngland's worthy Executives. Throughout the six States there wasbut one anxiety, one resolve, --anxiety for the safety of thegovernment, resolve to subdue the revolt against it. 

New England is not mentioned first except in a geographical sense. More important even than her patriotic action was the course ofthe great Central and Western States. New York and Pennsylvaniaof themselves constituted no mean power, with a population of sevenmillions, with their boundless wealth, and their ability to producethe material of war. Edwin D. Morgan was the Executive of NewYork. He was a successful merchant of high character, of thesturdiest common sense and soundest judgment. A man of wealthhimself, he possessed the entire confidence of the bankers andcapitalists of the metropolis. His influence in aid of the financesof the government in its early period of depression was givenwithout stint and was of incalculable value. In the neighboringState of New Jersey, Governor Charles Olden was ready for heartyco-operation, and seconded with patriotic zeal every movement inaid of the loyal cause. 

Of a different type from Governor Morgan, but equally valuable andmore enthusiastic, was the Governor of Pennsylvania, Andrew G. Curtin. Circumstances had thrown him into close and cordialrelations with Mr. Lincoln, --relations which had their origin atthe time of the Chicago Convention, and which had grown more intimateafter Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. Before the firing on Sumter, but when the States of the Confederacy were evidently preparingfor war, Mr. Lincoln earnestly desired a counter signal of readinesson the part of the North. Such a movement in New England wouldhave been regarded in the South merely as a fresh ebullition ofradicalism. In New York the tone was too conservative and GovernorMorgan too cautious to permit the demonstration to be made there. Governor Curtin undertook to do it in Pennsylvania at the President'sspecial request. On the eleventh day of April, one day before theSouth precipitated the conflict, the Legislature of Pennsylvaniapassed an Act for the better organization of the militia, andappropriated five hundred thousand dollars to carry out the detailsof the measure. The manifest reference to the impending troublewas in the words prescribing the duty of the Adjutant-General ofthe State in case the President should call out the militia. Itwas the first official step in the loyal States to defend the Union, and the generous appropriation, made in advance of any blow struckby the Confederacy, enabled Governor Curtin to rally the forces ofthe great Commonwealth to the defense of the Union with marvelouspromptness. His administration was vigorous, and his support ofthe Union cause was in the highest degree efficient, patriotic, and successful. He attained an exceptional popularity with thesoldiers, and against the most bitter attacks never lost his holdon the confidence and personal regard of Mr. Lincoln. 

 GOVERNORS OF LOYAL STATES. 

In the West the commanding figure among a number of distinguishedExecutives was Oliver P. Morton of Indiana. He was of stalwartframe, full health, and the highest physical vigor. His energywas untiring, his will unconquerable. In the closely balancedcondition of parties in his State, he had been trained to the mostaggressive and exacting form of leadership, so that he entered uponhis gubernatorial duties with a certain experience in the controlof men which was of marked value. He possessed a mind of extraordinarystrength; and in frequent contests at the bar and upon the stump, he had thoroughly disciplined his faculties. In debate he wasformidable. It cannot be said that he exhibited striking originalityof thought, or that he possessed in large degree the creative power. But in the art of presenting with force and clearness a subjectwhich he had studied, of analyzing it and simplifying it to thecomprehension of the common mind, of clothing it in language asplain and forcible as the diction of John Bunyan, he has had fewequals among the public men of America. 

The Governor of Iowa was Samuel J. Kirkwood, a man of truth, courage, and devoted love of country. Distinguished for comprehensiveintelligence, for clear foresight, for persuasive speech, forspotless integrity, for thorough acquaintance with the people, hewas a model of executive efficiency. Alexander Ramsey, the firstgovernor of the Territory of Minnesota, was now governor of thatState. As strong in character as he was in popularity, as able ashe was patriotic, he broadened by his executive career a personalfame already enviable. Austin Blair of Michigan was a worthycompeer of these eminent officials, and administered his high trustwith honor to himself and with advantage to his country. RichardYates of Illinois had been chosen governor the day Mr. Lincoln waselected President, and enjoyed an exceptional popularity with thepeople of his State. William Dennison had succeeded Salmon P. Chase in the gubernatorial chair of Ohio, and was unremitting inhis labor for the Union. Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin hadcontributed in no small degree by public and attractive speech tothe triumph of Mr. Lincoln, and was now intrusted with an importantduty, to which he gave himself with genuine zeal. 

In these sixteen States--all the non-slaveholding Commonwealthseast of the Rocky Mountains--the governors were members of theRepublican party. They were in political accord, and in completepersonal sympathy with the administration. This was regarded byMr. Lincoln as not in all respects a fortunate circumstance. Itwas his belief, as it was the belief of many others, that if loyalDemocrats had been in the executive chairs of some of the largestStates, the effect would have been more impressive. It would havesuggested a more absolute unity of the Northern people in supportof the government. It would in some degree have relieved thestruggle for national life from the opprobrium contained in thereproach which subsequently became too common, that after all itwas "a Republican war, " waged merely for the abolition of slavery. 

The two States on the Pacific coast had Democratic governors, and, by reason of the strong influence which the Southern Democrats hadexercised in both under the influence of William M. Gwin and JosephLane, there was deep solicitude as to the course of event in thatimportant outpost of the Union. The loyal adherence of those Statesto the National Government was a profound disappointment to theConfederacy. Jefferson Davis had expected, with a confidenceamounting to certainty, and based, it is believed, on personalpledges, that the Pacific Coast, if it did not actually join theSouth, would be disloyal to the Union, and would, from its remotenessand its superlative importance, require a large contingent of thenational forces to hold it in subjection. It was expected by theSouth that California and Oregon would give at least as much troubleas Kentucky and Missouri, and would thus indirectly but powerfullyaid the Southern cause. The enthusiastic devotion which thesedistant States showed to the Union was therefore a surprise to theSouth and a most welcome relief to the National Government. Theloyalty of the Pacific Coast was in the hearts of its people, butit was made more promptly manifest and effective by the patrioticconduct of Governor Downey and Governor Whittaker, and by the fervidand persuasive eloquence of Thomas Starr King. 

The war wrought a great change in the relative position of partiesin California. In the autumn of 1861 the Republican candidate, Leland Stanford, was chosen Governor of the State. He received56, 036 votes, while John Conness, a war Democrat, received 30, 944, and McConnell who was the representative of the Gwin Democracy, which had so long controlled the State, received 32, 750. The menwho supported Conness, if driven to the choice, would have supportedStanford as against McConnell, thus showing the overwhelmingsentiment of California in favor of the Union. Two years before, in the election of 1859, Mr. Stanford, as the Republican candidate, received but 10, 110 votes, while Milton S. Latham, representingthe Buchanan administration, received 62, 255, and Curry, the Douglascandidate, 31, 298. The majority of the Douglas men, if forced tochoose, would have voted for Latham as against Stanford. In thePresidential election of 1860 California gave Mr. Lincoln 38, 734votes, Mr. Douglas 38, 120, Mr. Breckinridge 33, 975, Mr. Bell 9, 136. The vote which Governor Stanford received in September, 1861, showshow rapid, radical, and complete was the political revolution causedin California by the Southern Rebellion. 

 THE ELECTION IN KENTUCKY. 

In the eager desire of the loyal people to hasten all measures ofpreparation for the defense of the Union, fault was found with Mr. Lincoln for so long postponing the session of Congress. Betweenthe date of his proclamation and the date of the assembling ofCongress, eighty days were to elapse. Zealous and impatientsupporters of the loyal cause feared that the Confederacy would beenabled to consolidate its power, and to gather its forces for amore serious conflict than they could make if more promptly confrontedwith the power of the Union. But Mr. Lincoln judged wisely thattime was needed for the growth and consolidation of Northern opinion, and that senators and representatives, after the full developmentof patriotic feeling in the free States, would meet in a frame ofmind better suited to the discharge of the weighty duties devolvingupon them. An additional and conclusive reason with the Presidentwas, that Kentucky had not yet elected her representatives to theThirty-seventh Congress, and would not do so, under the constitutionand laws, until the ensuing August. Mr. Lincoln desired to giveample time for canvassing Kentucky for the special election, whichwas immediately ordered by the governor of the State for thetwentieth of June. From the first, Mr. Lincoln had peculiar interestin the course and conduct of Kentucky. It was his native State, and Mr. Clay had been his political exemplar and ideal. He believedalso that in the action of her people would be found the best indexand the best test of the popular opinion of the Border slave States. He did every thing therefore that he could properly do, to aidKentucky in reaching a conclusion favorable to the Union. He wasrewarded with a great victory. Of the ten representatives chosen, nine were decided friends of the Union, with the venerable Crittendenat their head, ably seconded by Robert Mallory and William H. Wadsworth. Only one member, Henry C. Burnett, was disloyal to thegovernment, and he, after a few months' tarry in the Union councils, went South and joined the Rebellion. The popular vote showed 92, 365for the Union candidates, and 36, 995 for the Secession candidates, giving a Union majority of more than 55, 000. Mr. Lincoln regardedthe result in Kentucky as in the highest degree auspicious, and asamply vindicating the wisdom of delaying the extra session ofCongress. The effect was to stimulate a rapidly developing loyaltyin the western part of Virginia, to discourage rebellious movementsin Missouri, and to arrest Disunion tendencies in Maryland. 

Under the protection of the administration, and inspired by theconfidence of its support, the Union men of Kentucky had done forthat State what her Union men might have done for Tennessee if JohnBell and his Whig associates had been as bold and as true to theirold principles and John J. Crittenden and Garrett Davis had provedin Kentucky. The conduct of Mr. Bell was a sad surprise to hisNorthern friends, and a keen mortification to those Southern Whigswho had remained firm in their attachment to the Union. The votewhich he had received in the South at the Presidential electionwas very nearly as large as that given to Breckinridge. The voteof Bell and Douglas united, exceeded that given to Breckinridge inthe slave States by more than a hundred thousand. The popularjudgment in the North had been that the Disunion element in theSouth was massed in support of Breckinridge, and that all whopreferred the candidacy of Bell or Douglas might be relied upon inthe supreme crisis as friends of the Union. Two Southern States, Kentucky and Tennessee, had given popular majorities for Mr. Bell, and there was no reason for supposing that the Union sentiment ofTennessee was any less pronounced than that of Kentucky. Indeed, Tennessee had the advantage of Mr. Bell's citizenship and longidentification with her public service, while Kentucky encounteredthe personal influence and wide-spread popularity of Mr. Breckinridge, who took part against the Union. 

If Mr. Bell had taken firm ground for the Union, the Secessionmovement would have been to a very great extent paralyzed in theSouth. Mr. Badger of North Carolina, of identically similarprinciples with Crittenden, could have given direction to the oldWhig sentiment of his State, and could have held it steadily asKentucky was held to the Union. The Bell and Everett campaign hadbeen conducted upon the single and simple platform of the Unionand the Constitution, --devotion to the Union, obedience to theConstitution. Mr. Everett, whose public life of grace, eloquence, and purity had not been especially distinguished for courage, pronounced with zeal and determination in favor of Mr. Lincoln'sadministration, and lent his efforts on the stump to the cause ofthe Union with wonderful effect through the Northern States. Theeagerness of Virginia Democrats never could have swept their Stateinto the whirlpool of Secession if the supporters of Mr. Bell inTennessee and North Carolina had thrown themselves between the OldDominion and the Confederacy. With that aid, the former Whigs ofVirginia, led by Stuart and Botts and Wickham and Baldwin, andunited with the loyal Democrats of the mountain and the valley, could have held the State firmly to the support of the Union, andcould have effectively nullified the secret understanding betweenMr. Mason and the Montgomery government, that Virginia should secedeas soon as her open co-operation was needed for the success of theSouthern revolt. 

 THE WHIGS OF THE SOUTH. 

A large share of the responsibility for the dangerous developmentof the Rebellion must therefore be attributed to John Bell and hishalf million Southern supporters, who were all of the old Whigparty. At the critical moment they signally failed to vindicatethe principles upon which they had appealed in the preceding canvassfor popular support. They are not justly chargeable with originalDisunion proclivities. Sentiments of that kind had been consolidatedin the Breckinridge party. But they are responsible for permittinga party whose rank and file did not outnumber their own to leadcaptive the public opinion of the South, and for permitting themselvesto be pressed into a disavowal of their political principles, andto the adoption of the extreme views against which they had alwayswarred. The precipitate manner in which the Southern men of theancient Whig faith yielded their position as friends of the Unionwas an instructive illustration of the power which a compact anddesperate minority can wield in a popular struggle. In a secretballot, where every man could have voted according to his ownconvictions and desires, the Secession scheme would have beendefeated in Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, andArkansas. But the men who led the Disunion movement, understoodthe practical lesson taught by the French revolutionist, that"audacity" can overcome numbers. In such a contest conservatismalways goes down, and radicalism always triumphs. The conservativewishes to temporize and to debate. The radical wishes to act, andis ready to shoot. By reckless daring a minority of Southern menraised a storm of sectional passion to which the friends of theUnion bowed their heads and surrendered. 

It would be incorrect to speak of a Whig party in the South at theoutbreak of the civil war. There were many Whigs, but theirorganization was gone. It was the destruction of that party whichhad prepared the way for a triumph of the Democratic Disunionists. In the day of their strength the Whigs could not have been overbornein the South by the Secessionists, nor would the experiment havebeen tried. No party in the United States ever presented a morebrilliant array of talent than the Whigs. In the South, thoughalways resting under the imputation of not being so devoted to thesupport of Slavery as their opponents, they yet maintained themselves, by the power of intellect and by the prestige of chivalric leadership, in some extraordinary political battles. Many of their eminentmen have a permanent place in our history. Others, with lessnational renown, were recognized at home as possessing equal power. In their training, in their habits of mind, in their pride andindependence, in their lack of discipline and submission, they wereperhaps specially fitted for opposition, and not so well adaptedas men of less power, to the responsibility and detail ofadministration. But an impartial history of American statesmanshipwill give some of the most brilliant chapters to the Whig partyfrom 1830 to 1850. If their work cannot be traced in the Nationalstatute-books as prominently as that of their opponents, they willbe credited by the discriminating reader of our political annalsas the English of to-day credit Charles James Fox and his Whigassociates--for the many evils which they prevented. 

[* Baillie Peyton is erroneously described as uniting with theSouth. He remained true to the Union throughout the contest. ]

CHAPTER XV. 

Thirty-Seventh Congress assembles. --Military Situation. --List ofSenators: Fessenden, Sumner, Collamer, Wade, Chandler, Hale, Trumbull, Breckinridge, Baker of Oregon. --List of Members of theHouse of Representatives: Thaddeus Stevens, Crittenden, Lovejoy, Washburne, Bingham, Conkling, Shellabarger. --Mr. Grow electedSpeaker. --Message of President Lincoln. --Its Leading Recommendations. --His Account of the Outbreak of the Rebellion. --Effect of theMessage on the Northern People. --Battle of Bull Run. --Its Effecton Congress and the Country. --The Crittenden Resolution adopted. --Its Significance. --Interesting Debate upon it in the Senate. --FirstAction by Congress Adverse to Slavery. --Confiscation of CertainSlaves. --Large Amount of Business dispatched by Congress. --Strikingand Important Debate between Baker and Breckinridge. --Expulsion ofMr. Breckinridge from the Senate. --His Character. --Credit due toUnion Men of Kentucky. --Effect produced in the South of ConfederateSuccess at Bull Run. --Rigorous Policy adopted by the ConfederateGovernment. --Law respecting "Alien Enemies. "--Law sequestratingtheir Estates. --Rigidly enforced by Attorney-General Benjamin. --AnInjudicious Policy. 

The Thirty-seventh Congress assembled according to the President'sproclamation, on the fourth day of July, 1861. There had been noebb in the tide of patriotic enthusiasm which overspread the loyalStates after the fall of Sumter. Mr. Lincoln's sagacity in fixingthe session so late had apparently been well approved. The temperof the senators and representatives as they came together couldnot have been better for the great work before them. Startlingevents, following each other thick and fast, had kept the countryin a state of absorbing excitement, and Congress saw around it onevery side the indications of a sanguinary struggle to come. Evenafter the firing on Sumter, anxious and thoughtful men had notgiven up all hope of an adjustment. The very shock of arms in theharbor of Charleston, it was believed by many, might upon sobersecond thought induce Southern men to pause and consider andnegotiate before taking the fatal plunge. Such expectations werevain. The South felt that their victory was pre-ordained. JeffersonDavis answered Mr. Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand men bya proclamation ordering the enlistment of one hundred thousand. The Confederacy was growing in strength daily. State after Statewas joining it, and energy and confidence prevailed throughout allits borders. The situation grew every day more embarrassing andmore critical. Without waiting for the action of Congress, Mr. Lincoln had called for forty-two thousand additional volunteers, and added eleven new regiments, numbering some twenty-two thousandmen, to the regular army. A blockade of the Southern ports hadbeen ordered on the 19th of April, and eighteen thousand men hadbeen added to the navy. 

No battle of magnitude or decisive character had been fought whenCongress assembled; but there had been activity on the skirmishline of the gathering and advances forces and, at many points, blood collision. In Baltimore, on the historic 19th of April, themob had endeavored to stop the march of Massachusetts troops hurryingto the protection of the National Capital. In Missouri GeneralNathaniel Lyon had put to flight the disloyal governor, andestablished the supremacy of National authority. In Western VirginiaGeneral McClellan had met with success in some minor engagements, and on the upper Potomac the forces under General Robert Pattersonhad gained some advantages. A reverse of no very serious characterhad been experienced at Big Bethel, near Hampton Roads, by thetroops under General Benjamin F. Butler. General Robert C. Schenck, in command of a small force, had met with a repulse a few milesfrom Washington, near Vienna in the State of Virginia. Theseincidents were not in themselves of special importance, but theyindicated an aggressive energy on the part of the Confederates, and foreshadowed the desperate character which the contest wasdestined to assume. Congress found itself legislating in a fortifiedcity, with patrols of soldiers on the streets and with a militaryadministration which had practically superseded the civil policein the duty of maintaining order and protecting life. The situationwas startling and serious, and for the first time people began torealize that we were to have a war with bloody fighting and muchsuffering, with limitless destruction of property, with costlysacrifice of life. 

 UNITED-STATES SENATORS. 

The spirit in both branches of Congress was a fair reflection ofthat which prevailed in the North. Andrew Johnson of Tennesseewas the only senator who appeared from the eleven seceding States. John C. Breckinridge was present from Kentucky, somewhat mortifiedby the decisive rebuke which he had received in the vote of hisState. The first important act of the Senate was the seating ofJames H. Lane and Samuel C. Pomeroy as senators from the new Stateof Kansas, which had been admitted at the last session of Congressas a free State, --in a bill which, with historic justice, Mr. Buchanan was called upon to approve, after he had announced inCongress, during the first year of his administration, that Kansaswas as much a slave State as South Carolina. The first questionof moment growing out of the Rebellion was the presentation ofcredentials by Messrs. Willey and Carlile, who claimed seats assenators from Virginia, the right to which was certified by theseal of the State with the signature of Francis H. Pierpont asgovernor. The credentials indicated that Mr. Willey was to takethe seat vacated by Mr. Mason, and Mr. Carlile that vacated by Mr. Hunter. The loyal men of Virginia, especially from the westerncounties, finding that the regularly organized government of theState had joined the Rebellion, extemporized a government composedof the Union men of the Legislature which had been in session thepreceding winter in Richmond. This body had met in Wheeling, andelected two men as senators who had stood firmly for the Union inthe convention which had forced Virginia into secession. Theiradmission to the Senate was resisted by Mr. James A. Bayard, thensenator from Delaware, and by the few other Democratic senatorswho still held seats. But after discussion, Mr. Willey and Mr. Carlile were sworn in, and thus the first step was taken which ledsoon after to the partition of the Old Dominion and the creationof the new State of West Virginia. The free States had a unanimousrepresentation of Republican senators, with the exception of JohnR. Thompson from New Jersey, Jesse D. Bright from Indiana, JamesW. Nesmith from Oregon, and the two senators from California, MiltonS. Latham and James A. McDougall, the latter of whom was sworn inas the successor of William M. Gwin. 

The Senate, though deprived by secession of many able men from theSouth, presented an imposing array of talent, statesmanship, andcharacter. William Pitt Fessenden had already served one term withdistinction, and was now in the third year of his second term. Hepossessed a combination of qualities which gave him just eminencein his public career. He was brilliant from his youth upward; hadled the Maine Legislature when but a few years beyond his majority;and, at a time when members of the legal profession are strugglingfor a first foot-hold, he had stepped to the front rank in the barof Maine. He was elected a representative in Congress in 1840 atthirty-four years of age. He never enjoyed popularity in the sensein which that word is ordinarily used, but he had the absoluteconfidence and admiration of his constituents. He possessed thatpeculiar strength with the people--the most valuable and mostenduring a public man can have--which comes from a sense of pridein the ability and character of the representative. Somewhatreserved and distant in manner to the world at large, he was genialand delightful to the intimate circle whom he called friends. 

As a debater Mr. Fessenden was exceptionally able. He spoke withoutapparent effort, in a quiet, impressive manner, with a completemaster of pure English. He preserved the _lucidus ordo_ in hisargument, was never confused, never hurried, never involved instyle. A friend once said to him that the only criticism to bemade of his speeches in the Senate was that he illustrated hispoint too copiously, throwing light upon it after it was made plainto the comprehension of all his hearers. "That fault, " said he, "I acquired in addressing juries, where I always tried to adapt myargument to the understanding of the dullest man of the twelve. "It was a fault which Mr. Fessenden overcame, and in his later yearshis speeches may be taken as models for clearness of statement, accuracy of reasoning, felicity of expression, moderation of tone. There have been members of the Senate who achieved greater distinctionthan Mr. Fessenden, but it may well be doubted whether in thequalities named he ever had a superior in that body. His personalcharacter was beyond reproach. He maintained the highest standardof purity and honor. His patriotism was ardent and devoted. Thegeneral character of his mind was conservative, and he had theheartiest contempt of every thing that savored of the demagogue inthe conduct of public affairs. He was never swayed from hisconclusion by the passion of the hour, and he met the gravestresponsibilities with even mind. He had a lofty disregard ofpersonal danger, possessing both moral and physical courage in ahigh degree. He was constant in his devotion to duty, and no doubtshortened his life by his public labors. *

 UNITED-STATES SENATORS. 

Mr. Sumner, though five years the junior, was senior in senatorialservice to Mr. Fessenden, and had attained wider celebrity. Mr. Sumner's labor was given almost exclusively to questions involvingour foreign relations, and to issues growing out of the slaveryagitation. To the latter he devoted himself, not merely withunswerving fidelity but with all the power and ardor of his nature. Upon general questions of business in the Senate he was not anauthority, and rarely participated in the debates which settledthem; but he did more than any other man to promote the anti-slaverycause, and to uprear its standard in the Republican party. He hadearned, in an unexampled degree, the hatred of the South, and thisfact had increased the zeal for him among anti-slavery men throughoutthe North. The assault, made upon him by Preston S. Brooks, aSouth-Carolina representative, for his famous speech on Kansas, had strengthened his hold upon his constituency, which was notmerely the State of Massachusetts but the radical and progressiveRepublicans of the entire country. 

Mr. Sumner was studious, learned, and ambitious. He prepared hisdiscussions of public questions with care, but was not ready as adebater. He presented his arguments with power, but they werelaborious essays. He had no faculty for extempore speech. LikeAddison, he could draw his draft for a thousand pounds, but mightnot have a shilling of change. This did not hinder his progressor lessen his prestige in the Senate. His written arguments werethe anti-slavery classics of the day, and they were read moreeagerly than speeches which produced greater effect on the hearer. Colonel Benton said that the eminent William Pinkney of Marylandwas always thinking of the few hundred who came to hear him in theSenate Chamber, apparently forgetting the million who might readhim outside. Mr. Sumner never made that mistake. His argumentswent to the million. They produced a wide-spread and prodigiouseffect on public opinion and left an indelible impression on thehistory of the country. 

Jacob Collamer of Vermont was a senator of eminent worth and ability. He had earned honorable fame as a member of the House of Representatives, and as a member of the Cabinet in the administration of GeneralTaylor. He had entered the Senate at a ripe age, and with everyqualification for distinguished service. To describe him in asingle word, he was a wise man. Conservative in his nature, hewas sure to advise against rashness. Sturdy in his principles, healways counseled firmness. In the periods of excitement throughwhich the party was about to pass, his judgment was sure to proveof highest value--influenced, as it always was, by patriotism, andguided by conscience. Without power as an orator, he was listenedto in the Senate with profound attention, as one who never offeredcounsel that was not needed. He carried into the Senate the gravity, the dignity, the weight of character, which enabled him to controlmore ardent natures; and he brought to a later generation the wisdomand experience acquired in a long life devoted to the service ofhis State and of his country. 

 UNITED-STATES SENATORS. 

Zachariah Chandler had been the recognized leader of the Republicanparty in Michigan from its formation. He had superseded GeneralCass with a people in whose affections the latter had been stronglyintrenched before Chandler was born. He had been four years inthe Senate when the war broke out, and he was well established inreputation and influence. He was educated in the common schoolsof his native State of New Hampshire, but had not enjoyed theadvantage of collegiate training. He was not eloquent accordingto the canons of oratory; but he was widely intelligent, had givencareful attention to public questions, and spoke with force andclearness. He was a natural leader. He had abounding confidencein himself, possessed moral courage of a high order, and did notknow the sensation of physical fear. He was zealous in theperformance of public duty, radical in all his convictions, patrioticin every thought, an unrelenting foe to all forms of corruption. He distinguished between a friend and an enemy. He was alwaysready to help the one, and, though not lacking in magnanimity, heseldom neglected an opportunity to cripple the other. 

Lyman Trumbull had entered the Senate six years before, when Illinoisrevolted against the course of Douglas in destroying the MissouriCompromise. Mr. Lincoln had earnestly desired the place, but waivedhis claims. The election of Trumbull was considered desirable forthe consolidation of the new party, and the Republicans of Whigantecedents were taught a lesson of self-sacrifice by the promptnesswith which Mr. Lincoln abandoned the contest. Judge Trumbull hadacquired a good reputation at the bar of his State, and at oncetook high rank in the Senate. His mind was trained to logicaldiscussion, and as a debater he was able and incisive. His politicalaffiliations prior to 1854 were with the Democracy, and aside fromthe issue in regard to the extension of slavery, he did not fullysympathize with the principles and tendencies of the Republicanparty. He differed from Mr. Lincoln just as Preston King, senatorfrom New York, differed from Mr. Seward. Lincoln and Seward believedin Henry Clay and all the issues which he represented, while Trumbulland King were devoted to the policies and measures which characterizedthe administration of Jackson. The two classes of men composingthe Republican party were equally zealous in support of the principlesthat led to the political revolution of 1860, but it was not easyto see what would be the result of other issues which time andnecessity might develop. 

Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio had been ten years in the Senate when thewar broke out. He entered in March, 1851--the immediate successorof Thomas Ewing who had been transferred to the Senate from theCabinet of Taylor, to take the place of Thomas Corwin who left theSenate to enter the Cabinet of Fillmore. Mr. Wade was elected asa Whig--the last senator chosen by that party in Ohio. His triumphwas a rebuke to Mr. Corwin for his abandonment of the advancedposition which he had taken against the aggressions of the slavepower. It was rendered all the more significant by the defeat ofMr. Ewing, who with his strong hold upon the confidence and regardof the people of Ohio, was too conservative to embody the popularresentment against the odious features of the Compromise of 1850. Mr. Wade entered the Senate with Mr. Sumner. Their joint comingimparted confidence and strength to the contest for free soil, andwas a powerful re-enforcement to Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Hale, who represented the distinctively anti-slavery sentiment inthe Senate. The fidelity, the courage, the ability of Mr. Wadegave him prominence in the North, and were a constant surprise tothe South. He brought to the Senate the radicalism which Mr. Giddings had so long upheld in the House, and was protected in hisaudacious freedom of speech by his steadiness of nerve and hisknown readiness to fight. 

Henry B. Anthony entered the Senate on the 4th of March, 1859, atforty-four years of age. He had been Governor of Rhode Island tenyears before. He received a liberal education at Brown University, and was for a long period editor of the _Providence Journal_, aposition in which he established an enviable fame as a writer andsecured an enduring hold upon the esteem and confidence of hisState. In the Senate he soon acquired the rank to which his thoroughtraining and intelligence, his graceful speech, his ardent patriotism, his stainless life entitled him. No man has ever enjoyed, amonghis associates of all parties, a more profound confidence, a morecordial respect, a warmer degree of affection. 

 UNITED-STATES SENATORS. 

John P. Hale of New Hampshire was still pursuing the career whichhe had begun as an early advocate of the anti-slavery cause, andin which he had twice overthrown the power of the Democratic partyin New Hampshire. --Henry Wilson was the colleague of Mr. Sumner, and was a man of strong parts, self-made, earnest, ardent, andtrue. --Lot M. Morrill was the worthy associate of Mr. Fessenden, prominent in his profession, and strong in the regard and confidenceof the people of his States. --The author of the Wilmot Proviso camefrom Pennsylvania as the successor of Simon Cameron, and as thecolleague of Edgar Cowan, whose ability was far greater than hisambition or his industry. --James W. Grimes, a native of New Hampshire, who had gone to Iowa at the time of its organization as a Territoryand had been conspicuously influential in the affairs of the State, entered the Senate in March, 1859. He possessed an iron will andsound judgment. He was specially distinguished for independenceof party restraint in his modes of thought and action. He andJudge Collamer of Vermont were the most intimate associates of Mr. Fessenden, and the three were not often separated on public questions. --The colleague of Mr. Grimes was James Harlan, one of Mr. Lincoln'smost valued and most confidential friends, and subsequently a memberof his Cabinet. --James R. Doolittle came from Wisconsin, a far moreradical Republican than his colleague, Timothy O. Howe, and bothwere men of marked influence in the councils of their party. --JohnSherman filled the vacancy occasioned by the appointment of Mr. Chase to the Treasury. Mr. Chase had been chosen as the successorof George E. Pugh, and remained in the Senate but a single day. Mr. Sherman had been six years in the House, and had risen rapidlyin public esteem. He had been the candidate of his party forSpeaker, and had served as chairman of Ways and Means in the Congresspreceding the war. --From the far-off Pacific came Edward DickinsonBaker, a senator from Oregon, a man of extraordinary gifts ofeloquence; lawyer, soldier, frontiersman, leader of popularassemblies, tribune of the people. In personal appearance he wascommanding, in manner most attractive, in speech irresistiblycharming. Perhaps in the history of the Senate no man ever leftso brilliant a reputation from so short a service. He was born inEngland, and the earliest recollection of his life was the splendidpageant attending the funeral of Lord Nelson. ** He came with hisfamily to the United States when a child, lived for a time inPhiladelphia, and removed to Illinois, where he grew to manhoodand early attained distinction. He served his State with greatbrilliancy in Congress, and commanded with conspicuous success oneof her regiments in the war with Mexico. The Whigs of the North-West presented Colonel Baker for a seat in the Cabinet of PresidentTaylor. His failure to receive the appointment was a soremortification to him. He thought his political career in Illinoiswas broken; and in 1852, after the close of his service in Congress, he joined the throng who were seeking fortune and fame on thePacific slope. When leaving Washington he said to a friend thathe should never look on the Capitol again unless he could comebearing his credentials as a senator of the United States. Hereturned in eight years. 

Among the opposition senators, some fourteen in number, the mostprominent was John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, who had steppedfrom the Vice-President's chair to the floor of the Senate as thesuccessor of Mr. Crittenden. Mr. Breckinridge at that time wasforty years of age, attractive in personal appearance, graceful, and cordial in manner, by inheritance and by cultivation a gentleman. He came from a section where family rank gave power and influence. He united in his person the best blood of the South and the North, --preserving and combining the most winning traits of each. Hislineage in Kentucky naturally brought to him the sympathy andsupport of the State. He was born to success and authority amonghis people. Originally he had anti-slavery convictions, as hadall the members of his eminent family. So strongly was this tendencydeveloped in his mind that, when he came to the bar, he removed tothe Territory of Iowa, intending to identify himself with the growthof the free North-West. Circumstances overcame the determination, and carried him back to Kentucky, where he was welcomed at thehearth-stones and in the hearts of her people. 

 MR. CLAY AND MR. BRECKINRIDGE. 

At twenty-five years of age Mr. Breckinridge was appointed majorin one of the Kentucky regiments, which served in the Mexican war. After his return he entered upon the practice of his profession inLexington, and against all the traditions of his family identifiedhimself with the Democratic party. An apparently slight incidenthad an important bearing upon his earlier political career. Hewas selected to deliver the address of welcome to Mr. Clay on hisreturn to Kentucky in the autumn of 1850, from the field of hissenatorial triumph in securing the adoption of the celebratedcompromise of that year. Mr. Breckinridge's speech was gracefuland effective. He eulogized Mr. Clay's work with discrimination, and paid the highest tribute to the illustrious statesman. Mr. Clay was visibly touched by the whole scene. His old opponentswere present by the thousand to do him honor. The enmities andantagonisms of earlier years were buried. He had none but friendsand supporters in Kentucky. He responded with earnestness, andeven with emotion: "My welcome, " he said, "has been made all themore grateful from being pronounced by my eloquent young friend, the son of an eloquent father, the grandson of a still more eloquentgrandfather, both of whom were in days long gone my cherishedcompanions, my earnest supporters. " Mr. Clay's words were so warm, his manner was so cordial, that it seemed as if he intended toconfer upon Breckinridge the leadership in Kentucky, which, aftera half century's domination, he was about to surrender. Undoubtedlythe events of that day aided Breckinridge the next year in carryingthe Ashland District for Congress, and drew to him thereafter thesupport of many influential Whigs. He entered Congress when theslavery discussion was absorbing public attention, and by theirresistible drift of events he was carried into an associationwith extreme Southern men. It was by their friendly influence thathe was promoted to the Vice-Presidency as soon as he became eligibleunder the Constitution. During the four stormy years of Buchanan'sadministration, when the sectional contest approached its crisis, Mr. Breckinridge became more and more the representative of Southernopinion, and, though unequal to Douglas in the arena of debate, hebecame the leader of those who opposed the "popular sovereignty"dogma of the Illinois senator. He was thence drawn by influenceswhich he could not have controlled if he had desired, into theprolonged and exciting controversy which disrupted the Democraticparty. Intellectually Mr. Breckinridge was not the equal of manySouthern men who deferred to him as a leader. His precedence wasdue to his personal character, to his strong connections, to hiswell-tempered judgment, and especially to a certain attractivenessof manner which was felt by all who came in contact with him. 

The prominence of New England in the Senate was exceptional. Somany positions of influence were assigned to her that it createdno small degree of jealously and ill-feeling in other sections. The places were allotted according to the somewhat rigid rules ofprecedence which obtain in that body, but this fact did not inducesenators from the Middle and Western States to acquiesce with grace. The chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations was givento Mr. Sumner; Mr. Fessenden was placed at the head of the FinanceCommittee, which then included Appropriations; Mr. Wilson was madechairman of Military Affairs; Mr. John P. Hale, chairman of NavalAffairs; Mr. Collamer, chairman of Post-office and Post-roads; Mr. Foster of Connecticut, chairman of Pensions; Mr. Clark of NewHampshire, chairman of Claims; Mr. Simmons of Rhode Island, chairmanof Patents; Mr. Foot of Vermont, chairman of Public Buildings andGrounds; Mr. Anthony, chairman of Printing; Mr. Dixon of Connecticut, chairman of Contingent Expenses. Mr. Lot M. Morrill, who had justentered the public service from Maine, was the only New-Englandsenator left without a chairmanship. There were in all twenty-twocommittees in the Senate. Eleven were given to New England. Buteven this ratio does not exhibit the case in its full strength. The Committees on Foreign Relations, Finance, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs shaped almost the entire legislation in time ofwar, and thus New England occupied a most commanding position. The retirement of Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Cameron from theSenate to enter the Cabinet undoubtedly increased the number ofimportant positions assigned to New England. Twenty-two Stateswere represented in the Senate, and it was impossible to makesixteen of them, including the four leading States of the Union, recognize the justice of placing the control of National legislationin the hands of six States in the far North-East. It was not afortunate arrangement for New England, since it provoked prejudiceswhich proved injurious in many ways, and lasted for many years. 

 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

The House of Representatives was promptly organized by the electionof Galusha A. Grow of Pennsylvania as Speaker. Mr. Grow came fromthe Wilmot district, on the northern border of the State, wherethe anti-slavery sentiment had taken earliest and deepest root. As Connecticut had in the Colonial period claimed a large part ofthe area of North Pennsylvania, her emigration tended in thatdirection, and this fact had given a distinct and more radical typeto the population. Mr. Grow was himself a native of Connecticut. He was chosen Speaker because of his activity in the anti-slaverystruggles of the House, and because of his aptitude for the dutiesof the chair. Francis P. Blair, Jr. , of Missouri was a rivalcandidate, and was supported by strong influences. It was notconsidered expedient to hold a party caucus, and the Democraticminority declined to present a candidate. On the roll call, Mr. Grow received 71 votes, Mr. Blair 40, while 48 votes, principallyof Democratic representatives, were cast for different gentlemenwho were in no sense candidates. Accepting Mr. Grow's pluralityas the best form of nomination to the office, a large number ofthe friends of Mr. Blair changed their votes before the result wasauthoritatively declared, and Mr. Grow was announced as receiving90 votes, --a majority of all the members. Two members appearedfrom Virginia. The other Confederate States were withoutrepresentation. Emerson Etheridge of Tennessee was chosen Clerk, in compliment to his fidelity and courage as a Union man. 

The House was filled with able men, many of whom had parliamentaryexperience. The natural leader, who assumed his place by commonconsent, was Thaddeus Stevens, a man of strong peculiarities ofcharacter, able, trained, and fearless. Born in Vermont and educatedat Dartmouth, he had passed all his adult years in Pennsylvania, and was thoroughly identified with the State which he had servedwith distinction both in her own Legislature and in Congress. Hehad the reputation of being somewhat unscrupulous as to politicalmethods, somewhat careless in personal conduct, somewhat lax inpersonal morals; but to the one great object of his life, thedestruction of slavery and the elevation of the slave, he wassupremely devoted. From the pursuit of that object nothing coulddeflect him. Upon no phase of it would he listen to compromise. Any man who was truly anti-slavery was his friend. Whoever espousedthe cause and proved faithless in never so small a degree, becamehis enemy, inevitably and irreconcilably. Towards his own race heseemed often to be misanthropic. He was learned in the law, andfor a third of a century had held high rank at the bar of a Statedistinguished for great lawyers. He was disposed to be taciturn. A brilliant talker, he did not relish idle and aimless conversation. He was much given to reading, study, and reflection, and to theretirement which enabled him to gratify his tastes. As was saidof Mr. Emerson, Mr. Stevens loved solitude and understood its use. 

Upon all political questions Mr. Stevens was an authority. Hespoke with ease and readiness, using a style somewhat resemblingthe crisp, clear sententiousness of Dean Swift. Seldom, even inthe most careless moment, did a sentence escape his lips, thatwould not bear the test of grammatical and rhetorical criticism. He possessed the keenest wit, and was unmerciful in its use towardthose whom he did not like. He illustrated in concrete form thedifference between wit and humor. He did not indulge in the latter. He did not enjoy a laugh. When his sharp sallies would set theentire House in an uproar, he was as impassive, his visage assolemn, as if he were pronouncing a funeral oration. His memoryof facts, dates, and figures was exact, and in argument he knewthe book and chapter and page for reference. He was fond of youngmen, invited their society, encouraged and generously aided them. He was easily moved by the distress of others. He was kind, charitable, lavish of his money in the relief of poverty. He hadcharacteristics which seemed contradictory, but which combined tomake one of the memorable figures in the Parliamentary history ofthe United States, --a man who had the courage to meet any opponent, and who was never overmatched in intellectual conflict. 

Mr. Stevens had efficient colleagues from Pennsylvania. The mostdistinguished was John Hickman, who had been a Democrat until 1860, and who in debate was skillful and acute. William D. Kelley enteredthe House at this session for the first time, and was destined toserve his State for a long series of years, with ability, fidelity, and usefulness. James K. Moorhead, John Covode, Edward McPherson, and John W. Killinger were active and influential members. ***

 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

New York sent Reuben E. Fenton, already prominent, popular, andstrong in the public service; Elbridge G. Spaulding, who becameuseful and even eminent as an adviser in financial legislation;William A. Wheeler, afterwards Vice-President of the United States;Theodore Pomeroy, the neighbor and confidential friend of Mr. Seward; Charles B. Sedgwick, of pronounced ability in the law;Charles H. Van Wyck, who afterwards sought distinction in the West;and Abraham Olin, subsequently well known in judicial life. Theablest and most brilliant man of the delegation was Roscoe Conkling. He had been elected to the preceding Congress when but twenty-nineyears of age, and had exhibited a readiness and eloquence in debatethat placed him at once in the first rank. His command of languagewas remarkable. In affluent and exuberant diction Mr. Conklingwas never surpassed in either branch of Congress, unless, perhaps, by Rufus Choate. 

The Ohio delegation was especially strong. John A. Bingham, theoldest in service on the Republican side, was an effective debater, well informed, ready, and versatile. A man of high principle, ofstrong faith, of zeal, enthusiasm, and eloquence, he could alwayscommand the attention of the House. His colleague, SamuelShellabarger, was distinguished for the logical and analyticalcharacter of his mind. Without the gift of oratory, paying littleheed to the graces of speech, Mr. Shellabarger conquered by theintrinsic strength of his argument, which generally amounted todemonstration. His mind possessed many of the qualities whichdistinguished Mr. Lincoln. In fairness, lucidness, fullness ofstatement, the two had a striking resemblance. Valentine B. Hortonwas a valuable member on all questions of finance and business;and on the issues touching slavery James M. Ashley followed theradical example of Mr. Giddings. Among the Democrats, George H. Pendleton, Clement L. Vallandigham, and Samuel S. Cox were especiallyconspicuous. Mr. Pendleton was regarded as the leader of theDemocratic side of the House by a large section of his party, andhis assignment to the Committee of Ways and Means by the Speakerwas intended as a recognition of that fact. Mr. Cox gave muchattention to foreign affairs, to which his mind had been drawn bya brief but fruitful participation in the diplomatic service ofthe country. Mr. Vallandigham possessed ability, and a certainform of dogged courage, combined with a love of notoriety, whichallured him to the assumption of extreme positions and the advocacyof unpopular measures. No other State was in the aggregate so ablyrepresented as Ohio. 

 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

Indiana was influential in the House. Schuyler Colfax was at theheight of his successful career on the floor and destined to eminentpromotion in the public service. Among his Republican colleagueswere George W. Julian, long and creditably identified with the anti-slavery cause, and especially esteemed for the conscientiousattention he had given to all questions relating to the publiclands; Albert G. Porter, in his second Congress, well trained fordebate, with ability and high character, rapidly winning publicfavor, but cut off from his legislative career by a Democraticmajority in his district, although his strength with the peoplehas since been strikingly attested; William McKee Dunn, a man ofsound judgment, to be known and appreciated afterwards in otherfields of honorable duty. On the Democratic side, William S. Holmanalready ranked as an old member. His efforts were steadily andpersistently directed to the enforcement of public economy; andthough he may have sometimes been unreasonable, and though he wasoften accused of acting the part of a demagogue, the country oweshim a debt of gratitude for the integrity, intelligence, andsimplicity with which he has illustrated a most honorable careeras representative of the people. Daniel W. Voorhees, by nature afierce partisan, yet always filled with generous impulses, was inhis second Congress. His character was significantly illustratedby his willingness to lend his attractive eloquence in the Virginiacourts in defense of one of John Brown's associates in the Harper'sFerry tragedy, --a magnanimous act in view of the risk to his positionamong the pro-slavery Democracy, with whom he was strongly identifiedin party organization. 

Illinois sent Elihu B. Washburne, already eight years a representativein Congress, a man of courage, energy, and principle, devoted tothe Republican party, constant in attendance upon the sessions ofthe House, expert in its rules, its most watchful and most carefulmember, an economist by nature, a foe to every form of corruption. Owen Lovejoy, though a native of Maine, springing from Puritanancestry, and educated to the Christian ministry in the faith taughtby Calvin, had the fiery eloquence of a French Revolutionist. Noteven the exasperating wit of Thaddeus Stevens, or the studied tauntsof John Quincy Adams, ever threw the Southern men into such rageas the speeches of Lovejoy. He was recklessly bold. His brotherhad been killed by a mob for preaching the doctrine of theAbolitionists, and he seemed almost to court the same fate. Hewas daring enough to say to the Southern Democrats, at a time ofgreat excitement in the House, in a speech delivered long beforethe war, that the negroes were destined to walk to emancipation, as the children of Israel had journeyed to the promised land, "through the _Red_ Sea. " Among the Democrats the most conspicuouswas William A. Richardson, who had been a devoted adherent ofDouglas, and had co-operated with in the repeal of the MissouriCompromise. A younger adherent of Douglas was John A. Logan, serving in his second term. He remained however but a short timein the Thirty-seventh Congress. His ardent patriotism and ambitioustemperament carried him into the war, where his brilliant careeris known and read of all men. 

The most distinguished accession to the House was John J. Crittendenof Kentucky. He had never before served in that branch, but hehad been chosen to the Senate six times by the Legislature of hisState, --for five full terms and for the remainder of Mr. Clay'sterm when he retired in 1842. Only one other man, William E. Kingof Alabama, has ever been so many times elected to the Senate. Mr. Crittenden, like Mr. Clay, entered the Senate at thirty yearsof age. His service began the day that Madison left the Presidency, and ended the day of Lincoln's inauguration. But in this longperiod he had served only two full terms, and his total service inthe Senate was little more than twenty years. He resigned in 1819"to get bread for his family, " as he expressed it; the compensationof a senator for the session of Congress not averaging at that timemore than nine hundred dollars per annum. He resigned in 1841 tobecome Attorney-General in the Cabinet of Harrison. He resignedin 1848 to run for Governor of Kentucky in aid of General Taylor'scandidacy, and he left the governorship in 1850, after the deathof Taylor, to accept his old position in the Cabinet. He wasappointed to the Supreme Bench by John Quincy Adams in the lastyear of his administration; but the Senate, already under theinfluence of the Jackson men, refused to confirm him. Mr. Claywrote to Mr. Crittenden in anticipation of his failure, biddinghim "cultivate calmness of mind and prepare for the worst event. "

Mr. Crittenden's ability was of a high order. He stood at the headof that class of statesmen who were next to the highest grade. Like so many other eminent Whigs, he was excluded from the fullrecognition of his power by the overshadowing prestige of Mr. Clayand Mr. Webster. The appearance of Mr. Crittenden in the House inhis seventy-fourth year was his patriotic response to the roll-callof duty. He loved his country and his whole country, and everyeffort of his waning strength was put forth in behalf of the Union. It was his influence, more than that of any other man, which savedhis State from the vortex of Rebellion. But for his strong holdupon the sympathy and pride of Kentucky, the malign influence ofBreckinridge might have forced the State into the Confederacy. Mr. Lincoln considered Mr. Crittenden's course entitled to theadmiration and gratitude of every man who was loyal to the Union. 

 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

Another Kentuckian gave noble aid to the National cause. CharlesA. Wickliffe was a contemporary of Mr. Crittenden, and had for manyyears belonged to the same party. In the Whig dissensions whichfollowed the accession of Mr. Tyler to the Presidency, Mr. Wickliffesupported the Administration. As an effective blow to Mr. Clay, the President called Mr. Wickliffe to his Cabinet. He served asPostmaster-General through Mr. Tyler's term, and with his chiefwent over to the Democratic party, supporting Mr. Polk in 1844. There was much anger over his course, on the part of the KentuckyWhigs, resulting in personal estrangements. He was a man of ability, of commanding appearance, of high character. His return to Congress, where he had originally entered nearly forty years before, broughta valuable support to the cause of the Union. 

Associated with Crittenden and Wickliffe were three men of mark. Robert Mallory, William H. Wadsworth, and James S. Jackson wereyounger but not less devoted friends of the Union. Their examplewas especially valuable in holding thousands of young Kentuckiansfrom following Breckinridge into the Confederate army. Jacksongave his life to his country on one of the battle-fields of the war. 

--Missouri sent Francis P. Blair, Jr. , and James S. Rollins, whohad already been in the smoke and fire of civil conflict, and whoseloyalty to the Union, under every form of peril, entitled them tothe respect and confidence of patriotic men. 

--Massachusetts sent Benjamin F. Thomas of rare eloquence; AlexanderH. Rice, afterwards the governor of his State; Thomas D. Elliott, John B. Alley, the venerable William Appleton; and Henry L. Dawes, whose long service attests his character, his ability, and theconfidence of his constituents. 

--From New Hampshire came Gilman Marston, who soon after gainedcredit in the field; from Vermont, Justin S. Morrill, one of themost useful, industrious, and honorable members of the House; fromMaine, its distinguished ex-governor, Anson P. Morrill; and FrederickA. Pike, of strong mind, keen and incisive in debate, but lackingthe ambition necessary to give him his proper rank in the House. Samuel C. Fessenden and Thomas A. D. Fessenden, brothers of thedistinguished senator, were members of this House, --the only instancein which three brothers were ever in Congress at the same time fromthe same State. Three Washburns had served in the precedingCongress, but they represented three States. 

--The far North-West was well represented by young men. WilliamWindom came from Minnesota, and from Iowa James F. Wilson, a manof positive strength, destined to take very prominent part inlegislative proceedings. Fernando C. Beaman came from Michigan, and John F. Potter and A. Scott Sloan from Wisconsin. Martin F. Conway came from the youngest State of the Union, fresh from thecontests which had made Kansas almost a field of war. 

The organization of the House was so promptly effected that thePresident's message was received on the same day. Throughout thecountry there was an eagerness to hear Mr. Lincoln's views on thepainful situation. The people had read with deep sympathy thetender plea to the South contained in his Inaugural address. Thenext occasion on which they had heard from him officially was hisproclamation for troops after the fall of Sumter. Public opinionin the North would undoubtedly be much influenced by what thePresident should now say. Mr. Lincoln was keenly alive to theimportance of his message, and he weighed every word he wrote. Hemaintained, as he always did, calmness of tone, moderation inexpression. He appealed to reason, not to prejudice. He spoke asone who knew that he would be judged by the public opinion of theworld. It was his fortune to put his name to many state papers ofextraordinary weight, but never to one of graver import than hisfirst message to Congress. 

 PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE. 

The President informed Congress that he would not call theirattention "to any ordinary subject of legislation. " In fact therewere but two things for Congress to do in the national exigency--provide for the enlistment of an army, and for the raising of moneynecessary to the conduct of a great war. The President vividlynarrated the progressive steps in the South which had brought aboutthe existing status of affairs. He depicted in strong colors thecondition in which he found the government when he assumed office;how "the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, and custom-houses" of theNational Government had been seized; how "the accumulations ofnational revenue" had been appropriated; how "a disproportionateshare of Federal muskets and rifles" had found their way into theSouthern States, and had been seized to be used against thegovernment; how the navy had been "scattered in distant seas, leaving but a small part of it within immediate reach of thegovernment;" how seven States had seceded from the Union, and formed"a separate government, which is already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign powers. " With this critical situationhe was compelled to deal at once, and the policy which he had chosenwhen he entered upon his office looked to the exhaustion of allpeaceful measures before a resort to stronger ones. 

In pursuing the policy of peace, the President had "sought only tohold the public places and property not already wrested from thegovernment, and to collect the revenue--relying for the rest ontime, discussion, and the ballot-box. " He had even gone so far as"to promise a continuance of the mails at government expense tothe very people who were resisting the government;" and he hadgiven "repeated pledges" that every thing should be "forbornewithout which it was believed possible to keep the government onfoot;" that there should be no "disturbances to any of the people, or to any of their rights. " He had gone in the direction ofconciliation as far as it was possible to go, without consentingto a disruption of the government. 

The President gave in detail the events which led to the assaulton Sumter. He declared that the reduction of the fort "was in nosense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. "They well knew "that the garrison in the fort could by no possibilitycommit an aggression upon them;" they were expressly notified that"the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrisonwas all which would be attempted, unless themselves, by resistingso much, should provoke more. " They knew that the National Governmentdesired to keep the garrison in the fort, "not to assail them, butmerely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve theUnion from actual and immediate dissolution. " The ConfederateGovernment had "assailed and reduced the fort for precisely thereverse object--to drive out the visible authority of the FederalUnion, and thus force it to immediate dissolution. "

"In this act, " said Mr. Lincoln, "discarding all else, they haveforced upon the country the distinct issue--immediate dissolutionor blood; and this issue embraces more than the fate of these UnitedStates. It presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a Constitutional Republic, a government of the people bythe same people, can or cannot maintain its territorial integrityagainst its own domestic foes. " The President presented this pointwith elaboration. The question really involved, was "whetherdiscontented individuals, too few in number to control theadministration according to the organic law, can always, upon thepretenses made in this case, or any other pretenses, or arbitrarilywithout pretenses, break up the government, and thus practicallyput an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, _Is there in all Republics this inherent and fatal weakness?_ Musta government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of itsown people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"

The President was severe upon Virginia and Virginians. He had madeearnest effort to save the State from joining the Rebellion. Hehad held conferences with her leading men, and had gone so far onthe 13th of April as to address a communication, for public use inVirginia, to the State convention then in session at Richmond, inanswer to a resolution of the convention asking him to define thepolicy he intended to pursue in regard to the Confederate States. In this he re-asserted the position assumed in his Inaugural, andadded that "if, as now appears to be true, an unprovoked assaulthas been made on Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty torepossess it if I can, and the like places which had been seizedbefore the government was devolved upon me. I shall, to the bestof my ability, repel force by force. " This letter was used toinflame public sentiment in Virginia, and to hurl the State intoSecession through the agency of a Convention elected to maintainthe Union. Mr. Lincoln afterwards believed that the letter hadbeen obtained from him under disingenuous pretenses and for theexpress purpose of using it, as it was used, against the Union andin favor of the Confederacy. 

 PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE. 

The President's resentment towards those who had thus, as he thought, broken faith with him is visible in his message. Referring to theVirginia convention, he observed that, "the people had chosen alarge majority of professed Union men" as delegates. "After thefall of Sumter, many members of that majority went over to theoriginal Disunion minority, and with them adopted an ordinancewithdrawing the State from the Union. " In his own peculiar style, Mr. Lincoln made the stinging comment, "Whether this change waswrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or bytheir great resentment at the government's resistance to thatassault, is not definitely known. " Though the Virginia conventionhad submitted the ordinance of Secession to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day nearly a month in the future, the Presidentinformed Congress that "they immediately commenced acting as ifthe State was already out of the Union. " They seized the arsenalat Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Norfolk, and "received, perhaps invited, large bodies of troops from the so-called secedingStates. " They "sent members to their Congress at Montgomery, andfinally permitted the insurrectionary government to be transferredto their Capitol at Richmond. " Mr. Lincoln concluded with anominous sentence which might well have inspired Virginians with asense of impending peril; "The people of Virginia have thus allowedhis giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders, andthis government has no choice left but to deal with it where itfinds it. " In that moment of passion these words, with all theirterrible significance, were heard by Southern men only to be jeeredat. 

When the President came to specific recommendations he was briefand pointed. He asked that Congress would place "at the controlof the government at least four hundred thousand men, and fourhundred millions of money. " He said this number was about one-tenth of those of proper age within the regions where all wereapparently willing to engage, and the sum was "less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by men who seem ready to devotethe whole. " He argued that "a debt of six hundred millions ofdollars is now a less sum per head than the debt of the Revolutionwhen we came out of that struggle, and the money value in thecountry bears even a greater proportion to what it was then thandoes the population. " "Surely, " he added, "each man has as stronga motive now to _preserve_ our liberties as each had then to_establish_ them. "

After arguing at length as to the utter fallacy of the right ofSecession, and showing how the public "mind of the South had beendrugged and insidiously debauched with the doctrine for thirtyyears, " the President closed his message "with the deepest regretthat he found the duty of employing the war power of the governmentforced upon him;" but he "must perform his duty, or surrender theexistence of the government. " Compromise had been urged upon thePresident from every quarter. He answered all such requests frankly:"No compromise by public servants could in this case be a cure;not that compromises are not often proper, but that no populargovernment can long survive a marked precedent that those who carryan election can only save the government from immediate destructionby giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reversetheir own deliberate decision. "

Mr. Lincoln thus saw his duty clearly and met it boldly. In hisown person was centred, as he profoundly realized, the fate ofRepublican government. He had been elected President of the UnitedStates in strict accordance with all the requirements of theConstitution. He had been chosen without bribe, without violence, without undue pressure, by a majority of the electoral votes. Ifthere had been outrage upon the freedom of the ballot it was notamong his supporters; if there had been a terror of public opinion, overawing the right of private judgment, it was not in the Stateswhich had voted for him, but in those Southern communities where, by threats of violence, the opportunity to cast a ballot was deniedto electors favorable to his cause. If he should now yield, heevil results would be immeasurable and irremediable. "As a privatecitizen, " he said, "the Executive could not have consented thatRepublican institutions shall perish; much less could he in betrayalof so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people have confidedto him. " He avowed that, in full view of his great responsibility, he had so far done what he had deemed his duty. His words werealmost to foreshadow the great tragedy of after years when declaringthat _he felt he had no moral right to shirk, or even to count thechances of his own life in what might follow_. In conclusion hesaid to Congress, "having thus chosen our own course without guile, and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forwardwithout fear, and with manly hearts. "

The effect of this message upon the public opinion of the Northwas very great. If there had been hesitation by any party or anyclass upon the subsidence of the first glow of patriotism whichhad animated the country after the assault on Sumter, Mr. Lincoln'swords arrested it, and restored enthusiasm and ardor to all hearts. Indeed, men of thought and discretion everywhere saw that the courseof the President was fixed, and even if they differed from hisconclusions, they were persuaded that safety could be secured onlyby following his counsels, and upholding his measures. Mr. Lincolnhad been throughout his life much given to reading, to argument, to induction, to speculation, to reflection. He was now beforethe world as a man of whom decision and action were required, withthe lives and fortunes of unborn millions depending upon his wisdom, with the fate of Republican liberty and Constitutional governmentat stake upon his success. The history of the world shows noexample of a man upon whom extraordinary public duties and perilousresponsibilities were so suddenly thrust. No antecedent traininghad apparently fitted him for his work; no experience in affairshad given assurance that he could master a situation which demandedan unprecedented expenditure of treasure, which involved the controlof armies larger than the fabled host of Xerxes, which developedquestions of state-craft more delicate and more difficult thanthose which had baffled the best minds in Europe. 

Under the inspiration of the message, and in strict accordance withits recommendations, Congress proceeded to its work. No legislationwas attempted, none was even seriously suggested, except measuresrelating to the war. In no other session of Congress was so muchaccomplished in so brief a time. Convening on the fourth day ofJuly, both Houses adjourned finally on the 6th of August. Therewere in all but twenty-nine working-days, and every moment wasfaithfully and energetically employed. Seventy-six public Actswere passed. With the exception of four inconsiderable bills, theentire number related to the war, --to the various modes ofstrengthening the military and naval forces of the Union, to thewisest methods of securing money for the public service, to theeffectual building up of the National credit. Many of these billswere long and complex. The military establishment was re-organized, the navy enlarged, the tariff revised, direct taxes were levied, and loan-bills perfected. Two hundred and seven millions of dollarswere appropriated for the army, and fifty-six millions for thenavy. Some details of these measures are elsewhere presented underappropriate heads. They are referred to here only to illustratethe patriotic spirit which pervaded Congress, and the magnitude ofthe work accomplished under the pressure of necessity. 

 DEFEAT OF THE UNION ARMY AT BULL RUN. 

Seventeen days after the extra session began, and fifteen daysbefore it closed, the country was startled and profoundly moved bya decisive defeat of the Union army at Bull Run in Virginia. TheNational troops were commanded by General Irvin McDowell, and theConfederates by General Beauregard. The battle is remarkable forthe large number of division and brigade commanders who afterwardsbecame widely known. Serving under General McDowell were GeneralWilliam T. Sherman, General Hunter, General Burnside, General Miles, General Heintzelman, General Fitz-John Porter, and General Howard. Serving under General Beauregard were Stonewall Jackson, GeneralLongstreet, General Ewell, General J. E. B. Stuart. General JosephE. Johnston re-enforced Beauregard with another army during thefight, and became the ranking-officer on the field. The defeat ofthe Union army was complete; it was a _rout_, and on the retreatbecame a panic. When the troops reached the protection of thefortifications around Washington, a thorough demoralization pervadedtheir ranks. The holiday illusion had been rudely dispelled, andthe young men who had enlisted for a summer excursion, suddenlyfound that they were engaged in a bloody war in which comrades andfriends had been slain by their side, and in which they saw nothingbefore them but privation, peril, loss of health, and possibly lossof life. The North had been taught a lesson. The doubting wereat last convinced that the Confederates were equipped for a desperatefight, and intended to make it. If the Union were to be saved, itmust be saved by the united loyalty and the unflinching resolutionof the people. 

The special and immediate danger was an outbreak in the Borderslave States. Their people were seriously divided; but the Unionmen, aided by the entire moral influence and in no small degree bythe military force of the Nation, had thus far triumphed. Therepulse of the National arms, with the consequent loss of prestige, necessarily emboldened the enemies of the Union, who, by playingupon the prejudices and fears of the slave-holders, might succeedin seducing them from their allegiance. To prevent the success ofsuch appeal Mr. Crittenden, whose wise counsels were devoted withsleepless patriotism to the preservation of loyalty in the BorderStates, offered in the House a resolution defining the objects ofthe National struggle. The resolution set forth that "the deplorablecivil war has been forced upon the country by the Disunionists ofthe Southern States now in arms against the Constitutional Government;"that "in this National emergency, Congress, banishing all feelingsof mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to thewhole country;" that "the war is not waged in any spirit ofoppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or theoverthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutionsof those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of theConstitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired;" and that, "as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease. "The resolution was adopted by the House without debate, and withonly two negative votes. 

 THE CRITTENDEN RESOLUTION. 

The same resolution was offered in the Senate by Andrew Johnson ofTennessee two days after its adoption in the House. It led to asomewhat acrimonious debate. Mr. Polk of Missouri desired anamendment declaring that the war had been "forced upon the countryby the Disunionists of the Southern and Northern States. " He wasasked by Mr. Collamer of Vermont, whether he had ever "heard ofany Northern Disunionists being in revolt against the government. "He replied by asserting his belief that there were DisunionistsNorth as well as South. He had "read Fourth of July speeches, inwhich the country was congratulated that there was now to be adissolution of the Union. " The amendment was rejected, receivingonly four votes. 

--Mr. Collamer spoke ably for the resolution. He was not howeverafraid of the word "subjugation. " Its literal, classical meaningwas, to pass under the yoke, but in the popular acceptation itmeant that "all the people of the United States should submit tothe Constitution and laws. "

--Mr. Harris of New York expressed his approval of the resolution"precisely as it was offered. Every expression in it was apt andappropriate. " If slavery should be abolished as a result of thewar, he would not "shed a tear over that result; but yet it is notthe purpose of the government in prosecuting the war to overthrowslavery. "

--Mr. Fessenden of Maine agreed with Mr. Collamer as to the word"subjugation. " It expressed the idea clearly, and he was "satisfiedwith it. The talk about subjugation is mere clap-trap. "

--Mr. Doolittle of Wisconsin said the use of the word "subjugation"in the resolution did not imply that it was not "the purpose ofthe Government to compel the Disunionists to submit to the Constitutionand the laws. "

--Mr. Willey of Virginia said that there was a great sensitivenessin his section; that there was a fear among many that the objectof the war was subjugation; that "its design was to reduce the OldDominion to a province, and to make the people (in the language ofthe senator from Vermont) pass under the yoke. "

--Mr. Hale of New Hampshire favored the resolution. He said themost radical abolitionists had "always disclaimed the idea or thepower of interfering with slavery in the States. "

--Mr. Clark, the colleague of Mr. Hale, would support the resolution, and would oppose any amendment offered to it, not because he likedits phraseology, but because "it was drawn by the senator fromTennessee, and suited him and the region from which he came. "

--Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky could not vote for the resolution, because he did not "agree with the statement of facts contained init. " He would not go into the antecedents of the unhappy difficulties. He did not consider that "the rupture in the harbor of Charleston, the firing on the _Star of the West_, and the collision at FortSumter, justified those proceedings on the part of the Presidentwhich have made one blaze of war from the Atlantic to the westernborders of the Republic. " He did not believe that "the Presidenthad a right to take that step which produced the war, and to call(under Presidential authority alone) the largest army into thefield ever assembled on the American continent, and the largestfleet ever collected in American harbors. " He believed that "theresponsibility for the war is to be charged, first, to the majorityin the two Houses last winter in rejecting amendments to theConstitution; and, secondly, to the President, for calling out anarmed force. "

--Mr. Sherman of Ohio replied with great spirit to Mr. Breckinridge. He said Ohio and Kentucky stood side by side, and had always beenfriends; but if the senator who had just spoken, spoke the voiceof his State, then he feared that Kentucky and Ohio would soon beenemies. He felt confident however that "the views expressed donot represent the sentiments of Kentucky's patriotic citizens. "On the contrary, no person with the authority of President Lincoln"ever forbore so patiently. " The people of the loyal States had"forborne with the Disunionists of the Southern States too muchand too long. " There was not a line, not a syllable, not a promise, in the Constitution which the people of the loyal States did notreligiously obey. "The South has no right to demand any othercompromise. The Constitution was the bond of union; and it wasthe South that sought to change it by amendments, or to subvert itby force. The Disunionists of the Southern States are traitors totheir country, and must be, and will be, subdued. "

--Mr. Breckinridge, replying to Mr. Sherman, believed that he trulyrepresented the sentiment of Kentucky, and would submit the matterto the people of his State. "If they should decide that theprosperity and peace of the country would be best promoted by anunnatural and horrible fraternal war, and should throw their ownenergies into the struggle, " he would "acquiesce in sadness andtears, but would no longer be the representative of Kentucky inthe American Senate. " He characterized personal allusion whichhad been made to himself as ungenerous and unjust, and declaredthat he had "never uttered a word or cherished a thought that wasfalse to the Constitution and Union. "

--Mr. Browning of Illinois, the successor of Stephen A. Douglas inthe Senate, closed the debate. He spoke of "the indulgence shownto Mr. Breckinridge, " and of his having used it to "assail thePresident vehemently, almost vindictively, while he had not a singleword of condemnation for the atrocious conduct of the rebelliousStates. " Was the senator from Kentucky here to vindicate them, and the hurl unceasing denunciations at the President, "who wasnever surpassed by any ruler in patriotism, honor, integrity, anddevotion to the great cause of human rights?"

The resolution was adopted with only five dissenting votes, --Breckinridge and Powell of Kentucky, Johnson and Polk of Missouri, and Trumbull of Illinois. Mr. Trumbull voted in the negative, because he did not like the form of expression. 

The Crittenden Resolution, as it has always been termed, was thusadopted respectively, not jointly, by the two Houses of Congress. Its declarations, contained in the concluding clauses, though madesomewhat under the pressure of national adversity, were neverthelessa fair reflection of the popular sentiment throughout the North. The public mind had been absorbed with the one thought of restoringthe Union promptly and completely, and had not even contemplatedinterference with slavery as an instrumentality to that end. Manywise and far-seeing men were convinced from the first that theRebellion would result in the destruction of slavery, but forvarious reasons deemed it inexpedient to make a premature declarationof their belief. Indeed, the wisest of them saw that a prematuredeclaration would probably prove a hinderance and not a help tothe conclusion they most desired. In the Senate it was noted thatMr. Sumner withheld his vote, as did Thaddeus Stevens and OwenLovejoy in the House. But almost the entire Republican vote, including such men as Fessenden, Hale, Chandler, and Grimes, sustained the resolution. It was the voice of the Republican party, with no one openly opposing it in either branch of Congress. 

 ANTI-SLAVERY SENTIMENT DEVELOPED. 

It was soon discovered, however, that if the National Governmentdid not interfere with slavery, slavery would seriously interferewith the National Government. In other words, it was made apparentthat the slaves if undisturbed were to be a source of strength tothe Rebellion. Mr. Crittenden's resolution had hardly passed theHouse when it was learned from the participants in the battle ofBull Run that slaves by the thousand had been employed on theConfederate side in the construction of earthworks, in drivingteams, in cooking, in the general work of the Quartermaster andCommissary Departments, and in all forms of camp drudgery. Topermit this was simply adding four millions to the population fromwhich the Confederates could draw their quotas of men for militaryservice. It was no answer to say that they never intended to putarms in the hands of negroes. Their use in the various forms ofwork to which they were allotted, and for which they were admirablyqualified, released the same number of white men, who could at oncebe mustered into the ranks. The slaves were therefore an effectiveaddition to the military strength of the Confederacy from the verybeginning of the war, and had seriously increased the availableforce of fighting men at the first engagement between the twoarmies. 

As soon as this fact became well established, Congress proceededto enact the first law since the organization of the FederalGovernment by which a slave could acquire his freedom. The "Actto confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes" was onthe calendar of the Senate when the disaster at Bull Run occurred, and had been under consideration the day preceding the battle. Asoriginally framed, it only confiscated "any property used or employedin aiding, abetting, or promoting insurrection, or resistance tothe laws. " The word "property" would not include slaves, who, inthe contemplation of the Federal law, were always "persons. " Anew section was now added, declaring that "whenever hereafter duringthe present insurrection against the Government of the UnitedStates, any person held to labor or service under the law of anyState shall be required or permitted by the person to whom suchlabor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment, or in any military or naval service whatever against the Governmentof the United States, the person to whom such service or labor isdue shall forfeit his claim thereto. " The law further provided ineffect that "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claimto a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, thatthe slave had been employed in the military or naval service againstthe United States contrary to the provisions of this Act. "

 ZEAL AND INDUSTRY OF CONGRESS. 

The virtue of this law consisted mainly in the fact that it exhibiteda willingness on the part of Congress to strike very hard blowsand to trample the institution of slavery under foot whenever orwherever it should be deemed advantageous to the cause of the Unionto do so. From that time onward the disposition to assail slaverywas rapidly developed, and the grounds on which the assurancecontained in the Crittenden Resolution was given, had so changedin consequence of the use of slaves by the Confederate Governmentthat every Republican member of both Senate and House felt himselfabsolved from any implied pledge therein to the slave-holders ofthe Border States. Humiliating as was the Bull Run disaster tothe National arms, it carried with it many compensating considerations, and taught many useful lessons. The nation had learned that warmust be conducted according to strict principles of military science, and cannot be successfully carried on with banners and toasts andstump speeches, or by the mere ardor of patriotism, or by boundlessconfidence in a just cause. The Government learned that it islawful to strike at whatever gives strength to the enemy, and thatan insurgent against the National authority must, by the law ofcommon sense, be treated as beyond the protection of the NationalConstitution, both as to himself and his possessions. 

Though the Act thus conditionally confiscating slave property wassigned by Mr. Lincoln, it did not meet his entire approval. Hehad no objection to the principle involved, but thought it ill-timed and premature, --more likely to produce harm than good. Hebelieved that it would prove _brutum fulmen_ in the rebelliousStates, and a source of injury to the Union cause in the Borderslave States. From the outbreak of hostilities, Mr. Lincoln regardedthe position of those States as the key to the situation, and everything which tended to weaken their loyalty as a blow struck directlyand with fearful power against the Union. He could not howeverveto the bill, because that would be equivalent to declaring thatthe Confederate army might have the full benefit of the slavepopulation as a military force. What he desired was that Congressshould wait on his recommendations in regard to the question ofSlavery. He felt assured that he could see the whole field moreclearly; that, above all, he knew the time and the method for thatform of intervention which would smite the States in rebellion andnot alienate the slave States which still adhered to the Union. 

The rapidity with which business was dispatched at this sessiongave little opportunity for any form of debate except that whichwas absolutely necessary in the explanation of measures. Activeinterest in the House centred around the obstructive and disloyalcourse of Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio and Mr. Burnett of Kentucky. Still greater interest attached to the course of Mr. Breckinridgein the Senate. He had returned to Washington under a cloud ofsuspicion. He was thoroughly distrusted by the Union men ofKentucky, who had in the popular election won a noble victory overthe foes of the National Government, of whom Mr. Breckinridge hadbeen reckoned chief. No overt act of treason could be chargedagainst him, but the prevalent belief was that his sympathies werewholly with the government at Richmond. He opposed every actdesigned to strengthen the Union, and continually found fault withthe attitude and with the intentions of the National Government. He was considered by many to be in Washington only that he mightthe more efficiently aid the cause of the Confederacy. During theconsideration of "a bill to suppress insurrection and sedition, "a debate arose between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Baker, the newsenator from Oregon, which fixed the attention of the country uponthe former, and subjected him to general condemnation in the LoyalStates. 

 BRECKINRIDGE AND BAKER DISCUSSION. 

The Oregon senator, with his ardent nature, and his impulse to takepart in every conflict, had raised a regiment of volunteersprincipally composed of men from the Pacific coast. It was knownas the California Regiment, and was encamped near Washington. **** Onthe 1st of August, while performing the double and somewhat anomalousduty of commanding his regiment and representing Oregon in theSenate, Mr. Baker entered the chamber in the full uniform of aColonel in the United-States army. He laid his sword upon his deskand sat for some time listening to the debate. He was evidentlyimpressed by the scene of which he was himself a conspicuous feature. Breckinridge took the floor shortly after Baker appeared, and madea speech, of which it is fair criticism to say that it reflectedin all respects the views held by the members of the ConfederateCongress then in session at Richmond. Colonel Baker evidently grewrestive under the words of Mr. Breckinridge. His face was aglowwith excitement, and he sprang to the floor when the senator fromKentucky took his seat. His reply, abounding in denunciation andinvective, was not lacking in the more solid and convincing argument. He rapidly reviewed the situation, depicted the character of theRebellion, described the position of Breckinridge, and passionatelyasked, "What would have been thought, if, in another Capitol, ina yet more martial age, a senator, with the Roman purple flowingfrom his shoulders, had risen in his place, surrounded by all theillustrations of Roman glory, and declared that advancing Hannibalwas just, and that Carthage should be dealt with on terms of peace?What would have been thought, if, after the battle of Cannae, asenator had denounced every levy of the Roman people, everyexpenditure of its treasure, every appeal to the old recollectionsand the old glories?"

Mr. Fessenden, who sat near Baker, responded in an undertone "Hewould have been hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. " Baker, with hisaptness and readiness, turned the interruption to still furtherindictment of Breckinridge: "Are not the speeches of the senatorfrom Kentucky, " he asked, "intended for disorganization? are theynot intended to destroy our zeal? are they not intended to animateour enemies? Sir, are they not words of brilliant, polished_treason_, even in the very Capitol of the Republic?"

It is impossible to realize the effect of the words so eloquentlypronounced by the Oregon senator. In the history of the Senate, no more thrilling speech was ever delivered. The striking appearanceof the speaker in the uniform of a soldier, his superb voice, hisgraceful manner, all united to give to the occasion an extraordinaryinterest and attraction. 

The reply of Mr. Breckinridge was tame and ineffective. He didnot repel the fierce characterizations with which Colonel Bakerhad overwhelmed him. He did not stop to resent them, though hewas a man of unquestioned courage. One incident of his speech wasgrotesquely amusing. He was under the impression that the suggestionin regard to the Tarpeian Rock had been made by Mr. Sumner, and heproceeded to denounce the senator from Massachusetts with bitterindignation. Mr. Sumner looked surprised, but having becomeaccustomed to abuse from the South, said nothing. When next dayit was shown by the _Globe_ that Mr. Fessenden was the offender, Mr. Breckinridge neither apologized to Mr. Sumner, nor attackedthe senator from Maine. The first was manifestly his duty. Fromthe second he excused himself for obvious reasons. After hisexperience with Baker, Breckinridge evidently did not court aconflict with Fessenden. 

The course of Mr. Breckinridge was in direct hostility to theprevailing opinion of his State. The Legislature of Kentucky passeda resolution asking that he and his colleague, Lazarus W. Powell, should resign their seats, and, in the event of refusal, that theSenate would investigate their conduct, and, if it were found tobe disloyal, expel them. Mr. Breckinridge did not wait for suchan investigation. In the autumn of 1861 he joined the Rebellion, and was welcomed by the leaders and the people of the Confederacywith extravagant enthusiasm. His espousal of their cause wasconsidered by them to be as great an acquisition as if a fresh armycorps had been mustered into their service. His act called forththe most bitter denunciation throughout the North, and among theloyal people of Kentucky. He had not the excuse pleaded by so manymen of the South, that he must abide by the fortunes of his States, and the worst interpretation was placed upon his presence at theJuly session of Congress. 

Among the earliest acts at the next session was the expulsion ofMr. Breckinridge from the Senate. It was done in a manner whichmarked the full strength of the popular disapprobation of hiscourse. The senators from the rebellious States had all beenexpelled at the July session, but without the application of anopprobrious epithet. There had also been a debate as to whetherexpulsion of the persona, or a mere declaration that the seats werevacant, were the proper course to be pursued by the Senate. AndrewJohnson maintained the latter, and all the Democratic senators, except McDougall of California, voted with him. But in the caseof Mr. Breckinridge there was not a negative vote--his own colleaguePowell remaining silent in his seat while five Democratic senatorsjoined in the vote for his expulsion. The resolution, draughtedby Mr. Trumbull, was made as offensive as possible, curtly declaringthat "John C. Breckinridge, the traitor, be and is hereby expelledfrom the Senate. "

The mutation of public opinion is striking. Mr. Breckinridge livedto become a popular idol in Kentucky. Long before his death (whichoccurred in 1875 in his fifty-fourth year) he could have had anyposition in the gift of his State. If his political disabilitiescould have been removed, he would undoubtedly have returned to theSenate. His support did not come solely from those who hadsympathized with the South, but included thousands who had beenloyally devoted to the Union. He possessed a strange, fascinatingpower over the people of Kentucky, --as great as that which had beenwielded by Mr. Clay, though he was far below Mr. Clay in intellectualendowment. No man gave up more than he when he united his fortuneswith the seceding States. It was his sense of personal fidelityto the Southern men who had been faithful to him, that blinded himto the higher obligation of fidelity to country, and to the higherappreciation of self-interest which is inseparably bound up withduty. He wrecked a great career. He embittered and shortened alife originally devoted to noble aims, and in its darkest shadowsfilled with generous impulses. 

The original aim of Kentucky was to preserve a position of neutralityin the impending contest was found to be impracticable. TheConfederates were the first to violate it, by occupying that sectionof the State bordering upon the Mississippi River with a considerableforce under the command of General Polk, the Episcopal Bishop ofLouisiana. This was on the 4th of September. Two days later theColonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Volunteers, who was in commandat Cairo, took possession of Paducah. It was the first importantstep in a military career which fills the most brilliant pages inthe military annals of our country. The name of the IllinoisColonel was Ulysses S. Grant. 

 EFFECT OF REBEL VICTORY AT BULL RUN. 

The Confederate victory at Bull Run produced great effect throughoutthe South. The fall of Sumter had been a signal encouragement tothose who had joined the revolt against the Union, but as no bloodhad been spilled, and as the garrison had been starved out ratherthan shelled out, there was a limit to enthusiasm over the result. But now a pitched battle had been fought within cannon sound ofthe National Capital, and the forces of the Union had been put toflight. Jefferson Davis had come from Richmond during the battle, and telegraphed to the Confederate Congress that the night had"closed upon a hard-fought field, " but that the enemy were routed, and had "precipitately fled, abandoning a large amount of arms, knapsacks, and baggage;" that "too high praise cannot be bestowedupon the skill of the Confederate officers or the gallantry of alltheir troops;" that "the Confederate force was fifteen thousand, and the Union army was thirty-five thousand. " He evidently knewthe effect which these figures would have upon the pride of theSouth, and he did not at the moment stop to verify his statements. The actual force under McDowell was much less, that under Beauregardmuch greater, than Mr. Davis stated. McDowell was certainlyoutnumbered after General Johnston's army arrived on the field. If General Patterson, who was in command in the Shenandoah Valley, had been able to engage or detain Johnston, the fate of the daymight have been different. But Johnston outgeneraled Patterson, and achieved what military genius always does, --he had his forcein the right place at the right time. 

The effect of the Rebel victory at Bull Run was at once visible inthe rigorous policy adopted by the Confederate Government. Thepeople of the Confederacy knew that their numbers were less thanthose of the Union, but Jefferson Davis had in effect told themthat fifteen Southern men might be relied upon to put to flightthirty-five Northern men, and on this ratio they felt equal to thecontest. The Congress at Richmond went to every extreme in theirlegislation. A fortnight after the battle they passed "an Actrespecting alien enemies, " "warning and requiring every male citizenof the United States, fourteen years old and upwards, to departfrom the Confederate States within forty days from the date of thePresident's Proclamation, " which was issued on the 14th of August. Those only could remain who intended to become citizens of theConfederacy. With the obvious design of avoiding every thing whichcould chill the sympathy with the Confederacy so largely prevailingin the Border States, the Proclamation excepted from its operationthe States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, the Districtof Columbia, the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, and the IndianTerritory. This was a manifest declaration of what they expectedto include in the Confederacy when the National Government shouldfinally surrender. Wherever a slave was held, the Confederateleaders adjudged the people to be their friends and their futureallies. 

 CONFEDERATE CONFISCATION BILL. 

This warning to alien enemies could not however be regarded as ameasure of special harshness, or one beyond the fair exercise ofthe war power. But the next step was of a different nature. Alaw was enacted sequestrating "the estates, property, and effectsof alien enemies. " Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, who was at the timeAttorney-General of the Confederate Government, proceeded to enforcethe Act with utmost rigidity. The exception of the Border Statesand Territories, already noted, was also made under this law, buttowards the citizens of States of unquestioned loyalty no mercywas shown. A close search was instituted by Mr. Benjamin, in whichagents, former partners, attorneys, trustees, and all who mighthave the slightest knowledge of a piece of property within thelimits of the Confederacy, belonging to a loyal citizen of theUnited States, were compelled to give information under penalty ofa fine which might be as high as five thousand dollars, andimprisonment which might last for six months. They were forced totell of any lands, chattels, rights, interests, an alien enemymight have, and also of any debts which might be due to an alienenemy. Mr. Benjamin's letter of instruction included among alienenemies all "subjects of Great Britain, France, or other neutralnations, who have a domicile or are carrying on business or trafficwithin the States at war with the Confederacy. " It was a schemeof wholesale, cruel confiscation of the property of innocent persons, and the most ingenious lawyer of the Confederacy was selected toenforce it by inquisitorial processes which disregarded the confidenceof friendship, the ties of blood, and the loyalty of affection. 

The National legislation had given no precedent or warrant forproceedings so harsh. At the extra session there had been noattempt at the confiscation of any property except that directlyused in aid of the insurrection. Slaves were added to his classonly after it was learned that they were thus employed by theConfederates. Not only therefore did the Confederacy introduceslaves as a component element of the military force, but it resortedto confiscation of a cruel and rigorous type as one of the sourcesof financial strength. If the Confederate authorities had not thusset the example, it would have been difficult, perhaps impracticable, to induce Congress to entertain such a line of policy. Many werein favor of it from the first, but so many were against it thatthe precedent thus established by the Confederacy was not only anirresistible temptation but a justifying cause for lines of Nationalpolicy which were afterwards complained of as unusual andoppressive. 

[* NOTE. --The following is a complete list of the Senators who servedin the Thirty-seventh Congress. Republicans in Roman, Democratsin Italic, American or Old-Line Whigs in small capitals. 

CALIFORNIA. --_Milton S. Latham; James A. McDougall. _CONNECTICUT. --James Dixon; Lafayette S. Foster. DELAWARE. --_James A. Bayard; Willard Saulsbury. _ILLINOIS. --_Stephen A. Douglas_, died June 3, 1861; Lyman Trumbull; Orville H. Browning, appointed in place of Douglas; _William A. Richardson_, elected in place of Douglas. INDIANA. --_Jesse D. Bright_, expelled Feb. 5, 1862; Henry S. Lane; Joseph A. Wright, appointed in place of Bright; _David Turpie_, elected in place of Bright. IOWA. --James W. Grimes; James Harlan. KANSAS. --James H. Lane; Samuel C. Pomeroy. KENTUCKY. --_Lazarus W. Powell; James C. Breckinridge_, expelled Dec. 4, 1861; GARRETT DAVIS, elected in place of Breckinridge. MAINE. --Lot M. Morrill; William Pitt Fessenden. MARYLAND. --ANTHONY KENNEDY; JAMES A. PEARCE, died Dec. 30, 1862; Thomas H. Hicks, elected in place of Pearce. MASSACHUSETTS. --Charles Sumner; Henry Wilson. MICHIGAN. --Zachariah Chandler; Kinsley S. Bingham, died Oct. 5, 1861; Jacob M. Howard, elected in place of Bingham. MINNESOTA. --Morton S. Wilkinson; _Henry M. Rice_. MISSOURI. --_Trusten Polk_, expelled Jan. 10, 1862; John B. Henderson, appointed in place of Polk; _Waldo P. Johnson_, expelled Jan. 10, 1862; _Robert Wilson_, appointed in place of Johnson. NEW HAMPSHIRE. --John P. Hale; Daniel Clark. NEW JERSEY. --_John R. Thomson_, died Sept. 12, 1862; John C. Ten Eyck; Richard S. Field, appointed in place of Thomson; _James W. Wall_, elected in place of Thomson. NEW YORK. --Preston King; Ira Harris. OHIO. --Benjamin F. Wade; Salmon P. Chase, resigned March 5, 1861, to become Secretary of Treasury; John Sherman, elected in place of Chase. PENNSYLVANIA. --David Wilmot, elected in place of Cameron; Edgar Cowan; Simon Cameron, resigned March 5, 1861. RHODE ISLAND. --James F. Simmons, resigned December, 1862; Henry B. Anthony; Samuel G. Arnold, elected in place of Simmons. TENNESSEE. --Andrew Johnson, resigned March 4, 1862, to be military governor of Tennessee. VERMONT. --Solomon Foot; Jacob Collamer. VIRGINIA. --Waitman T. Willey; John S. Carlile. WISCONSIN. --James R. Doolittle; Timothy O. Howe. ]

[** An anachronism occurs in stating that Senator Baker of Oregonhad witnessed as a child the funeral pageant of Lord Nelson. Hewas not born for five years after Lord Nelson fell. The error wastaken from a eulogy pronounced on Senator Baker after his death. The occurrence referred to was doubtless some one of the manymilitary pageants in London at the close of the Napoleonic wars. ]

[*** NOTE. --The following is a list of Representatives in the Thirty-seventh Congress. Republicans are given in Roman, Democrats inItalic, American or Old-Line Whigs in small capitals. 

CALIFORNIA. --Aaron A. Sargent; Frederick F. Low; Timothy G. Phelps. CONNECTICUT. --Dwight Loomis; _James E. English; George C. Woodruff_; Alfred A. Burnham. DELAWARE. --George P. Fisher. ILLINOIS. --Eilhu B. Washburne; Isaac N. Arnold; Owen Lovejoy; William Kellogg; _William A. Richardson_, elected Senator; _John A. McClernand_, resigned 1861 to enter the army; _James C. Robinson; Philip B. Fouke; John A. Logan_, resigned 1861 to enter the army; _William J. Allen_, elected in place of Logan; _Anthony L. Knapp_, elected in place of McClernand. INDIANA. --_John Law; James A. Cravens; William S. Holman_; George W. Julian; Albert G. Porter; _Daniel W. Voorhees_; Albert S. White; Schuyler Colfax; William Mitchell; John P. C. Shanks; W. McKee Dunn. IOWA. --Samuel R. Curtis, resigned Aug. 4, 1861, to enter the army; William Vandever; James F. Wilson, elected in place of Curtis. KANSAS. --Martin F. Conway. KENTUCKY. --_Henry C. Burnett_, expelled Dec. 3, 1861; JAMES S. JACKSON, died in 1862; HENRY GRIDER; _Aaron Harding; Charles A. Wickliffe_; GEORGE W. DUNLAP; ROBERT MALLORY; _John W. Menzies_; SAMUEL L. CASEY, elected in place of Burnett; WILLIAM H. WADSWORTH; JOHN J. CRITTENDEN; GEORGE H. YEAMAN, elected in place of Jackson. LOUISIANA. --BENJAMIN F. FLANDERS, seated in February, 1863; MICHAEL HAHN, seated in February, 1863. MAINE. --John N. Goodwin; Charles W. Walton, resigned May 26, 1862; Samuel C. Fessenden; Anson P. Morrill; John H. Rice; Frederick A. Pike; Thomas A. D. Fessenden, elected in place of Walton. MARYLAND. --JOHN W. CRISFIELD; EDWIN H. WEBSTER; _Cornelius L. L. Learly_; FRANCIS THOMAS; CHARLES B. CALVERT; _Henry May_. MASSACHUSETTS. --Thomas D. Eliot; James Buffington; Benjamin F. Thomas; Alexander H. Rice; William Appleton, resigned in 1861; John B. Alley; Daniel W. Gooch; Charles R. Train; Goldsmith F. Bailey, died May 8, 1862; Charles Delano; Henry L. Dawes; Samuel Hooper, elected in place of Appleton; Amasa Walker, elected in place of Bailey. MICHIGAN. --Bradley F. Granger; Fernando C. Beaman; Francis W. Kellogg; Rowland E. Trowbridge. MINNESOTA. --Cyrus Aldrich; William Windom. MISSOURI. --Francis P. Blair, Jr. , resigned in 1862; JAMES S. ROLLINS; _Elijah H. Norton; John W. Reid_, expelled Dec. 2, 1861; _John W. Noell; John S. Phelps; William A. Hall; Thomas L. Price_, elected in place of Reid. NEW HAMPSHIRE. --Gilman Marston; Edward H. Rollins; Thomas M. Edwards. NEW JERSEY. --John T. Nixon; John L. N. Stratton; _William G. Steele; George T. Cobb; Nehemiah Perry_. NEW YORK. --E. Henry Smith; MOSES F. ODELL; _Benjamin Wood_; William Wall; Frederick A. Conkling; _Elijah Ward; Edward Haight_; Charles H. Van Wyck; _John B. Steele_; Stephen Baker; Abraham B. Olin; James B. McKean; William A. Wheeler; Scorates N. Sherman; _Chauncey Vibbard_; Richard Franchot; Roscoe Conkling; R. Holland Duell; William E. Lansing; Ambrose W. Clark; Charles B. Sedgwick; Theodore M. Pomeroy; John P. Chamberlain; Alexander S. Diven; Robert B. Van Valkenburgh; Alfred Ely; Augustus Frank; Burt Van Horn; Elbridge G. Spaulding; Reuben E. Fenton; _Erastus Corning; James E. Kerrigan_; Isaac C. Delaplaine. OHIO. --_George H. Pendleton_; John A. Gurley; _Clement L. Vallandigham; William Allen_; James M. Ashley; _Chilton A. White_; Richard A. Harrison; Samuel Shellabarger; _Warren P. Noble_; Carey A. Trimble; Valentine B. Horton; _Samuel S. Cox_; Samuel T. Worcester; Harrison G. Blake; William P. Cutler; _James R. Morris_; Sidney Edgerton; Albert G. Riddle; John Hutchins; John A. Bingham; _R. H. Nugen_. OREGON. --_George K. Shiel_. PENNSYLVANIA. --_William E. Lehman_; John P. Verree; William D. Kelley; William M. Davis; John Hickman; _Thomas B. Cooper_, died April 4, 1862; _John D. Stiles_, elected in place of Cooper, deceased; _Sydenham E. Ancona_; Thaddeus Stevens; John W. Killinger; James H. Campbell; _Hendrick R. Wright_; Philip Johnson; Galusha A. Grow, Speaker; James T. Hale; _Joseph Bailey_; Edward McPherson; Samuel S. Blair; John Covode; _Jesse Lazear_; James K. Moorhead; Robert McKnight; John W. Wallace; John Patton; Elijah Babbitt; _Charles J. Biddle_. RHODE ISLAND. --William P. Sheffield; George H. Browne. TENNESSEE. --GEORGE W. BRIDGES; ANDREW J. CLEMENTS; HORACE MAYNARD. VERMONT. --Portus Baxter; Justin S. Morrill; Ezekiel P. Walton. VIRGINIA. --Jacob B. Blair, elected in place of Carlile; William G. Brown, John S. Carlile, elected Senator July, 1861; Joseph E. Segar; Charles H. Upton; Kililan V. Whaley. WISCONSIN. --Luther Hanchett, died Nov. 24, 1862; Walter D. McIndoe, elected in place of Hanchett; John F. Potter; A. Scott Sloan. 

_Territorial Delegates_. --Colorado, Hiram P. Bennett; Dakota, John B. S. Todd; Nebraska, Samuel G. Daily; Nevada, John Cradlebaugh; New-Mexico, John S. Watts; Utah, John M. Bernhisel; Washington, William H. Wallace. ]

[**** It should be stated that the so-called "California" regimentof Colonel Baker was recruited principally in Philadelphia fromthe young men of that city. ]

CHAPTER XVI. 

Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress. --The Military Situation. --Disaster at Ball's Bluff. --Death of Colonel E. D. Baker. --ThePresident's Message. --Capital and Labor. --Their Relation discussedby the President. --Agitation of the Slavery Question. --The Houserefuses to re-affirm the Crittenden Resolution. --Secretary Cameronresigns. --Sent on Russian Mission. --Succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton. --His Vigorous War Measures. --Victories in the Field. --Battle ofMill Spring. --General Order of the President for a Forward Movement. --Capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. --Prestige and Popularityof General Grant. --Illinois Troops. --General Burnside's Victory inNorth Carolina. --Effect of the Victories upon the Country. --ContinuedSuccess for the Union in the South-West. --Proposed Celebration. --The Monitor and the Merrimac. --Ericsson. --Worden. --Capture of NewOrleans by Farragut. --The Navy. --Its Sudden and Great Popularity. --Legislation in its Favor. --Battle of Shiloh. --Anxiety in theNorth. --Death of Albert Sidney Johnston. --General Halleck takesthe Field. --Military Situation in the East. --The President andGeneral McClellan. --The Peninsular Campaign. --Stonewall Jackson'sRaid. --Its Disastrous Effect. --Fear for Safety of Washington. --Anti-Slavery Legislation. --District of Columbia. --Compensated Emancipation. --Colonization. --Confiscation. --Punishment of Treason. 

The first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress came to an endamid the deep gloom caused by the disastrous defeat at Bull Run. The second session opened in December, 1861, under the shadow ofa grave disaster at Ball's Bluff, in which the eloquent senatorfrom Oregon, Edward D. Baker, lost his life. Despite these reversesthe patriotic spirit of the country had constantly risen, and hadincreased the Union forces until the army was six hundred thousandstrong. Winfield Scott had gone upon the retired list at the ripeage of seventy-five, and George B. McClellan had succeeded him incommand of the army. The military achievements thus far had beenscarcely more then defensive. The National Capital had beenfortified; Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri had beenwrenched from rebel domination; while on our Southern coast twolandings had been effected by the Union troops, --the first atHatteras in North Carolina, the second at Port Royal in SouthCarolina. There was serious danger of a division of popularsentiment in the North growing out of the Slavery question; therewas grave apprehension of foreign intervention from the arrest ofMason and Slidell. The war was in its eighth month; and, strongand energetic as the Northern people felt, it cannot be denied thata confidence in ultimate triumph had become dangerously developedthroughout the South. 

 THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, 1861. 

The message of Mr. Lincoln dealt with the situation in perfectcandor. He did not attempt to withhold any thing or to color anything. He frankly acknowledged that "our intercourse with foreignnations had been attended with profound solicitude. " He recognizedthat "a nation which endured factious domestic division is exposedto disrespect abroad; and one party, if not both, is sure, sooneror later, to invoke foreign intervention. " With his peculiar powerof condensing a severe expression, he said that "the disloyalcitizens of the United States have offered the ruin of our countryin return for the aid and comfort which they have invoked abroad. "This offer was made on the presumption that some commercial orsubstantial gain would accrue to other nations from the destructionof the Republic; but Mr. Lincoln believed with confidence that"foreign governments would not in the end fail to perceive thatone strong nation promises more durable peace, and a more extensive, valuable, and reliable commerce, than can the same nation brokeninto hostile fragments, " and for this reason he believed that therebel leaders had received from abroad "less patronage andencouragement than they probably expected. "

The President dwelt with satisfaction upon the condition of theBorder States, concerning whose course he had constantly exhibitedthe profoundest solicitude. He now informed Congress that "noblelittle Delaware led off right, from the first, " and that Maryland, which had been "made to seem against the Union, " had given "sevenregiments to the loyal cause, and none to the enemy, and her people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majorityand a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to anycandidate on any question. " Kentucky, concerning which his anxietyhad been deepest, was now decidedly, and, as he thought, "unchangeably, ranged on the side of the Union. " Missouri he announced ascomparatively quiet, and he did not believe she could be againoverrun by the insurrectionists. These Border slave States, noneof which "would promise a single soldier at first, have now anaggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field for theUnion; while of their citizens certainly not more than a third ofthat number, and they of doubtful whereabouts and doubtful existence, are in arms against it. " Beyond these results the President hadsome "general accounts of popular movements in behalf of the Unionin North Carolina and Tennessee, " and he expressed his belief that"the cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainlySouthward. "

The one marked change in the popular opinion of the free States, now reflected in Congress, was in respect to the mode of dealingwith Slavery. Mr. Lincoln was conservative, and always desired tokeep somewhat in the rear rather than too far in advance of thepublic judgment. In his message he avoided all direct expressionupon the Slavery question, but with the peculiar shrewdness whichcharacterized his political discussion he announced a series ofgeneral truths respecting labor and capital which, in effect, weredeadly hostile to the institution. He directed attention to thefact the "the insurrection is largely if not exclusively a war uponthe first principle of popular government--the rights of the people. "Conclusive evidence of this appeared in "the maturely consideredpublic documents as well as in the general tone of the insurgents. "He discerned a disposition to abridge the right of suffrage and todeny to the people the "right to participate in the selection ofpublic officers except those of the Legislature. " He found indeedthat "monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refugefrom the power of the people. " While he did not think it fittingto make "a general argument in favor of popular institutions, " hefelt that he should scarcely be justified were he "to omit raisinga warning voice against this approach of returning despotism. " Itwas, he said, "the effort to place capital on an equal footingwith, if not above, labor in the structure of government, " and itassumed "that labor is available only in connection with capital;that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehowby the use of it induces him to labor. "

 THE PRESIDENT'S ANTI-SLAVERY ARGUMENT. 

Mr. Lincoln found that the next step in this line of argument raisedthe question, "whether it is best that capital shall hire laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or buy them, and drive them to it without their consent?" thus leading to theconclusion that "all laborers are either hired laborers or what wecall slaves, " and that "whoever is once a hired laborer is fixedin that condition for life. " From all these theories Mr. Lincolnradically dissented, and maintained that "labor is the superior ofcapital, and deserves much the higher consideration. " "No menliving, " said he, "are more worthy to be trusted than those whotoil up from poverty--none less inclined to take or touch aughtwhich they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrenderinga political power which they already possess, and which, ifsurrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement, and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them till all ofliberty shall be lost. " If Mr. Lincoln had directly attempted atthat early stage of the contest to persuade the laboring men ofthe North that it was best for them to aid in abolishing Slavery, he would have seriously abridged the popularity of his administration. He pursued the wiser course of showing that the spirit of theSouthern insurrection was hostile to all free labor, and that inits triumph not merely the independence of the laborer but hisright of self-defense, as conferred by suffrage, would be imperiledif not destroyed. Until the discussion reached the higher planeon which Mr. Lincoln placed it, the free laborer in the North wasdisposed to regard a general emancipation of the slaves as tendingto reduce his own wages, and as subjecting him to the disadvantageof an odious contest for precedence of race. The masses in theNorth had united with the Republican party in excluding Slaveryfrom the Territories because the larger the area in which freelabor was demanded the better and more certain was the remuneration. But against a general emancipation Mr. Lincoln was quick to seethat white laborers might be readily prejudiced by superficialreasoning, and hence he adduced the broader argument which appealedat once to their humanity, to their sense of manly independence, and to their instinct of self-preservation against the mastery andthe oppression of capital. 

The agitation of the Slavery question, while unavoidable, wasnevertheless attended with serious embarrassments to the Unioncause. The great outburst of patriotism which followed the fallof Sumter contemplated a rally of the entire North for the defenseof the Flag and the preservation of the Union. Neither politicalparty was to take advantage of the situation, but all alike wereto share in the responsibility and in the credit of maintainingthe government inviolate. Every month however had demonstratedmore and more that to preserve the government without interferingwith Slavery would be impossible; and as this fact became clearlyevident to the Republican vision, a large section of the Democraticparty obdurately refused to acknowledge it or to consent to themeasures which it suggested. It was apparent therefore within thefirst six months of the struggle that a division would come in theNorth, which would be of incalculable advantage to the insurrectionists, and that if the division should go far enough it would insurevictory to the Confederate cause. If the Democratic party as awhole had in the autumn of the year 1861 taken the ground which aconsiderable section of it assumed, it would have been impossibleto conduct the war for the Union successfully. Great credittherefore was due and was cordially given to the large element inthat party which was ready to brave all the opprobrium of theirfellow-partisans and to accept the full responsibility of co-operating with the Republicans in war measures. 

Congress had hardly come together when the change of opinion andaction upon the Slavery question became apparent. Mr. Holman ofIndiana, reciting the Crittenden resolution which had been passedthe preceding session with only two adverse votes, offered aresolution that its principles "be solemnly re-affirmed by thisHouse. " Objection was made by several members. Mr. ThaddeusStevens moved to lay the resolution on the table, and the motionprevailed on a yea and nay vote by 71 to 65. The majority wereall Republicans. The minority was principally made up of Democrats, but Republicans as conspicuous as Mr. Dawes of Massachusetts andMr. Shellabarger of Ohio voted in the negative. The wide divergencebetween this action on the part of the Republicans on the thirdday of December, 1861, and that which they had taken on the preceding22d of July, was recognized and appreciated by the country, andthus began the open division on the Slavery question which continuallywidened, which consolidated the Republican party in support of themost radical measures, and which steadily tended to weaken theDemocratic party in the loyal States. 

 SECRETARY CAMERON RESIGNS. 

At the height of the excitement in Congress over the engagement atBall's Bluff there was a change in the head of the War Department. The disasters in the field and the general impatience for moredecisive movements on the part of our armies led to the resignationof Secretary Cameron. He was in his sixty-third year, and thoughof unusual vigor for his age, was not adapted by education or habitto the persistent and patient toil, to the wearisome detail oforganization, to the oppressive increase of responsibility, necessarily incident to military operations of such vast proportionsas were entailed by the progress of the war. He was nominated asMinister to Russia, and on the eleventh day of January, 1862, wassucceeded in the War Department by Edwin M. Stanton. 

Mr. Stanton signalized his entrance upon duty by extraordinaryvigor in war measures, and had the good fortune to gain credit formany successes which were the result of arrangements in progressand nearly perfected under his predecessor. A week after he wassworn in, an important victory was won at Mill Springs, Kentucky, by General George H. Thomas. The Confederate commander, GeneralZollicoffer, was killed, and a very decisive check was put to anew development of Secession sympathy which was foreshadowed inKentucky. A few days later, on the 27th of January, under theinspiration of Mr. Stanton, the President issued a somewhat remarkableorder commanding "a general movement of the land and naval forcesof the United States against the insurgent forces on the 22d ofFebruary. " He especially directed that the army at and aboutFortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of WesternVirginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army andflotilla at Cairo, and the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico beready for a movement on that day. The order did not mean what wasstated on its face. It was evidently intended to mislead somebody. 

The Illinois colonel who had taken possession of Paducah in thepreceding September was now known as Brigadier-General Grant. Hehad been made prominent by a daring fight at Belmont, Missouri, onthe 7th of November (1861) against a largely superior force underthe command of the Confederate General Pillow. For the numbersengaged it was one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war. The quarter-master of the expedition intimated to General Grantthat in case of a reverse he had but two small steamers for transportationto the Illinois shore. The General's only reply was that in theevent of his defeat "the steamers would hold all that would beleft. " He was now in command at Cairo, and co-operating with himwas a flotilla of hastily constructed gunboats under the commandof Flag-officer A. H. Foote of the navy. General Grant evidentlyinterpreted Mr. Lincoln's order to mean that he need not wait untilthe 22d, and he began his movement of the first day of February. By the 16th he had captured Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Theflotilla had been more active than the troops, against Fort Henry, which was speedily evacuated, but Fort Donelson did not surrenderuntil after a hard-fought land battle in which the characteristictenacity, skill, and bravery of General Grant were for the firsttime fully shown to the country. "The victory achieved, " heannounced in his congratulatory order to the troops, "is not onlygreat in the effect it will have in breaking down the rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever takenin a single battle on this continent. " The number of prisonersexceeded ten thousand; forty pieces of cannon and extensive magazinesof ordnance with military stores of all kinds were captured. TheConfederate commander was General S. B. Buckner, who had joinedthe rebellion under circumstances which gained him much ill willin the Loyal States. Under a flag of truce he asked General Granton the morning of the 16th for an armistice to "settle the termsof capitulation. " General Grant's answer was, "No terms exceptunconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to moveimmediately on your works. " General Buckner felt himself "compelledto accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms" which GeneralGrant proposed. It is due to General Buckner to say that he hadbeen left in a humiliating position. The two generals who rankedhim, Gideon J. Pillow and John B. Floyd, seeing the inevitable, had escaped from the fort the preceding night with five thousandmen, leaving to Buckner the mortification of surrender. In viewof this fact the use of the term "unchivalrous" by the Confederatecommander can be justly appreciated. 

 VICTORY AT FORT DONELSON. 

The effect of the victory upon the country was electric. The publicjoy was unbounded. General Grant had become in a day the hero ofthe war. His fame was on every tongue. The initials of his namewere seized upon by the people for rallying-cries of patriotism, and were woven into songs for the street and for the camp. He was"Unconditional Surrender, " he was "United States, " he was "UncleSam. " Not himself only but his State was glorified. It was anIllinois victory. No less than thirty regiments from that Statewere in General Grant's command, and they had all won great credit. This fact was especially pleasing to Mr. Lincoln. Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Kentucky were all gallantly represented on the field, but the prestige of the day belonged to Illinois. Many of herpublic men, prominent in political life before and since the war, were in command of regiments. The moral force of the victory wasincreased by the fact that so large a proportion of these prominentofficers had been, like General Grant, connected with the Democraticparty, --thus adding demonstration to assurance that it was anuprising of a people in defense of their government, and not merelythe work of a political party seeking to extirpate slavery. JohnA. Logan, Richard J. Oglesby, William R. Morrison, and William PittKellogg were among the Illinois officers who shared in the renownof the victory. General Lewis Wallace commanded a division madeup of Indiana and Kentucky troops, and was honorably prominent. The total force under General Grant was nearly fifty regiments, furnishing about twenty-eight thousand men for duty. They hadcaptured the strongest Confederate intrenchment in the West, mannedby nearly seventeen thousand men. The defeat was a great mortificationto Jefferson Davis. He communicated intelligence of the disasterto the Confederate Congress in a curt message in which he describedthe official reports of the battle as "incomplete and unsatisfactory, "and stated that he had relieved Generals Floyd and Pillow fromcommand. 

Two important results followed the victory. The strong fortificationserected at Columbus, Kentucky, to control the passage of theMississippi, were abandoned by the Confederates; and Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, was surrendered to the Union army withoutresistance. The Confederate force at the latter point was undercommand of General Albert Sidney Johnston, who, unable to offerbattle, sullenly retreated southward. If the Confederate troopshad been withdrawn from Fort Donelson in season to effect a junctionwith Johnston at Nashville, that able general might have deliveredbattle there on terms possibly advantageous to his side. It wasthis feature of the case which rendered the loss of Donelson soserious and so exasperating to the Confederate Government, as shownin the message of Jefferson Davis. 

Another victory for the Union was gained on the coast of NorthCarolina under the joint efforts of the army and the navy. GeneralBurnside was in command of the former and Commodore Gouldsboroughof the latter. The battle of Roanoke Island was fought the dayafter the capture of Fort Henry, and the Union victory led to alodgment of the national forces on the soil of North Carolina, which was held firmly to the end. Events beyond the Mississippiwere also favorable to the National Government. General SterlingPrice had been the cause of much trouble in Missouri, where he waspersonally popular. He had led many young men into rebellion, andhis efforts to carry the State into the Confederacy were energeticand unremitting. He had been dominating a large section of Missouriand creating grave apprehensions for its safety. On the 18th ofFebruary General Halleck, who had succeeded General Frémont in thecommand of the Western Department, telegraphed the Secretary ofWar: "General Curtis has driven Price from Missouri, and is severalmiles across the Arkansas line, cutting up Price's army and hourlycapturing prisoners and stores. The Army of the South-West isdoing its duty nobly. The flag of the Union is floating inArkansas. "

These victories coming almost simultaneously produced a profoundimpression throughout the Loyal States. Men rushed to the conclusionthat the war would be closed and the Union restored before the endof the year. The most sedate communities become mercurial andimpressible in time of deep excitement. The rejoicing was universal. Congress ordered the illumination of the Capitol and other publicbuildings in Washington on the 22d of February "in honor of therecent victories of our army and navy;" and "as a mark of respectto the memory of those who had been killed and in sympathy withthose who have been wounded" the House of Representatives on the19th of February, on the motion of Mr. Washburne of Illinois, adjourned without transacting business. The flags taken in therecent victories were to be publicly exhibited, and a day of generalcongratulation was to be associated with the memory of Washingtonand "the triumph of the government which his valor and wisdom haddone so much to establish. " In the midst of the arrangements forthis celebration, the members of the Cabinet jointly communicatedto Congress on the 21st of February the intelligence that "thePresident of the United States is plunged into affliction by thedeath of a beloved child. " Congress immediately ordered that theillumination of the public buildings be omitted, and "entertainingthe deepest sentiments of sympathy and condolence with the Presidentand his family, " adjourned. The reading of Washington's FarewellAddress on the 22d, before the two Houses, was the only partaccomplished of the brilliant celebration that had been designed. 

 THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC. 

A fortnight later, on the 8th of March (1862), came the remarkableengagement in Hampton Roads between the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_. The former vessel arrived at Fortress Monroe after the _Merrimac_had destroyed the United-States sloop-of-war _Cumberland_ and thefrigate _Congress_, and had driven the steam-frigate _Minnesota_aground just as darkness put an end to the fight. On Sunday morning, March 9, the _Merrimac_ renewed her attack upon the _Minnesota_, and was completely surprised by the appearance of a small vesselwhich, in the expressive description of the day, resembled a cheese-box on a raft. She had arrived from New York at the close of thefirst day's fight. From her turret began a furious cannonade whichnot only diverted the attack from the _Minnesota_ but after aferocious contest of many hours practically destroyed the _Merrimac_, which was compelled to seek the shelter of Confederate batteriesat Sewell's Point, and never re-appeared in service. The reliefto the North by this victory was incalculable. Not only had the_Merrimac_ been stopped in her expected bombardment of Northerncities, but the success of the _Monitor_ assured to the governmenta class of armor-plated vessels that could be of great value inthe coast service to which our naval operations were principallyconfined. Against land batteries they would prove especiallyformidable. Ericsson who constructed the _Monitor_ and LieutenantWorden who commanded her, divided the honors, and were everywhereregarded as having rendered an invaluable service to the country. The modesty and heroism of Worden secured him an unbounded shareof popular admiration and respect. 

In the ensuing month of April the navy performed another greatservice by the capture of New Orleans. The fleet was in commandof Captain Farragut, and successfully passed the fortificationswhich had been erected by the National Government to prevent aforeign foe from entering the Mississippi. New Orleans made noresistance to the approach of the fleet, and General B. F. Butler, in command of the Department of the Gulf, established his headquartersin the city. The importance of this conquest to the Union causecould hardly be estimated. It enabled the government to embarrassthe trans-Mississippi States in their support of the rebel army, and thus inflicted a heavy blow upon the fortunes of the Confederacy. New Orleans in the control of the National Government was easy todefend, and it afforded a base of offensive operations in so manydirections that no amount of vigilance could anticipate the attacksthat might be made by the Union forces. 

Viewed in connection with the effective work of Flag-officer Footein supporting General Grant in the Henry and Donelson campaign, and of Gouldsborough in supporting Burnside on the coast of NorthCarolina, these later and greater achievements of the navy servedto raise that branch of the service in popular esteem. Besidesthe intrinsic merit which attached to the victories, they had allthe advantage of a genuine surprise to the public. Little had beenexpected from the navy in a contest where the field of operationseemed so restricted. But now the people saw that the most importantpost thus far wrenched from the Confederacy had been taken by thenavy, and that it was effectively sustaining and strengthening thearmy at all points. It was no longer regarded as a mere blockadingforce, but was menacing the coast of the Confederate States, penetrating their rivers, and neutralizing the strength of thousandsof Rebel soldiers who were withdrawn from armies in the field toman the fortifications rendered necessary by this unexpected formof attack. These facts made a deep impression of Congress. Sincethe close of the second war with Great Britain the navy had enjoyedno opportunity for distinction. The war with Mexico was wholly acontest on land, and for a period of forty-five years the navy ofthe United States had not measured its strength with any foe. Meanwhile however it had made great advance in the education andtraining of its officers and in the general tone of the service. Under the secretaryship of George Bancroft, the eminent historian, (in the cabinet of Mr. Polk, ) an academy had been established atAnnapolis for the scientific training of naval officers. By thisenlightened policy, inaugurated if not originally conceived by Mr. Bancroft, naval officers had for the first time been placed on anequal footing with the officers of the army who had long enjoyedthe advantages of the well-organized and efficient school at WestPoint. The academy had borne fruit, and at the outbreak of thewar, the navy was filled with young officers carefully trained inthe duties of their profession, intelligent in affairs, and withan _esprit de corps_ not surpassed in the service of any othercountry. Their efficiency was supplemented by that of volunteerofficers in large numbers who came from the American merchantmarine, and who in all the duties of seamanship, in courage, capacity, and patriotism, were the peers of any men who ever troda deck. 

Congress now realized that a re-organization of the naval servicewas necessary, that the stimulus of promotion should be moreliberally used, the pride of rank more generously indulged. AnAct was therefore passed on the 16th of July greatly enlarging thescope of the naval organization and advancing the rank of itsofficers. Farragut had won his magnificent triumph at New Orleanswhile holding the rank of captain, --the highest then known to ourservice, --and Worden had achieved his great fame at Hampton Roadswith the commission of a lieutenant. David D. Porter, with nohigher rank, had been exercising commands which in any Europeangovernment would have been assigned to an admiral. Perhaps no navyin the world had at that time abler officers than ours, while therank and emolument, except for the lowest grades, was shamefullyinadequate. The old navy had only the ranks of passed-midshipman, lieutenant, commander, and captain. The new law gave nine grades, --midshipman, ensign, master, lieutenant, lieutenant-commander, commander, captain, commodore, and rear-admiral. The effect ofthe increased rank was undoubtedly stimulating to the service andvaluable to the government. Two higher grades of vice-admiral andadmiral were subsequently added, and were filled by Farragut andPorter to whom in the judgment of the Department special and emphatichonor was due. The navy had conquered its own place in the publicregard, and had performed an inestimable service in the contestagainst the rebellion. 

 THE DESPERATE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 

The brilliant success in the early spring, both of the army andnavy, was unfortunately not continued in the subsequent months. General Grant, after the fall of Nashville, marched southward toconfront the army of General A. S. Johnston, and on the 6th and7th of April a terrible battle was fought at Pittsburg Landing onthe Tennessee River. The battle was originally called by that namein the annals of the Union, but the title of "Shiloh" given to itby the Confederate authorities, is the one more generally recognizedin history. In the first day's engagement the Union army narrowlyescaped a crushing defeat; but before the renewal of the conteston the following morning General Buell effected a junction withthe forces of General Grant, and the two, united, recovered allthe lost ground of the day before and gained a substantial victoryfor the Union, though at great cost of life. The Union army lostsome eighteen hundred men killed and nearly eight thousand wounded. The Confederate loss was not less. There is no doubt that GeneralGrant was largely outnumbered on the first day, but after thejunction of Buell he probably outnumbered the Confederates. Sixtythousand was perhaps the maximum of the Union forces on the secondday, while the Confederate army, as nearly as can be ascertained, numbered fifty thousand. One great event of the battle was thedeath of Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of marked skill, a manof the highest personal character. Jefferson Davis made his deaththe occasion of a special message to the Confederate Congress, inwhich he said that "without doing injustice to the living, our lossis irreparable. " The personal affliction of Mr. Davis was sore. The two had been at West Point together, and had been close friendsthrough life. William Preston Johnston, son of the fallen General, a young man of singular excellence of character and of most attractivepersonal traits, was at the time private secretary to Mr. Davis. He has since been widely known in the South in connection with itseducational progress. 

Deep anxiety had preceded the battle throughout the North, and therelief which followed was grateful. It was made the occasion bythe President for a proclamation in which the people were asked"to assemble in their places of public worship and especiallyacknowledge and render thanks to our Heavenly Father for the successeswhich have attended the Army of the Union. " But after the firstflush of victory, the battle became the subject of controversy inthe newspapers. Criticism of officers was unsparing, the slaughterof our soldiers was exaggerated, crimination and recrimination wereindulged in respecting the conduct of troops from certain States. General Grant was accused of having been surprised and of havingthereby incurred a danger which narrowly escaped being a defeat. The subject was brought into Congress and warmly debated. SenatorSherman of Ohio introduced a resolution calling for all the reportsfrom the officers in command, and made a speech defending theconduct of the Ohio troops, upon which some reflections had beeninconsiderately and most unjustly cast. Mr. Elihu Washburne madean elaborate speech in the House on the 2d of May, in which he gavea full account of the battle, and defended General Grant with muchwarmth against all possible charges which, either through ignoranceor malice, had been preferred against him for his conduct of thebattle. This speech, which was of great value to General Grant, both with the Administration and the country, laid the foundationof that intimate friendship which so long subsisted between himand Mr. Washburne. Mr. Richardson of Illinois followed his colleague, and expressed his disgust with even the introduction of the subjectin Congress. He felt that our armies would gain more renown andsecure greater victories if the "Riot Act" could be read, and bothHouses of Congress dispersed to their homes at the very earliestmoment. 

General Halleck, who had command of the Western Department, becameanxious for reputation on the field, and was thought by many to bejealous of the daily increasing fame of General Grant. After thebattle of Shiloh, he took command in person of the army which Granthad already rendered illustrious, leaving Grant to command itsright wing. Uniting the Western forces into one large army GeneralHalleck marched southward in pursuit of the Confederate column nowunder the command of Beauregard, and strongly intrenched at Corinth. As the army approached, Corinth was evacuated, and the campaign ofGeneral Halleck, leading to no important engagement, did not addto his military fame. Meanwhile there had been increasingdissatisfaction in Congress and among the people with the supersedureof General Grant, and to relieve the situation General Halleck wascalled to Washington in the early part of July to take command ofthe army which had been relinquished by McClellan in March, whenhe set forth upon the Peninsular campaign. In the interveningmonths there had been no General-in-Chief of the army, the dutiesbeing performed by the Secretary of War. 

 GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. 

The Western victories, important as they were, did not remove thepressure in the East. The popular interest was more largelyconcentrated in the success of the Army of the Potomac, which wouldsecure the safety of the National Capital, and possibly the possessionof the capital of the Confederacy. High hopes had been staked uponthe issue. Elaborate preparations had been made and the utmostcare had been taken in the organization and discipline of the army. 

General George B. McClellan was intrusted with the command. Hewas a native of Pennsylvania, a distinguished graduate of WestPoint, a man of high personal character. His military skill wasvouched for by older officers whose opinions would have weight withthe President. But he had been six months in command of the Armyof the Potomac and had done nothing in the field. The autumn hadpassed in inaction, the winter had worn away, and the spring hadcome without finding him ready to move. Whatever might be thejustification for delay, it was his misfortune to become the subjectof controversy. There was a McClellan party and an anti-McClellanparty, in the press, among the people, in Congress, and in thearmy. How far this may have impaired the efficiency of his commandcannot be known, but it no doubt seriously undermined him in theconfidence of the War Department. Before he had fired a gun inthe Peninsular campaign he was in a disputation with both thePresident and Secretary Stanton. On the 9th of April (1862) Mr. Lincoln wrote him, "Your dispatches complaining that you are notproperly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me verymuch. " General McClellan had complained that the President haddetained McDowell's corps, and thus weakened the strength of hisarmy, and the President was defending the policy as one necessaryto the safety of Washington. McClellan protested that he had buteighty-five thousand men at Yorktown. The President insisted thathe had a hundred and eight thousand. "And once more, " said thePresident, "in conclusion, let me tell you it is indispensable toyou that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You willdo me the justice to remember that I always insisted that goingdown the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or nearManassas, was only shifting and not surmounting the difficulty;that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchmentsat either place. The country will not fail to note (is now noting)that the present hesitation to move upon the intrenched enemy isbut the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you that Ihave never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness offeeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose of sustaining you sofar as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. "

This condition of affairs with the indication of increasing discordbetween the Commander-in-Chief and General McClellan boded no goodto the Union cause, and the entire Peninsular campaign was but asuccession of "hopes deferred" that made the heart sick; ofdisappointment, of great sacrifice of life and treasure, and inthe end of positive disaster and humiliating retreat. 

As General McClellan neared Richmond and needed re-enforcementsfor a decisive battle with General Lee's army, the Confederatesused the most admirable tactics for the purpose of alarming theauthorities at Washington and compelling them to withhold help fromthe Army of the Potomac. Stonewall Jackson came thundering downthe Shenandoah Valley with a force which the exaggeration of theday placed far beyond his real numbers. He brushed aside the armyof General Banks at Winchester by what might well be termed amilitary cyclone, and created such consternation that our troopsin the Potomac Valley were at once thrown upon the defensive. McDowell with his corps was at Fredericksburg, hurrying to HanoverCourt-House for the purpose of aiding McClellan. With our forcesthus remote from Washington, and the fortifications around the cityimperfectly manned, something akin to panic seized upon theGovernment. General McDowell, by direct order of the President, was turned from his march on Richmond, to follow or interceptJackson. On the 25th of May the Secretary of War telegraphed tothe governors of the Loyal States: "Intelligence from variousquarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marchingon Washington. You will please organize and forward immediatelyall the militia and volunteer forces in your State. " The governorsin turn issued alarming proclamations, some of which were eminentlycalculated to spread the contagion of fear prevailing at Washington. Governor Andrew, with evident apprehension of the worst, informedthe people of Massachusetts that "The wily and barbarous horde oftraitors to the people, to the Government, to our country, and toliberty, menace again the National Capital: they have attacked androuted Major-General Banks, are advancing on Harper's Ferry, andare marching on Washington. The President calls on Massachusettsto rise at once for its rescue and defense. " Throughout the entireNorth there was for several days a genuine belief that the NationalCapital might soon be in possession of the Confederate army, andthe senators and representatives in Congress be seized as prisonersof war. 

 STONEWALL JACKSON'S STRATEGY. 

Meanwhile Stonewall Jackson having marched to the very banks ofthe Potomac and shelled Harper's Ferry, and having succeeded beyondhis most sanguine expectation in the object which he had in view, deliberately began his retreat. He was followed up the ShenandoahValley by the commands of four Major-Generals and one Brigadier-General of the Union army. He drew these united forces after himprecisely as he desired, for the benefit of Lee's army at Richmond. He did not fly from them as if dreading a battle, for that wouldhave been to dismiss the large Union force to the aid of GeneralMcClellan. Occasionally detailing a fraction of his command toengage in a skirmish with his pursuers, who far outnumbered hiswhole force, he managed to keep his main body at a safe distance, and to reserve it for a more important work ahead. After thusdrawing our troops so far up the valley that it was impossible forthem to retrace their steps in season for concentration on Richmond, he rapidly transported the main body of his own troops by rail fromStaunton, and rejoined General Lee in time to take part in thefinal and memorable series of engagements which, by the close ofJune, had compelled General McClellan to take refuge on the banksof the James, where he could have the co-operation of the gunboatswhich lay at Harrison's Landing. 

General Halleck took command as General-in-Chief of the army directlyafter the Army of the Potomac had closed its campaign againstRichmond. He visited Harrison's Landing on the 24th of July tomake personal inquiry into the situation, and the result was anorder for the transfer of the army to Acquia Creek. GeneralMcClellan protested earnestly, and, in the judgment of many of themost skilled in military science, wisely, against this movement. The Army of the Potomac, he said, was "within twenty-five miles ofRichmond, and with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the armyby water during its advance to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Acquia Creek we would be seventy miles from Richmond, with landtransportation all the way. " He thought the government had ampletroops to protect Washington and guard the line of the Potomac, and he could not see the wisdom of transporting the Army of thePotomac two hundred miles at enormous cost, only to place it threetimes as far from Richmond as it then was. General Halleck'sposition was sustained by the President, and the Secretary of War, and the argument of General McClellan, convincing and conclusiveas it seems, was overruled by the peremptory mandate of his militarysuperiors. 

The failure of the Peninsular campaign will always be a subject ofcontroversy. At the time it was one of prolonged and angry dispute. Where military critics so widely differ, civilians gain the rightto a personal judgment. The weakness of that great military movementwas the lack of cordiality and confidence between the commanderand the Administration at Washington. The seeds of distrust hadbeen sown and a bountiful crop of disaster was the natural growth. The withdrawal of McDowell's corps was a fatal blow to McClellan. Before a military court which was inquiring into the transaction, General McClellan stated under oath that he had "no doubt that theArmy of the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps ofGeneral McDowell been separated from it; and that, had the commandof General McDowell in the month of May joined the Army of thePotomac by way of Hanover Court-House, we would have had Richmonda week after the junction. " He added, with evident reference toMr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, "I do not hold General McDowellresponsible for a failure to join me on that occasion. "

 STONEWALL JACKSON'S SUCCESSFUL RAID. 

When General McDowell was turned back from Fredericksburg to takepart in the fruitless chase after Stonewall Jackson in the ShenandoahValley, he was doing precisely what the President of the ConfederateStates would have ordered, had he been able to issue the orders ofthe President of the United States. McDowell saw the blunder, buthis directions were peremptory and nothing was left but to obey. He telegraphed the Secretary of War, "The President's order is acrushing blow to us. " Mr. Lincoln personally and immediatelyreplied to General McDowell, "The change is as painful to me as itcan possibly be to you or to any one. " McDowell then ventured toargue the case with the President. He distinctly told Mr. Lincolnthat he could effect nothing in trying to cut off Stonewall Jacksonin the Shenandoah Valley. "I shall, " he continued, "gain nothingfor you there, and I shall lose much for you here. It is thereforenot only on personal ground that I have a heavy heart in thismatter, but I feel that it throws us all back, and from Richmondnorth we shall have all our large mass paralyzed, and shall haveto repeat what we have just accomplished. " Mr. Lincoln's orderand the whole of this correspondence were by telegraph on the twenty-fourth day of May. Conclusive as the reasoning of General McDowellseems, it did not move Mr. Lincoln from his purpose; and the heavyre-enforcement which was then within three days of the point whereit could most effectively aid McClellan, was diverted to a hopelessand useless pursuit. Had McDowell been allowed to proceed as hedesired and as General McClellan confidently expected, he wouldhave re-enforced the Army of the Potomac for an attack on Lee, while Stonewall Jackson's corps was in the Shenandoah Valley. Bythe unfortunate diversion ordered by Mr. Lincoln, precisely thereverse occurred. Stonewall Jackson's corps arrived before Richmondin season to aid in defeating McClellan, while McDowell with hissplendid contingent was aimlessly loitering in a distant part ofVirginia. 

The President was led into this course by the urgent advice of theSecretary of War. When McClellan went to the field, Mr. Stantonundertook personally to perform the duties of General-in-Chief inWashington. This was evidently an egregious blunder. Neither byeducation, temper, temperament, nor by any other trait of hischaracter, was Mr. Stanton fitted for this duty. He was verypositively and in a high degree unfitted for it. With three Major-Generals--McDowell, Banks, and Frémont--exercising independentcommands in the Potomac Valley, with their movements exerting adirect and important influence upon the fortunes of the main armyunder McClellan, there was especial need of a cool-headed, experienced, able general at the Capital. Had one of the three great soldierswho have been at the head of the army since the close of the war, then been in chief command at Washington, there is little hazardin saying that the brilliant and dashing tactics of StonewallJackson would not have been successful, and that if General McClellanhad failed before Richmond, it would not have been for lack oftimely and adequate re-enforcement. 

Before these military disasters occurred, Congress had made progressin its legislation against the institution of Slavery. At thebeginning of the war there had been an ill-defined policy, or ratheran absence of all policy, in relation to the most important ofpending questions. The winter preceding the outbreak of therebellion had been so assiduously devoted by Congress to effortsof compromise and conciliation, that it was difficult to turn thepublic mind promptly to the other side, and to induce the peopleto accept the logical consequences of the war. There was no uniformpolicy among our generals. Each commander was treating the questionvery much according to his own personal predilection, and that wasgenerally found to be in accordance with his previous politicalrelations. The most conspicuous exception to this rule was GeneralBenjamin F. Butler, who had been identified with the extreme pro-slavery wing of the Democratic party. He was in command in May, 1861, at Fortress Monroe, and he found that when fugitive slavessought the protection of his camp they were pursued under flags oftruce, and their return was requested as a right under the Constitutionof the United States by men who were in arms against the Constitution. The anomaly of this situation was seen by General Butler, and hemet it promptly by refusing to permit the slaves to be returned, declaring them to be contraband of war. As they were useful tothe enemy in military operations, they were to be classed with armsand ammunition. This opinion was at first received joyously bythe country, and the word "contraband" became the synonym of fugitiveslave. But General Butler's judgment is justified by the rules ofmodern warfare, and its application solved a question of policywhich otherwise might have been fraught with serious difficulty. In the presence of arms the Fugitive-slave Law became null andvoid, and the Dred Scott decision was trampled under the iron hoofof war. 

 SLAVERY ABOLISHED IN THE DISTRICT. 

The first exercise of legislative power hostile to the institutionof slavery, already detailed, was promptly followed by one stillmore decisive. Congress provided for the abolition of the institutionin the District of Columbia. A bill for this purpose was introducedin the Senate on the 16th of December, 1861, and two months laterMr. Morrill of Maine, from the Committee on the District, reportedit to the Senate with a favorable recommendation. Garrett Davisof Kentucky spoke in support of an amendment requiring thecolonization, beyond the limits of the United States, of all personswho might be liberated by the Act. He was firmly persuaded thatthe liberation of slaves with their continued residence among thewhites would result in a war of races. Mr. Hale of New Hampshirecombated his opinion by arguments and facts drawn from the historyof emancipation in Jamaica. Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts gave aninteresting history of the circumstances which led to the selectionof the site for the National Capital upon slave territory. 

Mr. Sumner dealt with the subject at great length, enforcing hisviews by numerous authorities drawn from history, from the decisionsof courts, and from the opinions of publicists and statesmen ofmodern times. The opponents of the measure did not conceal theirapprehension that the abolition of slavery in the District ofColumbia portended its overthrow in the States. Mr. Sumner andhis associates hailed the movement as the inauguration of a policydestined to produce that result. "The future, " said the Massachusettssenator, "cannot be doubtful. At the National Capital slavery willgive way to freedom. But the good work will not stop here: it mustproceed. What God and Nature decree, Rebellion cannot arrest. "Mr. Sherman of Ohio maintained that it was not a measure for thepreservation of the government, but a municipal regulation, andthat the time had come when it was evidently wise to exercise thepowers granted by the Constitution. Mr. Willey of Virginia deprecatedthe existence of slavery in the capital of the country, but heopposed the emancipation bill as the first of a series of measuresthat would end in the abolition of slavery in all the States byact of Congress. The bill passed the Senate the third day of Aprilby a vote of 29 to 14. 

When the measure reached the House and was read for information itwas at once challenged by Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio; and upon theparliamentary question "Shall the bill be rejected?" the yeas were45 and the nays were 93. The debate which immediately followedwas in good temper, with a notable absence of the exasperationwhich it was feared the subject would call forth. Mr. Crittendenof Kentucky stated the objections of the minority, and especiallyof the Border slave States, fairly and temperately. The time seemedto him unpropitious inasmuch as the moving cause of the secessionof the States was the apprehension on their part that Congress waslikely to take measures for the abolition of slavery. The passageof the bill necessarily rendered futile every attempt at reconciliation. Secondly, there was an implied agreement with Virginia and Marylandat the time of the cession of the District that "the system ofslavery shall not be disturbed. " And finally, the bill, althoughit provided for compensation to lawful owners, was in effect ameasure of confiscation. It passed the House by a vote of 92 to38. The President accompanied his approval with a special messagein which, while not doubting the constitutionality of the measure, he intimated that there were "matters within and about the Actwhich might have taken a course or shape more satisfactory to hisjudgment. " He especially commended the provision made for compensationto the owners of slaves, and referred with satisfaction to theappropriation made to aid any colored person of the District whomight desire to emigrate "to Liberia, Hayti, or any country beyondthe limits of the United States which the President may determine. "The sum of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated for thispurpose by the Act--one hundred dollars being allowed to eachemigrant. The experiment came to nothing. The colored personswho had resided in the United States as slaves were obviouslydesirous of trying their fortunes as freemen among the people whomthey knew, and in the homes to which they were attached. 

 THE PRESIDENT'S CONSERVATIVE COURSE. 

Mr. Lincoln had always been a firm believer in the scheme of Africancolonization; and in his message of December, 1861, he recommendeda provision for colonizing the slaves set free by the influence ofwar. From the slave States which had remained loyal to the Unionhe was willing to accept slaves in lieu of the direct tax, accordingto some mode of valuation that might be agreed upon, and he wasanxious that adequate provision should be made for their settlementin some place or places with a climate congenial to them. But theexperiment with the manumitted negroes of the District, which wasmade in compliance with this recommendation of the President andin deference to his personal wishes, frequently and earnestlyexpressed, demonstrated the impracticability of the plan. Colonizationcould be effected only by the forcible removal of the coloredpeople, and this would have been a more cruel violation of theirnatural rights than a continuance of the slavery in which they wereborn. If free choice between the two conditions had been offered, nine-tenths, perhaps even a larger proportion of the slaves, wouldhave preferred to remain in their old homes. In an economic pointof view the scheme was indefensible. We were at the time the onlycountry with undeveloped agricultural resources in warm latitudes, that was not engaged in seeking labor from all quarters of theworld. The Colonization scheme deliberately proposed to strip theUnited States of patient, faithful laborers, acclimated to thecotton and sugar fields of the South, and capable of adding greatwealth to the nation. Colonization would deprive us of this muchneeded labor, would entail vast expense in the deportation of thenegroes, and would devolve upon this country, by a moral responsibilitywhich it could not avoid, the protection and maintenance of thefeeble government which would be planted on the shores of Africa. The Liberian experiment, honorable as it was to the colored race, and successful as it had proved in establishing civilization inAfrica, had not attained such material prosperity as would justifythe United States in the removal of millions of its population toa remote country where there was no demand for labor. 

Mr. Lincoln's course on the Slavery question at that period of hisAdministration was steadily and studiously conservative. He hadchecked the Secretary of War (Mr. Cameron) in the issuing of ananti-slavery order which was considered premature and unwise; hehad countermanded and annulled the proclamations of General Hunterand General Frémont declaring the slaves to be free within thedistricts of their respective commands. He now recommended ameasure in the line of his conservative policy, to which he attachedgreat weight, and from which he anticipated important consequences. On the 6th of March, 1862, the President sent a message to Congressrecommending the adoption of a joint resolution declaring that "theUnited States ought to co-operate with any State which may adoptgradual abolishment of slavery, giving to each State pecuniary aidto be used in its discretion to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system. " Mr. Lincolnbelieved that if the leaders of the existing Rebellion could conquertheir independence, the Border slave States would necessarily jointhem from sympathy with their institutions. By the initiation ofemancipation all possible desire or tendency in that directionwould be removed, and thus a severe blow be given to the Rebellion. He believed in compensation to the slave-holder, and expressed hisopinion that "gradual and not sudden emancipation is better forall. " He asked Congress to consider "how very soon the currentexpenses of the war would purchase at a fair valuation all theslaves in any named State. "

When the message reached the House it was referred to the Committeeof the Whole on the State of the Union. Four days later Mr. RoscoeConkling moved to suspend the rules in order to bring the resolutionbefore the House "in the exact form in which the President hadrecommended it. " The motion prevailed by 86 to 35. Francis P. Blair of Missouri and the representatives from West Virginia werethe only Border State men who voted to suspend the rules. Mr. Conkling thought an immediate vote might be taken because he presumed"every member had made up his mind on the question involved. " Butthe Kentucky delegation desired time for consultation. Theyconcluded to oppose the resolution. Mr. Crittenden, speaking thesentiments of all, asked, "Why do you exact of Kentucky more thanshe has already done to show her loyalty? Has she not parted withall her former allies, with all her natural kindred in other States?Why should it be asked that she should now surrender up her domesticinstitutions?" Against the protest of Kentucky the resolution waspassed, such radical abolitionists as Owen Lovejoy warmly supportingthe proposition to pay for slaves out of the Treasury of the UnitedStates. Mr. Henderson of Missouri and Mr. Willey of West Virginiawere the only Border State senators who saw the vast advantage tobe secured to their own constituents by the passage of the measure. They supported it ably and heartily. It was earnestly opposed bythe senators from Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware. Mr. Carlileof West Virginia was the only senator in nominal sympathy with theAdministration who voted against it. The hostility to the President'spolicy by senators from the Border slave States was so fixed as toprevent even a free discussion of the measure, and it was thereforeremanded to a future day for consideration. 

 CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY. 

A still more aggressive movement against slavery was made by Congressbefore the close of this eventful session. On the day that Congressconvened, in the preceding December, Mr. Trumbull gave notice ofhis intention to introduce a bill "for the confiscation of theproperty of rebels, and giving freedom to the persons they hold inslavery. " Three days later he formally introduced the bill, andmade a lucid explanation of its provisions and its objects. He"disdained to press it upon the ground of a mere military powersuperior to the civil in time of war. " "Necessity, " said he, "isthe plea of tyrants; and if our Constitution ceases to operate, the moment a person charged with its observance thinks there is anecessity to violate it, is of little value. " So far from admittingthat the superiority of the military over the civil power in timeof war, Mr. Trumbull held that "under the Constitution the militaryis as much the subject of control by the civil power in war as inpeace. " He was for suppressing the rebellion "according to law, and in no other way;" and he warned his countrymen who stood "readyto tolerate almost any act done in good faith for the suppressionof the rebellion, not to sanction usurpations of power which mayhereafter become precedents for the destruction of constitutionalliberty. " Though the bill was introduced on the second day ofDecember, 1861, it did not become a law until the 17th of July inthe next year. 

In the months intervening, it was elaborately debated, almost everysenator taking part in the discussion. Garrett Davis of Kentucky, who had succeeded Mr. Breckinridge in the Senate, made a long speechagainst the bill, contending that Congress had no power to freeany slaves. He wanted a bill of great severity against the rebelleaders: "to those that would repent" he would give "immunity, peace, and protection; to the impenitent and incorrigible he wouldgive the gallows, or exile and the forfeiture of their whole estate. "Such a law as that, he said, his "own State of Kentucky desired. As Hamilcar brought his infant son Hannibal to the family altar, and made him swear eternal enmity to the Roman power, so I havesworn and will ever maintain eternal enmity to the principle ofsecession and all its adherents. " It was seen throughout the debatethat the bill under consideration was in large part provoked bythe confiscation measures of the Confederate Congress, and Mr. Davis declared that "the debts due to the North, estimated at$200, 000, 000, seized, confiscated, and appropriated by the rebelgovernment, shall be remunerated fully. "

Mr. John B. Henderson of Missouri who, as a Union man of prominenceand ability, had succeeded Trusten Polk in the Senate, opposed thebill because it would "cement the Southern mind against us anddrive new armies of excited and deluded men from the Border Statesto espouse the cause of rebellion. " He urged that "the Unionsentiment of the South should be cultivated, and radical measurestending to destroy that sentiment should be dropped. " Mr. Fessendenwas conservative on this as on other questions, and insisted uponthe reference of Mr. Trumbull's bill to a committee; which was theoccasion of some little passage between himself and Mr. Trumbull, not without temper. Mr. Trumbull suggested that "the senator fromMaine would not be likely to get any light from the deliberationsof five men unless he were himself one of them. " Retorting in thesame spirit, but, as he said, good-naturedly, Mr. Fessenden saidhe should not "hope that _any_ deliberation of anybody wouldenlighten the senator from Illinois. "

Sustaining the extreme power of confiscation, Mr. Sumner desired"the Act to be especially leveled at the institution of Slavery. "He recalled the saying of Charles XII. Of Sweden, that the cannoneerswere perfectly right in directing their shots at him, for the warwould be at an instant end if they could kill him; whereas theywould reap little from killing his principal officers. "There is, "said the senator, "no shot in this war so effective as one againstSlavery, which is king above all officers; nor is there betteraugury of complete success than the willingness at last to fireupon this wicked king. " By this means, Mr. Sumner believed thatwe should "take from the rebellion its mainspring of activity andstrength, stop its chief stores of provisions and supplies, removea motive and temptation to prolonged resistance, and destroy foreverthe disturbing influence which, so long as it exists, will keepthis land a volcano, ever ready to break forth anew. " Mr. Sumner, Mr. Wade, and Mr. Chandler, the senators who were regarded as mostradical, desired more stringent provisions than they could secure. The really able lawyers of the Senate, Mr. Fessenden and JudgeCollamer, repressed the extreme measures which but for theirinterposition would have been enacted. As the bill was finallyperfected, Mr. Chandler and his colleague Mr. Howard voted againstit, as did also Mr. Browning of Illinois and the Border-StateSenators Davis of Kentucky, Henderson of Missouri, and Carlile ofVirginia. To the Michigan senators the bill was too weak; to theothers it was too strong. Mr. Willey of Virginia was the onlysenator from a slave-holding State who voted on the radical side. With the exceptions noted, Republican senators all voted for thebill. 

 CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY. 

A series of measures in the House relating to confiscation wereunder discussion while the Senate was considering the same subject. The House passed a more stringent bill than the Senate would accept, and the subject was finally sent to a committee of conference, which from the points of disagreement framed the measure thatultimately became a law. As in the Senate, the Border-State menopposed the measure, but were overborne by the popular opinionwhich nearly consolidated the Republican vote of the North in favorof it. It was however an undoubted weakness, morally and politically, that such men as Crittenden and Mallory of Kentucky, James S. Rollins of Missouri, and Francis Thomas and Edwin H. Webster ofMaryland were recorded against it. The bill was passed in theHouse by a vote of 82 to 42. The conference report having somewhatstrengthened the original measure passed by the Senate, Messrs. Howard and Chandler of Michigan gave it their support, but for thesame reason Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania and Mr. Willey of Virginiaopposed it. The final vote was 27 in favor to 12 against it. 

The Act, as it finally passed, affixed to the crime of treason thepunishment of death, or, at the discretion of the court, imprisonmentfor not less than five years and a fine of not less than ten thousanddollars, --all the slaves, if any, to be declared free. "To insurethe speedy termination of the present rebellion" it was made theduty of the President to cause the seizure of the estate andproperty, money, stocks, credits, and effects of the followingclasses of persons: First, all those hereafter acting as officersof the army or the navy of the rebels in arms against the governmentof the United States; second, of any person acting as President, Vice-President, member of Congress, judge of any court, cabinetofficer, foreign minister, commissioner, or consul of the so-calledConfederate States; third, of any person acting as governor of aState, member of a convention or Legislature, or judge of any courtof any of the so-called Confederate States of America; fourth, ofany person who having held an office of honor, trust, or profit inthe United States shall hereafter hold an office in the so-calledConfederate States; fifth, of any person hereafter holding anyoffice or agency under the so-called Confederate States or underany of the several States of said Confederacy; sixth, of any personwho owning property in any loyal State or Territory of the UnitedStates, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter assist andgive aid and comfort to the rebellion. "And all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property shall be null and void; and itshall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such persons forthe possession or use of such property, or any of it, to allegeand prove that he is one of the persons described in this section. "

In the provisions of the Act directly affecting slavery it wasdeclared that "All slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engagedin rebellion against the Government of the United States or whoshall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from suchpersons and taking refuge within the lines of the army, and allslaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and comingunder the control of the Government of the United States, and allslaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied byrebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the UnitedStates, shall be deemed captives, shall be forever free of theirservitude, and not again held as slaves. " This provision had avery sweeping application. Even if the war had ended without aformal and effective system of emancipation, it is believed thatthis statute would have so operated as to render the slave systempractically valueless. When the war closed it is probable thatnot less than one-half of all the slaves of the rebel States hadcome within the scope of this statute, and had therefore beendeclared legally free by the legislative power of the United States. 

 CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY. 

Mr. Lincoln signed the Confiscation Act with reluctance. Indeedhe had prepared a veto, but a joint resolution had been passed inorder to remove the objections which in the President's view wereabsolutely fatal to the original bill, either as regarded itsjustice or its constitutionality. He had insisted to certainsenators that the Confiscation Law must in terms exclude thepossibility of its being applied to any act done by a rebel priorto its passage, and that no punishment or proceeding under it shouldbe so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of theoffender beyond his natural life. These, with some minor defects, being corrected, the President affixed his signature and made publicproclamation of the intended enforcement of the Act as qualifiedby the joint resolution approved on the same day. But there isgood reason for believing that Mr. Lincoln would have been glad toconfine its application to slave property, and he felt moreoverthat he could deal with that subject without the co-operation ofCongress. The military situation was so discouraging that in thePresident's view it would have been wiser for Congress to refrainfrom enacting laws which, without success in the field, would benull and void, and which, with success in the field, would berendered unnecessary. Congress adjourned on the same day that Mr. Lincoln approved the bill, and on returning home the senators andrepresentatives found their constituents depressed, anxious, andalarmed for the country. 

It cannot be said that the results flowing from this measure, eitherin restraining the action of Southern men or in securing to theNational Treasury money derived from confiscated property, were atall in proportion to the importance ascribed to it in the discussionof both branches of Congress. Indeed the effect both morally andmaterially was far short of expectation. It is highly probablethat if the stringent measure of the Confederate Congress and itsstringent enforcement under the vigorous administration of Attorney-General Benjamin had not been attempted, the Congress of the UnitedStates could not have been induced to enter upon a course oflegislation concerning which there existed much doubt and divisionof opinion among the Republicans. It is at least certain that butfor the causes named, the scope of the Confiscation Act would havebeen confined within those limits which would have directly influencedthe institution of Slavery, and would not have interfered with anyother species of property. Whatever distress therefore came toSouthern men, from the provisions in the Confiscation Act outsideof those relating to Slavery, may fairly and properly be traced tothe spirit of retaliation (always an effective weapon in time ofwar) which naturally followed the causeless and cruel procedure ofthe Confederate Government. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

Ball's Bluff Disaster. --Mr. Conkling's Resolution of Inquiry. --Unsatisfactory Reply of Secretary Cameron. --Second Resolution. --Second Reply. --Incidental Debate on Slavery. --Arrest of GeneralCharles P. Stone. --His History. --His Response to Criticisms madeupon him. --Responsibility of Colonel Baker. --General Stone beforethe Committee on the Conduct of the War. --His Examination. --Testimonyof Officers. --General Stone appears before the Committee a SecondTime. --His Arrest by Order of the War Department. --No Cause assigned. --Imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. --Solitary Confinement. --Sees Nobody. --His Wife denied Access to him. --Subject brought into Congress. --A Search for the Responsibility of the Arrest. --Groundless Assumptionof Mr. Sumner's Connection with it. --Mr. Lincoln's Message in Regardto the Case. --General Stone's Final Release by an Act of Congress. --Imprisoned for One Hundred and Eighty-nine Days. --Never told theCause. --Never allowed a Trial. --Appears a Third Time before theCommittee. --The True Responsibility for the Arrest. --His Restorationto Service. --His Resignation. --Joins the Khedive's Service. 

On the day that Congress convened, (December 2, 1861, ) Mr. RoscoeConkling offered a resolution which was unanimously agreed to bythe House, requesting "the Secretary of War, if not incompatiblewith the public service, to report to the House whether any, andif any, what, measures have been taken to ascertain who is responsiblefor the disastrous movement of our troops at Ball's Bluff. " A fewdays later Mr. Chandler of Michigan offered a resolution in theSenate, directing an inquiry by a committee of three "into thedisasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff. " Mr. Grimes of Iowa offereda substitute which, after various modifications, directed theappointment of a "joint committee of three members of the Senate, and four members of the House of Representatives, to inquire intothe conduct of the present war, with power to send for persons andpapers, and with leave to sit during the sessions of either branchof Congress. " The resolutions led to some debate. Mr. Chandlermaintained that "it is the duty of the Senate to ascertain who isresponsible for sending eighteen hundred men across the Potomac, in two old scows, without any means of retreat. " Mr. McDougallthought a discussion of the question at that time was impolitic. Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Committee on MilitaryAffairs, while admitting that many mistakes had been made, assertedthe "the greatest error in the conduct of the war has been theseries of irresponsible proclamations issued by generals on thefield. " The joint resolution was adopted by the Senate with onlythree dissenting votes (Messrs. Latham, Carlile, and Rice) and bythe House unanimously. Mr. Wade of Ohio, Mr. Chandler of Michigan, and Mr. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee on the part of the Senate, withMr. Gooch of Massachusetts, Mr. Covode of Pennsylvania, Mr. Julianof Indiana, and Mr. Odell of New York on the part of the House, constituted the committee. 

 THE DISASTER AT BALL'S BLUFF. 

The Secretary of War, in answer to Mr. Conkling's resolution touchingthe disaster at Ball's Bluff, stated that Major-General McClellan, commanding the army, "is of opinion that an inquiry on the subjectof the resolution would at this time be injurious to the publicservice. " The answer did not satisfy Mr. Conkling. He immediatelymoved another resolution declaring that the communication from theSecretary of War was "not responsive nor satisfactory to the House, and that the secretary be directed to return a further answer. "A spirited debate followed, taking a somewhat extended range. Mr. Conkling said that his resolution related to "the most atrociousmilitary murder ever committed in our history as a people. Itrelates to a lost field; to a disastrous and humiliating battle;to a blunder so gross that all men can see it, --a blunder whichcost us confessedly nine hundred and thirty men, the very prideand flower of the States from which they came. " . . . "The Bluffis a mile in length up and down the river, and the landing andascent were made in the middle of it. Behind this was a six-acrelot skirted by woods on three sides. Into this burial-ground, oneby one, as the boat brought them over, went up the devoted seventeenhundred. . . . Behind them rolled a deep river which could neverbe repassed. Before them and surrounding them on every side wasa tree-sheltered and skulking foe, three or four times theirnumber. . . . In an hour, in less than an hour, the field was ahell of fire raging from every side. The battle was lost beforeit was begun. It was from the outset a mere sacrifice, a sheerimmolation, without a promise of success or a hope of escape. ". . . "On the same side of the river with Leesburg, " said Mr. Conkling, "within a day's march of that place, lay General McCall commandinga division containing fifteen regiments which marched fully eleventhousand men. If Leesburg were to be attacked, or if a reconnoissancein force were to be made in that direction, one of the first wondersin this case is, that the work should have been assigned to GeneralStone's division, divided as it was from the scene of action by agreat river, when the division of General McCall was within a day'smarch of the spot, with neither river, mountain, nor barrier to betraversed. "

--Mr. Richardson of Illinois thought Mr. Conkling's resolution wascalculated "to raise an issue between the House of Representativesand the army, and divide the country. " He thought this would injurethe cause of the Union. In military matters he would "rather trustthe commanding general of the army than a committee of the House. "

--Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky protested against "the House interferingin the conduct of the war and the management of the army byinvestigating transactions which are in their nature purely military. "He maintained that "such a policy takes control out of the handsof men supposed to be competent and puts it in the hands of mensupposed not to be competent. " "If, " continued Mr. Crittenden, "we are to find fault with every movement, who not appoint acommittee of the House to attend the Commander-in-chief? Why notsend them with our army so that the power of Congress may be feltin battle as well as in the halls of legislation?"

--Mr. Lovejoy of Illinois gave a characteristic turn to the debate. "I believe before God, " said he, --"and if it be fanaticism now itwill not be when history traces the events of the day, --that thereason why we have had Bull Run and Ball's Bluff and other defeatsand disasters is that God, in his providence, designs to arraignus before this great question of human freedom, and make us takethe right position. " Slavery, according to Mr. Lovejoy, was theJonah on board the National ship, and the ship would founder unlessJonah were thrown overboard. "When Jonah was cast forth into thesea, the sea ceased from raging. " Our battles, in Mr. Lovejoy'sbelief, "should be fought so as to hurt slavery, " and enable thePresident to decree its destruction. "To be President, to be king, to be victor, has happened to many; to be embalmed in the heartsof mankind through all generations as liberator and emancipatorhas been vouchsafed to few. "

 THE DISASTER AT BALL'S BLUFF. 

--Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky believed we should "preserve the Unionand slavery under it. " He wised to "throw the Abolitionistsoverboard. "

--Mr. Mallory of Kentucky, while not believing slavery to beincompatible with our liberty under the Constitution, declared thatso far as he understood the feeling of the people of Kentucky, "ifthey ever come to regard slavery as standing in the way of theUnion, they will not hesitate to wipe out the institution. " Loudapplause followed this remark. 

--Mr. McKee Dunn of Indiana, while believing that "if slavery standsin the way of the Union it must be destroyed, " was not yet "willingto accept Mr. Lovejoy as prophet, priest, or king. " He thought"the gentleman from Illinois was not authorized to interpret God'sprovidence" in the affairs of men. 

--Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, in recalling the debate to the immediatequestion before the House, took occasion to protest against thedoctrine of non-interference laid down by Mr. Crittenden. "Has itcome to this, " said Mr. Stevens, "that Congress is a mere automaton, to register the decrees of another power, and that we have nothingto do but to find men and money? . . . This is the doctrine ofdespotism, better becoming that empire which they are attemptingto establish in the South. "

The resolution offered by Mr. Conkling was adopted by a vote of 79to 54, on a call of the yeas and nays. The affirmative vote waswholly Republican. A few Republicans voted with the Democrats inthe negative. The reply of Secretary Cameron was no more satisfactorythan to the first resolution. He informed the House that "measureshave been taken to ascertain who is responsible for the disastrousmovement of our troops at Ball's Bluff, but it is not deemedcompatible with the public interest to make known these measuresat the present time. " The difference between this answer and thefirst, was that the Administration assumed the responsibility ofwithholding the information, and did not rest it upon the judgmentof the general in command of the army. 

Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone was a graduate of West PointMilitary Academy, from Massachusetts. His family belongs to theold Puritan stock of that commonwealth, and had been honorablyrepresented in every war in which the American people had engaged. General Stone served as a lieutenant in the Mexican war with highcredit, and in 1855 resigned his commission and became a residentof California. It happened that he was in Washington at the breakingout of the civil war, and in response to the request of his oldcommander, General Scott, took a prominent part in the defense ofthe capital, considered to be in danger after the rising of theBaltimore mob. His conduct was so admirable that when the President, a few weeks later, directed the organization of eleven new regimentsin the Regular Army, he appointed General Stone to the Colonelcyof the 14th United-States Infantry. After the battle of Bull Run, when General McClellan was promoted to the command of the Army ofthe Potomac, General Stone was selected to command a division whichwas directed to occupy the valley of the Potomac above Washington, as a corps of observation. The Union troops, engaged in thedisastrous battle of Ball's Bluff, belonged to his corps, but wereunder the immediate command of Colonel E. D. Baker. The repulseand slaughter on that melancholy field were followed by excitementand indignation throughout the country quite as deep as that shownin Congress. The details of the disaster were greatly exaggerated. The official summary of losses, made up with care, showed that thetotal number killed, including both officers and men, was 49;wounded, 158; missing, 714, of whom a few were drowned, and thegreat mass taken prisoners. The popular admiration for ColonelBaker was unbounded, and the suspicion that his life had beenneedlessly destroyed created such a feeling as demanded a victim. General Stone was selected for the sacrifice, and popular wrathwas turned upon him with burning intensity. Rumors and exaggerationsfilled the newspapers; and the public, in that state of credulitywhich is an incident to the victim-hunting mania, accepted everything as true. It was widely believed that Colonel Baker saidmournfully, as he marched to the battle-field, "I will obey GeneralStone's order, but it is my death-warrant. "

 BALL'S BLUFF DISASTER INVESTIGATED. 

Goaded by these injurious and unfounded rumors, General Stone, ina letter to the Adjutant-General of the army, written a fortnightafter the battle, deemed it his "duty to answer the persistentattacks made through the press by the friends of the lamentedColonel Baker. " He called attention to the "distinct violationsby Colonel Baker of his orders and instructions, " and declared thathe was left "to use his own discretion about crossing his force, or retiring that already over. " He found it "painful to censurethe acts of one who gallantly died on the field of battle, " butjustice to himself required "that the full truth should be made toappear. " Colonel Baker did not receive the order "as a death-warrant, " for it was delivered to him "at his own request. " That"Colonel Baker was determined to fight a battle" was made evidentby the fact that "he never crossed to examine the field, never gavean order to the troops in advance, and never sent forward toascertain their position, until he had ordered over his force, andpassed over a considerable portion of it. " On the 5th of January, 1862, General Stone appeared before the Committee on the Conductof the War, and was examined under oath as to every detail of theBall's-Bluff disaster which could in any way, directly or remotely, involve his responsibility as a commander. His answers were frank, withholding nothing, and were evidently intended to communicateevery pertinent fact. So far as may be inferred from the questionsand comments, the evidence was entirely satisfactory to thecommittee. 

After the examination of General Stone, many officers of his commandappeared before the committee. The captains and lieutenants, freshfrom private life, whose names he probably did not know, and withwhom he perhaps never exchanged a word, were summoned in largenumber. They had remarkable stories to tell about General Stone'sdisloyalty; about his holding secret correspondence with the enemy;about his permitting letters and packages to be taken across theline without examination; about his allowing rebels to go freelyback and forth; and finally about his passing within the rebellines to hold confidential interviews with the officers commandingthe force opposed to him. It is singular that men of the acutenessand high character of those composing the committee did not carefullysift the testimony and subject it to the test of a rigorous cross-examination. The stories told by many of these swift witnesseswere on the surface absurd, and should have been exposed. Publicityalone would have largely counteracted the evil effect of theirnarratives, but the examination was secret, and the witnessesevidently felt that the strongest bias against General Stone wasthe proper turn to give their testimony. The atmosphere was, asit often is in such cases, unfavorable to the suspected man; andhis reputation was mercilessly assailed where he could not reply, and was not even allowed to hear. When officers of the highergrades, who came near to General Stone, who shared his confidenceand assisted in his councils, were examined, the weight of thetestimony was markedly different. General F. W. Lander regardedGeneral Stone as "a very efficient, orderly, and excellent officer. "Colonel Isaac J. Wistar, who succeeded Colonel Baker in the commandof the California regiment, gave the highest testimony to GeneralStone's loyalty, and to the "full confidence" reposed in him bymen of every rank in the brigade with which he was serving. ColonelCharles Devens who, with his regiment, the Fifteenth MassachusettsInfantry, had borne an honorable part on the bloody field, testifiedthat he and the officers of the Fifteenth "had confidence in GeneralStone. " Colonel James H. Van Allen, commanding a regiment ofcavalry in General Stone's division, gave the most cordial testimonyof his loyalty and high character. 

After the larger part of the evidence adverse to General Stone hadbeen heard, he received an intimation through General McClellanthat it might be well for him to appear again before the Committeeon the Conduct of the War. He obtained leave of absence from hiscommand, repaired to Washington, and presented himself before thecommittee on the 31st of January, twenty-six days after his firsttestimony had been given. For some reason which the committee didnot deem it necessary to explain, General Stone was not furnishedwith the names of the witnesses who had testified against him inthe dark; their testimony was not submitted to him; it was not evenread in his hearing. He was simply informed by the chairman--Senator Wade of Ohio--that "in the course of our investigationsthere has come out in evidence matters which may be said to impeachyou. I do not know that I can enumerate all the points, but Ithink I can. In the first place is your conduct in the Ball's-Bluff affair--your ordering your forces over without sufficientmeans of transportation, and in that way endangering your army, incase of a check, by not being able to re-enforce them. . . . Anotherpoint is that the evidence tends to show that you have had unduecommunication with the enemy by letters that have passed back andforth, by intercourse with officers from the other side, and bypermitting packages to go over unexamined, to known Secessionists. . . . The next and only other point that now occurs to me is thatyou have suffered the enemy to erect formidable fortifications orbatteries on the opposite side of the river, within the reach ofyour guns, and which you could easily have prevented. " GeneralStone's answer was as lucid, frank, and full as could be made tocharges of so sweeping a character. His explanations were unreserved, and his justification apparently complete and unanswerable againstevery form of accusation which the chairman submitted. To thecharge of disloyalty General Stone replied with much feeling, "Thatis one humiliation I had hoped I should never be subjected to. Ithought there was one calumny that could not be brought againstme. Any other calumny I should expect after what I have received, but that one I should have supposed that you personally, Mr. Chairman, would have rejected at once. _You_ remember last springwhen the Government had so few friends here, when the enemy hadthis city I might almost say in his power, I raised all the volunteertroops that were here during the seven dark days. I disciplinedand posted those troops. I commanded them, and they were the firstto invade the soil of Virginia, and I led them. " Mr. Wade hereinterrupted, and said, "I was no so unjust as not to mention thatcircumstance to the committee. " General Stone resumed, "I couldhave surrendered Washington. And now I will swear that thisgovernment has not a more faithful soldier, of poor capacity itmay be, but not a more faithful soldier from the day I was calledinto service to this minute. "

 GENERAL CHARLES P. STONE ARRESTED. 

Subsequent developments proved that three days before this secondexamination General McClellan had in his possession an order fromEdwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, directing him "to relieveGeneral Stone from his command of a division in the Army of thePotomac, and that he be placed in arrest and kept in close custodyuntil further orders. " It is evident therefore that so far as theWar Department was involved, the case had been prejudged, or judgedat least without giving the accused man an opportunity to be heardin his own defense. It is difficult to understand why his testimonydid not have the effect to recall or suspend the order of arrest, but despite the candor and evident honesty of his explanations, the blow fell upon him. Early on Saturday the eighth day of FebruaryGeneral McClellan directed the provost marshal of the district, General Andrew Porter, "to arrest Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone at once, and to send him under close custody by first trainto Fort Lafayette, where he will be placed in charge of the commandingofficer, and have no communication with any one from the time ofhis arrest. " Brigadier-General Sykes, commanding the City Guard, executed the order, taking General Stone from his bed at midnightin the hotel where he was stopping, and making him a close prisoner. Shortly after daylight the following morning General Stone addresseda note to General Seth Williams, Adjutant-General on the staff ofGeneral McClellan, informing him of his arrest, and adding, "Conscious of having been at all times a faithful soldier of theUnited States, I must respectfully request that I may be furnishedat an early a moment as practicable with a copy of whatever chargesmay have been preferred against me, with the opportunity of promptlymeeting them. "

To this respectful communication no answer was made, and GeneralStone was hurried off to Fort Lafayette, under strict guard, withan order from General McClellan for his imprisonment. At the fortthe money which he had in his pockets was taken from him, and hewas placed in solitary confinement in a room ordinarily used forquarters of enlisted men. No letter was allowed to leave him orreach him without the most rigid inspection. Under this close_surveillance_, with an armed sentinel pacing before the door ofhis room, without opportunity for outdoor air or exercise, he waskept for forty-nine days. He applied at different times to themilitary authorities in Washington for a statement of the chargesagainst him, for a speedy trial, for access to the records of hisown office and his own headquarters, for a change of the place ofhis confinement. To none of these applications was answer of anykind returned. After he had been nearly two months in prison heasked that his wife might be allowed to visit him. She was in thedeepest anguish, and her society in his imprisonment could havesubjected the government to no danger, because she would have beenunder the same restraint and espionage as her husband. This naturaland reasonable request, made only after his confinement promisedto be indefinite, was peremptorily and curtly refused by the WarDepartment. 

On the fiftieth day the place of his imprisonment was changed fromFort Lafayette to Fort Hamilton near by, and the opportunity foropen-air exercise within the fort was accorded him, though alwaysunder the eye of a sentinel. Here he renewed his request for thecharges against him, without eliciting answer. He applied to theofficer in command of the fort to learn of what possible crime hewas accused, and the officer replied that he knew nothing of it;he was absolutely ignorant of any ground for General Stone'simprisonment. After striving for more than sixty days to ascertainthe nature of his offense, and secure an opportunity to vindicatehimself, the prisoner adopted another course. He applied forsuspension of arrest with liberty to join the army just settingforth under General McClellan for the Peninsular campaign. Noreply was made to his request. A few weeks later, when the Unionforces under General Banks were defeated in the valley of theShenandoah, he again asked the privilege of active duty, and againwas treated with contemptuous silence. On the 4th of July hetelegraphed directly to President Lincoln, recalling the honorableservice in which he had been engaged just one year before. Remindingthe President of the pressing need which the country then had "ofthe services of every willing soldier, " he begged to be sent tothe field. With manly dignity he declared, "I am utterly unconsciousof any act, word, or design which should make me less eligible toan honorable place among the soldiers of the Republic than uponany day of my past life. "

 GENERAL STONE'S CASE IN CONGRESS. 

Meanwhile the subject had forced itself upon the attention ofCongress. On the 24th of March, Senators Latham and McDougall ofCalifornia, the first a supporter of Breckinridge in 1860, theother a supporter of Douglas, with Aaron A. Sargent, representativefrom the same State and a most radical Republican, united in anenergetic memorial to Secretary Stanton, on behalf of General Stoneas a citizen of California. They stated that "the long arrest ofGeneral Stone without military trial or inquiry has led to complaintsfrom many quarters. . . . Having known General Stone for years, and never having had cause to doubt his loyalty, we feel it ourduty to inquire of the government through you for some explanationof a proceeding which seems to us extraordinary. " To this memorialno reply was made, and after waiting nearly three weeks Mr. McDougallintroduced in the Senate a very searching resolution of inquiry, requesting the Secretary of War to state upon whose authority thearrest was made, and upon whose complaint; why General Stone hadbeen denied his rights under the articles of war; why no chargesand specifications of his offense had been made; whether GeneralStone had not frequently asked to be informed of the charges againsthim; and finally upon what pretense he was still kept in prison. Mr. McDougall spoke in the Senate on the 15th of April in supportof his resolution, making some interesting personal statements. General Stone was arrested on the night of Saturday, the 8th ofFebruary. "On the Wednesday evening before that, " said Mr. McDougall, "I met General Stone, dressed as became a person of his rank, atthe house of the President, where no one went on that evening exceptby special invitation. He was there mingling with his friends, receiving as much attention and as much consideration from allabout him as any man there present. . . . Only two evenings afterthat, if I remember right, he was the guest under similar circumstancesof the senior general in command of our army [McClellan], and thereagain receiving the hospitalities of the men first in office andfirst in the consideration of the country. On, I think, the veryday of his arrest he was in the War Department, and was receivedby the head of that department as a man who had the entire confidenceof the government, and of himself as one of the government'srepresentatives. On that evening he was seized, taken from hishome and family at midnight, carried off to Fort Lafayette andimprisoned, as are men convicted and adjudged guilty of the highestoffense known to the law. . . . I undertake to say upon goodauthority that almost presently before his arrest he said to thepresent Secretary of War [Stanton], 'Sir, I hear complaints aboutmy conduct as an officer at Ball's Bluff. I wish you to inquireinto it and have the matter determined. ' He was assured that therewere no charges against him, and the secretary advised him insubstance in these words: 'There is no occasion for your inquiry;go back to your command. ' That was the day of the night on whichhe was arrested. " Mr. McDougall's statement, the accuracy of whichwas not challenged by any one, disclosed the fact that while GeneralStone was a guest at the White House and at the residence of GeneralMcClellan, the latter had in his possession the order for arrest, and had held it for several days. 

The resolution of Mr. McDougall was debated at some length in theSenate, Mr. Wade making a fiery speech in defense of the coursepursued by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and Mr. Browningof Illinois defending the President, upon whom there had been noimputation of any kind. Mr. Doolittle suggested that the resolutionbe referred to a committee. Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts submitteda substitute, simply requesting "the President of the United Statesto communicate to the Senate any information touching the arrestand imprisonment of General Stone, not deemed incompatible withthe public interest. " Mr. Sumner had "no opinion to express inthe case, for he knew nothing about it;" but "it seemed clear" tohim "that General Stone ought to be confronted with his accusersat an early day, unless there be some reason of an overbearingmilitary character which would render such a trial improper. " Mr. Sumner had "seen in various newspapers a most persistent attempt"to connect him "with the credit or discredit of the arrest. " Hedeclared that from the beginning he "had been an absolute strangerto it. " The arrest was made, he repeated, without his "suggestionor hint, direct or indirect. " He declared that he "was as freefrom all connection with it" as "the intimate friends and familyrelatives of the prisoner. " At the close of the debate Mr. McDougallaccepted Mr. Wilson's resolution as a substitute for his, and onthe 21st of April the latter was adopted by general consent. 

 SENATOR SUMNER AND GENERAL STONE. 

The unfounded assumption of Mr. Sumner's connection with the arrestsprang perhaps from some censorious remarks in the Senate made byhim in December touching General Stone's alleged course in sendingback fugitive slaves. Subsequent intelligence indicated that Mr. Sumner had been misinformed on this matter, and that the facts didnot inculpate General Stone. But instead of writing to Mr. Sumnerto correct the statements made in his speech, General Stone, mostunwisely and most reprehensibly, addressed to the senator on the23d of December an ill-tempered and abusive letter. Mr. HenryMelville Parker of Massachusetts investigated all the facts andincidents of the case, and came to the conclusion that Mr. Sumner, as an act of revenge for the insolent letter, had caused GeneralStone's arrest. But the facts do not warrant Mr. Parker's conclusion. Aside from Mr. Sumner's public denial on the floor of the Senate--which of itself closed the issue--he was never known to be guiltyof an act of revenge. That passion belongs to meaner natures. The dates, moreover, remove the imputation of Mr. Parker. GeneralStone's hasty and ill-considered letter was placed in Mr. Sumner'shands on Christmas Day, 1861. The arrest was made on the 8th ofFebruary, 1862--forty-six days later. The intervening circumstancesnowhere involve Mr. Sumner in the remotest degree. 

In answer to the call upon the President for information, Mr. Lincoln sent a message to the Senate on the 1st of May, saying, "General Stone was arrested and imprisoned under my general authority, and upon evidence which, whether he be guilty or innocent, required, as appears to me, such proceedings to be had against him for thepublic safety. " The President deemed it "incompatible with thepublic interest, and perhaps unjust to General Stone, to make amore particular statement of the evidence. " After saying thatGeneral Stone had not been tried because the officers to constitutea court-martial could not be withdrawn from duty without seriousinjury to the service, the President gave this public assurance:"He will be allowed a trial without unnecessary delay: the chargesand specifications will be furnished him in due season, and everyfacility for his defense will be afforded him by the War Department. "This message on its face bears evidence that it was prepared atthe War Department, and that Mr. Lincoln acted upon assurancesfurnished by Mr. Stanton. The arrest was made upon his "general"authority, and clearly not from any specific information he possessed. But the effect of the message was to preclude any further attemptat intervention by Congress. Indeed the assurance that GeneralStone should be tried "without unnecessary delay" was all thatcould be asked. But the promise made to the ear was broken to thehope, and General Stone was left to languish without a word ofintelligence as to his alleged offense, and without the slightestopportunity to meet the accusers who in the dark had convicted himwithout trial, subjected him to cruel punishment, and exposed himto the judgment of the world as a degraded criminal. 

Release from imprisonment came at last by the action of Congress, coercing the Executive Department to the trial or discharge ofGeneral Stone. In the Act of July 17, 1862, "defining the pay andemolument of certain officers, " a section was inserted declaringthat "whenever an officer shall be put under arrest, except atremote military posts, it shall be the duty of the officer by whoseorders he is arrested to see that a copy of the charges shall beserved upon him within eight days thereafter, and that he shall bebrought to trial within ten days thereafter unless the necessitiesof the service prevent such trial; and then he shall be brought totrial within thirty days after the expiration of said ten days, orthe arrest shall cease. " The Act reserved the right to try theofficer at any time within twelve months after his discharge fromarrest, and by a _proviso_ it was made to apply "to all personsnow under arrest and waiting trial. " The bill had been pendingseveral months, having been originally reported by Senator Wilsonbefore General Stone's arrest. 

The provision of the Act applicable to the case of General Stonewas only a full enforcement by law of the seventy-ninth article ofwar, which declared that "no officer or soldier who shall be putin arrest shall continued in confinement more than eight days, oruntil such time as a court-martial can be assembled. " It was adirect violation of the spirit of this article, and a cruel strainingof its letter, to consign General Stone to endless or indefiniteimprisonment. Any man of average intelligence in the law--andSecretary Stanton was eminent in his profession--would at once saythat the time beyond the eight days allowed for assembling a court-martial must be a reasonable period, and that an officer was entitledto prompt trial, or release from arrest. The law now passed wasimperative. Withing eight days the arrested officer must be notifiedof the charges against him, within ten days he must be tried, and"if the necessities of the service prevent a trial" within thirtydays after the ten, the officer is entitled to an absolute discharge. General Stone's case fell within the justice and the mercy of thelaw. The eight days within which he should be notified of thecharges against him had been long passed; the ten days had certainlyexpired; but by the construction of the War Department the victimwas still in the power that wronged him for thirty days more. Fromthe 17th of July, thirty days were slowly told off until the 16thof August was at last reached, and General Stone was once more afree man. He had been one hundred and eighty-nine days in prison, and was at last discharged by the limitation of the statute withouta word of exculpation or explanation. The routine order simplyrecited that "the necessities of the service not permitting thetrial, within the time required by law, of Brigadier-General CharlesP. Stone, now confined in Fort Lafayette, the Secretary of Wardirects that he be released from arrest. "

 GENERAL STONE FINALLY RELEASED. 

The order simply turned him adrift. He was a Colonel in the RegularArmy and a Brigadier-General in the volunteer service; and theSecretary, according to the rule of the War Department, should havegiven him some instruction, --either assigning him to duty ordirecting him to report at some place and await orders. Thinkingit might be an omission, General Stone telegraphed the War Departmentthat he had the honor "to report for duty. " He waited five daysin New York for an answer, and receiving none repaired to Washington. Reporting promptly at the office of the Adjutant-General, he wastold they had no orders for him, and knew nothing about his arrest. He then applied to General McClellan, on the eve of the Antietamcampaign, for permission to serve with the army. General McClellanon the 7th of September wrote to Secretary Stanton that he wouldbe glad to avail himself of General Stone's services and that hehad "no doubt as to his loyalty and devotion. " No answer wasreturned by the War Department. On the 25th of September GeneralStone, still eager to confront his accusers, applied to General-in-Chief Halleck for a copy of any charges or allegations against him, and the opportunity of promptly meeting them. He reminded thegeneral that two hundred and twenty-eight days had elapsed sincehis arrest, and that if he were to be tried for any offense thosewho had served under him must be the witnesses of his conduct, andthat from battle and disease these witnesses were falling by hundredsand thousands; the casualties were so great indeed that his commandwas already reduced one-half. General Halleck replied that he hadno official information of the cause of General Stone's arrest, and that so far as he could ascertain no charges or specificationswere on file against him. 

Several weeks later, on the 1st of December, 1862, General Stoneapplied to General McClellan, calling his attention to the Act ofJuly 17, under which any officer arrested had the right to "a copyof the charges against him within eight days. " He thereforerespectfully requested General McClellan, as the officer who orderedthe arrest, to furnish him a copy of the charges. General McClellanreplied on the 5th of December that the order for arrest had beengiven him by the Secretary of War, who told him it was at thesolicitation of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and basedon testimony taken by them. He further informed General Stone thathe had the order, in the handwriting of Secretary Stanton, severaldays before it was carried into effect, and added the followingsomewhat remarkable statement: "On the evening when you werearrested I submitted to the Secretary of War the written result ofthe examination of a refugee from Leesburg. This information toa certain extent agreed with the evidence stated to have been takenby the Committee, and upon its being imparted to the Secretary heagain instructed me to cause you to be arrested, which I at oncedid. " This discloses the fact that General McClellan was cognizantof the character of the testimony submitted against General Stone, and so rigidly withheld from the knowledge of the person mostinterested. On receipt of General McClellan's note, General Stoneimmediately asked him for the name of the Leesburg refugee and fora copy of his statement. A member of General McClellan's staffanswered the inquiry, stating that the general "does not recollectthe name of the refugee, and the last time he recollects seeingthat statement was at the War Department immediately previous toyour arrest. " General Stone, victim of the perversity which haduniformly attended the case, was again baffled. He was never ableto see the statement of the "refugee" or even to get his name, though, according to General McClellan, the testimony of therefugee was the proximate and apparently decisive cause of GeneralStone's arrest. 

General Stone applied directly to the President, asking "if hecould inform me why I was sent to Fort Lafayette. " The Presidentreplied that "if he told me all he knew about it he should not tellme much. " He stated that while it was done under his generalauthority, he did not do it. The President referred General Stoneto General Halleck who stated that the arrest was made on therecommendation of General McClellan. This was a surprise to GeneralStone, for General McClellan had but recently written him that hehad full confidence in his devotion and loyalty. General Halleckreplied that he knew of that letter, and that "the Secretary ofWar had expressed great surprise at it because he said that GeneralMcClellan himself had recommended the arrest, and now seemed to bepushing the whole thing on his [the secretary's] shoulders. " Thesearch for the agency that would frankly admit responsibility wasrendered still more difficult by the denial of the Committee onthe Conduct of the War that the arrest had ever been recommendedby them, either collectively or individually. They had simplyforwarded to the Secretary of War such evidence as was submittedto them. 

 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ARREST. 

General Stone appeared before the Committee on the Conduct of theWar on the 27th of February, 1863--nearly five months after hisrelease from imprisonment. He was allowed to see the testimonywhich had hitherto been withheld from him, and answered all theaccusations in detail with convincing candor and clearness. As heproceeded in his triumphant response to all the accusations againsthim, the committee said "Why did you not give us these explanationswhen you were here before?"--"Because, " replied General Stone, "ifthe chairman will remember, the committee did not state to me theparticular cases. . . . I gave general answers to general allegations. "General Stone stated further to the committee that he ought himselfto have asked for a Court of Inquiry after the reverse at Ball'sBluff. "The reason why I did not, " he continued, "was this: WhileGeneral McClellan was at Edward's Ferry, he showed me a telegramwhich he had written to the President to the effect that he hadexamined into the affair at Ball's Bluff and that General Stonewas entirely without blame. " "After the expression of that opinion, "said General Stone, "it would not have been respectful to ask fora Court of Inquiry. It was given by the highest authority and sentto the highest authority, and as a soldier I had no right to askfor justification except of my superiors. " Subsequently, on theoccasion of Mr. Conkling's speech "severely criticising" GeneralStone's conduct in connection with the affair at Ball's Bluff, theGeneral applied to the aide-de-camp of General McClellan, as likelyto be informed of the Commander's wishes, to know if he "shouldask for a Court of Inquiry, " and the reply was "No. " He then askedif he should make a statement correcting the mistakes in Mr. Conkling's speech. The reply was "Write nothing; say nothing; keepquiet. " The committee asked General Stone, as a military man, "Whohad the power to bring you to trial?" He answered "When I wasarrested, the General-in-Chief, General McClellan, had that power. I know I should claim that power if any man under my command werearrested. "

 GENERAL STONE'S RESIGNATION. 

The responsibility for the arrest and imprisonment of General Stonemust, according to the official record of the case, rest on SecretaryStanton, Major-General McClellan, and the Committee on the Conductof the War. It is very clear that Mr. Lincoln, pressed by a thousandcalls and placing implicit confidence in these three agencies, tookit for granted that ample proof existed to justify the extraordinarytreatment to which General Stone was subjected. General Stone isnot to be classed in that long list of private citizens temporarilyconfined without the benefit of _habeas corpus_, on the charge ofsympathizing with the Rebellion. The situation of those personsmore nearly assimilates with that of prisoners of war. It differstotally from the arrest of General Stone in that the cause ofdetention was well known and very often proudly avowed by the persondetained. The key of their prison was generally in the hands ofthose who were thus confined, --an honest avowal of loyalty and anoath of allegiance to the National Government securing their release. If they could not take the oath they were justifiably held, andwere no more injured in reputation than the millions with whosedaring rebellion they sympathized. But to General Stone thegovernment permitted the gravest crime to be imputed. A soldierwho will betray his command belongs by the code of all nations tothe most infamous class--his death but feebly atoning for the injuryhe has inflicted upon his country. It was under the impliedaccusation of this great guilt that General Stone was left in duressfor more than six weary months, deprived of all power of self-defense, denied the inherited rights of the humblest citizen ofthe Republic. In the end, not gracefully but tardily, and as itseemed grudgingly, the government was compelled to confess its ownwrong and to do partial justice to the injured man by restoringhim to honorable service under the flag of the Nation. No reparationwas made to him for the protracted defamation of his character, noorder was published acknowledging that he was found guiltless, nocommunication was ever made to him by National authority givingeven a hint of the grounds on which for half a year he was pilloriedbefore the nation as a malefactor. The wound which General Stonereceived was deep. From some motive, the source of which willprobably remain a mystery, his persecution continued in many pettyand offensive ways, until he was finally driven, towards the closeof the war, when he saw that he could be no longer useful to hiscountry, to tender his resignation. It was promptly accepted. Hefound abroad the respect and consideration which had been deniedhim at home, and for many years he was Chief of the General Staffto the Khedive of Egypt. 

It is not conceivable that the flagrant wrong suffered by GeneralStone was ever designed by any one of the eminent persons who sharethe responsibility for its infliction. They were influenced byand largely partook of the popular mania which demanded a victimto atone for a catastrophe. The instances in which this dispositionof the public mind works cruel injury are innumerable, and onlytime, and not always time, seems able to render justice. Too oftenthe object of popular vengeance is hurried to his fate, and placedbeyond the pale of that reparation which returning reason is eagerto extend. Fortunately the chief penalty of General Stone was theanguish of mind, the wounding of a proud spirit. His case willstand as a warning against future violations of the liberty whichis the birthright of every American, and against the danger ofappeasing popular clamor by the sacrifice of an innocent man. Throughout the ordeal, General Stone's bearing was soldierly. Hefaced accusation with equanimity and endured suffering with fortitude. He felt confident of ultimate justice, for he knew that it is notthe manner of his countrymen "to deliver any man to die before thathe which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licenseto answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him. "

CHAPTER XVIII. 

The National Finances. --Debt when the Civil War began. --Deadly Blowto Public Credit. --Treasury Notes due in 1861. --$10, 000, 000 required. --An Empty Treasury. --Recommendation by Secretary Dix. --SecretaryThomas recommends a Pledge of the Public Lands. --Strange Suggestions. --Heavy Burdens upon the Treasury. --Embarrassment of Legislators. --First Receipts in the Treasury in 1861. --Chief Dependence hadalways been on Customs. --Morrill Tariff goes into Effect. --It meetsFinancial Exigencies. --Mr. Vallandigham puts our Revenue at$50, 000, 000, our Expenditures at $500, 000, 000. --Annual Deficiencyunder Mr. Buchanan. --Extra Session in July, 1861. --Secretary Chaserecommends $80, 000, 000 by Taxation, and $240, 000, 000 by Loans. --Loan Bill of July 17, 1861. --Its Provisions. --Demand Notes. --Seven-thirties. --Secretary Chase's Report, December, 1861. --SituationSerious. --Sales of Public Lands. --Suspension of Specie Payment. --The Loss of our Coin. --Its Steady Export to Europe. 

When the civil war began, the Government of the United States oweda less sum than it owed under the administration of Washingtonafter the funding of the debt of the Revolution. The populationin 1861 was nine times as large, the wealth thirty times as greatas in 1791. The burden therefore was absolutely inconsiderablewhen contrasted with our ability to pay. But there had been suchgross mismanagement of the Treasury, either from incompetency ordesign, under the administration of Howell Cobb, that the creditof the government was injured. There was embarrassment when thereshould have been security; there was scarcity when the most ordinaryprudence would have insured plenty. So much depended at that momenton the ability of the government to raise money by pledging itsfaith, that Mr. Cobb perhaps thought he was dealing the deadliestblow at the nation by depriving it of the good name it had so longheld in the money markets of the world. With unblemished creditat the opening of the war, the government could have used itsmilitary power with greater confidence, and consequently withgreater effectiveness. 

 THE NATIONAL CREDIT INJURED. 

At the beginning of the year 1861 it was necessary for the governmentto raise about $10, 000, 000 to meet Treasury notes outstanding andthe interest secured upon them. Congress had passed, on the 17thof December, 1860, a law authorizing the issue of new Treasurynotes for this amount, bearing interest at the rate of six percent. , and redeemable after one year; but the Secretary of theTreasury was authorized to issue them, upon public notice, at thebest rates of interest offered by responsible bidders. Before theclose of the month negotiations were completed, after unusualeffort, and it was found that the notes were issued at variousrates, only $70, 200 at six per cent. , $5, 000 at seven per cent. , $24, 500 at eight per cent. , $355, 000 at rates between eight percent. And below ten per cent. , $3, 283, 500 at ten per cent. Andfractions below eleven per cent. , $1, 432, 700 at eleven per cent. , and by far the larger share, $4, 840, 000 at twelve per cent. Theaverage for the whole negotiation made the rate of interest tenand five-eighths per cent. 

The Treasury was empty, for the nominal balance was only $2, 233, 220on the 1st of January. Obligations were accruing to such an extentthat General John A. Dix, as Secretary of the Treasury, informedthe Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, that the revenue exhibited, on the 1st of February, a deficit of$21, 677, 524. The committee estimated that the sum needed to carryon current operations was at least $5, 000, 000 in addition. A loanof $25, 000, 000 was proposed, to meet these demands. Secretary Dix, who felt the pulse of the financial centres, recommended in a letterto the Ways and Means Committee that the several States be askedto pledge the United-States "deposit funds" in their hands for thesecurity of the loan. His immediate predecessor, Philip F. Thomas, had, in his annual report in the preceding December, urged thatthe "public lands be unconditionally pledged for the ultimateredemption of all the Treasury notes which it may become necessaryto issue. "

Such suggestions seem strange to the ears of those who were afterwardsaccustomed to the unbounded credit of the Republic. But thesesecretaries were called to hear from capitalists the declarationthat the national debt had increased from $28, 460, 958 on the 1stof July, 1857, to $64, 640, 838 on the 1st of July, 1860, and thatthe figures were still mounting upward. In the mean time therevenues were falling off, the sales of public lands were checked, and the estimates of customs for the current year were practicallyoverthrown by the secession of the Southern States and the denialof the authority of the Union. 

The task of Congress might well strike some thoughtful legislatorsas that of making bricks without straw. As the Rebellion took formand organization, it became clear that the ability and willingnessof the people to raise large sums of money were vital factors inthe problem of the maintenance of the Union. It was well that noone knew just how great were the burdens which the loyal peoplemust bear. It is no disparagement to the leading statesmen of thatera, that they did not at first propose measures adequate to theemergency, because no standards existed by which the magnitude ofthat emergency could be estimated. If Congress had understood onthe 1st of July, 1861, that the ordinary expenditures of thegovernment would be, within the fiscal years 1863 and 1864, morethan the entire expenditures of the National Government from thefoundation of the nation to that day, paralysis would have fallenupon the courage of the bravest. If the necessity had been proclaimedof raising by loans before the 1st of July, 1865, two thousandmillions of dollars more than the National Treasury had ever receivedfrom loans and revenue combined, the audacity of the demand wouldhave forbidden serious consideration. If the Ways and MeansCommittee had been notified that before the end of 1865, the annualcharge for interest on the national debt, for which provision mustbe made, would reach $150, 977, 697, much more than twice the totalexpenditure of the preceding year, skill and energy would haveundergone the crucial test. But the surprise of legislators wouldhave been equally great if they could then have unrolled the futurerecords of the Treasury, and have seen that in the year in whichthe Rebellion would be suppressed, the receipts from customs wouldattain the vast sum of $179, 046, 651, while from internal revenue, a source not yet drawn upon, the enormous aggregate of $309, 226, 813would be contributed to maintain the public credit. 

We are so familiar with the vast sums which the war against theRebellion caused the National Government to disburse, that it isdifficult to appreciate the spirit with which the legislators of1861 approached the impending burdens. They knew that their taskwas great. They were in imminent peril, not only from open hostility, but from doubt and fear. The resources of the Republic had notbeen measured, the uprising of popular patriotism had not yetastonished foreign foes and even the most sanguine of domesticparticipants. With the information which was then before the world, it may be questioned whether a complete scheme for providing themoney necessary for the struggle could have been passed throughCongress, or rendered effective with capitalists. The needs ofeach crisis were supplied as each arose. Congress did not try tolook far into the future. It exerted itself to give daily breadto the armies of the Union, to provide munitions of war, to buildand equip the navy. 

 NATIONAL FINANCES IN 1861. 

The first receipts into the Treasury in 1861, other than from theordinary revenues under preceding statutes, came from the loan ofFebruary 5, which authorized the issue of bonds bearing six percent. Interest, payable within not less than ten, or more thantwenty years. The amount authorized was $25, 000, 000, and thesecretary was able to negotiate $18, 415, 000 at the average rate ofeighty-nine and three one-hundredths (89. 03) per cent. 

The Congress which closed its session of the 4th of March, 1861, among its final acts provided for a loan of $10, 000, 000 in bonds, or the issue of a like sum in Treasury notes; and the Presidentwas also empowered to issue Treasury notes for any part of loanspreviously authorized. Under this statute, notes were issued tothe amount of $12, 896, 350, payable sixty days after date, and$22, 468, 100 payable in two years. This measure indicated thedisposition to provide for pressing exigencies by devices whichcovered only the present hour, and left heavier responsibilitiesto the future. An incident of this period was the settlement ofthe debt incurred in the war in Oregon against the Indians, bygiving to the claimants or their representatives six per cent. Bonds redeemable in twenty years. The bonds were taken to theamount of $1, 090, 850, showing that such securities were welcome toclaimants even at par. 

The chief dependence of the United States for revenue had alwaysbeen upon customs. But no real test had ever been made of the sumthat might be collected from this source. The aim had been to seewith how small an amount the National Government could be supported, not how large an amount might be collected. The time was now uponus when this critical experiment was to be tried, and the initialstep in that direction was the Morrill Tariff which went into effecton the first day of April. It radically changed the policy of ourcustoms duties from the legislation of 1846 and 1857, and put thenation in the attitude of self-support in manufactures. Althoughintroduced before secession attained its threatening proportions, it was well adapted to the condition in which the country was placedat the time of its enactment. It was a measure carefully elaborated, and based upon principles which were applied with studious accuracyto all its parts. Under it the imposts which had averaged aboutnineteen per cent. On dutiable articles, and fifteen per cent. Onthe total importations, mounted to thirty-six per cent. On dutiablearticles, and to twenty-eight per cent. On the total importations. Thus, although the goods brought into the country fell off unavoidablyby reason of the war, and especially of the difficulties encounteredby our vessels from the rebel privateers, the customs duties ratherincreased than diminished, and something was thus secured in theway of a basis of credit for the immense loans which became necessary. The measure, Mr. Sherman of Ohio stated, would in ordinary timesproduce an income of $65, 000, 000 a year to the Treasury. 

The Morrill Tariff was found to meet the exigencies of the situationto such a degree that when Congress came together in response tothe call of President Lincoln, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, as head ofthe committee charged with the subject, informed the House that ithad been determined not to enter upon a general revision. Hereported a measure to extend the schedule of dutiable articles withthe view of adding immediately to the revenue about $22, 250, 000annually. After disagreement with the Senate his bill with slightalteration was enacted and became the tariff on Aug. 5, 1861. InDec. 24, 1861, the duties on tea, coffee, and sugar were increaseddirectly as a war measure. During the consideration of this bill, Mr. Morrill presented estimates showing that the revenue would beincreased by about $7, 000, 000, and Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio tookoccasion to dwell on the falling off of importations, asking, "Howare you to have revenue from imports when nothing is imported?Your expenditures are $500, 000, 000, your income but $50, 000, 000. "He was much nearer the actual figures than political rhetoric isapt to be. Mr. Morrill's response was only to hope that thegentleman from Ohio had some proposition to offer more acceptablethan the pending bill. That bill was indeed a reasonable, and, sofar as it went, an effective measure, and Mr. Vallandigham had nosubstitute to offer. 

 NATIONAL FINANCES IN 1861. 

In his annual report as Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb had, on the 4th of December, 1860, estimated that the receipts of theTreasury for the fiscal year ending with June, 1862, would amountto $64, 495, 891, while he reckoned that the expenditures would be$68, 363, 726. With the prospect of peace and national unity hepredicted a deficiency of $3, 867, 834 for that year. His figureswere so preposterously incorrect as to justify the suspicion ofintentional misstatement. The deficiency for the four years ofMr. Buchanan's administration had been, according to a statementby Mr. Sherman of Ohio in the House of Representatives, almostexactly $20, 000, 000 a year. This deficiency had been met bycontinual borrowing. On the 11th of February Secretary Dix reportedto the Committee of Ways and Means that provision must be madebefore the 4th of March for a final deficiency of $9, 901, 118. Thisnecessity was provided for by a clause in the Morrill Tariff Act;and the authority to issue Treasury notes to the full amount ofloans previously permitted, gave to the administration of PresidentLincoln the means to start upon its difficult career. 

With a revenue which no one estimated beyond $5, 000, 000 a month, with a credit at the low ebb which the sales of its bonds hadalready exhibited, the nation was to prepare for a war of untoldmagnitude. Mr. Chase, as Secretary of the Treasury, began to trythe fruitfulness of the loan laws under which he must proceed. April 2, 1861, he offered $8, 000, 000, but the prices were notsatisfactory to him, and he sold only $3, 099, 000 at the rate of94. 01. Nine days later he received bids for $1, 000, 000 of Treasurynotes bearing six per cent. Interest, and with considerable exertionhe secured the increase of this sum to $5, 000, 000 at par. Acommittee of the New-York Chamber of Commerce led in a movement, representing the banks of some of the chief cities, to assist theTreasury in borrowing the means required for its pressing exigencies. By this co-operation Mr. Chase raised in May $7, 310, 000 on bondsat rates from eighty-five to ninety-three per cent. And $1, 684, 000by Treasury notes at par. 

When Congress met in special session under the call of Mr. LincolnJuly 4, Secretary Chase found it necessary to declare that whilethe laws still permitted loans amounting to $21, 393, 450, theauthority was unavailable because of the limitation that thesecurities, whether bonds or Treasury notes, should be issued onlyat par, on the basis of six per cent. Interest. Practicallytherefore no power existed to borrow money. While, on the firstof the month then current, there was a nominal balance in theTreasury of $2, 355, 635, charges by reason of appropriations forthe account of the preceding fiscal year were outstanding to theextent of $20, 121, 880. The short loans already made, constitutedalso an immediate claim, and these amounted to $12, 639, 861. Allthese burdens were to be borne in addition to the demands of theyear, which, as already demonstrated, would be one of extendedmilitary operations and of costly preparations and movements atsea. The total for which the secretary asked that Congress mightprovide resources, reached according to his estimates the sum of$318, 519, 581 for the fiscal year. Far-seeing men believed thateven this enormous aggregate would fall short of the actual demand. 

Mr. Chase proposed that $80, 000, 000 be raised by taxation, and$240, 000, 000 by loans. The suggestion was already urged that evena larger proportion of the money needed, should be raised bytaxation. But unwillingness to create friction and oppositiondoubtless entered into the considerations which determined therecommendations of the secretary. He proposed to rely upon thetariff for a large share of the basis of credit, and, while addingto its provisions, to impose a direct tax, and to levy duties uponstills and distilled liquors, on ale and beer, on tobacco, spring-carriages, bank-notes, silver ware, jewellery, and legacies. 

Congress made haste to consider and substantially to carry out therecommendations of Secretary Chase. The legislators were notinclined to go farther than the head of the Treasury suggested. No practical proposition was made for a broader scheme of taxation. The tariff, as has been indicated, was enlarged. A bill was passed, levying a direct tax of $20, 000, 000, to be apportioned among allthe States, of which the sum of $12, 000, 000 was apportioned amongthe States which had not seceded from the Union. Instead of thescheme of internal taxes which Mr. Chase had proposed, an incometax was substituted, to be collected on the results of the yearending April 1, 1862, and assessed at three per cent. On all incomesin excess of $800; but before any collections were made under it, the broader internal-revenue system went into effect. Direct taxeshad been tried in 1800 and again in 1814, but the receipts hadalways been disappointing. The results under Secretary Chase'sproposition were altogether unsatisfactory; and on the 1st of July, 1862, an Act was passed limiting the tax to one levy previous toApril 1, 1865, when the law should have full force. The estimatesof collections were set at $12, 000, 000 annually, or very near thatsum. For four years, 1862-1865 inclusive, the receipts were only$4, 956, 657: in 1867 they became $4, 200, 233, and then dribbled away. 

 THE NATIONAL LOAN ACT OF JULY, 1861. 

Inadequate as is now seen to be the legislation of 1861 withreference to actual revenue, the receipts fell far below thecalculations of experts. For the fiscal year 1862 the customsamounted to only $49, 056, 397, and the direct tax to $1, 795, 331;and the total receipts, excluding loans, were only $51, 919, 261instead of $80, 000, 000, as expected under the estimates of theTreasury. The plea may perhaps be pressed in defense of Congress, that financial legislation, laggard as it was, ran before popularreadiness to raise money by taxes. There was a wide-spread oppositionamong the strongest advocates of the war, to all measures whichwould, at an early stage, render the contest pecuniarily oppressive, and hence make it unpopular. 

President Lincoln in his message at the opening of the specialsession had called upon Congress for $400, 000, 000 in money, and400, 000 men. Mr. Chase's figures were $320, 000, 000. He doubtlessdeemed it wise to ask for no more than Congress would promptlygrant. As the struggle proceeded, it was demonstrated that thosecalculated most justly who relied most completely on the popularpurpose to make every sacrifice to maintain the national integrity. This was however the period of depression after the first battleof Bull Run, of hesitation before casting every thing into thescale for patriotism. 

The eloquent fact about the Loan Bill is that Congress made hasteto enact it. It was introduced into the House of Representativeson the 9th of July. On the next day Mr. Stevens, chairman of theWays and Means Committee, called up the bill, and, upon going intocommittee of the whole, induced the House to limit general debateto one hour. In the committee the entire time was occupied by Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio, in criticism on the President's message andon the general questions involved in the prosecution of the war. Mr. Holman of Indiana addressed to the gentleman from Ohio twoinquiries bearing on the purpose of the latter to aid in maintainingthe Union. No response was made to the speech of Mr. Vallandigham. The committee rose, and the bill was passed by a vote of 105 to 5. In the Senate no discussion took place, certain amendments lookingto the perfection of the measure were adopted, and the bill waspassed without division. The House at once concurred in the Senateamendments, and the act was consummated by which the first of thegreat war loans was authorized. 

This Act became law on the 17th of July. Its provisions createda system by which the Secretary of the Treasury might offer bondsnot exceeding $250, 000, 000 in the aggregate at seven per cent. Interest, redeemable after twenty years; or he might issue Treasurynotes payable three years after date, and bearing seven and three-tenths per cent. Interest, --the notes not to be of less denominationthan fifty dollars. A separate section permitted the secretary tooffer not more than $100, 000, 000 abroad, payable in the UnitedStates or in Europe. The same Act authorized for a part of thesum not exceeding $50, 000, 000, the exchange for coin or the use inpayment of salaries or other dues, of notes of less denominationthan fifty dollars but not less than ten dollars, and bearinginterest at the rate of three and sixty-five one-hundredths percent. Payable in one year; or these might be payable on demand andwithout interest. This loan might therefore be in bonds for salein this country or in a different form for sale abroad; or, second, it might be in Treasury notes of not less than fifty dollars each, bearing seven and three-tenths per cent. Interest; or, third, apart of the loan not exceeding $50, 000, 000 might be in notes ofeven as low denomination as ten dollars at three and sixty-fiveone-hundredths per cent. ; and, finally, this latter part might bein notes without interest payable on demand. The bonds were torun at least twenty years; the seven-thirties three years; and thethree-sixty-fives were payable in one year, and exchangeable intoseven-thirties at the pleasure of the holder. A supplementary Actwas passed Aug. 5, 1861, which permitted the secretary to issuesix per cent. Bonds, payable at the pleasure of the United Statesafter twenty years, and the holders of seven-thirty notes wereallowed to exchange their notes for such bonds. The minimum ofthe denominations of Treasury notes was reduced to five dollars, and all the demand notes of less denomination then fifty dollarswere receivable for payment of public dues. By Act of Feb. 12, 1862, the limit of demand notes was raised to $60, 000, 000. In thismodified form the statute directed the movements of the Treasuryduring the autumn of the first year of the Rebellion. 

 SECRETARY CHASE'S REPORT, 1861. 

In his report, dated December 9, 1861, the Secretary of the Treasuryrelated the steps which he had taken to raise money under theselaws. Mr. Chase informed Congress that "his reflections led himto the conclusion that the safest, surest, and most beneficial planwould be to engage the banking institutions of the three chiefcommercial cities of the seaboard to advance the amounts neededfor disbursement in the form of loans for three years' seven-thirtybonds, to be reimbursed, as far as practicable, from the proceedsof similar bonds, subscribed for by the people through the agenciesof the national loan; using, meanwhile, himself, to a limitedextent, in aid of these advances, the power to issue notes ofsmaller denominations than fifty dollars, payable on demand. "Representatives of the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphiaunited to give moneyed support to the government. The secretaryopened books of subscription throughout the country. The bankssubscribed promptly for $50, 000, 000, paying $5, 000, 000 at once incoin, and agreeing the pay the balance, also in coin, as needed bythe government. For this loan the banks received seven-thirtynotes, and the proceeds of the popular loan were transferred tothem. The sales to the public amounted to little more than halfthat sum; but the banks, when called upon, made a second advanceof $50, 000, 000. By these and other agencies, Mr. Chase was ableto present an encouraging summary of the Treasury operations. 

He stated that "there were paid to creditors, or exchanged for coinat par, at different dates, in July and August, six per cent. Twoyears' notes, to the amount of $14, 019, 034. 66; there was borrowedat par. In the same months, upon sixty days' six per cent. Notes, the sum of $12, 877, 750; there were borrowed at par, on the 19th ofAugust, under three years' seven-thirty bonds, issued for the mostpart to subscribers to the national loan, $50, 000, 000; there wereborrowed at par for seven per cent. , on the 10th of November, upontwenty years' six per cent. Bonds, reduced to the equivalent ofsevens, including interest, $45, 795, 478. 48; there have been issued, and were in circulation and on deposit with the treasurer on the30th of November, of United-States notes payable on demand, $24, 550, 325, --making an aggregate realized from loans in variousforms of $197, 242, 588. 14. " The loan operations had therefore beenfairly successful, for they were still in progress; and PresidentLincoln was justified in stating in his message that "the expendituresmade necessary by the Rebellion are not beyond the resources ofthe loyal people, and the same patriotism which has thus farsustained the government will continue to sustain it, till peaceand union shall yet bless the land. "

But the shadows were growing thick, and the situation was veryserious. Mr. Chase was compelled to report that his estimates ofrevenue must be reduced below the figures which he gave in July by$25, 447, 334: at the same time the expenditures must be reckoned atan increase of $213, 904, 427. Predictions as to the speedy closeof the war had ceased. Provision must be made, not only for thedeficiencies presented, but for the ensuing year, during which thesecretary estimated that the expenditures would be $475, 331, 245. He proposed to amend the direct tax law, so as to collect under it$20, 000, 000; to establish a system of internal revenue as he hadsuggested in July, and to increase some of the customs duties. From these sources, united with the receipts from the public lands, the revenue would be $95, 800, 000. With this basis, reliance mustbe placed on loans for the enormous sum of $654, 980, 920, and underexisting laws he could borrow only $75, 449, 675. 

The sale of public lands had furnished some part of the resourcesof the nation from an early day. The annual product had not beenlarge as a rule. In 1834 and 1835 the sales had been abnormal, amounting in the latter year to $24, 877, 179, and only about$10, 000, 000 less in the preceding year. They were $11, 497, 049 in1855, but they had fallen until they were less than $2, 000, 000 in1859. It was natural to consider whether any help could be derivedfrom this quarter in the hour of national necessity. A forced saleof lands was impossible to any such extent as to affect the receiptsof the Treasury in the ratio of its demands. The pledge of thedomain as security for loans was suggested only to be rejected. As was natural, purchases of the public domain ceased almost entirelywhile the young men of the country were summoned to the nationaldefense, and the better strength went into the field of battle. From the public lands therefore the Treasury could hope for little, and very little was in fact received from them during the Rebellion. Secretary Chase had estimated in July that $3, 000, 000 might beannually derived from this source; but the receipts from the salesof lands never reached even $1, 000, 000 a year until two years afterthe Rebellion had been suppressed. Practically the public landspassed out of consideration as a source of revenue. Unfortunatelyalso the attempt to levy a direct tax was received by the peoplewith grave manifestations of disapproval. Its enforcement waslikely to prove mischievous. The close of the year 1861 wastherefore heavy with discouragement to the government. The militaryreverses at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff had outweighed in the popularmind the advantages we had gained elsewhere; the surrender ofSlidell and Mason, though on every consideration expedient, hadwounded the national pride; and now the report of the Secretary ofthe Treasury tended to damp the ardor of those who had with sanguinetemperament looked forward to an easy victory over the Rebellion. 

 SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENT. 

It was felt by all that the National credit, which had been partiallyrestored under Mr. Chase's administration of the Treasury, couldnot be maintained except from the pockets of the people, and thatevery man must expect to contribute of his substance to the supportof the government in the great task it had assumed. Happily allconsiderate and reflecting men saw that, desperate as the strugglemight be, it must be accepted with all its cost and all its woe. They could at least measure it and therefore could face it. Onthe side of defeat they could not look. That was a calamity sogreat as to be immeasurable, and it left to the loyal millions nochoice. If the struggle then in progress had been with a foreignpower, popular opinion would have overthrown any administrationthat would not at once make peace. But peace on the basis of adissevered Union, a disintegrated people, a dishonored nationality, could not be accepted and would not be endured. 

The discouragement in financial circles produced by the Treasuryreport of Mr. Chase, hastened if it did not cause the suspensionof specie payment by the banks of New-York City. Many countrybanks had ceased to pay specie some time before; indeed, many hadbeen only on a nominal basis of coin since the financial crisis of1857. So long however as the specie standard was upheld by theNew-York banks, the business of the country was securely maintainedon the basis of coin. It was therefore a matter of serious momentand still more serious portent that the financial pressure becameso strong in the last days of the year 1861 as to force the banksof the metropolis to confess that they could no longer maintain aspecie standard. It had been many years since the government hadpaid any thing but coin over its counters, but Treasury notes hadjust been issued payable on demand, and many millions were alreadyin circulation. They would now be presented for redemption, andif promptly met, the Treasury would be rapidly drained of itsspecie. There were twenty-five millions less of gold coin in thegovernment vaults than Secretary Chase had expected. This fact ofitself enforced a larger issue of demand notes than would otherwisehave been called for, and had thus doubly complicated the financialsituation. The Treasury had disbursed a large amount of demandnotes and received a smaller amount of gold coin than the wellconsidered estimates of the secretary had anticipated. 

The presumption was in favor of our being much stronger in cointhan we were found to be. The discovery of gold in California hadresulted in an enormous product, --surpassing any thing known inthe history of mining. But we had been encouraging the importationof goods from Europe which were confessedly somewhat cheaper thanour own fabrics, and in amount largely in excess of our export ofcotton and cereals. We were therefore constantly paying thedifference in coin. The political economists who had been incontrol of our finances insisted upon treating our gold as anordinary product, to be exported in the same manner that we exportedwheat and pork. The consequence was that during the decade precedingthe war our exports of specie and bullion exceeded our imports ofthe same by the enormous aggregate of four hundred and fifty millionsof dollars. For that whole period there had been a steady shipmentof our precious metals to Europe at a rate which averaged nearlyfour millions of dollars per month. 

Advocates of protection had found the drain of our specie theproximate cause of the financial panic of 1857. They now believedthat the same cause had produced a suspension of coin payment ata much earlier date than the war pressure alone would have broughtit about. They did not lose the opportunity of demonstrating thata system of protection which would have manufactured more andimported less, and which would thus have retained many millions ofour specie at home, would have enabled us to meet the trials ofthe war with greater strength and confidence. If the Morrill Tariffhad been enacted four years before, it would have been impossiblefor Secretary Cobb to stab the national credit. He would have beendealing constantly with a surplus instead of a deficit, and couldnot have put the nation to shame by forcing it to hawk its paperin the money markets at the usurious rate of one per cent. A month. One of the wisest financiers in the United States has expressedthe belief that two hundred millions of coin, which might easilyhave been saved to the country by a protective tariff between 1850and 1860, would have kept the National debt a thousand millionsbelow the point which it reached. Of all the arguments with whichprotectionists have arraigned free-traders, perhaps the mostdifficult to answer is that which holds them responsible for theweak financial condition of 1860-61 in that they had deliberatelydriven our specie from the country for the ten preceding years. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

The Legal-tender Bill. --National Finances at the Opening of theYear 1862. --A Threefold Contest. --The Country thrown upon its ownResources. --A Good Currency demanded. --Government takes Control ofthe Question. --Authorizes the Issue of $150, 000, 000 of Legal-tenderNotes. --Mr. Spaulding the Author of the Measure. --His Speech. --Opposed by Mr. Pendleton. --Position of Secretary Chase. --Urges theMeasure upon Congress. --Speeches by Thaddeus Stevens, Mr. Vallandigham, Mr. V. B. Horton, Mr. Lovejoy, Mr. Conkling, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Morrill, Mr. Bingham, Mr. Shellabarger, Mr. Pike and Others. --Spirited andAble Debate. --Bill passes the House. --Its Consideration by theSenate. --Speeches by Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Collamer and Others. --Bill passes the Senate. --ItsWeighty Provisions. --Secretary Chase on State Banks. --Policy ofthe Legal-tender Bill. --Its Effect upon the Business and Prosperityof the Country. --Internal Revenue Act. --Necessity of Large Sumsfrom Taxation. --Public Credit dependent on it. --ConstitutionalProvisions. --Financial Policy of Alexander Hamilton. --ExcisesUnpopular. --Whiskey Insurrection. --Resistance by Law. --SupremeCourt Decision. --Case of Hylton. --Provisions of New Act. --SearchingCharacter. --Great Revenue desired. --Credit due to Secretary Chase. 

At the opening of the year 1862, from causes narrated in thepreceding chapter, the government finances were in an embarrassedand critical situation. In Europe the general opinion--founded inmany influential quarters on the wish--was that the Union would bedissolved; that with the success of the South, there would be stillfurther division between the East and the West; and that the onlycompact power would be the Confederacy founded on slavery, withthe world's great staples as the basis of its wealth and its assureddevelopment. We had but recently and narrowly escaped war withEngland on account of the Trent affair, and in the crafty andadventurous Emperor of France we had a secret enemy who saw in ourdownfall the possible extension of his power and the strengtheningof his throne. Confederate bonds were more popular in England thatthe bonds of the United States. The world's treasures were closedagainst us. The bankers of Europe, with the Rothschilds in thelead, would not touch our securities. Their united clientageincluded the investors of Great Britain and the Continent, and apopular loan could not be effected without their aid and co-operation. We were engaged therefore in a threefold contest, --a military onewith the Confederacy, and diplomatic and moral one with thegovernments of England and France, a financial one with the moneypower of Europe. 

These causes threw us upon our own resources. The problem to besolved was the utilization of our wealth without the aid whichcomes from the power to borrow foreign money. Congress had obviouslyfailed at the extra session of July to use the taxing power to theextent which financial wisdom demanded, and though it was nowwilling to correct the error, there was not enough time to waitthe slow process of enactment, assessment, and collection. Ourneed was instant and pressing. The banks of the country, many ofthem in reckless, speculative hands, were freed by the suspensionof specie payment from their just responsibility, and might floodthe country with worthless paper which would entail great distressupon the people. The Treasury notes not being paid in coin ondemand, as promised on their face, became discredited to such adegree that the banks of the leading commercial cities would receivethem only as a special deposit, and not as money of account. Soentirely were these notes distrusted in the opening month of 1862that in more than one instance State banks exchanged their ownbills for them as an act of patriotism, in order that the bountydue to soldiers just recruited might be paid before they left theirState rendezvous to join the armies in the field. Troops alreadyin the service had seen more than one pay-day go by without sightof the paymaster, and tens of millions were overdue to them. Discontent in all the camps was the natural result. 

With no power to exchange our bonds for coin except at such ratesas would destroy national credit, with only a hundred millions ofcoin in all our banks when the war began, and a hundred and fiftymillions hoarded among the people, with the lavish products of ourmines transferred to Europe to pay for articles which it would havebeen wiser to manufacture at home, our situation was not merelyone of anxiety but of peril. Never in the history of nationalprogress through trials and crises, were wise statesmanship andfinancial sagacity more imperatively demanded. The Rebels mightfight without money, for they had no national credit to protect;but to the Union, bankruptcy meant final and hopeless ruin. 

 LEGAL-TENDER CURRENCY PROPOSED. 

The first thing to be secured was a currency. That was demandedto pay the debt of honor due to the soldiers; to remove stagnationin business; to put the people in heart and hope. It had beendemonstrated that Treasury notes, without punctual and regularredemption, would not circulate. When A paid them to B in satisfactionof a debt, B had no assurance that he might in turn cancel anobligation by paying them to C. It would perhaps occur to C, thatfor a lawful debt he had the right to demand gold or silver; forthe law told him in explicit terms that nothing else constituteda legal-tender. It was obviously impossible to conduct the businessof the country and to carry on the war, in coin payments, with thesmall amount of coin at command. Few would insist upon coin, butas the power to insist upon it was a legal right, it was a continuingmenace to the confidence of trade. 

In the opinion of the majority, the one imperative duty was thatthe government should take control of the currency, issue its ownpaper as a circulating medium, and make it equal and alike to all, by declaring it to be a legal-tender in the payment of debts. Itwas the most momentous financial step ever taken by Congress, --asit is the one concerning which the most pronounced and evenexasperating difference of opinion was manifested at the time, hassince continued, and will probably never entirely subside so longas the government keeps one legal-tender note in circulation. Itwas admitted to be a doubtful if not dangerous exercise of power;but the law of necessity overrides all other laws, and asserts itsright to govern. All doubts were decided in favor of the nation, in the belief that dangers which were remote and contingent couldbe more easily dealt with than those which were certain andimminent. 

Relief came promptly. On the 22d of January, 1862, Mr. E. G. Spaulding of New York reported the legal-tender bill to the House. It had been maturely considered by the Committee of Ways and Means, --a committee made up of very able men. Mr. Spaulding is entitledto rank as the author of the measure. It is difficult to assignabsolute originality in any case where so many minds are at workin the same field of investigation, and where, with an approximateidentity of date, there is a general similarity of conclusion. But the formal proposition and the public advocacy belong to Mr. Spaulding. He had been all his life engaged in financial affairs, was a banker of recognized ability in the city of Buffalo, andenjoyed a high reputation throughout the State of New York forintelligence and probity. He had not waited for advice or evenfor consultation, but on the thirtieth day of December, 1861, --theday on which the banks of New York suspended specie payment, --heintroduced the original legal-tender bill in the House ofRepresentatives. 

The first provision of the bill now reported, was for the issue of$150, 000, 000 of Treasury notes, differing from those previouslyauthorized by being declared a legal-tender for all obligations, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on thepublic debt. The notes were also to be exchangeable into six percent. Bonds, redeemable at the pleasure of the United States afterfive years. In reporting the bill, Mr. Spaulding called it "a warmeasure, a measure of necessity not of choice, to meet the mostpressing demands upon the Treasury, to sustain the army and navyuntil they can make a vigorous advance upon the traitors and crushout the Rebellion. " He argued, "These notes will find their wayinto all the channels of trade among the people; and as theyaccumulate in the hands of capitalists, they will exchange themfor the six per cent. Twenty years' bonds:" the notes will "beequally as good, and in many cases better, than the presentirredeemable circulation issued by the banks. " Mr. Spaulding arguedthat the Constitution justified such legislation in the emergency, and he declared that by this plan "the government will be able toget along with its immediate and pressing necessities without beingobliged to force its bonds on the market at ruinous rates ofdiscount: the people under heavy taxation will be shielded againsthigh rates of interest, and capitalists will be afforded faircompensation for the use of their money during the pending strugglefor national existence. "

Mr. Spaulding admitted that "a suspension of specie payment isgreatly to be deplored, " but he contended that "it is not a fatalstep in an exigency like the present. The British Government andthe Bank of England remained under suspension from 1797 to 1821-22, a period of twenty-five years. During this time Englandsuccessfully resisted the power of the Emperor Napoleon, andpreserved her own imperiled existence. As a measure of necessity, she made the Bank of England notes virtually a legal-tender bysuspending the specie restriction. Throughout this period thepeople of Great Britain advanced in wealth, population, andresources. " Mr. Spaulding maintained that "gold is not as valuableas the production of the farmer and the mechanic, for it is not asindispensable as are food and raiment. Our army and navy must havewhat is far more valuable to them than gold or silver. They musthave food, clothing, and the material of war. Treasury notes, issued by the government on the faith of the whole people, willpurchase these indispensable articles. "

 MR. CHASE FAVORS LEGAL-TENDER. 

When the bill was taken up for consideration on the 29th of January, the objections which had been raised in the public press were elaboratedin the Committee of the Whole. Mr. Pendleton of Ohio was the firstin opposition. In beginning a long argument, he insisted that "thefeature of this bill which first strikes every thinking man, evenin these days of novelties, is the proposition that these notesshall be made a legal-tender in discharge of all pecuniary obligations, as well those which have accrued in virtue of contracts alreadymade as those which are yet to accrue in pursuance of contractswhich shall hereafter be made. Do gentlemen appreciate the fullimport and meaning of that clause? Do they realize the full extentto which it will carry them? Every contract for the purchase ofmoney is in legal contemplation a contract for the payment of goldand silver coin. Every promissory note, every bill of exchange, every lease reserving rent, every loan of money reserving interest, every bond issued by this government, is a contract to which thefaith of the obligor is pledged, that the amount, whether rent, interest, or principal, shall be paid in the gold and silver coinof the country. " Mr. Pendleton deemed it a very serious matterthat "the provisions of this bill contemplate impairing the obligationof every contract of that kind, and disturbing the basis upon whichevery judgment and decree and verdict have been entered. " Heconcluded by referring to the depreciated paper of the FrenchRevolution, to the long suspension of specie currency in England, and the throes attending return to it in 1822. Quoting DanielWebster's words that "gold and silver currency is the law of theland at home, the law of the world abroad: there can, in the presentcondition of the world, be no other currency, " Mr. Pendleton madean earnest appeal to the House "to heed this lesson of wisdom. "

Repeated declarations were made during the debate that the Secretaryof the Treasury had not given his approval of the pending measure. This impression was seriously impeding the progress of the bill, and, if it had been confirmed, would probably have defeated it. A belief was prevalent that Mr. Chase would be glad to have theadvantage of the measure in the management of the Treasury withoutassuming the responsibility of its recommendation. But it was soonevident that he could not remain in a passive and receptive positionwithout defeating the bill. Its real opponents took advantage ofthe rumors; and its supporters, annoyed if not angered, by thesuggestion of hostility on the part of the Treasury, were determinedthat Secretary Chase should take open ground. The embarrassmentwas relieved by a letter from the Secretary to the Committee ofWays and Means, dated Jan. 29, and read in the House on the 4th ofFebruary by Mr. Spaulding. The letter had great influence onCongress. Without it, the measure would probably have beendefeated. 

Mr. Chase, assuming that "the provision making United-States notesa legal-tender has doubtless been well considered by the committee, "deemed it his duty to say that "in respect to the provision hisreflections had conducted him to the same conclusions the committeehad reached. " He did not wish to conceal that he felt "a greataversion to making any thing but coin a legal-tender in payment ofdebts. " He had been anxious "to avoid the necessity of suchlegislation. " He found it however "impossible, in consequence ofthe large expenditures entailed by the war and the suspension ofthe banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements. " Hedeclared therefore that it "had become indispensably necessary thatwe should resort to the issue of United-States notes. Making thema legal-tender might however still be avoided, if the willingnessmanifested by the people generally, by railroad companies, and bymany of the banking institutions, to receive and pay them as moneyin all transactions were absolutely or practically universal; butunfortunately there are some persons and some institutions thatrefuse to receive and pay them, and their action tends, not merelyto the unnecessary depreciation of the notes, but to establishdiscriminations in business against those, who, in this matter, give a cordial support to the government, and in favor of thosewho do not. Such discrimination should if possible be prevented;and the provision making the notes a legal-tender, in a greatmeasure at least, prevents it by putting all citizens in thisrespect on the same level, both of rights and duties. " In additionto this official communication, Mr. Spaulding felt justified inreading a personal note from Mr. Chase, in which he said that he"came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal-tender clauseis a necessity, " but that he "came to it decidedly and supportedit earnestly. "

 THADDEUS STEVENS IN THE DEBATE. 

Thaddeus Stevens threw the whole weight of his influence in favorof the measure. To alternative propositions which had been submitted, he made strenuous objection. Certain bankers of New York hadsuggested that the immediate wants of the government might besupplied by pledging seven and three-tenths per cent. Bonds witha liberal margin, payable in one year, to the banks, which wouldadvance a portion in gold and the rest in currency. Mr. Stevensargued that "the effect of this would be that the government wouldpay out to its creditors the depreciated notes of non-specie-payingbanks. And as there is no possibility that the pledges would beredeemed when due, they would be thrown into the market and soldfor whatever the banks might choose to pay for them. The folly ofthis scheme needs no illustration. " Another proposition, pressedvery earnestly, was to strike out the legal-tender clause, and makethe notes receivable for all taxes and public dues, but not to makeany provision for redeeming them in coin on demand. Mr. Stevensdid not "believe that such notes would circulate anywhere exceptat a ruinous discount. Notes not redeemable on demand, and notmade a legal-tender, have never been kept at par. " Even those whocould use them for taxes and duties would, in Mr. Stevens's opinion, "discredit them that they might get them low. " He was convincedthat "if soldiers, mechanics, contractors, and farmers were compelledto take them from the government, they must submit to a heavy shavebefore they could use them. The knowledge that they were providedfor by taxation, and would surely be paid twenty years hence, wouldnot sustain them. "

To two prominent amendments which had been submitted, Mr. Stevensmanifested earnest opposition. He said "the one moved by thegentleman from Ohio (Mr. Vallandigham) proposes the same issue ofnotes, but objects to legal-tender, and does not provide for theirredemption in coin. He fears our notes would depreciate. Let himwho is sharp enough, instruct the House how notes that every manmust take can be less valuable than the same notes that no man needtake and few would, since they are irredeemable on demand. " As tothe constitutionality of the bill, he thought that whoever "admitsour power to emit bills of credit, nowhere expressly authorized bythe Constitution, is an unreasonable doubter when he denies thepower to make them a legal-tender. " "The proposition of thegentleman from New York" (Mr. Roscoe Conkling), continued Mr. Stevens, "authorizes the issuing of seven per cent. Bonds, payablein thirty-one years, to be sold ($250, 000, 000 of it) or exchangedfor the currency of the banks of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. This suggestion seems to lack every element of wise legislation. Make a loan payable in irredeemable currency, and pay that in itsdepreciated condition to our contractors, soldiers, and creditorsgenerally! The banks would issue unlimited amounts of what wouldbecome trash, and buy good hard-money bonds of the nation. Wasthere ever such a temptation to swindle? The gentleman from NewYork further proposes to issue $200, 000, 000 United-States notes, redeemable in coin in one year. Does he not know that such notesmust be dishonored, and the plighted faith of the government bebroken? If we are to use suspended notes to pay our expenses, whynot use our own?"

The minority of the Ways and Means Committee, through Mr. V. B. Horton of Ohio, had submitted a plan, as Mr. Stevens characterizedit, "to issue United-States notes, not a legal-tender, bearing aninterest of three and sixty-five hundredths per cent. , and fundablein seven and three-tenths per cent. Bonds, not payable on demand, but at the pleasure of the United States. This gives one and three-tenths per cent. Higher interest than our loan, and, not beingredeemable on demand, would share the fate of all non specie-payingnotes not a legal-tender. " Mr. Stevens believed that the governmentwas reduced to a narrow choice. It must either throw bonds at sixor seven per cent. On the market within a few months in amountsufficient to raise at least $600, 000, 000 in money, --$557, 000, 000being already appropriated, --or it must issue United-States notes, not redeemable in coin, but fundable in specie-paying bonds attwenty years; such notes either to be made a legal-tender, or totake their chance of circulation by the voluntary act of the people. The sturdy chairman of Ways and Means maintained that "the highestrate at which we could sell our bonds would be seventy-five percent. , payable in currency, itself at a discount, entailing a losswhich no nation or individual doing a large business could standfor a single year. " He contended that "such issue, without beingmade legal-tender, must immediately depreciate, and would go onfrom bad to worse. If made a legal-tender, and not issued in excessof the legitimate demand, the notes will remain at par, and passin all transactions, great and small, at the full value of theirface; we shall have one currency for all sections of the country, and for every class of people, the poor as well as the rich. "

 MR. LOVEJOY AND MR. CONKLING. 

Mr. Owen Lovejoy of Illinois on the other hand marked out a verydifferent plan. He advocated as the first step, "adequate taxation, if need be to the extent of $200, 000, 000. " In the next place, hewould so legislate as to "compel all banking institutions to dobusiness on a specie basis. Every piece of paper that claimed tobe money but was not, he would chase back to the man or corporationthat forged it, and visit upon the criminal the penalties of thelaw. He would not allow a bank note to circulate that was notconstantly, conveniently, and certainly convertible into specie. "In the third place, he would issue interest-paying bonds of theUnited States, and "go into the market and borrow money and paythe obligations of the government. This would be honest, business-like, and in the end economical. This could be done. Other channelsof investment are blocked up, and capital would seek the bonds asan investment. " As contrasted with the measure proposed by theWays and Means Committee, Mr. Lovejoy intimated that his represented"the health and vigor of the athlete;" the other, "the bloatedflesh of the beer-guzzler. "

Mr. Roscoe Conkling of New York expressed hearty agreement withMr. Lovejoy. He agreed "with some other gentleman who said thathis bill was a legislative declaration of national bankruptcy. "He agreed "with still another gentleman who said that we werefollowing at an humble and disgraceful distance the ConfederateGovernment, as it is called, which has set up the example of makingpaper a legal-tender, and punishing with death those who deny thepropriety of the proposition. " Mr. Conkling declared that "insolvencyis ruin and dissolution;" and he believed that "in passing thisbill, as was said by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Thomas], we are to realize the French proposition about virtue, --that it isthe first step that costs. Another and another and another$100, 000, 000 of this issue will follow. We are plunging into anabyss from which there are to be no resuscitation and no resurrection. "Mr. Conkling thought "it right to learn of an enemy, " and already"the _London Times_ hails this $150, 000, 000 legal-tender bill asthe dawn of American bankruptcy, the downfall of American credit. "The public debt by the first of the ensuing July, within less thana year from the first battle of the war, was already estimated at$806, 000, 000. "Who can credit these figures, " said Mr. Conkling, "when he remembers that the world's greatest tragedian closed hisbloody drama at St. Helena leaving the public debt of France lessthan seventy million of pounds?" He believed that "all the moneyneeded can be provided by means of unquestionable legality andsafety. " He believed the substitute he had offered would effectthat result. 

Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts, a man of large experience in financialand commercial affairs, spoke ably in support of the legal-tenderclause. "No one, " said he, "supposes for one moment that governmentnotes will be sold for coined money, or that coined money will beborrowed on them. It is fair to suppose that the opponents of theadministration well understand that this would be the effect ofaccepting the amendment to strike out the legal-tender clause fromthe bill; and that their object, while they talk about coined moneyto deceive some of our friends, is to oblige the government to giveup the sub-treasury, and to use for its payment the depreciatedbills of the suspended banks; thereby flooding the whole countrywith these irredeemable notes, and producing, in time, a state offinancial confusion and distress that would ruin any administration. The proposed issue of government notes guards against this effectof inflating the currency by the provision to convert them intogovernment bonds, the principal and interest of which, as beforestated, are payable in specie. "

Mr. Morrill of Vermont supported the bill proposed by the minorityof the Ways and Means Committee. He described the legal-tenderfeatures as "not blessed by one sound precedent, but damned byall. " As a war measure he thought "it was not waged against theenemy, but might well make him grin with delight. " He would assoon provide "Chinese wooden guns for the army as paper money alonefor the Treasury. " Mr. Morrill declared that there never was agreater fallacy than to pretend that as "the whole United Statesare holden for the redemption of these notes, they will, if madea legal-tender, pass at par. " He contended that, as currency, "nomore of them can be used than enough to fill the demands of commerce. "He directed attention to the fact that of the Treasury notes alreadyissued, payable in specie on demand, "the government succeeded incirculating but $27, 000, 000 of the $50, 000, 000 authorized, and ofthese the banks had held $7, 000, 000. " The sanguine feeling inregard to the length of the war was disclosed by Mr. Morrill. Speaking on the 4th of February, 1862, he ridiculed the suggestionthat "the war would be prolonged until July 1, 1863. " He declaredthat "we could close the war by the thirtieth day of July next, aswell as in thirty years. ' This opinion was the one commonly acceptedat the time in Congressional circles, though discountenanced bythe wisest among those holding important commands in the army. 

Mr. Bingham of Ohio spoke earnestly in favor of the bill. He couldnot "keep silent" when he saw "efforts made to lay the power ofthe American people to control their currency, a power essentialto their interest, at the feet of brokers and of city bankers whohave not a tittle of authority save by the assent of forbearanceof the people to deal in their paper issues as money. " Mr. Binghamargued that as there "is not a line or word or syllable in theConstitution which makes any thing a legal-tender, --gold or silveror any thing else, --it follows that Congress, having 'the power toregulate commerce, ' may determine what shall be a lawful tender inthe discharge of obligations payable in money only. " The "limitationof the power to impair the obligation of contracts, " as Mr. Binghampointed out, was "a limitation upon the States only, and did notrestrain the action of Congress. "

Mr. Sheffield of Rhode Island argued earnestly against the bill, and predicted the same fate for it, if enacted, that overcame asimilar attempt in his State during the Revolutionary war "to makepaper a legal-tender. " The people would not submit to it, and "thecourts set it aside as an unlawful exercise of legislative power. "

 ABLE SPEECH BY MR. PIKE. 

Mr. Frederick A. Pike of Maine made one of the clearest and ablestspeeches delivered in the House in favor of the bill. He regardedit as an experiment forced upon the country by necessity. "Weissue $150, 000, 000, " said Mr. Pike, "on a venture. " We measure it"with population and wealth and existing currency. We compare itwith the action of the past. " The issue of Continental notes hadreached $20, 000, 000 by the month of April, 1777, besides a largeamount of currency by the States. "And yet, " said Mr. Pike, "nomarked signs of depreciation had appeared. " The whole property ofthe country did not at that time in his judgment "exceed fivehundred millions. " From these facts he deduced our ability tostand the proposed issue of paper. Mr. Pike had little faith inthe infallibility of any one's judgment as to the ultimate resultof financial experiments. He recalled the circumstance that SirRobert Peel's famous bank bill was introduced in Parliament in 1844with the confident declaration by Her Majesty's Government that"inquiry had been exhausted. " But in the "first mercantile pinch"the measure which was "the embodiment of financial wisdom" did notwork favorably, and "the government was compelled to interpose onbehalf of the bank and of the business community. " "Tax, fight, and emancipate, " Mr. Pike declared to be "the Trinity of oursituation. "

Mr. Valentine B. Horton of Ohio was opposed to giving the legal-tender quality to government paper. He said "the country was neverso wealthy as to-day; never was so little due to foreign countries;never were the people so free from embarrassment. The one drawbackis that the Treasury wants money to an immense amount. " He believedthat an appeal to the capitalists would call forth "gold in theutmost abundance. " To pass the legal-tender bill would, in hisjudgment, be "a legislative declaration that the administration isnot equal to the occasion for which it was elected. " He thought"the time for oracular utterances about a great movement, " by whichbankers had been inspired with undue hope, had passed by, and thatsomething practical and actual would soon be accomplished. 

Mr. John B. Alley supported the bill by arguments which came fromhis own wide experience in business. The choice, he said, wasbetween notes of the government and "an irredeemable bank currency, a great deal of which will be found, as it was after the war of1812, utterly worthless. "

Mr. Charles W. Walton of Maine spoke briefly but ably on theconstitutional power of Congress to pass the bill. He contendedthat the authority to declare a legal-tender "was an implied andnot a direct power;" that, admitting it to belong to the Government, it exists "without limitation. " The question before the House, therefore, is "one of expediency only, " and on that ground heearnestly supported the measure. 

Mr. Shellabarger of Ohio answered the "charges of bad faith andinjustice" which had been brought against the bill by its opponents. The cry of ruin to the country he compared with similar fears forEngland on the part of her economists, and showed how, in everycase, they had been disproved by the rising power and growing wealthof that kingdom. He said the legal-tender notes would be "borneup by all the faith and all the property of the people, and theywill have all the value which that faith untarnished and thatproperty inestimable can given them. "

Mr. John Hickman of Pennsylvania, having no doubt as to the powerof Congress to pass the bill, supported it as a governmentalnecessity. 

 MR. FESSENDEN OPPOSES LEGAL-TENDER. 

The debate in the House was able and spirited throughout. Judgingby the tone and number of the Republicans who spoke against thebill, a serious party division seemed to be impending. The measurecame to a vote on the 6th of February, the interest in the discussioncontinuing to the last. Mr. Owen Lovejoy sought occasion to givethe measure a parting malediction, declared that "there is noprecipice, no chasm, no yawning bottomless gulf before this nation, so terrible, so appalling, so ruinous, as the bill before theHouse, " and Mr. Roscoe Conkling sought the floor to say that heconcurred "in every word" Mr. Lovejoy had spoken. Mr. Conklingsaid the debate had been allowed to close "without pretext of solidargument by any member in favor of the constitutionality of theone feature of the bill. "

The essential difference between the plan of the minority and thatof the committee had reference to the legal-tender clause. In factthe other details of the Loan Bill could have been agreed upon ina single day's discussion, and the delay was occasioned solely bythe one feature of legal-tender. On substituting the measure ofthe minority the vote was 55 yeas to 95 nays. The bill was thenpassed by a vote of 93 to 59. The yeas were all Republican. Amongthe nays--principally Democrats--were found some of the ablest andmost influential members of the Republican party. Valentine B. Horton of Ohio, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, Roscoe Conkling, F. A. Conkling, and Theodore M. Pomeroy of New York, Albert G. Porterof Indiana, Owen Lovejoy of Illinois, William H. Wadsworth ofKentucky, Benjamin F. Thomas of Massachusetts, and Edward H. Rollinsof New Hampshire, were conspicuous for their hostility to the legal-tender clause. 

The Senate received the bill on the next day, and on the 10th itwas reported from the Finance Committee for immediate action. Mr. Fessenden explained the amendments which the committee had embodiedin the House Bill. In the first section they provided that theinterest on the national debt should be paid in coin. Upon thispoint Mr. Fessenden considered that the public credit, in largedegree, depended. As to the legal-tender feature of the notes, hecould not make up his mind to support it. "Will your legal-tenderclause, " he inquired, "make your notes any better? Do you imaginethat because you force people to take these notes they are to beworth the money, and that no injury is to follow? What is theconsequence? Does not property rise? You say you are injuringthe soldier if you compel him to take a note without its being alegal-tender; but will not the sutler put as much more on his goods?And if the soldier sends the notes to his wife to be passed at acountry store for necessaries for his family, what will be theresult? The goods that are sold are purchased in New York; theprice is put on in New York; a profit is added in the country; andthus the soldier loses just as much. You are not saving any thingfor any body. "

Mr. Fessenden then inquired, "What do we offer without the legal-tender clause? We are offering notes, with the interest securedbeyond a question if the amendments proposed by the Committee onFinance of the Senate are adopted, based on the national faith, and with the power to deposit and receive five per cent. Interestin any sub-treasury, and the power of the government to sell thestock at any price, to meet whatever it may be necessary to meet. Will notes of this kind stand better when going out, if you putthe confession upon their face, that they are discarded by you, and that you know they ought not to be received, and would not be, unless their reception is compelled by legal enactment?"

The argument against this view, according to Mr. Fessenden, "issimply that the banks will not take the notes unless they are madea legal-tender, and therefore they will be discredited. It wasthus reduced to a contest between the government and the banks;and the question is whether the banks have the will and the powerto discredit the notes of the United-States Treasury. " With allhis objections to the legal-tender feature, --and they were verygrave, --Mr. Fessenden intimated his willingness to vote for it ifit were demonstrated to be a necessity. On the constitutionalquestion involved he did not touch. He preferred, he said, "tohave his own mind uninstructed" upon that aspect of the case. 

In illustration of the doubt and diversity of opinion prevailing, Mr. Fessenden stated that on a certain day he was advised verystrongly by a leading financial man that he must at all eventsoppose the legal-tender clause, which he described as utterlydestructive. On the same day he received a note from anotherfriend, assuring him that the legal-tender bill was an absolutenecessity to the government and the people. The next day the firstgentleman telegraphed that he had changed his mind, and now thoughtthe legal-tender bill peremptorily demanded by public exigency. On the ensuing day the second gentleman wrote that he had changedhis mind, and now saw clearly that the legal-tender bill would ruinthe country. There can be no harm in stating that the authors ofthese grotesque contradictions were Mr. James Gallatin and Mr. MorrisKetchum of New York. 

 MR. COLLAMER AND MR. SHERMAN. 

Mr. Collamer of Vermont followed Mr. Fessenden in an exhaustiveargument against the bill as a violation of the Constitution. Hebelieved "in the power of the government to sustain itself in thestrife physically and pecuniarily. " He was not willing to say toa man, " Here is my note: if I do not pay it, you must steal theamount from the first man you come to, and give him this note inpayment. " He would not be governed in this matter, as Mr. Fessendenintimated he might be, "by necessity. " He had taken an oath tosupport the Constitution, and he believed this bill violated it. He "would not overthrow the Constitution in the Senate Chamberwhile the rebels are endeavoring to overthrow it by war. "

Senator Wilson looked upon the contest as one "between the men whospeculate in stocks, and the productive, toiling men of the country. "He believed "the sentiment of the nation approaches unanimity infavor of this legal-tender clause. " He had received letters fromlarge commercial houses in Massachusetts, representing millions ofcapital, and "they declare that they do not know a merchant in thecity of Boston engaged in active business who is not for the legal-tender bill. "

Senator Sherman of Ohio urged the adoption of the measure, because"all the organs of financial opinion in this country agree thatthere is a majority" for it; and he cited the New-York Chamber ofCommerce, the Committee on Public Safety in New York, and theChambers of Commerce of Boston and Philadelphia, as taking thatground. He proceeded "to show the necessity of it from reason. "He stated that the government must "raise and pay out of the Treasuryof the United States before the first day of July next, accordingto the estimate of the Committee of Ways and Means, the sum of$343, 235, 000. Of this sum $100, 000, 000 is now due and payable tosoldiers, contractors, to the men who have furnished provisionsand clothing for the army; to officers, judges, and civil magistrates. "Mr. Sherman argued that "a question of hard necessity presses uponthe government. This money cannot be obtained from the banks. With a patriotic feeling not usually attributed to money corporations, the banks have already exhausted their means. The aggregate capitalof the banks of the three principal cities of the United States isbut $105, 000, 000, and they have taken more than their capital inbonds of the United States. " It was, therefore, idle to look tothe banks for relief. "They have, " continued the senator, "alreadytied up their whole capital in the public securities. They askthis currency to enable them to assist further in carrying on thegovernment. Among others, the cashier of the Bank of Commerce, the largest bank corporation in the United States and one that hasdone much to sustain the government, appeared before the Committeeon Finance, and stated explicitly that his bank, as well as otherbanks of New York, could not further aid the government, unlessits currency was stamped by, and invested with, the legal form andauthority of lawful money, which they could pay to others as wellas receive themselves. "

Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware argued that the proposed measureviolated the Constitution. "No one, " said he, "can deny the factthat in the contracts between man and man, and in governmentcontracts to pay money, the obligation is to pay intrinsic value. If you violate that by this bill, which you certainly do, how canyou expect that the faith of the community will be given to thelaw which you now pass, in which you say that you will pay hereafterthe interest on your debt in coin? Why should they give credit tothat declaration? If you can violate the Constitution of the UnitedStates, in the face of your oaths, in the face of its palpableprovision, what security do you offer to the lender of money?"

Senator Sumner did not join his colleague in enthusiastic supportof the bill. He was indeed much troubled by its provisions. "Isit necessary, " he inquired, "to incur all the unquestionable evilsof inconvertible paper, forced into circulation by Act of Congress, to suffer the stain upon our national faith, to bear the stigma ofa seeming repudiation, to lose for the present that credit whichin itself is a treasury, and to teach debtors everywhere thatcontracts may be varied at the will of the stronger? Surely thereis much in these inquiries which may make us pause. If our countrywere poor or feeble, without population and without resources; ifit were already drained by a long war; if the enemy had succeededin depriving us of the means of livelihood, --then we should noteven pause. But our country is rich and powerful, with a numerouspopulation, busy, honest, and determined, and with unparalleledresources of all kinds, agricultural, mineral, industrial, andcommercial. It is yet undrained by the war in which we are engaged, nor has the enemy succeeded in depriving us of any of the means oflivelihood. " But he concluded, "whatever may be the nationalresources, they are not now within reach except by summary process. "He consented "reluctantly, painfully, that the process shouldissue. " He could not however "give such a vote without warningthe government against the danger of such an experiment. Themedicine of the Constitution must not become its daily bread. "

 SENATE VOTES ON LEGAL-TENDER. 

The bill came to a vote in the Senate on the 13th of February. The government exigency was so pressing that the Senate discussionwas limited to four days. On the motion of Mr. Collamer to strikeout the legal-tender clause, the vote stood 17 yeas to 23 nays. Anthony of Rhode Island, Collamer and Foot of Vermont, Fessendenof Maine, King of New York, Cowan of Pennsylvania, Foster ofConnecticut, and Willey of Virginia, among the Republicans, votedto strike out. The vote to retain the legal-tender feature wasRepublican, with the exception of Garrett Davis of Kentucky, McDougall of California, Rice of Minnesota, and Wilson of Missouri. This question being settled, the bill, with the legal-tender clauseembodied, passed by a vote fo 30 to 7. Mr. Anthony of Rhode Islandstated that, having voted against the legal-tender provision, he"could not take the responsibility of voting against the onlymeasure which is proposed by the government, and which has alreadypassed the House of Representatives. " Three Republicans, Collamer, Cowan, and King, and four Democrats, Kennedy, Pearce, Powell, andSaulsbury, were the senators who voted against the bill on itsfinal passage. 

The bill was returned to the House of Representatives the next day. The Senate amendments were taken up on the 19th. Mr. Spauldingobjected to them generally, and especially to the provisions forselling the bonds at the market price and for paying the interestin coin. Mr. Pomeroy of New York advocated concurrence in theamendments of the Senate, as did Mr. Morrill of Vermont. Upon theamendment to pay interest in coin, the House divided, with 88 ayesto 56 noes. Upon the clause allowing the secretary to sell bondsat the market value, there were 72 ayes to 66 noes. A conferenceon the points of difference between the two Houses was managed bySenators Fessenden, Sherman, and Carlile, and RepresentativesStevens, Horton, and Sedgwick. The report of the Conferees wasagreed to in both Houses, and the Act was approved and became alaw on the 25th of February. Its leading provisions were for theissue of legal-tender notes, on which the debate chiefly turned, and of coupon or registered bonds not to exceed $500, 000, 000 inthe aggregate, bearing six per cent. Interest, redeemable at thepleasure of the United States after five years, and payable twentyyears after date. The bonds were to be sold at their market valuefor coin or Treasury notes, and the notes to be exchangeable intothem in sums of fifty dollars, or any multiple of fifty. Thesesecurities became widely known and popular as the five-twenties of1862. The fourth section allowed deposits of United-States noteswith designated depositories to draw interest at five per cent. , and to be paid after ten days' notice, but the total of such depositswas not to exceed $25, 000, 000 at any time. By the fifth section, duties on imported goods were required to be paid in coin, and theproceeds were pledged, first, to the payment in coin of the intereston the bonds of the United States; and second, to a sinking-fundof one per cent. Of the entire debt for its ultimate payment. 

Certificates of indebtedness were authorized by Act of Congresspassed without debate and approved on the first day of March. These could be granted to any creditor whose claim had been audited, and they drew six per cent. Interest, payable at first in coin, but by Act of March 3, 1863, lawful money was substituted forinterest. By Act of March 17, 1862, these certificates could begiven in discharge of checks drawn by disbursing officers, if theholders of the latter chose to accept them. The secretary wasclothed with power by the Act of March 17, 1862, to buy coin withany bonds or notes on such terms as he might deem advantageous. The same Act gave legal-tender value to the demand notes previouslyauthorized. The limitation upon temporary deposits was also raisedto $50, 000, 000. 

Mr. Chase, by a communication of June 7 (1862), asked for a furtherissue of legal-tender notes to the amount of $150, 000, 000, and heurged that the limit of five dollars be removed, and denominationsas low as a single dollar be permitted. He declared that it wasimpossible to obtain coin necessary to pay the soldiers, and thatthe plan proposed would remove from disbursing officers the temptationto exchange coin for small bank notes. A reserve of one-third ofthe temporary deposits would take $34, 000, 000, and the replacementof the demand notes $56, 500, 000 more, so that for immediate usethe Treasury would get only $59, 500, 000 of the sum asked for. Mr. Spaulding of New York on the 17th of June presented the measure asreported from the Ways and Means Committee. He argued that thisform of loan was "so popular with the people and so advantageousto the government, that it should be extended so far as it couldbe done safely. " Objections such as were offered to the originalpolicy were presented to the additional notes. It was alreadysuggested to authorize notes for fractions of a dollar, but themajority decided against it. The bill passed the House ofRepresentatives on the 24th of June. In the Senate, Mr. Shermanof Ohio attempted to add a clause for the taxation of the circulationof banks, but it was not received with favor. With certain amendmentsthe bill passed the Senate on the 2d of July. On a disagreementwhich ensued, the conferees were Senators Fessenden, Sherman, andWright, and Representatives Stevens, Spaulding, and Phelps ofMissouri. By their action the volume of notes of denominationsless than five dollars was restricted to $35, 000, 000, and thereserve for meeting deposits was fixed at $75, 000, 000. Whileexchangeable into six per cent. Bonds, the notes might also be paidin coin under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. Thereport was accepted by the Senate on the 7th of July, and by theHouse on the 8th. It became a law by the President's approval onthe 11th of July. 

 SECRETARY CHASE ON THE BANKS. 

On the 14th of July, Secretary Chase called the attention of Congressto the great evils arising from the issue by non specie-payingbanks and unauthorized persons of depreciated currency, and theconsequent disappearance of small coin. As a remedy an Act waspassed, and approved July 17, for the use of postage and otherstamps in payment of fractional parts of a dollar. These stampswere made exchangeable by assistant treasurers for United-Statesnotes in sums not less than five dollars. Banks and persons wereforbidden, from the first day of the ensuing August, to make orissue any note or token for a less sum than one dollar, intendedto be used as money, under the penalty of a fine not exceeding$500, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. "Shinplasters"had become almost like the frogs of Egypt for multitude. They werein every man's hand and were of all degrees of value. They weresometimes issued for purposes of fraud. Silver had become lost toview, and business houses resorted to the use of their own notesas a convenience. The government stamps were not well adapted tocirculate as currency, and they soon gave way to notes of handsomedesign which came into universal use as the "small change" of thecountry. 

The proper order of the leading measures of finance has always beena subject of contention. Grave differences of opinion exist, evento this day, concerning the necessity and expediency of the legal-tender provision. The judgment of many whose financial sagacityis entitled to respect is, that if the internal tax had been firstlevied, and the policy adopted of drawing directly upon the banksfrom the Treasury for the amounts of any loans in their hands, theresort by the government to irredeemable paper might at least havebeen postponed and possibly prevented. The premium on gold becamethe measure of the depreciation of the government credit, andpractically such premiums were the charge made for every loannegotiated. In his report of December, 1862, Secretary Chasejustified the legal-tender policy. He explained that by thesuspension of specie payments the banks had rendered their currencyundesirable for government operations, and consequently no courseother than that adopted was open. Mr. Chase declared that themeasures of general legislation had worked well. "For the fiscalyear ending with June, " he said, "every audited and settled claimon the government and every quartermaster's check for suppliesfurnished, which had reached the Treasury, had been met. " For thesubsequent months, the secretary "was enabled to provide, if notfully, yet almost fully, for the constantly increasing disbursements. "

The political effects of the legal-tender bill were of largeconsequence to the Administration and to the successful conduct ofthe war. If it had been practicable to adhere rigidly to the speciestandard, the national expenditure might have been materiallyreduced; but the exactions of the war would have been all the timegrating on the nerves of the people and oppressing them withremorseless taxation. Added to the discouragement caused by ourmilitary reverses, a heavy financial burden might have proveddisastrous. The Administration narrowly escaped a damaging defeatin 1862, and but for the relief to business which came from thecirculation of legal-tender notes, the political struggle mighthave been hopeless. But as trade revived under the stimulus of anexpanding circulation, as the market for every species of productwas constantly enlarging and prices were steadily rising, thesupport of the war policy became a far more cheerful duty to themass of our people. 

This condition of affairs doubtless carried with it many elementsof demoralization, but the engagement of the people in schemes ofmoney-making proved a great support to the war policy of thegovernment. We saw the reproduction among us of the same causesand the same effects which prevailed in England during her prolongedcontest with Napoleon. Money was superabundant, speculation wasrife, the government was a lavish buyer, a prodigal consumer. Every man who could work was employed at high wages; every man whohad commodities to sell was sure of high prices. The whole communitycame to regard the prevalent prosperity as the outgrowth of thewar. The ranks of the army could be filled by paying extravagantbounty after the ardor of volunteering was past, and the hardshipof the struggle was thus in large measure concealed if not abated. Considerate men knew that a day of reckoning would come, but theybelieved it would be postponed until after the war was ended andthe Union victorious. 

The policy of the legal-tender measure cannot therefore be properlydetermined if we exclude from view that which may well be termedits political and moral influence upon the mass of our people. Itwas this which subsequently gave to that form of currency a stronghold upon the minds of many who fancied that its stimulating effectupon business and trade could be reproduced under utterly differentcircumstances. Argument and experience have demonstrated thefallacy of this conception, and averted the evils which might haveflowed from it. But in the judgment of a large and intelligentmajority of those who were contemporary with the war and gavecareful study to its progress, the legal-tender bill was a mosteffective and powerful auxiliary in its successful prosecution. 

 THE INTERNAL-REVENUE SYSTEM. 

Grateful as was the relief to the people from legal-tender notes, it was apparent to Congress that a government cannot, any more thanan individual, maintain a state of solvency by the continuousissuing of irredeemable paper. Money must not merely be promised, it must be paid. The Government therefore required a strong, efficient system of taxation--one that would promptly return largesums to the Treasury. From customs, an increasing revenue wasalready enriching the Government vaults, but the amount derivablefrom that source was limited by the ability of the people to consumeforeign goods, and wise economists did not desire an enlargedrevenue the collection of which was at war with so many domesticinterests. The country therefore turned by common instinct to asystem of internal duties, --to incomes, to excise, to stamps. Inthe extra session of the preceding year, Congress had, by the Actof August 5, 1861, laid the foundation for a system of internalrevenue by providing for a direct tax of twenty millions of dollarson the real estate of the country, and for an income tax of threeper cent. On all incomes in excess of eight hundred dollars perannum. But the appointment of assessors and collectors under thebill had been postponed "until after the second Tuesday of February, 1862, " which was practically remanding the whole subject to thefurther consideration of Congress before any man should be askedto pay a dollar of tax under the law. The intervening months hadnot decreased but had on the contrary largely developed thenecessities of the National Treasury, and enhanced the necessityof a stable revenue system. The exigency had become so great thatCongress was compelled for the first time in our history, to resortto the issue of government notes as a legal-tender currency. Promptness and decision were essential to the preservation of theNational credit. The sources, the extent, the limitations of thetaxing power were closely examined by Secretary Chase in his reportand the subject was remanded to Congress for determination. 

The Constitution gives to Congress to power to levy imposts, andprohibits it to the States. It gives also to Congress the powerto levy internal taxes and excises, leaving to the States the rightto do the same. It is one of the traditions of the Conventionwhich met in Philadelphia in 1787 to frame the Federal Constitution, that Mr. Hamilton remarked in a conference of its leading membersthat if the power to levy impost and excise should be given to thenew government, it would prove strong and successful. If the powerwere not to be given he did not desire to waste his time in repeatingthe failure of the old Confederation, and should return at once toNew York. It was undoubtedly his influence which secured the wideand absolute field of taxation to the General Government. He wellknew that direct taxes are onerous, and as the majority insistedon levying them in proportion to population, as in the oldConfederation, their use as a resource to the General Governmentwas practically nullified. Such a system involved the absurditythat men taken _per capita_ average the same in respect to wealth, and that one hundred thousand people in New York should pay no moretax than the same number in Arkansas. Statesmen and financierssaw from the first that the direct tax clause in the Constitutionwould be valuable only in forcing the use of the excise. But forthe dread of this, the States would not have yielded all the sourcesof indirect taxation to the National Government. 

When appointed Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hamilton insistedupon the prompt levy of excises. He induced the first Congress tolay a tax on all distilled spirits. If made from molasses or sugaror other foreign substance, the tax should be from eleven to thirtycents per gallon according to the percentage above or below proof. If made from domestic products, the tax should be from nine totwenty-five cents per gallon. The first was practically a tax onrum, the second on whiskey. This excise was followed in subsequentyears by duties on carriages, on snuff, on property sold at auction, on refined sugar, and by the sale of stamps. Other articles werein after years added to the list, and to aid the Treasury duringthe period of the second war with Great Britain, a heavy impositionof internal duties was resorted to as the most prompt and efficientmode of replenishing the hard pressed Treasury. 

 THE INTERNAL-REVENUE SYSTEM. 

The excise was from the first unpopular. The men who insisted that"black quart-bottles" should be admitted free of duty when thefirst tariff bill was passed, did not relish the levying of a heavytax on the whiskey that was to fill them. The exciseman was totheir view precisely what Dr. Johnson had defined him in hisdictionary: "an odious wretch, employed to collect an unjust tax. "Revolutionary proceedings had been inaugurated by resistance to atax on tea. But tea at that day was looked upon as a luxury inwhich only a few could indulge, while whiskey was regarded as anecessity, of universal consumption. Resistance went so far as toorganize an insurrection in Western Pennsylvania against the officialauthority which attempted to collect the tax. The outbreak waspromptly suppressed by the power of the General Government but theresult of the agitation was a deep-seated prejudice against theFederal party. Pennsylvania sympathized with the more liberalviews of Jefferson, and in the Presidential election of 1796 gavehim fourteen of her fifteen electoral votes. John Adams receivedthe other vote, and as he was chosen by a majority of one, hisPennsylvania support, small as it was, proved timely and valuable. 

Resistance to internal duties was tried by legal methods. A heavyduty had been laid on carriages--two dollars per year for those ofsimplest form and fifteen dollars for the most costly. The taxapplied to all carriages for the conveyance of persons, whetherkept for private use or for public hire. One Daniel Lawrence Hyltonof Virginia resisted the payment of the tax and the case wasultimately heard before the Supreme Court in the February term of1796. Mr. Hamilton who had resigned from the Treasury Departmentthe preceding year, argued the case for the Government in conjunctionwith the Attorney-General, Charles Lee. Mr. Campbell, Attorneyfor the Virginia District and Mr. Ingersoll, the Attorney-Generalof Pennsylvania, appeared for the plaintiff. The case turned whollyupon the point whether the tax, on carriages kept for private use, was a direct tax. If not a direct tax, it was admitted to beproperly levied according to that clause in the Constitution whichdeclares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniformthroughout the United States. " If a direct tax it was wrongfullylevied because the Constitution declares that "no capitation orother direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the censusor enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States. "

The well-known decision of the court, delivered by Judge SamuelChase, pronounced the tax to be constitutional. Justice JamesWilson who concurred in the decision had taken a very prominentpart as a delegate from Pennsylvania in the convention which framedthe Constitution, and ranked at that time as one of the ablestlawyers in the Union. The opinion of the judges seemed to be, though no formal decision was rendered to that effect, that a taxon land, and a capitation or poll tax, are the only levies whichwithin the terms of the Constitution are to be considered _direct_taxes. The decision was one of extraordinary interest to theGovernment, as, had it been the other way, one great resource forthe raising of money, indeed the greatest resource, would have beentaken from the Federal Government. The appearance of Mr. Hamiltonwas an indication of the dignity and importance which were attachedto the case by Washington's Administration. 

A singular feature of the proceedings was the allegation by Mr. Hylton that he "owned, possessed, and kept one hundred and twenty-five chariots for the conveyance of persons--exclusively for hisown separate use and not to let out to hire, or for the conveyanceof persons for hire. " What particular necessity a Virginia gentlemanof the last century had for that number of chariots "for his ownseparate use" is nowhere explained. It may have been the merefilling of the blanks in a legal declaration in which the declarantwas permitted a free use of figures, but as it stands in the reportsof Supreme Court decisions, it seems to be one of the odd incidentsthat make up the humor of the Law. 

The system of internal duties and excises continued in variousforms for thirty years, practically disappearing at last in 1821. But for the financial demands precipitated by the war of 1812 andthe period of depression which ensued, the system would have beenabolished at an earlier date. During the period of their existence, from 1790 to 1820, the internal taxes had yielded to the Governmentthe gross sum of $22, 000, 000, an average of a little more than$700, 000 per annum. It thus proved a very valuable resource tothe Republic in the period of its early financial troubles. 

 COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXES. 

Congress now determined under the recommendation of Secretary Chaseto use this great source of revenue to the fullest practicableextent. Immediately after the passage of the Legal-tender Act thesubject of internal revenue was taken up, elaborately investigatedby committees, exhaustively discussed in both Senate and House. The final result was the enactment of a bill "to provide internalrevenue to support the Government and to pay interest on the publicdebt, " which received the President's approval on the first day ofJuly (1862). It was one of the most searching, thorough, comprehensivesystems of taxation ever devised by any Government. Spiritous andmalt liquors and tobacco were relied upon for a very large shareof revenue; a considerable sum was expected from stamps; and threeper cent. Was exacted from all annual incomes over six hundreddollars and less than ten thousand, and five per cent. --afterwardsincreased to ten per cent. --on all incomes exceeding ten thousanddollars. Manufactures of cotton, wool, flax, hemp, iron, steel, wood, stone, earth, and every other material were taxed three percent. Banks, insurance and railroad companies, telegraph companies, and all other corporations were made to pay tribute. The butcherpaid thirty cents for every beef slaughtered, ten cents for everyhog, five cents for every sheep. Carriages, billiard-tables, yachts, gold and silver place, and all other articles of luxurywere levied on heavily. Every profession and every calling, exceptthe ministry of religion, was included within the far-reachingprovisions of the law and subjected to tax for license. Bankersand pawnbrokers, lawyers and horse-dealers, physicians andconfectioners, commercial brokers and peddlers, proprietors oftheatres and jugglers on the street, were indiscriminately summonedto aid the National Treasury. The law was so extended and so minutethat it required thirty printed pages of royal octavo and more thantwenty thousand words to express its provisions. 

Sydney Smith's striking summary of English taxation was originallyincluded in a warning to the United States after the war of 1812against indulging a marital spirit or being inflamed with a desirefor naval renown. "Taxes, " said the witty essayist in the _EdinburghReview_, "are the inevitable consequences of being too fond ofglory. " He bade us beware of Essex, Porter, and Stephen Decatur. Even in the second year of the civil war in which we were strugglingfor life rather than for glory, we had come to realize every exactionascribed to the British system. We were levying "taxes upon everyarticle which enters into the mouth or covers the back or is placedunder the foot; taxes on every thing which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste; taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion;taxes on every thing on earth and the waters under the earth; taxeson every thing that comes from abroad or is grown at home; on thesauce which pampers man's appetite and on the drug that restoreshim to health; on the ermine which decorates the judge and the ropewhich hangs the criminal; on the poor man's salt and the rich man'sspice; on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of thebride. "

The system of internal revenue of which the foregoing is noexaggeration proved in all respects effective. Congress renderedthe taxes more palatable and less oppressive to the producers bylargely increasing the duties on imports by the Tariff Act of July14, 1862, thus shutting out still more conclusively all competitionfrom foreign fabrics. The increased cost was charged to theconsumer, and taxes of fabulous amount were paid promptly and withapparent cheerfulness by the people. The internal revenue wasbounteous from the first, and in a short period increased to amillion of dollars per day for every secular day of the year. Theamount paid on incomes for a single year reached seventy-threemillions of dollars, the leading merchant of New York paying inone check a tax of four hundred thousand dollars on an income offour millions. Mr. Webster said that "Hamilton smote the rock ofthe National resources and abundant streams of revenue gushedforth. " But Hamilton's Funding Bill was not more powerful inestablishing the credit of the young Republic after the Revolutionthan was the Internal-revenue Act in imparting strength to thefinances of the matured Nation in the throes and agonies of civilwar. It was the crowning glory of Secretary Chase's policy, andits scope and boldness entitle him to rank with the great financiersof the world. 

CHAPTER XX. 

Elections of 1862. --Mr. Lincoln advances to Aggressive Position onSlavery. --Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress adjourns. --Democratic Hostility to Administration. --Democratic State Conventions. --Platforms in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. --Nominationof Horatio Seymour for Governor of New York. --The President preparesfor a Serious Political Contest. --The Issue shall be the Union orSlavery. --Conversation with Mr. Boutwell. --Proclamation ofEmancipation. --Meeting of Governors at Altoona. --CompensatedEmancipation proposed for Border States. --Declined by their Senatorsand Representatives. --Anti-slavery Policy apparently Disastrousfor a Time. --October Elections Discouraging. --General James S. Wadsworth nominated against Mr. Seymour. --Illinois votes againstthe President. --Five Leading States against the President. --Administration saved in Part by Border States. --Last Session ofThirty-seventh Congress. --President urges Compensated Emancipationagain. --Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863. --Long Controversyover Question of Compensation for Slaves. --Test Case of Missouri. --Fourteen Million Dollars offered her. --General Pope's Campaign. --Army of the Potomac. --Battle of Antietam. --McClellan removed. --Burnside succeeds him. --Defeat at Fredericksburg. --Hooker succeedsBurnside. --General Situation. --Arming of Slaves. --Habeas Corpus. --Conscription Law. --Depressed and Depressing Period. 

Popular interest in the summer of 1862 was divided between eventsin the field and the election of Representatives to the Thirty-eighth Congress. A year before, the line of partisan division hadbeen practically obliterated in the Loyal States--the whole peopleuniting in support of the war. The progress of events had to alarge extent changed this auspicious unanimity, and the Administrationwas now subjected to a fight for its life while it was fightingfor the life of the Nation. 

The conservatism which Mr. Lincoln had maintained on the Slaveryquestion had undoubtedly been the means of bringing to the supportof the war policy of his Administration many whom a more radicalcourse at the outset would have driven into hostility. As headvanced however towards a more aggressive position, politicaldivisions became at each step more pronounced. The vote on thequestion of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia had beenstrictly on the line of party, and the same is true of the propositionfor compensated emancipation in the Border States, and of the Actconfiscating the property of Rebels. Not a single Democrat in theSenate or House sustained one of these measures. They were allpassed by Republican votes alone, the Democratic minority protestingeach time with increasing earnestness and warmth. 

The second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress adjourned on the17th of July, 1862, but long before that date the excitementprevailing in Congress had extended to the people, and politicaldivisions were every day growing more earnest, partisan leadersevery day more active, their followers every day more excited. The Slavery question was the source of the agitation, and by acommon instinct throughout the free States, the Democrats joinedin the cry against an Abolition war. They were as ready, theydeclared, as on the day after the firing on Sumter, to uphold allmeasures necessary for the defense of the Government and themaintenance of the Union, and they demanded that the Republicansshould restrict the war to its legitimate ends--as defined by thesupporters of the Administration in July, 1861, by the unanimousadoption of the Crittenden Resolution. They would not listen toany change of action based on change of circumstances, and theyprepared to enforce at the ballot-box their opinions touching thenew departure of Congress and the President. 

The Democratic State Conventions in Pennsylvania and Ohio, bothheld on the 4th of July, reflected the feeling which so largelypervaded the ranks of the party throughout the North. In Pennsylvaniathe Convention unanimously declared that "the party of fanaticismor crime, whichever it may be called, that seeks to turn loose theslaves of the Southern States to overrun the North and to enterinto competition with the white laboring masses, thus degradingtheir manhood by placing them on an equality with negroes, isinsulting to our race and merits our most emphatic and unqualifiedcondemnation. " They further declared that "this is a governmentof white men and was established exclusively for the white race";that "the negroes are not entitled to and ought not to be admittedto political and social equality with the white race. "

 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORMS IN 1862. 

The Democratic Convention of Ohio made an equally open appeal torace prejudice. They avowed their belief that the Emancipationpolicy of the Republican party if successful "would throw upon theBorder free States an immense number of negroes to compete withand under-work the white laborers and to constitute in various waysan unbearable nuisance"; and that "it would be unjust to our gallantsoldiers to compel them to free the negroes of the South, andthereby fill Ohio with a degraded population to compete with thesesame soldiers upon their return to the peaceful avocations of life. "It was not by mere chance that the Democratic party of these twogreat States held their conventions on the National Anniversary. It had been carefully pre-arranged with the view of creating aserious impression against the Administration. 

The Democrats of Indiana went beyond their brethren of Ohio andPennsylvania in the vigor with which they denounced the anti-slaverypolicy of the President. Their convention was held a month later, and unanimously demanded that "the public authorities of Indianashould see that the constitution and laws of the State are enforcedagainst the entrance of free negroes and mulattoes, " declaring that"when the people of Indiana adopted the negro exclusion clause intheir constitution by a majority of ninety-four thousand votes theymeant that the honest laboring white man should have no competitorin the black race; that the soil of Indiana should belong to thewhite man, and that he alone was suited to the form of herinstitutions. " In Illinois the Democratic party adopted substantiallythe same platform as that proclaimed in Indiana. They made thedistinct and unmistakable issue that a war for the abolition ofslavery could not have their support; that the Government of theUnited States was made for white men, and that negroes could notbe admitted to terms of equality in civil rights. 

The most important election of the year was that to be held in NewYork, not merely because of the prestige and power of the State, but on account of the peculiar elements that entered into thecontest. The Democratic party proceeded in the selection ofcandidates and in the definition of issues with great circumspection. They avoided the rancorous expressions used in Pennsylvania andOhio, declared that they would continue to render the governmenttheir sincere and united support in the use of all legitimate meansto suppress the rebellion, and cited the Crittenden Resolution, unanimously passed by Congress in July, 1861, as embodying theprinciples upon which they appealed for popular support. Theyexpressed their "willingness to withhold their views upon allquestions not rendered imperative by the imperiled condition ofthe country. " The had not one word to say on the subject of slavery, and they avowed their readiness to act in the coming election withany class of loyal citizens who agreed with them in the principlesembodied in their platform. This last clause related to a thirdparty, the remnant of those who had supported Mr. Bell in 1860 andwho had just held a convention at Troy. They had comprised theirentire platform in "the Constitution, the Union and the enforcementof the laws, " and had nominated Horatio Seymour for governor. 

It was not difficult to see that politically the case was wellmanaged, and that the most partisan of partisans in the person ofMr. Seymour, was enabled to appear before the voters of New Yorkin the attitude of one who could graciously correct the errors ofthe Administration, and direct the course of the war in channelsof patriotism that would harmonize the entire people. The nominationof Mr. Seymour was made with great enthusiasm by the Democracy, and the policy of the National Administration was thus challengedin the leading State of the Union. Mr. Lincoln looked upon thesituation as one of exceeding gravity. The loss to the Administration, of the House of Representatives in the Thirty-eighth Congress, would place the control of the war in the hands of its opponents, and, as the President believed, would imperil the fate of theNational struggle. The power of the purse controls the power ofthe sword. The armies in the field required a vast and constantexpenditure, and to secure the money a rigorous system of taxationmust be enforced. A House of Representatives controlling the powerto tax and the power to appropriate could, if hostile to the war, neutralize and destroy all the efforts of the Executive. 

The President measured the extent of the danger and prepared tomeet it. He clearly read the signs of the times. He saw that theanti-slavery policy of Congress had gone far enough to arouse thebitter hostility of all Democrats who were not thoroughly committedto the war, and yet not far enough to deal an effective blow againstthe institution. He saw that as the Administration was committedto the partial policy which involved all the danger of a re-actionand a retreat, it would be wise to commit it to the bold, far-reaching, radical and aggressive policy from which it would beimpossible to turn without deliberately resolving to sacrifice ournationality. He determined therefore to lay before the people achoice between the Union and Slavery. He would persuade them thatboth could not be saved and that they must choose the one whichthey regarded as the more worthy of preservation. Slavery was notonly the inciting cause of the rebellion but was its chief strengthand support in the South and at the same time a weakening elementto the Union cause in the Loyal States. No man had looked at thequestion in all its bearings so closely as Mr. Lincoln. He hadstudied the consequences of every step and had proceeded with theutmost caution. 

 THE PRESIDENT'S MONITORY PROCLAMATION. 

The President kept his own counsels so closely, and relied soconfidently upon his own conclusions, that it is not possible tosay when he first seriously entertained the thought of generalemancipation as a war measure. Mr. George S. Boutwell of Massachusettswho enjoyed Mr. Lincoln's confidence and who at this period of thecontest was appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is authorityfor some interesting statements. About the time that the anti-slavery legislation now under discussion was in progress Mr. Lincolnreceived a letter written by a loyal citizen of Louisiana, containinga strong argument against emancipation. He depicted in vivid colorsthe bad results to flow from it and appealed earnestly to thePresident not to take so dangerous a step. Without combating indetail the arguments of his correspondent who personally enjoyedhis confidence, Mr. Lincoln said, "You must not expect me to giveup this government without playing my last card. "

During an interview with Mr. Lincoln after the adjournment ofCongress in July, and when military disasters were falling thickand fast upon us, Mr. Boutwell suggested to the President that wecould not hope to succeed until the slaves were emancipated. Towhich Mr. Lincoln answered, "You would not have it done now, wouldyou? Had we not better wait for something like a victory?" Thestatement, widely made in the autumn of 1862, that Mr. Lincoln hadbeen frightened or driven into the issuing of the proclamation bythe meeting of the governors of the Loyal States at Altoona, hadno foundation in fact. When the President's attention was calledto it, he said, "The truth is, I never thought of the meeting ofthe governors at all. When Lee came over the Potomac I made aresolve that if McClellan drove him back I would send the proclamationafter him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, but Icould not find out until Saturday whether we had won a victory orlost a battle. It was then too late to issue it that day, and onSunday I fixed it up a little, and on Monday I let them have it. "This colloquial style was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and thefrankness with which it was spoken disposes utterly of the claimsmade in behalf of Mr. Chase and Mr. Sumner that they contributedto the text of the Monitory Proclamation of 1862. 

Two months before issuing the Proclamation Mr. Lincoln had urgentlyrequested the senators and representatives of the Border States togive their effective co-operation in aid of compensated emancipation. In his letter of July 12 he said "Before leaving the Capitol, consider and discuss this subject among yourselves. You are patriotsand statesmen, and as such I pray you to consider this propositionand at least commend it to the consideration of your States andpeople. As you would perpetuate popular government, I beseech youthat you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in greatperil, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring aspeedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved tothe world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, its happy future assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To youmore than to any others the privilege is given to assure thathappiness, to swell that grandeur, to link your own names therewithforever. "

The majority of the senators and representatives from the BorderStates did not concur with Mr. Lincoln's views and did not respondfavorably to his earnest appeal. The Maryland delegation inCongress, the Kentucky delegation with one exception, and theMissouri delegation with one exception, entered into a long argumentdissenting from the conclusions of the President. The West Virginiamen (with the exception of Mr. Carlile), Mr. Casey of Kentucky, Mr. John W. Noell of Missouri, Mr. George P. Fisher of Delaware, together with Mr. Horace Maynard and Mr. A. J. Clements fromTennessee (not a Border State), expressed their readiness to co-operate with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Maynard wrote a separate letterdistinguished by breadth of view and strength of expression. Itis impossible to comprehend the determination of the Border Statemen at that crisis. Having resisted in vain the aggressivelegislation of Congress already accomplished, they could hardlyfail to see that the institution of slavery was threatened withutter destruction. It seems absolutely incredible that, standingon the edge of the crater, they made no effort to escape from theupheaval of the volcano, already visible to those who stood afaroff. 

 THE PRESIDENT'S ANTI-SLAVERY POLICY. 

The Monitory Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 22d ofSeptember. It gave public notice that on the first day of January, 1863--just one hundred days distant--"all persons held as slaveswithin any State or designated part of a State, the people whereofshall be in rebellion against the United States, shall be thenthenceforward and forever free. " It was a final tribute to thoseengaged in rebellion that every agency, every instrumentality wouldbe employed by the government in its struggle for self-preservation. It brought--as Mr. Lincoln intended it should bring--the seriousnessof the contest to the hearts and consciences of the people in theLoyal States. He plainly warned them that every thing was at stakeand that if they were unwilling to meet the trial with the courageand the sacrifice demanded, they were foredoomed to disaster, todefeat, to dishonor. He knew that the policy would at firstencounter the disapproval of many who had supported him for thePresidency, and that it would be violently opposed by the greatmass of the Democratic party. But his faith was strong. He believedthat the destruction of slavery was essential to the safety of theUnion, and he trusted with composure to the discerning judgmentand ultimate decision of the people. If the Administration was tobe defeated, he was determined that defeat should come upon anissue which involved the whole controversy. If the purse of theNation was to be handed over to the control of those who were notready to use the last dollar in the war for the preservation ofthe Union, the President was resolved that every voter in the LoyalStates should be made to comprehend the deadly significance of sucha decision. 

The effect of the policy was for a time apparently disastrous tothe Administration. The most sagacious among political leaderstrembled for the result. Only the radical anti-slavery men of thetype of Sumner and Stevens and Lovejoy were strong and unyieldingin faith. They could not doubt, they would not doubt the result. For many weeks the elections in the North promised nothing butadversity. Maine voted a few days before the Proclamation wasissued. Ever since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise themajorities against the Democrats in that State had varied from tento nineteen thousand. Under the pressure of military reverses andthe cry of an abolition war, the majority for Abner Coburn, theRepublican candidate for governor, was a little over four thousand;and for the first time in ten years one of the districts returneda Democratic representative to Congress in the person of L. D. M. Sweat. Vermont, contrary to the tide of opinion elsewhere, increasedher majority for the Administration--an event due in large part tothe loyal position taken by Paul Dillingham who had been the leaderof the Democratic party in the State. 

The October elections were utterly discouraging. In Ohio theDemocrats prevailed in fourteen of the Congressional districts, leaving the Republicans but five, --registering at the same time apopular majority of some seven thousand against the Administration. The extent of this reverse may be measured by the fact that in thepreceding Congressional election Republican representatives hadbeen chosen in thirteen districts. In Indiana the result wasoverwhelming against the President. The Republicans had held theirconvention early in the summer and had re-affirmed the CrittendenResolution as embodying their platform of principles. They werenot in position therefore to withstand the furious onslaught madeby the Democrats on the Slavery question. Of the eleven Congressionaldistricts the Republicans secured but three, and the Democrats hada large majority on the popular vote. --In Pennsylvania whose electionwas usually accepted as the index to the average public opinion ofthe country, the Democrats secured a majority of four thousand, and elected one-half the delegation to Congress. In November, 1860, Mr. Lincoln had received a majority of sixty thousand inPennsylvania, and this change marked the ebb of popular favorcreated by the anti-slavery policy of the Administration. 

Against the candidacy of Mr. Seymour for the governorship of NewYork, the Republicans nominated James S. Wadsworth, formerly apartisan of Mr. Van Buren and Silas Wright. He was a gentleman ofthe highest character, of large landed estate which he had inherited, and of wide personal popularity. He had volunteered for the war andwas then in the service, with the rank of Brigadier-General. Theconvention which nominated him assembled after Mr. Lincoln's decisiveaction. They hailed "with the profoundest satisfaction the recentproclamation of the President declaring his intention to emancipatethe slaves of all rebels who did not return to their allegiance bythe 1st of January, 1863, " and they urged upon the National Government"to use all the means that the God of battles had placed in itspower against a revolt so malignant and so pernicious. " LymanTremaine, a distinguished citizen who had been theretofore connectedwith the Democratic party, was nominated for Lieutenant-Governor. 

The contest was extremely animated, enlisting the interest of theentire country. The result was a victory for Mr. Seymour. Hismajority over General Wadsworth was nearly ten thousand. His votealmost equaled the total of all the Democratic factions in thePresidential election of 1860, while Mr. Wadsworth fell nearlyseventy thousand behind the vote given to Mr. Lincoln. Thediscrepancy could be well accounted for by the greater number ofRepublicans who had gone to the war, and for whose voting outsidethe State no provision had been made. No result could have beenmore distasteful to the Administration than the triumph of Mr. Seymour, and the experience of after years did not diminish theregret with which they had seen him elevated to a position of powerat a time when the utmost harmony was needed between the Nationaland State Governments. 

 REPUBLICAN DEFEAT IN ILLINOIS. 

To the President the most mortifying event of the year was theoverwhelming defeat in Illinois. Great efforts were made by theRepublican party to save the State. Personal pride entered intothe contest almost as much as political principle, but against allthat could be done the Democrats secured a popular majority ofseventeen thousand, and out of the fourteen representatives inCongress they left but three to the Republicans. They chose aDemocratic Legislature, which returned William A. Richardson tothe Senate for the unexpired term of Mr. Douglas, --filled sincehis death by O. H. Browning who had been appointed by the Governor. The crushing defeat of Mr. Lincoln in his own State had a depressingeffect upon the party elsewhere, and but for the assurance in whichthe Administration found comfort and cheer, that the Democrats wereat home to vote while the Republicans were in the field to fight, the result would have proved seriously discouraging to the countryand utterly destructive of the policy of emancipation as proclaimedby the President. 

In the five leading free States, the Administration had thus metwith a decisive defeat. The Democratic representatives chosen toCongress numbered in the aggregate fifty-nine, while those favorableto the Administration were only forty. In some other States theresults were nearly as depressing. New Jersey, which had givenhalf its electoral vote to Mr. Lincoln two years before, now electeda Democratic governor by nearly fifteen thousand majority, and ofher five representatives in Congress only one was friendly to thepolicy of the Administration. Michigan, which had been Republicanby twenty thousand in 1860, now gave the Administration but sixthousand majority, though Senator Chandler made almost superhumanefforts to bring out the full vote of the party. Wisconsin, whichhad given Mr. Lincoln a large popular majority, now gave a majorityof two thousand for the Democrats, dividing the Congressionaldelegation equally between the two parties. 

If this ratio had been maintained in all the States, the defeat ofthe war party and of the anti-slavery policy would have beencomplete. But relief came and the Administration was saved. TheNew-England States which voted in November stood firmly by theirprinciples, though with diminished majorities. The contest inMassachusetts resulted in the decisive victory of Governor Andrewover General Charles Devens, who ran as a Coalition candidate ofthe Democrats and Independents against the emancipation policy ofthe Administration. New Hampshire which voted the ensuing springhad the benefit of a Loyal re-action and sustained the Administration. In the West, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota cheered the Administrationwith unanimous Republican delegations to Congress, and on thePacific coast California and Oregon stood firmly by the President. 

The result in the Border slave States amply vindicated the sagacityand wisdom of the President in so constantly and carefully nurturingtheir loyalty and defending them against the inroads of theConfederates. They responded nobly, and in great part repairedthe injury inflicted by States which were presumptively more loyalto the Administration, and which had a far larger stake in thestruggle for the Union. Delaware's one representative was Republican, Missouri elected a decisive majority of friends to the Administration, and in the ensuing year Kentucky, West Virginia, and Marylandmaterially increased the strength of the government. The Administrationwas finally assured that it would be able to command a majority ofabout twenty in the House. But for the aid of the Border slaveStates the anti-slavery position of Mr. Lincoln might have beenoverthrown by a hostile House of Representatives. It is truetherefore in a very striking sense that the five slave States whichMr. Lincoln's policy had held to their loyalty, were most effectivelyused by him in overpowering the eleven slave States which hadrevolted against the Union. 

 COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION URGED. 

The third and last session of the Thirty-seventh Congress assembledfour weeks after the close of the exciting contest for the controlof the next House of Representatives. The message of Mr. Lincolnmade no reference whatever to the political contest in the country, and unlike his previous communications to Congress gave no specialsummary of the achievements by our forces either upon the land orthe sea. He contended himself with stating that he transmittedthe reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and referredCongress to them for full information. He dwelt a length upon thetotal inadequacy of Disunion as a remedy for the differences betweenthe people of the two sections, and quoted with evident satisfactionthe declarations he had made in his Inaugural address upon thatpoint. In his judgment "there is no line, straight or crooked, suitable for a National boundary upon which to divide. Trace itthrough from east to west upon the line between the free and theslave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third ofits length are rivers easy to be crossed; and populated, or soonto be populated, thickly on both sides, while nearly all itsremaining length are merely surveyor's lines over which people maywalk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence. No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass bywriting it down on paper or parchment as a National boundary. " Inthe President's view "a nation may be said to consist of itsterritory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the onlypart which is of certain durability. That portion of the earth'ssurface which is inhabited by the people of the United States iswell adapted for the home of one National family, but it is notwell adapted for two or more. "

Mr. Lincoln was still anxious that the Loyal slave States shouldsecure the advantage of compensated emancipation which he hadalready urged, and he recommended an amendment to the Constitutionwhereby a certain amount should be paid by the United States toeach State that would abolish slavery before the first day ofJanuary, A. D. 1900. The amount was to be paid in bonds of theUnited States on which interest was to begin from the time of actualdelivery to the States. The amendment was further to declare, that"all slaves who enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war atany time before the end of the rebellion shall be forever free, "but the individual owners, if loyal, shall be compensated at thesame rate that may be paid to those in States abolishing slavery. The amendment also proposed to give to "Congress the right toappropriate money for the colonization of the emancipated slaves, with their own consent, at any place outside of the United States. "

Congress had scarcely time to consider this grave proposition whenthe President issued on the first day of the new year (1863) hisformal Proclamation abolishing slavery in all the States in rebellionagainst the Government, with the exception of Tennessee, and ofcertain parishes in Louisiana and certain counties in Virginiawhose population was considered loyal to the Government. Tennesseewas excepted from the operation of the Proclamation at the urgentrequest of Andrew Johnson who, after the fall of Nashville in thepreceding spring, had resigned from the Senate to accept theappointment of military governor of his State. His service in theSenate, with his State in flagrant rebellion, was felt to be somewhatanomalous and he was glad to accept a position in which he couldbe more directly helpful to the loyal cause. He possessed theunbounded confidence of Mr. Lincoln who yielded to his viewsrespecting the best mode of restoring Tennessee to the Union, andher inhabitants to their duty to the National Government. Thereis good reason for believing that both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnsonafterwards regarded the omission of Tennessee from the Proclamationof Emancipation as a mistake, honestly made in the first place byGovernor Johnson and too readily acceded to by the President. 

The recommendation of Mr. Lincoln for a system of compensatedemancipation was taken up promptly and cordially by the Republicanmembers of both branches of Congress. The House appointed a specialcommittee on the subject. With but little delay a bill was passedappropriating to Missouri, the first State considered, ten millionsof dollars with the restriction that the money should be paid onlyto the loyal slave-holders. The Senate increased the amount tofifteen millions of dollars and returned it to the House forconcurrence in the amendment. The measure had been thus passed inboth branches but with stubborn opposition on the part of someprominent Democratic leaders from Missouri. John B. Henderson inthe Senate and John W. Noell in the House labored earnestly tosecure the compensation for their State, but the bill was finallydefeated in the House. By factious resistance, by dilatory motionsand hostile points of order, the Democratic members from Missouriwere able to force the bill from its position of parliamentaryadvantage, and to prevent its consideration within the period inwhich a majority of the House could control its fate. The justresponsibility for depriving Missouri of the fifteen millions ofdollars must be charged in an especial degree to Thomas L. Price, Elijah H. Norton, and William A. Hall, representatives from thatState, who on the 25th of February, 1863, by the use of objectionabletactics deprived the House of the opportunity even to consider abill of such value and consequence to their constituents. A largemajority stood ready to pass it, but the determined hostility ofthe Democratic members from Missouri defeated the kindly and generousintentions of Congress towards their own State. At a later periodin the session the attempt was made to pass the bill by a suspensionof the Rules, but this motion though it received the support of amajority was defeated for the lack of two-thirds of the votes asrequired. The Democratic members of Missouri were again active inresisting the boon which was offered to their State and so earnestlypressed by the Republicans of the House. 

 MISTAKE OF BORDER STATE MEN. 

The course of the Missouri representatives was sustained by thesolid vote of the Democratic members from the free States, andreceived the co-operation of a majority of representatives fromthe Border slave States. If the bill for Missouri had passed, asimilar relief would have been offered to Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware. Mr. Crittenden whose influence with therepresentatives from these States was deservedly great could notbe persuaded to adopt the President's policy. The considerationwhich influenced him and other Border State men to the course whichsubsequent events proved to be unwise, was their distrust of thesuccess of the Union arms. The prospect had grown steadilydiscouraging ever since the adjournment of Congress in the precedingJuly, and with the exception of General McClellan's success atAntietam there had been nothing to lighten the gloom which deeplybeclouded the military situation. The daily expenditures of thenation were enormous, and the Secretary of the Treasury had at theopening of the season estimated that the National debt at the closeof the current fiscal year would exceed seventeen hundred millionsof dollars. The Border State men chose therefore to maintainpossession of their four hundred thousand slaves, even with thetitle somewhat shaken by war, rather than to part with them forthe bonds of a Government whose ability to pay they consideredextremely doubtful. 

They could readily have secured, indeed they were urged to accept, fifty millions of dollars, the equivalent of gold coin, in securitieswhich became in a few years the favorite investment of the wisestcapitalists in the world. Such opportunities are never repeated. The magnanimous policy of the President and the wise liberality ofthe Republican party were precisely adapted, if the Border Statemen could have seen it, to the critical situation of the hour. Subsequent events prevented the repetition of the offer, and theslave-holders were left to thank themselves and their representativesfor the loss of the munificent compensation proffered by theGovernment. They could not believe Mr. Lincoln when at the pressingmoment he pleaded with them so earnestly to accept the terms, andflavored his appeal with the humorous remark to Mr. Crittenden:"You Southern men will soon reach the point where bonds will be amore valuable possession than bondsmen. Nothing is more uncertainnow than two-legged property. "

After the unfortunate issue of the Peninsular campaign and in thefear that Lee might turn directly upon Washington, a new army wasorganized on the 27th of June, 1862, and placed under the commandof Major-General John Pope. It included the forces which had beenserving under Frémont, Banks and McDowell, and was divided intothree corps with these officers respectively in command. GeneralFrémont considering the designation below his rank asked to berelieved from the service, and his corps was assigned to GeneralRufus King, and soon after to General Sigel. General Pope tookthe field on the 14th of July with a formidable force. GeneralMcClellan was still within twenty-five miles of Richmond, and withPope in front of Washington, the Confederate authorities were ata standstill and could not tell which way to advance with hope ofsuccess or even with safety. 

If the army of Lee should move towards Washington he might becompelled to fight General Pope protected by the extensivefortifications on the south side of the Potomac, leaving Richmondat the same time uncovered, with the possibility that McClellan, re-enforced by Burnside's corps which lay at Fortress Monroe, wouldrenew his attack with an army of ninety thousand men. But as soonas the Confederates ascertained that McClellan was ordered back tothe Potomac, they saw their opportunity and made haste to attackPope. Fault was found with the slowness of McClellan's movements. His judgment as a military man was decidedly against the transferof his army from the point it occupied near Richmond, and it cannotbe said that he obeyed the distasteful order with the alacrity withwhich he would have responded to one that agreed with his ownjudgment. 

 AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF THE CONFEDERATES. 

No reason can be assigned why if the Army of the Potomac was to bebrought back in front of Washington it should not have beentransferred in season to re-enforce General Pope and give a crushingblow to Lee. General McClellan was directed on the third day ofAugust to withdraw his whole army to Acquia Creek, and as GeneralHalleck declares, "in order to make the movement as rapidly aspossible General McClellan was authorized to assume control of allthe vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which therewas then a vast fleet. " General McClellan did not begin theevacuation of Harrison's Landing until the 14th of August--elevendays after it was ordered. General Burnside's corps was orderedon the 1st of August to move from Newport News to Acquia Creek, and an estimate of the transportation facilities at command ofGeneral McClellan, may be formed from the fact that Burnside'swhole corps reached their destination in forty-eight hours. GeneralLee knew at once by this movement that it was not the design toattack Richmond, and he made haste to throw his army on Pope beforethe slow moving army from Harrison's Landing could re-enforce him. General McClellan did not himself reach Acquia Creek until the 24thof August. The disasters sustained by General Pope in the monthof August could not have occurred if the forces of the Union, readily at command, had been brought seasonably to his aid. Itwas at this crisis that the unfortunate movements were made, thefull responsibility for which, perhaps the exact character of which, may never be determined, but the sorrowful result of which was thatthe Union forces, much larger in the aggregate than Lee's, weredivided and continually outnumbered on the field of battle. 

Flushed with success the Confederate authorities pushed theirfortunes with great boldness. General Bragg invaded Kentucky witha large army and General Lee prepared to invade Pennsylvania. Thecruel defeat of General Pope disabled him for the time as a commander, and the Administration, fearing for the safety of Washington, andyielding somewhat to the obvious wishes of the soldiers, orderedGeneral McClellan on September 2 to assume command of all troopsfor the defense of the Capital. General Lee avoiding the fortificationsof Washington, passed over to Maryland, and prepared to invadePennsylvania with a force formidable in numbers and with the addedstrength of a supreme confidence in its invincibility. GeneralMcClellan moved promptly westward to cut off Lee's progress northward. After preliminary engagements the main battle of Antietam was foughton the 17th of September, resulting in a Union victory. Lee wasseverely repulsed and retreated across the Potomac. 

General McClellan fought the battle of Antietam under extraordinaryembarrassment caused by the surrender of Harper's Ferry to theConfederates on the 13th, with a loss to the Union army of morethan twelve thousand men. Could he have had the advantage of thisforce on the battle-field, under a competent commander, at thecritical moment, his victory over Lee might have been still moredecisive. His success however was of overwhelming importance tothe National Government and put a stop to an invasion of Pennsylvaniawhich might have been disastrous in the extreme. He was blamedseverely, perhaps unjustly, for not following Lee on his retreatand reaping the fruits of his victory. He had the misfortune tofall into a controversy once more with the authorities at Washington. After a correspondence with the War Department he was peremptorilyordered by the General-in-Chief Halleck on the 6th of October inthese words: "The President directs that you cross the Potomacand give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army mustmove now while the roads are good. . . . I am directed to add thatthe Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur withthe President in these instructions. " The order was not promptlyobeyed. The Army of the Potomac--as those who spoke for GeneralMcClellan maintained--had been for six months engaged in a laboriouscampaign in which they had fought many battles and experienced muchhardship. They needed rest, recruitment, clothes, shoes, and ageneral supply of war material before setting out on what wouldprove a winter march. The authorities at Washington asserted, andapparently proved on the testimony of Quartermaster-General Meigs, a most accomplished, able, and honorable officer, that the Army ofthe Potomac, when it received its first orders to move in October, was thoroughly and completely equipped. General McClellan thoughthowever that if intrusted with the command of the army he shouldbe allowed to direct its movements. He crossed the Potomac nearHarper's Ferry in the last week of October, and began an advancethrough Virginia which effectually covered Washington. He hadreached Warrenton, and, before the plan of his campaign was developed, received at midnight, on the 7th of November, a direct order fromPresident Lincoln to "surrender the command of the army to GeneralBurnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capitalof New Jersey. "

 GENERAL McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER. 

The reasons for this sudden and peremptory order were not given, and if expressed would probably have been only an assertion of theutter impossibility that the War Department and General McClellanshould harmoniously co-operate in the great military movementswhich devolved upon the Army of the Potomac. But the time ofremoval was not opportunely selected by the Administration. AfterGeneral McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, a large proportionof the Northern people clamored for his deposition from command, and it would have been quietly acquiesced in by all. At the endof those disastrous days when he was falling back on the line ofthe James River, General McClellan had telegraphed the Secretaryof War "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you or to any persons in Washington. You have done yourbest to sacrifice this army. " Perhaps no such dispatch was everbefore sent by a military officer to the Commander-in-Chief of thearmy--to the ruler of the nation. In any other country it wouldhave been followed with instant cashiering. Mr. Lincoln, with hisgreat magnanimity, had however condoned the offense, and after thedefeat of Pope the Administration had enlarged the command ofMcClellan and trusted the fortunes of the country to his generalship. The trust had not been in vain. He had rolled back the tide ofinvasion by a great battle in which for the first time the army ofLee had been beaten. He was now marching forward with his armystrengthened for another conflict, and without explanation to thecountry or to himself was deprived of his command. A large partof the people and of the public press and an overwhelming majorityin the army were dissatisfied with the act, and believed that itwould entail evil consequences. 

This ended the military career of General McClellan which throughoutits whole period had been a subject of constant discussion--adiscussion which has not yet closed. The opinion of a majority ofintelligent observers, both civil and military, is that he was aman of high professional training, admirably skilled in the scienceof war, capable of commanding a large army with success, but atthe same time not original in plan, not fertile in resource, andlacking the energy, the alertness, the daring, the readiness totake great risks for great ends, which distinguish the militaryleaders of the world. For a commander of armies, in an offensivecampaign, his caution was too largely developed. He possessed intoo great a degree what the French term the _defensive instinct ofthe engineer_, and was apparently incapable of doing from his ownvolition what he did so well on the bloody field of Antietam, whenunder the pressure of an overwhelming necessity. 

General Burnside assumed the command with diffidence. After aconsultation with General Halleck he moved down the Rappahannockopposite Fredericksburg where he confronted General Lee's army onthe 13th of December, and made an attack upon it under greatdisadvantages and with the legitimate result of a great defeat. The total loss of killed and wounded of the Union army exceededten thousand men. The public mind was deeply affected throughoutthe North by this untoward event. All the prestige which Lee hadlost at Antietam had been regained, all the advantage we had securedon that field was sacrificed by the disaster on the still bloodierfield of Fredericksburg. It added immeasurably to the gloom of agloomy winter, and in the rank and file of the army it caused adissatisfaction somewhat akin to mutiny. So pronounced did thisfeeling become and so plainly was it manifested that the subjectattracted the attention of Congress and led to some results which, despite the seriousness of the situation, were irresistibly amusing. 

On the 23d of January Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts offered a somewhatextraordinary resolution, --instructing the Committee on the Conductof the War to "inquire whether Major-General Burnside has sincethe battle of Fredericksburg formed any plans for the movement ofthe Army of the Potomac or any portion of the same, and if sowhether any subordinate generals of said army have written to orvisited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution ofsuch movements, and whether such proposed movements have beenarrested or interfered with, and if so by what authority. " Theconsideration of the resolution was postponed under the rule, andthree days later it was called up by Mr. Anthony of Rhode Islandand its adoption urged "with the view of finding out whether officerswere coming up here from the Army of the Potomac to interfere withthe plans of General Burnside. " There was indeed no doubt thatsome of the general officers connected with the army had been inWashington, and confidentially informed the President of thedispirited and depressed condition of the whole force. 

 GENERAL BURNSIDE AND GENERAL HOOKER. 

General Burnside's character was one of great frankness, truth, and fidelity. He was full of courage and of manliness, and heconceived from circumstances within his knowledge, that certainofficers in his command were gradually undermining and destroyinghim in the confidence of the army and of the public. He had notdesired the position to which the President called him as thesuccessor of General McClellan. He did not feel himself indeedquite competent to the task of commanding an army of one hundredthousand men. But there as in every other position in life hewould try to do his best. He failed and failed decisively. Itwould probably have been wise for him to resign his commandimmediately after the defeat at Fredericksburg. On January 23, the Friday before the Senate resolution was adopted, GeneralBurnside, highly incensed by the injury which he thought had beendone him, wrote an order peremptorily "dismissing, subject to theapproval of the President, Major-General Joseph E. Hooker from theArmy of the United States, for having been guilty of unjust andunnecessary criticism of his superior officers, and for having bythe general tone of his conversation endeavored to create distrustin the minds of officers who have associated with him, and forhaving habitually spoken in disparaging terms of other officers. "The order declared that General Hooker was dismissed "as a manunfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like thepresent when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism is due from every person in the field. " The sameorder dismissed Brigadier-General John Newton and Brigadier-GeneralJohn Cochrane for going to the President with criticisms on theplans of the commanding officer, and relieved Major-General WilliamB. Franklin, Major-General W. F. Smith, Brigadier-General Sturgisand several others from further service in the Army of the Potomac. 

The outcome of this extraordinary proceeding was very singular. General Burnside took the order, before its publication, to thePresident who instead of approving it, very good-naturedly founda command for the General in the West, and on the very day thatthe Senate passed the resolution of inquiry, two orders were readat the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, --one from GeneralBurnside announcing that Major-General Joseph E. Hooker was assignedto the command of the Army of the Potomac and asking the army to"give to the brave and skillful General, who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and co-operation;" the other fromGeneral Hooker assuming command of the Army of the Potomac bydirection of the President and conveying to the late commander, General Burnside, "the most cordial good wishes of the whole army. "

In the South-West where General Grant, General Sherman, and GeneralRosecrans were stubbornly contesting the ground, no decisive resultswere attained. The army went into winter quarters, with a generalfeeling of discouragement pervading the country. A substantialadvantage was gained by General Buell's army in driving Bragg outof Kentucky, and a very signal and helpful encouragement came tothe Government from the fact that the public manifestations inKentucky were decisively adverse to the Confederates, and thatLee's army in Maryland met no welcome from any portion of thepopulation. General McClellan's army was cheered everywhere inMaryland as it marched to the field of Antietam; and as Braggretreated through the mountain sections of Kentucky his stragglerswere fired upon by the people, and the women along the routeupbraided the officers with bitter maledictions. Perhaps thefeature of the two invasions most discouraging to the Confederateswas the condition of the popular mind which they found in the BorderStates. They had expected to arouse fresh revolt, but they met apeople tired of conflict and longing for repose under the flag ofthe Nation. 

Congress felt that the situation was one of uncertainty if not ofpositive adversity. They did not however abate one jot or tittleof earnest effort in providing for a renewal of the contest in theensuing spring. They appropriated some seven hundred and fortymillions of dollars for the army and some seventy-five millionsfor the navy, and they took the very decisive step of authorizing"the President to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the landand naval service of the United States such number of volunteersof African descent as he may deem useful to suppress the presentRebellion for such term of service as he may prescribe, not exceedingfive years. " The enactment of this bill was angrily resisted bythe Democratic party and by the Union men of the Border States. But the Republicans were able to consolidate their ranks in supportof it. In the popular opinion it was a radical measure, and thereinlay its chief merit. Aside from the substantial strength whichthe accession of these colored men to the ranks would give to theUnion army, was the moral effect which would be produced on theminds of Southern men by the open demonstration that the Presidentdid not regard the Proclamation of Emancipation as _brutum fulmen_, but intended to enforce it by turning the strong arm of the slaveagainst the person of the master. It was a policy that requiredgreat moral courage, and it was abundantly rewarded by successfulresults. It signalized to the whole world the depth of theearnestness with which the Administration was defending the Union, and the desperate extent to which the contest would be carriedbefore American nationality should be surrendered. The measurehad long been demanded by the aggressive sentiment of the North, and its enactment was hailed by the mass of people in the LoyalStates as a great step forward. 

 SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS. 

A subject of striking interest at this session of Congress was thepassage of the "Act relating to _habeas corpus_, and regulatingjudicial proceedings in certain cases. " The President had orderedfor the public safety, and as an act necessary to the successfulprosecution of the war, the arrest and confinement of certainpersons charged with disloyal practices. No punishment was attemptedor designed except that of confinement in a military fortress ofthe United States. It became a matter of argument not only inCongress but throughout the country, whether the President wasauthorized by the Constitution to suspend the writ of _habeascorpus_. In order to set the question at rest it was now proposedto pass an Act of indemnity for past acts to all officers engagedin making arrests, and also to confirm to the President by law theright which he had of his own power been exercising. The billdeclared that "during the present Rebellion the President of theUnited States, whenever in his judgment the public safety mayrequire it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of_habeas corpus_ in any case throughout the United States or anypart thereof; and wherever the said writ shall be suspended nomilitary or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writof _habeas corpus_, to return the body of any person or personsdetained by him by authority of the President. "

The bill was stubbornly resisted by the Democratic party, and afterits passage by the House thirty-six Democratic representativesasked leave to enter upon the Journal a solemn protest against itsenactment. They recited at length their grounds of objection, theprincipal of which was "the giving to the President the right tosuspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ throughout the limits of theUnited States, whereas by the Constitution the power to suspendthe privilege of that writ is confided to the discretion of Congressalone and is limited to the place threatened by the dangers ofinvasion or insurrection, " and also because "the bill purports toconfirm and make valid by act of Congress arrests and imprisonmentswhich were not only not warranted by the Constitution of the UnitedStates but were in palpable violation of its express prohibitions. "Mr. Thaddeus Stevens peremptorily moved to lay the request on thetable, and on a call of the ayes and noes the motion prevailed bya vote of 75 to 41. The division in the House by this time amountedto a strict line, on one side of which was the war party and onthe other side the anti-war party. 

The crowning achievement of the session in aid of the Union wasthe passage of an "Act for enrolling and calling out the Nationalforces and for other purposes. " By its terms all able-bodiedcitizens of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, with a few exemptions which were explicitly stated, were declared to "constitute the National forces and shall beemployed to perform military duty in the service of the UnitedStates when called on by the President for that purpose. " Volunteeringwas not to be relied upon as the sole means of recruiting the army, but the entire population within the arms-bearing age was now tobe devoted to the contest. Taken in connection with other legislationalready adverted to--the enormous appropriations for the forthcomingcampaign, the organization of African regiments, the suspension ofthe writ of _habeas corpus_ at the President's discretion--thislast measure was the conclusive proof of the serious determinationwith which Congress and the people would continue the contest. The spirit with which the President and Congress proceeded in thatdepressing and depressed period proved invaluable to the country. The situation had so many elements of a discouraging character thatthe slightest hesitation or faltering among those controlling theadministration of the Government would have been followed by distrustand dismay among the people. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

The President's Border-State Policy. --Loyal Government erected inVirginia. --Recognized by Congress and Senators admitted. --Desirefor a New State. --The Long Dissatisfaction of the People of WesternVirginia. --The Character of the People and of their Section. --TheirOpportunity had come. --Organization of the Pierpont Government. --State Convention and Constitution. --Application to Congress forAdmission. --Anti-slavery Amendment. --Senate Debate: Sumner, Wade, Powell, Willey, and Others. --House Debate: Stevens, Conway, Bingham, Segar. --Passage of Bill in Both Branches. --Heavy Blow to the OldState. --Her Claims deserve Consideration. --Should be treated asgenerously at least as Mexico. 

The great importance attached by Mr. Lincoln to the preservationof Loyalty in the line of slave States which bordered upon the freeStates was everywhere recognized. As Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri had been promptly placed under the control of governmentsfriendly to the Union, there remained of the States in rebelliononly Virginia with territory adjacent to the Loyal States. Virginiabordered on the Ohio River for two hundred and fifty miles; shewas adjacent to Pennsylvania for a distance of one hundred andtwenty miles, half on the southern, half on the western line ofthat State. Her extreme point stretched to the northward ofPittsburg, and was within twenty-five miles of the parallel oflatitude that marks the southern boundary of New England. Thecontinued exercise of even a nominal jurisdiction so far North, bythe State which contained the capital of the Rebel Confederacy, would be a serious impeachment of the power of the NationalGovernment, and would detract from its respect at home and itsprestige abroad. But the National Government was of itself capableonly of enforcing military occupation and proclaiming the jurisdictionof the sword. What the President desired was the establishment ofcivil government by a loyal people, with the reign of law and ordereverywhere recognized. Happily the disposition of the inhabitantswas in harmony with the wishes of the Administration and thenecessities of the Union. 

After the adoption of the Secession Ordinance by the VirginiaConvention on the 17th of April, the loyal people of the Westernsection of the State were prompt to act. As early as the 13th ofMay--a fortnight before the day appointed for the popular vote onthe Secession Ordinance in Virginia--five hundred staunch Unionmen came together in a Convention at Wheeling, denounced theOrdinance of Secession and pledged their loyalty to the NationalGovernment and their obedience to its laws. If the Ordinance shouldbe approved by the popular vote of Virginia, this preliminaryconference requested the people in all the counties represented, to appoint delegates on the fourth day of June to a General Conventionto assemble in Wheeling on the 11th of the same month. These Union-loving men were energetic and zealous. They realized that withthe secession of Virginia, completed and proclaimed, they must doone of two things--either proceed at once to organize a Stategovernment which would be faithful to the National Constitution, or drift helplessly into anarchy and thus contribute to the successof the rebellion. Their prompt and intelligent action is a remarkableillustration of the trained and disciplined ability of Americansfor the duties of self-government. 

The members of the Convention which was organized on the 11th ofJune were even more determined than those who had assembled thepreceding month. Without delay they declared the State offices ofVirginia vacant because of the treason and disloyalty of those whohad been elected to hold them, and they proceeded to fill them andform a regular State organization of which Francis H. Pierpont wasappointed the executive head. They did not assume to represent amere section of the State, but in the belief that the loyal peoplewere entitled to speak for the whole State they declared that theirgovernment was the Government of Virginia. This Western movementwas subsequently strengthened by the accession of delegates fromAlexandria and Fairfax Counties in Middle Virginia and from Accomacand Northampton Counties on the Eastern Shore. Thus organized, the Government of the State was acknowledged by Congress as theGovernment of Virginia and her senators and representatives wereadmitted to seats. 

Notwithstanding the compliance with all the outward forms andrequirements, notwithstanding the recognition by Congress of thenew government, it was seen to be essentially and really theGovernment of West Virginia. It was only nominally and by constructionthe Government of the State of Virginia. It did not represent thepolitical power or the majority of the people of the entire State. That power was wielded in aid of the rebellion. The senators andrepresentatives of Virginia were in the Confederate Congress. Thestrength of her people was in the Confederate Army, of which adistinguished Virginian was the commander. The situation wasanomalous, though the friends of the Union justified the irregularityof recognizing the framework of government in the hands of loyalmen as the actual civil administration of the State of Virginia. 

 CHARACTER OF WEST VIRGINIA. 

The people of the Western section of Virginia realized that theposition was unnatural, --one which they could not sustain by popularpower within the limits of the State they assumed to govern, exceptfor the protection afforded by the military power of the NationalGovernment. Between the two sections of the State there had longbeen serious antagonisms. Indeed from the very origin of thesettlement of West Virginia, which had made but little progresswhen the Federal Constitution was adopted, its citizens were inlarge degree alienated from the Eastern and older section of theState. The men of the West were hardy frontiersmen, a majority ofthem soldiers of the Revolution and their immediate descendants, without estates, with little but the honorable record of patrioticservice and their own strong arms, for their fortunes. They hadfew slaves. They had their land patents, which were certificatesof patriotic service in the Revolutionary war, and they dependedupon their own labor for a new home in the wilderness. A populationthus originating, a community thus founded, were naturally uncongenialto the aristocratic element of the Old Dominion. They had no traderelations, no social intercourse, with the tide-water section ofthe State. Formidable mountain ranges separated the two sections, and the inhabitants saw little of each other. The business interestsof the Western region led the people to the Valley of the Ohio andnot to the shores of the Chesapeake. The waters of the Monongahelaconnected them with Pennsylvania and carried them to Pittsburg. All the rivers of the western slope flowed into the Ohio and gaveto the people the markets of Cincinnati and Louisville. Theircommercial intercourse depended on the navigation of Western waters, and a far larger number had visited St. Louis and New Orleans thanhad ever seen Richmond or Norfolk. The West-Virginians were awareof the splendid resources of their section and were constantlyirritated by the neglect of the parent State to aid in theirdevelopment. They enjoyed a climate as genial as that of theItalians who dwell on the slopes of the Apennines; they had forestsmore valuable than those that skirt the upper Rhine; they hadmineral wealth as great as that which has given England her precedencein the manufacturing progress of the world. They were anxious forself-government. Their trustworthy senator, Waitman T. Willey, declared that the people west of the Alleghany range had for sixtyyears "desired separation. " The two sections, he said, had beentime and again on the eve of an outbreak and the Western peoplecould with difficulty be held back from insurrection. Criminationsand recriminations had been exchanged at every session of theLegislature for forty years and threats of violence had been hurledby one section at the other. 

The opportunity for a new State had now come. Its organizationand admission to the Union would complete the chain of loyalCommonwealths on the south side of Mason and Dixon's line, andwould drive back the jurisdiction of rebellious Virginia beyondthe chain of mountains and interpose that barrier to the progressof the insurrectionary forces Westward and Northward. The provisionin the Federal Constitution that no new State shall be formed withinthe jurisdiction of any other State without the consent of theLegislature of the State as well as of Congress, had always beenthe stumbling-block in the way of West Virginia's independence. Despite the hostilities and antagonisms of the two populations, Virginia would insist on retaining this valuable section of countrywithin her own jurisdiction. But now, by the chances of war, thesame men who desired to create the new State were wielding theentire political power of Virginia, and they would naturally grantpermission to themselves to erect a State that would be entirelyfree from the objectionable jurisdiction which for the time theyrepresented. They were not slow to avail themselves of theiropportunity. 

 ADMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA TO THE UNION. 

The Pierpont Government, as it was now popularly termed, adoptedan Ordinance on the 20th of August, 1861, providing "for theformation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of thisState. " The Ordinance was approved by a vote of the people on thefourth Thursday of October, and on the 26th of November the Conventionassembled in Wheeling to frame a constitution for the new government. The work was satisfactorily performed, and on the first Thursdayof April, 1862, the people approved the constitution by a vote fo18, 862 in favor of it with only 514 against it. The work of therepresentatives of the projected new State being thus ratified, the Governor called the Legislature of Virginia together on thesixth day of May, and on the 13th of the same moth that body gaveits consent, with due regularity, to "the formation of a new Statewithin the jurisdiction of the said State of Virginia. " A fortnightlater, on the 28th of May, Senator Willey introduced the subjectin Congress by presenting a memorial from the Legislature of Virginiatogether with a certified copy of the proceedings of the ConstitutionalConvention and the vote of the people. 

The constitution was referred to the Committee on Territories anda bill favorable to admission was promptly reported by Senator Wadeof Ohio. The measure was discussed at different periods, largelywith reference to the effect it would have upon the institution ofslavery, and Congress insisted upon inserting a provision that "thechildren of slaves, born in the State after the fourth day of July, 1863, shall be free; all slaves within the said State who shall atthat time be under the age of ten years shall be free when theyarrive at the age of twenty-one years; all slaves over ten andunder twenty-one shall be free at the age of twenty-five years;and no slave shall be permitted to come into the State for permanentresidence therein. " This condition was to be ratified by theConvention which framed the constitution, and by the people at anelection held for the purpose, and, upon due certification of theapproval of the condition to the President of the United States, he was authorized to issue his proclamation declaring West Virginiato be a State of the Union. 

Mr. Sumner was not satisfied with a condition which left WestVirginia with any form of slavery whatever. He said there were"twelve thousand human beings now held in bondage in that State, and all who are over a certain age are to be kept so for theirnatural lives. " He desired to strike out the provision whichpermitted this and to insert on in lieu thereof, declaring that"within the limits of the said State there shall be neither slaverynor involuntary servitude otherwise than in the punishment of crimewhereof the party shall have been duly convicted. " Mr. Sumner'samendment was opposed by some of the most radical anti-slavery menin the Senate, notably by Collamer and Foot of Vermont, by Wade ofOhio, and by Howe of Wisconsin. They believed that the convictionsof the people of West Virginia had developed to the point embodiedin the bill, and that to attempt the immediate extirpation ofslavery might lead to re-action and possibly to the rejection ofthe constitution. Mr. Sumner's amendment was therefore defeatedby 24 votes against 11. Of the 24 votes 17 were given by Republicansenators. 

Mr. Powell of Kentucky vigorously opposed the bill in all its parts. He contended that "if the cities of New York and Brooklyn, withthe counties in which they are located, were to get up a littlebogus Legislature and say they were the State of New York, and askto be admitted and cut off from the rest of the State, I would justas soon vote for their admission as to vote for the pending bill. "No senator, he said, could pretend to claim that "even a third partof the people of Virginia have ever had any thing to do withrendering their assent to the making of this new State within theterritorial limits of that ancient Commonwealth. " He declared thisto be "a dangerous precedent which overthrows the Constitution andmay be fraught with direful consequences. " "Out of the one hundredand sixty counties that compose the State of Virginia, " he continued, "less than one-fourth have assumed to act for the entire State;and even within the boundaries of the new State more than half thevoters have declined to take part in the elections. "

Mr. Willey argued that the Legislature represented the almostunanimous will of all the loyal people of West Virginia. He saidthat "besides the 19, 000 votes cast, there were 10, 100 men absentin the Union army, and that, the conclusion being foregone, thepeople had not been careful to come out to vote, knowing that theconstitution would be overwhelmingly adopted. " On the 14th ofJuly, three days before Congress adjourned, the bill passed theSenate by a vote of 23 to 17. Mr. Rice of Minnesota was the onlyDemocrat who favored the admission of the new State. The otherDemocratic senators voted against it. Mr. Chandler and Mr. Howardof Michigan voted in the negative because the State had voluntarilydone nothing towards providing for the emancipation of slaves; Mr. Sumner and Mr. Wilson, because the State had rejected the anti-slavery amendment; Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Cowan, because of theirregularity of the whole proceeding. 

 ADMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA TO THE UNION. 

The bill was not considered in the House until the next session. It was taken up on the 9th of December and was vigorously attackedby Mr. Conway of Kansas. He questioned the validity of the PierpontGovernment and asked whether the law which gave him his warrant ofauthority had come from "a mob or from a mass-meeting. " He saidhe had "serious reason to believe that it is the intention of thePresident to encourage the formation of State organizations in allthe seceded States, and that a few individuals are to assume Statepowers wherever a military encampment can be effected in any ofthe rebellious districts. " Mr. Conway denounced this scheme as"utterly and flagrantly unconstitutional, as radically revolutionaryin character and deserving the reprobation of every loyal citizen. "It aimed, he said, at "an utter subversion of our constitutionalsystem and will consolidate all power in the hands of the Executive. "He was answered with spirit by Mr. Colfax of Indiana, who reviewedthe successive steps by which the legality of the Virginia governmenthad been recognized by the President and by all the departments ofthe executive government. He argued that West Virginia had takenevery step regularly and complied with every requirement of theConstitution. 

Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky said the Wheeling government could beregarded as the government of the whole State of Virginia "only bya mere fiction. We _know_ the fact to be otherwise. " He said itwas the party applying for admission that consented to the admission, and that was the whole of it. When the war should cease and theNational authority should be re-established he wanted the Union asit was. This would be "a new-made Union--the old majestic bodycut and slashed by passion, by war, coming to form another government, another Union. The Constitution gives us no power to do what weare asked to do. " Mr. Maynard said there were "two governors andtwo Legislatures assuming authority over Virginia simultaneously. The question here is which shall the Government of the United Statesrecognize as the true and lawful Legislature of Virginia?" Hecontended that it had already been settled, by the admission ofmembers of both branches of Congress under the Pierpont Government. Mr. Dawes affirmed that "nobody has given his consent to the divisionof the State of Virginia and the erection of a new State who doesnot reside within the new State itself. " He contended thereforethat "this bill does not comply with the spirit of the Constitution. If the remaining portions of Virginia are under duress while thisconsent is given, it is a mere mockery of the Constitution. " Mr. Brown of Virginia, from that part which was to be included in thenew State, corrected Mr. Dawes, but the latter maintained thatwhile a member of the Legislature "was picked up in Fairfax andtwo or three gentlemen in other parts of the State, they protestedthemselves that they did not pretend to represent the counties fromwhich they hailed. "

Mr. Thaddeus Stevens said he did not desire to be understood as"sharing the delusion that we are admitting West Virginia inpursuance of any provision of the Constitution. " He could "findno provision justifying it, and the argument in favor of it originateswith those who either honestly entertain an erroneous opinion, orwho desire to justify by a forced construction an act which theyhave predetermined to do. " He maintained that it was "but mockeryto say that the Legislature of Virginia has ever consented to thedivision. Only two hundred thousand out of a million and a quarterof people have participated in the proceedings. " He contended that"the State of Virginia has a regular organization, and by a largemajority of the people it has changed its relations to the FederalGovernment. " He knew that this was treason in the individuals whoparticipated in it; but so far as the State was concerned, it wasa valid act. Our government, he argued, "does not act upon a State. The State, as a separate distinct body, is the State of a majorityof the people of Virginia, whether rebel or loyal, whether convictor free men. The majority of the people of Virginia is the Stateof Virginia, although individuals have committed treason. " "GovernorPierpont, " continued Mr. Stevens, "is an excellent man, and I wishhe were the Governor elected by the people of Virginia. Butaccording to my principles operating at the present time I can votefor the admission of West Virginia without any compunctions ofconscience--only with some doubt about the policy of it. None ofthe States now in rebellion are entitled to the protection of theConstitution. These proceedings are in virtue of the laws of war. We may admit West Virginia as a new State, not by virtue of anyprovision of the Constitution but under our absolute power whichthe laws of war give us in the circumstances in which we are placed. I shall vote for this bill upon that theory, and upon that alone. I will not stultify myself by supposing that we have any warrantin the Constitution for this proceeding. "

 ADMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA TO THE UNION. 

Mr. Bingham of Ohio made an able argument principally devoted torebutting the somewhat mischievous ground assumed by Mr. Stevens. He affirmed that "the minority of the people of the State cannotbe deprived of their rights because the majority have committedtreason. " He argued that, the majority of the people of Virginiahaving become rebels, the State was in the hands of the loyalminority, who in that event had a right to administer the laws, maintain the authority of the State government, and elect a StateLegislature and a Governor, through whom they might call upon theFederal Government for protection against domestic violence, according to the express guaranty of the Constitution. "To denythis proposition, " continued Mr. Bingham, "is to say that when themajority in any State revolt against the laws, the State governmentcan never be re-organized nor the rights of the minority protectedso long as the majority are in revolt. " He contended that thedoctrine he advocated was not a new one, that it was as old as theConstitution, and he called attention to the remarkable letter of"The Federalist, " addressed by Mr. Madison to the American peoplein which "he who is called the author of the Constitution" asked:"Why may not illicit combinations for purposes of violence be formedas well by a majority of a State as by a majority of a county ordistrict of the same State? And if the authority of the Stateought in the latter case to protect the local magistrate, oughtnot the Federal authority in the former case to support the Stateauthority?"

Mr. Segar, who represented the district including Fortress Monroe, pleaded very earnestly against the dismemberment of his State andhe argued, as Mr. Powell had argued in the Senate, that there wasno evidence that a majority of the people within the counties whichwere to compose the new State had ever given their assent to itsformation. The ordinary vote of those counties he said was 48, 000while on the new State question the entire vote cast was only19, 000. He named ten counties included in the new State organizationin which not a single vote had been cast on either side of thequestion at the special election. Though loyal to the Union andgrieving over the rebellious course of Virginia he begged that thishumiliation might be spared her. "Let there not be two Virginias;let us remain one and united. Do not break up the rich cluster ofglorious memories and associations which gather over the name andthe history of this ancient and once glorious Commonwealth. "

On the passage of the bill the ayes were 96 and the noes were 55. The ayes were wholly from the Republican party, though severalprominent Republicans opposed the measure. Almost the entireMassachusetts delegation voted in the negative, as did also Mr. Roscoe Conkling, Mr. Conway of Kansas and Mr. Francis Thomas ofMaryland. The wide difference of opinion concerning this act wasnot unnatural. But the cause of the Union was aided by the additionof another loyal commonwealth, and substantial justice was done tothe brave people of the new State who by their loyalty had earnedthe right to be freed from the domination which had fretted themand from the association which was uncongenial to them. 

To the old State of Virginia the blow was a heavy one. In theyears following the war it added seriously to her financialembarrassment, and it has in many ways obstructed her prosperity. As a punitive measure, for the chastening of Virginia, it cannotbe defended. Assuredly there was no ground for distressing Virginiaby penal enactments that did not apply equally to every other Stateof the Confederacy. Common justice revolts at the selection ofone man for punishment from eleven who have all been guilty of thesame offense. If punishment had been designed there was equalreason for stripping Texas of her vast domain and for withdrawingthe numerous land grants which had been generously made by theNational Government to many of the States in rebellion. But Texaswas allowed to emerge from the contest without the forfeiture ofan acre, and Congress, so far from withdrawing the land grants bywhich other Southern States were to be enriched, took pains torenew them in the years succeeding the war. The autonomy of Virginiaalone was disturbed. Upon Virginia alone fell the penalty, whichif due to any was due to all. 

 THE PUBLIC DEBT OF VIRGINIA. 

Another consideration is of great weight. An innocent third partywas involved. Virginia owed a large debt, held in great part byloyal citizens of the North and by subjects of foreign countries. The burden was already as heavy as she could bear in her entirety, and dismemberment so crippled her that she could not meet herobligations. The United States might well have relieved Virginiaand have done justice to her creditors by making some allowancefor the division of her territory. Regarding her only as entitledto the rights of a public enemy so long as she warred upon theUnion, we may confidently maintain that she is entitled at leastto as just and magnanimous treatment as the National Governmentextends to a foreign foe. In our war with Mexico it became ourinterest to acquire a large part of the territory owned by thatrepublic. We had conquered her armies and were in possession ofher capital. She was helpless in our hands. But the high senseof justice which has always distinguished the United States in herpublic policies would not permit the despoilment of Mexico. Wenegotiated therefore for the territory needed, and paid for it alarger price than would have been given by any other nation in theworld. The American Government went still farther. Many of ourcitizens held large claims against Mexico, and the failure to paythem had been one of the causes that precipitated hostilities. Our government in addition to the money consideration of fifteenmillions of dollars which we paid for territory, agreed to exonerateMexico from all demands of our citizens, and to pay them from ourown Treasury. This supplementary agreement cost the NationalTreasury nearly four million dollars. 

If the United State were willing to place Virginia on the basis onwhich they magnanimously placed Mexico after the conquest of thatRepublic, a sufficient allowance would be made to her to compensateat least for that part of her public debt which might presumptivelybe represented by the territory taken from her. If it be said inanswer to such a suggestion that it would be fairer for West Virginiato assume the proportional obligation thus indicated, the promptrejoinder is that in equity her people are not held to suchobligation. The public improvements for which the debt was inlarge part incurred had not been so far completed as to benefitWest Virginia when the civil war began, --their advantages beingmainly confined to the Tide-water and Piedmont sections of theState. There is indeed neither moral nor legal responsibilityresting upon West Virginia for any part of the debt of the oldState. 

In determining the relative obligations of the National Governmentand of the government of West Virginia, concerning the debt, it isof the first importance to remember that the new State was notprimarily organized and admitted to the Union for the benefit ofher own people, but in far larger degree for the benefit of thepeople of the whole Union. The organic law would not have beenstrained, legal fictions would not have been invented, contradictorytheories would not have been indulged, if a great national interesthad not demanded the creation of West Virginia. If it had not beenapparent that the organization of West Virginia was an advantageto the loyal cause; if the border-State policy of Mr. Lincoln, sorigidly adhered to throughout the contest, had not required thislink for the completion of its chain, --the wishes of the peoplemost directly involved would never have had the slightest attentionfrom the Congress of the United States. Strong and equitable aswas the case of West Virginia, irritating and undesirable as herrelations to the older State might be, advantageous to the peopleas the new government might prove, these considerations would notof themselves have offered sufficient inducement to engage theattention of Congress for an hour at that critical period. Theywould have been brushed aside and disregarded with that coolindifference by which all great legislative bodies prove how easyit is to endure the misery of other people. West Virginia indeedgot only what was equitably due, and what she was entitled to claimby the natural right of self-government. The war brought goodfortune to her as conspicuously as it brought ill fortune to theolder State from which she was wrenched. West Virginia is to becongratulated, and her creditable career and untiring enterprisesince she assumed the responsibilities of self-government show howwell she deserved the boon. But the wounds inflicted on the motherState by her separation will never be healed until Virginia isrelieved from the odium of having been specially selected from theeleven seceding States for the punishment that struck at onceagainst her prosperity and against her pride of empire. 

Nor should it be forgotten that the State of Virginia before thewar might well be regarded as the creditor and not the debtor ofthe National Government. One of her earliest acts of patriotism asan independent State was the cession to the General Government ofher superb domain on the north side of the Ohio River, from thesale of which more than one hundred millions of dollars have beenpaid into the National Treasury. A suggestive contrast is presentedto-day between the condition of Virginia and the condition of Texasand Florida. It was the aggressive disunionism of the two latterStates which aided powerfully in dragging Virginia into rebellion. But for the urgency of the seven original Confederate States, inwhich Texas and Florida were numbered, Virginia Loyalists wouldhave been able to hold their State firm in her National allegiance. Since the war Texas has traveled the highway to wealth and power, founded on the ownership of her public lands, of which the NationalGovernment could have deprived her with as little difficulty as wasfound in dividing Virginia. Florida has likewise enjoyed generalprosperity, and secured rapid development from the resources ofland which the National Government had generously given her beforethe war and of which she was not deprived for her acts of rebellion. True-hearted Americans rejoice in the prosperity of these Stateswhich adorn the southern border of the Republic; but they cannothelp seeing, and seeing with regret, how differently the ancientCommonwealth of Virginia has fared at the hands of the NationalGovernment. 

 EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED. 

If the hurt to Virginia were of a general character, which couldnot be specified or defined, her case might be passed over withthe plea of _damnum absque injurid_. But, unfortunately, --or itmay be fortunately, --the detriment to her public credit can bestated with substantial precision, and can be traced directly toher despoilment. That took from her the power to pay her debt. If the harm resulting therefrom were confined to the State and tothe holders of her securities, the National Government might themore easily disregard the equities of the case. But Virginia'sembarrassment is of wide-spread concern, and injuriously affectsthe public credit of other States. Nor can it be said that theprecedent of aiding Virginia could be quoted for aid to every Statethat might get into financial trouble. It could be quoted onlyfor the case--which will perhaps never again occur--where theNational Government shall strip the State of a large and valuablepart of her territory, and thus take from her the ability to meether obligations. The precedent might then be quoted, and shouldbe unhesitatingly followed. 

In the formal and necessarily austere administration of publicaffairs there is little room for the interposition of sentiment. Yet sentiment has its place. We stimulate the ardor of patriotismby the mere display of a flag which has no material force, butwhich is emblematic of all material force, and typifies the gloryof the Nation. We stir the ambition of the living by rearing costlymonuments to the heroic dead. It may surely be pardoned if Americansshall feel a deep personal interest in the good name and goodfortune of a State so closely identified with the early renown ofthe Republic, --a State with whose soil is mingled the dust of thoseto whom all States and all generations are debtors, --the Father ofhis Country, the author of the Declaration of Independence, thechief projector of the National Constitution. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

National Currency and State Bank Currency. --In Competition. --Legal-tender Bill tended to expand State Bank Circulation. --SecretaryChase's Recommendation. --Favorably received. --State Bank Circulation, $150, 000, 000. --Preliminary Bill to establish National Banks. --Fessenden. --Sherman. --Hooper. --National Bank System in 1862. --Discussed among the People. --Recommended by the President. --Mr. Chase urges it. --Bill introduced and discussed in Senate. --Discussionin the House. --Bill passed. --Hugh McCulloch of Indiana appointedComptroller of the Currency. --Amended Bank Act. --To remedy Defects, Circulation limited to $500, 000, 000. --National Power. --State Rights. --Taxation. --Renewed Debate in Senate and House. --Bill passed. --Merits of the System. --Former Systems. --First Bank of the UnitedStates. --Charters of United-States banks, 1791-1816. --NationalBanks compared with United-States Banks. --One Defective Element. --Founded on National Debt. 

The Secretary of the Treasury had not failed to see that a constantconflict and damaging competition must ensue between the currencyof the Nation and the currency of the State banks. It was thecourse of the banks more than any other agency that had discreditedthe "demand notes" and demonstrated to the Treasury Department andto Congress the absolute necessity of imparting the legal-tenderquality to the paper issued by the government. As this paper tookthe place of gold and silver in the payment of every obligation, both corporate and individual, --except duties on imports and intereston the National debt, --it was made easy for the State banks toextend their circulation. It was quite practicable for them tokeep a sufficient amount of legal-tender paper in their vaults tomeet all the probable requirements of redemption, and they werethus tempted to expand their loans and issue their own bills to adangerous extent. It was indeed hardly necessary to provide legal-tender notes to redeem their own bills. One kind of paper money, to a large proportion of the public, was practically as good asanother. Coin redemption being abandoned, the banks in a certainsense lost all moral and legal restraint. The enactment of theLegal-tender Bill had not therefore given the control of the currencyto the government. It had only increased the dangers of inflationby the stimulus it imparted and the protection it afforded to thecirculation of State bank notes. 

 SECRETARY CHASE'S RECOMMENDATION. 

Secretary Chase had grasped the situation earlier than the experiencedfinanciers who assumed to be his special advisers, and while hewas, in the opinion of unjust critics, completely in the hands ofthe State banks, he surprised the country by recommending in hisreport of December, 1861, the establishment of a National systemthat should give the General Government complete control of thecurrency. The State bank circulation in the loyal States heestimated at $150, 000, 000. "The whole of it, " he regarded as "aloan without interest from the people to the banks. " The secretarythought "it deserves consideration whether sound policy does notrequire that the advantages of this loan be transferred from thebanks, representing the interest of stockholders, to the governmentrepresenting the aggregate interest of the whole people. " Attentionwas called to the fact that "the existing circulation depends onthe laws of thirty-four States and the character of some sixteenhundred private corporations. " It was somewhat startling to learnthat "the circulation is usually furnished in greatest proportionby institutions of least actual capital and is commonly in theinverse ratio of solvency. "

The bold and comprehensive recommendation of Mr. Chase was favorablyreceived by many of the leading men in Congress and by many of theablest financiers of the country. The committees of both Senateand House were well disposed, but preferred time for consultationand deliberation. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the aid ofMr. E. G. Spaulding, Mr. Sherman, and Mr. Samuel Hooper, engagedin the preparation of a bank bill which in due time was submittedto the Committee of Ways and Means. The committee was at thatmoment engaged on the Internal-revenue Bill, the important characterof which absorbed the attention of Congress. The adjustment ofthe tariff duties to the excise taxes was also a serious laborwhich left no adequate time to mature a bank bill in season forits consideration at that session. Indeed the committee was notable to report the bill to the House until the 12th of July, 1862, when five thousand extra copies were printed for distribution amongthe financial institutions of the country. It was deemed wise togive the people time to consider so important a measure, and withthat end in view all further action was postponed to the nextsession. 

Meanwhile the bill was published in the leading papers of the loyalStates and elicited the most diverse opinion. It was howeverreceived with favor by the public. Those interested in the Statebanks were at first exceedingly hostile to it. The proposition totax their circulation two per cent. In addition to the three percent. Imposed upon incomes by the new law was considered harsh andunjust. The object was to compel the retirement of the State bankcirculation. In no other way could a national system be at oncegenerally instituted. The courts had repeatedly held the authorityof the States to charter banks with power to issue and circulatenotes as money, to be constitutional. Congress could not abridgethis right in any way by direct legislation. Its power to tax washowever undoubted. The friends of the State bank system claimedthat the indirect method of destroying the institution by taxingits notes out of existence was an arbitrary exercise of questionablepower. 

The advocates of a uniform and stable system of banking to curethe manifold evils then prevailing, admitted that the prerogativeof the States could not be questioned, but urged that the exerciseof it had invariably increased and often produced the financialtroubles which had afflicted the country in the past. If the Stateswould not surrender their prerogative, the National Governmentwould be compelled to exercise its larger prerogative embodied inthe power to tax. The right of the nation to do this had beenasserted by the head of the Treasury under a Democratic administrationsome years before. Recognizing as he did the necessity of a reformin the system of banking, Secretary Guthrie in his report to Congressin 1855 declared that "if the States shall continue the charterand multiplication of banks with authority to issue and circulatenotes as money, and fail to apply any adequate remedy to theincreasing evil, and also fail to invest Congress with the necessarypower to prohibit the same, Congress may be justified in the exerciseof the power to levy an excise upon them, and thus render theauthority to issue and circulate them valueless. "

 THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL BANKS. 

During the autumn of 1862 the bank question was subjected to athorough discussion among the people. The legal-tender notes hadalready become popular, and were evidently preferred by the publicto the notes of local banks. The depression naturally incident tocontinued reverses in the field led to the defeat of the Administrationin many of the State elections, but despite the operation of alladverse causes the general trade of the country was good. Thecrops had been abundant and prices were remunerative. All thathad been claimed for the legal-tender bill by its most sanguineadvocates had been realized in the business of the country. Theone disappointment was their failure to keep at par with gold; buteven this, in the general prosperity among the people, did notcreate discouragement. The Internal-revenue system had but justgone into operation, and the only feature embarrassing to the peoplewas the requirement that the taxes should be paid in the legal-tender paper of the government. No provision of law could haveoperated so powerfully for a system of National banks. The peoplewere subjected to annoyance and often to expense in exchanging thenotes of their local banks for the government medium. The internalfiscal machinery of the government evidently required places ofdeposit. The tax-collectors could not intrust the funds in theirhands to State banks except at their own risk. The money of thegovernment was thus liable to loss from the absence of responsibleagencies under the control of National power. The fact that thebills of State banks were not receivable for taxes tended constantlyto bring them into disrepute. The refusal of the government totrust its funds in the keeping of the State banks was nothing lessthan the requirement of the Sub-treasury Act, but to the popularapprehension it was a manifestation of distrust which did the banksgreat harm. The total revenue of the National Government had beforethe war been collected at a few custom-houses on the coast, andthe public had not been generally familiar with the mode of itssafe-keeping. The system of internal taxes now reached the interior, and the people were made daily witnesses of the fact that thegovernment would not trust a dollar of its money in the vaults ofa State bank. 

Under the influences thus at work, the friends of the State banksplainly saw that the National system was growing in favor, and theybegan to admit that its creation might facilitate the financialoperations of the country. Many of them were willing to give ita fair trial. The advocates of the National system constantlypressed their cause among the people. The five-twenty six percent. Bonds, into which the legal tenders were convertible, offered, as they explained, an excellent basis for banking. Their absorptionfor that purpose would create not only a market for that class ofsecurities but inevitably cause them to appreciate in value. Thegovernment would thus be largely benefitted, and its cause wouldbe strengthened by the silent influence of self-interest whichwould certainly be developed by the general distribution of itsbonds as the basis of a national currency. It was also urged thatthe existing banks could with great facility and without sacrificere-organize under the proposed national law. 

The popular mind having been thus favorably turned towards thesystem of national banks, the President specifically approved itin his message to Congress in December, 1862. Expressing his doubts"whether a circulation of United-States notes, payable in coin, and sufficiently large for the wants of the people, can be permanently, usefully, and safely maintained, " Mr. Lincoln asked if there was"any other mode by which necessary provision for the public wantscan be made, and the great advantage of a safe and uniform currencysecured?" He declared that he knew of none "which promises socertain results, and is at the same time so unobjectionable, asthe organization of banking associations under a general law ofCongress well guarded in its provisions. " Mr. Chase elaboratedhis recommendation of the preceding year to the same effect. Heasked that "a tax might be imposed on the notes of existing bankssuch as would practically exclude them from circulation. " In theirstead the legal-tender notes would be used, but he preferred "acirculation furnished by the government but issued by bankingassociations organized under a general Act of Congress. "

Mr. Chase said "the central idea of the proposed measure is theestablishment of one uniform circulation, of equal value throughoutthe country, upon the foundation of national credit combined withprivate capital. " He suggested that "these associations be entirelyvoluntary. Any persons desirous of employing real capital insufficient amounts, can, if the plan be adopted, unite togetherunder proper articles, and having contributed the requisite capitalcan invest such part of it, not less than a fixed minimum, in United-States bonds, and having deposited these bonds with the properofficer of the United States can receive United-States notes insuch denominations as may be desired, and employ them as money indiscounts and exchanges. " As a further inducement, the secretarysaid "the stockholders of any existing banks can in like mannerorganize under the Act, and transfer, by such degrees as may befound convenient, the capital of the old to the use of the newassociations. The notes thus put into circulation will be payableuntil resumption in United-States notes, and after resumption inspecie, by the association which issues them, on demand, and ifnot so paid will be redeemable at the Treasury of the United Statesfrom the proceeds of the bonds pledged in security. " The secretarythought it would be "difficult to conceive of a note circulationwhich will combine higher local and general credit than this. After a few years no other circulation would be used, nor couldthe issues of the national circulation be easily increased beyondthe legitimate demands of business. Every dollar of circulationwould represent real capital actually invested in national stocks, and the total amount issued could at all times be easily and quicklyascertained from the books of the Treasury. "

 SENATE DISCUSSES THE BANKING SYSTEM. 

The bill to carry out these suggestions was introduced in the Senateon the 26th of January, 1863, by Mr. Sherman, and was reported fromthe Finance Committee on the 2d of February. On the 9th the Senatetook it up for consideration. Mr. Sherman advocated the proposedsystem in an elaborate argument on several distinct grounds: "Thebanks would furnish a market for United-States bonds; they wouldabsorb the circulation of the State banks gradually and withoutharsh measures; they would create a community of interest betweenthe stockholders of the banks, the people, and the government, where now there existed a great contrariety of opinion and a greatdiversity of interests; adequate safeguards would be establishedagainst counterfeiting; the currency proposed would be uniform andwould take the place of the notes of sixteen hundred banks, differingin style, and so easily imitated and altered that while notes ofone-sixth of the existing banks had been counterfeited, 1, 861 kindsof imitations were afloat, and 3, 039 alterations, in addition to1, 685 spurious notes, in which hardly any care had been taken toshow any resemblance to the genuine. " The national banks would bedepositories of public moneys and their notes would be receivablefor taxes. He concluded by declaring that "we cannot maintain ournationality unless we establish a sound and stable financial system, and as the basis of it we must have a uniform national currency. "Accordingly he deemed the passage of the pending bill "more importantthan any other measure now pending either in Senate or House. "

--Mr. Henderson of Missouri sought to limit the system to bankswith a capital not less then $300, 000, and thought "it would beinfinitely better that all the banks should be established in NewYork, Philadelphia, Boston, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and such citiesas those. " He said "they had had some experience in the West withbanking laws which permitted the organization of banks in out-of-the-way places, obscure villages, and unknown cross-roads. "

--Mr. Powell of Kentucky, who was most persistent in his advocacyof a currency based on gold and silver coin, moved to "strike fromthe bill the words which prevented the acceptance of the Nationalbank notes for duties on imports. " These duties were payable incoin in order to secure gold with which to pay the interest on thepublic debt. In supporting his amendment, Senator Powell said thatif the bill became a law the fact that they could not be receivedfor customs would tend to depreciate the notes, and he wanted thecredit of the paper money kept up if the country was to have noother. His motion was defeated. 

--Mr. Ira Harris of New York secured the adoption of three sections, to be added at the end of the bill, which would enable State banksto accept its provisions and become National institutions morereadily and more easily. He said that he was not opposed to a fairtrial of the new system, but he doubted very much whether the banksof New York could be induced to abandon their State charters. "Thebanking system of New York was the best in the world. The banksenjoyed privileges which they could not be induced to surrenderand the people would be reluctant to trust any others. "

--Mr. John Carlile of West Virginia voted against all amendmentbecause he wanted the bill to kill itself, which would happen ifit were not improved. He voted against Senator Henderson's amendmentto limit charters to banks with $300, 000 capital. If the billpassed as it came from the Finance Committee there "will be banksestablished at every cross-road in the country. The State bankswill be destroyed, and widows and orphans whose all is invested inthe stock of these institutions will be impoverished. "

--Mr. Clark of New Hampshire thought the proposed system might beimproved by providing "that there shall be a visitation on the partof the States. " He thought it would give confidence to the banksif the States "had the right to know how they stood. "

--Mr. Pomeroy of Kansas thought the right to organize with a capitalas low as $50, 000 was a good provision and would "tend to popularizeand extend the National banks throughout the country. "

 SENATE DISCUSSES THE BANKING SYSTEM. 

--Mr. Howard of Michigan opposed the bill because he thought itseffect would be to "wage a very unnecessary and dangerous war uponthe State institutions, " and also because he deplored "the contestwhich will probably arise out of it in our local politics. "

--Mr. Garrett Davis, avowing himself an advocate of the old United-States Bank which President Jackson destroyed, was opposed to thepending bill because "it does not provide for the convertibilityof its paper into coin. " The "system is based on government bonds, and they sold in New York yesterday at a discount of fifty-threepercent. "

--Mr. Chandler of Michigan corrected Mr. Davis. "Gold sold atfifty-three per cent. Premium, but that did not mean a discount offifty-three per cent. On the bonds. "

--Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts pertinently asked Mr. Davis "if thecredit of the government is not good enough, where is there leftin the country any thing good enough to bank on? If the governmentgoes down, there is not a considerable bank in America that doesnot go down with it. "

--Mr. Doolittle of Wisconsin regarded it as "a necessity that thegovernment should take control of the paper currency of the country. In some way we must restrain the issues of State banks. If wepermit these banks to flood the channels of circulation, we destroyourselves. "

--Mr. Collamer of Vermont denied the right to tax the State banksout of existence, and to establish corporations in the State andTerritories. Independently of the power of visitation by thoseStates and Territories, he objected to making the governmentresponsible for the ultimate redemption of the bills by the securitiesdeposited. He inquired in what respect the promises of the Nationalbanks would be better than the notes of the government, and whyshould they be substituted for them?

--Mr. Chandler of Michigan claimed that when the whole system wasin operation the government would borrow $300, 000, 000 at four percent. Per annum, because, while the bonds deposited with the bankswould draw six per cent. , the tax would bring back two per cent. He did not know how far the bill would go, but "all that is in itis good. "

The bill came to a vote in the Senate on the 12th of February, andnarrowly escaped defeat. The yeas were twenty-three, the naystwenty-one. The senators from Oregon, Nesmith and Harding, werethe only Democrats who voted in the affirmative. Nine Republicansenators voted against it. 

The House of Representatives received the bill on the 19th. Mr. Spaulding of New York advocated it very earnestly. He stated thatits principle was based on the free banking law of New York, whichhad been in successful operation since 1838. He dwelt upon thenational character of the proposed notes, on their use in paymentof taxes, and on the advantage to accrue from the exemption of thebanking associations from State and United-States taxation. 

--Mr. Fenton of New York expressed the belief that the measurewould aid in extricating the government from the financial difficultiesin which it was involved, and pronounced it "one of the most potentmeans by which the representatives could strengthen the governmentand the people in the struggle to put down the enemies of thecountry, and give hope and courage to the hearts of those bravemen who have gone forth to battle. " Considerable opposition wasoffered, chiefly on details and by amendments. But the Housesustained the measure as it came from the Senate, and passed it onthe 20th of February, by the close vote of 78 to 64, on the callof the ayes and noes. It was approved by the President on the 25th. 

The Currency Bureau of the Treasury Department provided for in theNational Banking Act was organized by the appointment of HughMcCulloch, who was then at the head of one of the largest Statebanking institutions in Indiana. He was recognized as possessingexecutive capacity and large experience in financial affairs. Hehad originally been opposed, as were many others interested inState banks, to the National Banking Act, but, as he says, the morehe examined "the system" the more it "grew into favor with him dayby day. " This appears to have been the result with all who gavethe question a fair and candid consideration, even when biased bypersonal interests or political prejudice. The law was defectivein many particulars and some of its provisions made it difficultfor existing State banks to accept charters under it. The firstannual report of the comptroller of the currency shows that by Nov. 28, 1863, 134 banks had been organized under the Act. Fourteen ofthese were in the New-England States, sixteen in New York, twentyin Pennsylvania, twenty in Indiana, thirty-eight in Ohio; NewJersey, the District of Columbia, and Kentucky each had one; Illinoisseven, Iowa six, Michigan and Wisconsin four each, and Missouritwo. Their total capital was $7, 184, 715. The bonds deposited withthe Treasurer of the United States were $3, 925, 275, their deposits$7, 467, 059, and their loans and discounts $5, 413, 963. 

 THE AMENDED BANK BILL OF 1864. 

In his report Mr. McCulloch pointed out defects of the law whichhad become apparent by the test of experience, and made manysuggestions for its improvement. The whole subject was taken intoconsideration by the Ways and Means Committee of the House at thefirst session of the Thirty-eighth Congress. An amended bill, which repealed the Act of February 25, 1863, and supplied its place, was reported from the committee March 14, 1864. It was carefullyconsidered in the committee of the whole, section by section, andagainst the protest of its advocates an amendment was ingraftedupon it giving to the States the right to impose taxes on the bankshares for State and municipal purposes to the same degree thattaxes were imposed upon the property of other moneyed corporations. This bill was reported to the House from the committee of the wholeon the 16th of April, when Mr. Stevens moved a substitute in whichthe tax amendment was left out. The substitute was defeated, andthereupon the immediate friends of the bill united with the oppositionand laid the whole subject on the table. Mr. Stevens was totallyopposed to the exercise of any power whatever by the States overbanks established by National authority. 

In the height of the war excitement, when men's minds were inflamedby a just resentment toward the Southern theory of States' rights, there was a tendency to go to extremes in the other direction. Some of the Republican leaders, notably Mr. Stevens, were veryradical in their views in this respect, and would scarcely havehesitated at the abolition of all the checks upon Federal powerwhich the Constitution wisely gives to the States. But apart fromconsiderations of this character it was believed by many of thefriends of the national banking system that the imposition of Statetaxes, in addition to those to be imposed by the General Government, would defeat the object of the bill. Others in their anxiety tostrengthen the National Government were anxious to reserve to itexclusively the largest possible scope of taxation. It soon becameapparent however that some concession must be made to those of bothpolitical parties who believed that the States could not constitutionallybe deprived of the right to levy uniform taxes on property withintheir jurisdiction. To meet the views of these gentlemen the Waysand Means Committee reported a bill with a provision intended toreconcile all differences of opinion. This gave to the State thepower to tax the capital stock, circulation, dividends, or businessof national banks at no higher rate than was imposed upon the sameamount of moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens ofthe State, provided no tax was imposed upon that part of the capitalinvested in United-States bonds. This was adopted by a vote of 70to 60 on the 18th of April, 1864. 

The opposition to the bill in all other respects save this questionof taxation was confined mainly to the Democratic members of theHouse. The measure was by this time regarded favorably by allRepublicans. It was considered to be a part of the Administrationpolicy, and one that would contribute largely to strengthen thegovernment in its struggle. Its success thus far had demonstratedthat under a perfected law it would soon become the general andpopular banking system of the country. It was daily growing infavor with business men, and there was no longer doubt that a largeproportion of the surplus capital of the nation would be investedin United-States bonds and in the stock of National banks. In thedebate in the House which was prolonged, two speeches of particularinterest were elicited. Mr. James Brooks of New York, as the leaderof the Democratic minority on the question, ably summarized theobjections of his party. He was a man of education and greatintelligence. He had traveled extensively and was a close observer. He had been a writer for the metropolitan press for many years, and was familiar with the political and financial history of thecountry from an early period. He was an effective speaker. Onthe occasion he was in large part supplied with facts by Mr. JamesGallatin, who as president of one of the principal banks of New-York City had unsuccessfully attempted to dictate the financialpolicy of the government in 1861. Mr. Gallatin had conceived anintense hostility to Mr. Chase, and inspired Mr. Brooks to make inthe course of the debate on the bank bill some unfounded chargesagainst the Secretary. The speech of Mr. Brooks was a generalattack upon the financial policy of the administration directedprincipally against the Legal-tender Act, and at the same time aqualified defense of the State bank system. He asserted that thegovernment could have successfully carried on the war upon a speciebasis, but his authority for this claim was Mr. Gallatin. Mr. Samuel Hooper at the close of the debate defended the financialpolicy of the Administration and disposed of the argument of Mr. Brooks. He asserted that Mr. Gallatin had induced the banks ofNew-York City on December 30, 1861, to suspend specie payments, and briefly related his presumptuous attempt to dictate to theSecretary of the Treasury the financial policy of the Nation. Hedeclared that the issue of legal-tender notes was the only resourceleft to the government, and "was wise as well as necessary. " Inhis review of the financial history of the country he dealtunsparingly with the old State-bank system, and exposed in a masterlymanner its inherent defects even in those States where the greatestcare had been exercised by the Legislative power to hedge it aboutwith limitations. 

 THE AMENDED BANK BILL OF 1864. 

In the Senate the debate on the House bill was chiefly confined toamendments proposed by the Finance Committee. The provisionincorporated by the House in regard to taxation was amplified soas to make it more specific and definite. Considerable oppositionwas shown to this action, but Mr. Fessenden, chairman of Finance, defended the recommendation of his committee and successfullyreplied to the arguments against it. An efforts was made by SenatorsDoolittle, Henderson, and Trumbull on the Republican side to preventthe establishment of any more banks under this law than were inexistence in May, 1864, unless they redeemed their notes in coin. The banks then organized, possessed an aggregate capital of about$36, 000, 000, with bonds deposited to secure circulation to theextent of a little more than $33, 000, 000. The argument was thatthis addition to the legal-tender notes already in circulationsupplied an ample currency for the business of the country. Theissue of the whole $300, 000, 000 of National bank notes authorizedby the bill, these senators claimed, would be such an expansion ofthe currency as would sink its value to almost nothing. Theyproposed also to compel the State banks to retire their circulation, but permitted them to organize on the specie basis as Nationalbanks. Mr. John P. Hale of New Hampshire thought that "it wouldbe much simpler to incorporate in the bill a provision abolishingall such instruments as had previously been known as Stateconstitutions. " Senator Collamer proposed to require the banks toretain in their vaults one-fourth of all the gold they received asinterest on their bonds deposited to secure circulation until theresumption of specie payments. 

These amendments were voted down, and the bill finally passed theSenate on the 10th of May by a vote of 30 to 9, ten senators beingabsent or not voting. A conference committee of the two Housesagreed upon the points of difference. The report was adopted andthe bill was approved by the President on the 3d of June, 1864. By the end of November 584 National banks had been organized, withan aggregate capital of $108, 964, 597. 28, holding $81, 961, 450 ofthe bonds of the United States to secure a circulation of $65, 864, 650. These banks at once became agencies for the sale of the government'ssecurities, and their officers being usually the men of mostexperience in financial affairs in their respective communities, gave encouragement and confidence to their neighbors who had moneyto invest. The sale of government bonds was in this way largelyincreased. The National banks thus became at once an effectiveaid to the government. By the close of the fiscal year 1864$367, 602, 529 of bonds were disposed of by the banks. During thefiscal year 1865 bonds to the amount of $335, 266, 617 were sold overtheir counters. On the 1st of October, 1865, there were in existence1, 513 National banks, with an aggregate capital of $395, 729, 597. 83, with $276, 219, 950 of bonds deposited with the Treasurer of theUnited States to secure circulation. 

Experience has justified the authors and promoters of the nationalbanking system. Originally the circulation was limited to a totalvolume of $300, 000, 000, apportioned, one-half according torepresentative population, and the remainder by the Secretary ofthe Treasury among associations with "due regard to the existingbanking capital, resources, and business of the respective States, Districts, and Territories. " Complaint arose that by such limitationand apportionment injustice was done and monopolies created. Afterthe war this restriction was removed and banking under the nationalsystem became entirely free. The advantages of uniform circulationon a basis of undoubted strength and availability have won almostuniversal favor among business men and prudent thinkers. Therestoration of the multiform State system, with notes of varyingvalue and banks of doubtful solvency, would receive no supportamong the people. 

The National bank system with all its merits has not escaped seriousopposition. The Bank of the United States, as twice established, incurred the hostility of the Democratic party, --their two greatestleaders, Jefferson and Jackson, regarding the creation of such aninstitution as not warranted by the Constitution. A persistentattempt has been made by certain partisans to persuade the peoplethat the national banks of to-day are as objectionable as thosewhich encountered serious hostility at earlier periods in ourhistory. An examination into the constitution of the banks formerlyorganized by direct authority of the General Government will showhow wide is the difference between them and the present system ofnational banks. It will show that the feature of the earlier bankswhich evoked such serious opposition and ultimately destroyed themis not to be found in the present system and could not be incorporatedin it. It was from the first inapplicable and practicallyimpossible. 

 THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA. 

The most important financial institution established in the UnitedStates before the adoption of the Constitution was the Bank ofNorth America, still doing business in Philadelphia, with unbrokencareer through all the mutations of the eventful century which haspassed since it was called into existence. It had its origin in1780, when certain patriotic citizens of Philadelphia resolved to"open a security subscription of three hundred thousand pounds _inreal money_, " the object being to procure supplies for the army, "then on the point of mutiny for lack of the common necessaries oflife. " The enterprising men who had the matter in hand addressedthemselves to the task of providing three million rations and threehundred hogsheads of rum for the famished troops. The ContinentalCongress recognized their patriotic conduct and pledged "the faithof the government for the effectual reimbursement of the amountadvanced. " It fell to Robert Morris, Superintendent of Financefor the government, to organize the bank which owed its origin tothese circumstances. While engaged in this arduous task he receivedtwo letters of advice from an anonymous source, ably written, anddisplaying considerable knowledge of the science of banking, thenalmost unknown in America. Indeed the methods of banking--it mightbe proper to say its secrets--were jealously guarded by thecapitalists who monopolized it in the financial centres of Europe. Mr. Morris was struck by the ability and originality of his unknowncorrespondent, and was amazed to find that Alexander Hamilton, thenbut twenty-three years of age, was the author of the letters. Itwas the first exhibition of that mastery of finance which gave Mr. Hamilton his enduring fame. 

When Mr. Hamilton assumed control of the Treasury Department underthe Presidency of Washington he found that the Bank of North Americahad accepted a State charter from Pennsylvania and was not thereforein a position to fulfil the functions of a National bank which hedesired to establish as an aid to the financial operations of thegovernment. After his funding of the Revolutionary debt he appliedto Congress for the charter of a National bank, with a capital of$10, 000, 000, twenty-five per cent. Of which must be paid in coinand the remainder in the bonds of the United States. The governmentwas to own $2, 000, 000 of the stock of the bank and was obviouslyto become its largest borrower. The measure encountered thedetermined opposition of the Secretary of State, Jefferson, andthe Attorney-General, Edmund Randolph, and it finally became analmost distinctly sectional issue--the Northern members of Congresswith few exceptions sustaining it; the Southern members under thelead of Mr. Madison almost wholly opposing it. It became a law onthe 25th of February, 1791. 

When the charter of the bank--which was granted for twenty years--expired in 1811 the administration of Mr. Madison favored itsrenewal. The eminent financier, Albert Gallatin, then Secretaryof the Treasury, informed Congress that the bank had been "wiselyand skillfully managed. " The hostility to it originated in politicalconsiderations. It was regarded as an aristocratic institution, was violently opposed by the State banks which by this time hadbecome numerous, and notwithstanding the change of Mr. Madison inits favor, the bill to re-charter was defeated. The contest howeverwas severe. In the House the opponents of the bill had but onemajority, and there being a tie in the Senate the re-charter wasdefeated by the casting vote of George Clinton the Vice-President. By this course Congress gave to the State banks a monopoly of thecirculating medium. The war of 1812 followed, and in the sweep ofits disastrous influence a large majority of these banks weredestroyed, their notes never redeemed, and great distress consequentlyinflicted upon the people. 

It was this result which disposed Congress, as soon as the war wasover, to establish for the second time a Bank of the United States. The charter was drawn by Alexander J. Dallas who had succeeded Mr. Gallatin at the Treasury. In the main it followed the provisionsof the first bank, but owing to the growth of the country thecapital stock was enlarged to twenty-five millions, of which thegovernment subscribed for one-fifth, payable wholly in its ownbonds. Individual subscribers were required to pay one-fourth incoin and three-fourths in government bonds. The charter was againlimited to twenty years. It was this bank which encountered thebitter opposition of President Jackson, and which was seriouslyinjured by his order to the Secretary of the Treasury, Roger B. Taney, in 1834, to withhold the deposit of government funds fromits vaults. The act of President Jackson is usually referred toas "a removal of the deposits. " This is incorrect. The governmentdeposits were not removed from the United-States Bank, except inthe ordinary course of business for the needs of the Treasury. But the order of the President prevented further deposits ofgovernment money being made, and thus destroyed one of the principalresources upon which the bank had been organized. A short timebefore the charter of the United-States Bank expired, a Statecharter was obtained from the Legislature of Pennsylvania, underwhich the bank continued business until 1841, when its affairs werewound up with heavy loss to the stockholders. 

 THE UNITED-STATES BANKS, --1791-1816. 

These brief outlines of the charters of the United-States banks of1791 and 1816 show how entirely dissimilar they were in manyessentials from the system of national banks established under theActs of 1863 and 1864. In the first the government was a largestockholder and the officers of the Treasury practically directedall the operations and all the details of the bank. In the systemnow prevailing the government cannot be a stockholder, and takesno part in the management of banks except to see that the laws arecomplied with and that the safeguards for the public are rigidlymaintained. An especially odious feature in the United-States Bankwas the favoritism shown in its loans, by which it constantly tendedto debauch the public service. Political friends of the institutionwere too often accommodated on easy terms, and legitimate bankingwas thus rendered impossible. No such abuse is practicable underthe present system. Indeed there is such an entire absence of itthat the opponents of the National banks have not even brought theaccusation. 

There was special care taken to place the Currency Bureau entirelybeyond partisan influence. The misfortunes which had come uponthe United-States Bank from its connection with party interestswere fully appreciated by the wise legislators who drafted theNational Bank Act. They determined to guard against the recurrenceof the calamities which destroyed the former system. The originalAct of 1863, organizing the National system, provided that theComptroller of the Currency should be appointed by the Presidentupon the nomination of the Secretary of the Treasury, and, unlikeany other Federal officer at that time, his term was fixed at fiveyears. This period of service was established in order that itshould not come to an end with the Presidential term. It was alsospecifically provided, long in advance of the tenure-of-office Act, that the President could not remove the Comptroller unless withthe advice and consent of the Senate. The Comptroller was thusexcepted by statute from that long list of officers who were formany years subjected to change upon the incoming of each Administration. From the organization of the National Banking system to this time(1884) there have been four Comptrollers, --three of whom voluntarilyresigned. The present incumbent of the office, Mr. John Jay Knox, has discharged his important duties with great satisfaction fortwelve years, and with his predecessors has conclusively establishedin practice the non-partisan character which is indispensable tothe successful administration of the Bureau. 

The division and distribution of bank capital under the Nationalsystem do not merely carry its advantages to every community, butthey afford the most complete guaranty against every abuse whichmay spring from a large aggregation of capital. The Bank of theUnited States in 1816 had a capital of thirty-five millions ofdollars. If a similar institution were established to-day, bearinga like proportion to the wealth of the country, it would requirea capital of at least six hundred millions of dollars--many foldlarger than the combined wealth of the Bank of England and the Bankof France. It is hardly conceivable that such a power as thiscould ever be intrusted to the management of a Secretary of theTreasury or to a single board of directors, with the temptationswhich would beset them. It is the contemplation of such an enormouspower placed in the hands of any body of men that gives a morecorrect appreciation of the conduct and motives of General Jacksonin his determined contest with the United-States Bank. His instinctswere correct. He saw that such an institution increasing with thegrowth of the country would surely lead to corruption, and by itsunlimited power would interfere with the independence of Congressand with the just liberty of the people. 

 MERITS OF NATIONAL BANK SYSTEM. 

The single feature of resemblance between the Bank of the UnitedStates and the system of National banks is found in the fact thatGovernment bonds constitute the foundation of each. But the useto which the bonds are devoted in the new system in entirelydifferent from that of the old. The United-States Bank retainedits bonds in its own vaults, liable to all the defalcation andmismanagement which might affect the other assets. In the presentsystem the National Bank deposits its bonds with the TreasuryDepartment, where they are held as special security for the redemptionof the bills which the bank puts in circulation. The United-StatesBank circulated its bills according to its own discretion, andthere was no assurance to the holder against an over-issue and nocertainty of ultimate redemption. The National Bank can issue nobills except those furnished by the Treasury Department in exchangefor the bonds deposited to secure prompt redemption. In the formercase there was no protection to the people who trusted the bank bytaking its bills. In the case of the National Bank, the governmentholds the security in its own hands and protects the public fromthe possibility of loss. 

The one defective element in the National bank system is that itrequires the permanence of National debt as the basis of itsexistence. In a Republican government the people naturally opposea perpetual debt, and could with difficulty be persuaded to consentto it for any incidental purpose however desirable. But so longas a National debt exists no use has been found for it more conduciveto the general prosperity than making it the basis of a bankingsystem in which flexibility and safety are combined to a degreenever before enjoyed in this country and never excelled in anyother. In no other system of banking have the bills had such widecirculation and such absolute credit. They are not limited to theUnited States. They are current in almost every part of the Americancontinent, and are readily exchangeable for coin in all the martsof Europe. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Depression among the People in 1863. --Military Situation. --Hostilityto the Administration. --Determination to break it down. --Vallandigham'sDisloyal Speech. --Two Rebellions threatened. --General Burnsidetakes Command of the Department of the Ohio. --Arrests Vallandigham. --Tries him by Military Commission. --His Sentence commuted by Mr. Lincoln. --Habeas Corpus refused. --Democratic Party protests. --Meeting in Albany. --Letter of Governor Seymour. --Ohio Democratssend a Committee to Washington. --Mr. Lincoln's Replies to AlbanyMeeting and to the Ohio Committee. --Effect of his Words upon theCountry. --Army of the Potomac. --General Hooker's Defeat atChancellorsville. --Gloom in the Country. --The President's Lettersto General Hooker. --General Meade succeeds Hooker in Command ofthe Army. --Battle of Gettysburg. --Important Victory for the Union. --Relief to the Country. --General Grant's Victory at Vicksburg. --Fourth of July. --Notable Coincidence. --State Elections favorableto the Administration. --Meeting of Thirty-eighth Congress. --SchuylerColfax elected Speaker. --Prominent New Members in Each Branch. --E. D. Morgan, Alexander Ramsey, John Conness, Reverdy Johnson, ThomasA. Hendricks, Henry Winter Davis, Robert C. Schenck, James A. Garfield, William B. Allison. --President's Message. --ThirteenthAmendment to the Constitution. --First proposed by James M. Ashley. --John B. Henderson proposes Amendment which passes the Senate. --Debate in Both Branches. --Aid to the Pacific Railroads. --Lieutenant-General Grant. 

At no time during the war was the depression among the people ofthe North so great as in the spring of 1863. When the Thirty-seventh Congress came to its close on the 3d of March, partisanfeeling was so bitter that a contest of most dangerous characterwas foreshadowed in the Loyal States. The anti-slavery policy ofthe President was to be attacked as tending to a fatal divisionamong the people; the conduct of the war was to be arraigned asimpotent, and leading only to disaster. Circumstances favored anassault upon the Administration. The project of freeing the slaveshad encountered many bitter prejudices among the masses in theLoyal States, and reverses in the field had created a dread ofimpending conscriptions which would send additional thousands tobe wasted in fruitless assaults upon impregnable fortifications. General Hooker had succeeded to the command of the Army of thePotomac, still sore under the cruel sacrifice of its brave men inthe previous December. General Grant was besieging Vicksburg, which had been fortified with all the strength that military sciencecould impart, and was defended by a very strong force under thecommand of J. C. Pemberton, a graduate of West Point, and a lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. 

 CRUSADE AGAINST THE PRESIDENT. 

The opponents of the Administration intended to press the attack, to destroy the prestige of Mr. Lincoln, to bring hostilities inthe field to an end, to force a compromise which should givehumiliating guaranties for the protection of Slavery, to bring theSouth back in triumph, and to re-instate the Democratic party inthe Presidential election of the ensuing year for a long and peacefulrule over a Union in which radicalism had been stamped out andAbolitionists placed under the ban. Such was the flattering prospectwhich opened to the view of the party that had so determinedlyresisted and so completely defeated the Administration in the greatStates of the Union the preceding year. The new crusade againstthe President was begun by Mr. Vallandigham, who if not the ablestwas the frankest and boldest member of his party. He took thestump soon after the adjournment of the Thirty-seventh Congress. It was an unusual time of the year to begin a political contest;but the ends sought were extraordinary, and the means adopted mightwell be of the same character. On the first day of May Mr. Vallandigham made a peculiarly offensive, mischievous, disloyalspeech at Mount Vernon, Ohio, which was published throughout theState and widely copied elsewhere. It was perfectly apparent thatthe bold agitator was to have many followers and imitators, andthat in the rapidly developing sentiment which he represented, theAdministration would have as bitter an enemy in the rear as it wasencountering at the front. The case was therefore critical. Mr. Lincoln saw plainly that the Administration was not equal to thetask of subduing two rebellions. While confronting the power ofa solid South he must continue to wield the power of a solid North. 

After General Burnside had been relieved from the command of theArmy of the Potomac he was sent to command the Department of Ohio. He established his headquarters at Cincinnati in April (1863). Heundoubtedly had confidential instructions in regard to the mode ofdealing with the rising tide of disloyalty which, beginning inOhio, was sweeping over the West. The Mount-Vernon speech of Mr. Vallandigham would inevitably lead to similar demonstrationselsewhere, and General Burnside determined to deal with its author. On Monday evening the 4th of May he sent a detachment of soldiersto Mr. Vallandigham's residence in Dayton, arrested him, carriedhim to Cincinnati, and tried him by a military commission of whicha distinguished officer, General Robert B. Potter, was president. Mr. Vallandigham resisted the whole proceeding as a violation ofhis rights as a citizen of the United States, and entered a protestdeclaring that he was arrested without due process of law andwithout warrant from any judicial officer, that he was not in eitherthe land or naval forces of the United States nor in the militiain actual service, and therefore was not triable by a court-martialor military commission, but was subject only, by the express termsof the Constitution, to be tried on an indictment or presentmentof a grand jury. Of the offense charged against him there was nodoubt, and scarcely a denial; and the commission, brushing asidehis pleas, convicted him, and sentenced him to be placed in closeconfinement, during the continuance of the war, in some fortressof the United States--the fortress to be designated by the commandingofficer of the department. General Burnside approved the proceeding, and designated Fort Warren in the harbor of Boston as the place ofMr. Vallandigham's detention. 

 THE ARREST OF VALLANDIGHAM. 

The President, with that sagacity which was intuitive and unfailingin all matters of moment, disapproved the sentence, and commutedit to one sending Mr. Vallandigham beyond our military lines tohis friends of the Southern Confederacy. The estimable and venerableJudge Leavett of the United-States District Court was applied tofor a writ of _habeas corpus_, but he refused to issue it. Thejudge declared that the power of the President undoubtedly impliesthe right to arrest persons who by their mischievous acts ofdisloyalty impede or hinder the military operations of the government. The Democratic party throughout the Union took up the case withintemperate and ill-tempered zeal. Meetings were held in variousplaces to denounce it, and to demand the right of Vallandigham toreturn from the rebel lines within which he had been sent. GovernorSeymour of New York in a public letter denounced the arrest as "anact which had brought dishonor upon our country, and is full ofdanger to our persons and our homes. If this proceeding is approvedby the government and sanctioned by the people it is not merely astep towards revolution, it is revolution; it will not only leadto military despotism, it establishes military despotism. In thisrespect it must be accepted, or in this respect it must be rejected. If it is upheld our liberties are overthrown. " Waxing still bolderGovernor Seymour said "the people of this country now wait withthe deepest anxiety the decision of the Administration upon theseacts. Having given it a generous support in the conduct of thewar, we now pause to see what kind of government it is for whichwe are asked to pour out our blood and our treasure. The actionof the Administration will determine, in the minds of more thanone-half of the people of the Loyal States, whether this war iswaged to put down rebellion in the South or to destroy freeinstitutions at the North. "

The evil effect upon the public opinion of the North of such languagefrom a man of Governor Seymour's high personal character andcommanding influence with his party can hardly be exaggerated. Itcame at a time when the Administration was sorely pressed and whenit could not stand an exasperating division in the North. Thegovernor's letter was publicly read at a large meeting of theDemocratic party in Albany, presided over by Erastus Corning, andcalled to consider the act of the Administration. A long seriesof resolutions denouncing Vallandigham's arrest were adopted andforwarded to the President. But Mr. Lincoln rose to the occasionas if inspired, and his letter of June 12 to the Albany Committeeturned the popular tide powerfully in favor of the Administration. One of the points presented made a deep impression upon theunderstanding and profoundly stirred the hearts of the people. "Mr. Vallandigham was not arrested, " said the President, "becausehe was damaging the political prospects of the Administration orthe personal interests of the commanding general, but because hewas damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which thelife of this Nation depends. . . . If Mr. Vallandigham was notdamaging the military power of the country, then his arrest wasmade on mistake of facts, which I would be glad to correct onreasonable, satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whoseresolutions I am considering, to be in favor of suppressing theRebellion by military force--by armies. Long experience has shownthat armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punishedby the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the lawand the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot asimple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch ahair of the wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is nonethe less injurious when effected by getting father or brother orfriend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelingsuntil he is persuaded to write the soldier-boy that he is fightingin a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptiblegovernment, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and to savethe boy is not only constitutional, but is withal a great mercy. "No other man in our history has so fully possessed the power ofpresenting an argument in concrete form, overthrowing all the logicof assailants, and touching the chords of public feeling with atenderness which becomes an irresistible force. 

The Democrats of Ohio took up the arrest of Vallandigham withespecial earnestness, and were guilty of the unspeakable folly ofnominating him as their candidate for governor. They appointed animposing committee--one from each Congressional district of theState--to communicate with the President in regard to the sentenceof banishment. They arrived in Washington about the last of June, and addressed a long communication to Mr. Lincoln, demanding therelease and return of Mr. Vallandigham. They argued the case withability. No less than eleven of the committee were or had beenmembers of Congress, with George H. Pendleton at their head. Mr. Lincoln's reply under date of June 29 to their communication wasas felicitous, as conclusive, as his reply to the Albany Committee. He expressed his willingness in answer to their request, to releaseMr. Vallandigham without asking pledge, promise, or retraction fromhim, and with only one simple condition. That condition was that"the gentlemen of the committee themselves, representing as theydo the character and power of the Ohio Democracy, will subscribeto three propositions: _First_, That there is now a rebellion inthe United States, the object and tendency of which are to destroythe National Union, and that in your opinion an army and navy areconstitutional means for suppressing that rebellion. _Second_, That no one of you will do any thing which in his own judgment willtend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen theefficiency of the army and navy while engaged in the effort tosuppress that rebellion. And _Third_, That each of you will inhis sphere do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamenof the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress theRebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for andsupported. "

Mr. Lincoln sent duplicates of these three conditions to thecommittee, one of which was to be returned to him indorsed withtheir names as evidence of their agreement thereto, the publicationof which indorsement should be of itself a revocation of the orderin relation to Mr. Vallandigham. If the Ohio gentlemen subscribedto these conditions as essential and obligatory, they therebyjustified the arrest of Vallandigham for resisting each and everyone of them. If they would not subscribe to them they placedthemselves before the people of Ohio in an attitude of hostilityto the vigorous and successful conduct of the war, on which thefate of the Union depended. The committee made a very lame rejoinderto the President. He had in truth placed them in a dilemma, fromwhich they could not extricate themselves, and they naturally fellunder popular condemnation. Mr. Lincoln's hit had indeed been sopalpable that its victims were laughed at by the public, and theirparty was foredoomed by their course to political annihilation inthe coming election. 

 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

While these interesting events were in progress the military exigencywas engaging the attention of the people with an interest almostpainfully intense. There was an urgent demand for an early movementby the Army of the Potomac. Mr. Lincoln realized that promptsuccess was imperatively required. The repetition of the disastersof 1862 might fatally affect our financial credit, and end withthe humiliation of an intervention by European Powers. GeneralHooker was impressed by Mr. Lincoln with the absolute necessity ofan early and energetic movement of the Army of the Potomac. Onthe 2d and 3d of May he fought the battle of Chancellorsville. Hehad as large a force as the Union army mustered on a single battle-field during the war, --not less perhaps than one hundred and twentythousand men. He made a lamentable failure. Without bringing morethan one-third of his troops into action he allowed himself to bedriven across the Rappahannock by Lee, who, on the 7th of May, issued a highly congratulatory and boastful order detailing hisvictory. 

In the issuing of orders General Hooker was one day in advance ofLee. He tendered to the soldiers his "congratulations on theachievements of the past seven days, " and assured them that "ifall has not been accomplished that was expected, the reasons arewell known to the army. " He further declared that "in withdrawingfrom the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a generalbattle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence ofits confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles itrepresents. Profoundly loyal and conscious of its strength, " theGeneral continued, "the Army of the Potomac will give or declinebattle whenever its interest or its honor may demand. " The Generalthought "the events of the past week may swell with pride the heartof every officer and soldier in the army. By your celerity andsecrecy of movement our advance was undisputed; and on our withdrawal, not a rebel ventured to follow. " The questionable character ofthese compliments exposed General Hooker to ridicule, and increasedthe public sense of his unfitness for high command, though he wasa gallant and brave soldier and admirably fitted for a division ora corps. The Union loss was serious. The killed and woundedexceeded eleven thousand. The year thus opened very inauspiciously. The gloom of 1862 was not dispelled. The shadows had not lifted. The weightiest anxiety oppressed both the government and the people. The Confederacy had sustained a heavy loss in the death of StonewallJackson. He had a genius for war, and in a purely military pointof view it would perhaps have been better for the Confederates tolose the battle than to lose the most aggressive officer in theirArmy. 

The spirit of the Confederates rose high. They believed they wouldbe able to hold the line of the Mississippi against the army ofGrant, and in the defeat and demoralization of the army of thePotomac they saw their way clear to an invasion of Pennsylvania, for which General Lee began his preparations with leisure andcompleted them with thoroughness. After General Hooker's failureat Chancellorsville, and his remarkable order which followed it, he evidently lost the confidence of the President. Some of thehasty notes and telegrams sent to General Hooker after his defeatare in Mr. Lincoln's most characteristic vein. June 5 the Presidentwrote, "If you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. . . . In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled up on the _river likean ox jumped half over a fence, liable to be torn by dogs, frontand rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other_. "Later, on June 10, the President wrote, "Lee's Army and not Richmondis your true objective point. If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow on his flank on the inside track, shortening your lineswhile he lengthens his. Fight him when opportunity offers. If hestays where he is _fret him and fret him_. "* Lee was, by the dateof this note, well on his way towards the North, and the militarysituation grew every hour more critical. 

 THE THREE DAYS' BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

The indispensable requisite to Union success was a commander forthe Army of the Potomac in whose competency the Administration, the people, and most of all the soldiers would have confidence. In the judgment of military men it was idle to intrust anotherbattle to the generalship of Hooker; and as the army moved acrossMaryland to meet Lee on the soil of Pennsylvania, General Hookerwas relieved and the command of the army assigned to General GeorgeG. Meade. This change of commanders was made by order of thePresident on the 28th of June, only two days before the openingengagement of the great battle of Gettysburg. By the middle ofJune the advance guard of Lee's army had reached the upper Potomac, and on its way had literally destroyed the division of the Unionarmy commanded by General Milroy and stationed at Winchester. Theagitation throughout the country was profound. On the 15th of Juneas the magnitude of Lee's movement became more apparent, thePresident issued a proclamation stating that "Maryland, WestVirginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio were threatened with invasion andrequired an immediate addition to the military forces. " He calledtherefore for one hundred thousand militia from these four Statesto serve for six months; ten thousand each from Maryland and WestVirginia, thirty thousand from Ohio, and fifty thousand fromPennsylvania. All the surrounding States were aroused. GovernorSeymour sent fifteen thousand extra men from New York. GovernorParker sent a valuable contingent from New Jersey. Western Marylandwas occupied at various points as early as the 20th of June, andduring the last week of that month rebel detachments were in thesouthern counties of Pennsylvania committing depredations andexacting tribute, --in York, Cumberland, Franklin, Fulton and Adams. 

The two armies finally converged at Gettysburg, and on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July the battle was fought which in many of itsaspects was the most critical and important of the war. TheConfederates began with the self-assurance of victory; and withvictory they confidently counted upon the occupation of Philadelphiaby Lee's army, upon the surrender of Baltimore, upon the flight ofthe President and his Cabinet from Washington. It was within theextravagant and poetic dreams of the expectant conquerors to proclaimthe success of the Confederacy from the steps of Independence Hall, and to make a treaty with the fugitive Government of the UnitedStates for half the territory of the Republic. But it was not sofated. The army under Meade proved unconquerable. In conflictson Virginia soil the army of Lee had been victorious. Its invasionof the North the preceding year had been checked by McClellan beforeit reached the border of the free States. It was now fighting onground where the spirit which had nerved it in Virginia wastransferred to the soldiers of the Union. With men of the Norththe struggle was now for home first, for conquest afterwards, andthe tenacity and courage with which they held their ground forthose three bloody days attest the magnificent impulse which thedefense of the fireside imparts to the heart and to the arm of thesoldier. 

General Meade had not been widely known before the battle, but hewas at once elevated to the highest rank in the esteem and love ofthe people. The tide of invasion had been rolled back after thebloodiest and most stubbornly contested field of the war. Thenumbers on each side differed but little from the numbers engagedat Waterloo, and the tenacity with which the soldiers of the BritishIsles stood that day against the hosts of Napoleon, was rivaled onthe field of Gettysburg by men of the same blood, fighting in theranks of both armies. 

The relief which the victory brought to the North is indescribable. On the morning of the Fourth of July a brief Executive order wastelegraphed from the Executive mansion to all the free States, announcing the triumph, for which "the President especially desiresthat on this day, He whose will, not ours, should ever be done, beeverywhere remembered and reverenced with the profoundest gratitude. "By one of those coincidences that have more than once happened inour history, the Fourth of July of this year was made especiallymemorable. Rejoicings over the result at Gettysburg had scarcelybegun when word came from General Grant that the Confederate forcesat Vicksburg had surrendered, and that at ten o'clock of the Fourth, the very hour when Mr. Lincoln issued the bulletin proclaiming thevictory of Gettysburg, General Pemberton's forces marched out andstacked arms in front of their works, prisoners of war to GeneralGrant. The city of Vicksburg was immediately occupied by the Uniontroops, the first division of which was commanded by General JohnA. Logan. Jackson, the Capital of Mississippi, defended by GeneralJoseph E. Johnston, capitulated a few days later to General Sherman, and the Confederate forces at Port Hudson surrendered to the armyof General Banks. This was the last obstruction to the navigationof the Mississippi, and the great river flowed unvexed to the sea. 

The entire situation was changed by these important victories. Heart and spirit were given to the people, hope grew into confidence, the strength of the Government was vastly increased, the prestigeof the Administration was greatly heightened. Could the electionfor the Thirty-eighth Congress have taken place in the autumn of1863, and not in the autumn of 1862, instead of being a closestruggle it would have been an overwhelming triumph for the warpolicy which had wrought out such splendid results. The popularre-action was attested in every State where an election gaveopportunity. Governor Curtin was re-chosen by a large majority inPennsylvania over Judge George W. Woodward, who had pronounced ajudicial decision against the constitutionality of the proscriptionlaw; the course of Governor Seymour was rebuked in New York by thethirty thousand majority given to the Republican State ticket, which was headed by the brilliant Chauncey M. Depew, then but twenty-nine years of age; while in Ohio the Democratic party was overwhelmedby an avalanche of popular indignation which responded to thenomination of Vallandigham with a majority of a hundred and onethousand for the Administration. 

 MEETING OF THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS. 

The Thirty-eighth Congress met on the first Monday of December, 1863. The House was promptly organized by the election of SchuylerColfax to the Speakership. He received 101 votes; all othercandidates 81. Mr. Samuel S. Cox received 42 votes, the highestgiven to any candidate of the opposition. The vote for Mr. Colfaxwas the distinctive Republican strength in the House. On issuesdirectly relating to the war the Administration was stronger thanthese figures indicate, being always able to command the supportof Mr. Stebbins, Mr. Odell, and Mr. Griswold of New York, and ofseveral members from the Border States. 

Schuyler Colfax was especially fitted for the duties of the Chair. He had been a member of the House for eight years, having beenchosen directly after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Hecame from good Revolutionary stock in New Jersey, but had beenreared in the West; had learned the trade of a printer, and hadedited a successful journal at South Bend. He was a paragon ofindustry, with keen, quick, bright intellect. He mingled freelyand creditably in the debates. With a wisdom in which many ablemembers seem deficient, he had given studious attention to theRules of the House, and was master of their complexities. Kindlyand cordial by nature it was easy for him to cultivate the art ofpopularity, which he did with tact and constancy. He came to theChair with absolute good will from both sides of the House, and asa presiding officer proved himself able, prompt, fair-minded, andjust in all his rulings. 

The political re-action of 1862 had seriously affected the membershipof the House. Many of those most conspicuous and influential inthe preceding Congress had either been defeated or had prudentlydeclined a renomination. E. G. Spaulding, Charles B. Sedgwick, Roscoe Conkling, and A. B. Olin did not return from New York; JohnA. Bingham and Samuel Shellabarger were defeated in Ohio; GalushaA. Grow was not re-elected in Pennsylvania, and lost in consequencea second term as Speaker; Albert G. Porter and McKee Dunn gave wayto Democratic successors in Indiana. In the delegations of allthe large States radical changes were visible, and the narrow escapeof the Administration from total defeat in the preceding year wasdemonstrated afresh by the roll-call of the House. 

 MEMBERS OF THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS. 

But the loss of prominent members was counterbalanced by thecharacter and ability of some of the new accessions. Henry WinterDavis took his seat as representative from one of the districts ofthe city of Baltimore. He had been originally elected to the Houseas a member of the American party in 1854, and had been re-electedin 1856 and 1858. He had not co-operated with the Republican partybefore the war, and had supported Mr. Bell for the Presidency in1860. He was always opposed to the Democratic party, and was underall circumstances a devoted friend of the Union, an arch-enemy ofthe Secessionists. Born a Southern man, he spoke for the South, --for its duty to the Federal Government, for its best and highestdestiny. To him before and above all other men is due the maintenanceof loyalty in Maryland. His course was censured by the DemocraticLegislature of his State in the winter preceding the Rebellion. He replied through an address "to the voters of Maryland, " whichfor eloquence of expression, force, and conclusiveness of reasoningis entitled to rank in the political classics of America as theAddress to the Electors of Bristol ranks in the political classicsof England. As a debater in the House Mr. Davis may well be citedas an exemplar. He had no boastful reliance upon intuition orinspiration or the spur of the moment, though no man excelled himin extempore speech. He made elaborate preparation by the studyof all public questions, and spoke from a full mind with completecommand of premise and conclusion. In all that pertained to thegraces of oratory he was unrivaled. He died at forty-eight. Hadhe been blessed with length of days, the friends who best knew hisability and his ambition believed that he would have left the mostbrilliant name in the Parliamentary annals of America. 

Robert C. Schenck was an invaluable addition to the House. He hadbeen serving in the field since the outbreak of the war, but hadbeen induced to contest the return of Vallandigham to Congress. His canvass was so able and spirited that though in other parts ofthe State the Democrats captured eight Republican districts, hedefeated Vallandigham in a Democratic district. Mr. Schenck hadoriginally entered Congress in 1843 at thirty-four years of age, and after a distinguished service of eight years was sent byPresident Fillmore as Minister-Plenipotentiary to Brazil. Afterhis return he had taken no part in political affairs until now. His re-appearance in Congress was therefore significant. He wasat once placed at the head of the Committee on Military Affairs, then of superlative importance, and subsequently was made chairmanof Ways and Means, succeeding Mr. Stevens in the undoubted leadershipof the House. He was admirably fitted for the arduous and difficultduty. His perceptions were keen, his analysis was extraordinarilyrapid, his power of expression remarkable. On his feet, as thephrase went, he had no equal in the House. In the five-minutediscussion in Committee of the Whole he was an intellectual marvel. The compactness and clearness of his statement, the facts andarguments which he could marshal in that brief time, were a constantsurprise and delight to his hearers. No man in Congress duringthe present generation has rivaled his singular power in thisrespect. He was able in every form of discussion, but his peculiargift was in leading and controlling the Committee of the Whole. **

 MEMBERS OF THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS. 

Several new members entered the Thirty-eighth Congress who weredestined to long service and varying degrees of prominence. JamesA. Garfield came from Ohio with a valuable reputation acquired inthe Legislature of his State and with a good military record, established in the war and recognized by the conferment of a Major-General's commission which he had won on the field. William B. Allison, John A. Kasson and Hiram Price of Iowa, John A. J. Creswellof Maryland, Glenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania, all earned honorabledistinction in after years. George S. Boutwell entered fromMassachusetts at forty-five years of age. Twelve years before, asa radical Democrat and Free-Soiler, he had been chosen governor ofhis State. James G. Blaine entered from Maine at thirty-threeyears of age. Among the new members on the Democratic side of theHouse were Samuel J. Randall, with the reputation of conspicuousservice in the Pennsylvania Legislature, and William R. Morrison, fresh from his duty in the field as colonel of an Illinois regiment, and, though still young, old enough to have served with credit inthe Mexican war. Fernando Wood, who had been elected a member ofthe House in 1840, and had served one term, now entered again. Francis Kernan appeared in public life for the first time, havingdefeated Roscoe Conkling in the Utica district. Charles A. Eldridgeof Wisconsin became one of the ablest parliamentarians of the House. 

In the Senate some important changes were made. Governor Morganentered from New York as the successor of Preston King; GovernorSprague came from Rhode Island, and Governor Ramsey from Minnesota. These elections were all made in direct recognition of the valuableservice which these Republican War-Governors had rendered thecountry. John Conness, a follower of Douglas, who had done muchfor the cause of the Union on the Pacific coast, now bore thecredentials of California. B. Gratz Brown came from Missouri aspledge of the radical regeneration of that State. 

To the Democratic side of the chamber three able men were added. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland succeeded to the seat made vacant thepreceding autumn by the death of James Alfred Pearce. Mr. Johnsonhad long been eminent at the Bar of the Supreme Court. He was awarm supporter of Mr. Clay, and was chosen to the Senate as a Whigin 1845. He was attorney-general in the Cabinet of PresidentTaylor, and after the defeat of the Whigs in 1852 had co-operatedwith the Democrats. He had stood firmly by the Union, and his re-appearance in the Senate added largely to the ability and learningof that body. Thomas A. Hendricks entered from Indiana as thesuccessor of Jesse D. Bright, who had been expelled upon a chargeof disloyalty. Mr. Hendricks had served in the House of Representativesfrom 1851 to 1855. He was but thirty-one years of age when firstchosen and his record in the House had not prepared the public toexpect the strength and ability which he displayed as senator. Hewas in the full maturity of his powers when he took his seat, andhe proved able, watchful, and acute in the discharge of his publicduties. He was always at his post, was well prepared on allquestions, debated with ability, and rapidly gained respect andconsideration in the Senate. Charles R. Buckalew of Pennsylvaniasucceeded David Wilmot. Both he and Mr. Hendricks were fruits ofthe violent re-action against the Administration the precedingyear. Mr. Buckalew came with high reputation, but did not gain soprominent a position in the Senate as his friends had anticipated. He did not seem ambitious, was not in firm health, and though hisability was recognized, his service did not strengthen his partyeither in the Senate or in his State. A Democrat from Pennsylvaniais somewhat out of harmony with the members of his party elsewhere, on account of the advocacy of the Protective system to which he isforced by the prevailing opinion among his constituents. 

 THE MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Congress assembled in December, 1863, in very different spirit fromthat which prevailed either at the opening or at the adjournmentof the preceding session. The President in his annual messagerecognized the great change for which "our renewed and profoundestgratitude to God is due. " Referring to the depressing period ofthe year before, he said "The tone of public feeling at home andabroad was not satisfactory. With other signs the popular electionsthen just passed indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while amidmuch that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming fromEurope were uttered in accents of pity, that we were too blind tosurrender a hopeless cause. Our commerce was suffering greatly bya few armed vessels built upon and furnished from foreign shores, and we were threatened with such additions from the same quarteras would sweep our trade from the sea and raise the blockade. Wehad failed to elicit from European governments any thing hopefulon this subject. . . . 

"We are now permitted to take another view. The rebel borders arepressed still further back, and by the complete opening of theMississippi the country, dominated by the Rebellion, is dividedinto distinct parts with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgentcontrol, and influential citizens in each, --owners of slaves andadvocates of slavery at the beginning of the Rebellion, --now declareopenly for emancipation in their respective States. Of those Statesnot included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which three years ago would tolerate any restraint uponthe extension of slavery into new territories, only now dispute asto the best mode of removing it within their own limits. " ThePresident dwelt with much satisfaction upon the good behavior ofthe slave population. "Full one hundred thousand of them are nowin the United-States military service, about one-half of whichnumber actually bear arms in the ranks, thus giving a doubleadvantage, --of taking so much labor from the insurgents' cause, and supplying the places which otherwise might be filled with somany white men. So far as tested it is difficult to say that theyare not as good soldiers as any. No servile insurrection or tendencyto cruelty has marked the measures of emancipation and the armingof the blacks. . . . Thus we have a new reckoning. The crisiswhich threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past. "

The Thirty-seventh Congress was distinguished for its effectivelegislation on all subjects relating to the finances and to therecruitment of a great army. It was reserved to the Thirty-eighthCongress to take steps for the final abolition of slavery by thesubmission to the States of a Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The course of events had prepared the public mind for the mostradical measures. In the short space of three years, by theoperation of war, under the dread of national destruction, a greatchange had been wrought in the opinions of the people of the LoyalStates. When the war began not one-tenth of the citizens of thoseStates were in favor of immediate and unconditional emancipation. It is very doubtful whether in September, 1862, the proclamationof the President would have been sustained by the majority of theNorthern people. In every instance the measures of Congress werein advance of public opinion, but not so far in advance as to invitea calamity through re-action. The President was throughout moreconservative than Congress. He had surprised every one with theEmancipation Proclamation, but he was so anxious for some arrangementto be made for compensating the Border States for their loss ofslaves, that he did not at once recommend the utter destruction ofthe institution by an amendment to the Fundamental Law of theRepublic. He left Congress to take the lead. 

Mr. James M. Ashley of Ohio is entitled to the credit of havingmade the first proposition to Congress to amend the Constitutionso as to prohibit slavery throughout the United States. Duringthe entire contest Mr. Ashley devoted himself with unswervingfidelity and untiring zeal to the accomplishment of this object. He submitted his proposition on the fourteenth day of December. Mr. Holman of Indiana objected to the second reading of the bill, but the speaker overruled the objection and the bill was referredto the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. Wilson of Iowa, chairmanof the Judiciary Committee, and Mr. Arnold of Illinois subsequentlyintroduced joint resolutions proposing a like amendment to theConstitution. Mr. Holman moved to lay the resolution of Mr. Arnoldon the table. The motion failed by a vote of 79 nays to 58 ayes. The vote thus disclosed was so far from the two-thirds necessaryto carry the constitutional amendment as to be discouraging to thesupporters of the measure. 

 AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 

On the thirteenth day of January, 1864, Mr. Henderson of Missouriintroduced in the Senate a joint resolution proposing a completeabolition of slavery by an amendment to the Constitution, and onthe tenth day of February Mr. Trumbull, chairman of the JudiciaryCommittee, reported the proposition to the Senate in these words:"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a punishmentfor crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shallexist in the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. "Mr. Garrett Davis of Kentucky proposed to amend the resolution soas to exclude the descendants of negroes on the maternal side fromall places of office and trust under the government of the UnitedStates. Mr. Davis betrayed by this motion his apprehension thatfreedom to the negro would be followed by the enjoyment of civilrights and the exercise of political power. Mr. Davis proposed atthe same time to amend the Constitution so as to consolidate NewEngland into two States to be called East New England and West NewEngland, the evident attempt being to avenge the overthrow of theslave system by the degradation of that section of the country inwhich the anti-slavery sentiment had originated and received itschief support. 

--It fell to Mr. Trumbull, as the senator who had reported theresolution, to open the debate. He charged the war and all itsmanifold horrors upon the system of slavery. He stated withclearness the views of the opposition in regard to the legal effectof the proclamation of emancipation, and with eloquent force oflogic he portrayed the necessity of universal freedom as the chiefmeans of ending not only the controversy on the battle-field, butthe controversy of opinion. --Mr. Willard Saulsbury of Delaware onthe 31st of March replied to Mr. Trumbull, and discussed the subjectof slavery historically, citing the authority of the old and thenew dispensations in its support. --Mr. Hendricks of Indiana objectedto a proposition to amend the Constitution while eleven States ofthe Union were unable to take part in the proceedings. He wisheda constitution for Louisiana as well as for Indiana, for Floridaas well as for New Hampshire. --Mr. Clark of New Hampshire criticisedthe Constitution, and traced the woes which the country was thenenduring to the recognition of slavery in that instrument. Fromthe twenty-eighth day of March until the eighth day of April, whenthe final vote was taken, the attention of the Senate was given tothe debate, with only unimportant interruptions. Upon the passageof the resolution, the yeas were 38, and the nays 6. The nays wereMessrs. Garrett Davis, Hendricks, McDougall, Powell, Riddle, andSaulsbury. Upon the announcement of the vote, Mr. Saulsbury said, "I bid farewell to all hope for the reconstruction of the AmericanUnion. "

When the joint resolution, passed by the Senate, was read in theHouse, Mr. Holman objected to the second reading, and on thequestion, "Shall the joint resolution be rejected?" the yeas were55 and the nays 76, an even more discouraging vote than the first. With 55 members opposed to the amendment, it would require 110 tocarry it, or 34 more than the roll-call had disclosed. The debatewas opened by Mr. Morris of New York who treated the abolition ofslavery as a necessary preliminary to the reconstruction of theUnion. 

--Mr. Fernando Wood denounced the movement as "unjust in itself, a breach of good faith utterly irreconcilable with expediency. "

--Mr. Ebon C. Ingersoll of Illinois made a strong and eloquentappeal for the passage of the amendment and the liberation of theslave. With the accomplishment of that grand end, said he, "ourvoices will ascend to Heaven over a country re-united, over a peopledisinthralled, and God will bless us. "

--Mr. Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania argued earnestly againstthe amendment. He regarded it as the beginning of radical changesin our Constitution, and the forerunner of usurpation. The policypursued was uniting the South and dividing the North. 

--Mr. Arnold of Illinois said, "in view of the long catalogue ofwrongs which it has inflicted upon the country, I demand to-daythe death of African slavery. "

--Mr. Mallory of Kentucky maintained that Mr. Lincoln had beenforced to issue the Proclamation of Emancipation by the governorswho met at Altoona. He was answered by Mr. Boutwell of Massachusetts, who most effectively disproved the charge. 

--Mr. Pendleton of Ohio maintained that three-fourths of the Statespossessed neither the power to establish nor to abolish slavery inall the States. He contended that the power to amend did not carrywith it the power to revolutionize and subvert the form and spiritof the government. 

The vote on the passage of the amendment was taken on the fifteenthday of June. The yeas were 93, the nays were 65. The yeas were27 short of the necessary two-thirds. Mr. Ashley of Ohio, who hadby common consent assumed parliamentary charge of the measure, voted in the negative, and in the exercise of his right under therules, entered upon the journal a motion to reconsider the vote. This ended the contest in the first session of the Thirty-eighthCongress. Mr. Ashley gave notice that the question would go tothe country, and that upon the re-assembling of Congress in Decemberhe should press the motion to reconsider, and he expected that theamendment would be adopted. This result forced the question intothe Presidential canvass of 1864, and upon the decision of thatelection depended the question of abolishing slavery. The issuethus had the advantage of a direct submission to the votes of thepeople before it should go to the State Legislatures for ultimatedecision. 

 PUBLIC AID TO THE PACIFIC RAILROAD. 

In the previous Congress an Act had been passed which was approvedby the President on the first day of July, 1862, to aid in theconstruction of a railroad and telegraph line from the MissouriRiver to the Pacific Ocean, and to secure to the government theuse of the same for postal, military, and other purposes. Thecompany authorized to build it was to receive a grant of publicland amounting to five alternate sections per mile on each side ofthe road. In addition to the lands the Government granted thedirect aid of $16, 000 per mile in its own bonds, payable upon thecompletion of each forty miles of the road. The bill was passedby a vote which in the main but not absolutely was divided on theline of party. The necessity of communication with our Pacificpossessions was so generally recognized that Congress was willingto extend generous aid to any company which was ready to completethe enterprise. The association of gentlemen who had organizedunder the provisions of the Act, were unable, as they reported, toconstruct the road upon the conditions prescribed and the aidtendered. It was impossible to realize money from the lands underthe grant, as they were too remote for settlement, and $16, 000 permile was declared insufficient to secure the means requisite forthe construction of the road across trackless plains, and throughrugged passes of the Rocky Mountains. 

The corporators had accordingly returned to Congress in 1864 forfurther help, and such was the anxiety in the public mind to promotethe connection with the Pacific that enlarged and most generousprovision was made for the completion of the road. The land-grantwas doubled in amount; the Government for certain difficult portionsof the road allowed $32, 000 per mile, and for certain mountainoussections $48, 000 per mile. The whole of this munificent grant wasthen subordinated as a second mortgage upon the road and itsfranchise, and the company was empowered to issue a first mortgagefor the same amount for each mile--for $16, 000, $32, 000 and $48, 000, according to the character of the country through which the roadwas to pass. Mr. Washburne of Illinois and Mr. Holman of Indianmade an earnest fight against the provisions of the bill as needlesslyextravagant, and as especially censurable in time of war when ourresources were needed in the struggle for our national life. Mr. Washburne had sustained the original bill granting the aid of landsand of bonds. He alleged, and produced a tabular statement insupport of the assertion, that the Government was granting $95, 000, 000to the enterprise, besides half of the land in a strip twenty mileswide from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean. 

 PUBLIC AID TO THE PACIFIC RAILROAD. 

So earnest however was the desire of the Government to secure theconstruction of the road that the opponents of the bill were unableto make any impression upon the House. On an amendment by Mr. Holman declaring that "the roads constructed under the Act shallbe public highways and shall transport the property and the troopsof the United States, when transportation thereof shall be required, free of toll or other charge, " there could be secured but 39 votesin the affirmative. On an amendment by Mr. Washburne to strikeout the section which subordinated the government mortgage to thatof the railroad company on the lands and the road, but 38 voted inthe affirmative and the bill passed without a call of the yeas andnays. In the Senate there were only five votes against the bill. Mr. Ten Eyck of New Jersey was the only Republican senator whovoted in the negative. Whatever may have subsequently occurred tosuggest that the grant was larger than was needed for the constructionof the highway to the Pacific, there can be no doubt that anoverwhelming sentiment, not only in Congress but among the people, was in favor of the bountiful aid which was granted. The terriblestruggle to retain the Southern States in the Union had persuadedthe Administration and the Government that no pains should be sparedand no expenditure stinted to insure the connection which mightquicken the sympathy and more directly combine the interests ofthe Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. A morecareful circumspection might perhaps have secured the same workwith less expenditure; but even with this munificent aid a fullyear passed before construction began from the eastern end of theroad, and for a considerable period it was felt that the men whoembarked their money in the enterprise were taking a very hazardoustask on their hands. Many capitalists who afterwards indulged indenunciations of Congress for the extravagance of the grants, wereurged at the time to take a share in the scheme, but declinedbecause of the great risk involved. 

Two organizations, composed of powerful men, were formed to prosecutethe work. The California Company, with Governor Leland Stanfordand the indomitable C. P. Huntington at the head, constructed thethousand miles stretching from the Bay of San Francisco to SaltLake, and a company headed by Oakes Ames and Oliver Ames, twoMassachusetts men noted for strong business capacity, industry, and integrity, constructed the thousand miles from the MissouriRiver to the point of junction. In the history of great enterprises, no parallel can be found to the ability and energy displayed inthe completion of this great work. With all the aids and adjunctsof surrounding civilization, there had never been two thousandmiles of rail laid so rapidly as this was across trackless plains, over five rugged ranges of mountains, through a country withoutinhabitants, or inhabited only by wild Indians who offered obstructionand not help. 

On the first day of the session, December 7, 1863, Mr. Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois introduced a bill to empower the Presidentto appoint a Lieutenant-General for all our forces. It was avowedlyintended for General Grant who had already been appointed a Major-General in the Regular Army. Some opposition was shown to themeasure, when it was formally reported from the Military Committeeby Mr. Farnsworth of Illinois who ably supported it. Mr. ThaddeusStevens indicated his intention to oppose it and was followed byMr. Garfield who thought the action premature. Mr. Schenck alsointimated that it might be difficult at that moment to say whowould in the end command precedence among our generals. Eighteenmonths before, McClellan would have been chosen; after GettysburgMeade would have been selected; at one time in the midst of hissuccesses in the South-West Rosecrans might have been appointed. As a matter of course Grant would now be selected. Mr. Schenckhowever announced his intention to support the measure. 

Mr. Washburne closed the debate with an impressive plea for thebill. He avowed that it meant General Grant who had been "successfulin every fight from Belmont to Lookout Mountain. The people ofthis country want a fighting general to lead their armies, andGeneral Grant is the man upon whom we must depend to fight out thisrebellion in the end. " Mr. Washburne gave a unique description ofGeneral Grant in the critical campaign below Vicksburg: "GeneralGrant did not take with him the trappings and paraphernalia socommon to many military men. As all depended on celerity of movementit was important to be encumbered with as little baggage as possible. General Grant took with him neither a horse nor an orderly nor aservant nor a camp-chest nor an overcoat nor a blanket nor even aclean shirt. His entire baggage for six days--I was with him atthe time--was a tooth-brush. He fared like the commonest soldierin his command, partaking of his rations and sleeping upon theground with no covering except the canopy of heaven. " The speechof Mr. Washburne was very earnest and very effective, and, the votecoming at its conclusion, the House passed the bill by 96 yeas to41 nays. It was not strictly a party vote. Randall of Pennsylvania, Morrison of Illinois, Eldridge of Wisconsin, Voorhees of Indianaand several other Democratic partisans supported the measure, whileThaddeus Stevens, Winter Davis, Garfield, Broomall of Pennsylvaniaand others among the Republicans opposed it. 

The bill was desired by the President who approved it on the 29thof February, 1864, and immediately nominated Ulysses S. Grant tobe Lieutenant-General. Mr. Lincoln saw the obvious advantage ofplacing a man of General Grant's ability in command of all thearmies. The General was ordered to Washington at once, and arrivedat the capital on the eighth day of March. Mr. Lincoln had neverbefore seen him, though both were citizens of Illinois and GeneralGrant had been distinguished in the field for more than two years. A new era opened in our military operations and abundant vigor wasanticipated and realized. General Sherman was left in command ofthe great army in the West. He had up to this time been servingwith General Grant but was now to assume command of an enormousforce and to engage in one of the most arduous, heroic, and successfulcampaigns in the military history of the country. The march fromVicksburg to Chattanooga, thence to Atlanta, to Savannah, andNorthward to the Potomac, is one of the longest ever made by anarmy. From Vicksburg to Chattanooga the army was under command ofGeneral Grant, but the entire march of the same body of troops musthave exceeded two thousand miles through the very heart of theinsurrectionary country. But the great operations of both Grantand Sherman were incomplete when Congress adjourned on the Fourthof July. Its members returned home to engage in a canvass ofextraordinary interest and critical importance. 

 CHARACTER OF GENERAL SHERMAN. 

The character and ability of General Sherman were not fullyappreciated until the second year of the war. He had not aimed tostartle the country at the outset of his military career with anyof the brilliant performances attempted by many officers who wereheard of for a day and never afterwards. With the true instinctand discipline of a soldier, he faithfully and skillfully did thework assigned to him, and he gained steadily, rapidly, and enduringlyon the confidence and admiration of the people. He shared in thesuccessful campaigns of General Grant in the South-West, and earnedhis way to the great command with which he was now intrusted, --acommand which in one sense involved the prompt success of all themilitary operations of the Government. Disaster for his army didnot of course mean the triumph of the Rebellion, but it meant freshlevies of troops, the prolongation of the struggle, and a seriousincrease to the heavy task that General Grant had assumed inVirginia. 

General Sherman was a graduate of West Point, and while still ayoung man had served with marked credit for some twelve years inthe army. But he had more than a military education. Through acheckered career in civil life, he had enlarged his knowledge ofthe country, his acquaintance with men, his experience in affairs. He had been a banker in California, a lawyer in Kansas, Presidentof a college in Louisiana, and, when the war began, he was aboutto take charge of a railroad in Missouri. It would be difficult, if not impossible to find a man who has so thorough, so minute aknowledge of every State and Territory of the Union. He has madea special study of the geography and products of the country. Someone has said of him, that if we should suddenly lose all the mapsof the United States, we need not wait for fresh surveys to makenew ones, because General Sherman could reproduce a perfect map intwenty-four hours. That this is a pardonable exaggeration wouldbe admitted by any one who had conversed with General Sherman inregard to the topography and resources of the country from Maineto Arizona. 

General Sherman's appearance is strongly indicative of his descent. Born in the West, he is altogether of Puritan stock, his fatherand mother having emigrated from Connecticut where his familyresided for nearly two centuries. All the characteristics of thatremarkable class of men re-appear in General Sherman. In grim, determined visage, in commanding courage, in mental grasp, insternness of principle, he is an Ironside Officer of the Army ofCromwell, modified by the impulsive mercurial temperament whicheight generations of American descent, with Western birth andrearing, have impressed upon his character. 

[* The Italicized words were underscored in the original lettersof the President. ]

[** THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS. REPUBLICANS IN ROMAN; DEMOCRATS IN ITALIC. 

The Senate was composed of same members as in Thirty-seventh Congress(given on pp. ----), with the following exceptions:--ILLINOIS. --_William A. Richardson_ succeeded O. H. Browning. INDIANA. --_Thomas A. Hendricks_ succeeded _David Turpie_. MAINE. --Nathan A. Farwell succeeded William Pitt Fessenden. MARYLAND. --_Reverdy Johnson_ succeeded _James Alfred Pearce_. MINNESOTA. --Alexander Ramsey succeeded _Henry M. Rice_. MISSOURI. --B. Gratz Brown succeeded _Robert Wilson_. NEW JERSEY. --_William Wright_ succeeded _James W. Wall_. NEW YORK. --Edwin D. Morgan succeeded Preston King. PENNSYLVANIA. --_Charles R. Buckalew_ succeeded David Wilmot. RHODE ISLAND. --William Sprague succeeded Samuel G. Arnold. »Waitman T. Willey and Peter G. Van Winkle were admitted as the first senators from West Virginia. Lemuel J. Bowden took Mr. Willey's place as senator from Virginia, and colleague of John Carlile. The political power of West Virginia was thus actually represented at one time by four senators. »James W. Nye and William M. Stewart took their seats Feb. 1, 1865, as senators from the new State of Nevada. »Ten States were unrepresented. 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

CALIFORNIA. --Cornelius Cole, William Higby, Thomas B. Shannon. CONNECTICUT. --Augustus Brandegee, Henry C. Deming, _James E. English_, John H. Hubbard. DELAWARE. --Nathaniel B. Smithers. ILLINOIS. --_James C. Allen; William J. Allen_; Isaac N. Arnold; _John R. Eden_; John F. Farnsworth; _Charles M. Harris_; Ebon C. Ingersoll, elected in place of Owen Lovejoy, deceased; _Anthony L. Knapp_; Owen Lovejoy, died March 25, 1864; _William R. Morrison; Jesse O. Norton; James C. Robinson; Lewis W. Ross; John T. Stuart_; Elihu B. Washburne. INDIANA. --Schuyler Colfax, _James A. Cravens_, Ebenezer Dumont, _Joseph K. Edgerton, Henry W. Harrington, William S. Holman_, George W. Julian, _John Law, James F. McDowell_, Godlove S. Orth, _Daniel W. Voorhees_. IOWA. --William B. Allison, Joseph B. Grinnell, Asahel W. Hubbard, John A. Kasson, Hiram Price, James F. Wilson. KANSAS. --A. Carter Wilder. KENTUCKY. --Lucien Anderson, Brutus J. Clay, Henry Grider, Aaron Harding, Robert Mallory, William H. Randall, Green Clay Smith, _William H. Wadsworth_, George H. Yeaman. MAINE. --James G. Blaine, Sidney Perham, Frederick A. Pike, John H. Rice, _Lorenzo D. M. Sweat_. MARYLAND. --John A. J. Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, _Benjamin G. Harris_, Francis Thomas, Edwin H. Webster. MASSACHUSETTS. --John R. Alley, Oakes Ames, John D. Baldwin, George S. Boutwell, Henry L. Dawes, Thomas D. Eliot, Daniel W. Gooch, Samuel Hooper, Alexander H. Rice, William B. Washburn. MICHIGAN. --Augustus C. Baldwin, Fernando C. Beaman, John F. Driggs, Fracis W. Kellogg, John W. Longyear, Charles Upson. MINNESOTA. --Ignatius Donnelly, William Windom. MISSOURI. --Francis P. Blair, Jr. , seat successfully contested by Samuel Knox; Henry T. Blow, Sempronius H. Boyd; _William A. Hall; Austin A. King_; Samuel Knox, seated in place of Mr. Blair, June 15, 1864; Benjamin Loan; Joseph W. McClurg; James S. Rollins, _John G. Scott_. NEVADA. --Henry G. Worthington, seated Dec. 21, 1864. NEW HAMPSHIRE. --_Daniel Marcy_, James W. Patterson, Edward H. Rollins. NEW JERSEY. --_George Middleton, Nehemiah Perry, Andrew J. Rogers_, John F. Starr, _William G. Steele_. NEW YORK. --_James Brooks; John W. Chanler_; Ambrose W. Clark; Freeman Clarke; Thomas T. Davis; Reuben E. Fenton, resigned Dec. 10, 1864; Augustus Frank; _John Ganson_; John A. Griswold; _Anson Herrick_; Giles W. Hotchkiss; Calvin T. Hulburd; _Martin Kalbfleisch_; Orlando Kellogg; _Francis Kernan_; De Witt C. Littlejohn; James M. Marvin; Samuel F. Miller; Daniel Morris; _Homer A. Nelson; Moses F. Odell_; Theodore M. Pomeroy; _John V. L. Pruyn; William Radford; Henry G. Stebbins_, resigned 1864; _John B. Steele; Dwight Townsend_, elected in place of Mr. Stebbins; Robert B. Van Valkenburgh; _Elijah Ward; Charles H. Winfield; Benjamin Wood; Fernando Wood_. OHIO. --James M. Ashley, _George Bliss, Samuel S. Cox_, Ephraim B. Eckley, _William E. Finck_, James A. Garfield, _Wells A. Hutchins, William Johnson, Francis C. LeBlond, Alexander Long, John F. McKinney, James R. Morris, Warren P. Noble, John O'Neill, George H. Pendleton_, Robert C. Schenck, Rufus P. Spaulding, _Chilton A. White, Joseph W. White_. OREGON. --John R. McBride. PENNSYLVANIA. --_Sydenham E. Ancona, Joseph Baily_, John M. Broomall, _Alexander H. Coffroth, John L. Dawson, Charles Denison, James T. Hale, Philip Johnson_, William D. Kelley, _Jesse Lazear, Archibald McAllister, William H. Miller_, James K. Moorhead, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Charles O'Neill, _Samuel J. Randall_, Glenni W. Scofield, Thaddeus Stevens, _John D. Stiles, Myer Strouse_, M. Russell Thayer, Henry W. Tracy, Thomas Williams. RHODE ISLAND. --Nathan F. Dixon, Thomas A. Jenckes. VERMONT. --Portus Baxter, Justin S. Morrill, Fred. E. Woodbridge. WEST VIRGINIA. --Jacob B. Blair, William G. Brown, Killian V. Whaley. WISCONSIN. --_James T. Brown_, Amasa Cobb, _Charles A. Eldridge_, Walter D. McIndoe, Ithamar C. Sloan, _Ezra Wheeler_. 

TERRITORIAL DELEGATES. ARIZONA. --Charles D. Poston. COLORADO. --Hiram P. Bennett. DAKOTA. --William Jayne, _John B. S. Todd_. IDAHO. --William H. Wallace. MONTANA. --_Samuel McLean_, seated June 6, 1865. NEBRASKA. --Samuel G. Daily. NEVADA. --Gordon N. Mott. NEW MEXICO. --Francisco Perea. UTAH. --John F. Kenney. WASHINGTON. --_George E. Cole_. ]

CHAPTER XXIV. 

Presidential Election of 1864. --Preliminary Movements. --GeneralSentiment favors Mr. Lincoln. --Some Opposition to his Renomination. --Secretary Chase a Candidate. --The "Pomeroy Circular. "--Mr. Chasewithdraws. --Republican National Convention. --Baltimore, June 7. --Frémont and Cochrane nominated. --Speech of Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. --Mr. Lincoln renominated. --Candidates for Vice-President. --AndrewJohnson of Tennessee nominated. --Democratic National Convention. --Chicago, August 29. --Military Situation discouraging. --Characterof the Convention. --Peace Party prevails. --Speeches of Belmont, Bigler, Hunt, Long, Seymour. --Nomination of General McClellan forPresident. --George H. Pendleton for Vice-President. --Platform. --Suits Vallandigham. --General McClellan accepts, but evades thePlatform. --General Frémont withdraws. --Success of the Union Army. --Mr. Lincoln's Popularity. --General McClellan steadily losesGround. --Sheridan's Brilliant Victories. --General McClellan receivesthe Votes of only Three States. --Governor Seymour defeated in NewYork. 

The Presidential election of 1864 was approaching, with markedpolitical fluctuations and varying personal prospects. The tideof public feeling ebbed or flowed with the disasters or the victoriesof the war. The brilliant military triumphs of the summer of 1863had quelled political opposition, and brought overwhelming successto the Republican party. This period of heroic achievement andpopular enthusiasm was followed in the winter of 1863-64 by adormant campaign, a constant waste, and an occasional reverse whichproduced a corresponding measure of doubt and despondency. Thewar had been prolonged beyond the expectation of the country; theloss of blood and of treasure had been prodigious; the rebels stillflaunted their flag along the Tennessee and the Rappahannock; thepublic debt was growing to enormous proportions; new levies oftroops were necessary; the end could not yet be seen; and all thesetrials and sacrifices and uncertainties had their natural effectupon the temper of the public and upon the fortunes of the war. 

The preliminary movements connected with the Presidential canvassbegan in this period of doubt. The prevailing judgment of theUnion-Republican party, with full trust in the President's sagacityand clear recognition of the injurious construction that would beput upon a change, pointed unmistakably to the renomination of Mr. Lincoln. But this predominant sentiment encountered some vigorousopposition. A part of the hostility was due to a sincere thoughmistaken impatience with Mr. Lincoln's slow and conservative methods, and a part was due to political resentments and ambitions. Themore radical element of the party was not content with the President'scautious and moderate policy, but insisted that he should proceedto extreme measures or give way to some bolder leader who wouldmeet this demand. Other individuals had been aggrieved by personaldisappointments, and the spirit of faction could not be altogetherextinguished even amid the agonies of war. There were civil aswell as military offices to be filled, and the selection amongcandidates put forward in various interests could not be madewithout leaving a sense of discomfiture in many breasts. 

These various elements of discontent and opposition clustered aboutSecretary Chase, and found in him their natural leader. He wasthe head of the radical forces in the Cabinet, as Mr. Seward wasthe exponent of the conservative policy. He had been one of theearliest and most zealous chiefs of the Free-soil party, and rankedamong the brightest stars in that small galaxy of anti-slaverysenators who bore so memorable a part in the Congressional strugglesbefore the war. He was justly distinguished as a political leaderand an able and a versatile statesman. For the part he was nowdesired and expected to play he had a decided inclination and nota few advantages. Keenly ambitious, he was justified by his talents, however mistaken his time and his methods, in aspiring to thehighest place. His sympathies were well understood. By hisunconcealed views and his direct expressions he had encouraged themovement against Mr. Lincoln. A year in advance of the Presidentialelection he had announced his conviction that no President shouldbe re-elected, and had added the opinion that a man of differentqualities from those of Mr. Lincoln would be needed for the nextfour years. 

 MR. CHASE A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. 

Apart from the influence of his known attitude and of his recognizedleadership, the opponents of Mr. Lincoln were naturally attractedto Mr. Chase by the fact that he was at the head of the departmentwhich was most potential in the distribution of patronage. If thepurpose was not avowed, the inference was suggested that no mancould do more to help himself. There had been sharp contentionover the important Treasury offices in New York, in which Mr. Chaseappeared on the one side and the rival influences in the Administrationon the other, and this contest was interpreted as a part of thepolitical and Presidential struggle. Mr. Chase having consentedto the use of his name as a candidate, his friends began activework on his behalf. Early in the winter of 1863-64 what was knownas the "Pomeroy circular" was sent out, ostensibly as a confidentialpaper, but promptly finding its way into print. It derived itsname from the Kansas senator who was prominent in the advocacy ofMr. Chase's nomination. The circular represented that Mr. Lincoln'sre-election was impossible; that his "manifest tendency towardcompromises and temporary expedients of policy" rendered itundesirable; that Mr. Chase united more of the qualities needed ina President for the next four years than were combined in any otheravailable candidate; and that steps should be taken at once toeffect a general organization to promote his nomination. 

But the effort met with small response. It aroused no popularsympathy. Its chief effect indeed was to call forth the alwaysconstant if sometimes latent attachment of the people to Mr. Lincoln, and to develop an irresistible desire for his re-election. A fewdays after the issue of the "Pomeroy circular" the Republicanmembers of the Ohio Legislature passed a resolution in favor ofMr. Lincoln's renomination, and Mr. Chase availed himself of thisunmistakable action in his own State to withdraw his name as acandidate. The signal failure of the movement however did notentirely arrest the effort to prevent Mr. Lincoln's renomination. Restless spirits still persisted in an opposition as destitute ofvalid reason as it was abortive in result. With the view of promptlysettling the disturbing question of candidates and presenting anundivided front to the common foe, the Republican National Conventionhad been called to meet on the 7th of June. The selection of thisearly date, though inspired by the most patriotic motives, was madean additional pretext for factious warfare. An address was issuedinviting the "radical men of the nation" to meet at Cleveland onthe 31st of May, with the undisguised design of menacing andconstraining the Republican Convention. This call passionatelydenounced Mr. Lincoln by implication as prostituting his positionto perpetuate his own power; it virulently assailed the BaltimoreConvention, though not yet held, as resting wholly on patronage;it challenged the rightful title of that authoritative tribunal ofthe party, and declared for the principle of one term. There hadbeen no election of delegates to this Cleveland assemblage, and itpossessed no representative character. It was simply a massconvention, and numbered about a hundred and fifty persons claimingto come from fifteen different States. 

The platform adopted by the Convention was brief, and in somedirections extreme. It demanded that the rebellion be suppressedwithout compromise, and that the right of _habeas corpus_ and theprivilege of asylum be held inviolate; declared for the Monroedoctrine and for constitutional amendments prohibiting the re-establishment of Slavery and providing for the election of Presidentfor one term only and by direct vote of the people; and finallyadvocated the confiscation of the lands of rebels and theirdistribution among the soldiers and actual settlers. GeneralFrémont was selected as the candidate for President, and GeneralJohn Cochrane of New York for Vice-President. General Frémonthurried forward his letter of acceptance, which was dated only fourdays after his nomination and three days before the BaltimoreConvention. It repudiated the proposed confiscation, but approvedthe remainder of the platform. It was chiefly devoted to a vehementattack upon Mr. Lincoln's Administration, which was charged withincapacity and with infidelity to the principles it was pledged tomaintain. General Frémont further hinted that if the BaltimoreConvention would select some candidate other than Mr. Lincoln hewould retire from the contest, but plainly declared that if thePresident were renominated there would be no alternative but toorganize every element of opposition against him. 

Three days before the Baltimore Convention, a mass meeting was heldin New York to give public voice to the gratitude of the countryto General Grant and his command, for their patriotic and successfulservices. While this was the avowed object of the demonstration, there was a suspicion that it had a political design and that itsreal purpose was to present General Grant as a Presidential candidate. If such were the intent, it was effectually frustrated both by theemphatic refusal of General Grant to countenance the use of hisname, and by the admirable and impressive letter of Mr. Lincoln. Paying a warm tribute to the heroic commander of the army, thePresident said appealingly, "He and his brave soldiers are now inthe midst of their great trial, and I trust that at your meetingyou will so shape your good words that they may turn to men andguns, moving to his and their support. " This patriotic singlenessof thought for the country's safety defeated and scattered all morepolitical plans, and the hearts of the people turned more and moreto Mr. Lincoln. He had been steadily growing in the esteem of hiscountrymen. The patience, wisdom, and fidelity with which he hadguided the government during its unprecedented trials and dangershad won the profound respect and affection of the people. Besidesthis deepening sentiment of personal devotion and confidence, therewas a wide conviction that, in his own expressive phrase, "it isnot wise to swap horses while crossing the stream. "

 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. 

Under these circumstances the Union-Republican National Conventionmet in Baltimore. The feeling with which it convened was one ofpatriotic and exultant confidence. The doubts prevailing a fewmonths before had been dissipated. The accession of General Grantto the command of all our armies, and the forward movement both inthe East and in the West, inspired faith in the speedy and completetriumph of the Union cause. Many eminent men were included in theroll of delegates to the Convention. Not less than five of theleading War Governors were chosen to participate in its councils. Vermont sent Solomon Foot who had stood faithful in the Senateduring the struggles before the war. Massachusetts had commissionedher eloquent Governor John A. Andrew; the delegation from New Yorkembraced Henry J. Raymond; Daniel S. Dickinson, who was to beprominently named for Vice-President; and Lyman Tremain who, likeDickinson, was one of the able war Democrats that had joined theRepublican party. New Jersey and Ohio each sent two ex-governors--Marcus L. Ward and William A. Newell from the former, and WilliamDennison and David Tod from the latter. Simon Cameron, ThaddeusStevens, and Ex-Speaker Grow of Pennsylvania; Governor Blair andOmer D. Conger of Michigan; Angus Cameron of Wisconsin and GeorgeW. McCrary of Iowa were among the other delegates who have sincebeen identified with public affairs and have occupied positions ofresponsibility. 

In calling the Convention to order Governor Morgan of New York madea brief speech advocating a constitutional amendment abolishingslavery. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge of Kentucky was chosen temporarychairman. The appearance on the platform of this venerable andvenerated divine was in itself an event of great interest. Bybirth and association he was connected with the aristocratic classwhich furnished the pillars of the Confederacy; he belonged to afamily conspicuously identified with the rebellion; yet among hisown order he was the strongest and sturdiest champion of the Unioncause south of the Ohio. His pointed eloquence was equaled by hisindomitable courage. The aggressive qualities of his staunch Scotchancestry shone in his own resolute and unyielding character, andhe was distinguished both in Church and in State as an able anduncompromising controversialist. His years and his history inspireda general feeling of reverence; and as he was conducted to thechair of the Convention, his tall figure, strong face, and patriarchalbeard imparted to him something of personal majesty. His speechwell illustrated his rugged attributes of character. It was sharp, sinewy, and defiant. At the beginning he hurled out the declarationthat "the nation shall not be destroyed;" and referring to the pleawhich treated the Constitution as the sacred shield of the systemthat was waging war on the Union and which insisted that it mustremain untouched, he proclaimed that "we shall change the Constitutionif it suits us to do so. " He solemnly affirmed "that the onlyenduring, the only imperishable cement of all free institutionshas been the blood of traitors. " He alluded to the fact that hehad lived amid the surroundings of slavery, and had been amongthose who sustained and upheld the system; but, recognizing thatit was this institution which had lifted the sword against theUnion, he aroused the enthusiasm of his vast audience by hisunhesitating declaration that we must "use all power to exterminateand extinguish it. " Next to the official platform itself, thespeech of Dr. Breckinridge was the most inspiring utterance of theConvention. 

When the question of calling the roll of the Southern States andof receiving their delegates was reached, Thaddeus Stevens objectedon the ground that such an act might be regarded as recognizingthe right of States in rebellion to participate in the ElectoralCollege. The Convention decided however to call the roll of allthe States, and to refer the question of admitting their delegatesto the Committee on Credentials. Ex-Governor Dennison of Ohio waselected permanent president. Preston King of New York from theCommittee on Credentials reported in favor of admitting the RadicalUnion delegation from Missouri, and excluding the ConservativeUnion or Blair delegation. It was proposed to amend by admittingboth delegations to seats; but the recognition of the Radical Uniondelegation was urged on the ground not only that they were regularlyelected, but that it was the duty of the Convention to strengthenthe advanced Union sentiment of the South, and that their admissionwould be the practical adhesion of the national party to the broadanti-slavery policy which was essential to the salvation of thecountry. This view prevailed by a vote of 440 to 4. The admissionof the delegations from Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana was aquestion of no less interest. It involved the effect of therebellion upon the relation of the rebelling States to the Union. Could they have a voice in public affairs without specific measuresof restoration, or were the acts of secession a nullity withoutinfluence upon their legal status? The committee reported in favorof admitting the delegations from these States, without the rightto vote. The chairman, Mr. King, was the only member who dissented, and he moved to amend by admitting them on the same footing as allthe other delegates. The question was first taken on Tennessee, and the amendment was carried by a vote of 310 to 153--a decisionwhich had an important bearing on the subsequent nomination forVice-President. The delegates from Arkansas and Louisiana weregiven the right to vote by 307 to 167. The Territories of Colorado, Nebraska, and Nevada were soon to enter the Union as States, andtheir delegates were allowed to vote. The remaining Territoriesand the States of Virginia and Florida were admitted without theright to vote. 

 THE PLATFORM AND THE CANDIDATE. 

With the completion of the organization the Committee on Resolutionsmade their report through Mr. Henry J. Raymond. The platform uponwhich it had unanimously agreed was a trenchant and powerfuldeclaration of policy. Its tone was elevated, its expression wasdirect and unequivocal. It pledged every effort to aid the Governmentin quelling by force of arms the rebellion against its authority;it approved "the determination of the government not to compromisewith rebels nor to offer them any terms of peace except such asmay be based upon an unconditional surrender of their hostilityand a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and lawsof the United States;" and it called upon the government to prosecutethe war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppressionof the Rebellion. It resolved that "as slavery was the cause andnow constitutes the strength of this Rebellion, and as it must bealways and everywhere hostile to the principles of Republicangovernment, justice and the national safety demand its utter andcomplete extirpation from the soil of the Republic;" and it declaredfor "such an amendment to the Constitution as shall terminate andforever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits orjurisdiction of the United States. " The heroism of the soldiersand sailors of the Republic was gratefully acknowledged. Thewisdom, patriotism, and fidelity of President Lincoln, and hismeasures for the defense of the nation were approved. A generalexpression that harmony should prevail in the national councilswas interpreted as contemplating a possible reconstruction of theCabinet. Declarations for the encouragement of foreign immigrationby a liberal policy, for the speedy construction of a Pacificrailroad, for the inviolability of the National faith, and for there-assertion of the Monroe doctrine, completed a platform which inall its parts was pervaded by the most vigorous spirit. Itscommanding feature was its explicit demand for the abolition ofslavery. The President's Proclamation of Emancipation had beenissued more than a year before, but this was the first Nationalassemblage with power to make it the fixed policy of a party. TheBaltimore platform, which was adopted by acclamation, made thisthe paramount issue, and from that hour Freedom and the Union wereinseparably associated. 

The nomination for President being in order, there was a strifefor the honor of naming Mr. Lincoln. General Simon Cameron offereda resolution declaring Abraham Lincoln the choice of the Unionparty for President, and Hannibal Hamlin its candidate for Vice-President. To this proposition the immediate objection was made thatit might be open to the misconstruction of not permitting a freevote, and that it complicated the selection for the first placewith a contest over the second. After some discussion GeneralCameron withdrew his resolution, and on a general demand, in orderto remove all ground for the charge that the nomination was forced, the roll of the Convention was called. Abraham Lincoln was namedby 497 delegates, --all of the Convention except the 22 from Missouri, who under instructions voted for General Grant. Amid great enthusiasmMr. Lincoln's nomination was then declared to be unanimous. 

 CANDIDATES FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT. 

The Vice-Presidency had excited an animated contest. While manyfelt that the old ticket should remain unbroken, and that Mr. Hamlinshould continue to be associated with Mr. Lincoln, there was a widesentiment in favor of recognizing the war Democrats, who had actedwith the Union party, by selecting one of their number for thesecond place. Two prominent representatives of this class weresuggested, --Daniel S. Dickinson of New York and Andrew Johnson ofTennessee. One was identified with the patriotic Democrats of theNorth and the other with the sturdy and intrepid Unionists of theSouth. Mr. Dickinson, by reason both of his earnest loyalty andof his coming from the important State of New York, was regardedin many quarters with special favor. The Massachusetts delegationearly declared their preference, and sent a message to the New-Yorkdelegation announcing their purpose to vote for him if New Yorkwould present him as a candidate. Had New York given him a unitedsupport his nomination would not have been doubtful. But the veryreasons which commended him in other sections excited jealousy inhis own State, and prompted an opposition which led to his defeat. 

Mr. Dickinson's career had been long and honorable. He had beenchosen to the State Senate in 1837, and quickly attained a leadingplace. After serving as lieutenant-governor, he was in 1844appointed United-States senator by Governor Bouck to fill a vacancy, and was subsequently elected by the Legislature for a full term. Appearing in the Senate at the important juncture when the annexationof Texas and the Mexican war were agitating the country, he soontook an active part in the discussions. He was particularlydistinguished for his aptness in repartee, and for his keen andincisive humor. Politically he belonged to the conservative or_Hunker_ wing of the Democracy. Entering the Senate just as SilasWright was leaving it to assume the Governor's chair, he joinedSecretary Marcy and the influences that moulded Polk's Administration, against the able and powerful statesman who had so long held swayover the Democratic party in New York. Mr. Dickinson's talent madehim the leader of the Hunkers, and in 1852 he was one of theircandidates for President. When the war came, he declared himselfunreservedly on the side of the Government, and rendered valuableservice to the Union party. He was especially effective on thestump. His sharp wit, his rich fund of anecdotes, his sparklinghumor, his singular felicity and aptness of biblical illustration, which had earned for him the popular name of "Scripture Dick, "served to give him wonderful command over an audience, and theeffect was heightened by his personal appearance, which his long, flowing silvery locks made strikingly impressive. 

The suggestion of Mr. Dickinson's name for Vice-President wascordially received by many delegates. But some of the controllinginfluences among the New-York Republicans were not well disposedtowards the advancement of those who came from the Democratic ranks. They feared, besides, that if the candidate from Vice-Presidentwere taken from New York, it might prejudice her claims for theCabinet, and might endanger Mr. Seward's position as Secretary ofState. For these reasons their influence was thrown against Mr. Dickinson's nomination. On a test-vote in the New-York delegation, Dickinson received 28, Johnson 22, and Hamlin 6. This result wasfatal to Mr. Dickinson's chances, and brought Mr. Johnson prominentlyforward. His record and character had much to attract the patrioticrespect of the country. The vigor and boldness with which, thougha Southern senator, he had denounced secession at the beginning ofthe outbreak, had taken strong hold of the popular heart. Thefirmness and unyielding loyalty he had displayed as Military Governorof Tennessee greatly deepened the favorable impression. Thedelegates from his own and other Southern States had been admittedto the Convention as an evidence that the Republican party honoredthe tried and faithful loyalists of the South, and many felt thatthe nomination of Mr. Johnson would emphasize this sentiment, andfree the party from the imputation of sectional passion and purpose. The ballot for Vice-President gave Johnson 200; Dickinson 113;Hamlin 145; General B. F. Butler 26; General L. H. Rousseau 21;with a few scattering votes. Before the final announcement, severaldelegations changed to Johnson, until as declared the ballot stood, Johnson 492; Dickinson 17; Hamlin 9. Mr. Johnson was then unanimouslynominated. The Convention had completed its work, and the resultswere hailed with satisfaction throughout the country. 

The Republicans had been compelled in 1856 and 1860 to nominatetheir candidates both for President and Vice-President from theNorth. This was contrary to the patriotic traditions of the countrywith which a single exception had in all parties divided thecandidates between the two great sections of the country. Strangelyenough both parties violated the practice in the exciting canvassof 1828, when Jackson and Calhoun were the candidates of theDemocratic party and Adams and Rush were the candidates of theNational Republican party. The nomination now of Andrew Johnsonfrom the South tended, in the phrase of the day, to _nationalize_the Republican party, and this consideration gave it popularitythroughout the North. It was nevertheless felt by many of Mr. Hamlin's friends to be an injustice to him. But it did him noinjury. He accepted the result in a cordial manner and workedearnestly for the success of the nominees. The whole country sawthat the grounds upon which Mr. Hamlin was superseded were not inderogation of the honorable record he had made in his long andfaithful public career. 

 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, 1864. 

The Democratic National Convention was held nearly three monthsafter the Republican Convention had renominated Mr. Lincoln, andonly two months prior to the election. It had originally beencalled to meet in Chicago on the 4th of July; but as the timeapproached, the brighter military prospects and the rekindlednational hopes left a darker Democratic outlook, and the assemblingof the Convention had been delayed to the 29th of August. Severalreasons had combined to secure the selection of this unusually lateday. It gave longer opportunity to observe the course of themilitary campaign, and to take advantage of any unfavorableexigencies; it allowed more time to compose Democratic dissensions;and it furnished more scope for the party, whose chances restedsolely upon the degree of popular discontent, to seize upon anydisturbed state of the public mind, and turn it to account. 

The delay of nearly two months had been accompanied by a markedchange in the situation. The advance of the Union cause which haddepressed Democratic expectations in the spring, had been succeededby inactivity and doubts which revived Democratic hopes in August. The postponement which had been ordered that they might availthemselves of any unfavorable course of affairs, thus deluded theminto a bold abandonment of all reserve. Changes in the militarysituation were sometimes sudden and swift. Had the Convention beenpostponed another week, its tone and action might have beenessentially different; for its tumultuous session had scarcelyclosed before the clouds that hung over the country during thesummer were scattered, and our armies entered upon the most brilliantmovements and triumphs of the war--triumphs which did not ceaseuntil the surrender at Appomattox. 

But the Convention assembled at a time of uncertainty if not ofgloom and depression. The issue of the great struggle was not yetclear. General Grant, with his unquailing resolution "to fight itout on this line, " had cut his way through the Wilderness over thebloody field of Spotsylvania, and against the deadly lines of ColdHarbor. He had fastened his iron grip upon Petersburg, and therethe opposing armies were still halting in their trenches. In theShenandoah Valley, Early was defiant and aggressive. In the West, the delay at Kennesaw, the fall of the heroic McPherson, and otherreverses had marked a campaign of slow advances. The assaults uponMr. Lincoln's Administration had been renewed with increased venomand persistence. Mistaken and abortive peace negotiations withpretended rebel commissioners at Niagara Falls had provoked muchcriticism and given rise to unfounded charges. The loyal spiritand purpose of the people were unshaken; but there was some degreeof popular impatience with the lack of progress, and it was theexpectation of the Democratic managers that the restive feelingmight be turned into the channel of opposition to the Administration. 

The Convention included among its delegates many of the mostdistinguished leaders of the Democratic party. Massachusetts sentJosiah G. Abbott and George Lunt. The credentials of Connecticutwere borne by the positive and aggressive William W. Eaton. Amongthe representatives of New York were the accomplished GovernorSeymour; the acute Dean Richmond; Samuel J. Tilden, who had notyet achieved his national distinction; Sanford E. Church, whoafterwards became chief judge of the Court of Appeals; and Ex-Governor Washington Hunt, whose Silver-Gray conservatism had carriedhim into the Democratic party. Ohio counted on the roll of herdelegates William Allen, who had been the contemporary of Websterand Clay in the Senate; George H. Pendleton and Allen G. Thurman, who were yet to take high rank in that body; and Clement L. Vallandigham, just then more prominent with a doubtful celebritythan any one of his abler colleagues. Pennsylvania contributed Ex-Governor Bigler, and William A. Wallace already showing the politicaltalent which afterwards gave him a leading position. The Indianadelegation was led by Joseph E. McDonald, and the Kentucky delegationby Governor Powell, James Guthrie, and by Ex-Governor Wickliffe whohad been driven by Mr. Lincoln's anti-slavery policy into the ranksof his most bitter opponents. In ability and leadership theConvention fairly represented the great party whose principles andpolicy it had met to declare. Besides the accredited delegates, it brought together a large number of the active and ruling membersof the Democratic organization. The opposition to the war wasstronger in the West than in the East, and the presence of theConvention in the heart of the region where disloyal societies wererife, gathered about it a large and positive representation of thePeace party, which manifested itself in public meetings and ininflammatory utterances. 

 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, 1864. 

The representatives inside and outside of the Convention were unitedin opposing the War and in demanding Peace. But there were differentshades of the Peace sentiment. One portion of the Convention, ledchiefly by the adroit New-York managers, arraigned the whole conductand policy of the Administration, and insisted upon a cessation ofhostilities, but at the same time modified the force and effect ofthis attitude by urging the nomination of General McClellan forPresident. They concurred in the demand for an armistice, but madea reservation in favor of continuing the war in case the rebelsrefused to accept it. Another portion sought to make the declarationagainst the war so broad and emphatic that neither General McClellannor any man who had been identified with the struggle for the Unioncould become the candidate. Both divisions agreed in denouncingthe war measures of the Administration, in resisting emancipation, in calling for immediate cessation of military movements, and inopposing the requirement of any conditions from the Southern States. They differed only in the degree of their hostility to the war. The faction peculiarly distinguished as the Peace party was led byMr. Vallandigham of Ohio, who was the central figure of theConvention. He had been conspicuous in Congress as the most vehementand violent opponent of every measure for the prosecution of thewar. Subsequent events had increased his notoriety, and givenexplicit significance to his participation in the National Conventionof his party. 

The Convention, meeting in the same city where Abraham Lincoln hadfirst been nominated four years before, struck its keynote inopposition to his Administration. Mr. August Belmont, Chairman ofthe National Committee, opened the proceedings with a violentspeech. "Four years of misrule, " he said, "by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party have brought our country to the very verge ofruin. . . . The past and present are sufficient warnings of thedisastrous consequences which would befall us if Mr. Lincoln's re-election should be made possible by our want of patriotism andunity. " In still more explicit terms he went on to picture thedireful effects of that catastrophe. "The inevitable results ofsuch a calamity, " he said, "must be the utter disintegration ofour whole political and social system amid bloodshed and anarchy, with the great problems of liberal progress and self-governmentjeopardized for generations to come. "

Ex-Governor Bigler of Pennsylvania was made temporary chairman, and followed in a speech which expressed similar sentiments in morediscreet and temperate language than Mr. Belmont had used. Hecontented himself with general utterances, and was not betrayedinto personal reflections or prophecies of ruin. The organizationwas promptly completed, and the character of the platform wasforeshadowed when it was known that Mr. Vallandigham was a rulingspirit in the Committee on Resolutions. It was a suggestive incidentthat Ex-Governor Wickliffe of Kentucky presented letters from twodelegates chosen to represent that State, explaining their absenceby the fact that they were imprisoned by the Union Government, without cause, as they alleged, but presumably for disloyal conduct. Various individual propositions were then brought forward. Thetemper and purpose of the Convention may be judged from the offerof a resolution by so conservative and moderate a man as Ex-GovernorHunt of New York, declaring in favor of an armistice and of aconvention of States "to review and amend the Constitution so asto insure to each State the enjoyment of all its rights and theconstitutional control of its domestic concerns, "--meaning inplainer words the perpetuation and protection of slavery. Thispolicy aimed to stop the Rebellion by conceding what the rebelsfought for. Then came a characteristic proposition from AlexanderLong of Ohio. Mr. Long was a member of Congress, and next to Mr. Vallandigham had been most active in resisting war measures. Fora speech which was treasonable in tone he had been publicly censuredby the House. His proposition provided for the appointment of acommittee to proceed at once to Washington, and urge PresidentLincoln to stop the draft until the people could decide the questionof peace or war. These various propositions, following the usualcourse, were referred to the Committee on Resolutions. 

 THE PEACE POLICY PROCLAIMED. 

Governor Horatio Seymour of New York was chosen president, and ontaking the chair made the most elaborate and important address ofthe Convention. He was exceedingly popular with his party, andwas justly recognized as among the ablest defenders of its views. By virtue both of his official position and of his personal strengthhe was looked to more than any other leader for the exposition ofDemocratic policy. Singularly prepossessing in manner, endowedwith a rare gift of polished and persuasive speech, he put in moreplausible form the extreme and virulent utterances of intemperatepartisans. He was skilled in dialectics, and his rhetoricaldexterity had more than once served him and his friends in goodstead. He was well-nigh the idol of his party, and no other mancould so effectively rally its strength or direct its policy. Hisaddress as presiding officer was intended to be free from themenacing tone which marked most of the speeches of the Convention, but it veiled the same sentiment in more subtle and specious phrase. He charged both the cause and the continuance of the war upon theRepublican party. "Four years ago, " he said, "a convention met inthis city when our country was peaceful, prosperous, and united. Its delegates did not mean to destroy our government, to overwhelmus with debt, or to drench our land with blood; but they wereanimated by intolerance and fanaticism, and blinded by an ignoranceof the spirit of our institutions, the character of our people, and the condition of our land. They thought they might safelyindulge their passions, and they concluded to do so. Their passionshave wrought out their natural results. " Governor Seymour had nocriticism for those who had drawn the sword against the government;he did not impute to them any responsibility for the war; but hecharged the wrong upon those who were defending the Union. Inadvocating an armistice which would involve a practical surrenderof the contest he said: "The Administration will not let theshedding of blood cease, even for a little time, to see if Christiancharity or the wisdom of statesmanship may not work out a methodto save our country. Nay, more, they will not listen to a proposalfor peace which does not offer that which this government has noright to ask. " It was the abolition of slavery which "this governmenthas no right to ask. " As he advanced towards his conclusionGovernor Seymour grew more pronounced and less discreet. "But asfor us, " he said, "we are resolved that the party which has madethe history of our country since its advent to power seem like someunnatural and terrible dream, shall be overthrown. We have forbornemuch because those who are now charged with the conduct of publicaffairs know but little about the principles of our government. "The entire speech was able, adroit, and mischievous. 

In the preparation of the platform the champions of the peace policyhad their own way. The friends of General McClellan were soanxious to secure his nomination and to conciliate the oppositionthat they studiously avoided provoking any conflict with thepredominant peace sentiment. The substance and vital spirit ofthe platform were contained in the second resolution as follows:"That this Convention does explicitly declare as the sense of theAmerican people, that after four years of failure to restore theUnion by the experiment of war, during which under the pretense ofa military necessity of a war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, andpublic liberty and private right alike trodden down, and the materialprosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts bemade for a cessation of hostilities with a view to an ultimateconvention of all the States, or other peaceable means, to the endthat at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored onthe basis of the Federal Union of the States. " The few remainingresolutions pledged fidelity to the Union, condemned the allegedinterference of the military authority with certain State elections, denounced what were recited as arbitrary acts of Administrativeusurpation, reprobated "the shameful disregard of the Administrationof its duty in respect to our fellow-citizens who now are and longhave been prisoners of war, " and declared the sympathy of theDemocratic party with the soldiers of the Republic. 

The extreme Peace party having carried the platform, the lessradical section of the Convention secured the candidate for President. But General McClellan was not nominated without a vehement protest. The presentation of his name was the signal for a stormy debate. Mr. Harris of Maryland passionately declared that one man named asa candidate "was a tyrant. " "He it was, " continued the speaker, "who first initiated the policy by which our rights and libertieswere stricken down. That man is George B. McClellan. Marylandwhich has suffered so much at the hands of that man will not submitin silence to his nomination. " This attack produced great confusion, and to justify his course Mr. Harris read General McClellan's orderfor the arrest of the Maryland Legislature. He proceeded, "All thecharges of usurpation and tyranny that can be brought againstLincoln and Butler can be made and substantiated against McClellan. He is the assassin of State rights, the usurper of liberty, and ifnominated will be beaten everywhere, as he was at Antietam. "

General Morgan of Ohio warmly defended McClellan. He declared thatthere was a treasonable conspiracy in Maryland to pass an ordinanceof secession, and that McClellan had thwarted it. Mr. Long espousedthe other side. "You have arraigned Lincoln, " he said, "as beingguilty of interfering with the freedom of speech, the freedom ofelections, and of arbitrary arrests, and yet you propose to nominatea man who has gone even farther than Lincoln has gone in theperpetration of similar tyrannical measures. McClellan is guiltyof the arrest of the Legislature of a sovereign State. He hassuspended the writ of _habeas corpus_, and helped to enforce theodious Emancipation Proclamation of Lincoln, the wiling instrumentof a corrupt and tyrannical administration. He has aided whilepossessing military power all its efforts to strip American freemenof their liberties. "

The heated debate lasted till darkness forced an adjournment, andon re-assembling in the morning a ballot was immediately taken. General McClellan received 162 votes, and 64 votes were dividedamong Horatio Seymour, Thomas H. Seymour of Connecticut and others;but before the result was announced several changes were made, andthe vote as finally declared as 202˝ for McClellan and 23˝ forThomas H. Seymour. For Vice-President two ballots were taken. Onthe first, James Guthrie of Kentucky had 65˝ votes; George H. Pendleton of Ohio, 54˝; Governor Powell of Kentucky, 32˝; GeorgeW. Cass of Pennsylvania, 26. Mr. Guthrie had been identified withthe war party; Mr. Pendleton as a member of Congress had opposedthe war and was the favorite of the Peace party; and on the secondballot Mr. Guthrie's name was withdrawn and Mr. Pendleton unanimouslynominated. This act completed the work of the Convention. 

 RE-ACTION AGAINST THE DEMOCRACY. 

The response of the country to the action of the Democraticrepresentatives was an immediate outburst of indignant rebuke. There were thousands of patriotic Democrats who deeply resentedthe hostility of the Convention to the loyal sentiment of thepeople, and who felt that it was as fatal as it was offensive. The general expression of condemnation, and the manifestations onall sides foreshadowed the doom of the Chicago ticket. GeneralMcClellan and his friends felt the necessity of doing something toplacate the aroused sentiment which they could not resist, and hevainly sought to make his letter of acceptance neutralize thebaneful effect of the Democratic platform. 

In truth General McClellan practically disavowed the platform. Heignored the demand for a cessation of hostilities and the declarationthat the war was a failure. "The re-establishment of the Union, "he said, "in all its integrity is and must continue to be theindispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it as clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peaceupon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resourcesof statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by thetraditions of the American people, consistent with the honor andinterests of the country, to secure such peace, re-establish theUnion, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights ofevery State. The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask nomore. " While thus proposing to "exhaust the resources of statesmanship"to secure peace, he indicated that if such efforts were unavailingthe responsibility for consequences would fall upon those whoremained in arms against the Union. But the letter failed to attainits object. Its dissent from the dangerous and obnoxious propositionsof the platform was too guarded and reserved to be satisfactory. The people felt moreover that the deliberate declarations of theConvention and not the individual expressions of the candidatedefined the policy of the party. 

One of the first results of the Democratic position was the withdrawalof General Frémont from the canvass. As a loyal man he could notfail to see that his position was entirely untenable. Either Mr. Lincoln or General McClellan would be the next President and hisduty was made so plain that he could not hesitate. The argumentfor Mr. Lincoln's re-election addressed itself with irresistibleforce to the patriotic sentiment and sober judgment of the country. Apart from every consideration growing out of the disloyal attitudeof the Democratic Convention, it was felt that the rejection ofMr. Lincoln would be regarded by the rebels as the condemnation ofthe war policy and would encourage them to renewed, prolonged, andmore desperate resistance. This conviction appealed to patrioticmen of all parties. Mere political feeling largely subsided, andthe people were actuated by a higher sense of public duty. Especiallywas every effort made to remove all grounds of difference whichhad divided members of the Union party. The Baltimore platformindicated some dissatisfaction with the Cabinet, and, acting uponthis suggestion, the President requested and received the resignationof Postmaster-General Blair. It is but just to Mr. Blair to saythat he gave to Mr. Lincoln his earnest and faithful support inthe election. 

From the hour of the Chicago Convention the whole course of eventssteadily strengthened the canvass for Mr. Lincoln. The turn ofthe political tide came with sudden and overpowering force. Thenews of the capture of Fort Morgan burst upon the DemocraticConvention while it was declaring the war a failure, and the dayafter its adjournment brought the still more inspiring intelligencethat Sherman had taken Atalanta. The swift successes of Farragutin Mobile Bay, following the fall of the rebel stronghold in theSouth, filled the country with joy. Within two days from the hourwhen the Chicago delegates separated with the demand for a practicalsurrender to the rebellion, President Lincoln was able to issue aproclamation for thanksgiving in all the churches for the greatUnion triumphs; and this was followed by national salutes fromevery navy-yard and arsenal and from all military headquarters. The political effect of the victories was instantaneous andoverwhelming. As Secretary Seward expressed it in a public speech, "Sherman and Farragut have knocked the planks out of the Chicagoplatform. "

 GREAT VICTORY FOR MR. LINCOLN. 

The tide of victory swept on. While Grant was holding Lee as ina vise at Petersburg, and Sherman was breaking the shell of theConfederacy at Atlanta, Sheridan was dashing through the ShenandoahValley. Three striking victories crowned his bold and brilliantprogress. The battles of Winchester and Fisher's Hill came withinthree weeks of Atlanta and within three days of each other. Thethird exploit at Cedar Creek was still more dramatic and thrilling. The succession of matchless triumphs was the theme of every journaland every orator, and the North was aflame with the enthusiasm itkindled. In the light of the answer flashed back from a score ofbattle-fields, the Chicago declaration that the war was a failurewas not only seen to be unpatriotic and mischievous but was madecontemptible by universal ridicule and obloquy. 

The political effect of these victories was precisely what Mr. Lincoln had foreseen and foretold. Speaking of the issue to afriend, he said, "With reverses in the field the case is doubtfulat the polls. With victory in the field the election will takecare of itself. " And so it was. Vermont and Maine in September, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana in October, registered in advancethe edict of the people in regard to the Presidency. The resultin November was an overwhelming triumph for Mr. Lincoln. Of thetwenty-two States participating in the election, General McClellanreceived the electoral vote of but three. It is perhaps a stillstronger statement to say that of the eighteen free States hereceived the vote of but one. New Jersey gave him her electors, and Kentucky and Delaware, angered by the impending destruction ofSlavery, turned against the Administration and against the prosecutionof the war. Maryland had escaped from all influences connectedwith Slavery by its abolition the preceding October, and now casther vote for Mr. Lincoln. Missouri and West Virginia, the onlyother slave States loyal to the Union, stood firmly by the President. Mr. Lincoln received two hundred and twelve electoral votes andGeneral McClellan received twenty-one. 

The chief interest of the whole country for the last month of thecampaign had centred in New York. As nearly as Mr. Lincoln waswilling to regard a political contest as personal to himself, hehad so regarded the contest between Mr. Seymour and Mr. Fenton. Governor Seymour's speech in the Chicago Convention had been anindictment of a most malignant type against the Administration. The President felt that he was himself wholly wrong or GovernorSeymour was wholly wrong, and the people of New York were to decidewhich. They rendered their verdict in the election of Reuben E. Fenton to the Governorship by a majority of thousands over Mr. Seymour. Without that result Mr. Lincoln's triumph would have beenincomplete. For its accomplishment great credit was awarded tothe Republican candidate for the admirable thoroughness of hiscanvass and for the judicious direction of public thought to thenecessity of vindicating the President against the aspersions ofMr. Seymour. The victory in the Nation was the most complete everachieved in an election that was seriously contested. 

CHAPTER XXV. 

President's Message, December, 1864. --General Sherman's March. --Compensated Emancipation abandoned. --Thirteenth Amendment. --Earnestlyrecommended by the President. --He appeals to the Democratic Members. --Mr. Ashley's Energetic Work. --Democratic Opportunity. --Unwiselyneglected. --Mr. Pendleton's Argument. --Final Vote. --Amendmentadopted. --Cases arising under it. --Supreme Court. --Change of Judgesat Different Periods. --Peace Conference at Fortress Monroe. --Secretary Chase resigns. --Mr. Fessenden succeeds him. --Mr. Fessenden'sReport. --Surrender of Lee. --General Grant's Military Character. --Assassination of President Lincoln. --His Characteristics. --Cost ofthe War. --Compared with Wars of Other Nations. --Our Navy. --Createdduring the War. --Effective Blockade. --Its Effect upon the South. --Its Influence upon the Struggle. --Relative Numbers in Loyal andDisloyal States. --Comparison of Union and Confederate Armies. --Confederate Army at the Close of the War. --Union Armies comparedwith Armies of Foreign Countries. --Area of the War. --Its Effectupon the Cost. --Character of Edwin M. Stanton. 

Sustained by so emphatic a vote of popular confidence, PresidentLincoln greeted Congress on the first Monday of December, 1864, with a hopeful and cheerful message. He reported that our armies, holding all the lines and positions gained, "have steadily advanced, thus liberating the regions left in the rear. " The Presidentregarded "General Sherman's march of three hundred miles directlythrough an insurgent country" as the "most remarkable feature inthe military operations of the year. " It was in progress when thePresident delivered his message, and "the result not yet beingknown, conjecture in regard to it cannot be here indulged. " ThePresident reported that the actual disbursements in money from theTreasury for the past fiscal year were $865, 234, 087. 86. 

Mr. Lincoln had finally abandoned the project of compensating theBorder States for their loss of property in slaves. The people ofthose States had, through their representatives, blindly andwillfully rejected the offer when it was urged upon them by theAdministration, and had defeated the bill embodying the propositionon the eve of its passage in the House when it had already passedthe Senate. The situation was now entirely changed. Maryland, without waiting for National action and regardless of compensation, had in the preceding October taken the matter under her own controland deliberately abolished slavery. Mr. Lincoln now announced theState as "secure to liberty and union for all the future. Thegenius of rebellion will no longer claim Maryland. Like anotherfoul spirit being driven out, it may seek to tear her, but it willwoo her no more. " There was no reason why the other Border Statesshould not follow her example--and there was the strongest argumentagainst compensating another State for doing what Maryland had doneof her own free will and from an instinct of patriotism, as theone act which would conclusively separate her from all possibilityof sympathy with the rebellion. 

Freed thus from what he may have regarded as the obligations ofhis Border-State policy and upheld by the great popular majoritywhich he had received in the election, the President warmlyrecommended to Congress the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendmentto the Constitution. He called attention to the fact that it hadalready received the sanction of the Senate, but failed in theHouse for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote. There was nodoubt that the large Republican majority, already elected to theThirty-ninth Congress, would adopt the Amendment, but such adoptionimplied postponement for a whole year, with loss of the moralinfluence which would be gained by prompter action. It impliedalso that the Amendment would depend solely upon Republican votes, and the President was especially anxious that it should receiveDemocratic support. Still another reason wrought upon the President'smind. He believed the rebellion to be near its end, and no mancould tell how soon a proposition might come for the surrender ofthe Confederate Armies and the return of the Rebel States to theirNational allegiance. If such a proposition should be made, Mr. Lincoln knew that there would be a wild desire among the loyalpeople to accept it, and that in the forgiving joy of re-union theywould not insist upon the conditions which he believed essentialto the future safety and strength of the National Government. Slavery had been abolished in the District of Columbia by a law ofCongress, and in Maryland by her own action. It still existed inthe other Border States and in Tennessee, and its abolition in theremaining States of the Confederacy depended upon the validity ofthe President's Proclamation of Emancipation. 

 THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. 

Without discussing the validity of the Proclamation Mr. Lincolnincidentally assumed it, with an emphatic assertion of his ownposition, which came nearer the language of threat than his habitualprudence and moderation had ever permitted him to indulge. "Inpresenting the abandonment of armed resistance on the part of theinsurgents as the only indispensable condition to ending the war, "said the President, "I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. . . . While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt toretract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation. Nor shall I returnto slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamationor by any of the Acts of Congress. _If the people should, bywhatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to re-enslavesuch persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument toperform it. _. " This was fair notice by Mr. Lincoln to all theworld that so long as he was President the absolute validity ofthe Proclamation would be maintained at all hazards. 

This position enabled the President to plead effectively withCongress for the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and theconsequent avoidance of all possible conflicts between differentdepartments of the Government touching the legal character of theProclamation. Recognizing the fact that he was addressing the sameHouse of Representatives which had already rejected the anti-slaveryamendment, he made a special appeal, though without using partisannames, to the Democratic members. "Without questioning the wisdomor patriotism of those who stood in opposition, " said the President, "I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of themeasure at the present session. Of course the abstract questionis not changed, but an intervening election shows almost certainlythat the next Congress will pass the measure if this Congress doesnot. Hence there is only a question of time as to when the proposedamendment will go to the States for their action, and as it is togo at all events, may we not agree that the sooner the better?"He urged the argument still more closely upon the Democratic members. "In a great national crisis like ours, unanimity of action amongthose seeking a common end is very desirable, almost indispensable, and yet no approach to such unanimity is attainable unless somedeference shall be paid to the will of the majority. " Mr. Lincolnfound much encouragement in the fact that in the national election"no candidate for any office whatever, high or low, ventured toseek votes on the avowal that he was in favor of giving up theUnion. . . . In the distinct issue of Union or no Union thepoliticians have shown their instinctive knowledge that there isno diversity among the people. "

The proposed Constitutional amendment was brought before the Houseon the 6th of January by Mr. Ashley of Ohio, upon whose motion toreconsider the adverse vote of the preceding session, the questioncontinued to have a parliamentary status. He made a forcible speechin support of the amendment, but the chief value of his work didnot consist in speaking, but in his watchful care of the measure, in the quick and intuitive judgment with which he discerned everyman on the Democratic side of the House who felt anxious as to thevote he should give on the momentous question, and in the pressurewhich he brought to bear upon him from the best and most influentialof his constituents. The issue presented was one that might wellmake thoughtful men pause and consider. The instant restorationto four millions of human beings of the God-given right of freedomso long denied them, depended upon the vote of the House ofRepresentatives. It addressed itself to the enlightened judgmentand to the Christian philanthropy of every member. Each one hadto decide for himself whether so far as lay in the power of hisown vote he would give liberty to the slave, or forge his fettersanew. The constitutional duty of not interfering with slavery inthe States could not be pleaded at the bar of conscience for anadverse vote. There was no doubt that under the terms of theConstitution such interference was unwarranted. But this was aquestion of changing the Constitution itself so as to confer uponCongress the express power to enlarge the field of personal libertyand make the Republic free indeed. It came therefore as an originaland a distinct question whether millions of people with theirdescendants for all time should be doomed to slavery or gifted withfreedom. 

It was a singular opportunity for the Democratic party. Its membershad always professed to be endued with a broader spirit of libertythan their opponents who under various organizations had confrontedthem in the political contests of the preceding half-century. Intheir evangelization of Liberty the Democrats had halted at thecolor-line, but, as they alleged, only because the solemn obligationsof the Constitution forbade a step beyond. Here by the convergingexigencies of war it became of vast interest to the white race thatslavery should be smitten and destroyed. Its destruction was indeedthe deadliest blow that could be given to the Rebellion which wasthreatening destruction to the Republic. It was not unfair to say, as was said by many during the crisis, that it was brought to everyman's conscience to decide whether he would continue to imperilthe fate of the Union by refusing the enfranchise the slave. 

 THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. 

It fell to Mr. George H. Pendleton to play an important part inthis crisis. His leadership on the Democratic side of the Househad been confirmed by the popular voice of his party in the nominationfor the Vice-Presidency, and though he had been defeated in theelection he returned to the House with increased prestige amonghis own political associates. The argument he had made the precedingsession was now repeated with earnest spirit and in plausible form. He maintained that "three-fourths of the States do not possess theconstitutional power to pass this amendment. " A colleague fromOhio (Mr. S. S. Cox) had made a radical argument in the otherdirection, asserting that "three-fourths of the States have theright to amend the Constitution in every particular except the twospecified in the instrument; they have the right to do any thing, even to erect a monarchy!" Without carrying the argument so far, Mr. Cox might well have reminded his colleague that four yearsbefore, in the winter of compromise preceding the war, the onepoint sought to be gained by all who asked additional guarantiesfor slavery was that the power to abolish the institution byconstitutional amendment should be taken from the States. It wouldhave been a precious consolation at the time to Mr. Pendleton'sSouthern friends, to hear from him the argument that no such powerexisted and that slavery was in no danger from its attemptedexercise. Such action by the Federal Government was the one thingwhich the South had especially dreaded and which all the amendmentsto the Constitution proposed by the Peace Congress of 1861 aimedto prevent. Mr. Pendleton omitted his argument therefore at themost pertinent time for its submission, but he made it now withfreshness and vigor and with evident effect upon his politicalassociates. 

Mr. Pendleton was very effectively answered by many members on theRepublican side of the House; by General Garfield elaborately, byMr. Boutwell briefly but most pointedly. The debate was prolongedand able. At least one-third of the entire House took part in it. The ground was somewhat beaten, but many of the arguments were ofpermanent historic interest. Among the most valuable were thespeeches of Mr. Glenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania, Mr. John A. Kasson of Iowa, and Mr. James S. Rollins of Missouri. As therepresentative of a slave-holding constituency the argument andvote of Mr. Rollins were of special weight. The tone and temperof the speeches exhibited assurance on one side and failing confidenceon the other. The moral pressure was steadily for the Amendmentand its strength grew rapidly both in Congress and the country. It had been borne into the minds of the people that slavery hadproduced the war, and it seemed a righteous retribution that slaveryshould end with the war. It had drawn the sword; let it perish bythe sword. 

When the hour arrived for the final struggle, on Tuesday, January31, 1865, the galleries of the House were filled in every part, largely no doubt by friends of the measure. There were eightabsentees, without pairs. They were all Democrats. It may beassumed that they assented to the amendment, but that they werenot prepared to give it positive support. This list comprisedJesse Lazear of Pennsylvania, John F. McKinney and Francis C. LeBlond of Ohio, Daniel W. Voorhees and James F. McDowell of Indiana, George Middleton and A. J. Rogers of New Jersey, and Daniel Marcyof New Hampshire. The members of the Democratic party who gavetheir votes for the amendment, and thus secured its passage by theThirty-eighth Congress, were James E. English of Connecticut, AnsonHerrick, William Radford, Homer A. Nelson, John B. Steele and JohnGanson of New York, A. H. Coffroth and Archibald McAllister ofPennsylvania, Wells A. Hutchins of Ohio, and Augustus C. Baldwinof Michigan. Mr. Nelson had not voted at the first session, butall the others are recorded against the proposition. With the aidof these eleven, the vote was 119 yeas to 56 nays--more than theconstitutional two-thirds. When the announcement was made, theSpeaker became powerless to preserve order. The members upon theRepublican side sprang upon their seats cheering, shouting, andwaving hands, hats, and canes, while the spectators upon the floorand in the galleries joined heartily in the demonstration. Uponthe restoration of order Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois rose and said, "Mr. Speaker, in honor of this immortal and sublime event, I movethat this House do now adjourn. " The Speaker declared the motioncarried, but Mr. Harris of Maryland demanded the ayes and noes, and the House adjourned by a vote of 121 to 24. 

The great act of Liberation, so far as Congress could control it, was complete. The amendment was at once submitted to the States, and by official proclamation of December 18, 1865, --less than elevenmonths after Congress had spoken, --the Secretary of State announcedthat it had been ratified by the Legislatures of twenty-seven Statesand was a part of the Constitution. The result was attained bythe united action of one party and the aid of a minority of theother party. The co-operation of the Democratic members had gainedfor the cause of emancipation a whole year. The action was oftranscendent importance, --lofty in conception, masterful in execution. Slavery in the United States was dead. To succeeding and notdistant generations its existence in a Republic, for three-quartersof a century, will be an increasing marvel. 

 THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN COURT. 

The language of the Thirteenth Amendment is so comprehensive andabsolute that vital questions of law are not likely at any time toarise under it. The Article is in two parts. _First_, "Neitherslavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crimewhereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist withinthe United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. _Second_, Congres shall have power to enforce this Article byappropriate legislation. " By this Amendment the relation betweenthe National and State Governments, respecting the question ofHuman Liberty, was radically changed. Before its adoption slaverycould be established or abolished in any State at the will of themajority. The National prohibition now extended everywhere thatthe flag floated; freedom of the person became thenceforth a matterof National concern. The power of the State was subordinated tothe continuing and supreme authority of the Nation. 

The Supreme Court has had occasion in a few cases only to deal withthe Thirteenth Amendment, and in those cases the questions raiseddid not touch the validity or scope of the Article. In the caseof _White_ v. _Hart_, reported in 13 _Wallace_, the Court held thata note given for slaves at a time prior to emancipation was a validcontract and could be enforced. This judgment was rendered in theface of the fact that the Reconstructed Constitution of the Stateof Georgia, where the contract was made, contained a provision thatno Court should have or take "jurisdiction in any case of debt theconsideration of which was a slave or the hire thereof. " The Courtheld that the provision in the Georgia Constitution was invalid asto all agreements made prior to its adoption, upon the ground thatit was a violation of the Constitution of the United States whichprovides that no State shall make any law "impairing the obligationof contracts. " In the case of _Osborne_ v. _Nicholson_, 13 _Wallace_, where the cause of action was a note given for a slave in Arkansas, March 20, 1861, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment didnot constitute a bar to the claim. These cases serve to show thenarrow and restricted character of the issues made under the Article--issues long since passed by the limitation of time. 

One point in the adoption of the Amendment caused much speculationat the time, not unaccompanied with anxiety. The whole number ofStates was thirty-six. The assent of three-fourths of that numberwas required to amend the Constitution. Twenty-seven States votedthrough their Legislatures in favor of the Amendment--preciselythe requisite number. But of these, nine had been in rebellionand had not at the time been restored to the enjoyment of theirrights as States in the Union. They had not been re-admitted torepresentation either in the House or the Senate. The majority ofthese States were not considered to be entitled to representationin Congress for three years after they had given their formal assentto the Thirteenth Amendment. The question as to whether they couldgive valid assent to an amendment to the Constitution was one whichmight possibly be raised. If they were not in condition to enjoyrepresentation in Congress, it might be asked how they could be incondition to perform a much higher function. If they could notparticipate in the enactment of Statute Law, how could theyparticipate in the far weightier duty of framing the Organic Lawof the Republic?

If the same judges who pronounced the Dred Scott decision had beenstill on the Bench, serious trouble might have arisen. But therehad been a radical change in the Judicial Department, not simplyin the _personnel_ of the judges but in the views they entertainedtouching the functions, powers, and duties of the Federal Government. It fell to Mr. Lincoln's lot to appoint a majority of the judgesand thus practically to constitute a new Court. Washington, theelder Adams, and Jackson were the only Presidents before him whohad appointed a Chief Justice, and when he nominated Mr. Chase, there had been only one other chief justice named for sixty-threeyears. He appointed as associate justices Noah Swayne of Ohio, Samuel F. Miller of Iowa, David Davis of Illinois, all in 1862, and Stephen J. Field of California the year following. Mr. Lincoln'ssound judgment was apparent in this as in other great duties. There are single judges in our history who, in point of learning, rank higher in the estimation of the legal profession, but perhapsnever a majority of the court who were superior in all the qualitieswhich adorn the Judicial character. 

 THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 

Considering that the tenure is for life, it seemed as if anextraordinary number of Judicial appointments fell to one President. But as the eminence which fits a man for the high station is notattained until past the middle period of life, the changes arenecessarily somewhat rapid. Washington in his Presidency of eightyears nominated, for a Court of six members, eleven judges whoserved, besides one who declined and one who was rejected. Downto this period in our history (1884) it has fallen to the lot ofeach of our twenty-one Presidents except Harrison, Tyler, andJohnson, to nominate at least one associate justice. Under Jacksonand Van Buren the entire Court was revolutionized. A Chief Justiceand six associates were appointed, selected exclusively from theirpolitical supporters. From that time onward until the Administrationof Mr. Lincoln, every judge was selected from the Democratic party, with the exception of Benjamin R. Curtis who was appointed byPresident Fillmore. When Mr. Lincoln entered upon his officialduties, the Judicial Department of the Government differenced inevery conceivable way from his construction of the Constitution inso far as the question of slavery was involved. But one judgecould be expected to look with favor upon the course he wouldpursue. The venerable John McLean, though placed on the Bench byJackson, had changed his political views and relations, and healone of all the justices sympathized with Mr. Lincoln. 

The Southern States prior to 1860 had secured a large majority ofappointments on the Supreme Bench. In originally constituting theCourt Washington had equally divided the judges between the slaveStates and the free States. After his Administration and untilthe incoming of President Lincoln, the Court uniformly containeda majority of Southern men. From the beginning of the Governmentuntil the election of Mr. Lincoln, there had been eighteen associatejustices appointed from the slave States, and but fifteen from thefree States. The average term of service of the judges from theSouth had been about fourteen years; from the North about twelveyears. From 1789 to 1860, the Chief Justice had been from theSouth during the whole period with the exception of twelve years. It is a fact worth noting that neither the elder nor the youngerAdams appointed a Northern man to the Bench. They appointed threefrom the South. It is not among the least of the honors belongingto the elder Adams that he gave to the country the illustriousChief Justice Marshall. 

Directly after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment came a wide-spread rumor that negotiations for peace were in progress whichmight interfere with the anti-slavery action of Congress. On the8th of February Mr. Thaddeus Stevens moved and the House unanimouslyadopted a resolution requesting "the President to communicate tothe House such information as he may deem not incompatible withthe public interest relative to the recent conference betweenhimself and the Secretary of State and Messrs. Alexander H. Stephens, Robert M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell in Hampton Roads. " Mr. Lincoln replied at once, giving in detail every step which had ledto the conference, and all that was accomplished by it. It wasbrought about by the elder Francis P. Blair, who under a flag oftruce had visited Richmond early in January. Mr. Lincoln hadsteadily insisted on three preliminary conditions: First, theabsolute restoration of the national authority in all the States;second, no receding from the positions taken on the slavery question;third, no cessation of military operations on the part of theGovernment till the hostile forces surrendered and disbanded. Onthese conditions the Confederate agents could not treat, and theconference came to no agreement. In his message Mr. Lincoln madeone significant remark. "By the other party it was not said thatin any event or on any condition they would ever consent to re-union; and yet they equally omitted to declare that they would notso consent. " The proceedings left no special interest, except onecharacteristic anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. The Confederate agentsdesired the recognition of the power of "President" Davis to makea treaty. Mr. Lincoln would not consent to this, would not in anyevent or in any way recognize another "President" within theterritory of the United States. Mr. Hunter cited the example ofCharles I. Treating with rebels in his own kingdom. Mr. Lincolnreplied that his only distinct recollection of that matter was thatCharles lost his head!

 MR. FESSENDEN IN THE TREASURY. 

Soon after the Baltimore Convention, Mr. Chase resigned his positionas Secretary of the Treasury. The relations between himself andthe President had become personally somewhat unpleasant, but thatthere had been no loss of confidence or respect was proven by thePresident's nomination of Mr. Chase to be Chief Justice of theUnited States as the successor of the venerable Roger B. Taney, who died on the 12th of October (1864). William Pitt Fessendensucceeded Mr. Chase in the Treasury, and entered upon his dutieson the fifth day of July. He was admirably fitted by every mentaland moral quality for the position, but he did not possess thephysical strength necessary for the arduous labor which it imposed. He consented in response to the very earnest request of Mr. Lincolnto accept the trust for a brief period. It was of great importanceto the country, to the Administration, and to Mr. Lincoln personallythat Mr. Chase should be succeeded by a man of no less eminentcharacter. 

In his report of December 6, 1864, Mr. Fessenden discussed thefinancial situation with comprehensive ability. He urged additionaltaxation, some plan for making the public lands available as asource of revenue, and arrangements for carrying out the laws fora sinking-fund. He opposed the suggestion of resorting to foreignloans for any part of the money needed. He said, "This nation hasbeen able thus far to conduct a domestic war of unparalleledmagnitude and cost without appealing for aid to any foreign people. It has chosen to demonstrate its power to put down insurrection byits own strength, and furnish no pretense for doubt of its entireability to do so, either to domestic or foreign foes. The peopleof the United States have felt a just pride in this position beforethe world. In the judgment of the secretary it may well be doubtedwhether the national credit abroad has not been strengthened andsustained by the fact that foreign investments in our securitieshave not been sought by us, and whether we have not found a pecuniaryadvantage in self-reliance. " Reciting the steps which he had takenfor placing loans, he declared; "These negotiations have affordedsatisfactory evidence not only of the ability of the people tofurnish at a short notice such sums as may be required but of theentire confidence felt in the national securities. After nearlyfour years of a most expensive and wasting war, the means to continueit seem apparently undiminished, while the determination to prosecuteit with vigor to the end is unabated. "

Liberal response was made by Congress to Mr. Fessenden's requestfor enlarged power to borrow money. The internal revenue was mademore stringent, the tariff was amended and made still more protective, and to facilitate the raising of troops the Conscription Act wasmade more severe and exacting. Congress proceeded as if the warwere still to continue for years. Nothing was neglected, nothingrelaxed. But every one could see that the Confederacy was totteringto its fall. Sherman's magnificent march across Georgia, to whichthe President referred as in progress when he sent his message toCongress, had been completed with entire success, with an _éclat_indeed which startled Europe as well as America. He had capturedSavannah, and was marching North driving the army of General JosephE. Johnston before him. General Grant meanwhile was tighteninghis hold on Richmond and on the army of General Lee. From his campon the James he was directing military operations over an area ofvast extent. The great victory which General Thomas had won overHood's army in the preceding December at Nashville had effectuallydestroyed the military power of the Confederacy in the South-West, and when Congress adjourned on the day of Mr. Lincoln's secondinauguration there was in the mind of the people everywhere aconviction that the end was near. 

The President himself spoke guardedly in his Inaugural address. He simply said that "the progress of our armies is reasonablysatisfactory and encouraging. With high hope for the future, noprediction in regard to it is ventured. " The tone of the address, so far from being jubilant as the mass of his hearers felt, wasineffably sad. It seemed to bear the wail of an oppressed spirit. The thought and the language were as majestic as those of theancient prophets. As if in agony of soul the President cried out:"Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray that this mighty scourgeof war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continueuntil all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fiftyyears of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop ofblood drawn with the lash shall be paid with another drawn withthe sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it mustbe said that the judgments of the Lord are true and righteousaltogether. "

The fall of the military power of the rebellion was in the end morerapid and more complete than the most sanguine had dared to expect. The month of March was one of great activity with our militaryforces. Three weeks after his inauguration the President went toCity Point, Virginia, partly to escape the pressure of duty atWashington and party to be near the scene of the final triumph tosettle any important questions that might arise, if an offer ofsurrender should be made by the Confederate commander. On the daybefore his inauguration he had directed the Secretary of War tosay to General Grant that he wished him to "have no conference withGeneral Lee unless for the capitulation of his army or for somepurely military matter. " The President did "not wish General Grantto decide, discuss or confer upon any political question. " Hewould not submit such questions "to military conferences orconventions. " He returned to Washington on the 8th of April andon the succeeding day the Army of Lee surrendered to General Grant. 

 THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 

The rejoicing throughout the Loyal States cannot be pictured. Congratulation was universal. The end had come. Sympathy withthe South in her exhausted and impoverished condition mingledlargely with the exultant joy over a restored Union, a triumphantflag, an assured future of National progress. Admiration was notwithheld from the soldiers of the Confederacy, who had borne theirbanner so bravely against every discouragement on a hundred fieldsof battle. The bearing of General Grant and General Lee at thefinal surrender was marked by a spirit of chivalric dignity whichwas an instructive lesson to all their countrymen--alike to thevictor and to the vanquished. 

General Grant's active service in the field closed with the surrenderof Lee. All the commanders of Confederate forces followed theexample of their General-in-Chief, and before the end of the monththe armed enemies of the Union had practically ceased to exist. The fame of General Grant was full. He had entered the servicewith no factitious advantage, and his promotion, from the first tothe last, had been based on merit alone, --without the aid ofpolitical influence, without the interposition of personal friends. Criticism of military skill is but idle chatter in the face of anunbroken career of victory. General Grant's campaigns were variedin their requirements and, but for the fertility of his resourcesand his unbending will, might often have ended in disaster. Courageis as contagious as fear, and General Grant possessed in the highestdegree that faculty which is essential to all great commanders, --the faculty of imparting throughout the rank and file of his armythe same determination to win with which he was himself alwaysinspired. 

One peculiarity of General Grant's military career was his constantreadiness to fight. He wished for no long periods of preparation, lost no opportunity which promptness could turn to advantage. Healways accepted, without cavil or question, the position to whichhe might be assigned. He never troubled the War Department withrequests or complaints, and when injustice was inflicted upon him, he submitted silently, and did a soldier's duty. Few men in anyservice would have acquiesced so quietly as did General Grant, whenat the close of the remarkable campaign beginning at Fort Henryand ending at Shiloh, he found himself superseded by General Halleck, and assigned to a subordinate command in an army whose glory wasinseparably associated with his own name. Self-control is thefirst requisite for him who aims to control others. In thatindispensable form of mental discipline General Grant exhibitedperfection. 

When he was appointed Lieutenant-General, and placed in command ofall the armies of the Union, he exercised military control over agreater number of men than has any general since the invention offire-arms. In the campaigns of 1864 and 1865, the armies of theUnion contained in the aggregate not less than a million of men. The movements of all the vast forces were kept in harmony by hiscomprehensive mind, and in the grand consummation which insuredUnion and Liberty, his name became inseparably associated with thetrue glory of his country. 

Six days after the surrender of Lee, the Nation was thrown intothe deepest grief by the assassination of the President. The gloomwhich enshrouded the country was as thick darkness. The peoplehad come, through many alterations of fear and hope, to repose themost absolute trust in Mr. Lincoln. They realized that he had seenclearly where they were blind, that he had known fully where theywere ignorant. He had been patient, faithful, and far-seeing. Religious people regarded him as one divinely appointed, like theprophets of old, to a great work, and they found comfort in theparallel which they saw in his death with that of the leader ofIsrael. He too had reached the mountain's top, and had seen theland redeemed unto the utmost sea, and had then died. 

 CHARACTER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Mr. Lincoln had been some time in the Presidency before the publicestimate of him was correct or appreciative. The people did notat first understand him. In the glamour of the Presidential canvassthey had idealized him, --attributing to him some traits above andmany below his essential qualities. After his election and beforehis inauguration there was a general disposition to depreciate him. He became associated in the popular mind with an impending calamity, and tens of thousands who had voted for him, heartily repented theact and inwardly execrated the day that committed the destinies ofthe Union to his keeping. The first strong test brought upon Mr. Lincoln was this depressing re-action among so many of his supporters. A man with less resolute purpose would have been cast down by it, but Mr. Lincoln preserved the _mens aequa in arduis_. Through thegloom of the weeks preceding his inauguration he held his even way. Perhaps in the more terrible crises through which he was afterwardscalled to pass, a firmer nerve was required, but not so rare acombination of qualities as he had shown in the dismal months withwhich the year 1861 opened. 

Mr. Lincoln united firmness and gentleness in a singular degree. He rarely spoke a harsh word. Ready to hear argument and alwaysopen to conviction, he adhered tenaciously to the conclusions whichhe had finally reached. Altogether modest, he had confidence inhimself, trusted to the reasoning of his own mind, believed in thecorrectness of his own judgment. Many of the popular conceptionsconcerning him are erroneous. No man was farther than he from theeasy, familiar, jocose character in which he is often painted. While he paid little attention to form or ceremony he was not amen with whom liberties could be taken. There was but one personin Illinois outside of his own household who ventured to addresshim by his first name. There was no one in Washington who everattempted it. Appreciating wit and humor, he relished a good story, especially if it illustrated a truth or strengthened an argument, and he had a vast fund of illustrative anecdote which he used withthe happiest effect. But the long list of vulgar, salacious storiesattributed to him, were retailed only by those who never enjoyedthe privilege of exchanging a word with him. His life was altogethera serious one--inspired by the noblest spirit, devoted to thehighest aims. Humor was but an incident with him, a partial reliefto the melancholy which tinged all his years. 

He presented an extraordinary combination of mental and moralqualities. As a statesman he had the loftiest ideal, and it fellto his lot to inaugurate measures which changed the fate of millionsof living men, of tens of millions yet to be born. As a managerof political issues and master of the art of presenting them, hehas had no rival in this country unless one be found in Jefferson. The complete discomfiture of his most formidable assailants in1863, especially of those who sought to prejudice him before thepeople on account of the arrest of Vallandigham, cannot easily beparalleled for shrewdness of treatment and for keen appreciationof the reactionary influences which are certain to control publicopinion. Mr. Van Buren stands without rival in the use of partisantactics. He operated altogether on men, and believed in self-interest as the mainspring of human action. Mr. Lincoln's abilitywas of a far higher and broader character. There was never theslightest lack of candor or fairness in his methods. He sought tocontrol men through their reason and their conscience. The onlyart the employed was that of presenting his views so convincinglyas to force conviction on the minds of his hearers and his readers. 

The Executive talent of Mr. Lincoln was remarkable. He wasemphatically the head of his own Administration, ultimate judge atall points and on all occasions where questions of weight were tobe decided. An unwise eulogist of Mr. Seward attributes to himthe origination and enforcement of the great policies whichdistinguished the Administration. So far is this from the truththat in more than one instance the most momentous steps were takenagainst the judgment and contrary to the advice of the Secretaryof State. The position of control and command so firmly held byMr. Lincoln was strikingly shown when the Peace Conference wasabout to assemble at Fortress Monroe. He dispatched Mr. Seward tothe place of meeting in advance of his own departure from Washington, giving him the most explicit instructions as to his mode of action, --prescribing carefully the limitations he should observe, andconcluding with these words: "_You will hear all they may chooseto say, and report it to me. You will not assume to definitelyconsummate any thing_. " Assuredly this is not the language ofdeference. It does not stop short of being the language of command. It is indeed the expression of one who realized that he was clothedwith all the power belonging to his great office. No one had amore sincere admiration of Mr. Seward's large qualities than thePresident; no one more thoroughly appreciated his matchless powers. But Mr. Lincoln had not only full trust in his own capacity, buta deep sense of his own responsibility--a responsibility whichcould not be transferred and for which he felt answerable to hisconscience and to God. 

 CHARACTER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

There has been discussion as to Mr. Lincoln's religious belief. He was silent as to his own preference among creeds. Prejudiceagainst any particular denomination he did not entertain. Alliedall his life with Protestant Christianity, he thankfully availedhimself of the services of an eminent Catholic prelate--ArchbishopHughes of New York--in a personal mission to England, of greatimportance, at a crisis when the relations between the two countrieswere disturbed and threatening. Throughout the whole period ofthe war he constantly directed the attention of the nation todependence on God. It may indeed be doubted whether he omittedthis in a single state paper. In every message to Congress, ineery proclamation to the people, he made it prominent. In July, 1863, after the battle of Gettysburg he called upon the people togive thanks because "it had pleased Almighty God to hearken to thesupplications and prayers of an afflicted people and to vouchsafesignal and effective victories to the Army and Navy of the UnitedStates, " and he asked the people "to render homage to the DivineMajesty and to invoke the influence of his Holy Spirit to subduethe anger which has produced and so long sustained a needless andcruel rebellion. " On another occasion, recounting the blessingswhich had come to the Union, he said, "No human counsel hath devised, nor hath any mortal hand worked out, these great things. They arethe gracious gifts of the Most High God who, while dealing with usin anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. "Throughout his entire official career, --attended at all times withexacting duty and painful responsibility, --he never forgot his owndependence, or the dependence of the people, upon a Higher Power. In his last public address, delivered to an immense crowd assembledat the White House on the 11th of April, to congratulate him onthe victories of the Union, the President, standing as he unconsciouslywas in the very shadow of death, said reverently to his hearers, "In the midst of your joyous expression, He from whom all blessingsflow must first be remembered"!

Not only in life but in treasure the cost of the war was enormous. In addition to the large revenues of the Government which had beencurrently absorbed, the public debt at the close of the strugglewas $2, 808, 549, 437. 55. The incidental losses were innumerable inkind, incalculable in amount. Mention is made here only of theactual expenditure of money--estimated by the standard of gold. The outlay was indeed principally made in paper, but the faith ofthe United States was given for redemption in coin--a faith whichhas never been tarnished, and which in this instance has beensignally vindicated by the steady determination of the people. Never, in the same space of time, has there been a Nationalexpenditure so great. 

Other nations have made costly sacrifices in struggles affectingtheir existence or their master passions. In the memorable campaignsof the French in 1794, when the Republic was putting forth its mostgigantic energies, the expenses rose to 200, 000, 000 francs a month, or about $450, 000, 000 a year. For the three years of the rebellion, after the first year, our War Department alone expended $603, 314, 411. 82, $690, 391, 048. 66, and $1, 030, 690, 400 respectively. The FrenchDirectory broke down under its expenditures by its lavish issue of_assignats_ and the French Republic became bankrupt. Our Governmentwas saved by its rigorous system of taxation imposed upon the peopleby themselves. Under Napoleon, in addition to the impositions onconquered countries, the budgets hardly exceeded in francs thecharges of the United States for the rebellion, in dollars. Thusin 1805 the French budget exhibited total expenditures of 666, 155, 139francs, including 69, 140, 000 francs for interest on the debt. Inthe same year the minister stated to the Chambers that income wasderived from Italy of 30, 000, 000 francs, and from Germany andHolland 100, 000, 000, leaving 588, 998, 705 to be collected fromFrance. In 1813 the French expenditures had risen to 953, 658, 772francs, and the total receipts from French revenue were 780, 959, 847francs. The French national debt has been measured since 1797 bythe interest paid, fixed at that time at five per cent. From 1800to 1814, the period of the Consulate and the Empire, this interestwas increased by 23, 091, 635 francs, indicating an addition of twentytimes that sum to the principal of the debt. The Government ofthe Restoration added in 1815, 101, 260, 635 francs to the annualinterest. Thus the cost of the Napoleonic wars to France may bestated at about $487, 000, 000 added to the principal of the debt, or less than one-fifth of the increment of our national obligationson account of the rebellion. The French burdens were extended overthe whole period from 1800 to 1814. Our own were concentrated intothe space of four years. 

 NATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN THE WAR. 

The total expenditures of Great Britain during the French Revolutionand the career of Napoleon were Ł1, 490, 000, 888, or nearly fivetimes that sum in dollars. The largest expenditures in any singleyear were in 1815, Ł130, 305, 958, or in dollars, $631, 976, 894. After 1862 our expenditures were not so low as that in any year, and they were more than double that sum in the closing year of thewar when the great armies were mustered out of service and finalpayment was made to all. 

The British expenditures in the war against the French during theperiod of the Revolution were a little more than Ł490, 000, 000 andagainst Napoleon a little less than Ł1, 000, 000, 000; or $4, 850, 000, 000in the aggregate, for twenty-three years. The total outlay wastherefore larger than our payments on account of the rebellion. But there was no period of ten years in her wars with the French, in which Great Britain expended so much as the United States expendedin four years. The loss of Great Britain by discounts in raisingmoney or by the use of depreciated paper was greater than thatincurred by the United States. A leading English authority saysthat of the vast burden up to 1816, the "artificial enhancementsdue to discounts in raising money were so great that for every Ł100received into the treasury a national debt of Ł173 was created. "

No other wars than those of England and France can be compared withours in point of expenditure. For the war between France andGermany in 1870 the indemnity demanded by the conqueror was5, 000, 000, 000 francs, equivalent in American money to $930, 000, 000. This sum was much in excess of the outlay of Germany. The expensesof France on her own account in that contest were 1, 873, 238, 000francs, or $348, 432, 068, and this is only from one-half to one-third of the annual outlay of the United States during the rebellion. France added to the interest charge at this time 349, 637, 116 francs, indicating that the whole sum of the indemnity and other warexpenditures has passed into the principal of the permanent debtof the country. 

The one grand feature of this lavish expenditure of wealth by theGovernment of the United States is that it was directed and enforcedby the people themselves. No imperial power commanded it, no kinglyprerogative controlled it. It was the free, unbiased, unchangeablewill of the Sovereign People. They declared at the ballot-box, byuntrammeled popular suffrage, that the war must go on. "The Americanpeople, "--said Henry Winter Davis in the House of Representativesat one of the most exciting periods of the struggle, --"the Americanpeople, rising to the height of the occasion, dedicate this generationto the sword, and, pouring out the blood of their children, demandthat there be no compromise; that ruin to the Republic or ruin tothe Rebel Confederacy are the only alternatives; that no peaceshall be made except under the banner of Victory. Standing on thisgreat resolve to accept nothing but Victory or ruin, Victory isours!"

At the outbreak of hostilities the Government discovered that ithad no Navy at its command. The Secretary, Mr. Welles, found uponentering his office but a single ship in a Northern port fitted toengage in aggressive operations. In the beginning of the greatcontest which was at once to be waged upon the seas, wherein theGovernment proposed to close Southern ports, and the South todestroy Northern commerce, the advantage was clearly with the South. From Cape Henry to the Rio Grande the Navy of the United Stateswas called upon to create an effective blockade against all ingressand egress. The conformation of the coast, which along greatdistances prevented the entrance and exit of ocean-going vessels, materially aided in the task, but it was still such a one as hadnever before been attempted in the naval history of the world. The line to be subjected to blockade was as long as the line fromthe Bay of Biscay to the Golden Horn and in many respects it wasfar more difficult to control. 

This blockade was an absolute necessity imposed on the UnitedStates. The South relied with implicit faith upon its ability tosecure by the sale of cotton the means of carrying on the war. The Confederate Government did not believe that the United Stateswould hazard a conflict with the manufacturing nations of Europe, by attempting a blockade that would prevent the export of thestaple; or if they did believe it, they looked upon it as thefatuous step on the part of the National Government that wouldpromptly induce intervention by the combined power of England andFrance. This reliance was explicitly stated in advance by Mr. Hammond of South Carolina, who three years before the inaugurationof Mr. Lincoln, on the fourth day of March, 1858, made thisdeclaration in the United-States Senate:--

"Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should the Northmake war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. Whatwould happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? I willnot stop to depict what every one can imagine, but this is certain, England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized worldwith her. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No Power on earthdares to make war upon cotton. _Cotton is King_. "

 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLOCKADE. 

Boastful and impotent as the declaration of Mr. Hammond now seems, it had a better basis of fact to stand upon than many of the fierypredictions in which Southern statesmen were wont to indulge. Theimportance of cotton to the civilized world could hardly beexaggerated, and yet it was this very importance that forced theUnited States to the course which was pursued. The NationalGovernment could not permit the export of cotton without constantlyaggrandizing the power of the rebellion, and it could not preventits export without tempting the manufacturing nations of Europe toraise the blockade. The Administration wisely prepared to enforcethe blockade and to meet all the consequences. 

To accomplish its undertaking, the energy of the Nation was devotedto the creation of a navy. By the end of the year 1863 the governmenthad six hundred vessels of war which were increased to seven hundredbefore the rebellion was subdued. Of the total number at leastseventy-five were ironclad. It may be instanced with laudablepride that one enterprising man, honorably distinguished as ascientific engineer, constructed in less than a hundred days anarmored squadron of eight ships, in the aggregate of five thousandtons burden, capable of steaming nine knots per hour and destinedfor effective service upon the rivers of the South-West. When thecontractor, Mr. James B. Eads of St. Louis, agreed to furnish thesesteamers to the Government, the timber from which they were to bebuilt was still standing in the forest and the machinery with whichthe armor was to be rolled was not constructed. 

A year after the first battle was fought the naval force of theUnited States had practically interdicted all legitimate commercewith the Southern States. No more effective method of warfarecould have been devised. At the outbreak of the war the States inrebellion were able to manufacture but few of the articlesindispensable to the ordinary life of a people. Their wealth waspurely agricultural. Cotton and tobacco were their only exports. For a supply of manufactures the South had depended wholly uponits trade with the North and with Europe. The natural effect ofthe war was greatly to lessen production, and the blockade made itimpossible to find a market for any large portion of the diminishedproduct of cotton. As a striking evidence of the prosperity inthe South at the time it complained of oppression, the largestcotton crop which had ever been grown was that of 1860. It numberedmore than five million two hundred thousand bales, nearly four anda half millions of which had found a ready market in Europe andthe North before the outbreak of the war. The crop of 1861 waslittle more than one-half that of the preceding year. Of the threeand a half millions which remained available for export at the endof 1861 it was estimated that up to August, 1862, not more thanfifty thousand bales had been carried to England, the principalforeign consumer. 

The demand for food created by the Southern army caused a majorityof the plantations to raise corn, and the cotton crop of 1862 didnot amount to more than one million bales, very little of whichfound a foreign market; and the supply and exportation diminishedfrom this time onward. Cotton which sold in December, 1861, inLiverpool for 11ľ_d_. Per pound had risen in December, 1862, to24˝_d_. Per pound, and as a result, half a million persons inEngland, dependent for their daily bread upon this manufacturingindustry, were thrown out of employment and reduced to beggary. So great was the distress that by April, 1863, nearly two millionpounds sterling had been expended for their relief, and this sumdoes not include the vast amounts expended in local volunteercharities. English manufacturers saw that the supply of the rawproduct from America could no longer be depended upon, and effortswere made to introduce the manufacture of the inferior staple fromIndia, but the experiment proved in the main unsatisfactory andunprofitable. 

The stringency of the blockade which prevented the exportation ofcotton, prevented also the importation of manufactured articles. While compelled to acknowledge this fact, the Confederate Secretaryof State, Mr. Benjamin, attempted very cleverly to turn it toaccount by showing the advantages which would accrue to the commercialand manufacturing classes of England by the speedy triumph of therebellion. Writing to Mr. Mason, who represented the Confederacyin England, Mr. Benjamin said, "The almost total cessation ofexternal commerce for the last two years has produced the completeexhaustion of all articles of foreign growth and manufacture, andit is but a moderate computation to estimate the imports into theConfederacy at three hundred millions of dollars for the first sixmonths which will ensue after the treaty of peace. " The unexpressedpart of the proposition which this statement covered was the mostinteresting. The merchants and ship-owners of England were tounderstand that the sale and transportation of this vast amount offabrics would fall into the hands of England if the Confederacyshould succeed, and that if it should fail, the domestic trade ofthe United States would absorb the whole of it. It was a shrewdappeal to a nation whose foreign policy has always been largelyinfluenced by considerations of trade. 

 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLOCKADE. 

The economic condition of the South at this time may be comparedto that of a man with full purse, lost in a desert. Southern cottonwould easily sell in the markets of New York or Liverpool for fourtimes its price in Charleston, while the manufactures of Manchesteror of Lowell were worth in Charleston four times the price inLiverpool or New York. Exchange was rendered by the blockadepractically impossible. When the profits of a successful voyagefrom Liverpool to Charleston and return, would more than repay theexpense of the construction of the best steamer and of the voyage, the temptation to evade the blockade was altogether too strong tobe resisted by the merchants and manufacturers of England. Blockade-running became a regular business with them, and the extent towhich it was carried may be inferred from the fact that during thewar the American fleet captured or sunk more than seven hundredvessels bound from British ports to ports of the Confederacy. Howmany vessels escaped our navy and safely ran the blockade may neverbe known, but for three years it was a steady contest between thenavy of the United States and the blockade-runners of England. The persistent course of the latter was stimulated both by cupidityand by ill will to this country. They were anxious to make pecuniarygains for themselves and to aid the Confederacy at the same time. They were checked only by the extra-hazardous character impartedto the trade by the alertness and superior vigilance of our cruiserswhich sent many millions of English ventures to less profitablemarkets and many millions to the adjudication of our own Prize-courts. 

The establishment and maintenance of a blockade is not accountedby naval officers as the most brilliant service to which in theline of their profession they may be deputed, but it was a serviceof inestimable value to the cause of the Union, and it was performedwith a skill and thoroughness never surpassed. The blockade requiredan enormous force of men. In addition to the marines, to the largebody of soldiers transferred from time to time to the navy, and tothe rebel prisoners that joined in the service, there were 121, 807men specially enlisted in the navy during the war. But for theaid thus rendered by the navy, the hard fight would have been longerand more sanguinary. Had not the South been thus deprived of themunitions of war, of clothing and of all manner of supplies whichEngland and France were eager to furnish her, we should not haveseen the end of the civil war in 1865, and we should have beensubjected to all the hazards implied by the indefinite continuanceof the struggle. 

The census of 1860 shows that the thirty-three States and sevenTerritories, which at that time composed the United States, containeda population of 31, 443, 791. Fifteen of these States with 12, 140, 296inhabitants were slave-holding, more than four millions of thepopulation being slaves; eighteen with an aggregate population of19, 303, 494 were classed as free. Four of the fifteen slave States, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, whose people numberedthree and one-half millions, constituted what were known as theBorder slave States--West Virginia being added to the list in 1862. Though a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of these States, from association and interest, sympathized with the South, theycontributed to the Union cause an army equal to two hundred thousandmen enlisted for three years, and throughout the war they wereloyal to the National Government. Many of the inhabitants of theseStates fought in the Confederate Army, but this loss was more thancompensated by the effective aid rendered by the loyal men whojoined the Union Army from the rebellious States. Tennesseefurnished more than thirty thousand men to the armies of the Union, and from almost every State which formed a portion of the Confederacymen enlisted in the loyal forces. It may with reasonable precisionbe affirmed that the encouragement which the Confederacy receivedfrom the slave States that remained true to the Union, was morethan offset by the effective aid rendered by loyal men residingwithin the limits of the rebellious States. 

 STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 

As the source of supply for an army the Southern Confederacy hadeleven States with an aggregate population of nine millions. Itis difficult to estimate with accuracy the numerical strength ofthe army which they organized at the beginning of the war. In asemi-official publication it was asserted that the army numberedmore than five hundred thousand men, but as twenty thousand of thisarmy were credited to Maryland and thirty-five thousand to Missouri, the number given was evidently a gross exaggeration. The statementwas probably made for effect upon the North rather than in theinterest of truth. A member of the Confederate Congress from NorthCarolina stated in debate in 1864 that the Confederate muster-rollnumbered more than four hundred thousand men, "of whom probablyone-half were not there. " During the entire period of the war itis probable that eleven hundred thousand men were embodied in theConfederate Army, though its effective strength did not at any timeconsist of more than one-half that number. But this force wasobtained by the South at great sacrifice. The necessity of astringent conscription act was felt as early as April 16, 1862, atwhich time the first Enrolment Act was passed by the ConfederateCongress. Under this Act, which was amended on the 27th of Septemberof the same year, Mr. Davis issued on the 15th of July, 1863, hisfirst conscription proclamation which called into the service ofthe Confederacy all white men between the ages of eighteen andforty-five who were not legally exempted from military service. The date of the proclamation shows that it was forced upon theConfederates by Lee's abortive invasion of Pennsylvania, and wasintended to fill the ranks of the army which had been shatteredand beaten on the field of Gettysburg. Further legislation by theConfederate Congress in February, 1864, extended the enrolment soas to include all white male residents of the Confederate Statesbetween the ages of seventeen and fifty. In February, 1865, Mr. Davis estimated that more than one hundred and fifty thousand menwere added to the Confederate armies by this forced conscription. 

Comparing the strength of the Confederate Army with the populationfrom which it was recruited, and taking into account the absolutelack of provision made for the comfort of the Southern soldier, the insufficient provision made for his sustenance and clothing, and the consequent desertion which made it imperative to repairdiminished strength, it is evident that the conscription legislationbore with fearful severity upon the people of the South. Comprehensiveas was the Enrolment Act, which rendered liable to military dutythe entire male population between the ages of seventeen and fifty, the South was compelled to overstep its self-imposed limit. Theforces which Lee and Johnston surrendered contained so many boysunfitted by youth and so many men unfitted by age for militaryservice, that a Northern General epigrammatically remarked thatfor its armies the Confederacy had been compelled in the end torob alike the cradle and the grave. 

Grave misstatements however have been made in regard to the diminishedforces of the Confederacy at the cessation of the war. The astoundingassertion has crept into statements intended to be historical thatLee surrendered an army of only ten thousand men, and Johnston anarmy of most insignificant numbers in comparison with that ofSherman. An accurate count made of the forces surrendered by theConfederacy and paroled by the North at the conclusion of the war, shows that the following numbers were embodied in the variousSouthern armies and were rendering active service in the field:--

The army of Virginia under General Robert E. Lee . . . . 28, 356The army of Tennessee under General Joseph E. Johnston . . 37, 047The army of Florida under Major-General Samuel Jones . . . 2, 113The army of Alabama under Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor . 12, 723The Trans-Mississippi army of General E. Kirby Smith . . . 10, 167The Arkansas army of Brigadier-General M. Jeff Thompson . . 5, 048

 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95, 454

These figures are given as the result of actual count made of theparoles signed, and have been verified by officers both of theUnion Army and of the Confederate Army. They represent the actualforce engaged in the field, and upon the basis of calculationadopted in the North would indicate a Confederate Army of nearlythree hundred thousand men at the close of the struggle. When thefrequent desertions from the Southern Army are remembered, andtheir losses in prisoners and those disabled in the fearful fightsof the months which preceded the surrender of Lee, it will not beexaggeration to say that the South had at the opening of GeneralGrant's campaign in Virginia the preceding summer more than fivehundred thousand men borne upon the rolls of its armies. The wasteof the Confederate forces during the sixty days immediately precedingthe final surrender was very great. The knowledge of the situationhad penetrated the ranks, and the men lost spirit and hope. Theresult which followed was precisely that which has always happenedwith armies so circumstanced. The ranks melted away, and therewere neither resource nor discipline to fill them again. 

 THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES. 

It would be but poor compliment to the soldiers of the Union towithhold just recognition of the brave opponents who met them onso many hard-fought fields. Nor is there any disposition amongloyal men to stint the praise which is always due to courage. Never perhaps was an army organized with fighting qualities superiorto those of the army put into the field by the Confederacy. Theyfought with an absolute conviction, however erroneous, that theircause was just; and their arms were nerved by the feeling whichtheir leaders had instilled deeply into their minds, that they werecontending against an intolerable tyranny and protecting thesacredness of home. In a war purely defensive, as was that of theConfederacy, an army such as they raised and maintained can bafflethe efforts of vastly superior numbers. The Confederates foundfrom their own experience how changed was the task when they assumedthe offensive and ventured to leave their own territory, with theirperfect knowledge of its topography and with a surrounding populationof sympathizers and helpers. In their first attempt at invasionthey did not get beyond cannon-sound of the Potomac, and in thesecond they were turned back by the result of the first battle. These facts do not impeach the prowess of the Confederate soldiery, but they illustrate the task imposed on the Army of the Union andthey suggest the vast difference in the responsibilities which theinvading and the defensive forces were called upon to meet. 

For so large an army as the Government of the Union was compelledto raise, volunteering could not be relied upon as a steady resourcefor recruitment. Great as was the ardor among the loyal people atthe beginning of the struggle, it was soon found, as it has alwaysbeen found in other nations, that unaided patriotism could notsupply the heavy demands constantly made to repair the waste fromthe casualties of war and from the ravages of disease. The Act ofCongress of March 3, 1863, provided for the enrolment of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty and forty-fiveyears, while the Act of February 24, 1864, granted freedom to allmale slaves between the ages of twenty and forty-five who mightenlist in the Northern armies. Reward was made to go with duty, and by the Act of July 4, 1864, Congress ameliorated the rigors ofthe conscription by paying to each drafted man a bounty for oneyears' service, at the same time doubling and trebling the amountfor two and three years' service respectively. The Secretary ofWar was by the same law directed to discharge from service at therequest of parents all persons under the age of eighteen years whomight have enlisted in the army, and it was made an offense punishablewith loss of commission for any officer knowingly to enlist a personless than sixteen years of age. Conscription laws have beenunpopular in all countries, and though resisted among us on oneoccasion with riot, they were upheld with strong courage by themass of the loyal people. Representatives in Congress who hadvoted for the enactments were returned by large majorities, andMr. Lincoln was re-elected with an overwhelming expression ofpopular favor at the very time when he was directing the enforcementof the draft. The vote of 1864 was perhaps the most significantexhibition of patriotism made during the war, and had an extraordinaryinfluence in discouraging those who were directing the fortunes ofthe Confederacy. 

In the Loyal States the Government called for more than 2, 750, 000men at various time throughout the war. In the South nearly everywhite person capable of bearing arms rendered at one time or anotherservice in the army. A leading military authority of England, speaking of the strength of the armies of the United States and ofthe Confederacy, says, "The total number of men called under armsby the Government of the United States between April, 1861, andApril, 1865, amounted to 2, 759, 049, of whom 2, 656, 053 were actuallyembodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1, 100, 000 menembodied by the Southern States during the same time, the totalarmed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly 4, 000, 000, drawnfrom a population of only 32, 000, 000 of all ages. Before this vastaggregate, the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or the recent efforts of France and Germany in the war of 1870-71, sink into insignificance. And within three years the whole ofthese vast forces were peaceably disbanded and the army had shrunkto a normal strength of only 30, 000 men. "

Germany with a population of 41, 000, 000 can in time of war furnishan army of 1, 250, 000 men. France with a population of 36, 000, 000claims that she can set more than 1, 500, 000 men afield. With apopulation of less than 25, 000, 0000 from which to levy troops, theGovernment of the United States had when the war closed more than1, 000, 000 men upon the muster-rolls of the army to be paid off anddischarged. Of this vast force probably not more than forty percent. Were available for operations on the field. The wounded, the sick, those upon furlough, upon detail in other service, uponmilitary service elsewhere than in the field, together with thosein military parlance absent or "not accounted for, " would, it isestimated, be equal to sixty per cent. Of the entire army. 

 AREA OF THE WAR AND ITS COST. 

The area over which the armies of the Union were called to operatewas 800, 000 square miles in extent, --as large as the German Empire, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Holland combined. Those wholed in the secession movement relied confidently upon the impossibilityof overcoming a population inhabiting so great an expanse ofterritory. Their judgment was confirmed by that of the best militarycritics of Europe who looked pityingly upon the folly of the UnitedStates for undertaking a task which after years of suffering andgreat loss of life could end only in defeat, with hopeless bankruptcyfor the surviving remnant of the Republic. Could the Governmenthave had the advantage of a small area for its military operations, its power to overcome the rebellion would have been greatly enhanced, and an army not exceeding half of that which was raised could havevindicated the authority of the flag and maintained the integrityof the Union. The National expenditures would have been decreasedin even greater ratio, for aside from reducing the number of troops, the enormous cost involved in transportation would have been lessenedby hundreds of millions of dollars in the four years of the war. 

Another cause of increased expenditure was the haste necessarilyattendant upon all the military preparations of the Government. Armies were to be created from the basis of an organization hardlygreater than would serve as a police force for the Republic. WhenFort Sumter was fired upon, the Army of the United States, rankand file, scarcely exceeded sixteen thousand men. The Governmentwas compelled to equip its vast forces from stores of which hardlya nucleus existed. Arms, ammunition, military supplies, were allto be instantly gathered. The growth of the great host, itsequipment, its marshaling, its prodigious strength, are among themarvels and the glories of our history. To admit that mistakeswere made is only to say that the work was in human hands. Criticismmay well be drowned in the acclaim of success. No National emergencyhas ever been met with greater courage, promptness, or skill. 

The loss to the country and the expenditures from its Treasurycould not be estimated when the war closed. We knew that a half-million citizens of the Republic had laid down their lives--threehundred thousand in defending the Union, two hundred thousand inattempting to destroy it. We knew the enormous amounts which hadbeen paid in supporting our armies. But we were not wholly preparedfor the millions that must be paid in satisfaction of claims whichthere had been no mode of reckoning. Nor had there been any standardby which an estimate could be made of the sums required by thepensions which the gratitude and the justice of the Governmentwould be called upon to grant. It was soon apparent that the needof relief was proportional to the magnitude of the struggle, andthe Government prepared to respond with a munificence neverparalleled. 

 THE CHARACTER OF EDWIN M. STANTON. 

Nine months after the outbreak of hostilities the organization andequipment of the National forces were placed under the directionof Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War. Outside of his professionalreputation, which was high, Mr. Stanton had been known to the publicby his service in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan during the last threemonths of his Administration. In that position he had undoubtedlyexhibited zeal and fidelity in the cause of the Union. He was amember of the Democratic party, a thorough believer in its principles, and a hearty opponent of Mr. Lincoln in the contest of 1860. Inspeech and writing he referred to Mr. Lincoln's supporters in theextreme partisan phrase of the day, --as "Black Republicans. " Hehad no sympathy with Mr. Lincoln's views on the subject of slavery, and was openly hostile to any revival of the doctrine of Protection. If Mr. Buchanan had been governed by the views of Mr. Stanton hewould undoubtedly have vetoed the Morrill Tariff bill, and thus anunintended injury would have been inflicted upon the reviving creditof the nation. A citizen of the District of Columbia, Mr. Stantonwas not called upon to make a personal record in the Presidentialelection of 1860, but his sympathies were well understood to bewith the supporters of Breckinridge. 

With these political principles and affiliations, Mr. Stanton wasnot even considered in connection with the original organizationof Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. But the fact of his being a Democratwas now in his favor, for Mr. Lincoln was anxious to signify bysome decisive expression, his appreciation of the patriotism whichhad induced so large a proportion of the Democratic party to layaside prejudice and unite in support of his Administration. Hehad a high estimate of Mr. Stanton's capacity, derived from personalintercourse in a professional engagement some three years before. He had learned something of his powers of endurance, of his trainedhabits of thought, of his systematic method of labor, and he hadconfidence that at forty-seven years of age, with vigorous healthand a robust constitution, Mr. Stanton could endure the strainwhich the increasing labor of the War Department would impose. His nomination was confirmed without delay, and the whole countryreceived his appointment with profound satisfaction. 

No Cabinet minister in our history has been so intemperatelydenounced, so extravagantly eulogized. The crowning fact in hisfavor is that through all the mutations of his stormy career hewas trusted and loved by Mr. Lincoln to the end of his days. Hewas at all times and under all circumstances absolutely free fromcorruption, and was savagely hostile to every man in the militaryservice who was even suspected of irregularity or wrong. Hepossessed the executive faculty in the highest degree. He wasprompt, punctual, methodical, rapid, clear, explicit in all hiswork. He imparted energy to every branch of the service, and hisvigorous determination was felt on the most distant field of thewar as a present and inspiring force. 

Mr. Stanton had faults. He was subject to unaccountable and violentprejudice, and under its sway he was capable of harsh injustice. Many officers of merit and of spotless fame fell under his displeasureand were deeply wronged by him. General Stone was perhaps the mostconspicuous example of the extremity of outrage to which theSecretary's temper could carry him. He was lacking in magnanimity. Even when intellectually convinced of an error, he was reluctantto acknowledge it. He had none of that grace which turns an enemyto a friend by healing the wounds which have been unjustly inflicted. While oppressing many who were under his control, he had the keenestappreciation of power, and to men who were wielding great influencehe exhibited the most deferential consideration. He had a quickinsight into character, and at a glance could tell a man who wouldresist and resent from one who would silently submit. He wasambitious to the point of uncontrollable greed for fame, and bythis quality was subject to its counterpart of jealousy, and to anenvy of the increasing reputation of others. It was a sore trialto him that after his able and persistent organization of all theelements of victory, the share of credit which justly belonged tohim, was lost sight of in the glory which surrounded the hero ofa successful battle. 

But his weaknesses did not obscure the loftiness of his character. The capricious malignity and brutal injustice of the Great Frederickmight as well be cited against the acknowledged grandeur of hiscareer, as an indictment be brought against Stanton's fame on hispersonal defects, glaring and even exasperating as they were. Tothe Nation's trust he was sublimely true. To him was committed, in a larger degree than to any other man except the President alone, the successful prosecution of the war and the consequent preservationof the Union. Against those qualities which made him so manyenemies, against those insulting displays of temper which woundedso many proud spirits helplessly subject to him for the time, against those acts of rank injustice which, in the judgment of hismost partial eulogist, will always mar his fame, must be rememberedhis absolute consecration to all that he was and of all he couldhope to be, to the cause of his country. For more than three years, of unceasing and immeasurable responsibility, he stood at his post, by day and by night, never flagging in zeal, never doubting infaith. Even his burly frame and rugged strength were overborne bythe weight of his cares and by the strain upon his nerves, but notuntil his work was finished, not until the great salvation hadcome. Persecution and obloquy have followed him into the grave, but an impartial verdict must be that he was inspired with thedevotion of a martyr, and that he wore out his life in a serviceof priceless value to all the generations of his countrymen. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

Relation with Great Britain. --Close of the Year 1860. --Prince ofWales's Visit to the United States. --Exchange of CongratulatoryNotes. --Dawn of the Rebellion. --Lord Lyons's Dispatch. --Mr. Seward'sViews. --Lord John Russell's Threats. --Condition of Affairs at Mr. Lincoln's Inauguration. --Unfriendly Manifestations by Great Britain. --Recognizes Belligerency of Southern States. --Discourtesy toAmerican Minister. --England and France make Propositions to theConfederate States. --Unfriendly in their Character to the UnitedStates. --Full Details given. --Motives inquired into. --Trent Affair. --Lord John Russell. --Lord Lyons. --Mr. Seward. --Mason and Slidellreleased. --Doubtful Grounds assigned. --Greater Wrongs against usby Great Britain. --Queen Victoria's Friendship. --Isolation of UnitedStates. --Foreign Aid to Confederates on the Sea. --Details given. --So-called Neutrality. --French Attempt to establish an Empire inMexico. --Lord Palmerston in 1848, in 1859, in 1861. --ConclusiveObservations. 

At the close of the year 1860 the long series of irritating anddangerous questions which had disturbed the relations of the UnitedStates and Great Britain, from the time of the Declaration ofIndependence, had reached final and friendly solution. The factgave unalloyed satisfaction to the American people and to theirGovernment. Mr. Buchanan was able to say in his message of December, in language which Lord Lyons truly described as "the most cordialwhich has appeared in any President's message since the foundationof the Republic, "--

"Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. Since the commencement of my Administration the two dangerousquestions arising from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and from the rightof search claimed by the British Government have been amicably andhonorably adjusted. The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which at different periods of the discussion borea threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirelysatisfactory to this government. The only question of any importancewhich still remains open is the disputed title between the twogovernments to the Island of San Juan in the vicinity of WashingtonTerritory. " It was obvious that neither government looked forwardto any trouble from this source. 

To give manifestation of the cordiality with which our friendshipwas reciprocated, Her Majesty had selected this auspicious yearfor a visit of her son, the Prince of Wales, to this country. HisRoyal Highness was received everywhere by the government and thepeople with genuine and even enthusiastic hospitality, and at thetermination of his visit Lord Lyons was instructed to express thethanks of Her Majesty. 

"One of the main objects, " His Lordship wrote to Secretary Cass onthe 8th of December, 1860, "which Her Majesty had in view insanctioning the visit of His Royal Highness was to prove to thePresident and citizens of the United States the sincerity of thosesentiments of esteem and regard which Her Majesty and all classesof her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occupies sodistinguished a position in the community of nations. Her Majestyhas seen with the greatest satisfaction that her feelings and thoseof her people in this respect have been met with the warmest sympathyin the great American Union; and Her Majesty trusts that the feelingsof confidence and affection, of which late events have proved beyondall question the existence, will long continue to prevail betweenthe two countries to their mutual advantage and to the generalinterests of civilization and humanity. I am commanded to stateto the President that the Queen would be gratified by his makingknown generally to the citizens of the United States her gratefulsense of the kindness with which they received her son, who hasreturned to England deeply impressed with all he saw during hisprogress through the States, and more especially so with the friendlyand cordial good will manifested towards him on every occasion byall classes of the community. "

Mr. William Henry Trescott, then Assistant Secretary of State, replied to Lord Lyons's note without delay, writing on the 11th ofDecember: "I am instructed by the President to express thegratification with which he has learned how correctly Her Majestyhas appreciated the spirit in which His Royal Highness was receivedthroughout the Republic, and the cordial manifestation of thatspirit by the people of the United States which accompanied him inevery step of his progress. Her Majesty has justly recognized thatthe visit of her son aroused the kind and generous sympathies ofour citizens, and, if I may so speak, has created an almost personalinterest in the fortunes of the Royalty which he so well represents. The President trusts that this sympathy and interest towards thefuture representative of the Sovereignty of Great Britain are atonce an evidence and a guaranty of that consciousness of commoninterest and mutual regard which have bound in the past, and willin the future bind together more strongly than treaties, the feelingsand the fortunes of the two nations which represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the constitutional liberty of the same greatrace. I have also been instructed to make this correspondencepublic, that the citizens of the United States may have thesatisfaction of knowing how strongly and properly Her Majesty hasappreciated the cordial warmth of their welcome to His RoyalHighness. "

 VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES. 

Time was soon to test "the sincerity of those sentiments of esteemand regard which Her Majesty and all classes of her subjectsentertain for the kindred race which occupies so distinguished aposition in the community of nations. " Within a few days afterthe exchange of this correspondence it became the duty of LordLyons to announce to his government that the domestic differences"in the great American Union" were deepening into so fierce a feudthat from different motives both General Cass the Secretary ofState, to whom his letter had been addressed, and Mr. Trescott theAssistant Secretary of State, by whom it had been answered, hadresigned, and that the United States, one "of the two great nationswhich represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the constitutionalliberty of the same great race, " was about to confront the gravestdanger that can threaten national existence. 

The State of South Carolina passed its Ordinance of SecessionDecember 17, 1860. From that date until the surrender of FortSumter, April 14, 1861, many of the most patriotic and able statesmenof the country and a large majority of the people of the Northhoped that some reasonable and peaceful adjustment of the difficultieswould be found. The new Administration had every right to expectthat foreign powers would maintain the utmost reserve, both inopinion and in action, until it could have a fair opportunity todecide upon a policy. The great need of the new President wastime. Both he and his advisers felt that every day's delay was asubstantial gain, and that the maintenance of the _status quo_, with no fresh outbreak at home and no unfriendly expression aborad, was of incalculable advantage to the cause of the Union. 

Amid the varying and contradictory impressions of the hour, LordLyons had reported events as they occurred, with singular fairnessand accuracy. Just one month before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, on the 4th of February, 1861, His Lordship wrote to Lord JohnRussell, at that time Her Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs:"Mr. Seward's real view of the state of the country appears to bethat if bloodshed can be avoided until the new government isinstalled, the seceding States will in no long time return to theConfederation. He seems to think that in a few months the evilsand hardships produced by secession will become intolerably grievousto the Southern States, that they will be completely re-assured asto the intentions of the Administration, and that the conservativeelement which is now kept under the surface by the violent pressureof the Secessionists will emerge with irresistible force. Fromall these causes he confidently expects that when elections forthe State Legislatures are held in the Southern States in Novembernext, the Union party will have a clear majority and will bringthe seceding States back into the Confederation. He then hopes toplace himself at the head of a strong Union party having extensiveramifications both in the North and in the South, and to make 'Unionor Disunion, not Freedom or Slavery, ' the watchwords of politicalparties. " It can scarcely escape notice how significant, even atthis early period, is the use in this dispatch of the word"confederation" as applied to the United States, --a use never beforemade of it in diplomatic communication since the establishment ofthe Constitution, and indicating, only too clearly, the view to betaken by the British Government of the relation of the States tothe Union. 

Whatever may have been the estimate at home of the policy attributedto Mr. Seward, it was certainly one which would commend itself tothe sympathy of a friendly nation, and one, to the success of whichno neutral power would hesitate to contribute all the aid it couldrightfully render. The dispatch of Lord Lyons was received inLondon on the 18th of February, and on the 20th Lord John Russellreplied as follows: "The success or failure of Mr. Seward's plansto prevent a disruption of the North-American Union is a matter ofdeep interest to Her Majesty's Government, but they can only expectand hope. They are not called upon nor would they be actingprudently were they to obtrude their advice on the dissentientparties in the United States. Supposing however that Mr. Lincoln, acting under bad advice, should endeavor to provide excitement forthe public mind by raising questions with Great Britain, HerMajesty's Government feel no hesitation as to the policy they wouldpursue. They would in the first place be very forbearing. Theywould show by their acts how highly they value the relations ofpeace and amity with the United States. But they would take careto let the government which multiplied provocations and sought forquarrels understand that their forbearance sprung from theconsciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness. They would warn a government which was making political capitalout of blustering demonstrations that our patience might be triedtoo far. "

 THREATS FROM LORD JOHN RUSSELL. 

It is impossible to mistake the spirit or the temper of thisdispatch. It is difficult to account for the manifest irritationof its tone except upon the ground that Lord John Russell saw ina possible reconciliation, between North and South, something thatthreatened the interest or jarred upon the sympathy of the BritishGovernment. It was at least sufficient and ominous warning of whatthe United States might expect from "the confidence and affection"which had only a few weeks before been outpoured so lavishly byHer Majesty's Government. The fact is worthy of emphasis thatsince the cordial interchange of notes touching the visit of thePrince of Wales there had not been a single word of unkindness inthe correspondence of the two governments. But our embarrassmentshad been steadily deepening, and according to many precedents inthe career of that illustrious statesman, Lord John seems to haveconsidered the period of our distress a fitting time to assert that"British forbearance springs from the consciousness of strengthand not from the timidity of weakness. "

On the 4th of March, 1861, the administration of Mr. Lincoln assumedthe responsibility of government. At that date the organizationof the Southern Confederacy had not been perfected. Four Stateswhich ultimately joined it had not yet seceded from the Union. There had been no overt act of violence. The Administration stillbelieved in the possibility of a peaceful settlement. But on the12th of April Fort Sumter was attacked. On the 14th it wassurrendered. On the 15th the President issued his Proclamationcalling out seventy-five thousand militia and summoning Congressto meet on the 4th of July. On the 17th the President of theConfederacy authorized the issue of letters of marque. On the 19ththe President of the United States proclaimed a blockade of theSouthern ports and declared that privateers with letters of marquefrom the Southern Confederacy would be treated as pirates. 

This condition of affairs rendered the relation of foreign powersto the Union and to the Confederacy at once urgent and critical. It is true that Fort Sumter had surrendered to a warlike demonstration, but fortunately no blood had been shed. It is true that lettersof marque had been authorized, but none had been actually issued. It is true that a blockade had been proclaimed, but some time mustelapse before it could be practically enforced. All that can besaid is that the rebellion had organized itself with promptnessand courage for a conflict. There was still a pause. Neitherparty thoroughly realized the horror of the work before them, thoughevery day made it more clearly apparent. Until then the UnitedStates was the only organized government on our soil known toEngland, and with it she had for three-quarters of a centurymaintained commercial and political relations which had grown closerand more friendly every year. The vital element of that governmentwas Union. Whatever might be the complicated relations of theirdomestic law, to the world and to themselves the United States ofAmerica was the indivisible government. This instinct of unionhad gathered them together as colonies, had formed them into animperfect confederation, had matured them under a NationalConstitution. It gave them their vigor at home, their power andinfluence abroad. To destroy their union was to resolve them intoworse than colonial disintegration. 

But the separation of the States was more than the dissolution ofthe Union. For, treating with all due respect the conviction ofthe Southern States as to the violation of their constitutionalrights, no fair-minded man can deny that the central idea of thesecession movement was the establishment of a great slave-holdingempire around the Gulf of Mexico. It was a bold and imperialconception. With an abounding soil, with millions of trained andpatient laborers, with a proud and martial people, with leadersused to power and skilled in government, controlling some of thegreatest and most necessary of the commercial staples of the world, the haughty oligarchy of the South would have founded a slaverepublic which, in its successful development, would have changedthe future of this continent and of the world. When Englishstatesmen were called upon to deal with such a crisis, the UnitedStates had a right to expect, if not active sympathy, at least thatneutrality which would confine itself within the strict limit ofinternational obligation, and would not withhold friendly wishesfor the preservation of the Union. 

 RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE UNION. 

England had tested slowly but surely the worth of the AmericanUnion. As the United States had extended its territory, haddeveloped in wealth, had increased in population, richer and richerhad become the returns to England's merchants and manufacturers;question after question of angry controversy had been amicablysettled by the conviction of mutual, growing, and peaceful interests. And while it had become a rhetorical truism with English historiansand statesmen, that relations with the independent Republic werestronger, safer, and more valuable than those of the old colonialconnection, her own principles of constitutional liberty were re-invigorated by the skill and the breadth with which they wereapplied and administered by her own children in a new country. England could not but know that all this was due to the Union, --the Union which had concentrated the weakness of scattered Statesinto a government that protected the citizen and welcomed theimmigrant, which carried law and liberty to the pioneer on theremotest border, which had made of provincial villages centres ofwealth and civilization that would not have discredited the capitalsof older nations, and which above all had created a Federalrepresentative government whose successful working might teachEngland herself how to hold together the ample colonies that stillformed the outposts of her Empire. 

More than all, a Cabinet, every member of which by personal relationof tradition connection belonged to the great liberal party thatfelt the achievement of Emancipation to be a part of its historicglory, should have realized that no diminution of a rival, nomonopoly of commerce, could bring to England any compensation forthe establishment of a slave-holding empire upon the central watersof the world. 

With this natural expectation the Government in less than sixtydays after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, sent its minister to London, confident that he would at least be allowed to present to theBritish Government for friendly consideration, the condition andpolicy of the Republic before any positive action should disturbthe apparently amicable relations of the two countries. Mr. CharlesFrancis Adams, who was selected for this important duty, wasinstructed to explain to the British Government that the peculiarrelation of the States to the Federal Government, and the reticenceand reservations consequent upon a change of administration, hadhitherto restrained the action of the President in the formationand declaration of his policy; that without foreign interferencethe condition of affairs still afforded reasonable hope of asatisfactory solution; and especially that it was necessary, ifthere existed a sincere desire to avoid wrong and injury to theUnited States, for foreign powers to abstain from any act ofpretended neutrality which would give material advantage or moralencouragement to the organized forces of the rebellion. 

Before Mr. Adams could cross the Atlantic the British Government, although aware of his mission and its object, decided upon its owncourse, in concerted action with France, and without reference tothe views or wishes or interest of the United States. On the daybefore Mr. Adams's arrival in England, as if to give him offensivewarning how little his representations would be regarded, HerMajesty's Government issued a proclamation recognizing the confederatedSouthern States as belligerents. It is entirely unnecessary todiscuss the question of the right to recognize belligerency. Thegreat powers of Europe had the same right to recognize the SouthernConfederacy as a belligerent that they had to recognize it as anestablished nationality, and with the same consequences, --alldependent upon whether the fact so recognized were indeed a fact. But the recognition of belligerency or independence may be themeans to achieve a result, and not simply an impartial acquiescencein a result already achieved. The question therefore was notwhether foreign powers had a right to recognize, but whether thetime and method of such recognition were not distinctly hostile, --whether they were not the efficient and coldly calculated means tostrengthen the hands of the Rebellion. 

Events proved that if the English Government had postponed thisaction until the Government of the United States had been alloweda frank discussion of its policy, no possible injury to Englishinterests could have resulted. It was but a very short time beforethe rebellion assumed proportions that led to the recognition ofthe Confederacy as a belligerent by the civil, judicial, and militaryauthorities of the Union; a recognition by foreign powers wouldthen have been simply an act of impartial neutrality. But, declaredwith such precipitancy, recognition could be regarded only as anact of unfriendliness to the United States. The proof of this isinherent in the case:--

1. The purpose of the secession, openly avowed from the beginning, was the dissolution of the Union and the establishment of anindependent slave-empire; and the joint recognition was a declarationthat such a result, fraught with ruin to us, was not antagonisticto the feelings or to the supposed interests of Europe, and thatboth the commercial ambition of England and the military aspirationsof France in Mexico hoped to find profit in the event. 

 ENGLAND'S RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY. 

2. This recognition of belligerency in defiance of the known wishesand interests of the United States, accompanied by the discourteousrefusal to allow a few hours' delay for the reception of the Americanminister, was a significant warning to the seceded States that norespect due to the old Union would long delay the establishment ofnew relations, and that they should put forth all their energiesbefore the embarrassed Administration could concentrate its effortsin defense of the National life. 

3. The recognition of the belligerent flag of the SouthernConfederacy, with the equal right to supplies and hospitality, guarantied by such recognition, gave to the insurgents facilitiesand opportunities which were energetically used, and led toconsequences which belong to a later period of this history, butthe injury and error of which were emphatically rebuked by a judgmentof the most important tribunal that has ever been assembled tointerpret and administer international law. 

The demand which naturally followed for a rigid enforcement of theblockade, imposed a heavy burden upon the Government of the UnitedStates just at the time when it was least prepared to assume sucha burden. Apologists for the unfriendly course of England interposethe plea that the declaration of blockade by the United States wasin fact a prior recognition of Southern belligerency. But it mustbe remembered that when the United States proposed to avoid thistechnical argument by closing the insurgent ports instead ofblockading them, Mr. Seward was informed by Lord Lyons, acting inconcert with the French minister, that Her Majesty's Government"would consider a decree closing the ports of the South actuallyin possession of the insurgent or Confederate States, as null andvoid, and that they would not submit to measures on the high seasin pursuance of such decree. " Bitterly might Mr. Seward announcethe fact which has sunk deep into the American heart: "It is indeedmanifest in the tone of the speeches, as well as in the generaltenor of popular discussion, that neither the responsible ministersnor the House of Commons nor the active portion of the people ofGreat Britain sympathize with this government, and hope, or evenwish, for its success in suppressing the insurrection; and that onthe contrary the whole British nation, speaking practically, desireand expect the dismemberment of the Republic. "

This very decided step towards a hostile policy was soon followedby another even more significant. On the 9th of May, 1861, onlya few days before the Proclamation of Her Britannic Majesty, recognizing the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy and thusdeveloping itself as a part of a concerted and systematic policy, Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, wrote to Lord JohnRussell: "I called this afternoon on M. Thouvenel, Minister ofForeign Affairs, for the purpose of obtaining his answer to theproposals contained in your Lordship's dispatch of the 6th inst. Relative to the measures which should be pursued by the MaritimePowers of Europe for the protection of neutral property in presenceof the events which are passing in the American States. M. Thouvenelsaid the Imperial Government concurred entirely in the views ofHer Majesty's Government in endeavoring to _obtain of the belligerents_a _formal_ recognition of the second, third, and fourth articlesof the Declaration of Paris. Count de Flahault (French Ambassadorin London) would receive instructions to make this known officiallyto your Lordship. With regard to the manner in which this endeavorshould be made, M. Thouvenel said that he thought a communicationshould be addressed to both parties _in as nearly as possible thesame language_, the consuls being made the organs of communicationwith the Southern States. "

Communicating this intelligence to Lord Lyons in a dispatch datedMay 18, 1861, Lord John Russell added these instructions: "YourLordship may therefore be prepared to find your French colleagueready to take the same line with yourself in his communicationswith the Government of the United States. I need not tell yourLordship that Her Majesty's Government would very gladly see apractice which is calculated to lead to great irregularities andto increase the calamities of war renounced by _both_ the contendingparties in America as it has been renounced by almost _every othernation_ in the world. . . . You will take such measures as youshall judge most expedient to transmit to Her Majesty's consul atCharleston or New Orleans a copy of my previous dispatch to you ofthis day's date, to be communicated at Montgomery to the Presidentof the so-styled Confederate States. "

The identity of the address and the equality upon which both thebelligerents were invited to do what had been done by "almost everyother _nation_ of the world" need not be emphasized. 

 ACTION OF CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. 

On July 5, 1861, Lord Lyons instructed Mr. Bunch, the British Consulat Charleston, South Carolina:--

"The course of events having invested the States assuming the titleof Confederate States of America with the character of belligerents, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to obtain fromthe existing government in those States securities concerning theproper treatment of neutrals. I am authorized by Lord John Russellto confide the negotiation on this matter to you, and I have greatsatisfaction in doing so. In order to make you acquainted withthe views of Her Majesty's Government, I transmit to you a duplicateof a dispatch to me in which they are fully stated. " His Lordshipthen proceeded to instruct the consul as to the manner in which itmight be best to conduct the negotiation, the object being to avoidas far as possible a direct official communication with theauthorities of the Confederate States. Instructions to the samepurport were addressed by the French Government to their consul atCharleston. 

What then was the point of the negotiations committed to theseconsuls? It will be found in the dispatch from Lord John Russell, communicated by his order to Mr. Bunch. It was the accession ofthe United States and of the Confederate States to the Declarationof Paris of April 16, 1856. That Declaration was signed by theMinisters of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. It adopted as article of Maritime Law thefollowing points:--

"1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception ofcontraband of war. 

"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, arenot liable to capture under the enemy's flag. 

"4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, --that isto say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent accessto the coast of the enemy. "

The Powers signing the Declaration engaged to bring it to theknowledge of those Powers which had not taken part in that Congressof Paris, and to invite them to accede to it; and they agreed that"the present Declaration is not and shall not be binding exceptbetween those Powers which have acceded or shall accede to it. "It was accepted by all the European and South American Powers. The United States, Mexico, and the Oriental Powers did not join inthe general acceptance. 

The English and French consuls in Charleston, having received theseinstructions, sought and found an intermediary whose position anddiplomatic experience would satisfy the requirements. This agentaccepted the trust on two conditions, --one, that he should befurnished with the instructions as proof to the Confederate Governmentof the genuineness of the negotiation, the other, that the answerof the Confederate Government should be received in whatever shapethat government should think proper to frame it. The negotiationsin Richmond which had by this time become the seat of the InsurgentGovernment were speedily concluded, and on the 13th of August, 1861, the Confederate Government passed the following resolution:--

"WHEREAS the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, in a conference held atParis on the 16th of April, 1856, made certain declarations concerningMaritime Law, to serve as uniform rules for their guidance in allcases arising out of the principles thus proclaimed;

"AND WHEREAS it being desirable not only to attain certainty anduniformity as far as may be practicable in maritime law, but alsoto maintain whatever is just and proper in the established usagesof nations, the Confederate States of America deem it important todeclare the principles by which they will be governed in theirintercourse with the rest of mankind: Now therefore be it

"_Resolved_, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, "1st, That we maintain the right of privateering as it has beenlong established by the practice and recognized by the law ofnations. 

"2d, That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exceptionof contraband of war. 

"3d, That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. 

"4th, Blockades in order to be binding must be effective; that isto say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent accessto the coast of the enemy. "

 ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE CONFEDERACY. 

"These resolutions, " says Mr. Bunch to Lord Lyons on Aug. 16, 1861, "were passed on the 13th inst. , approved on the same day by thePresident, and I have the honor to enclose herewith to your Lordshipthe copy of them which has been sent to Mr. ---- by the Secretaryof State to be delivered to M. De Belligny and myself. " On Aug. 30, 1861, Lord Lyons wrote to Lord John Russell: "I have received, just in time to have the enclosed copy made for your Lordship, adispatch from Mr. Consul Bunch reporting the proceedings taken byhim in conjunction with his French colleague M. De Belligny toobtain the adherence of the so-called Confederate States to thelast three articles of the Declaration of Paris;" and a few dayslater he says, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult and delicate, was managed with great tact andjudgment by the two consuls. "

Upon the discovery of this "difficult and delicate negotiation, "Mr. Seward demanded the removal of Mr. Bunch. Lord John Russellreplied to Mr. Adams Sept. 9, 1861, "The undersigned will withouthesitation state to Mr. Adams that in pursuance of an agreementbetween the British and French Government, Mr. Bunch was instructedto communicate to the persons exercising authority in the so-calledConfederate States the desire of those governments that the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris should beobserved by those States in the prosecution of the hostilities inwhich they were engaged. Mr. Adams will observe that the commerceof Great Britain and France is deeply interested in the maintenanceof the articles providing that the flag covers the goods, and thatthe goods of a neutral taken on board a belligerent ship are notliable to confiscation. Mr. Bunch, therefore, in what he has donein this matter, has acted in obedience to the instructions of hisgovernment, who accept the responsibility of his proceedings sofar as they are known to the Foreign Department, and who cannotremove him from his office for having obeyed instructions. "

Here then was a complete official negotiation with the ConfederateStates. Mr. Montagu Bernard, in his ingenious and learned work, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American War_, concealsthe true character of the work in which the British Government hadbeen engaged: "The history of an unofficial application made tothe Confederate States on the same subject is told in the twofollowing dispatches. It will be seen that the channel ofcommunication was a private person instructed by the British andFrench consuls, who had been themselves instructed by the ministersof their respective governments at Washington. " The presence ofa private intermediary at one point cannot break the chain ofofficial communication if the communications are themselves official. For certain purposes the governments of England and France consultedand determined upon a specific line of policy. That policy wascommunicated in regular official instructions to their minister inWashington. The Ministers were to select the instruments to carryit out, and the persons selected were the official consularrepresentatives of France and England, who although residing atthe South held their _exequatures_ from the United-States Government. They were instructed to make a political application to the governmentof the Confederacy, and Lord John Russell could not disguise thatgovernment under the mask of "the persons exercising authority inthe so-called Confederate States. " Their application was receivedby the Confederate Government through their agent just as it wouldhave been received through the mail addressed to the Secretary ofState. Their application was officially acted upon by the ConfederateCongress, and the result contained in an official document wastransmitted to them, and forwarded by them to their immediateofficial superiors in Washington, who recognized it as a successfulresult of "a difficult and delicate negotiation. " It was then sentto the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, and the responsibilityof the act was fully and finally assumed by those ministers. 

Nor can it be justified as an application to a belligerent, informinghim that in the exercise of belligerent rights England and Francewould expect a strict conformity to International Law. The fourarticles of the Treaty of Paris were not provisions of InternationalLaw. They were explicit modifications of that law as it had longexisted, and the Declaration itself stated that it was not to bindany of the Powers which had not agreed expressly to accept it. Itwas therefore an invitation, not to a belligerent but to the SouthernConfederacy, to accept and thus become a part to an internationalcompact to which in the very nature of things there could be noparties save those whose acceptance constituted an internationalobligation. It has never yet been claimed that a mere insurgentbelligerent, however strong, occupied such position. If insteadof declaring by resolution that the second, third, and fourtharticles of the Declaration of Paris were principles which by theirown voluntary action they would adopt as rules for their owngovernment, the Confederate States had, with an astute policy whichthe invitation itself seems intended to suggest, demanded that theyshould be allowed to accept the Declaration in the same method inwhich it had been accepted "by every other nation, " it is difficultto see how their demand could have been refused; and if it has beenadmitted, what would have been wanting to perfect the recognitionof the independence of the Southern Confederacy?

 THE PARIS CONVENTION. 

The motive of England and France in this extraordinary negotiationwith the Confederacy is plain. The right of privateering was notleft untouched except with deep design. By securing the assent ofthe Confederacy to the other three articles of the Paris Convention, safety was assured to British and French cargoes under the Americanflag, while every American cargo was at risk unless protected bya Foreign flag--generally the flag of England. It would have beenimpossible to invent a process more gainful to British commerce, more harmful to American commerce. While the British and Frenchconsuls were conducting this negotiation with the ConfederateStates, the British and French ministers were conducting anotherto the same purport with the United States. Finally Mr. Sewardoffered to waive the point made by Secretary Marcy many years beforeat the date of the Declaration, and to accept the four articles ofthe Paris Convention, pure and simple. But his could not be done, because the Confederate States had not accepted the first articleabolishing privateering and her privateers must therefore berecognized. England and France used this fact as a pretext forabsolutely declining to permit the accession of the United States, one of the great maritime powers of the world, to a treaty whichwas proclaimed to be a wise and humane improvement of the old andharsh law of nations, and to which in former years the United Stateshad been most earnestly invited to give her assent. This coursethrows a flood of light on the clandestine correspondence with theConfederacy, and plainly exposes the reasons why it was desiredthat the right of privateering should be left open to the Confederates. Through that instrumentality great harm could be inflicted on theUnited States and at the same time England could be guarded againsta cotton famine. To accomplish these ends she negotiated what waslittle less than a hostile treaty with an Insurgent Government. This action was initiated before a single battle was fought, andwas evidently intended as encouragement and inspiration to theConfederates to persist in their revolutionary proceedings againstthe Government of the United States. Any reasonable man, lookingat the condition of affairs, could not doubt that the publicrecognition of the independence of the Confederacy by England andFrance, was a foregone and rapidly approaching conclusion. 

With this condition of affairs leading necessarily to a morepronounced unfriendliness, an incident occurred towards the closeof the year which seriously threatened a final breach of amicablerelations. On the 9th of November, 1861, Captain Wilkes of theUnited-States steamer _San Jacinto_, seized the persons of JamesM. Mason and John Slidell, ministers from the Southern Confederacy, and their secretaries, on board the British mail-steamer _Trent_on her way from Havana to Kingston. Messrs. Mason and Slidell wereaccredited by the Executive of the Southern Confederacy to theGovernments of England and France. Their avowed object was toobtain the recognition by those governments of the independence ofthe new Southern Republic, and their success would have been a mostdangerous if not a fatal blow to the cause of the Union. But theywere not by any recognized principle of international law contrabandof war, and they were proceeding from a neutral port to a neutralport in a neutral vessel. The action of the officer who seizedthem was not authorized by any instructions, and the seizure wasitself in violation of those principles of maritime law for whichthe United States had steadily and consistently contended from theestablishment of its national life. The difficulty of adjustmentlay not in the temper or conviction of either government, but inthe passionate and very natural excitement of popular feeling inboth countries. In the United States there was universal andenthusiastic approval of the act of Captain Wilkes. In Englandthere was an equally vehement demand for immediate and signalreparation. 

 LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND LORD LYONS. 

Lord John Russell, after reciting the facts, instructed Lord Lyonsin a dispatch of Nov. 30, 1861: "Her Majesty's Government thereforetrust that when this matter shall have been brought under theconsideration of the Government of the United States, that governmentwill of its own accord offer to the British Government such redressas alone would satisfy the British nation; namely, the liberationof the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship in orderthat they may again be placed under British protection, and asuitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward you will proposethem to him. " In a dispatch of the same date Lord John Russellsays to Lord Lyons: "In my previous dispatch of this date I haveinstructed you by command of Her Majesty to make certain demandsof the Government of the United States. Should Mr. Seward ask fordelay in order that this grave and painful matter should bedeliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceedingseven days. If at the end of that time no answer is given, or ifany other answer is given except that of compliance with the demandsof Her Majesty's Government, your Lordship is instructed to leaveWashington with all the members of your Legation, bringing withyou the archives of the Legation, and to repair immediately toLondon. If however you should be of opinion that the requirementsof Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied with youmay report the facts to Her Majesty's Government for theirconsideration, and remain at your post until you receive furtherorders. " The communication of this peremptory limitation of timefor a reply would have been an offensive threat; but it was aprivate instruction to guide the discretion of the minister, notto be used if the condition of things upon its arrival promised anamicable solution. It must also in justice be remembered thatexcited feeling had been shown by different departments of our ownGovernment as well as by the press and the people. The House ofRepresentatives had unanimously adopted a resolution thankingCaptain Wilkes "for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct;" andthe Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Gideon Welles, had publicly andofficially approved his action. 

The spirit in which Lord Lyons would receive his instructions wasindicated in advance by his own dispatch to Lord John Russell ofNov. 19, 1861: "I have accordingly deemed it right to maintainthe most complete reserve on the subject. To conceal the distresswhich I feel would be impossible, nor would it if possible bedesirable; but I have expressed no opinion on the questions ofinternational law involved; I have hazarded no conjecture as tothe course which will be taken by Her Majesty's Government. Onthe one hand I dare not run the risk of compromising the honor andinviolability of the British flag by asking for a measure ofreparation which may prove to be inadequate. On the other hand Iam scarcely less unwilling to incur the danger of rendering asatisfactory settlement of the question more difficult by makinga demand which may turn out to be unnecessarily great. In thepresent imperfect state of my information I feel that the onlyproper and prudent course is to wait for the orders which yourLordship will give, with a complete knowledge of the whole case. I am unwilling moreover to deprive any explanation or reparationwhich the United-States Government may think it right to offer, ofthe grace of being made spontaneously. I know too that a demandfrom me would very much increase the main difficulty which thegovernment would feel in yielding to any disposition which theymay have to make amends to Great Britain. The American peoplewould more easily tolerate a spontaneous offer of reparation madeby its government from a sense of justice than a compliance witha demand for satisfaction from a foreign minister. "

In accordance with the sentiments thus expressed, Lord Lyons, interpreting his discretion liberally and even generously, calledupon Mr. Seward on the 19th of December, 1861, and the followingis his official account of the interview: "The Messenger Seymourdelivered to me at half-past eleven o'clock last night your Lordship'sdispatch of the 30th ultimo, specifying the reparation required byHer Majesty's Government for the seizure of Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell and their secretaries on board the royal mail-steamer_Trent_. I waited on Mr. Seward this afternoon at the StateDepartment, and acquainted him in general terms with the tenor ofthat dispatch. I stated in particular, as nearly as possible inyour Lordship's words, that the only redress which could satisfyHer Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's people would be theimmediate delivery of the prisoners to me in order that they mightbe placed under British protection, and moreover a suitable apologyfor the aggression which had been committed. I added that HerMajesty's Government hoped that the Government of the United Stateswould of its own accord offer this reparation; that it was in orderto facilitate such an arrangement that I had come to him withoutany written demand, or even any written paper at all, in my hand;that if there was a prospect of attaining this object I was willingto be guided by him as to the conduct on my part which would renderits attainment most easy. Mr. Seward received my communicationseriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation ofdissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequenceof questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact characterof the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to-morrow to consider the question and to communicate with the President. On the day after he should, he said, be ready to express an opinionwith respect to the communication I had made. In the mean time hebegged me to be assured that he was very sensible of the friendlyand conciliatory manner in which I had made it. "

 SECRETARY SEWARD AND LORD LYONS. 

On the 26th of December Mr. Seward transmitted to Lord Lyons thereply of the United States to the demand of the British Government. In forwarding it to his Government Lord Lyons said: "Beforetransmitting to me the note of which a copy enclosed in my immediatelypreceding dispatch of to-day's date, Mr. Seward sent for me to theState Department, and said with some emotion that he thought thatit was due to the great kindness and consideration which I hadmanifested throughout in dealing with the affair of the _Trent_, that he should tell me with his own lips that he had been able toeffect a satisfactory settlement of it. He had now however beenauthorized to address to me a note which would be satisfactory toHer Majesty's Government. In answer to inquiries from me Mr. Sewardsaid that of course he understood Her Majesty's Government to leaveit open to the Government of Washington to present the case in theform which would be most acceptable to the American people, butthat the note was intended to be and was a compliance with theterms proposed by Her Majesty's Government. He would add that thefriendly spirit and discretion which I had manifested in the wholematter from the day on which the intelligence of the seizure reachedWashington up to the present moment had more than any thing elsecontributed to the satisfactory settlement of the question. "

In his reply Mr. Seward took the ground that we had the right todetain the British vessel and to search for contraband persons anddispatches, and moreover that the persons named and their dispatcheswere contraband. But he found good reason for surrendering theConfederate envoys in the fact that Captain Wilkes had neglectedto bring the _Trent_ into a Prize Court and to submit the wholetransaction to Judicial examination. Mr. Seward certainly strainedthe argument of Mr. Madison as Secretary of State in 1804 to a mostextraordinary degree when he apparently made it cover the groundthat we would quietly have submitted to British right of search ifthe "Floating Judgment-seat" could have been substituted by aBritish Prize Court. The seizure of the _Trent_ would not havebeen made more acceptable to the English Government by transferringher to the jurisdiction of an American Prize-Court, unless indeedthat Court should have decided, as it most probably would havedecided, that the seizure was illegal. Measuring the English demandnot by the peremptory words of Lord John Russell but by the kindlyphrase in which Lord Lyons in a personal interview verballycommunicated them, Mr. Seward felt justified in saying that "theclaim of the British Government is not made in a discourteousmanner. " Mr. Seward did not know that at the very moment he waswriting these conciliatory words, British troops were on their wayto the Dominion of Canada to menace the United States, and thatBritish cannon were shotted for our destruction. 

Lord John Russell, however much he might differ from Mr. Seward'sargument, found ample satisfaction to the British Government inhis conclusion. He said in reply: "Her Majesty's Government havingcarefully taken into their consideration the liberation of theprisoners, the delivery of them into your hands, and the explanationsto which I have just referred, have arrived at the conclusion thatthey constitute the reparation which Her Majesty and the Britishnation had a right to expect. " And thus, by the delivery of theprisoners in the form and at the place least calculated to exciteor wound the susceptibilities of the American people, this dangerousquestion was settled. It is only to be regretted that the spiritand discretion exhibited by the eminent diplomatist who representedEngland here with such wisdom and good temper, had not been adoptedat an earlier date and more steadily maintained by the BritishGovernment. It would have prevented much angry controversy, muchbitter feeling; it would have averted events and consequences whichstill shadow with distrust a national friendship that ought to becordial and constant. 

 ENGLAND, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA. 

The painful event impressed upon the Government of the United Statesa profound sense of its isolation from the sympathy of Europe. The principle of maritime law, which was so promptly and rigorouslyapplied, was one for which the United States had contended in itsweakness against the usages of the world and against the arms ofGreat Britain. There was apparent now an eager resolution toenforce it, when that enforcement was sure to embarrass us and toprovoke a spirit of derisive triumph in our foes. It was clearthat no effort would be spared to restrict our belligerent rightswithin the narrowest possible limits. Not content with leaving usto settle this question with England, France and Prussia and Austriahastened to inform us in language professedly friendly, that Englandwould be supported in her demand for reparation, cost what it mightto us in prestige, and in power to deal with the Rebellion at home. At this time there was but one among the great nations of the worldwhich adhered to an active and avowed friendship for us. "We desireabove all things the maintenance of the American Union as oneindivisible nation, " was the kindly and always to be rememberedgreeting that came to us from the Emperor of Russia. 

The profound ability exhibited by Mr. Seward as Secretary of Statehas long been acknowledged and emphasized by the admiration andgratitude of the country. In the _Trent_ affair he acted under apressure of circumstances more harassing and perplexing than hadever tested the skill of American diplomacy. It is with nodisposition to detract from the great service rendered by him thata dissent is expressed from the ground upon which he placed thesurrender of Mason and Slidell. It is not believed that the doctrineannounced by Mr. Seward can be maintained on sound principles ofInternational Law, while it is certainly in conflict with thepractice which the United States had sought to establish from thefoundation of the Government. The restoration of the envoys onany such apparently insufficient basis did not avoid the mortificationof the surrender; it only deprived us of the fuller credit andadvantage which we might have secured from the act. It is to beregretted that we did not place the restoration of the prisonersupon franker and truer ground, viz. , that their seizure was inviolation of the principles which we had steadily and resolutelymaintained--principles which we would not abandon either for atemporary advantage or to save the wounding of our National pride. 

The luminous speech of Mr. Sumner, when the papers in the _Trent_case were submitted to Congress, stated the ground for which theUnited States had always contended with admirable precision. Wecould not have refused to surrender Mason and Slidell withouttrampling upon our own principles and disregarding the many precedentswe had sought to establish. But it must not be forgotten that thesword of precedent cut both ways. It was as absolutely againstthe peremptory demand of England for the surrender of the prisonersas it was against the United States for the seizure of them. Whatever wrong was inflicted on the British Flag by the action ofCaptain Wilkes, had been time and again inflicted on the Americanflag by officers of the English Navy, --without cause, withoutredress, without apology. Hundreds and thousands of Americancitizens had in time of peace been taken by British cruisers fromthe decks of American vessels and violently impressed into thenaval service of that country. 

Lord Castlereagh practically confessed in Parliament that thisoffense against the liberty of American citizens had been repeatedthirty-five hundred times. According to the records of our owndepartment of State as Mr. Sumner alleges "the quarter-deck of aBritish man-of-war had been made a floating judgment-seat sixthousand times and upwards, and each time some citizen or otherperson was taken from the protection of our national flag withoutany form of trial whatever. " So insolent and oppressive had Britishaggression become before the war of 1812, that Mr. Jefferson inhis somewhat celebrated letter to Madame de Staël-Holstein of May24, 1813, said, "No American could safely cross the ocean or ventureto pass by sea from one to another of our own ports. _It is notlong since they impressed at sea two nephews of General Washingtonreturning from Europe, and put them, as common seamen, under theordinary discipline of their ships of war_. "

After the war of 1812 these unendurable insults to our flag werenot repeated by Great Britain, but her Government steadily refusedto make any formal renunciation of her right to repeat them, sothat our immunity from like insults did not rest upon any betterfoundation than that which might be dictated by considerations ofinterest and prudence on the part of the offending Power. Thewrong which Captain Wilkes committed against the British flag wassurely not so great as if he had seized the persons of Britishsubjects--subjects, if you please, who were of kindred blood toone who stands as high in the affection of the British people asWashington stands in the affection of the American people, --ifindeed there be such a one in English tradition. 

The offense of Captain Wilkes was surely far below that in theessential quality of outrage. He had not touched the hair of aBritish subject's head. He had only removed from the hospitalityand shelter of a British ship four men who were bent on an errandof destruction to the American Union. His act cannot be justifiedby the canons of International Law as our own Government hasinterpreted and enforced them. But in view of the past and of thelong series of graver outrages with which Great Britain had sowantonly insulted the American flag, she might have refrained frominvoking the judgment of the civilized world against us, andespecially might she have refrained from making in the hour of oursore trial and our deep distress, a demand which no British Ministerwould address to this Government in the day of its strength andits power. 

 FRIENDLY POSITION OF THE QUEEN. 

It would be ungracious to withhold an expression of the lastingappreciation entertained in this country of the course pursued byHer Majesty, the Queen of England, throughout this most painfulordeal. She was wiser than her Ministers, and there can be littledoubt but for her considerate interposition, softening the rigorof the British demand, the two nations would have been forced intowar. On all the subsequent occasions for bitterness towards England, by reason of the treatment we experienced during the war, therewas an instinctive feeling among Americans that the Queen desiredpeace and good will, and did not sympathize with the insidiousefforts at our destruction, which had their origin in her dominions. It was fortunate that the disposition of the Queen, and not of herMinistry, was represented in Washington by Lord Lyons. The goodsense and good temper of His Lordship were of inestimable value toboth countries, in making the task of Mr. Seward practicable, without increasing the resentment of our people. 

It was well that the Government and people of the United Stateswere so early taught that their value to the world of foreignprinciples, foreign feeling, and foreign interests was only whatthey could themselves establish; that in this contest they mustdepend upon themselves; and that the dissolution of their NationalUnity and the destruction of their free, popular Government fromthe lack of courage and wisdom in those whose duty it was to maintainthem, would not be unwelcome to the Principalities and Powers that"were willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike. " This is notthe time to describe the vacillating and hesitating development ofthis hostile policy; but as the purpose of the United-StatesGovernment grew more steady, more resolute, and more self-reliant, a sickening doubt seemed to becloud the ill-concealed hope of ourruin. It was not long until the brave and deluded rebels of theSouth learned that there was no confidence to be placed in thecruel and selfish calculation which encouraged their desperateresistance with the show of sympathy, but would not avow an opensupport or make a manly sacrifice in their behalf. 

This initial policy of foreign powers had developed its naturalconsequences. It not only excited but it warranted in the SouthernConfederacy the hope of early recognition. It seemed impossiblethat, with this recognized equality between the belligerents, therewould not occur somewhere just such incidents as the seizure ofthe _Trent_ or the capture of the _Florida_ which would render itvery difficult to maintain peaceful relations between foreign Powersand the United States. The neutrality laws were complicated. Men-of-war commanded by ambitious, ardent, and patriotic officers wouldsometimes in the excitement of honorable feeling, sometimes inmistaken sense of duty, vindicate their country's flag; while itwas the interest of the officers of the Confederate cruisers, asbold and ingenious men who ever commanded ship, to create, whereverthey could, difficulties which would embarrass the interests ofneutrals and intensify between the United States and foreign Powersthe growing feeling of distrust. Thus from month to month theGovernment of the United States could never feel secure that therewould not arise questions which the indignation of its own peopleand the pride and latent hostility of foreign government wouldplace beyond the power of friendly adjustment. Such questions didarise with England, France, Brazil, Spain, and even with Mexico, which the common disinclination to actual war succeeded in postponingrather than settling. But as the civil war went on, three classesof questions took continuous and precise shape. Their scope andresult can be fully and fairly considered. These were--

1. The building and equipping of Confederate cruisers and theirtreatment as legitimate national vessels of war in the home andcolonial ports of foreign powers. 

2. The establishment at such ports as Nassau, in the immediatevicinity of the blockaded ports of the Southern States, of depotsof supplies, which afforded to the Confederates enormous advantagesin the attempt to break the blockade. 

3. The distinct defiance of the traditional policy of the UnitedStates by the invasion of the neighboring Republic of Mexico forthe avowed purpose of establishing there a foreign and monarchicaldynasty. 

 SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERACY. 

No sooner had Her Brittanic Majesty's proclamation, recognizingthe belligerent rights of the Southern Confederacy, been issued, than a naval officer of remarkable ability and energy was sent fromMontgomery to Liverpool. In his very interesting history of theservices rendered by him, that officer says: "The chief object ofthis narrative is to demonstrate by a plain statement of facts thatthe Confederate Government, through their agents, did nothing morethan all other belligerents have heretofore done in time of need;namely, tried to obtain from every possible source the meansnecessary to carry on the war in which they were engaged, and thatin so doing they took particular pains to understand the municipallaw of those countries in which they sought to supply their wants, and were especially careful to keep with the statutes. . . . 

"The object of the Confederate Government was not merely to builda single ship, but it was to maintain a permanent representativeof the Navy Department abroad, and to get ships and naval supplieswithout hindrance so long as the war lasted. To effect this purposeit was manifestly necessary to act with prudence and caution andto do nothing in violation of the municipal law, because a singleconviction would both expose the object and defeat the aim. " Hissolicitor "therefore drew up a case for counsel's opinion andsubmitted it to two eminent barristers, both of whom have sincefilled the highest judicial positions. The case was submitted;was a general and not a specific proposition. It was not intimatedfor what purpose and on whose behalf the opinion was asked, andthe reply was therefore wholly without bias, and embraced a fullexposition of the Act in its bearing upon the question of buildingand equipping ships in Her Majesty's dominions. 

"The inferences drawn from the investigation of the Act by counselwere put in the following form by my solicitor:--

"'1. It is no offense (under the Act) for British subjects toequip, etc. , a ship at some country _without_ Her Majesty's dominionsthough the intent be to cruise against a friendly State. 

"'2. It is no offense for _any_ person (subject or no subject) to_equip_ a ship _within_ Her Majesty's dominions if it be _not_ donewith the intent to cruise against a friendly State. 

"'3. The mere building of a ship _within_ Her Majesty's dominionsby any person (subject or no subject) is no offense, _whatever maybe the intent of the parties_, because the offense is not in the_building_, but the _equipping_. 

"'Therefore any ship-builder may build any ship in Her Majesty'sdominions, provided he does not equip her within Her Majesty'sdominions, and he had nothing to do with the acts of the purchasersdone _within_ Her Majesty's dominions without his concurrence, orwithout Her Majesty's dominions even with his concurrence. '"--[BULLOCK's _Secret Service of the Confederate States_, vol. I, pp. 65-67. ]

It is an amazing courtesy which attributes to the eminent counsela complete ignorance of the object and purpose for which theirweighty opinion was sought in the construction of British law. Such ignorance is feigned and not real, and the pretense of itsexistence indicates either on the part of the author or the counsela full appreciation of the deadly consequences of that maligninterpretation of England's duty for which two illustrious membersof the English Bar were willing to stand sponsors before the world. Conceding, as we fairly may concede, that the decision in the caseof the _Alexandra_ is confirmatory of the opinion given by theseleaders of the British bar, the result was simply the establishmentand administration of the Naval Department of the Confederacy inEngland. There was its chief, there were its financial agents, there its workshops. There were its vessels armed and commissioned. Thence they sailed on their mission of destruction, and thitherthey returned to repair their damages, and to renew their supplies. Under formal contracts with the Confederate Government the colonialports of Nassau and the Bermudas were made depots of supplies whichwere drawn upon with persistent and successful regularity. Theeffects of this thoroughly organized system of so-called neutralitythat supplied ports, ships, arms, and men to a belligerent whichhad none, are not matters of conjecture or exaggeration; they havebeen proven and recorded. In three years fifteen million dollars'worth of property was destroyed, --given to the flame or sunk beneaththe waters, --the shipping of the United States was reduced one-half, and the commercial flag of the Union fluttered with terrorin every wind that blew, form the whale-fisheries of the Arctic tothe Southern Cross. 

 MINISTER DAYTON'S INDIGNANT PROTEST. 

With this condition of affairs, permitted and encouraged by Englandand France, our distinguished minister at Paris was justified insaying to the Government of Louis Napoleon on the reception of theConfederate steamer _Georgia_ at Brest, in language which thoughbut the bare recital of fact was of itself the keenest reproach tothe French Government:--

"The _Georgia_, like the _Florida_, the _Alabama_, and other scourgesof peaceful commerce, was born of that unhappy decree which gavethe rebels who did not own a ship-of-war or command a single portthe right of an ocean belligerent. Thus encouraged by foreignpowers they began to build and fit out in neutral ports a class ofvessels constructed mainly for speed, and whose acknowledged missionis not to fight, but to rob, to burn, and to fly. Although thesmoke of burning ships has everywhere marked the track of the_Georgia_ and the _Florida_ upon the ocean, they have never soughta foe or fired a gun against an armed enemy. To dignify suchvessels with the name of ships-of-war seems to me, with deference, a misnomer. Whatever flag may fly from their mast-head, or whateverpower may claim to own them, their conduct stamps them as piratical. If vessels of war even, they would by this conduct have justlyforfeited all courtesies in ports of neutral nations. Manned byforeign seamen, armed by foreign guns, entering no home port, andwaiting no judicial condemnation of prizes, they have alreadydevastated and destroyed our commerce to an extent, as comparedwith their number, beyond any thing known in the records ofprivateering. "

It would seem impossible that such a state of things could be theresult of the impartial administration of an honest neutrality. It must be attributed to one of two causes;--either the municipallaw of foreign countries was not sufficient to enable the governmentsto control the selfishness or the sentiment of their people, --towhich the reply is obvious that the weakness and incompetence ofmunicipal law cannot diminish or excuse international obligations:or it must have been due to a misconception of the obligationswhich international law imposes. How far there may have been amotive for this misconception, how far the wish was father to thethought of such misconstruction, it is perhaps needless now toinquire. The theory of international law maintained by the foreignPowers may be fairly stated in two propositions:--

1. That foreign Powers had the right, and in due regard to theirown interests were bound, to recognize belligerency as a fact. 

2. That belligerents once recognized, were equals and must betreated with the same perfect neutrality. 

It is not necessary to deny these propositions, but simply toascertain their real meaning. In its primary and simple application, the law of belligerency referred to two or more belligerents, equally independent. Its application to the case of insurgentsagainst an established and recognized government is later, involvesother and in some respects different considerations, and cannoteven now be regarded as settled. To recognize an insurgent as abelligerent is not to recognize him as fully the equal of thegovernment from which he secedes. This would be simply to recognizehis independence. The limitation which international law placesupon this recognition is stated in the English phrase, "the rightto recognize belligerency as a fact;"--that is, to recognize thebelligerent to the extent of his war capacity but no farther. Theneutral cannot on this principle recognize in the belligerent thepossession of any power which he does not actually possess, althoughin the progress of the contest such power may be developed. 

The Southern Confederacy had an organized government and greatarmies. To that extent its power was a fact. But when foreigngovernments recognized in the insurgents the rights of oceanbelligerency, they went beyond the fact. They were actually givingto the Confederacy a character which it did not possess and whichit never acquired. For the Confederacy had not a ship or an openport. Whenever an insurgent power claims such right, it must bein condition to assume and discharge the obligation which suchrights impose. When any power, insurgent or recognized, claimssuch right, --the right to fly its flag, to deal in hostility withthe commerce of the world, to exercise dangerous privileges whichmay affect the interests and complicate the relations of othernations, --it must give to the world a guaranty that it is both ableand willing to administer the system of maritime law under whichit claims such rights and powers, by submitting its action to theregular and formal jurisdiction of Prize Courts. Strike the PrizeCourt out of modern maritime law and the whole system falls, andcapture on the sea becomes pure barbarism, --distinguished frompiracy only by the astuteness of a legal technicality. The SouthernConfederacy could give no guaranty. Just as it undertook tonaturalize foreign seamen upon the quarter-deck of its rovingcruisers, so it undertook to administer a system of maritime lawwhich precluded the most solemn and important of its provisions--a judicial decision--and converted the humane and legal right ofcapture into an absolute and a ruthless decree of destruction. Noneutral has the right to make or accept such an interpolation intothe recognized and essential principles of the law of maritimewarfare. 

 ENGLAND'S MALIGNANT NEUTRALITY. 

The application of this so-called neutrality to both the so-calledbelligerents was not designed nor was it practicable. In referringto the obligation of the neutral to furnish no assistance to eitherof the belligerents, one of the oldest and most authoritative ofinternational law writers says: "I do not say to give assistanceequally but to give no assistance, for it would be absurd that astate should assist at the same time two enemies. And besides itwould be impossible to do it with equality: the same things, thelike number of troops, the like quantity of arms and munitionsfurnished under different circumstances are no longer equivalentsuccors. " Assistance is not a theoretical idea; it is a plain, practical, unmistakable fact. When the United States had, at vastcost and by incredible effort, shut the Southern Confederacy fromthe sea and blockaded its ports against the entry of supplies, whenthat government had no resources within its territory by which itcould put a ship upon the ocean, or break the blockade from within, then it was that England allowed Confederate officers to camp uponher soil, organize her labor, employ her machinery, use her ports, occupy her colonial stations, almost within sight of the blockadedcoast, and to do this continuously, systematically, defiantly. 

By these acts the British government gave the most valuable assistanceto the South and actually engaged in defeating the military operationsof the United States. There was no equivalent assistance whichGreat Britain could or did render to the United States. They mighthave rendered other assistance, but none which would compensatefor this. Let it be supposed for one moment that Mexico hadpracticed, on the other side of the Rio Grande, the same sort ofneutrality, --that she had lined the bank of the river with depotsof military supplies; that she had allowed officers of the Confederatearmy to establish themselves and organize a complete system forthe receipt of cotton and the delivery of merchandise on herterritory; that her people had served as factors, intermediaries, and carriers, --would any reasonable interpretation of internationallaw consider such conduct to be impartial neutrality? But illustrationdoes not strengthen the argument. The naked statement of England'sposition is its worst condemnation. Her course, while ingeniouslyavoiding public responsibility, gave unceasing help to the Confederacy--as effective as if the intention had been proclaimed. The wholeprocedure was in disregard of international obligation and was theoutgrowth of what M. Prévost-Paradol aptly charaterized as a"malignant neutrality. "

It cannot be said in reply that the Governments of England andFrance were unable to restrain this demonstration of the sympathy, this exercise of the commercial enterprise of their people. Forthe time came when they did restrain it. As soon as it becameevident that the Confederacy was growing weaker, that with all itsmarvelous display of courage and endurance it could not preventthe final success of the Union, there was no longer difficulty inarresting the building of the iron-clads on the Mersey; then thewatchfulness of home and colonial authorities was quickened; thensupplies were meted out scantily; then the dangers of a great slaveempire began to impress Ministerial consciences, and the same Powersprepared to greet the triumph of the Union with well-feignedsatisfaction. But even if this change had not occurred the conditionof repressed hostility could not have lasted. It was war in disguise--not declared, only because the United-States Government couldnot afford to multiply its enemies, and England felt that therewas still uncertainty enough in the result to caution her againstassuming so great a risk. But the tension of the relation wasaptly described by Mr. Seward in July, 1863, when he said, --

"If the law of Great Britain must be left without amendment and beconstrued by the government in conformity with the rulings of thechief Baron of the Exchequer [the _Alexandra_ case] then there willbe left for the United States no alternative but to protect themselvesand their commerce against armed cruisers proceeding from Britishports as against the naval forces of a public enemy. . . . Britishports, domestic as well as colonial, are now open under certainrestrictions to the visits of piratical vessels, and not onlyfurnish them coals, provisions, and repairs, but even receive theirprisoners when the enemies of the United States come in to obtainsuch relief from voyages in which they have either burned shipsthey have captured, or have even manned and armed them as piratesand sent them abroad as auxiliaries in the work of destruction. Can it be an occasion for either surprise or complaint that if thiscondition of things is to remain and receive the deliberate sanctionof the British Government, the navy of the United States willreceive instructions to pursue these enemies into the ports whichthus in violation of the law of nations and the obligations ofneutrality become harbors for the pirates? The President verydistinctly perceives the risks and hazards which a naval conflictthus maintained will bring to the commerce and even to the peaceof the two countries. But he is obliged to consider that in thecase supposed, the destruction of our commerce will probably amountto a naval war, waged by a portion at least of the British nationagainst the government and people of the United States--a wartolerated although not declared or avowed by the British Government. If through the necessary employment of all our means of nationaldefense such a partial war shall become a general one between thetwo nations, the President thinks that the responsibility for thatpainful result will not fall upon the United States. "

 ENGLAND'S MALIGNANT NEUTRALITY. 

The truth is that the so-called neutral policy of foreign Powerswas the vicious application of obsolete analogies to the conditionsof modern life. Because of the doctrine of belligerent recognitionhad in its origin referred to nations of well established, independentexistence, the doctrine was now pushed forward to the extent ofgiving ocean belligerency to an insurgent which had in reality nomaritime power whatever. It was an old and recognized principlethat the commercial relations of the neutral should not be interferedwith unless they worked positive injury to the belligerent. Thenew application made the interests of neutral commerce the supremefactor in determining how far belligerent rights should be respected. The ship-building and carrying-trade of England were to be maintainedand encouraged at any cost to the belligerent. Under the old law, a belligerent had the right to purchase a ship and a cargo, or aneutral might run a blockade, taking all the risk of capture. Bythe new construction, power was to be given to a belligerent totransfer the entire administration of its naval service to foreignsoil, and to create and equip a navy which issued from foreignwaters, ready not for a dangerous journey to their own ports ofdelivery, but for the immediate demonstration of hostile purpose. No such absurd system can be found in the principles or precedentsof international law; no such system would be permitted by thegreat powers of Europe if to-morrow they should engage in war. 

The principle of this policy was essentially mercenary. It professedno moral sense. It might be perfectly indifferent to the high orthe low issues which the contest between the belligerents involved;it was deaf to any thing which might be urged by justice of humanityor friendship; it was the cynical recognition of the truth of theold proverb that "It is an ill wind which blows good to no one. "It was the same principle upon which England declares with audaciousselfishness that she cannot sacrifice that portion of her Indianrevenue which comes from the opium trade or the capital which isinvested in its growth and manufacture, and that China must thereforetake the poison which diseases and degrades her population. Butselfish as is this market-policy, it is a policy of circumstance. It may be resisted with success or it may be abandoned because itcannot succeed. It creates bitterness; it leads to war; it may inits selfishness cause the destruction of a nation, but it does notnecessarily imply a desire for that destruction. But there was inthe foreign policy of Europe towards the United States during thecivil war the manifestation of a spirit more intense in its hostility, more dangerous in its consequences. It was the spirit of enmityto the Union itself, and the emphatic demonstration of this feelingwas the invasion of Mexico for the purpose of converting the republicby force into an empire. Louis Napoleon's enterprise was distinctlybased on the utter destruction of the American Union. 

The Declaration of Independence by the British Colonies in Americawas something more than the creation of a new sovereignty. It wasthe foundation of a new system both of internal government andforeign relation, a system not entirely isolated from the affairsof the Old World but independent of the dynastic complications andthe territorial interests which controlled the political conflictsof Europe. At first, with its material resources undeveloped, itsterritorial extension limited and surrounded by the colonies ofthe great Powers, this principle although maintained as a conviction, could not manifest itself in action. But it showed itself in thatabstinence from entangling alliances which would avoid the dangersof even a too friendly connection. In time our territory expanded. The colonies of foreign nations following our example becameindependent republics whose people had the same aspirations, whosegovernments were framed upon the same basis of popular right. Therapidity of communication, supplied by the railroad and the telegraph, facilitated and concentrated this political cohesion, and therehad been formed from the borders of Canada to the Straits of Magellana complete system of republics (to which Brazil can scarcely beconsidered an exception) professing the same political creed, havinggreat commercial interests in common, and which with the extinctionof some few jealousies, were justified in the anticipation of aprosperous and peaceful future. There was not an interest or anambition of a single one of these republics which threatened aninterest or an ambition of a single European power. 

 THE REPUBLICS OF AMERICA. 

It needs no argument to show that the central element of thestability of this system of American republics was the strength ofthe Federal Union, its growth into a harmonious nationality, andits ability to prevent anywhere on the two continents the armedintervention of foreign Powers for the purpose of politicaldomination. This strength was known and this resolution publiclydeclared, and it is safe to affirm that before 1861 or after 1865not one nor all of the European Powers would have willingly challengedthis policy. But the moment the strength of the Union seemedweakened, the moment that the leading Republic of this system founditself hampered and embarrassed by internal dissensions, all Europe--that Europe which upon the threatening of a Belgian fortress, orthe invasion of a Swiss canton, or the loss of the key to a churchin Jerusalem, would have written protocols, summoned conferences, and mustered armies--quietly acquiesced in as wanton, wicked, andfoolish an aggression as ever Imperial folly devised. The samemonarch who appealed with confidence to Heaven when he declaredwar to prevent a Hohenzollern from ascending the throne of Spain, appealed to the same Heaven with equal confidence and equal successwhen he declared war to force a Hapsburg upon the throne of Mexico. 

The success of the establishment of a Foreign Empire in Mexicowould have been fatal to all that the United States cherished, toall that it hoped peacefully to achieve. The scheme of invasionrested on the assumption of the dissolution of the Union and itsdivision into two hostile governments; but aside from that possibility, it threatened the United States upon the most vital questions. Itwas at war with all our institutions and our habits of politicallife, for it would have introduced into a great country on thiscontinent, capable of unlimited development, that curious andmischievous form of government, that perplexing mixture of absolutismand democracy, --imperial power supported by universal suffrage, --which seems certain to produce aggression abroad and corruption athome, and which must have injuriously influenced the politicalgrowth of the Spanish-American Republics. Firmly seated in Mexico, it would have spread through Central America to the Isthmus, controlling all canal communications between the two oceans whichwere the boundaries of the Union, while its growth upon the PacificCoast would have been in direct rivalry with the natural andincreasing power of the United States. Commanding the Gulf ofMexico it would have controlled the whole commerce of the West-Indian islands and radically changed their future. Bound by dynasticconnection, checked and directed by European influence, it couldnot have developed a national policy in harmony with neighboringStates, but its existence and its necessary efforts at expansionwould have made it not only a constant menace to American Republicsbut a source of endless war and confusion between the great Powersof the world. The policy signally failed. But surely Europeanstatesmen, without miraculous foresight, might have anticipatedthat its success would have been more dangerous than its defeat, and that the conservative strength of the Union might be even tothem an influence of good and not of evil. 

 FORMER VIEWS OF LORD PALMERSTON. 

In 1859 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell: "It is plainthat France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on eachside of the Gut of Gibraltar which in the event of war betweenSpain and France on the one hand and England on the other would bya cross fire render that strait very difficult and dangerous topass and thus virtually shut us out of the Mediterranean. . . . The French Minister of War or of marine said the other day thatAlgeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on theAtlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port makeAlgeria safe? Evidently only against England, and how could sucha port help France against England? Only by tending to shut usout of the Mediterranean. " Later in the same year writing to thesame colleague, he says, "Till lately I had strong confidence inthe fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I havebegun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerlydeclared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant andhas not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to layhis foundation by beating with our aid or with our concurrence orour neutrality, first Russia, then Austria, and by dealing withthem generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrelwith us. . . . Next he has been assiduously laboring to increasehis naval means, evidently for offensive as well as for defensivepurposes, and latterly great pains have been taken to raise throughoutFrance and especially among the army and navy, hatred of Englandand a disparaging feeling of our military and naval means. "

Is it not strange that, even with such apprehensions, the destructionof the Union was so welcome in England that it blinded the eyes ofher statesmen and her people? They should surely have seen thatthe establishment of a Latin empire under the protection of France, in the heart of the Spanish-American Republics, would open a fieldfar more dangerous to British interests than a combination for aFrench port in Africa, and that in pursuing his policy the wilyEmperor was providing a throne for an Austrian archduke as acompensation for the loss of Lombardy. There was a time when LordPalmerston himself held broader and juster views of what ought tobe the relations between England and the United States. In 1848he suggested to Lord John Russell a policy which looked to a completeunification of the interests of the two countries: "If as I hope, "said His Lordship, "we shall succeed in altering our NavigationLaws, and if as a consequence Great Britain and the United Statesshall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutualequality with the exception of the coasting-trade and some otherspecial matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a goodopportunity for endeavoring to carry in some degree into executionthe wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished tosubstitute close alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependenceas the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain?A treaty for mutual defense would no longer be applicable to thecondition of the two countries as independent Powers, but mightthey not with mutual advantage conclude a treaty containing somethinglike the following conditions:--

"1. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter unfortunatelyarise between the contracting parties, they will in the first placehave recourse to the mediation of some friendly Power, and thathostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavor tosettle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless. 

"2. That if either of the two should at any time be at war withany other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contractingparty shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from suchPower under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate. 

"3. That in such case of war between either of the two partiesand a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contractingparty shall be allowed to enter into the service naval or militaryof such third Power. 

"4. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contractingparties shall afford assistance to the enemies of the other by seaor by land, unless war should break out between the two contractingparties themselves after the failure of all endeavors to settletheir differences in the manner specified in Article 1. "

At the time Lord Palmerston expressed these opinions, we had justclosed the Mexican war, with vast acquisition of territory and witha display of military power on distant fields of conquest whichsurprised European statesmen. Our maritime interests were almostequal to those of the United Kingdom, our prosperity was great, the prestige of the Nation was growing. In the thirteen interveningyears between that date and the outbreak of the Southern Rebellionwe had grown enormously in wealth, our Pacific possessions hadshown an extraordinary production of precious metals, our populationhad increased more than ten millions. If an alliance with theUnited States was desirable for England in 1848, it was far moredesirable in 1861, and Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister in thelatter year, his power to propose and promote it was far greater. Is there any reason that will satisfactorily account for HisLordship's abandonment of this ideal relation of friendship betweenthe two countries except that he saw a speedier way of adding tothe power of England by conniving at the destruction of the Union?His change from the policy which he painted in 1848 to that whichhe acted in 1861 cannot be satisfactorily explained upon any otherhypothesis than that he could not resist the temptation to crippleand humiliate the Great Republic. 

 FIXED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

This brief history of the spirit rather than the events whichcharacterized the foreign relations of the United States duringthe civil war, has been undertaken with no desire to revive thefeelings of burning indignation which they provoked, or to prolongthe discussion of the angry questions to which they gave rise. The relations of nations are not and should not be governed bysentiment. The interest and ambition of states, like those of men, will disturb the moral sense and incline to one side or the otherthe strict balance of impartial justice. New days bring new issuesand old passions are unsafe counselors. Twenty years have goneby. England has paid the cost of her mistakes. The Republic ofMexico has seen the fame and the fortunes of the Emperors who soughther conquest sink suddenly--as into the pits which they themselveshad digged for their victims--and the Republic of the United Stateshas come out of her long and bitter struggle, so strong that neveragain will she afford the temptation or the opportunity for unfriendlygovernments to strike at her National life. Let the past be thepast, but let it be the past with all the instruction and thewarning of its experience. 

The future safety of these continents rests upon the strength andthe maintenance of the Union, for had dissolution been possible, events have shown with what small regard the interests or the honorof either of the belligerents would have been treated. It has beentaught to the smaller republics that if this strength be shatteredthey will be the spoil of foreign arms and the dependent provincesagain of foreign monarchs. When this contest was over, the day ofimmaturity had passed and the United States stood before the worlda great and permanent Power. That Power can afford to bury allresentments. Tranquil at home, developing its inexhaustibleresources with a rapidity and success unknown in history, bound insincere friendship, and beyond the possibility of a hostile rivalry, with the other republics of the continents, standing midway betweenAsia and Europe, a Power on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic, with no temptation to intermeddle in the questions which disturbthe Old World, the Republic of the United States desires to livein amicable relation with all peoples, demanding only the abstinenceof foreign intervention in the development of that policy whichher political creed, her territorial extent, and the close andcordial neighborhood of kindred governments have made the essentialrule of her National life. 

[NOTE. --In the foregoing chapter the term "piratical" is usedwithout qualification in referring to the Southern cruisers, becauseit is the word used in the quotations made. It undoubtedlyrepresented the feeling of the country at that time, but in animpartial discussion of the events of the war the word cannot beused with propriety. Our own Courts have found themselves unableto sustain such a conclusion. Looking to the future it is betterto rest our objections to the mode of maritime warfare adopted bythe Confederacy upon a sound and enduring principle; viz. , thatthe recognition of ocean belligerency, when the belligerent cannotgive to his lawful exercise of maritime warfare the guaranty of aprize jurisdiction, is a violation of any just or reasonable systemof international law. The Confederacy had the plea of necessityfor its course, but the jurisdiction of England for aiding andabetting the practice has not yet been presented. ]

[NOTE. --Her Britannic Majesty's principal ministers of State in1861-2, --at the time of the correspondence touching the _Trent_affair, referred to in the preceding chapter, --were as follows:--

 _Premier_--Lord Palmerston. _Lord High Chancellor_--Lord Westbury. _Lord President of the Council_--Earl Granville. _Lord Privy Seal_--The Duke of Argyll. _Secretary for Foreign Affairs_--Lord John Russell. _Secretary for the Colonies_--The Duke of Newcastle. _Secretary for the Home Department_--Sir George Gray. _Secretary of State for War_--Sir G. C. Lewis. _Secretary of State for India_--Sir Charles Wood. _Chancellor of the Exchequer_--Rt. Honorable W. E. Gladstone. _Secretary for Ireland_--Rt. Honorable Edward Cardwell. _Postmaster-General_--Lord Stanley of Alderney. _President Board of Trade_--Rt. Honorable Charles Pelham Villiers. 

The same Ministry, with unimportant changes, continued in powerthroughout the whole period of the Rebellion in the United States. ]

ADDENDUM. 

The Tenth chapter of this volume having been given to the press inadvance of formal publication, many inquiries have been receivedin regard to the text of Judge Black's opinion of November 20, 1860, referred to on pp. 231, 232. The opinion was submitted tothe President by Judge Black as Attorney-General. So much of theopinion as includes the points which are specially controvertedand criticized is here given--about one-half of the entire document. It is as follows:--

. . . "I come now to the point in your letter which is probably ofthe greatest practical importance. By the Act of 1807 you mayemploy such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judgenecessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the samepurpose. By the Act of 1795 the militia may be called forth'whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or theexecution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations toopowerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicialproceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals. ' This imposesupon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether theexigency has arisen which requires the use of military force, andin proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be thecare not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority. 

"The laws referred to in the Act of 1795 are manifestly those whichare administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerialofficers of the courts for the punishment of crime against theUnited States, for the protection of rights claimed under theFederal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of suchobligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have authority topunish all who obstruct their regular administration, and themarshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs andtheir deputies in the several States in executing the laws of theStates. These are the ordinary means provided for the executionof the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to theemployment of any other, except in cases of extreme necessityarising out of great and unusual combinations against them. Theiragency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope withthe power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It isonly upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force canbe called into the field. Even then its operations must be purelydefensive. It can suppress only such combinations as are founddirectly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civilposse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet thesame opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military powermust be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, sinceit is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all. 

"But what if the feeling in any State against the United Statesshould become so universal that the Federal officers themselves(including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would bereached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if otherscould be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more thanprobable that great difficulty would be found in filling the offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case wehave no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officersto execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out ofplace, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid thecourts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions which belong exclusively tothe civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, nomatter what may be the physical strength which the Government hasat its command. Under such circumstances, to send a military forceinto any State, with orders to act against the people, would besimply making war upon them. 

"The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly onthe defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on thepublic property and aid the Courts in the performance of theirduty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and executethe other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extendand make them more effectual to those ends. 

"If one of the States should declare her independence, your actioncannot depend upon the righteousness of the cause upon which suchdeclaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State fromthe Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not ineither case the authority to recognize her independence or toabsolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the otherStates in Convention assembled, must take such measures as may benecessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for youbut to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden--that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive meansplaced in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption thatthe present constitutional relations between the States and theFederal Government continue to exist, until a new code of thingsshall be established either by law or force. 

"Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war againstone or more States, and require the Executive of the FederalGovernment to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from theother States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. Itmust be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor arethere any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among thepowers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, is that 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerningcaptures on land and water. ' This certainly means nothing morethan the power to commence and carry on hostilities against theforeign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same sectiongives Congress the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia, 'and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power isso restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can beexercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To executethe laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in theperformance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrectionagainst the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, tocases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance againsther own people. 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemieswho come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All theseprovisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize anattack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve thepeace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers donot seem to have thought that war was calculated 'to form a moreperfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, andsecure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. 'There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among themen who framed and ratified the Constitution, that military forcewould not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holdingthe States together. 

"If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of generalhostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be _ipsofacto_ an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treatedas an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionallyputting strife and enmity and armed hostility between differentsections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquility whichthe Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States beabsolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of thepeople bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry ona contest like that?

"The right of the General Government to preserve itself in itswhole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positiveaggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war topunish the people for the political misdeeds of their StateGovernment, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government ofthe United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of oneanother, and if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold themas subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theoryupon which they are now connected. 

"If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, thenthe Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shallarm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyondthat of merely protecting the General Government in the exerciseof its proper constitutional functions. 

"I am, very respectfully, yours, etc. , "J. S. BLACK. "

ERRATUM. 

In Chapter VIII. , there is some inaccuracy in regard to the numberof killed in the John Brown raid at Harper's Ferry. According tothe official report of Colonel Robert E. Lee, U. S. A. , who commandedthe military force that relieved Harper's Ferry, the insurgentsnumbered in all nineteen men, --fourteen white, five colored. Ofthe white men, ten were killed; two, John Brown and Aaron C. Stevens, were badly wounded; Edwin Coppee, unhurt, was taken prisoner; JohnE. Cooke escaped. Of the colored men, two were killed, two takenprisoner, one unaccounted for. 

THE APPENDICES. 

The progress of the country, referred to so frequently in the text, is strikingly illustrated and verified by the facts contained in theseveral appendices which follow. 

The appendices include a variety of subjects, and they have allbeen selected with the view of showing the progress and developmentof the Nation in the different fields of enterprise and human labor. 

The tabular statements as to the population and wealth of thecountry will be found especially accurate and valuable. Thestatistics relating to Education and the Public Schools, toAgriculture, to Railways, to Immigration, to the Army, to Shipping, to the Coal and Iron Product, to National and State Banks, to theCirculation of Paper Money, to the price of Gold, and to the PublicDebt, will be found full of interest. 

Thanks are due and are cordially given to Mr. Joseph Nimmo, Jr. , Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, and Mr. Charles W. Seaton, Superintendent of the Census, for valuable aid rendered in thepreparation of the appendices. 

For courtesies constantly extended, and for most intelligent anddiscriminating aid of various kinds, the sincerest acknowledgmentsare made to Mr. Ainsworth R. Spofford, the accomplished Librarianof Congress. 

APPENDIX A. POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT EACH CENSUS, FROM 1790 TO 1880 INCLUSIVE. [From the Reports of the Superintendents of the Census. ]

STATES AND STATES ANDTERRITORIES. 1880. 1870. 1860. 1850. 1840. 1830. 1820. 1810. 1800. 1790. TERRITORIES. 

Alabama . . . . . . 1, 262, 505 996, 992 964, 201 771, 623 590, 756 309, 527 127, 901 . . . . . . . . . . Alabama. Arkansas . . . . . . 802, 525 484, 471 435, 450 209, 897 97, 574 30, 388 { *18} . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. { 14, 255}California . . . . . 864, 694 560, 247 379, 994 92, 597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . California. Colorado . . . . . . 194, 327 39, 864 34, 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colorado. Connecticut . . . . 622, 700 537, 454 460, 147 370, 792 309, 978 297, 675 { *100} 261, 942 251, 002 237, 946 . Connecticut. { 275, 148}Delaware . . . . . . 146, 608 125, 015 112, 216 91, 532 78, 085 76, 748 72, 749 72, 674 64, 273 59, 006 . Delaware. Florida . . . . . . 269, 493 187, 748 140, 424 87, 445 54, 477 34, 730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Florida. Georgia . . . . . . 1, 542, 180 1, 184, 109 1, 057, 286 906, 185 691, 392 516, 823 340, 985 252, 433 162, 686 82, 548 . Georgia. Illinois . . . . . . 3, 077, 871 2, 539, 891 1, 711, 951 851, 470 476, 183 157, 445 55, 162 12, 282 . . . . . . . Illinois. Indiana . . . . . . 1, 978, 301 1, 680, 637 1, 350, 428 988, 416 685, 866 343, 031 147, 178 24, 520 5, 641 . . . . Indiana. Iowa . . . . . . . . 1, 624, 615 1, 194, 020 674, 913 192, 214 43, 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. Kansas . . . . . . . 996, 096 364, 399 107, 206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas. Kentucky . . . . . . 1, 648, 690 1, 321, 011 1, 155, 684 982, 405 779, 828 687, 917 { *182} 406, 511 220. 955 73, 677 . Kentucky. { 564, 135}Louisiana . . . . . 939, 946 726, 915 708, 002 517, 762 352, 411 215, 739 { *484} 76, 556 . . . . . . . Louisiana. { 152, 923}Maine . . . . . . . 648, 936 626, 915 628, 279 583, 169 501, 793 399, 455 { *66} 228, 705 151, 719 96, 540 . Maine. { 298, 269}Maryland . . . . . . 934, 943 780. 894 687, 049 583, 034 470, 019 447, 040 407, 350 380, 546 341, 548 319, 728 . Maryland. Massachusetts . . . 1, 783, 085 1, 457, 351 1, 231, 066 994, 514 737, 699 610, 408 { *128} 472, 040 422, 845 378, 787 . Massachusetts. { 523, 159}Michigan . . . . . . 1, 636, 937 1, 184, 059 749, 113 397, 654 212, 267 31, 639 { *131} 4, 762 . . . . . . . Michigan. { 8, 765}Minnesota . . . . . 780, 773 439, 706 172, 023 6, 077 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota. Mississippi . . . . 1, 131, 597 827, 922 791, 305 606, 526 375, 651 136, 621 75, 448 40, 352 8, 850 . . . . Mississippi. Missouri . . . . . . 2, 168, 380 1, 721, 295 1, 182, 012 682, 044 383, 702 140, 455 { *29} 20, 845 . . . . . . . Missouri. { 66, 557}Nebraska . . . . . . 452, 402 122, 993 28, 841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. Nevada . . . . . . . 62, 266 42, 491 6, 857 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nevada. New Hampshire . . . 346, 991 318, 300 326, 073 317, 976 284, 574 269, 328 { *139} 214, 460 183, 858 141, 885 . New Hampshire. { 244, 022}New Jersey . . . . . 1, 131, 116 906, 096 672, 035 489, 555 373, 306 320, 823 { *149} 245, 562 211, 149 184, 139 . New Jersey. { 277, 426}New York . . . . . . 5, 082, 871 4, 382, 759 3, 880, 735 3, 097, 394 2, 428, 921 1, 918, 008 { *701} 949, 059 589, 051 340, 120 . New York. {1, 372, 111}North Carolina . . . 1, 399, 750 1, 071, 361 922, 622 869, 039 753, 419 737, 987 638, 829 555, 500 478, 103 393, 751 . North Carolina. Ohio . . . . . . . . 3, 198, 062 2, 665, 260 2, 339, 511 1, 980, 329 1, 519, 467 937, 903 { *139} 230, 760 45, 365 . . . . Ohio. { 581, 295}Oregon . . . . . . . 174, 768 90, 923 52, 465 13, 294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oregon. Pennsylvania . . . . 4, 282, 891 3, 521, 951 2, 906, 215 2, 311, 786 1, 724, 033 1, 348, 233 { *1, 951} 810, 001 602, 365 434, 373 . Pennsylvania. {1, 047, 507}Rhode Island . . . . 276, 531 217, 353 174, 620 147, 545 108, 830 97, 129 { *44} 76, 931 69, 122 68, 825 . Rhode Island. { 83, 105}South Carolina . . . 995, 577 705, 606 703, 708 688, 507 594, 398 581, 185 502, 741 415, 115 345, 591 249, 073 . South Carolina. Tennessee . . . . . 1, 542, 359 1, 258, 520 1, 109, 801 1, 002, 717 829, 210 681, 904 { *52} 261, 727 105, 602 35, 691 . Tennessee. { 422, 771}Texas . . . . . . . 1, 591, 749 818, 579 604, 215 212, 592 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Texas. Vermont . . . . . . 332, 286 330, 551 315, 098 314, 120 291, 948 280, 652 { *15} 217, 895 154, 465 85, 425 . Vermont. { 235, 966}Virginia . . . . . . 1, 512, 565 1, 225, 163 1, 956, 318 1, 421, 661 1, 239, 797 1, 211, 405 { *250} 974, 600 880, 200 747, 610 . Virginia. {1, 065, 116}West Virginia . . . 618, 457 442, 014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. Wisconsin . . . . . 1, 315, 497 1, 054, 670 755, 881 305, 391 30, 945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisconsin. 

 Total, States . . 49, 371, 340 38, 115, 641 31, 183, 744 23, 067, 262 17, 019, 641 12, 820, 868 { *4, 631} 7, 215, 858 5, 294, 390 . . . . . Total, States. {9, 600, 783}

Arizona . . . . . . 40, 440 9, 658 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona. Dakota . . . . . . . 135, 177 14, 181 4, 837 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dakota. District of Columbia 117, 624 131, 700 75, 080 51, 687 43, 712 39, 834 33, 039 24, 023 14, 003 . . . . District of Columbia. Idaho . . . . . . . 32, 610 14, 999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho. Montana . . . . . . 39, 159 20, 595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Montana. New Mexico . . . . . 119, 565 91, 874 93, 516 61, 547 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. Utah . . . . . . . . 143, 963 86, 786 40, 273 11, 380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah. Washington . . . . . 75, 116 23, 955 11, 594 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington. Wyoming . . . . . . 20, 789 9, 118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming. 

 Total, Territories 784, 443 443, 730 259, 577 124, 614 43, 712 39, 834 33, 039 24, 023 14, 093 . . . . . Total, Territories. 

On the public ships . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 100 5, 318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the public ships. In U. S. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *4, 631 . . . . . . . . . . In U. S. Service. 

 Total, U. S. . . . 50, 155, 783 38, 558, 371 31, 443, 321 23, 191, 876 17, 069, 453 12, 866, 020 9, 633, 832 7, 239, 881 5, 308, 483 3, 929, 214 . . Total, U. S. 

* All other persons, except Indians, not taxed. 

APPENDIX B. 

APPORTIONMENT AMONG THE STATES OF REPRESENTATIVESIN CONGRESS AFTER EACH CENSUS. 

 Admitted By Cons- By 1st By 2nd By 3d By 4th By 5th By 6th By 7th By 8th By 9th By 10thSTATES. To the titution, Census, Census Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Union. 1789. 1790. 1800. 1810. 1820. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. RATIO OF REPRESENTATION . . . . 30, 000. 33, 000. 33, 000. 35, 000. 40, 000. 47, 700. 70, 680. 93, 423. 127, 381. 131, 425. 154, 325. 

Alabama . . . . . . . . 1819 . . . . . . . . 3 5 7 7 6 8 8Arkansas . . . . . . . . 1836 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5California . . . . . . . 1850 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4 6Colorado . . . . . . . . 1876 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1Connecticut . . . . . . . ---- 5 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 4 4 4Delaware . . . . . . . . ---- 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Florida . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 2Georgia . . . . . . . . ---- 3 2 4 6 7 9 8 8 7 9 10Illinois . . . . . . . . 1818 . . . . . . . . 1 3 7 9 14 19 20Indiana . . . . . . . . 1816 . . . . . . . . 3 7 10 11 11 13 13Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 1846 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 9 11Kansas . . . . . . . . . 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 7Kentucky . . . . . . . . 1792 . . 2 6 10 12 13 10 10 9 10 11Louisiana . . . . . . . 1812 . . . . . . . . 3 3 4 4 5 6 6Maine . . . . . . . . . 1820 . . . . . . . . 7 8 7 6 5 5 4Maryland . . . . . . . . ---- 6 8 9 9 9 8 6 6 5 6 6Massachusetts . . . . . . ---- 8 14 17 20 13 12 10 11 10 11 12Michigan . . . . . . . . 1837 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6 9 11Minnesota . . . . . . . . 1858 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 3 5Mississippi . . . . . . . 1817 . . . . . . . . 1 2 4 5 5 6 7Missouri . . . . . . . . 1821 . . . . . . . . 1 2 5 7 9 13 14Nebraska . . . . . . . . 1867 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3Nevada . . . . . . . . . 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1New Hampshire . . . . . . ---- 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 3 3 3 2New Jersey . . . . . . . ---- 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 7 7New York . . . . . . . . ---- 6 10 17 27 34 40 34 33 31 33 34North Carolina . . . . . ---- 5 10 12 13 13 13 9 8 7 8 9Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 1802 . . . . . . 6 14 19 21 21 19 20 21Oregon . . . . . . . . . 1859 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1Pennsylvania . . . . . . ---- 8 13 18 23 26 28 24 25 24 27 28Rhode Island . . . . . . ---- 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2South Carolina . . . . . ---- 5 6 8 9 9 9 7 6 4 5 7Tennessee . . . . . . . 1796 . . . . 3 6 9 13 11 10 8 10 10Texas . . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6 11Vermont . . . . . . . . 1791 . . 2 4 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 2Virgina . . . . . . . . ---- 10 19 23 23 22 21 15 13 11 9 10West Virginia . . . . . 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1848 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 8 9

 65 105 141 181 213 240 223 237 293 293 325

APPENDIX C. 

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1791-1883. 

Statement of the Outstanding Principal of the Public Debt of the UnitedStates on the 1st of January of each Year from 1791 to 1842 inclusive;and on the 1st of July of each Year from 1843 to 1883 inclusive. 

The amount given for the year 1791 represents the debt of the Revolutionunder the Funding Bill of Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. The debt had decreased to a considerable extent by the year 1812. Inconsequence of the war with Great Britain, which began that year, therewas a rapid increase, the maximum being reached in 1816. Thenceforward, with the exception of the years 1822, 1823, and 1824, --a period ofextreme financial depression, --the debt was steadily decreased, untilin the year 1835, under the Presidency of General Jackson, it wasextinguished, --the total amount outstanding being only $37, 000 in bondswhich were not presented for payment. The creation of a new debt, however, began at once, and was increased in the years 1847, 1848, and1849 by the Mexican war. This, in turn, was quite steadily reduceduntil the financial panic of 1857, when, during the administration ofMr. Buchanan, there was another incease. The debt was about eightymillions of dollars in amount when the civil war began. 

Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. 1791 $75, 463, 476. 52 1815 $ 99, 833, 660. 15 1839 $ 3, 573, 343. 82 1863 $1, 119, 772, 138. 631792 77, 227, 924. 66 1816 127, 334, 933. 74 1840 5, 270, 875. 54 1864 1, 815, 784, 370. 571793 80, 352, 634, 04 1817 123, 491, 965. 16 1841 13, 594, 480. 73 1865 2, 680, 647, 869. 741794 78, 427, 404. 77 1818 103, 466, 633. 83 1842 20, 601, 226. 28 1866 2, 773, 236, 173. 691795 80, 747, 587, 39 1819 95, 529, 648. 28 1843 32, 742, 922. 00 1867 2, 678, 126, 103. 871796 83, 762, 172. 07 1820 91, 015, 566. 15 1844 23, 461, 652. 50 1868 2, 611, 687, 851. 191797 82, 064, 479. 33 1821 89, 987, 427. 66 1845 15, 925, 303. 01 1869 2, 588, 452, 213. 941798 79, 228, 529. 12 1822 93, 546, 676. 98 1846 15, 550, 202. 97 1870 2, 480, 672, 427. 811799 78, 408, 669. 77 1823 90, 875, 877. 28 1847 38, 826, 534. 77 1871 2, 353, 211, 332, 321800 82, 976, 294. 35 1824 90, 269, 777. 77 1848 47, 044, 862. 23 1872 2, 253, 251, 328. 781801 83, 038, 050, 80 1825 83, 788, 432. 71 1849 63, 061, 858. 69 1873 2, 234, 482, 993. 201802 86, 712, 632. 25 1826 81, 054, 059. 99 1850 63, 452, 773. 55 1874 2, 251, 690, 468. 431803 77, 054, 686. 30 1827 73, 987, 357. 20 1851 68, 304, 796. 02 1875 2, 232, 284, 531. 951804 86, 427, 120. 88 1828 67, 475, 043. 87 1852 66, 199, 341. 71 1876 2, 180, 395, 067. 151805 82, 312, 150. 50 1829 58, 421, 413. 67 1853 59, 803, 117. 70 1877 2, 205, 301, 392. 101806 75, 723, 270. 66 1830 48, 565, 406. 50 1854 42, 242, 222. 42 1878 2, 256, 205, 892. 531807 69, 218. 398. 64 1831 39, 123, 191. 68 1855 35, 586, 858. 56 1879 2, 245, 495, 072. 041808 65, 196, 317. 97 1832 24, 322, 235, 18 1856 31, 972, 537. 90 1880 2, 120, 415, 370. 631809 57, 023, 192. 09 1833 7, 001, 698. 83 1857 28, 699, 831. 85 1881 2, 069, 013, 569. 581810 53, 173, 217. 52 1834 4, 760, 082. 08 1858 44, 911, 881. 03 1882 1, 918, 312, 994. 031811 48, 005, 587. 76 1835 37, 513. 05 1859 58, 496, 837. 88 1883 1, 884, 171, 728. 071812 45, 209, 737. 90 1836 336, 957. 83 1860 64, 842, 287. 881813 55, 962, 827. 57 1837 3, 308, 124. 07 1861 90, 580, 873. 721814 81, 487, 846. 24 1838 10, 434, 221. 14 1862 524, 176, 412. 13

APPENDIX D. 

Showing the Highest and Lowest Price of Gold in the New-York Market everyMonth, from the Suspension of Specie Payment by the Government inJanuary, 1862, until Resumption in January, 1879, a Period of SeventeenYears. 1862. 1863. 1864. 1865. 1866. 1867. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 103-5/8 100 160-3/4 133-5/8 159-3/8 151-1/2 233-3/4 198-1/8 144-5/8 129 137-7/8 132February . . . 104-3/4 102-1/8 172-1/2 152-1/2 161 157-1/4 216-1/2 196-5/8 140-5/8 135-7/8 140-1/2 135-1/4March . . . . 102-3/8 101-1/4 171-3/4 139 169-3/4 159 201 148-1/4 136-1/2 125 140-3/8 133-3/8April . . . . 102-1/4 101 157-7/8 145-1/2 184-3/4 166-1/4 153-5/8 144 129-5/8 125-1/2 142 132-3/8May . . . . . 104-1/8 102-1/8 154-3/4 143-1/2 190 168 145-3/8 128-5/8 141-1/2 125-1/8 138-7/8 134-7/8June . . . . . 109-1/2 103-3/8 148-3/8 140-1/2 250 193 147-3/8 135-7/8 167-3/4 137-5/8 138-3/4 136-1/2July . . . . . 120-1/8 108-3/4 145 123-1/4 285 222 146 138-3/4 155-3/4 147 140-5/8 138August . . . . 116-1/4 112-1/2 129-3/4 122-1/8 259-1/2 231-1/2 145-3/8 140-1/4 152-1/4 146-1/2 142-3/8 139-7/8September . . 124 116-1/2 143-1/8 126-7/8 254-1/2 191 145 142-5/8 147-1/8 143-1/4 146-3/8 141October . . . 133-1/2 122 156-3/4 140-3/8 227-3/4 189 149 144-1/8 154-3/8 145-1/2 145-5/8 140-1/4November . . . 133-1/4 129 154 143 260 210 148-3/4 145-7/8 148-5/8 137-1/2 141-1/2 138-1/8December . . . 134 128-1/2 152-3/4 148-1/2 243 212-3/4 148-1/2 144-5/8 141-3/4 131-1/4 137-7/8 133

 1868. 1869. 1870. 1871. 1872. 1873. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 141-7/8 133-1/4 136-5/8 134-5/8 123-1/4 119-3/8 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-1/8 108-1/2 114-1/4 111-5/8February . . . 144 139-5/8 136-1/4 130-7/8 121-1/2 115 112-1/2 110-3/4 111 109-1/2 115-7/8 112-7/8March . . . . 141-3/8 137-7/8 132-1/4 130-7/8 116-3/8 110-1/4 112 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8April . . . . 140-3/8 137-3/4 134-3/8 131-1/4 115-5/8 111-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8May . . . . . 140-1/2 139-1/8 144-7/8 134-5/8 115-1/2 113-3/4 112-1/4 111 114-3/4 112-1/8 118-5/8 116-5/8June . . . . . 141-1/2 139-1/8 139-5/8 136-1/2 114-3/4 110-7/8 113-1/8 111-3/4 114-3/4 113 118-1/4 115July . . . . . 145-1/4 140-1/8 137-7/8 134 122-3/4 111-1/8 113-1/4 111-3/4 115-1/4 113-1/2 116-3/8 115August . . . . 150 143-1/2 136-5/8 131-1/4 122 114-3/4 113-1/8 111-5/8 115-5/8 112-1/8 116-1/4 114-3/8September . . 145-1/8 141-1/8 162-1/2 130-5/8 116-3/4 113 115-1/8 112-1/4 115-1/8 112-5/8 116-1/8 110-7/8October . . . 140-3/8 133-3/4 132 128-1/8 114-1/4 111-1/8 115 111-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/4 111-1/4 107-5/8November . . . 137 132-1/8 128-5/8 121-1/2 113-1/4 110 112-5/8 110-1/2 114-1/4 111-3/8 110-1/2 106-1/8December . . . 136-3/4 134-1/2 124 119-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-3/8 108-1/2 113-3/8 111-1/8 112-5/8 108-3/8

 1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest LowestJanuary . . . 112-1/8 110-1/8 113-3/8 111-3/4 113-1/4 112-1/2 107-1/8 105-1/4 102-7/8 101-1/4February . . . 113 111-3/8 115-3/8 113-1/4 114-1/8 112/3-4 106-1/8 104-5/8 102-3/8 101-5/8March . . . . 113-5/8 111-1/4 117 114 115 113-3/4 105-3/8 104-1/4 102 100-3/4April . . . . 114-3/8 111-3/4 115-1/2 114 113-7/8 112-1/2 107-7/8 104-3/4 101-1/4 100-1/8May . . . . . 113-1/8 111-7/8 116-3/8 115 113-1/4 112-1/4 107-3/8 106-1/4 101-1/4 100-3/8June . . . . . 112-1/4 110-1/2 117-1/2 116-1/4 113 111-7/8 106-3/8 104-3/4 101 100-5/8July . . . . . 110-7/8 109 117-1/4 111-3/4 112-1/2 111-3/8 106-1/8 105-1/8 101-1/2 100-3/8August . . . . 110-1/4 109-1/4 114-3/4 112-5/8 112-1/8 109-3/8 105-1/2 103-7/8 100-3/4 100-1/2September . . 110-1/4 109-3/8 117-3/8 113-3/4 110-3/8 109-1/4 104 102-7/8 100-1/2 100-1/8October . . . 110-3/8 109-3/4 117-5/8 114-1/2 113-1/4 108-7/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 101-3/8 100-1/4November . . . 112-3/8 110 116-3/8 114-1/8 110-1/8 108-1/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100-1/8December . . . 112-3/8 110-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/8 109 107 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100

Table showing the Total Amount of Gold and Silver Coin issued from theMints of the United States in each Decennial Period since 1790. 

Period. Gold. Silver. Period. Gold. Silver. 1793-1800 . . $ 1, 014, 290. 00 $ 1, 440, 454. 75 1851-1860 . . $330, 237, 085. 50 $ 46, 582, 183. 001801-1810 . . 3, 250, 742. 50 3, 569, 165. 25 1861-1870 . . 292, 409, 545. 50 13, 188, 601. 901811-1820 . . 3, 166, 510. 00 5, 970, 810. 95 1871-1880 . . 393, 125, 751. 00 155, 123, 087. 101821-1830 . . 1, 903, 092. 50 16, 781, 046. 95 1881-1883 . . 204, 076, 239. 00 84, 268, 825. 651831-1840 . . 18, 756, 487. 50 27, 309, 957. 001841-1850 . . 89, 239, 817. 50 22, 368, 130. 00 Total . . . $1, 337, 179, 561. 00 $376, 602, 262. 55

APPENDIX E. 

The following statement exhibits the total valuation of real and personalestate in the United States, according to the Census Returns of 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880. 

Both the "true" and the "assessed" valuation are given, except in 1850, which gives only the "true. " The dispartiy between the actual properyand that which is assessed for taxation is very striking. 

The effect of the war and the consequent abolition of slavery on thevaluation of property in the Southern States is clearly shown by thefigures. 

In all comparisons of value between the different periods, it must beborne in mind, that, in 1870, gold was at an average premium of 25. 3 percent. To equate the valuation with those of other years, there must bea reduction of one-fifth on the reported valuation of 1870, both "true"and "assessed. "

The four periods exhibit a more rapid accumulation of wealth in theUnited States than was ever known before in the history of the world. 

STATES 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. STATESAND Assessed Assessed Assessed ANDTERRITORIES. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. TERRITORIES. 

Alabama . . . . . . . . . $228, 204, 332 $432, 198, 762 $495, 237, 078 $155, 582, 595 $201, 835, 841 $122, 867, 228 $428, 000, 000 . . Alabama. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 410, 295 3, 440, 791 9, 270, 214 41, 000, 000 . . Arizona. Arkansas . . . . . . . . 39, 841, 025 180, 211, 330 219, 256, 473 94, 528, 843 156, 394, 691 86, 409, 364 286, 000, 000 . . Arkansas. California . . . . . . . 22, 161, 872 139, 654, 667 207, 874, 613 269, 644, 068 638, 767, 017 584, 578, 036 1, 343, 000, 000 . . California. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 338, 101 20, 243, 303 74, 471, 693 240, 000, 000 . . Colorado. Connecticut . . . . . . . 155, 707, 980 341, 256, 976 444, 274, 114 425, 433, 237 774, 631, 524 327, 177, 385 799, 000, 000 . . Connecticut. Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 924, 489 5, 599, 752 20, 321, 530 118, 000, 000 . . Dakota. Delaware . . . . . . . . 21, 062, 556 39, 767, 233 46, 242, 181 64, 787, 223 97, 180, 833 59, 951, 643 130, 000, 000 . . Delaware. District of Columbia . . 14, 018, 874 41, 084, 945 41, 084, 945 74, 271, 693 126, 873, 618 99, 401, 787 220, 000, 000 . . District of Columbia. Florida . . . . . . . . . 22, 862, 270 68, 929, 685 73, 101, 500 32, 480, 843 44, 163, 655 30, 938, 309 120, 000, 000 . . Florida. Georgia . . . . . . . . . 335, 425, 714 618, 232, 387 645, 895, 237 227, 219, 519 268, 169, 207 239, 472, 599 606, 000, 000 . . Georgia. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 292, 205 6, 552, 081 6, 440, 876 29, 000, 000 . . Idaho. Illinois . . . . . . . . 156, 265, 006 389, 207, 372 871, 860, 282 482, 899, 575 2, 121, 680, 579 786, 616, 394 3, 210, 000, 000 . . Illinois. Indiana . . . . . . . . . 202, 650, 264 411, 042, 424 528, 835, 371 663, 455, 044 1, 268, 180, 543 727, 815, 131 1, 681, 000, 000 . . Indiana. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 23, 714, 638 205, 168, 983 247, 338, 265 302, 515, 418 717, 644, 750 398, 671, 251 1, 721, 000, 000 . . Iowa. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 518, 232 31, 327, 895 92, 125, 861 188, 892, 014 160, 891, 689 700, 000, 000 . . Kansas. Kentucky . . . . . . . . 301, 628, 456 528, 212, 693 666, 043, 112 409, 544, 294 604, 318, 552 350, 563, 971 902, 000, 000 . . Kentucky. Louisiana . . . . . . . . 233, 998, 764 435, 787, 265 602, 118, 568 253, 371, 890 323, 125, 666 160, 162, 439 382, 000, 000 . . Louisiana. Maine . . . . . . . . . . 122, 777, 571 154, 380, 388 190, 211, 600 204, 253, 780 348, 155, 671 235, 978, 716 511, 000, 000 . . Maine. Maryland . . . . . . . . 219, 217, 364 297, 135, 238 376, 919, 944 423, 834, 918 643, 748, 976 497, 307, 675 837, 000, 000 . . Maryland. Massachusetts . . . . . . 573, 342, 286 777, 157, 816 815, 237, 433 1, 591, 983, 112 2, 132, 148, 741 1, 584, 756, 802 2, 623, 000, 000 . . Masschusetts. Michigan . . . . . . . . 59, 787, 255 163, 533, 005 257, 163, 983 272, 242, 917 719, 208, 118 517, 666, 359 1, 580, 000, 000 . . Michigan. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 018, 773 52, 294, 413 84, 135, 322 228, 909, 590 258, 028, 687 792, 000, 000 . . Minnesota. Mississippi . . . . . . . 228, 951, 130 509, 472, 912 607, 324, 911 177, 278, 800 209, 197, 345 110, 628, 129 354, 000, 000 . . Mississippi. Missouri . . . . . . . . 137, 247, 707 266, 935, 851 501, 214, 398 556, 129, 969 1, 284, 922, 897 532, 795, 801 1, 562, 000, 000 . . Missouri. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 943, 411 15, 184, 522 18, 609, 802 40, 000, 000 . . Montana. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 426, 949 9, 131, 056 54, 584, 616 69, 277, 483 90, 585, 782 385, 000, 000 . . Nebraska. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 740, 973 31, 134, 012 29, 291, 459 156, 000, 000 . . Nevada. New Hampshire . . . . . . 103, 652, 835 123, 810, 809 156, 310, 860 149, 065. 290 252, 624, 112 164, 755, 181 363, 000, 000 . . New Hampshire. New Jersey . . . . . . . 200, 000, 000 296, 682, 492 467, 918, 324 624, 868, 971 940, 976, 064 572, 518, 361 1, 305, 000, 000 . . New Jersey. New Mexico . . . . . . . 5, 174, 471 20, 838, 780 20, 813, 768 17, 784, 014 31, 349, 793 11, 363, 406 49, 000, 000 . . New Mexico. New York . . . . . . . . 1, 080, 309, 216 1, 390, 464, 638 1, 843, 338, 517 1, 967, 001, 185 6, 500, 841, 264 2, 651, 940, 006 6, 308, 000, 000 . . New York. North Carolina . . . . . 226, 800, 472 292, 297, 602 358, 739, 399 130, 378, 622 260, 757, 244 156, 100, 202 461, 000, 000 . . North Carolina. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 504, 726, 120 959, 867, 101 1, 193, 898, 422 1, 167, 731, 697 2, 235, 430, 300 1, 534, 360, 508 3, 238, 000, 000 . . Ohio. Oregon . . . . . . . . . 5, 063, 474 19, 024, 915 28, 930, 637 31, 798, 510 51, 558, 932 52, 522, 084 154, 000, 000 . . Oregon. Pennsylvania . . . . . . 722, 486, 120 719, 253, 335 1, 416, 501, 818 1, 313, 236, 042 3, 808, 340, 112 1, 683, 459, 016 4, 942, 000, 000 . . Pennsylvania. Rhode Island . . . . . . 80, 508, 794 125, 104, 305 135, 337, 588 244, 278, 854 295, 965, 646 252, 538, 673 400, 000, 000 . . Rhode Island. South Carolina . . . . . 288, 257, 694 489, 319, 128 548, 138, 754 183, 913, 337 208, 146, 989 133, 560, 135 322, 000, 000 . . South Carolina. Tennessee . . . . . . . . 201, 246, 686 382, 495, 200 493, 903, 892 253, 782, 161 498, 237, 724 211, 778, 538 705, 000, 000 . . Tennessee. Texas . . . . . . . . . . 52, 740, 473 267, 792, 335 365, 200, 614 149, 732, 929 159, 052, 542 340, 364, 515 825, 000, 000 . . Texas. Utah . . . . . . . . . . 986, 083 4, 158, 020 5, 596, 118 12, 565, 842 16, 159, 995 24, 775, 279 114, 000, 000 . . Utah. Vermont . . . . . . . . . 92, 205, 049 84, 758, 619 122, 477, 170 102, 548, 528 235, 349, 553 86, 806, 775 302, 000, 000 . . Vermont. Virginia . . . . . . . . 430, 701, 082 657, 021, 336 793, 249, 681 365, 439, 917 409, 588, 133 308, 455, 135 707, 000, 000 . . Virginia. Washington . . . . . . . . . . 4, 394, 735 5, 601, 466 10, 642, 863 13, 562, 164 23, 810, 693 62, 000, 000 . . Washington. West Virginia . . . . . . Included in Virginia 140, 538, 273 190, 651, 491 139, 622, 705 350, 000, 000 . . West Virginia. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . 42, 056, 595 185, 945, 489 273, 671, 668 333, 209, 838 702, 307, 329 438, 971, 751 1, 139, 000, 000 . . Wisconsin. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 516, 748 7, 016, 748 13, 621, 829 54, 000, 000 . . Wyoming. 

 Total for U. S. . . . . $7, 135, 780, 228 $12, 084, 560, 005 $16, 159, 616, 068 $14, 178, 986, 732 $30, 068, 518, 507 $16, 902, 993, 543 $43, 642, 000, 000 . . Total for U. S. 

APPENDIX F. 

OWNERSHIP AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY. 

In the following table, the column headed "Location" gives the valuationof the property located in each State and Territory, by the Census of1880. The column headed "Ownership" gives the value of property ownedby the residents of the several States and Territories, wherever thatproperty may be located. Some interesting results are shown. Residentsof New York own thirteen hundred millions of property not located intheir State; residents of Pennsylvania, four hundred and fifty millions. Many of the States show a large proportion of their property ownedelsewhere. Considerably more than half the property of Nevada is ownedoutside the State. The whole table presents one of the most interestingdeductions of the Census Bureau. 

STATESAND Ownership. Location. TERRITORIES. 

Alabama . . . . . . $378, 000, 000 $428, 000, 000Arizona . . . . . . 23, 000, 000 41, 000, 000Arkansas . . . . . . 246, 000, 000 286, 000, 000California . . . . . 1, 430, 000, 000 1, 343, 000, 000Colorado . . . . . . 149, 000, 000 240, 000, 000Connecticut . . . . 852, 000, 000 779, 000, 000Dakota . . . . . . . 68, 000, 000 118, 000, 000Delaware . . . . . . 138, 000, 000 136, 000, 000Dist. Of Columbia . 223, 000, 000 220, 000, 000Florida . . . . . . 95, 000, 000 120, 000, 000Georgia . . . . . . 554, 000, 000 606, 000, 000Idaho . . . . . . . 12, 000, 000 29, 000, 000Illinois . . . . . . 3, 092, 000, 000 3, 219, 000, 000Indiana . . . . . . 1, 499, 000, 000 1, 681, 000, 000Iowa . . . . . . . . 1, 415, 000, 000 1, 721, 000, 000Kansas . . . . . . . 575, 000, 000 760, 000, 000Kentucky . . . . . . 880, 000, 000 902, 000, 000Louisiana . . . . . 422, 000, 000 382, 000, 000Maine . . . . . . . 501, 000, 000 511, 000, 000Maryland . . . . . . 869, 000, 000 837, 000, 000Massachusetts . . . 2, 795, 000, 000 2, 623, 000, 000Michigan . . . . . . 1, 370, 000, 000 1, 580, 000, 000Minnesota . . . . . 638, 000, 000 792, 000, 000Mississippi . . . . 324, 000, 000 354, 000, 000Missouri . . . . . . 1, 530, 000, 000 1, 562, 000, 000Montana . . . . . . 29, 000, 000 40, 000, 000Nebraska . . . . . . 200, 000, 000 385, 000, 000Nevada . . . . . . . 69, 000, 000 156, 000, 000New Hampshire . . . 328, 000, 000 363, 000, 000New Jersey . . . . . 1, 433, 000, 000 1, 305, 000, 000New Mexico . . . . . 30, 000, 000 49, 000, 000New York . . . . . . 7, 619, 000, 000 6, 208, 000, 000North Carolina . . . 446, 000, 000 461, 000, 000Ohio . . . . . . . . 3, 301, 000, 000 3, 238, 000, 000Oregon . . . . . . . 126, 000, 000 154, 000, 000Pennsylvania . . . . 5, 393, 000, 000 4, 942, 000, 000Rhode Island . . . . 420, 000, 000 400, 000, 000South Carolina . . . 296, 000, 000 322, 000, 000Tennessee . . . . . 666, 000, 000 705, 000, 000Texas . . . . . . . 725, 000, 000 825, 000, 000Utah . . . . . . . . 67, 000, 000 114, 000, 000Vermont . . . . . . 289, 000, 000 302, 000, 000Virginia . . . . . . 693, 000, 000 707, 000, 000Washington . . . . . 48, 000, 000 62, 000, 000West Virginia . . . 307, 000, 000 350, 000, 000Wisconsin . . . . . 969, 000, 000 1, 139, 000, 000Wyoming . . . . . . 20, 000, 000 54, 000, 000

 $43, 642, 000, 000 $43, 642, 000, 000

APPENDIX G

The following table exhibits the amount of revenue collected at theCustoms Houses on foreign imports each year, from 1789 to 1883, underthe various tariff laws; also the amount of internal revenue collectedeach year, from the foundation of the government to 1883. The separatetable gives the amount collected each year under the income-tax whilein force, and the total amount received from the tax on spirits andbeer for twenty-one years after it was first levied in 1862. 

Receipts of the United States from March 4, 1789, to June 30, 1883. 

Years. From Customs. From Internal Revenue. 1789-1791 $4, 399, 473. 001792 3, 443, 070. 85 $208, 942. 811793 4, 255, 306. 56 337, 705. 701794 4, 801, 065. 28 274, 089. 621795 5, 588, 461. 62 337, 755. 361796 6, 567, 987. 94 475, 289. 601797 7, 549, 649. 65 575, 491. 451798 7, 106, 061. 93 644, 357. 951799 6, 610, 449, 31 779, 136. 441800 9, 080, 932. 78 809, 396. 551801 10, 750, 778. 93 1, 048, 033. 431802 12, 438, 235. 74 621, 898. 891803 10, 479, 417. 61 215, 179. 691804 11, 098, 565. 33 50, 941. 291805 12, 938, 487. 04 21, 747. 151806 14, 667, 698. 17 20, 101. 451807 15, 845, 521. 61 13, 051. 401808 16, 363, 550. 58 8, 190. 231809 7, 257, 506. 62 4, 034. 291810 8, 583, 309. 31 7, 430. 631811 13, 313, 222. 73 2, 295. 951812 8, 958, 777. 53 4, 903. 061813 13, 224, 623. 25 4, 755. 041814 5, 998, 772. 08 1, 662, 984. 831815 7, 282, 942. 22 4, 678, 059. 071816 36, 306, 874. 88 5, 124, 708. 311817 26, 283, 348. 49 2, 678, 100. 771818 17, 176, 385. 00 955, 270. 201819 20, 283, 608. 76 229, 593. 631820 15, 005, 612. 15 106, 260. 531821 13, 004, 447. 15 69, 027. 631822 17, 589, 761. 94 67, 665. 711823 19, 088, 433. 44 34, 242. 171824 17, 878, 325. 71 34, 663. 371825 20, 098, 713. 45 25, 771. 351826 23, 341, 331. 77 21, 589. 931827 19, 712, 283. 29 19, 885. 681828 23, 205, 523. 64 17, 451. 541829 22, 681, 965. 91 14, 502. 741830 21, 922, 391. 39 12, 160. 621831 24, 224, 441. 77 6, 933. 511832 28, 465, 237. 24 11, 630. 651833 29, 031, 508. 91 2, 759. 001834 16, 214, 957. 15 4, 196. 091835 19, 391, 310. 59 10, 459. 481836 23, 409, 940. 53 370. 001837 11, 169, 290. 39 5, 493. 841838 16, 158, 800. 36 2, 467. 271839 23, 137, 924. 81 2, 553, 321840 13, 499, 502. 17 1, 682. 251841 14, 487, 216. 74 3, 261. 361842 18, 187, 908. 76 495. 001843 7, 046, 843. 91 103. 251844 26, 183, 570. 94 1, 777. 341845 27, 528, 112. 70 3, 517. 121846 26, 712, 667. 87 2, 897. 261847 23, 747, 864. 66 375. 001848 31, 757, 070. 96 375. 001849 28, 346, 738. 821850 39, 668, 686. 421851 49, 017, 567. 921852 47, 339, 326. 621853 58, 931. 865. 521854 64, 224, 190. 271855 53, 025. 794. 211856 64, 022, 863. 501857 63, 875, 905. 051858 41, 789, 620. 961859 49, 565, 824. 381860 53, 187, 511. 871861 39, 582, 125. 641862 49, 056, 397. 621863 69. 059, 642. 40 $37, 640, 787. 951864 102, 316, 152. 99 109, 741, 134. 101865 84, 928, 260. 60 209, 464, 215. 251866 179, 046, 651. 58 309, 226, 813. 421867 176, 417, 810. 88 266, 027, 537. 431868 164, 464, 599. 56 191, 087, 589. 411869 180, 048, 426. 63 158, 356, 460. 861870 194, 538, 374. 44 184, 899, 756. 491871 206, 270, 408. 05 143, 098, 153. 631872 216, 370, 286. 77 130, 642, 177. 721873 188, 089, 522. 70 113, 729, 314. 141874 163, 103, 833. 69 102, 409, 784. 901875 157, 167, 722. 35 110, 007, 493. 581876 148, 071, 984. 61 116, 700, 732. 031877 130, 956, 493. 07 118, 630, 407. 831878 130, 170, 680. 20 110, 581, 624. 741879 137, 250, 047. 70 113, 561, 610. 581880 186, 522, 064. 60 124, 009, 373. 921881 198, 159, 676. 02 135, 264, 385. 511882 220, 410, 730. 25 146, 497, 595. 451883 214, 706, 496. 93 144, 720, 368. 98

 Total $5, 073, 240, 329. 60 $3, 098, 575, 330. 71

 From Distilled Spirits. Years. From Income Tax. | From Fermented Liquors. 1863 $2, 741. 858. 25 $5, 176, 530. 50 $1, 628, 933. 821864 20, 294, 731. 74 30, 329, 149. 53 2, 290, 009. 141865 32, 050, 017. 44 18, 731, 422. 45 3, 734, 928. 061866 72, 982, 159. 03 33, 268, 171. 82 5, 220, 552. 721867 66, 014, 429. 34 33, 542, 951. 72 6, 057, 500. 631868 41, 455, 598. 36 18, 655, 630. 90 5, 955, 868. 921869 34, 791, 855. 84 45, 071, 230. 86 6, 099, 879. 541870 37, 775, 873. 62 55, 606, 094. 15 6, 319, 126. 901871 19, 162, 650. 75 46, 281, 848, 10 7, 389, 501. 821872 14, 436, 861. 78 49, 475, 516. 36 8, 258, 498. 461873 5, 062, 311. 62 52, 099, 371. 78 9, 324, 937. 841874 139, 472. 09 49, 444, 089. 85 9, 304, 679. 721875 232. 64 52, 081, 991. 12 9, 144, 004. 411876 588. 27 56, 426, 365. 13 9, 571, 280. 661877 97. 79 57, 469, 429. 72 9, 480, 789. 171878 50, 420, 815. 80 9, 937, 051. 781879 52, 570, 284. 69 10, 729, 320. 081880 61, 185, 508. 79 12, 829, 802. 841881 3, 021. 92 67, 153, 974. 88 13, 700, 241. 211882 69, 873, 408. 18 16, 153, 920. 421883 74, 368, 775. 20 16, 900, 615. 81

 Total $366, 911, 760. 48 $979, 232, 561. 53 $180, 031, 443. 95

APPENDIX H. 

IMPORTANT CROPS. 

The following table exhibits the aggregate production in the UnitedStates, for a series of years ending wih 1882, of certain crops whichcontribute largely to the national wealth. The total acreage, theyield per acre, and the value per acre, are given in each case. 

CORN. Yield per Acre. ValueYears. Bushels. Acres. | Value. Per Acre. 1849 592. 071, 1041859 838, 792, 7421866 867, 946, 295 34, 306, 538 25 $591, 666, 2951867 768, 320, 000 32, 520, 249 23 610, 948, 3901868 906, 527, 000 34, 887, 246 25. 9 569, 512, 460 $16. 321869 760, 944, 5491870 1, 094, 255, 000 38, 646, 977 28. 3 601, 839, 030 15. 571871 991, 898, 000 34, 091, 137 29. 1 478, 275, 900 14. 021872 1, 092, 719, 000 35, 526, 836 30. 7 435, 149, 290 12. 241873 932, 274, 000 39, 197, 148 23. 8 447, 183, 200 11. 411874 850, 148, 500 41, 036, 918 20. 7 550, 043, 080 13. 401875 1, 321, 069, 000 44, 841, 371 29. 4 555, 445, 930 12. 381876 1, 283, 827, 500 49, 033, 364 26. 1 475, 491, 210 9. 691877 1, 342, 558, 000 50, 369, 113 26. 6 480, 643, 400 9. 541878 1, 388, 218, 750 51, 585, 000 26. 9 441, 153, 405 8. 551879 1, 754, 591, 676 62, 368, 504 28. 11880 1, 717, 434, 543 62, 317, 842 27. 6 679, 714, 499 10. 911881 1, 194, 916, 000 64, 262, 025 18. 6 759, 482, 170 11. 821882 1, 617, 025, 100 65, 659, 546 24. 6 783, 867, 175 11. 91

WHEAT. Yield per Acre. ValueYears. Bushels. Acres. | Value. Per Acre. 1849 100, 485, 9441859 173, 104, 9241866 151, 999, 906 15, 424, 496 10 $333, 773, 6461867 212, 441, 400 18, 321, 561 11. 5 421, 796, 4601868 224, 036, 600 18, 460, 132 12. 1 319, 195, 290 $17. 291869 287, 745, 6261870 235, 884, 700 18, 992, 591 12. 4 245, 865, 045 12. 941871 230, 722, 400 19, 943, 893 11. 5 290, 411, 820 14. 561872 249, 997, 100 20, 858, 359 11. 9 310, 180, 375 14. 871873 281, 254, 700 22, 171, 676 12. 7 323, 594, 805 14. 201874 309, 102, 700 24, 967, 027 12. 5 291, 107, 895 11. 661875 292, 136, 000 26, 381, 512 11 294, 580, 990 11. 161876 289, 356, 500 27, 627, 021 10. 4 300, 259, 300 10. 861877 364, 194, 146 26, 277, 546 13. 9 394, 695, 779 15. 081878 420, 122, 400 32, 108, 560 13. 1 326, 346, 424 10. 151879 459, 483, 137 35, 430, 333 131880 498, 549, 868 37, 986, 717 13. 1 474, 201, 850 12. 481881 383, 280, 090 37, 709, 020 10. 2 456, 880, 427 12. 011882 504, 185, 470 37, 067, 194 13. 6 444, 602, 125 12. 00

POTATOES. Yield per Acre. ValueYears. Bushels. Acres. | Value. Per Acre. 1849 65, 797, 8961859 111, 148, 8671866 107, 200, 976 1, 069, 381 100 $72, 939, 0291867 97, 783, 000 1, 192, 195 82 89, 276, 8301868 106, 090, 000 1, 131, 552 93. 7 84, 150, 040 $74. 361869 143, 337, 4731870 114, 775, 000 1, 325, 119 86. 6 82, 668, 590 62. 381871 120, 461, 700 1, 220, 912 98. 6 71, 836, 671 58. 831872 113, 516, 000 1, 331, 331 85. 2 68, 091, 120 51. 141873 106, 089, 000 1, 295, 139 81. 9 74, 774, 890 57. 731874 105, 981, 000 1, 310, 041 80. 9 71, 823, 330 54. 821875 166, 877, 000 1, 510, 041 110. 5 65, 019, 420 43. 051876 124, 827, 000 1, 741, 983 71. 6 83, 861, 390 48. 141877 170, 092, 000 1, 792, 287 94. 9 76, 249, 500 42. 541878 124, 126, 650 1, 776, 800 69. 9 73, 059, 125 41. 121879 169, 458, 5391880 167, 659, 570 1, 842, 510 91 81, 062, 214 44. 001881 109, 145, 494 2, 041, 670 53. 5 99, 291, 341 48. 631882 170, 972, 508 2, 171, 636 78. 7 92, 304, 844 43. 84

HAY. Yield per Acre. ValueYears. Tons. Acres. | Value. Per Acre. 1849 13, 838, 6421859 19, 083, 8961866 21, 778, 627 17, 668, 904 1. 22 $317, 561, 8371867 26, 277, 000 20, 020, 554 372, 864, 6701868 26, 141, 900 21, 541, 573 1. 21 351, 941, 030 $16. 331869 27, 316, 0481870 24, 525, 000 19, 861, 805 1. 23 338, 969, 680 17. 061871 22, 239, 409 19, 009, 052 1. 17 351, 717, 035 18. 501872 23, 812, 800 20, 318, 936 1. 17 345, 969, 079 17. 021873 25, 085, 100 21, 894, 084 1. 34 339, 895, 486 15. 521874 24, 133, 900 21, 769, 772 1. 11 331, 420, 738 15. 221875 27, 873, 600 23, 507, 964 1. 18 342, 203, 445 14. 551876 30, 867, 100 25, 282, 797 1. 22 300, 901, 252 11. 901877 31, 629, 300 25, 367, 708 1. 24 271, 934, 950 10. 721878 39, 608, 296 26, 931, 300 1. 47 285, 543, 752 10. 601879 35, 150, 711 30, 631, 054 1. 151880 31, 925, 233 25, 863, 955 1. 23 371, 811, 084 14. 381881 35, 135, 064 30, 888, 700 1. 14 415, 131, 366 13. 431882 38, 138, 049 32, 339, 585 1. 15 369, 958, 158 11. 45

TOBACCO. Yield per Acre. ValueYears. Pounds. Acres. | Value. Per Acre. 1849 199, 752, 6551859 434, 209, 4611866 388, 128, 684 520, 107 746 $ 53, 778, 8881867 313, 724, 000 494, 333 631 41, 283, 4311868 320, 982, 000 427, 189 751 40, 081, 942 $93. 821869 262, 735, 341 481, 101 569 32, 206, 325 66. 941870 250, 628, 000 330, 668 757 26, 747, 158 80. 831871 263, 196, 100 350, 769 570 25, 901, 421 73. 841872 342, 304, 000 416, 512 821. 8 35, 730, 385 85. 781873 372, 810, 000 480, 878 775 30, 865, 972 64. 191874 178, 355, 000 281, 662 633. 2 23, 362, 765 82. 941875 379, 347, 000 559, 049 678. 5 30, 342, 600 54. 271876 381, 002, 000 540, 457 705 28, 282, 968 52. 331877 440, 000, 0001878 392, 546, 700 542, 850 723. 1 22, 137, 428 40. 781879 472, 661, 157 638, 841 739. 91880 446, 296, 889 602, 516 740. 7 36, 414, 615 60. 441881 449, 880, 014 646, 239 696. 1 43, 372, 3361882 513, 077, 558 671, 522 764 43, 189, 951 64. 18

APPENDIX I. 

The following table exhibits in a condensed and perspicuous form theoperations of the Post-Office Department, from the foundation of thegovernment. The very rapid increase in the revenue of the departmentafter 1860 will be noted. 

 No. Of Post Offices. | Extent of Post-Routes in Miles. | | Revenue of the Department. Years. | | | Expenditure of the Department. | | | | AMOUNT PAID FOR | | | | Salaries of Post-Masters. | | | | | Transportation of the Mail. 1790 75 1, 875 $37, 935 $32, 140 $8, 198 $22, 0811795 453 13, 207 160, 620 117, 893 30, 272 75, 3591800 903 20, 817 280, 804 213, 994 69, 243 128, 6441805 1, 558 31, 076 421, 373 377, 378 111, 552 239, 6351810 2, 300 36, 406 551, 684 495, 969 149, 438 327, 9661815 3, 000 43, 748 1, 043, 065 748, 121 241, 901 487, 7791816 3, 260 48, 673 961, 782 804, 422 265, 944 521, 9791817 3, 459 52, 089 1, 002, 973 916, 515 303, 916 589, 1891818 3, 618 59, 473 1, 130, 235 1, 035, 832 346, 429 664, 6111819 4, 000 67, 586 1, 204, 737 1, 117, 801 375, 828 717, 8811820 4, 500 72, 492 1, 111, 927 1, 160, 926 352, 295 782, 4251821 4, 650 78, 808 1, 059, 087 1, 184, 283 337, 599 815, 6811822 4, 709 82, 763 1, 117, 490 1, 167, 572 335, 299 788, 6181823 4, 043 84, 860 1, 130, 115 1, 156, 995 360, 462 767, 4641824 5, 182 84, 860 1, 197, 758 1, 188, 019 383, 804 768, 9391825 5, 677 94, 052 1, 306, 525 1, 229, 043 411, 183 785, 6461826 6, 150 94, 052 1, 447, 703 1, 366, 712 447, 727 885, 1001827 7, 003 105, 336 1, 524, 633 1, 468, 959 486, 411 942, 3451828 7, 530 105, 336 1, 659, 915 1, 689, 945 548, 049 1, 086, 3131829 8, 004 115, 000 1, 707, 418 1, 782, 132 559, 237 1, 153, 6461830 8, 450 115, 176 1, 850, 583 1, 932, 708 595, 234 1, 274, 2261831 8, 686 115, 486 1, 997, 811 1, 936, 122 635, 028 1, 252, 2261832 9, 205 104, 466 2, 258, 570 2, 266, 171 715, 481 1, 482, 5071833 10, 127 119, 916 2, 617, 011 2, 930, 414 826, 283 1, 894, 6381834 10, 693 119, 916 2, 823, 749 2, 910, 605 897, 317 1, 925, 5441835 10, 770 112, 774 2, 903, 356 2, 757, 350 945, 418 1, 719, 0071836 11, 091 118, 264 3, 408, 323 3, 841, 766 812, 803 1, 638, 0521837 11, 767 141, 242 4, 236, 779 3, 544, 630 891, 352 1, 996, 7271838 12, 519 134, 818 4, 238, 733 4, 430, 662 933, 948 3, 131, 3081839 12, 780 133, 999 4, 484, 657 4, 636, 536 980, 000 3, 285, 6221840 13, 468 155, 739 4, 543, 522 4, 718, 236 1, 028, 925 3, 296, 8761841 13, 778 155, 026 4, 407, 726 4, 499, 528 1, 018, 645 3, 159, 3751842 13, 733 149, 732 4, 456, 849 5, 674, 752 1, 146, 256 3, 087, 7961843 13, 814 142, 295 4, 296, 225 4, 374, 754 1, 426, 394 2, 947, 3191844 14, 103 144, 687 4, 237, 288 4, 296, 513 1, 358, 316 2, 938, 5511845 14, 183 143, 940 4, 289, 841 4, 320, 732 1, 409, 875 2, 905, 5041846 14, 601 152, 865 3, 487, 199 4, 084, 297 1, 042, 079 2, 716, 6731847 15, 146 153, 818 3, 955, 893 3, 979, 570 1, 060, 228 2, 476, 4351848 16, 159 163, 208 4, 371, 077 4, 326, 850 2, 394, 7031849 16, 749 163, 703 4, 905, 178 4, 479, 049 1, 320, 921 2, 577, 4071850 18, 417 178, 672 5, 552, 971 5. 212, 953 1, 549, 376 2, 965, 7861851 19, 796 196, 290 6, 727, 867 6, 278, 402 1, 781, 686 3, 538, 0641852 20, 901 214, 284 6, 925, 971 7, 108, 459 1, 296, 765 4, 225, 3111853 22, 320 217, 743 5, 940, 725 7, 982, 957 1, 406, 477 4, 906, 3081854 23, 548 219, 935 6, 955, 586 8, 577, 424 1, 707, 708 5, 401, 3821855 24, 410 227, 908 7, 342, 136 9, 968, 342 2, 135, 335 6, 076, 3351856 25, 565 239, 642 7, 620, 822 10, 405, 286 2, 102, 891 6, 765, 6391857 26, 586 242, 601 8, 053, 952 11, 508, 058 2, 285, 610 7, 239, 3331858 27, 977 260, 603 8, 186, 793 12, 722, 470 2, 355, 016 8, 246, 0541859 28, 539 260, 052 8, 668, 484 15, 754, 093 2, 453, 901 7, 157, 6291860 28, 498 240, 594 8, 518, 067 19, 170, 610 2, 552, 868 8, 808, 7101861 28, 586 140, 139 8, 349, 296 13, 606, 759 2, 514, 157 5, 309, 4541862 28, 875 134, 013 8, 299, 821 11, 125, 364 2, 340, 767 5, 853, 8341863 29, 047 139, 598 11, 163, 790 11, 314, 207 2, 876, 983 5, 740, 5761864 28, 878 139, 171 12, 438, 254 12, 644, 786 3, 174, 326 5, 818, 4691865 20, 550 142, 340 14, 556, 159 13, 694, 728 3, 383, 382 6, 246, 8841866 23, 828 180, 921 14, 386, 986 15, 352, 079 3, 454, 677 7, 630, 4741867 25, 163 203, 245 15, 237, 027 19, 235, 483 4, 033, 728 9, 336, 2861868 26, 481 216, 928 16, 292, 601 22, 730, 593 4, 255, 311 10, 266, 0561869 27, 106 223, 731 18, 344, 511 23, 698, 131 4, 546, 958 10, 406, 5011870 28, 492 231, 232 19, 772, 221 23, 998, 837 4, 673, 466 10, 884, 6531871 30, 045 238, 350 20, 037, 045 24, 390, 104 5, 028, 382 11, 529, 3951872 31, 863 251, 398 21, 915, 426 26, 658, 192 5, 121, 665 15, 547, 8211873 33, 244 256, 210 22, 996, 742 29, 084, 946 5, 725, 468 16, 161, 0341874 34, 294 269, 097 26, 447, 072 32, 126, 415 5, 818, 472 18, 881, 3191875 35, 547 277, 873 26, 791, 360 33, 611, 309 7, 049, 936 18, 777, 2011876 36, 383 281, 708 27, 895, 908 33, 263, 488 7, 397, 397 18, 361, 0481877 37, 345 292, 820 27, 468, 323 33, 486, 322 7, 295, 251 18, 529, 2381878 39, 258 301, 966 29, 277, 517 34, 165, 084 7, 977, 852 19, 262, 4211879 40, 855 316, 711 30, 041, 983 33, 449, 899 7, 185, 540 20, 012, 8721880 42, 989 343, 888 33, 315, 479 36, 542, 804 7, 701, 418 22, 255, 9841881 44, 512 344, 006 36, 785, 398 39, 251, 736 8, 298, 743 23, 196, 0321882 46, 231 343, 618 41, 876, 410 40, 039, 635 8, 964, 677 22, 846, 1121883 47, 863 353, 166 45, 508, 692 42, 816, 700 10, 315, 394 23, 870, 666

APPENDIX J. 

The following table exhibits the number of miles of railroad inoperation, and the number of miles constructed each year, in the UnitedStates, from 1830 to 1883 inclusive. It will be observed that nearlythree-fourths of the total mileage have been constructed since 1869. 

Year. Miles in Operation the the End of each Year. | Miles Constructed each Year. 1830 23 |1831 95 721832 229 1341833 380 1511834 633 2531835 1, 098 4651836 1, 273 1751837 1, 497 2241838 1, 913 4161839 2, 302 3891840 2, 818 5161841 3, 535 7171842 4, 026 4911843 4, 185 1591844 4, 377 1921845 4, 633 2561846 4, 930 2971847 5, 598 6681848 5, 996 3981849 7, 365 1, 3691850 9, 021 1, 6561851 10, 982 1, 9611852 12, 908 1, 9261853 15, 360 2, 4521854 16, 720 1, 3601855 18, 374 1, 6541856 22, 016 3, 6421857 24, 503 2, 4871858 26, 968 2, 4651859 28, 789 1, 8211860 30, 635 1, 8461861 31, 286 6511862 32, 120 8341863 33, 170 1, 0501864 33, 908 7381865 35, 085 1, 1771866 36, 801 1, 7161867 39, 250 2, 4491868 42, 229 2, 9791869 46, 844 4, 6151870 52, 885 6, 0791871 60, 293 7, 3791872 66, 171 5, 8781873 70, 278 4, 1071874 72, 383 2, 1051875 74, 096 1, 7131876 76, 808 2, 7121877 79, 089 2, 2811878 81, 776 2, 6871879 86, 497 4, 7211880 93, 545 7, 1741881 103, 334 11, 1421882 114, 930 11, 5911883 119, 937 6, 608

APPENDIX K. 

The following table gives the number of miles of railroad in operationin each State and Territory in the United States during the years 1865, 1870, 1875, 1877, 1879, 1880, 1881, and 1882 respectively. 

STATES AND TERRITORIES. 1865. 1870. 1875. 1877. 1879. 1880. 1881. 1882. 

Maine . . . . . . . . . 521 786 980 989 1, 009 1, 004 1, 027 1, 056New Hampshire . . . . . 667 736 934 964 1, 019 1, 014 1, 021 1, 038Vermont . . . . . . . 587 614 810 872 873 916 918 920Masschusetts . . . . . 1, 297 1, 480 1, 817 1, 863 1, 870 1, 915 1, 959 1, 967Rhode Island . . . . 125 136 179 204 210 211 212 212Connecticut . . . . . . 637 742 918 922 922 922 959 962 New England . . . . . 3, 834 4, 494 5, 638 5, 814 5, 903 5, 982 6, 096 6, 155

New York . . . . . . . 3, 002 3, 928 5, 423 5, 725 6, 008 6, 062 6, 332 7, 037New Jersey . . . . . . 864 1, 125 1, 511 1, 661 1, 663 1, 602 1, 781 1, 870Pennsylvania . . . . . 3, 728 4, 656 5, 705 5, 902 6, 068 6, 166 6, 331 6, 857Delaware . . . . . . . 134 197 272 272 293 275 275 282Maryland and Dist. Of Columbia . . . . . . 446 671 929 944 966 1, 005 1, 030 1, 063West Virginia . . . . . 365 387 615 638 694 691 706 813 Middle States . . . . 8, 539 10, 964 14, 455 15, 142 15, 679 15, 891 16, 455 17, 922

Virginia . . . . . . . 1, 407 1, 449 1, 608 1, 635 1, 672 1, 897 2, 224 2, 446Kentucky . . . . . . . 567 1, 017 1, 326 1, 509 1, 595 1, 592 1, 734 1, 807North Carolina . . . . 984 1, 178 1, 356 1, 426 1, 446 1, 463 1, 622 1, 759Tennessee . . . . . . . 1, 296 1, 492 1, 630 1, 656 1, 701 1, 845 1, 902 2, 067South Carolina . . . . 1, 007 1, 139 1. 335 1, 406 1, 424 1, 427 1, 479 1, 517Georgia . . . . . . . . 1, 420 1, 845 2, 264 2, 339 2, 460 2, 438 2, 540 2, 874Florida . . . . . . . . 416 446 484 485 519 557 702 973Alabama . . . . . . . . 805 1, 157 1, 800 1, 802 1, 832 1, 845 1, 859 1, 909Mississippi . . . . . . 898 990 1, 018 1, 088 1, 140 1, 133 1, 188 1, 309Louisiana . . . . . . . 335 450 466 466 544 675 937 1, 032 Southern States . . . 9, 129 11, 163 13, 287 13, 812 14, 333 14, 872 16, 187 17, 693

Ohio . . . . . . . . . 3, 331 3, 538 4, 461 4, 878 5, 521 5, 824 6, 321 6, 931Michigan . . . . . . . 941 1, 638 3, 446 3, 477 3, 673 3, 981 4, 326 4, 654Indiana . . . . . . . . 2, 217 3, 177 3, 963 4, 057 4, 336 4, 020 4, 406 5, 018Illinois . . . . . . . 3, 157 4, 823 7, 109 7, 334 7, 578 7, 900 8, 309 8, 752Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1, 010 1, 525 2, 566 2, 701 2, 896 3, 169 3, 471 3, 824Minnesota . . . . . . . 213 1, 092 1, 900 2, 194 3, 008 3, 390 3, 577 3, 974Dakota Territory . . . 65 275 290 400 1, 320 1, 733 2, 133Iowa . . . . . . . . . 891 2, 683 3, 850 4, 134 4, 779 5, 401 6, 165 6, 968Missouri . . . . . . . 925 2, 000 2, 905 3, 198 3, 740 3, 964 4, 206 4, 500Indian Territory . . . 275 275 275 279 285 350Arkansas . . . . . . . 38 256 740 767 808 889 1, 033 1, 533Texas . . . . . . . . . 465 711 1, 685 2, 210 2, 591 3, 257 4, 926 6, 007Nebraska . . . . . . . 122 705 1, 167 1, 286 1, 634 1, 949 2, 273 2, 494Kansas . . . . . . . . 40 1, 501 2, 150 2, 352 3, 103 3, 446 3, 655 3, 866Colorado . . . . . . . 157 807 1, 045 1, 208 1, 576 2, 193 2, 772New-Mexico Territory . 118 745 1, 034 1, 076Wyoming Territory . . . 459 459 465 472 500 564 613Idaho Territory . . . . 220 182 251 472Utah Territory . . . . 257 506 506 593 747 782 967Montana Territory . . . 10 110 267 659 Western States and Territories . . . . . 13, 350 24, 587 38, 254 41, 160 46, 963 52, 649 59, 777 67, 563

Nevada . . . . . . . . 593 601 627 720 738 894 948California . . . . . . 214 925 1, 503 2, 080 2, 209 2, 201 2, 315 2, 643Arizona Territory . . . 183 401 549 765Oregon . . . . . . . . 19 159 248 248 295 561 627 807Weashington Territory . 110 197 212 250 434 434 Pacific States and Territories . . . . . 233 1, 677 2, 462 3, 152 3, 619 4, 151 4, 819 5, 597

RECAPITULATION. New-England States . . 3, 834 4, 494 5, 638 5, 814 5, 903 5, 982 6, 096 6, 155Middle States . . . . . 8, 539 10, 964 14, 455 15, 142 15, 679 15, 891 16, 455 17, 922Southern States . . . . 9, 129 11, 163 13, 287 13, 812 14, 333 14, 872 16, 187 17, 693Western States and Territories . . . . . 13, 350 24, 587 38, 254 41, 169 46, 963 52, 649 59, 777 67, 563Pacific States and Territories . . . . . 233 1, 677 2, 462 3, 152 3, 619 4, 151 4, 819 5, 597

 Grand Total . . . . . 35, 085 52, 885 74, 096 79, 089 86, 497 93, 545 103, 334 114, 930

APPENDIX L. 

This table exhibits the total amount of pensions paid by the governmentfrom its foundation, including those to soldiers of the Revolution, warof 1812, Mexican war, war of the Rebellion, and the various Indian wars. 

Year. Pensions. 1791 $175, 813. 881792 109, 243. 151793 80, 087. 811794 81, 399. 241795 68, 673. 221796 100, 843. 711797 92, 256. 971798 104, 845. 331799 95, 444. 031800 64, 130. 731801 73, 533. 371802 85, 440. 391803 62, 902. 101804 80, 092. 801805 81, 854. 591806 81, 875. 531807 70, 500. 001808 82, 576. 041809 87, 833. 541810 83, 744. 161811 75, 043. 881812 91, 042. 101813 86, 989. 911814 90, 164. 361815 60, 656. 061816 188, 804. 151817 297, 374. 431818 890, 719. 901819 2, 415, 939. 851820 3, 208, 376. 311821 242, 817. 251822 1, 948, 199. 401823 1, 780, 588. 521824 1, 499, 326. 591825 1, 308, 810. 571826 1, 566, 593. 831827 976, 138. 861828 580, 573. 571820 949, 594. 471830 1, 363, 297. 311831 1, 170, 665. 141832 1, 184, 422. 401833 4, 589, 152. 401834 3, 364, 285, 301835 1, 954, 711. 321836 2, 882, 797. 961837 2, 672, 162. 451838 2, 156, 057. 291830 3, 142, 750. 511840 2, 603, 562. 171841 2, 388, 434. 511842 1, 378, 931. 331843 839, 041. 121844 2, 032, 008. 991845 2, 400, 788. 111846 1, 811, 097. 561847 1, 744, 883. 631848 1, 227, 496. 481849 1, 328, 867. 641850 1, 866, 886. 021851 2, 293, 377. 221852 2, 401, 858. 781853 1, 756. 306. 201854 1, 232, 665. 001855 1, 477, 612. 331856 1, 296, 229. 651857 1, 310, 380. 581858 1, 219, 768. 301859 1, 222, 222. 711860 1, 100, 802. 321861 1, 034, 599. 731862 852, 170. 471863 1, 078, 513. 361864 4, 985, 473. 901865 16, 347, 621. 341866 15, 605, 549. 881867 20. 936, 551. 711868 23, 782, 386. 781869 28, 476, 621. 781870 28, 340, 202. 171871 34, 443, 894. 881872 28, 533, 402. 761874 29, 038, 414. 661875 29, 456, 216. 221876 28, 257, 395. 691877 27, 963, 752. 271878 27, 137, 019. 081879 35, 121, 482. 391880 56, 777, 174. 441881 50, 059, 279. 621882 61, 345, 193. 951883 66, 012, 573. 64

 $724, 658, 382. 78

APPENDIX M. 

The following table shows the distribution of the tonnage of theUnited-States merchant-marine employed in the foreign trade, the coastingtrade, and the fisheries, from 1789 to 1883 inclusive. 

 Foreign Trade. | Coasting Trade. | | Whale Fisheries. Year Ended | | | Cod Fisheries. | | | | Mackerel Fisheries. | | | | | Total Merchant-Marine. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Dec. 31, 1789 123, 893 68, 607 9, 062 201, 562 1790 346, 254 103, 775 28, 348 478, 377 1791 363, 110 106, 494 32, 542 502, 146 1792 411, 438 120, 957 32, 062 564, 457 1793 367, 734 122, 071 30, 959 520, 764 1794 438, 863 162, 578 4, 129 23, 048 628, 618 1795 529, 471 184, 398 3, 163 30, 933 747, 965 1796 576, 733 217, 841 2, 364 34, 962 831, 900 1797 597, 777 237, 403 1, 104 40, 628 876, 912 1798 603, 376 251, 443 763 42, 746 898, 328 1799 657, 142 246, 640 5, 647 29, 979 939, 408 1800 667, 107 272, 492 3, 466 29, 427 972, 492 1801 630, 558 274, 551 3, 085 39, 382 947, 576 1802 557, 760 289, 623 3, 201 41, 522 892, 106 1803 585, 910 299, 060 12, 390 51, 812 949, 172 1804 680, 514 317, 537 12, 339 52, 014 1, 042, 404 1805 744, 224 332, 663 6, 015 57, 465 1, 140, 367 1806 798, 507 340, 540 10, 507 59, 183 1, 208, 737 1807 840, 163 349, 028 9, 051 70, 306 1, 268, 548 1808 765, 252 420, 819 4, 526 51, 998 1, 242, 595 1809 906, 855 405, 103 3, 777 34, 487 1, 350, 282 1810 981, 019 405, 347 3, 589 34, 828 1, 424, 783 1811 763, 607 420, 362 5, 209 43, 234 1, 232, 502 1812 758, 636 477, 972 2, 930 30, 459 1, 269, 997 1813 672, 700 471, 109 2, 942 19, 877 1, 166, 628 1814 674, 633 466, 159 562 17, 855 1, 159, 209 1815 854, 295 475, 666 1, 230 36, 937 1, 368, 128 1816 800, 760 522, 165 1, 168 48, 126 1, 372, 219 1817 804, 851 525, 030 5, 224 64, 807 1, 309, 912 1818 589, 954 549, 374 16, 750 69, 107 1, 225, 185 1819 581, 230 571, 058 32, 386 76, 078 1, 260, 752 1820 583, 657 588, 025 36, 445 72, 040 1, 280, 167 1821 593, 825 614, 845 27, 995 62, 293 1, 298, 958 1822 582, 701 624, 189 48, 583 69, 226 1, 324, 699 1823 600, 003 617, 805 40, 503 78, 225 1, 336, 566 1824 636, 807 641, 563 33, 346 77, 447 1, 389, 163 1825 665, 409 640, 861 35, 379 81, 462 1, 423, 111 1826 696, 221 722, 330 41, 984 73, 656 1, 534, 191 1827 701, 517 789, 159 45, 992 83, 687 1, 620, 607 1828 757, 998 842, 906 54, 801 85, 687 1, 741, 392 1829 592, 859 508, 858 57, 284 101, 797 1, 260, 798 1830 537, 563 516, 979 39, 705 61, 556 35, 973 1, 191, 776 1831 538, 136 539, 724 82, 797 60, 978 46, 211 1, 267, 846 1832 614, 121 649, 627 73, 246 55, 028 47, 428 1, 439, 450 1833 648, 869 744, 199 101, 636 62, 721 48, 726 1, 606, 151 1834 749, 378 783, 619 108, 424 56, 404 61, 082 1, 758, 907Sept. 30, 1835* 788, 173 797, 338 97, 649 77, 338 64, 443 1, 824, 941 1836 753, 094 873, 023 146, 254 63, 307 46, 424 1, 882, 102 1837 683, 205 956, 981 129, 137 80, 552 46, 811 1, 896, 686 1838 702, 962 1, 041, 105 124, 860 70, 084 56, 649 1, 995, 640 1839 702, 400 1, 153, 552 132, 285 72, 258 35, 984 2, 096, 479 1840 762, 838 1, 176, 694 136, 927 76, 036 28, 269 2, 180, 764 1841 788, 398 1, 107, 068 157, 405 66, 552 11, 321 2, 130, 744 1842 823, 746 1, 045, 753 151, 990 54, 805 16, 007 2, 092, 391June 30, 1843* 856, 930 1, 076, 156 152, 517 61, 224 11, 776 2, 158, 603 1844 900, 471 1, 109, 615 168, 614 85, 225 16, 171 2, 280, 096 1845 904, 476 1, 223, 218 190, 903 76, 901 21, 414 2, 417, 002 1846 943, 307 1, 315, 577 187, 420 79, 318 36, 463 2, 562, 085 1847 1, 047, 454 1, 488, 601 103, 859 77, 681 31, 451 2, 839, 046 1848 1, 168, 707 1, 659, 317 192, 613 89, 847 43, 558 3, 154, 042 1849 1, 258, 756 1, 770, 376 180, 186 81, 756 42, 942 3, 334, 016 1850 1, 439, 694 1, 797, 825 146, 017 93, 806 58, 112 3, 535, 454 1851 1, 544, 663 1, 899, 976 181, 644 95, 617 50, 539 3, 772, 439 1852 1, 705, 650 2, 055, 873 193, 798 110, 573 72, 546 4, 138, 440 1853 1, 910, 471 2, 134, 258 193, 203 109, 228 59, 850 4, 407, 010 1854 2, 151, 918 2, 322, 114 181, 901 111, 928 35, 041 4, 802, 902 1855 2, 348, 358 2, 543, 255 186, 848 111, 915 21, 625 5, 212, 001 1856 2, 302, 190 2, 247, 663 189, 461 102, 452 29, 887 4, 871, 653 1857 2, 268, 196 2, 336, 609 195, 842 111, 868 28, 328 4, 940, 843 1858 2, 301, 148 2, 401, 220 198, 594 119, 252 29, 594 5, 049, 808 1859 2, 321, 674 2, 488, 929 185, 728 129, 637 27, 070 5, 145, 038 1860 2, 379, 396 2, 644, 867 166, 841 136, 653 26, 111 5, 353, 868 1861 2, 496, 894 2, 704, 544 145, 734 137, 846 54, 795 5, 539, 813 1862 2, 173, 537 2, 606, 716 117, 714 133, 601 80, 596 5, 112, 164 1863 1, 926, 886 2, 960, 633 99, 228 117, 290 51, 019 5, 155, 056 1864 1, 486, 749 3, 245, 265 95, 145 103, 742 55, 499 4, 986, 400 1865 1, 518, 350 3, 381, 522 90, 516 65, 185 41, 209 5, 096, 782 1866 1, 387, 756 2, 719, 621 105, 170 51, 642 46, 589 4, 310, 778 1867 1, 515, 648 2, 660, 390 52, 384 44, 567 31, 498 4, 304, 487 1868 1, 494, 389 2, 702, 140 71, 343 83, 887** 4, 351, 759 1869 1, 496, 220 2, 515, 515 70, 202 62, 704 4, 144, 641 1870 1, 448, 846 2, 638, 247 67, 954 91, 460 4, 246, 507 1871 1, 363, 652 2, 764, 600 61, 400 92, 865 4, 282, 607 1872 1, 359, 040 2, 929, 552 51, 608 97, 547 4, 437, 747 1873 1, 378, 533 3, 163, 220 44, 755 109, 519 4, 696, 027 1874 1, 389, 815 3, 292, 439 39, 108 78, 290 4, 800, 652 1875 1, 515, 598 3, 219, 698 38, 229 80, 207 4, 853, 732 1876 1, 553, 705 2, 598, 835 30, 116 87, 802 4, 279, 458 1877 1, 570, 600 2, 540, 322 40, 593 91, 085 4, 242, 600 1878 1, 589, 348 2, 497, 170 39, 700 86, 547 4, 212, 765 1879 1, 451, 505 2, 598, 183 40, 028 79, 885 4, 169, 601 1880 1, 314, 402 2, 637, 686 38, 408 77, 538 4, 068, 034 1881 1, 297, 035 2, 646, 010 38, 551 76, 136 4, 057, 734 1882 1, 259, 492 2, 795, 777 32, 802 77, 862 4, 165, 933 1883 1, 269, 681 2, 838, 354 32, 414 95, 038 4, 235, 487

* Nine months** After 1867 the tonnage engaged in mackerel fisheries is included inthis column. 

APPENDIX N. 

The following table exhibits the immigration into the United States bydecades from 1821 to 1880. 

 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871Countries. To to to to to to 1881. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. 

England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 055 7, 611 32, 092 247, 125 251, 288 440, 961 76, 547Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 724 207, 381 780, 719 914, 119 456, 593 444, 589 79, 909Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 912 2, 667 3, 712 38, 331 44, 681 98, 926 16, 451Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 185 1, 261 6, 319 4, 642 6, 779 1, 316Great Britain, not specified . . . . 7, 942 65, 347 229, 979 132, 199 349, 766 7, 908 7 Total British Isles . . . . . . . 75, 803 283, 191 1, 047, 763 1, 338, 093 1, 106, 970 989, 163 165, 230

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 398 69, 558 21, 437Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 22 5, 074 4, 738 7, 416 7, 278 1, 939Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 1, 063 539 3, 749 17, 885 34, 577 8, 951France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 497 45, 575 77, 262 76, 358 37, 749 73, 301 5, 653Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 761 152, 454 434, 626 951, 667 822, 007 757, 698 249, 572Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 13, 475 6, 756Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 2, 253 1, 879 9, 231 12, 982 60, 830 20, 103Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 078 1, 412 8, 251 10, 789 9, 539 17, 236 10, 812Norway and Sweden . . . . . . . . . 91 1, 201 13, 903 20, 931 117, 798 226, 488 82, 859Russia and Poland . . . . . . . . . 91 646 656 1, 621 5, 047 54, 606 14, 476Spain and Portugal . . . . . . . . . 2, 622 2, 954 2, 759 10, 353 9, 047 9, 767 464Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 226 4, 821 4, 644 25, 011 23, 839 31, 722 11, 628All other countries in Europe . . . 43 96 155 116 234 1, 265 451 Total Europe, not British Isles . 23, 013 212, 497 549, 739 1, 114, 564 1, 073, 429 1, 357, 801 435, 101 Total Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 98, 816 495, 688 1, 597, 502 2, 452, 657 2, 180, 399 2, 346, 964 600, 331

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 35 41, 397 68, 059 122, 436 20, 711All other countries of Asia . . . . 8 40 47 61 385 632 64 Total Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 48 82 41, 458 68, 444 123, 068 20, 775

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 52 55 210 324 221 37

British North American Provinces . . 2, 277 13, 624 41, 723 59, 309 184, 713 430, 210 95, 188Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 817 6, 599 3, 271 3, 078 2, 386 5, 164 244Central America . . . . . . . . . . 105 44 368 449 96 229 33South America . . . . . . . . . . . 531 856 3, 579 1, 224 1, 443 1, 153 85West Indies . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 834 12, 301 13, 528 10, 660 9, 698 14, 461 1, 009 Total America . . . . . . . . . . 11, 564 33, 424 62, 469 74, 720 198, 336 451, 216 96, 559

Islands of the Atlantic . . . . . . 352 103 337 3, 090 3, 778 10, 121 1, 287Islands of the Pacific . . . . . . 2 9 29 158 235 11, 421 910All other countries, not specified . 32, 679 69, 801 52, 777 25, 921 15, 236 1, 684 146

 Aggregate . . . . . . . . . . . . 143, 439 599, 125 1, 713, 251 2, 598, 214 2, 466, 752 2, 944, 695 720, 045

APPENDIX O. 

COAL AND IRON PRODUCT. 

The following table exhibits the quantity of coal produced in eachState and Territory of the United States during the census years endedMay 31, 1870, and 1880, and the calendar years 1876, 1877, 1878, 1879, and 1881 (weight expressed in tons of 2, 240 pounds). 

STATE OR 1870. 1876. 1877. 1878. 1879. 1880. 1881. TERRITORY. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. 

_Anthracite_. Pennsylvania . . 15, 648, 437 21, 436, 667 23, 619, 911 20, 605, 262 26, 142, 689 28, 640, 819 28, 500, 016Rhode Island . . 14, 000 14, 000 14, 000 14, 000 15, 000 6, 176 10, 000Virginia . . . . 2, 817

_Bituminous_. Pennsylvania . . 7, 800, 386 11, 500, 000 12, 500, 000 13, 500, 000 14, 500, 000 18, 425, 163 20, 000, 000Illinois . . . . 2, 624, 163 3, 500, 000 3, 500, 000 3, 500, 000 3, 500, 000 6, 115, 377 6, 000, 000Ohio . . . . . . 2, 527, 285 3, 500, 000 5, 250, 000 5, 000, 000 5, 000, 000 6, 008, 595 8, 250, 000Maryland . . . . 2, 345, 153 1, 835, 081 1, 574, 339 1, 679, 322 1, 730, 709 2, 228, 917 2, 261, 918Missouri . . . . 621, 930 900, 000 900, 000 900, 000 900, 000 556, 304 1, 750, 000West Virginia. . 608, 878 800, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 250, 000 1, 839, 845 1, 500, 000Indiana . . . . 437, 870 950, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 454, 327 1, 500, 000Iowa . . . . . . 263, 487 1, 500, 000 1, 500, 000 1, 500, 000 1, 600, 000 1, 461, 116 1, 750, 000Kentucky . . . . 32, 938 650, 000 850, 000 900, 000 1, 000, 000 946, 288 1, 100, 000Tennessee . . . 133, 418 550, 000 750, 000 375, 000 450, 000 495, 131 750, 000Virginia . . . . 61, 803 90, 000 90, 000 75, 000 90, 000 43, 079 100, 000Kansas . . . . . 150, 582 125, 000 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 771, 142 750, 000Oregon . . . . . 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 43, 205 300, 000Michigan . . . . 28, 150 30, 000 30, 000 30, 000 35, 000 100, 800 100, 000California . . . 600, 000 600, 000 600, 000 600, 000 236, 950 600, 000Arkansas . . . . 14, 778 30, 000Montana . . . . 224North Carolina . 350Alabama . . . . 11, 000 100, 000 175, 000 200, 000 250, 000 323, 972 375, 000Nebraska . . . . 1, 425 30, 000 50, 000 75, 000 75, 000 200 75, 000Wyoming . . . . 500, 000 100, 000 100, 000 175, 000 589, 595 375, 000Washington . . . 100, 000 150, 000 150, 000 170, 000 145, 015 175, 000Utah . . . . . . 45, 000 45, 000 60, 000 225, 000 225, 000Colorado . . . . 250, 000 300, 000 367, 000 400, 000 462, 747 700, 000Georgia . . . . 100, 000 154, 644 150, 000

 Total bituminous 17, 648, 468 27, 569, 081 30, 688, 339 31, 525, 322 36, 665, 709 42, 417, 764 48, 816, 918 Total anthracite 15, 662, 437 21, 436, 667 23, 619, 911 20, 605, 262 26, 142, 689 28, 649, 812 28, 510, 016 Total anthracite and bituminous 33, 310, 905 49, 005, 748 54, 308, 250 52, 130, 584 62, 808, 398 71, 067, 576 77, 326, 934

APPENDIX O--_Concluded_. 

The following table shows the quantity of pig-iron produced, imported, exported, and retained for consumption in the United States, from 1867to 1882, expressed in tons of 2, 240 pounds. 

 Total Production and Imports. Calendar Year Ended | Exports, Foreign and Domestic. Year. Production. June 30, Imports. | | Retained for Home Consumption. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. 1866 1, 205, 663 1867 112, 642 1, 317, 705 628 1, 317, 0771867 1, 305, 023 1868 112, 133 1, 417, 156 282 1, 416, 8741868 1, 431, 250 1869 136, 975 1, 568, 225 273 1, 567, 9521869 1, 711, 287 1870 153, 283 1, 864, 570 1, 456 1, 863, 1141870 1, 665, 178 1871 178, 139 1, 843, 317 3, 772 1, 839, 5451871 1, 706, 793 1872 247, 529 1, 954, 322 2, 172 1, 952, 1501872 2, 548, 713 1873 215, 496 2, 764, 209 2, 818 2, 761, 2011873 2, 560, 963 1874 92, 042 2, 653, 005 10, 152 2, 642, 8531874 2, 401, 262 1875 53, 437 2, 454, 699 16, 193 2, 438, 5061875 2, 023, 733 1876 79, 455 2, 103, 188 7, 241 2, 095, 9471876 1, 868, 961 1877 67, 922 1, 936, 883 3, 560 1, 933, 3231877 2, 006, 594 1878 55, 000 2, 121, 594 6, 198 2, 115, 3961878 2, 301, 215 1879 87, 576 2, 388, 791 3, 221 2, 385, 5701879 2, 741, 853 1880 754, 657 3, 406, 510 2, 607 3, 493, 9031880 3, 835, 191 1881 417, 849 4, 253, 040 6, 811 4, 246, 2291881 4, 144, 254 1882 496, 045 4, 640, 299 9, 519 4, 630, 780

Quantity of Iron and Steel Railroad Bars produced, imported, exported, and retained for Consumption in the United States, from 1867 to 1882, expressed in tons of 2, 240 pounds. Total Production and Imports. Calendar Production. Year | Exports, Foreign and Domestic. Year. Iron. Steel. Total. Ended Imports. | | Retained for Home Consumption. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. June 30, _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. 1866 384, 623 384, 623 1867 96, 272 480, 895 159 480, 7361867 410, 319 2, 277 412, 596 1868 151, 097 563, 693 710 562, 9831868 445, 972 6, 451 452, 423 1869 237, 704 690, 127 564 689, 5631869 521, 371 8, 616 529, 987 1870 279, 766 809, 753 885 808, 8631870 523, 371 30, 357 553, 571 1871 458, 056 1, 011, 627 1, 341 1, 010, 2861871 658, 467 34, 152 692, 619 1872 531, 537 1, 224, 156 4, 484 1, 219, 6721872 808, 866 83, 991 892, 857 1873 357, 631 1, 250, 488 7, 147 1, 243, 3411873 679, 520 115, 192 794, 712 1874 148, 920 943, 632 7, 313 936, 3191874 521, 847 129, 414 651, 261 1875 42, 082 693, 343 14, 199 679, 1441875 447, 901 259, 699 707, 000 1876 4, 708 712, 308 13, 554 698, 7541876 417, 114 368, 269 785, 383 1877 30 785, 413 6, 103 779, 3101877 296, 911 385, 865 682, 776 1878 11 682, 787 8, 426 674, 3511878 288, 295 499, 817 788, 112 1879 2, 611 790, 723 7, 127 783, 5961879 375, 143 618, 851 993, 994 1880 152, 791 1, 146, 785 2, 363 1, 144, 4221880 440, 859 864, 353 1, 305, 212 1881 302, 294 1, 607, 506 4, 274 1, 603, 2321881 436, 233 1, 210, 285 1, 646, 518 1882 295, 666 1, 942, 184 4, 190 1, 937, 994

APPENDIX P. 

The following table shows the number of men called for by the Presidentof the United States, and the number furnished by each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, both for the Army and Navy, from April. 15, 1861, to close of the war. 

STATES Aggregate. AggregateAND Men furnished Reduced toTERRITORIES. Quota | Paid Commutation. A Three Years' | | | Total. Standard. Maine . . . . . . . . . 73, 587 70, 107 2, 007 72, 114 56, 776New Hampshire . . . . . 35, 897 33, 937 692 34, 629 30, 849Vermont . . . . . . . . 32, 074 33, 288 1, 074 35, 262 29, 068Massachusetts . . . . . 139, 095 146, 730 5, 318 152, 048 124, 104Rhode Island . . . . . 18, 898 23, 236 463 23, 699 17, 866Connecticut . . . . . . 44, 797 55, 864 1, 515 57, 379 50, 623New York . . . . . . . 507, 148 448, 850 18, 197 467, 047 392, 270New Jersey . . . . . . 92, 820 76, 814 4, 196 81, 010 57, 908Pennsylvania . . . . . 385, 369 337, 936 28, 171 366, 107 265, 517Delaware . . . . . . . 13, 935 12, 284 1, 386 13, 670 10, 322Maryland . . . . . . . 70, 965 46, 638 3, 678 50, 316 41, 275West Virginia . . . . . 34, 463 32, 068 32, 068 27, 711District of Columbia . 13, 973 16, 534 338 16, 872 11, 506Ohio . . . . . . . . . 306, 322 313, 180 6, 479 319, 659 240, 514Indiana . . . . . . . . 199, 788 196, 363 784 197, 147 153, 576Illinois . . . . . . . 244, 496 259, 092 55 259, 147 214, 133Michigan . . . . . . . 95, 007 87, 364 2, 008 89, 372 80, 111Wisconsin . . . . . . . 109, 080 91, 327 5, 097 96, 424 79, 260Minnesota . . . . . . . 26, 326 24, 020 1, 032 25, 052 19, 693Iowa . . . . . . . . . 79, 521 76, 242 67 76, 309 68, 630Missouri . . . . . . . 122, 496 109, 111 109, 111 86, 530Kentucky . . . . . . . 100, 782 75, 760 3, 265 79, 025 70, 832Kansas . . . . . . . . 12, 931 20, 149 2 20, 151 18, 706Tennessee . . . . . . . 1, 560 31, 092 31, 092 26, 394Arkansas . . . . . . . 780 8, 289 8, 289 7, 863North Carolina . . . . 1, 560 3, 156 3, 156 3, 156California . . . . . . 15, 725 15, 725 15, 725Nevada . . . . . . . . 1, 080 1, 080 1, 080Oregon . . . . . . . . 1, 810 1, 810 1, 810Washington Territory . 964 964 964Nebraska Territory . . 3, 157 3, 157 2, 175Colorado Territory . . 4, 903 4, 903 3, 697Dakota Territory . . . 206 206 206New-Mexico Territory . 6, 561 6, 561 4, 432Alabama . . . . . . . . 2, 576 2, 576 1, 611Florida . . . . . . . . 1, 290 1, 290 1, 290Louisiana . . . . . . . 5, 224 5, 224 4, 654Mississippi . . . . . . 545 545 545Texas . . . . . . . . . 1, 965 1, 965 1, 632Indian Nation . . . . . 3, 530 3, 530 3, 530Colored Troops* . . . . 93, 441 93, 441 91, 789

 Total . . . . . . . . 2, 763, 670 2, 772, 408 86, 724 2, 859, 132 2, 320, 272

* Colored troops organized at various stations in the States inrebellion, embracing all not specifically credited to States, and whichcannot be so assigned. 

Reduced to Periods of Service only, the Following Aggregates for theDifferent Periods in the Army and Navy appear:--

Periods of Enlistment. Number. 

60 days . . . . . . . . 2, 0453 months . . . . . . . 108, 416100 days . . . . . . . 85, 8074 months . . . . . . . 426 months . . . . . . . 26, 1188 months . . . . . . . 3739 months . . . . . . . 89, 8991 year . . . . . . . . 393, 7062 years . . . . . . . . 44, 4003 years . . . . . . . . 2, 028, 6304 years . . . . . . . . 1, 042

Aggregate enlistments . 2, 780, 478

The Number of Indivials who served during the War is estimated asfollows:--

Number who died during the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304, 360Number who were discharged for disability . . . . . . . . . . . 285, 545Deserters (less those arrested and 25 per cent. Additional) . . 128, 352One-third of those serving terms of less than one year (estimated that two-thirds thereof re-enlisted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104, 134One-half of those serving more than one year and less than two years (estimated that one-half re-enlisted) . . . . . . . . . . . . 224, 053Number in the service May 1, 1865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 000, 516 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 046, 969Add number in regular army at commencement of war . . . . . . 16, 422

Aggregate number of different individuals who served during the war 2, 063, 391

There are no records which give with accuracy the number of men inthe Confederate Army. The general aggregate for the four years is, upon the best authority attainable, placed at one million one hundredthousand men (1, 100, 000). The maximum number of men on the ConfederateArmy rolls at any one time is estimated at five hundred thousand. Theirregular manner in which the men were conscripted during the last twoyears of the war, taken in connection with the loss of records, makesit impossible to give accurate statements of the numbers furnished bythe several States. 

REGULAR ARMY. 

The following table shows the actual strength of the regular army ofthe United States at different periods, from 1789 to 1883 (retiredofficers not included). 

 Officers. Date. | Men. Total. 1780-90 . . 50 672 722 1795 . . . 212 3, 228 3, 440 1800 . . . 248 3, 803 4, 051 1805 . . . 196 2, 534 2, 730 1810 . . . 466 6, 488 6, 954July, 1812 . . . 301 6, 385 6, 686*Feb. , 1813 . . . 1, 476 17, 560 19, 036*Sept. 1814 . . . 2, 395 35, 791 38, 186*Feb. , 1815 . . . 2, 396 31, 028 33, 424*Dec. , 1820 . . . 712 8, 230 8, 942 1825 . . . 562 5, 157 5, 719 1830 . . . 627 5, 324 5, 951 1835 . . . 680 6, 471 7, 151 1840 . . . 733 9, 837 10, 570 1845 . . . 826 7, 523 8, 349 1850 . . . 948 9, 815 10, 763 1855 . . . 1, 042 14, 710 15, 752 1860 . . . 1, 108 15, 250 16, 367 1861 . . . 1, 004 15, 418 16, 422 1862 . . . 1, 720 21, 450 23, 170 1863 . . . 1, 844 22, 915 24, 759 1864 . . . 1, 813 19, 791 21, 604 1865 . . . 1, 605 20, 765 22, 310 1866 . . . 2, 020 31, 470 33, 490 1867 . . . 2, 853 53, 962 56, 815 1868 . . . 2, 835 48, 081 50, 916 1869 . . . 2, 700 34, 074 36, 774 1870 . . . 2, 541 34, 534 37, 075 1871 . . . 2, 105 26, 848 28, 953 1872 . . . 2, 104 26, 071 28, 175 1873 . . . 2, 076 26, 576 28, 652 1874 . . . 2, 080 26, 364 28, 444 1875 . . . 2, 068 23, 250 25, 318 1876 . . . 2, 151 26, 129 28, 250 1877 . . . 2, 178 21, 767 23, 945 1878 . . . 2, 153 23, 365 25, 818 1879 . . . 2, 127 24, 262 26, 389 1880 . . . 2, 152 24, 259 26, 411 1881 . . . 2, 181 22, 994 25, 175 1882 . . . 2, 162 23, 024 25, 186 1883 . . . 2, 143 23, 335 25, 478

* Second war with Great Britain

The following summary shows the total numbers of soldiers serving inthe various wars in which the United States was engaged prior to theRebellion. 

Soldiers of the War of the Revolution, 1775 to 1783 . . 289, 715Indian War, General Wayne, 1794 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 843Indian War, 1811 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650War with Great Britain, 1812 to 1815, number of soldiers, sailors and marines serving 12 months or more . . . . 63, 179 Number of militia serving 6 months or more . 66, 325 " " " " 3 " " " . 125, 643 " " " " 1 month " " . 125, 307 " " " " less than 1 month . 147, 200 ------- 527, 654Number of soldiers serving in Seminole War, 1817-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 911 Black-Hawk War, 1831-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 031 South-western disturbances, 1836 . . . . . . . . . . 2, 803 Cherokee Country disturbances, 1836-37 . . . . . . . 3, 926 Creek disturbances, 1836-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 418 Florida War, 1836-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 122Number of soldiers and sailors serving in Mexican War, 1846-47 . . . 105, 454Number of soldiers serving in New-York frontier disturbances, 1838-39 . . . . . . . 1, 128 Arostook disturbances, 1838-39, 2 regiments . . . . . 1, 430

APPENDIX Q. 

The following table exhibits the school age, population, and enrollmentof the States and Territories in 1881, with salaries paid to teachers, and total expenditure for schools. 

 School Age. | School Population. STATES. | | No. Enrolled in Public Schools. | | | Aggregate Salaries Paid to Teachers. | | | | Total Expenditure. Alabama . . . . . . . . . 7-21 422, 739 176, 289 $384, 769 $410, 690Arkansas . . . . . . . . 6-21 272, 841 98, 744 388, 412California . . . . . . . 5-17 211, 237 163, 855 2, 346, 056 3, 047, 605Colorado . . . . . . . . 6-21 40, 804 26, 000 557, 151Connecticut . . . . . . . 4-16 143, 745 119, 381 1, 025, 323 1, 476, 691Delaware . . . . . . . . 6-21 37, 285 29, 122 138, 819 207, 281Florida . . . . . . . . . 4-21 88, 677 39, 315 97, 115 114, 895Georgia . . . . . . . . . 6-18 461, 016 244, 197 498, 533Illinois . . . . . . . . 6-21 1, 002, 222 701, 627 4, 722, 349 7, 858, 414Indiana . . . . . . . . . 6-21 714, 343 503, 855 3, 057, 110 4, 528, 754Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 594, 730 431, 513 3, 040, 716 5, 129, 819Kansas . . . . . . . . . 5-21 348, 179 249, 034 1, 167, 620 1, 976, 397Kentucky . . . . . . . . 6-20 553, 638 238, 440 1, 248, 524Louisiana . . . . . . . . 6-18 271, 414 62, 370 374, 127 441, 484Maine . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 213, 927 150, 067 965, 697 1, 089, 414Maryland . . . . . . . . 5-20 319, 201 158, 909 1, 162, 429 1, 604, 580Massachusetts . . . . . . 5-15 312, 680 325, 239 4, 130, 714 5, 776, 542Michigan . . . . . . . . 5-20 518, 294 371, 743 2, 114, 567 3, 418, 233Minnesota . . . . . . . . 5-21 300, 923 177, 278 993, 997 1, 466, 492Mississippi . . . . . . . 5-21 419, 963 237, 288 644, 352 757, 758Missouri . . . . . . . . 6-20 723, 484 476, 376 2, 218, 637 3, 152, 178Nebraska . . . . . . . . 5-21 152, 824 100, 776 627, 717 1, 165, 103Nevada . . . . . . . . . 6-18 10, 533 8, 329 59, 194 140, 419New Hampshire . . . . . . 5-15 60, 899 63, 235 408, 554 577, 022New Jersey . . . . . . . 5-18 335, 631 203, 542 1, 510, 830 1, 914, 447New York . . . . . . . . 5-21 1, 662, 122 1, 021, 282 7, 775, 505 10, 923, 402North Carolina . . . . . 6-21 468, 072 240, 710 342, 212 409, 659Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 1, 063, 337 744, 758 5, 151, 448 8, 133, 622Oregon . . . . . . . . . 4-20 61, 641 34, 498 234, 818 318, 331Pennsylvania . . . . . . 6-21 1, 422, 377 931, 749 4, 677, 017 7, 994, 705Rhode Island . . . . . . 5-16 53, 077 44, 920 408, 993 549, 937South Carolina . . . . . 6-16 262, 279 133, 458 309, 855 345, 634Tennessee . . . . . . . . 6-21 545, 875 283, 468 529, 618 638, 009Texas . . . . . . . . . . 8-14 230, 527 186, 786 674, 869 753, 346Vermont . . . . . . . . . 5-20 99, 463 74, 646 366, 448 447, 252Virginia . . . . . . . . 5-21 556, 665 239, 046 823, 310 1, 100, 239West Virginia . . . . . . 6-21 213, 191 145, 203 539, 648 761, 250Wisconsin . . . . . . . . 4-20 491, 358 300, 122 1, 618, 283 2, 279, 103 Total for States . . . 15, 661, 213 9, 737, 176 $54, 642, 716 $83, 601, 327

 School Age. | School Population. TERRITORIES. | | No. Enrolled in Public Schools. | | | Aggregate Salaries Paid to Teachers. | | | | Total Expenditure. Arizona . . . . . . . . . 6-21 9, 571 3, 844 $44, 628Dakota . . . . . . . . . 5-21 38, 815 25, 451 314, 484District of Columbia . . 6-18 43, 558 27, 299 $295, 668 527, 312Idaho . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 7, 520 6, 080 38, 174 44, 840Montana . . . . . . . . . 4-21 9, 895 5, 112 52, 781 55, 781New Mexico . . . . . . . 7-18 29, 255 4, 755 28, 002 28, 973Utah . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 42, 353 26, 772 113, 768 199, 264Washington . . . . . . . 4-21 23, 899 14, 754 94, 019 114, 379Wyoming . . . . . . . . . 7-21 4, 112 2, 907 25, 894 28, 504Indian: Cherokees . . . . . . . 3, 715 3, 048 52, 500 Chickasaws . . . . . . 900 650 33, 550 Choctaws . . . . . . . 2, 600 1, 460 31, 700 Creeks . . . . . . . . 1, 700 799 26, 909 Seminoles . . . . . . . 400 226 7, 500Total for Territories . . 218, 293 123, 157 $648, 306 $1, 510, 115Total for States . . . . 15, 661, 213 9, 737, 176 54, 642, 716 83, 601, 327

Grand total . . . . . . . 15, 879, 506 9, 860, 333 $55, 291, 022 $85, 111, 442

APPENDIX R. 

The following table gives some interesting and important statisticsrespecting colleges in the United States. 

 No. Universities and Colleges. | No. Instructors in Preparatory Department. | | No. Students in Preparatory Department. STATES | | | No. Instructors in Collegiate Department. AND | | | | No. Students in Collegiate Department. TERRITORIES. | | | | | No. Volumes in College Libraries. | | | | | | Value of Grounds, Buildings, and Apparatus. | | | | | | | Income from Productive Funds. | | | | | | | | Receipts for the last Year from Tuition Fees. Alabama . . . . . 3 2 20 18 314 8, 200 $300, 000 $24, 600 $8, 000Arkansas . . . . . 4 10 564 28 271 2, 286 114, 000 1, 000 8, 300California . . . . 11 36 1, 178 131 602 47, 750 1, 380, 200 105, 116 91, 014Colorado . . . . . 3 2 113 23 45 11, 000 230, 000 1, 282 366Connecticut . . . 3 62 959 148, 155 472, 884 120, 776 114, 128Delaware . . . . . 1 8 54 6, 000 75, 000 4, 980 500Georgia . . . . . 6 2 70 54 554 30, 100 652, 300 43, 493 10, 650Illinois . . . . . 28 58 2, 901 224 1, 887 130, 630 2, 511, 550 95, 229 116, 844Indiana . . . . . 15 58 1, 793 128 1, 329 76, 591 1, 298, 000 50, 029 29, 646Iowa . . . . . . . 18 46 1, 697 168 1, 614 51, 022 789, 000 51, 382 42, 568Kansas . . . . . . 8 21 889 75 431 24, 178 523, 000 5, 500 5, 400Kentucky . . . . . 14 18 594 97 1, 178 45, 076 673, 000 38, 443 37, 060Louisiana . . . . 9 22 1, 022 68 174 57, 995 837, 000 15, 100 21, 060Maine . . . . . . 3 3 45 32 422 59, 371 863, 500 39, 000 22, 000Maryland . . . . . 11 18 325 160 1, 385 49, 922 892, 500 181, 734 45, 705Massachusetts . . 7 7 192 151 1, 865 292, 626 1, 250, 000 276, 131 166, 851Michigan . . . . . 9 22 1, 361 114 1, 166 59, 690 1, 344, 942 89, 290 75, 351Minnesota . . . . 5 1 279 44 408 21, 600 421, 196 50, 900 8, 340Mississippi . . . 3 7 557 21 320 8, 400 446, 000 32, 643 8, 275Missouri . . . . . 16 37 1, 101 196 1, 605 108, 315 1, 127, 220 63, 005 135, 294Nebraska . . . . . 5 11 360 16 216 8, 000 205, 000 2, 359 682Nevada . . . . . . 1 1 40New Hampshire . . 1 15 247 54, 000 125, 000 25, 000 16, 000New Jersey . . . . 4 73 677 60, 600 1, 150, 000 86, 615 20, 770New York . . . . . 27 113 2, 662 426 3, 495 294, 437 7, 480, 540 472, 413 462, 059North Carolina . . 9 8 616 69 590 31, 250 549, 000 10, 000 37, 096Ohio . . . . . . . 36 120 3, 726 284 2, 612 286, 411 3, 156, 744 180, 661 101, 775Oregon . . . . . . 8 21 785 38 458 9, 420 257, 000 20, 600 15, 950Pennsylvania . . . 27 70 1, 877 288 2, 367 163, 718 4, 744, 850 239, 499 250, 105Rhode Island . . . 1 18 251 53, 000 36, 999 30, 869South Carolina . . 8 8 358 42 304 17, 450 340, 000 22, 869 5, 194Tennessee . . . . 19 33 1, 122 148 1, 876 51, 708 1, 498, 250 80, 475 39, 720Texas . . . . . . 9 18 1, 075 58 540 10, 411 335, 000 775 55, 150Vermont . . . . . 2 18 93 33, 000 440, 000 16, 328 6, 082Virginia . . . . . 8 6 73 69 889 102, 000 1, 558, 000 22, 200 20, 540West Virginia . . 4 7 134 32 201 5, 800 295, 000 8, 469 5, 592Wisconsin . . . . 8 15 786 88 658 48, 765 890, 300 101, 556 56, 702Dist. Of Columbia 5 9 359 43 222 47, 411 900, 000 1, 957 1, 165Utah . . . . . . . 1 3 202 3 2, 735 30, 000 3, 147Washington . . . . 2 7 83 11 90 3, 200 100, 000 500 4, 500

 Total . . . . . 362 820 28, 959 3, 541 32, 459 2, 522, 223 $40, 255, 976 $2, 618, 008 $2, 080, 450

STATISTICS RESPECTING SCHOOLS OF SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 

Part I. --Institutions endowed with National Land-Grant. 

 Number of Schools. | No. Instructors. ) Preparatory Department. | | No. Students. ) | | | No. Instructors. ) Scientific Department. STATES. | | | | No. Students. ) | | | | | No. Volumes in General Libraries. | | | | | | Value of Grounds, Buildings, and Apparatus. | | | | | | | Income from Productive Funds. | | | | | | | | Receipts for the last Year from Tuition Fees. Alabama . . . . . . . . 1 1 47 11 135 2, 000 $75, 000 $20, 280Arkansas . . . . . . . . 1 2 14 200 170, 000 10, 400 $2, 000California . . . . . . . 1 0 0 26 101Colorado . . . . . . . . 1 5 57 150 55, 000Connecticut . . . . . . 1 26 185 5, 000 200, 000 29, 212 17, 798Delaware . . . . . . . . 1Florida . . . . . . . . 0 10, 004Georgia . . . . . . . . 5 16 877 19 182 3, 500 164, 000 17, 914 1, 800Illinois . . . . . . . . 1 3 77 24 303 12, 942 545, 000 21, 398 10, 619Indiana . . . . . . . . 1 2 141 9 140 2, 065 250, 000 17, 000 2, 029Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 15 20 211 6, 000 500, 000 45, 000 0Kansas . . . . . . . . . 1 13 267 3, 050 99, 525 31, 225 426Kentucky . . . . . . . . 1 2 13 182 85, 000 9, 900 1, 500Louisiana . . . . . . . 1 1 40 9 29 17, 000 400, 000 14, 500 0Maine . . . . . . . . . 1 8 110 4, 105 145, 000 7, 500Maryland . . . . . . . . 1 6 7 49 100, 000 6, 975 825Massachusetts . . . . . 2 45 517 5, 300 520, 727 30, 672 53, 107Michigan . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 12 227 6, 250 274, 380 20, 517 0Minnesota . . . . . . . 1Mississippi . . . . . . 2 10 437 9 102 2, 380 300, 000 11, 679Missouri . . . . . . . . 2 2 25 15 209 1, 750 46, 660 7, 680 1, 300Nebraska . . . . . . . . 1 25, 000Nevada . . . . . . . . . 1New Hampshire . . . . . 1 10 44 1, 200 100, 000 4, 800New Jersey . . . . . . . 1 14 54New York . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 52 259 253, 509North Carolina . . . . . 1 0 0 7 24 2, 000 7, 500Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 93 13 124 1, 600 500, 000 33, 923 3, 798Oregon . . . . . . . . . 1 3 60 10, 000 5, 000Pennsylvania . . . . . . 1 5 45 12 44 3, 000 532, 000 30, 000 0Rhode Island . . . . . . 1South Carolina . . . . . 2 4 58 26, 500 25, 000 11, 508Tennessee . . . . . . . 1 25, 410Texas . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 18 127 1, 090 212, 000 14, 280 4, 191Vermont . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 9 23 8, 130Virginia . . . . . . . . 2 1 108 33 320 2, 200 521, 080 23, 500 100West Virginia . . . . . 1Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1 0 0 18 124 200, 000 15, 322 18

 Total . . . . . . . . 46 52 1, 911 465 4, 281 109, 732 $6, 308, 881 $491, 229 $99, 511

U. S. Military Academy . 1 0 0 52 228 28, 208 2, 500, 000 0 0U. S. Naval Academy . . 1 0 0 65 261 22, 629 1, 292, 390 0 0

 Grand total . . . . . 48 52 1, 911 582 4, 770 160, 569 $10, 101, 271 $491, 229 $99, 511

Part II. --Insitutions not endowed with National Land-Grant. 

 Number of Schools. | No. Instructors. ) Preparatory Department. | | No. Students. ) | | | No. Instructors. ) Scientific Department. STATES. | | | | No. Students. ) | | | | | No. Volumes in General Libraries. | | | | | | Value of Grounds, Buildings, and Apparatus. | | | | | | | Income from Productive Funds. | | | | | | | | Receipts for the last Year from Tuition Fees. California . . . . . . . 1 2 34 5 68 300Colorado . . . . . . . . 2 8 83 600 $15, 000 $1, 500Georgia . . . . . . . . 1Indiana . . . . . . . . 1 900 135, 000 $15, 000Massachusetts . . . . . 5 103 224 6, 200 188, 500 72, 755 10, 050Michigan . . . . . . . . 1 3 7Missouri . . . . . . . . 1 5 249 17 153 125, 000New Hampshire . . . . . 2 16 50 2, 000 1, 700 11, 000 2, 160New Jersey . . . . . . . 2 29 156 5, 000 650, 000 43, 450 19, 780New York . . . . . . . . 5 84 2, 586 24, 393 2, 000, 000 43, 495 44, 100Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 100, 000 9, 734Pennsylvania . . . . . . 8 7 89 2, 268 42, 468 594, 000 6, 050Vermont . . . . . . . . 1 10 20 4, 000 20, 000 1, 000Virginia . . . . . . . . 3 8 123 550 400, 000 1, 200 7, 000District of Columbia . . 1

 Total . . . . . . . . 37 7 290 378 5, 738 86, 411 $4, 229, 200 $202, 684 $85, 590

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING STATISTICS RESPECTING SUPERIORINSTRUCTION. 

Adding the statistics of public and private schools of science (i. E. , schools endowed and schools not endowed with the public land-grant) tothose of universities and colleges, we have the following totals: Numberof institutions, 447; number of instructors in preparatory departments, 879, in collegiate and scientific departments, 4, 501; number of studentsin preparatory departments, 31, 160, in collegiate and scientificdepartments, 42, 967; income from productive funds, $3, 311, 921; incomefrom tuition, $2, 265, 551; volumes in college libraries, 2, 769, 203; valueof grounds, buildings, and apparatus, $54, 586, 447. 

APPENDIX S. 

An exhibit of the legal-tender currency in circulation on the first dayof January and the first day of July in each year since the firstgreenback was issued in 1862. 

Date. Amount. Jan. 1, 1863 . . $223, 108, 000July 1, 1863 . . 297, 767, 114Jan. 1, 1864 . . 444, 825, 022July 1, 1864 . . 431, 178, 671Jan. 1, 1865 . . 447, 074, 374July 1, 1865 . . 432, 687, 966Jan. 1, 1866 . . 425, 839, 319July 1, 1866 . . 400, 619, 206Jan. 1, 1867 . . 380, 276, 160July 1, 1867 . . 371, 783, 597Jan. 1, 1868 . . 356, 000, 000July 1, 1868 . . 356, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1869 . . 356, 000, 000July 1, 1869 . . 356, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1870 . . 356, 000, 000July 1, 1870 . . 356, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1871 . . 356, 000, 000July 1, 1871 . . 356, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1872 . . 357, 500, 000July 1, 1872 . . 357, 500, 000Jan. 1, 1873 . . 358, 557, 907July 1, 1873 . . 356, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1874 . . 378, 401, 702July 1, 1874 . . 382, 000, 000Jan. 1, 1875 . . 382, 000, 000July 1, 1875 . . 375, 771, 580Jan. 1, 1876 . . 371, 827, 220July 1, 1876 . . 369, 772, 284Jan. 1, 1877 . . 366, 055, 084July 1, 1877 . . 359, 764, 332Jan. 1, 1878 . . 349, 943, 776July 1, 1878 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1879 . . 346, 681, 016July 1, 1879 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1880 . . 346, 681, 016July 1, 1880 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1881 . . 346, 681, 016July 1, 1881 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1882 . . 346, 681, 016July 1, 1882 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1883 . . 346, 681, 016July 1, 1883 . . 346, 681, 016Jan. 1, 1884 . . 346, 681, 016

APPENDIX T. 

This table presents the number of national banks each year from thepassage of the original Bank Act, with the average capital, deposits, and circulation for each year on or near October 1 = from 1863 to 1883. 

 No. OfYears. Banks. Capital. Deposits. Circulation. 1863 . . 66 $7, 188, 393 $8, 497, 6821864 . . 508 86, 782, 802 122, 166, 536 $45, 260, 5041865 . . 1, 513 393, 157, 206 500, 910, 873 171, 321, 9031866 . . 1, 644 415, 472, 369 564, 616, 778 280, 253, 8181867 . . 1, 642 420, 073, 415 540, 797, 838 293, 887, 9411868 . . 1, 643 420, 634, 511 580, 940, 821 295, 593, 6451869 . . 1, 617 426, 399, 151 511, 400, 197 293, 593, 6451870 . . 1, 648 430, 399, 301 501, 407, 587 291, 798, 6401871 . . 1, 790 458, 255, 696 600, 868, 487 315, 519, 1171872 . . 1, 940 479, 629, 174 613, 290, 671 333, 495, 0271873 . . 1, 976 491, 072, 616 622, 685, 563 339, 081, 7991874 . . 2, 027 493, 765, 121 669, 068, 996 333, 225, 2981875 . . 2, 087 504, 829, 769 664, 579, 619 318, 350, 3791876 . . 2, 089 499, 802, 232 651, 385, 210 291, 544, 0201877 . . 2, 080 479, 467, 771 616, 403, 987 291, 874, 2361878 . . 2, 053 466, 147, 436 620, 236, 176 301, 888, 0921879 . . 2, 048 454, 067, 365 719, 737, 568 313, 786, 3421880 . . 2, 090 457, 553, 985 873, 537, 637 317, 350, 0361881 . . 2, 132 463, 821, 985 1, 070, 997, 531 320, 200, 0691882 . . 2, 269 483, 104, 213 1, 122, 472, 682 314, 721, 2151883 . . 2, 501 509, 699, 787 1, 049, 437, 700 310, 517, 857

APPENDIX U. 

The following table exhibits the principal items contained in thereturns of the State banks of the country, yearly, from 1834 to 1861:--

 No. OfYears. Banks. Capital. Deposits. Circulation. 1834 . . 506 $200, 005, 944 $75, 666, 986 $94, 839, 5701835 . . 704 231, 250, 337 83, 081, 365 103, 692, 4951836 . . 713 251, 875, 292 115, 104, 440 140, 301, 0381837 . . 788 251, 875, 292 115, 104, 440 140, 185, 8901838 . . 829 317, 636, 778 84, 601, 184 116, 138, 9101839 . . 840 327, 132, 512 90, 240, 146 135, 170, 9951840 . . 901 358, 442, 692 75, 696, 857 106, 968, 5721841 . . 784 313, 608, 959 64, 800, 101 107, 200, 2141842 . . 692 260, 171, 797 62, 408, 870 83, 734, 0111843 . . 691 228, 861, 948 56, 168, 623 58, 563, 6081844 . . 696 210, 872, 056 84, 550, 785 75, 167, 6461845 . . 707 206, 045, 969 88, 020, 646 89, 608, 7111846 . . 707 196, 894, 309 96, 913, 070 105, 552, 4271847 . . 715 203, 070, 622 91, 792, 533 105, 519, 7661848 . . 751 204, 838, 175 103, 226, 177 128, 506, 0911849 . . 782 207, 309, 361 91, 178, 623 114, 743, 4151850 . . 824 217, 317, 211 109, 586, 585 131, 366, 5261851 . . 879 227, 807, 553 128, 957, 712 155, 165, 2511852 . . 914 247, 858, 036 137, 255, 794 150, 619, 0151853 . . 950 267, 908, 519 145, 533, 876 146, 072, 7801854 . . 1, 208 301, 376, 071 188, 188, 744 204, 680, 2071855 . . 1, 307 332, 177, 288 190, 400, 342 186, 952, 2231856 . . 1, 398 343, 874, 272 212, 705, 662 195, 747, 9501857 . . 1, 416 370, 834, 686 230, 351, 352 214, 778, 8221858 . . 1, 422 394, 622, 799 185, 932, 049 155, 208, 2441859 . . 1, 476 401, 976, 242 259, 568, 278 193, 306, 8181860 . . 1, 562 421, 880, 095 253, 802, 129 207, 102, 4771861 . . 1, 601 429, 592, 713 257, 229, 562 202, 005, 767

APPENDIX V. 

MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The annexed map is designed to show, clearly and accurately, theterritorial extent of the United States as established by the Treatyof 1783, with the various additions since made, by purchase, conquest, or voluntary annexation. 

The map is intended to illustrate many parts of the text, and, inconnection with the various Appendices, will exhibit within smallcompass the expansion of free institutions, the growth of population, and the increase of material wealth with which the Republic has beenblessed. 

[map omitted]