WOODROW WILSON AS I KNOW HIM

BY

JOSEPH P. TUMULTY

To the memory of my dear mother Alicia Tumulty whose spirit of generosity, loyalty, and tolerance I trust will be found in the lines of this book

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In preparing this volume I have made use of portions of the followingbooks: "The War The World and Wilson" by George Creel; "What Wilson Did atParis, " by Ray Stannard Baker; "Woodrow Wilson and His Work" by William E. Dodd; "The Panama Canal Tolls Controversy" by Hugh Gordon Miller andJoseph C. Freehoff; "Woodrow Wilson the Man and His Work" by Henry JonesFord; "The Real Colonel House" by Arthur D. Howden Smith; "The ForeignPolicy of Woodrow Wilson" by Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West. Inaddition, I wish to make acknowledgment to the following books forincidental assistance: "My Four Years in Germany" by James W. Gerard;"Woodrow Wilson, An Interpretation" by A. Maurice Low; "A People Awakened"by Charles Reade Bacon; "Woodrow Wilson" by Hester E. Hosford; "WhatReally Happened at Paris, " edited by Edward Mandell House and CharlesSeymour, and above all, to the public addresses of Woodrow Wilson. Imyself had furnished considerable data for various books on Woodrow Wilsonand have felt at liberty to make liberal use of some portions of thesesources as guide posts for my own narrative. 

PREFACE

Woodrow Wilson prefers not to be written about. His enemies may, and ofcourse will, say what they please, but he would like to have his friendshold their peace. He seems to think and feel that if he himself can keepsilent while his foes are talking, his friends should be equally stoical. He made this plain in October, 1920, when he learned that I had slippedaway from my office at the White House one night shortly before theelection and made a speech about him in a little Maryland town, Bethesda. He did not read the speech, I am sure he has never read it, but the factthat I had made any sort of speech about him, displeased him. That was oneof the few times in my long association with him that I found himdistinctly cold. He said nothing, but his silence was vocal. 

I suspect this book will share the fate of the Bethesda speech, will notbe read by Mr. Wilson. If this seems strange to those who do not know himpersonally, I can only say that "Woodrow Wilson is made that way. " Hecannot dramatize himself and shrinks from attempts of others to dramatizehim. "I will not write about myself, " is his invariable retort to friendswho urge him to publish his own story of the Paris Peace Conference. Hecraves the silence from others which he imposes upon himself. He is quitewilling to leave the assessment and interpretation of himself to time andposterity. Knowing all this I have not consulted him about this book. YetI have felt that the book should be written, because I am anxious that hiscontemporaries should know him as I have known him, not only as anindividual but also as the advocate of a set of great ideas and as theleader of great movements. If I can picture him, even imperfectly, as Ihave found him to be, both in himself and in his relationship to importantevents, I must believe that the portrait will correct some curiousmisapprehensions about him. 

For instance, there is a prevalent idea, an innocently ignorant opinion insome quarters, an all too sedulously cultivated report in other quarters, that he has been uniformly headstrong, impatient of advice, his mindhermetically closed to counsel from others. This book will expose theerror of that opinion; will show how, in his own words, his mind was "openand to let, " how he welcomed suggestions and criticism. Indeed I fear thatunless the reader ponders carefully what I have written he may glean theopposite idea, that sometimes the President had to be prodded to action, and that I represent myself as the chief prodder. 

The superficial reader may find countenance lent to this latter view inthe many notes of information and advice which I addressed to thePresident and in the record of his subsequent actions which were more orless in accord with the counsel contained in some of these notes. If thereader deduces from this the conclusion that I was the instigator of someof the President's important policies, he will misinterpret the facts andthe President's character and mental processes; if he concludes that I amtrying to represent myself as the instigator he will misunderstand mymotives in publishing these notes. 

These motives are: first, to tell the story of my association with Mr. Wilson, and part of the record is contained in these notes; secondly, toshow what liberty he allowed me to suggest and criticize; how, so far frombeing offended, he welcomed counsel. Having this privilege I exercised it. I conceived it as part of my duty as his secretary and friend to report tohim my own interpretations of facts and public opinion as I gathered thesefrom newspapers and conversations, and sometimes to suggest modes ofaction. These notes were memoranda for my chief's consideration. 

The reader will see how frankly critical some of these notes are. The merefact that the President permitted me to continue to write to him in a veinof candour that was frequently brusque and blunt, is the conclusive answerto the charge that he resented criticism. 

Contrary to the misrepresentations, he had from time to time manyadvisers. In most instances, I do not possess written reports of whatothers said orally and in writing, and therefore in this record, which isessentially concerned with my own official and personal relations withhim, I may seem to represent myself as a preponderating influence. This isneither the fact nor my intention. The public acts of Mr. Wilson werefrequently mosaics, made up of his own ideas and those of others. Mywritten notes were merely stones offered for the mosaic. Sometimes thestones were rejected, sometimes accepted and shaped by the master builderinto the pattern. 

It was a habit of Mr. Wilson's to meditate before taking action, to listento advice without comment, frequently without indicating whether or notthe idea broached by others had already occurred to him. We who knew himbest knew that often the idea had occurred to him and had been thought outmore lucidly than any adviser could state it. But he would test his ownviews by the touchstone of other minds' reactions to the situations andproblems which he was facing and would get the "slant" of other minds. 

He was always ahead of us all in his thinking. An admirer once said: "Youcould shut him up in an hermetically sealed room and trust him to reachthe right decision, " but as a matter of fact he did not work that way. Hesought counsel and considered it and acted on it or dismissed it accordingto his best judgment, for the responsibility for the final action was his, and he was boldly prepared to accept that responsibility andconscientiously careful not to abuse it by acting rashly. While he wouldon occasion make momentous decisions quickly and decisively, the habitualcharacter of his mind was deliberative. He wanted all the facts and so faras possible the contingencies. Younger men like myself could counselimmediate and drastic action, but even while we were advising we knew thathe would, without haste and without waste, calmly calculate his course. What, coming from us, were merely words, would, coming from him, constitute acts and a nation's destiny. He regarded himself as the"trustee of the people, " who should not act until he was sure he was rightand should then act with the decision and finality of fate itself. 

Of another misapprehension, namely, that Mr. Wilson lacks human warmth, Ishall let the book speak without much prefatory comment. I have done mywork ill indeed if there does not emerge from the pages a human-heartedman, a man whose passion it was to serve mankind. In his daily intercoursewith individuals he showed uniform consideration, at times deeptenderness, though he did not have in his possession the little bag oftricks which some politicians use so effectively: he did not clap men ontheir backs, call them by their first names, and profess to eachindividual he met that of all the men in the world this was the man whomhe most yearned to see. Perhaps he was too sincere for that; perhaps bynature too reserved; but I am convinced that he who reads this book willfeel that he has met a man whose public career was governed not merely bya great brain, but also by a great heart. I did not invent this character. I observed him for eleven years. 

CONTENTS

PREFACE

CHAPTERI. THE POLITICAL LABORATORYII. DOING THE POLITICAL CHORESIII. MY FIRST MEETING WITH THE POLITICAL BOSSIV. COLONEL HARVEY ON THE SCENEV. THE NEW JERSEY SALIENTVI. SOMETHING NEW IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNSVII. THE CRISIS OP THE CAMPAIGNVIII. THE END OP THE CAMPAIGNIX. A PARTY SPLITX. EXIT THE OLD GUARDXI. EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIPXII. COLONEL HARVEYXIII. THE "COCKED HAT" INCIDENTXIV. WILSON AND THE OLD GUARDXV. MR. BRYAN ISSUES A CHALLENGEXVI. THE BALTIMORE CONVENTIONXVII. FACING A SOLEMN RESPONSIBILITYXVIII. WILLIAM F. McCOMBSXIX. THE INAUGURATION OF 1913XX. MEXICOXXI. PANAMA TOLLSXXII. REFORMING THE CURRENCYXXIII. RENOMINATEDXXIV. THE ADAMSON LAWXXV. GERMAN PROPAGANDAXXVI. WILSON AND HUGHESXXVII. NEUTRALITYXXVIII. PREPAREDNESSXXIX. THE GREAT DECLARATIONXXX. CARRYING ONXXXI. THE PEN IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORDXXXII. COLONEL ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL WOODXXXIII. WILSON THE WARRIORXXXIV. GERMANY CAPITULATESXXXV. APPEAL FOR A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSXXXVI. THE GREAT ADVENTUREXXXVII. WILSON--THE LONE HANDXXXVIII. JAPAN--SHANTUNGXXXIX. IRELANDXL. PROHIBITIONXLI. THE TREATY FIGHTXLII. THE WESTERN TRIPXLIII. RESERVATIONSXLIV. WILSON--THE HUMAN BEINGXLV. THE SAN FRANCISCO CONVENTIONXLVI. THE LAST DAY

APPENDIX

INDEX

WOODROW WILSON AS I KNOW HIM

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL LABORATORY

My introduction to politics was in the Fifth Ward of Jersey City, NewJersey, which for many years was the "Bloody Angle" of politics of thecity in which I lived. Always Democratic, it had been for many years theheart and centre of what New Jersey Democrats were pleased to call thegreat Gibraltar of Democracy. The ward in which I lived was made up of theplainest sort of people, a veritable melting pot of all races, but with apredominance of Irish, Germans, and Italians, between whom it was, likeancient Gaul, divided into three parts. 

My dear father, Philip Tumulty, a wounded soldier of the Civil War, afterserving an apprenticeship as an iron moulder under a delightful, whole-souled Englishman, opened a little grocery store on Wayne Street, JerseyCity, where were laid the foundation stones of his modest fortune andwhere, by his fine common sense, poise, and judgment, he soon establishedhimself as the leader of a Democratic faction in that neighbourhood. Thismodest little place soon became a political laboratory for me. In theevening, around the plain, old-fashioned counters, seated upon barrels andboxes, the interesting characters of the neighbourhood gathered, representing as they did the leading active political forces in thatquaint cosmopolitan community. 

No matter how far back my memory turns, I cannot recall when I did nothear politics discussed--not ward politics only, but frequently thepolitics of the nation and the world. In that grocery store, from the lipsof the plainest folk who came there, were carried on serious discussionsof the tariff, the money question, our foreign relations, and all phasesof the then famous Venezuelan question, which in those days threatened toset two continents on fire. 

The make-up of the little "cabinet" or group which surrounded my fatherwas most interesting. There was Mr. Alexander Hamill, the father ofCongressman Hamill of Jersey City, a student of Queen's College in Irelandand who afterward taught in the National Schools of Ireland, a well-read, highly cultured, broad-minded man of affairs; and dear Uncle JimmieKelter, almost a centenarian, whose fine old gray hair gave him theappearance of a patriarch. Uncle Jimmie nightly revelled in the recital tothose who were present as ready listeners, his experience when he waspresent at a session of the House of Parliament in London and heard thefamous Irish statesman, Daniel O'Connell, denounce England's attitude ofinjustice toward Catholic emancipation. He loved to regale the littlegroup that encircled him by reciting from memory the great speech ofRobert Emmett from the dock, and excerpts from the classic speeches of theleading Irish orators like Curran, Sheridan, and Fox. 

While these discussions in the little store wended their uneasy way along, a spark of humour was often injected into them by the delightful banter ofa rollicking, good-natured Irishman, a big two-fisted fellow, generous-hearted and lovable, whom we affectionately called "Big Phil. " I can seehim now, standing like a great pyramid in the midst of the little group, every now and then throwing his head back in good-natured abandon, recounting wild and fantastic tales about the fairies and banshees of theOld Land from whence he had come. When his listeners would turn away, withskepticism written all over their countenances, he would turn to me, whoseyouthful enthusiasm made me an easy victim upon which to work his magicspell in the stories which he told of the wonders of the Old Land acrossthe sea. 

I loved these delightful little gatherings in whose deliberations my dearfather played so notable a part. Those kind folk, now off the stage, neverallowed the spirit of provincialism to guide their judgment or theirattitude toward great public affairs. I recall with pleasure theirtolerance, their largeness of view, and fine magnanimity which raisedevery question they discussed to a high level. They were a very simplefolk, but independent in their political actions and views. Into thatlittle group of free, independent political thinkers would often come awarning from the Democratic boss of the city that they must follow withundivided allegiance the organization's dictum in political matters andnot seek to lead opinion in the community in which they lived. Supremelyindifferent were these fine old chaps to those warnings, and unmindful ofpolitical consequences. They felt that they had left behind them a land ofoppression and they would not submit to tyrannous dictation in this freeland of ours, no matter who sought to exert it. 

In this political laboratory I came in contact with the raw materials ofpolitical life that, as an older man, I was soon to see moulded intopolitical action in a larger way in the years to come. I found in politicsthat the great policies of a nation are simply the policies and passionsof the ward extended. In the little discussions that took place in thatstore, I was, even as a youth, looking on from the side-lines, struck bythe fine, wholesome, generous spirit of my own father. Never would hepermit, for instance, in the matter of the discussion of Ireland--so dearto his heart--a shade of resentment or bitterness toward England toinfluence his judgment in the least, for he believed that no man could bea just judge in any matter where his mind was filled with passion; and soin this matter, the subject of such fierce controversy, as in every other, he held a judgment free and far away from his passionate antagonisms. Ifound in the simple life of the community where I was brought up the samehuman things, in a small way, that I was subsequently to come in contactwith in a larger way in the whirligig of political life in the Capitol ofthe Nation. I found the same relative bigness and the same relativesmallness, the same petty jealousies and rivalries which manifestthemselves in the larger fields of a great nation's life; the same goodnature, and the same deep humanity expressing itself in the same way, onlydifferently apparelled. 

One of the most interesting places in the world for the study of humancharacter is the country store or the city grocery. I was able as a boystanding behind the counter of the little grocery store to study people;and intimately to become acquainted with them and their daily lives andthe lives of their women and children. I never came in contact with theirdaily routine, their joys and sorrows, their bitter actualities and deeptragedies, without feeling rise in me a desire to be of service. Iremember many years ago, seated behind the counter of my father's grocerystore, with what passionate resentment I read the vivid headlines of themetropolitan newspapers and the ghastly accounts of the now famousHomestead Strike of 1892. Of course, I came to realize in after years thatthe headlines of a newspaper are not always in agreement with the actualfacts; but I do recall how intently I pored over every detail of thistragic story of industrial war and how, deep in my heart, I resented theefforts of a capitalistic system that would use its power in this unjust, inhuman way. Little did I realize as I pored over the story of thistragedy in that far-off day that some time, seated at my desk at the WhiteHouse in the office of the secretary to the President of the UnitedStates, I would have the pleasure of meeting face to face the leadingactor in this lurid drama, Mr. Andrew Carnegie himself, and of hearingfrom his own lips a human and intelligent recital of the events whichformed the interesting background of the Homestead Strike. 

CHAPTER II

DOING THE POLITICAL CHORES

For the young man who wishes to rise in the politics of a great city thereis no royal road to preferment but only a plain path of modest serviceuncomplainingly rendered. Of course, there seem to be exceptions to thisrule. At times it is possible for the scion of a great family to rise totemporary distinction in politics without a preliminary course in theschool of local politics, for as a Democratic boss once said to me: "Greatfamily names are fine window-dressers, " but in my own experience I haveseen the disappointing end of careers thus begun and have found thatsometimes after a great name has been temporarily used to meet certainpolitical emergencies, the would-be politician is quickly thrust aside tomake way for the less pretentious but more capable man. There is nothingpermanent or lasting about a place in politics gained in this adventitiousway. Of course, there sometimes come to high office men from militarycareers, or men, like the distinguished subject of this book, from fieldsapparently remote from practical politics, but such successes are due toan appealing personal force, or to exceptional genius which the youngaspirant had better not assume that he possesses. The general rule holdsgood that a political apprenticeship is as necessary and valuable as anindustrial apprenticeship. 

My first official connection with politics was as the financial secretaryof the Fifth Ward Democratic Club of Jersey City. My father had told methat if I intended to play an active part in politics, it would benecessary to begin modestly at the bottom of the ladder, to do thepolitical chores, as it were, which are a necessary part of wardorganization work. I recall those days with singular pleasure, for my workgave me an unusual opportunity to meet the privates in the ranks and tomake friendships that were permanent. 

The meetings of the Club were held each week in a modest club house, withpart of the meeting given over to addresses made by what were thenconsidered the leading men in the Democratic party. It is queer how theaverage political worker favours the senator, or the ex-judge, or theex-Congressman, as a speaker on these occasions. Ex-Congressman Gray, ofTexas (I doubt whether there ever was a congressman by that name), wouldoften be the headliner and he could be depended upon to draw a crowded andenthusiastic house. The knowledge and experience I gained at theseinspirational meetings were mighty helpful to me in the political life Ihad carved out for myself. I found that when you had convinced theseplain, everyday fellows that, although you were a college man, you werenot necessarily a highbrow, they were willing to serve you to the end. Itwas a valuable course in a great university. It was not very long until Iwas given my first opportunity, in 1896, to make my first political speechin behalf of Mr. Bryan, then the Democratic candidate for President. I wasnot able at that time to disentangle the intricacies of the difficultmoney problems, but I endeavoured, imperfectly at least, in the speeches Imade, to lay my finger on what I considered the great moral issue that laybehind the silver question in that memorable campaign--the attempt byeastern financial interests to dominate the Government of the UnitedStates. 

After my apprenticeship, begun as secretary of the Fifth Ward DemocraticClub, an incident happened which caused a sudden rise in my politicalstock. At a county convention I was given the opportunity of making thenominating speech for the Fifth Ward's candidate for street and watercommissioner--a bricklayer and a fine fellow--who was opposing the machinecandidate. It was a real effort on my part and caused me days and nightsof worry and preparation. Indeed, it seemed to me to be the great momentof my life. I vividly recall the incidents of what to me was a memorableoccasion. I distinctly remember that on the night of the Convention, withthe delegates from my ward, I faced an unfriendly and hostile audience, our candidate having aroused the opposition of the boss and hissatellites. While I felt that the attitude of the Convention was one ofopposition to our candidate, there was no evidence of unfriendliness orhostility to myself as the humble spokesman of the Fifth Ward. When Istood up to speak I realized that I had to "play up" to the spirit ofgenerosity which is always latent in a crowd such as I was addressing. Ibelieve I won, although my candidate, unfortunately, lost. My Irishbuoyancy and good nature brought me over the line. I felt that theaudience in the gallery and the delegates on the floor were with me, butunfortunately for my cause, the boss, who was always the dominatinginfluence of the Convention, was against me, and so we lost in thespirited fight we made. In this first skirmish of my political career Imade up my mind to meet defeat with good grace and, if possible, smilingly, and no sore spot or resentment over our defeat ever showeditself in my attitude toward the men who saw fit to oppose us. Evidently, the boss and his friends appreciated this attitude, for it was reported tome shortly after the Convention that I was to be given recognition and bythe boss's orders would soon be placed on the eligible list for futureconsideration in connection with a place on the legislative ticket. 

One lesson I learned was not to be embittered by defeat. Since then I haveseen too many cases of men so disgruntled at being worsted in their firstbattles that their political careers ended when they should have been justbeginning. 

CHAPTER III

MY FIRST MEETING WITH THE POLITICAL BOSS

After serving my apprenticeship as a ward worker, devoted friends from myhome ward urged my name upon the Democratic leader, Mr. Robert Davis, fora place upon the Democratic legislative ticket for Hudson County. I hadgrown to have a deep regard and affection for this fine old fellow. Whilehe was a boss in every sense, maintaining close relations with the PublicService Corporations of the state, he had an engaging human side. He neverpretended nor deceived. With his friends he was open, frank, generous, andhonourable in all his dealings, and especially kind to and considerate ofthe young men who became part of his working force. With his politicalenemies he was fair and decent. Many a time during a legislative session, when I was a member of the House of Assembly, word would come to us of theboss's desire that we should support this or that bill, behind whichcertain corporate interests lay. The orders, however, were clean andwithout a threat of any kind. He took no unfair advantage and made noreprisals when we failed to carry out his desires. 

While a member of the New Jersey Legislature, the name of Woodrow Wilsonbegan to be first discussed in the political world of New Jersey. It cameabout in this way: By reason of the normal Republican majority of thestate the nomination by the Legislature in those days of a Democraticcandidate for the United States senatorship was a mere compliment, acourtesy, a very meagre one indeed, and was generally paid to the old warhorses of democracy like James E. Martine, of Plainfield, New Jersey; butthe appearance of the doughty Colonel Harvey on the scene, at the 1907session of the New Jersey Legislature, gave a new turn to this custom. Arequest was made by Colonel Harvey and diplomatically conveyed by hisfriends to the Democratic members of the Legislature, that the honorarynomination for the United States senatorship at this session of theLegislature should be given to President Wilson of Princeton. It may beadded that I learned years afterward that Mr. Wilson was not a party toColonel Harvey's plans; that once he even sent a friend as an emissary toexplain to the Colonel that Mr. Wilson did not believe that the use of hisname in connection with political office was a service to him or toPrinceton University. 

The suggestion that Woodrow Wilson be given the nomination was hotlyresented by young men like myself in the Legislature. Frankly, I led theopposition to the man I was afterward to serve for eleven years in thecapacity of private secretary. The basis of my opposition to Mr. Wilsonfor this empty honour was the rumour that had been industriouslycirculated in the state House and elsewhere, that there was, as Mr. Dooleysays, "a plan afoot" by the big interests of New Jersey and New York tonominate Woodrow Wilson for the senatorship and then nominate him forgovernor of the state as a preliminary start for the Presidency. Iremember now, with the deepest chagrin and regret, having bitterlyassailed Woodrow Wilson's candidacy in a Democratic caucus which Iattended and how I denounced him for his alleged opposition to labour. Inview of my subsequent intimacy with Mr. Wilson and the knowledge gained ofhis great heart and his big vision in all matters affecting labour, Icannot now point with pride to the speech I then made attacking him. I amsure the dear doctor, away off in Princeton, never even heard of myopposition to him, although in my conceit I thought the state reverberatedwith the report of my unqualified and bitter opposition to him. In my poorvanity I thought that perhaps what I had said in my speech of oppositionto him had reached the cloisters of Princeton. As a matter of fact, henever heard about me or my speech, and afterward in the years of ourassociation he "joshed" me about my opposition to him and would often makeme very uncomfortable by recounting to his friends at the White House howeven his own secretary had opposed him when his name was first underconsideration for the United States senatorship in New Jersey. 

To me was given the honour of nominating at a joint session of the Senateand House Assembly the candidate opposed to Woodrow Wilson for the Senate, the Honourable Edwin E. Stevens. I recall the comparison I made betweenthe claims of Colonel Stevens, the strict party man, and those of WoodrowWilson, the Princeton professor. The speech nominating Woodrow Wilson atthe joint session of the Legislature was the shortest on record. It wasdelivered by a big generous fellow, John Baader, one of the Smith-Nugentmen from Essex County. When Essex County was called, he slowly rose to hisfeet and almost shamefacedly addressing the Speaker of the House, said, tremulously: "I nominate for the United States Senate Woodrow Wilson, ofPrinceton, " and then, amid silence, sat down. No applause greeted the nameof the man he nominated. It seemed as if the college professor had nofriends in the Legislature except the man who had put his name forward forthe nomination. 

Colonel Stevens won the honorary nomination and Woodrow Wilson wasdefeated. Colonel Harvey, disgruntled but not discouraged, packed up hiskit and left on the next train for New York. 

CHAPTER IV

COLONEL HARVEY ON THE SCENE

Although the intrepid Colonel Harvey was defeated in the first skirmish toadvance the cause of Woodrow Wilson, he continued to pursue his purpose toforce his personal choice upon the New Jersey Democracy. The approachinggubernatorial election in 1910 gave the Colonel his opportunity and hetook full advantage of it. 

Rumours began to circulate that the machine run by Davis, Smith, and Ross, the great Democratic triumvirate of the state, was determined to nominatethe Princeton president at any cost. Young men like Mark Sullivan, JohnTreacy, and myself, all of Hudson County, representing the liberal wing ofour party, were bitterly opposed to this effort. We suspected that the"Old Gang" was up to its old trick of foisting upon the Democrats of thestate a tool which they could use for their own advantage, who, under thename of the Democratic party, would do the bidding of the corporateinterests which had, under both the "regular" organizations, Democraticand Republican, found in New Jersey their most nutritious pastures. At ameeting held at the Lawyers' Club in New York, younger Democrats, likeJudge Silzer of Middlesex and myself, "plighted our political troth" andpledged our undying opposition to the candidacy of the Princetonpresident. As a result of our conferences we set in motion the progressivemachinery of the state in an intensive effort to force the nomination ofJudge Silzer in opposition to that of Woodrow Wilson. 

As soon as the Democratic boss of Hudson County, Bob Davis, one of theleaders in the Wilson movement in North Jersey, was apprized of theproposed action on our part, he set about to head it off, and as part ofhis plan of opposition he sent for me in an effort to wean me away fromthe Silzer candidacy. I refused to yield. Upon being interrogated by me asto his interest in Woodrow Wilson, Boss Davis stated that if we nominatedWoodrow Wilson there would be a big campaign fund put up for him by MosesTaylor Pyne, a trustee of Princeton University. Never before was theignorance of a boss made more manifest. As a matter of fact, at that verytime there was no more implacable foe of Woodrow Wilson in the state ofNew Jersey than Moses Taylor Pyne, who headed the opposition to Mr. Wilsonin the Princeton fight. 

Years after this incident the President and I often laughed at what musthave been the surprise and discomfiture of Boss Davis when he finallylearned the facts as to Moses Taylor Pyne's real feelings toward WoodrowWilson. Previous to the gubernatorial campaign I asked Boss Davis if hethought Woodrow Wilson would make a good governor. His reply wascharacteristic of the point of view of the boss in dealing with thesematters of moment to the people of the state. "How the hell do I knowwhether he'll make a good governor?" he replied; "he will make a goodcandidate, and that is the only thing that interests me. "

Shortly after, those of us who banded together to oppose the bosses intheir efforts to force Doctor Wilson upon us began to the feel pressure ofthe organization's influence. Many of our friends left us in despair andin fear of the power of the machine. The movement toward Woodrow Wilson inthe state was soon in full swing. The Davis-Smith-Nugent-Ross machine wasin fine working order on the day and the night of the Convention. 

I was not even a delegate to the Convention, but I was present and kept inclose touch by contact with my friends with every phase of the conventionfight. Colonel Harvey was again on the scene as the generalissimo of theWilson forces, quietly and stealthily moving about, lining up his forcesfor the memorable battle of the morrow. There was bitter but unorganizedopposition to the favourite son of the state machine, Woodrow Wilson. TheConvention itself presented an unusual situation and demonstrated morethan anything I ever saw the power of the "Old Gang" to do the thing itsmasters had in mind. As I look back upon the great event of thisconvention, the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for the governorship of NewJersey, I feel that destiny was inscrutably engaged there, working inmysterious ways its wonders to perform, working perhaps through strange, incongruous instrumentalities to bring the man of destiny into action, ledby those who were opposed to everything Woodrow Wilson stood for, opposedby those who were yearning for and striving for just the dawn of politicalliberalism that his advent in politics heralded. The conflict of theTrenton Convention about to be enacted was an illustration of the poet'sline, "Where ignorant armies clash by night. " The successful side of theConvention was fighting for what they least wanted; the defeated againstwhat they most wanted. Here in this convention, in truth, were inaggressive action the incongruities of politics and in full display werewitnessed the sardonic contrasts between the visible and the invisiblesituations in politics. All the Old Guard moving with Prussian precisionto the nomination of the man who was to destroy for a time the machinerule in New Jersey and inaugurate a new national era in politicalliberalism while all the liberal elements of the state, including fine oldJudge Westcott of Camden and young men like myself were sullen, helpless. Every progressive Democrat in the Convention was opposed to the nominationof the Princetonian, and every standpatter and Old Guardsman was in favourof Woodrow Wilson. On the convention floor, dominating the whole affair, stood ex-Senator James Smith, Jr. , of New Jersey, the spokesman of the"highbrow" candidate for governor, controlling the delegates from southand west Jersey. Handsome, cool, dignified, he rose from the floor of theconvention hall, and in rich, low tones, seconded the nomination of theman "he had never met, " the man he would not "presume" to claimacquaintance with, the man whose life had lain in other fields than his. Very close to him, "taking his orders, " and acting upon every suggestionthat came to him, sat Jim Nugent, grim, big-jawed, the giant full-back ofSmith's invincible team, the rising star of machine politics in NewJersey. Down the aisle sat the "Little Napoleon" of Hudson County, BobDavis, wearing a sardonic smile on his usually placid face, with his bigeyes riveted upon those in the Convention who were fighting desperatelyand against great odds the effort of the state machine to nominatePresident Wilson. Across the aisle from me sat "Plank-Shad" Thompson, ofGloucester, big and debonair, a thoroughly fine fellow socially, butalways ready to act upon and carry out every tip that came to him from themaster minds in the Convention--Davis and Smith. 

These were the leading actors in this political drama. Behind the lines, in the "offing, " was the Insurgent Group, young men like Mark Sullivan andJohn Treacy of Hudson, stout defenders of the liberal wing in theConvention, feeling sullen, beaten, and hopelessly impotent against themass attack of the machine forces. What a political medley was present inthis convention--plebeian and patrician, machine man and politicalidealist--all gathered together and fighting as leading characters andsupernumeraries in the political drama about to be enacted. 

Not three men outside of the leading actors in this great political dramahad ever seen the Princeton professor, although many had doubtless readhis speeches. I watched every move from the side-lines. The bosses, withconsummate precision, moved to the doing of the job in hand, working theirspell of threats and coercion upon a beaten, sullen, spiritless body ofdelegates. One could easily discern that there was no heart in thedelegates for the job on hand. To them, the active forces in theConvention, the Princeton president was, indeed, a man of mystery. Whocould solve the riddle of this political Sphinx? Who was this man Wilson?What were his purposes? What his ideals? These questions were troublingand perplexing the delegates. Colonel Harvey, the commander-in-chief ofthe Wilson forces, when interrogated by us, refused to answer. Howmasterfully the Old Guard staged every act of the drama, and thus broughtabout the nomination of the Princeton president. The Convention is at anend. Wilson has been nominated by a narrow margin; the delegates, bitterand resentful, are about to withdraw; the curtain is about to roll down onthe last scene. The chairman, Mr. John R. Hardin, the distinguished lawyerof Essex, is about to announce the final vote, when the clerk of theConvention, in a tone of voice that reached every part of the hall, announces in a most dramatic fashion: "We have just received word that Mr. Wilson, the candidate for the governorship, _and the next President of theUnited States_, has received word of his nomination; has left Princeton, and is now on his way to the Convention. " Excellent stage work. The voiceof the secretary making this dramatic statement was the voice of Jacob, but the deft hand behind this clever move was that of Colonel Harvey. Thisannouncement literally sets the Convention on fire. Bedlam breaks loose. The only sullen and indifferent ones in the hall are those of us who metdefeat a few hours before. For us, at least, the mystery is about to besolved. The Princeton professor has left the shades of the University toenter the Elysian Fields of politics. 

At the time the secretary's announcement was made I was in the rear of theconvention hall, trying to become reconciled to our defeat. I then wendedmy weary way to the stage and stood close to the band, which was busyentertaining the crowd until the arrival of Mr. Wilson. I wanted to obtainwhat newspaper men call a "close-up" of this man of mystery. 

What were my own feelings as I saw the candidate quietly walk to thespeakers' stand? I was now to see almost face to face for the first timethe man I had openly and bitterly denounced only a few hours before. Whatreaction of regret or pleasure did I experience as I beheld the vigorous, clean-cut, plainly garbed man, who now stood before me, cool and smiling?My first reaction of regret came when he uttered these words:

 I feel the responsibility of the occasion. Responsibility is proportionate to opportunity. It is a great opportunity to serve the State and Nation. I did not seek this nomination, I have made no pledge and have given no promises. If elected, I am left absolutely free to serve you with all singleness of purpose. It is a new era when these things can be said, and in connection with this I feel that the dominant idea of the moment is the responsibility of deserving. I will have to serve the state very well in order to deserve the honour of being at its head. .. . Did you ever experience the elation of a great hope, that you desire to do right because it is right and without thought of doing it for your own interest? At that period your hopes are unselfish. This in particular is a day of unselfish purpose for Democracy. The country has been universally misled and the people have begun to believe that there is something radically wrong. And now we should make this era of hope one of realization through the Democratic party. 

I had another reaction of regret when he said:

"Government is not a warfare of interests. We shall not gain our ends byheat and bitterness. " How simple the man, how modest, how cultured!Attempting none of the cheap "plays" of the old campaign orator, heimpressively proceeded with his thrilling speech, carrying his audiencewith him under the spell of his eloquent words. How tense the moment! Hiswords, spoken in tones so soft, so fine, in voice so well modulated, soheart-stirring. Only a few sentences are uttered and our souls are stirredto their very depths. It was not only what he said, but the simple heart-stirring way in which he said it. The great climax came when he utteredthese moving words: "The future is not for parties 'playing politics' butfor measures conceived in the largest spirit, pushed by parties whoseleaders are statesmen, not demagogues, who love not their offices buttheir duty and their opportunity for service. We are witnessing arenaissance of public spirit, a reawakening of sober public opinion, arevival of the power of the people, the beginning of an age of thoughtfulreconstruction that makes our thoughts hark back to the age in whichdemocracy was set up in America. With the new age we shall show a newspirit. We shall serve justice and candour and all things that make, forthe right. Is not our own party disciplined and made ready for this greattask? Shall we not forget ourselves in making it the instrument ofrighteousness for the state and for the nation?"

After this climax there was a short pause. "Go on, go on, " eagerly criedthe crowd. The personal magnetism of the man, his winning smile, so frankand so sincere, the light of his gray eyes, the fine poise of his well-shaped head, the beautiful rhythm of his vigorous sentences, held the menin the Convention breathless under their mystic spell. Men all about mecried in a frenzy: "Thank God, at last, a leader has come!"

Then, the great ending. Turning to the flag that hung over the speakers'stand, he said, in words so impressive as to bring almost a sob from hishearers:

 When I think of the flag which our ships carry, the only touch of colour about them, the only thing that moves as if it had a settled spirit in it--in their solid structure, it seems to me I see alternate strips of parchment upon which are written the rights of liberty and justice and strips of blood spilled to vindicate those rights and then--in the corner--a prediction of the blue serene into which every nation may swim which stands for these great things. 

The speech is over. Around me there is a swirling mass of men whose heartshad been touched by the great speech which is just at an end. Men stoodabout me with tears streaming from their eyes. Realizing that they hadjust stood in the presence of greatness, it seemed as if they had beenlifted out of the selfish miasma of politics, and, in the spirit of theCrusaders, were ready to dedicate themselves to the cause of liberatingtheir state from the bondage of special interests. 

As I turned to leave the convention hall there stood at my side old JohnCrandall, of Atlantic City, like myself a bitter, implacable foe ofWoodrow Wilson, in the Convention. I watched him intently to see whateffect the speech had had upon him. For a minute he was silent, as if in adream, and then, drawing himself up to his full height, with a cynicalsmile on his face, waving his hat and cane in the air, and at the sametime shaking his head in a self-accusing way, yelled at the top of hisvoice, "I am sixty-five years old, and still a damn fool!"

CHAPTER V

THE NEW JERSEY SALIENT

No campaign in New Jersey caused so great an interest as the gubernatorialcampaign of 1910. The introduction of a Princeton professor into thepolitical melee in New Jersey had given a novel touch to what ordinarilywould have been a routine affair. The prologue to the great drama, thevarious scenes of which were now to unfold before the voters of the state, had been enacted at the Democratic Convention at Trenton under themasterly direction of the members of the Democratic Old Guard of thestate. New Jersey had long been noted throughout the country as the"Mother of Trusts", and the nesting place of Privilege. Through theiralliance and partnership with the political bosses of both parties the so-called corporate interests had been for many years successful, against thegreatest pressure of public opinion, in blocking the passage ofprogressive legislation. 

Liberal-minded men in the state had for many years been carrying on anagitation for the enactment into law of legislation that would makepossible the following great needs:

 1. The passage of a Direct Primary Act. 2. The passage of an Employers' Liability Act. 3. The regulation of Public Utilities. 4. The passage of a Corrupt Practices Act. 

These were matters within the scope of state legislation, and to these wasadded an agitation for a fifth reform, which, of course, could beaccomplished only through an amendment to the Constitution of the UnitedStates, the election of United States senators by vote of the people. 

In the old days in New Jersey, now happily gone, the days when thegranting of special corporation charters was the vogue, a sort ofpolitical suzerainty was set up by Railroad and Public Service interests. Every election was, in its last analysis, a solemn referendum upon thequestion as to which corporate interest should control legislation--whether the Pennsylvania Railroad, whose master mind was the Republicanleader of the state, United States Senator Sewall, or the Public Serviceinterests, whose votaries and friends were Senator Smith of New Jersey, and Milan Ross, Sr. , of Middlesex County. 

While these corporate interests fought among themselves over the matter ofa United States senatorship or the governorship of a state, they were atone in their unrelenting, bitter, and highly organized opposition to thepassage of what in this day we call by the highly dignified name of SocialWelfare Legislation. The voices of those liberal-minded men and women ofthe state, who, year after year, fought for this legislation, were likevoices crying in the wilderness. An illustration of corporate oppositionwas the unrelenting attitude of the Special Interest group of the state tothe passage of the Employers' Liability Act. Every decent, progressive, humane man in the state felt that the old, barbaric, Fellow-Servantdoctrine should be changed and that there should be substituted for it amore humane, wholesome, modern doctrine. Nearly every state in the Unionhad already recognized the injustice of the old rule, but the privilegedinterests in New Jersey could not be moved in their bitter and implacableopposition to it, and for over half a century they had succeeded inpreventing its enactment into law. Progressives or New Idea Republicans, high in the councils of that party, had fought with their Democraticbrethren to pass this legislation, but always without result. At lastthere came a revolt in the Republican party, brought about and led bysturdy Republicans like Everett Colby of Essex, and William P. Martin ofthe same county; George Record and Mark M. Fagan of my own county, Hudson. Out of this split came the establishment in the ranks of the Republicanparty itself of a faction which called itself the New Idea branch of theRepublican party. The campaign for humane legislation within the ranks ofthe G. O. P. Was at last begun in real fighting fashion. It was theirrepressible conflict between the old and the new, between those whobelieved human rights are superior to and take precedence over propertyrights. The conflict could not be stayed; its leaders could not berestrained. These men, Colby, Record, Martin, and Fagan, were the sowersof the Progressive seed which Woodrow Wilson, by his genius for leadershipand constructive action along humane lines, was soon to harvest. Hiscandidacy, therefore, admirably fitted into the interesting situation. 

When the convention that nominated Woodrow Wilson had adjourned, aconvention wholly dominated by reactionary bosses, it seemed as ifprogress and every fine thing for which the Progressives had worked hadbeen put finally to sleep. Behind the selection of the Princetonian andhis candidacy lay the Old Guard who thought the Professor could be used asa shield for their strategy. The Progressives, both Democratic andRepublican, had witnessed the scenes enacted at the Democratic Conventionat Trenton with breaking hearts. They were about to lose hope. They didnot know that the candidate had at the outset served notice on the OldGuard that if he were nominated he must be a free man to do nobody'sbidding, to serve no interests except those of the people of the state;but the Old Guard had not published this. 

The Republican candidate, nominated at the time Woodrow Wilson wasselected, was a most pleasant, kindly, genial man from Passaic, Mr. VivianM. Lewis, who had just retired as banking commissioner for the state. Byclever plays to the Progressives he had, at least temporarily, broughttogether the various progressive elements of the state. This movementapparently was aided by the Democratic candidate's reluctance in the earlydays of the campaign to speak out boldly against the domination of theDemocratic party by the bosses or the Old Guard. 

CHAPTER VI

SOMETHING NEW IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

Woodrow Wilson opened his gubernatorial campaign with a speech in JerseyCity, my home town. It was a distinct disappointment to those who attendedthe meeting. His speech in accepting the nomination had touched us deeplyand had aroused in us great expectations, but after the Jersey City speechwe were depressed in spirit, for it seemed to us that he was evading thereal issues of the campaign. I was most anxious to meet the candidate andgive him, if he invited it, my impressions of this speech. A dinner givento complete the ceremonies attendant upon the purchase of the Caldwellresidence of Grover Cleveland gave me the first opportunity to meet thepresident of Princeton in an intimate way. Mr. Wilson's first wife, a mostdelightful woman, made the introduction possible. As I fondly look backupon this meeting, I vividly recall my impressions of the man who had justbeen nominated for the governorship of the state in a convention in whichI had bitterly opposed him. 

The democratic bearing of the man, his warmth of manner, charm, and kindlybearing were the first things that attracted me to him. There was nocoldness or austerity about him, nor was he what the politicians wouldcall "high-browish. " He impressed me as a plain, unaffected, affablegentleman, who was most anxious to receive advice and suggestion from anyquarter. He made us doubly welcome by saying that he had heard a greatdeal of favourable comment about the work of Judge Sullivan and myself inthe Legislature. This made us feel perfectly at home, and this frankmanner of dealing with us opened the way for the suggestions we desired tomake to him as to the attitude we younger Democrats thought he shouldassume on what we believed were the vital, progressive issues of thecampaign. 

When he was informed that I was present at his first meeting a few nightsbefore in Jersey City, he came over to me and in a most friendly way said:"What did you really think of my speech?" For a moment I was embarrassed, and yet the frankness of the man was compelling and so I said: "Doctor, doyou really desire an honest opinion of that speech? I really want to serveyou but I can do so only by speaking frankly. " He replied: "That is what Imost desire. " "Well, " I said, "your speech was most disappointing. " Istopped suddenly, feeling that I had done enough damage to the Professor'sfeelings. But he urged: "Please tell me what your criticism is. What Imost need is honesty and frankness. You cannot hurt my feelings bytruthfully expressing your opinion. Don't forget that I am an amateur atthis game and need advice and guidance. " Encouraged by this suggestion, Iproceeded to tell him what I considered the principal defects of hisopening speech at Jersey City. I told him that there was a lack ofdefiniteness in it which gave rise to the impression that he was trying toevade a discussion of the moral issues of the campaign, among them, ofmajor importance, being the regulation of Public Utilities and the passageof an Employers' Liability Act. Briefly sketching for him our legislativesituation, I gave him the facts with reference to those large measures ofpublic interest; how, for many years, in face of constant agitation, theOld Guard had prevented the enactment of these measures into law, and how, therefore, his failure to discuss these matters in his first speech hadcaused a grave feeling of unrest in the progressive ranks of both partiesin New Jersey. 

[Illustration:

 The White House Washington

 Cornish, N. H. , July 3, 1915

 My dear Tumulty:

 I am heartily obliged to you for your telegrams. It is characteristic of you to keep my mind free by such messages. I am really having a most refreshing and rewarding time and am very thankful to get it. I hope that you are not having depressing weather in Washington and that you are finding it possible to make satisfactory arrangements for the family, so that we can have the pleasure of having you with us at the White House when I get back. 

 With warmest messages from us all, Affectionately yours, (signed) Woodrow Wilson

 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty Washington, D. C. 

This letter reveals the warm personal relations between the President andhis secretary. ]

He listened with keen attention and then modestly remarked: "I value veryhighly this tip and you may rest assured I shall cover these matters in mynext speech. I meant that speech to be general. "

In my ignorance of things past I did not know that the candidate hadhimself written the platform adopted by the Trenton Convention, and in myignorance of the future I did not then know that one of the boldest andmost remarkable political campaigns in America was to be conducted on thatplatform, and that after the election and inauguration of the nominee thechief business of the legislation was destined to be the enactment intolaw of each of the planks of the platform, a complete and itemizedfulfilment of preëlection promises, unusual in the history of Americanpolitics. At the time of my first conversation with the nominee I onlyknew that the Convention had been dominated by the reactionary elements inthe party, that under this domination it had stolen the thunder of theprogressive elements of the party and of the New Idea Republicans, andthat the platform had been practically ignored by the candidate in hisfirst campaign speech. In these circumstances, and smarting as I was underthe recollection of recent defeat, it is not strange that I thought Idetected the old political ruse of dressing the wolf in sheep's clothing, of using handsome pledges as a mask to deceive the gullible, and that Iassumed that this scholarly amateur in politics was being used for theirown purposes by masters and veterans in the old game of thimblerig. 

The candidate soon struck his gait and astonished me and all New Jerseywith the vigour, frankness, and lucidity of his speeches of exposition andappeal. No campaign in years in New Jersey had roused such universalinterest. There was no mistaking the character and enthusiasm of thegreeting the candidate received every place he spoke, nor the response histhrilling speeches evoked all over the state. Those who had gathered theidea that the head of the great university would appear pedantic and standstiff-necked upon an academic pedestal from which he would talk over theheads of the common people were forced, by the fighting, aggressiveattitude of the Doctor, to revise their old estimates. The campaign hadonly begun when the leading newspapers of the country, particularly thelarge dailies of New York, were taking an interest in the New Jerseyfight. 

Those of us who doubted Woodrow Wilson's sincerity and his sympathy forthe great progressive measures for which we had been fighting in the NewJersey Legislature were soon put at ease by the developments of hiscampaign and his sympathetic attitude toward the things we had so much atheart. 

No candidate for governor in New Jersey had ever made so striking andmoving an appeal. Forgetting and ignoring the old slogans and shibboleths, he appealed to the hearts and consciences of the people of the state. Hishomely illustrations evoked expressions of delight, until it seemed as ifthis newcomer in the politics of our state had a better knowledge of thepsychology of the ordinary crowd than the old stagers who had spent theirlives in politics. His illustrations always went home. 

For instance, speaking of progress, Doctor Wilson said that much dependedupon the action of the one who is supposed to be progressive. "I canrecall, " he would say in trying to make his point, "the picture of a poordevil of a donkey on a treadmill. He keeps on tramping, tramping, tramping, but he never gets anywhere. But, " he continued, "there is acertain elephant that's tramping, too, and how much progress is itmaking?" And then, again, he would grow solemn when he spoke of theaverage man. Turning aside from the humorous, he would strike a seriousnote like this one:

 You know that communities are not distinguished by exceptional men. They are distinguished by the average of their citizenship. I often think of the poor man when he goes to vote: a moral unit in his lonely dignity. 

 The deepest conviction and passion of my heart is that the common people, by which I mean all of us, are to be absolutely trusted. The peculiarity of some representatives, particularly those of the Republican party, is that when they talk about the people, they obviously do not include themselves. Now if, when you think of the people, you are not thinking about yourself, then you do not belong in America. 

 When I look back at the processes of history, when I look back at the genesis of America, I see this written over every page, that the nations are renewed from the bottom, not from the top; that the genius which springs up from the ranks of unknown men is the genius which renews the youth and the energy of the people; and in every age of the world, where you stop the courses of the blood from the roots, you injure the great, useful structure to the extent that atrophy, death, and decay are sure to ensue. This is the reason that an hereditary monarchy does not work; that is the reason that an hereditary aristocracy does not work; that is the reason that everything of that sort is full of corruption and ready to decay. 

 So I say that our challenge of to-day is to include in the partnership all those great bodies of unnamed men who are going to produce our future leaders and renew the future energies of America. And as I confess that, as I confess my belief in the common man, I know what I am saying. The man who is swimming against the stream knows the strength of it. The man who is in the mêlée knows what blows are being struck and what blood is being drawn. The man who is on the make is a judge of what is happening in America, not the man who has made; not the man who has emerged from the flood, not the man who is standing on the bank, looking on, but the man who is struggling for his life and for the lives of those who are dearer to him than himself. That is the man whose judgment will tell you what is going on in America, and that is the man by whose judgment I for one wish to be guided--so that as the tasks multiply and the days come when all will seem confusion and dismay, we may lift up our eyes to the hills out of these dark valleys where the crags of special privilege overshadow and darken our path, to where the sun gleams through the great passage in the broken cliffs, the sun of God, the sun meant to regenerate men, the sun meant to liberate them from their passion and despair and to lift us to those uplands which are the promised land of every man who desires liberty and achievement. 

Speaking for the necessity of corporate reform in business, he said:

 I am not objecting to the size of these corporations. Nothing is big enough to scare me. What I am objecting to is that the Government should give them exceptional advantages, which enables them to succeed and does not put them on the same footing as other people. I think those great touring cars, for example, which are labelled "Seeing New York, " are too big for the streets. You have almost to walk around the block to get away from them, and size has a great deal to do with the trouble if you are trying to get out of the way. But I have no objection on that account to the ordinary automobile properly handled by a man of conscience who is also a gentleman. I have no objection to the size, power, and beauty of an automobile. I am interested, however, in the size and conscience of the men who handle them, and what I object to is that some corporation men are taking "joy-rides" in their corporations. 

Time and time again men were reminded of the great speeches of Lincoln andthought they saw his fine spirit breathing through sentences like these:

 Gentlemen, we are not working for to-day, we are not working for our own interest, we are all going to pass away. But think of what is involved. Here are the tradition, and the fame, and the prosperity, and the purity, and the peace of a great nation involved. For the time being we are that nation, but the generations that are behind us are pointing us forward to the path and saying:

 "Remember the great traditions of the American people, " and all those unborn children that will constitute the generations that are ahead will look back to us, either at those who serve them or at those who betray them. Will any man in such circumstances think it worthy to stand and not try to do what is possible in so great a cause, to save a country, to purify a polity, to set up vast reforms which will increase the happiness of mankind? God forbid that I should either be daunted or turned away from a great task like this. 

Speaking of the candidate who opposed him:

 I have been informed that he has the best of me in looks. Now, it is not always the useful horse that is most beautiful. If I had a big load to be drawn some distance I should select one of those big, shaggy kinds of horses, not much for beauty but strong of pull. 

On one occasion, when he had been talking about his and Mr. Lewis'sdifferent conceptions of the "constitutional governor", and telling hisaudience how he, if elected, would interpret the election as a mandatefrom the people to assist in and direct legislation in the interests ofthe people of New Jersey at large, he paused an instant and then in thoseincisive tones and with that compression of the lips which marked his morebellicose words, he said curtly: "If you don't want that kind of agovernor, don't elect me. "

Excerpts from the speeches cannot do justice to this remarkable campaign, which Woodrow Wilson himself, after he had been twice elected President ofthe United States, considered the most satisfying of his politicalcampaigns, because the most systematic and basic. As Presidentialcandidate he had to cover a wide territory and touch only the high spotsin the national issues, but in his gubernatorial campaign he spoke inevery county of the state and in some counties several times, and hisspeeches grew out of each other and were connected with each other in away that made them a popular treatise on self-government. He used notechnical jargon and none of the stereotyped bombast of the usualpolitical campaign. He had a theme which he wanted to expound to thepeople of New Jersey, which theme was the nature and character of freegovernment, how it had been lost in New Jersey through the complicatedinvolvements of invisible government, manipulated from behind the scenesby adroit representatives of the corporate interest working in conjunctionwith the old political machines; how under this clever manipulationlegislators had ceased to represent the electorate and were, as he calledthem, only "errand boys" to do the bidding of the real rulers of NewJersey, many of whom were not even residents of the state, and how freegovernment could be restored to New Jersey through responsible leadership. He was making an application to practical politics of the fundamentalprinciples of responsible government which he had analyzed in his earlierwritings, including the book on "Congressional Government. " Beneath theconcrete campaign issues in New Jersey he saw the fundamental principlesof Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independenceand the Constitution of the United States. His trained habit of thinkingthrough concrete facts to basic principles was serving him well in thiscampaign; his trained habit of clear exposition in the Princeton lecturehall was serving him well. People heard from him political speaking of anew kind; full of weighty instruction and yet so simply phrased and soaptly illustrated that the simplest minded could follow the train ofreasoning; profound in political philosophy and yet at every stephumanized by one who believed government the most human of things becauseconcerned with the happiness and welfare of individuals; sometimes hespoke in parables, homely anecdotes so applied that all could understand;sometimes he was caustic when he commented on the excessive zeal ofcorporations for strict constitutionalism, meaning thereby only suchlegislation and judicial interpretations as would defend their propertyrights--how they had secured those rights being a question not discussedby these gentlemen; sometimes, though not frequently, there would bepurple patches of eloquence, particularly when descanting on the longstruggle of the inarticulate masses for political representation. 

One of the surprises of the campaign to those who had known him as anorator of classic eloquence was the comparative infrequency of rhetoricalperiods. It was as if he were now too deeply engaged with actualities tochisel and polish his sentences. Of the many anecdotes which he toldduring the campaign one of his favourites was of the Irishman digging acellar, who when asked what he was doing said: "I'm letting the darknessout. " Woodrow Wilson told the people of New Jersey that he was "lettingthe darkness out" of the New Jersey political situation. "Pitilesspublicity" was one of his many phrases coined in the campaign whichquickly found currency, not only in New Jersey but throughout the country, for presently the United States at large began to realize that what wasgoing on in New Jersey was symbolical of the situation throughout thecountry, a tremendous struggle to restore popular government to thepeople. Since the founders of the Republic expounded free institutions tothe first electorates of this country there had probably been no politicalcampaign which went so directly to the roots of free representativegovernment and how to get it as that campaign which Woodrow Wilsonconducted in New Jersey in the autumn of 1910. 

CHAPTER VII

THE CRISIS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The crisis of the campaign came when George L. Record, Progressive leaderin the ranks of the Republican party in Hudson County, uttered a ringingchallenge to the Democratic candidate to debate the issues of the campaignwith him. The challenge contained an alternative proposition that theDemocratic candidate either meet Mr. Record in joint debate in variousparts of the state or that he answer certain questions with reference tothe control of the Democratic party by what Mr. Record called the "OldGuard. " Mr. Record's letter and challenge created a profound sensationthroughout the state and brought hope and comfort to the ranks of theRepublican party. 

Record emphasized the Old Guard's control of the convention at whichWilson was nominated, basing most of his questions upon this character ofpolitical control, and openly challenging Wilson, the Democraticcandidate, to say whether the elements that were dominant at Trenton inthe Convention would be permitted by him, in case of his election, toinfluence his action as governor. 

For several days after the letter containing the challenge reached theDemocratic candidate, there was a great deal of apprehension in the ranksof the Democratic party lest the candidate should decide to ignore theRecord challenge, thus giving aid and comfort to the enemies ofprogressivism in the state, or, on the other hand, that he would accept itand thus give Mr. Record, who was a most resourceful public speaker and aleading exponent of liberalism in the state, a chance to outwit him inpublic debate. The latter practically demanded of the Democratic candidatethat he repudiate not only the Old Guard but the active management of hiscampaign which had been taken over by James R. Nugent, one of the leadersof Essex County, who daily accompanied the Democratic candidate on histour of the state. For a time it looked as if Doctor Wilson would ignoreentirely the Record challenge. It was plainly evident from all sides thatwhat appeared to be his reluctance to take a stand in the matter hadturned support away at a time when the sentiment of the state was rapidlyflowing his way. 

I accompanied the candidate on an automobile tour of the state and in ourlittle talks I sought to find out, in a diplomatic way, just how his mindwas running on the Record challenge and how he intended to meet it. In theautomobile with us on this tour was James R. Nugent, then the statechairman of the Democratic Committee. I ascertained that even he knewnothing about the Princetonian's attitude toward the Record challenge. Asignificant remark which the candidate dropped "between meetings" gave methe first intimation that the Democratic candidate was, to use a baseballexpression, "on to the Record curve" and that he would answer him in soemphatic and overwhelming a fashion that the Republican campaign wouldnever entirely recover from the blow. 

One day while we were seated in the tonneau of the automobile discussingthe Record challenge, Mr. Wilson pointed his finger at Jim Nugent andsaid, very significantly: "I intend to reply to Mr. Record, but I am surethat it will hurt the feelings of this fine fellow. "

A few days later, without consulting any one, Mr. Wilson replied toRecord's challenge. It was a definite, clean-cut, unequivocal repudiationof the Old Guard's control of the Democratic party, and a convincinganswer to every question that had been put to him. It rang true. Old-lineRepublicans, after reading this conclusive reply, shook their heads andsaid, regretfully, "Damn Record; the campaign's over. "

It was plainly evident that the crisis of the campaign had been safelypassed and that Mr. Wilson was on his way to the governorship. 

In his challenge Mr. Record had addressed to Doctor Wilson nineteenquestions. Mr. Wilson's reply was in part as follows:

 You wish to know what my relations would be with the Democrats whose power and influence you fear should I be elected governor, particularly in such important matters as appointments and the signing of bills, and I am very glad to tell you. If elected I shall not either in the matter of appointments to office, or assent to legislation, or in shaping any part of the policy of my administration, submit to the dictation of any person, or persons, "special interests, " or organizations. I will always welcome advice and suggestions from any citizens, whether boss, leader, organization man, or plain citizen, and I shall confidently seek the advice of influential and disinterested men representative of the communities and disconnected from political organizations entirely; but all suggestions and all advice will be considered on its merits and no additional weight will be given to any man's advice because of his exercising, or supposing that he exercises, some sort of political influence or control. I should deem myself for ever disgraced should I, in even the slightest degree, coöperate in any such system. I regard myself as pledged to the regeneration of the Democratic party. 

Mr. Record also inquired: "Do you admit that the boss system exists as Ihave described it?" "If so, how do you propose to abolish it?"

Mr. Wilson said:

 Of course I admit it. Its existence is notorious. I have made it my business for many years to observe and understand that system, and I hate it as thoroughly as I understand it. You are quite right in saying that the system is bipartisan; that it constitutes "the most dangerous condition in the public life of our state and nation to- day"; and that it has virtually, for the time being, "destroyed representative government and in its place set up a government of privilege. " I would propose to abolish it by the reforms suggested in the Democratic platform, by the election to office of men who will refuse to submit to it, and who will lend all their energies to break it up, and by pitiless publicity. 

Still hoping to corner the Governor, Mr. Record named the bosses:

 In referring to the Board of Guardians, do you mean such Republican leaders as Baird, Murphy, Kean, and Stokes? Wherein do the relations to the special interests of such leaders differ from the relation to the same interests of such Democratic leaders as Smith, Nugent, and Davis?

Mr. Wilson, answering this, said:

 I refer to the men you name. They [meaning Baird, Murphy, Kean, Stokes] differ from the others in this, that they are in control of the government of the state while the others are not, and cannot be if the present Democratic ticket is elected. 

In reply to Mr. Record's question: "Will you join me in denouncing theDemocratic 'overlords' as parties to a political boss system?" DoctorWilson replied: "Certainly I will join you in denouncing them--or any oneof either party who attempts any outrages against the Government andpublic morality. "

At this time I was in close touch with the managers of the Wilsoncampaign, including Smith, Nugent, and Davis. While they admired the finestrategy that lay back of the Democratic candidate's reply to Mr. Record, they looked upon it as a mere gesture upon the part of Mr. Wilson andscorned to believe that his reply to Mr. Record constituted a challenge totheir leadership. They did not show any evidences of dismay or chagrin atthe courageous attitude taken by Doctor Wilson. They simply smiled andshrugged their shoulders and said: "This is a great campaign play. "

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

The final meeting of the gubernatorial campaign was held in a largeauditorium in Newark, New Jersey, where the last appeal was made by theDemocratic candidate. It was a meeting filled with emotionalism such as Ihad never seen in a campaign before. The Democratic candidate, WoodrowWilson, had covered every section of the state and it was easy for eventhe casual observer to note the rising tide in his favour. The campaignhad, indeed, become a crusade; his eloquence and sledge-hammer blows atthe opposition having cut our party lines asunder. I was present at thefinal meeting and took my place in the wings of the theatre or auditorium, alongside of Senator Smith, the Democratic chieftain who a few weeksbefore had, in a masterful fashion, manipulated the workings of theConvention at Trenton in such a way as to make the Doctor's nominationpossible. Mr. Wilson's speech on this occasion was a profession of faithin the people, in the plain people, those "whose names never emerged intothe headlines of newspapers. " When he said in a delightful sort of banterto his audience, "I want you to take a sportsman's chance on me, " therewent up a shout of approval which could be heard as far as the hills ofold Bergen. 

The peroration of his final speech, spoken in a tone of voice that seemednot only to reach every ear but, in fact, to touch every heart, was asfollows:

 We have begun a fight that, it may be, will take many a generation to complete, the fight against privilege; but you know that men are not put into this world to go the path of ease. They are put into this world to go the path of pain and struggle. No man would wish to sit idly by and lose the opportunity to take part in such a struggle. All through the centuries there has been this slow, painful struggle forward, forward, up, up, a little at a time, along the entire incline, the interminable way which leads to the perfection of force, to the real seat of justice and honour. 

 There are men who have fallen by the way; blood without stint has been shed; men have sacrificed everything in this sometimes blind, but always instinctive and constant struggle, and America has undertaken to lead the way; America has undertaken to be the haven of hope, the opportunity for all men. 

 Don't look forward too much. Don't look at the road ahead of you in dismay. Look at the road behind you. Don't you see how far up the hill we have come? Don't you see what those low and damp miasmatic levels were from which we have slowly led the way? Don't you see the rows of men come, not upon the lower level, but upon the upper, like the rays of the rising sun? Don't you see the light starting and don't you see the light illuminating all nations?

 Don't you know that you are coming more and more into the beauty of its radiance? Don't you know that the past is for ever behind us, that we have passed many kinds of evils no longer possible, that we have achieved great ends and have almost seen their fruition in free America? Don't forget the road that you have trod, but, remembering it and looking back for reassurance, look forward with confidence and charity to your fellow men one at a time as you pass them along the road, and see those who are willing to lead you, and say, "We do not believe you know the whole road. We know that you are no prophet, we know that you are no seer, but we believe that you know the direction and are leading us in that direction, though it costs you your life, provided it does not cost you your honour. "

 And then trust your guides, imperfect as they are, and some day, when we all are dead, men will come and point at the distant upland with a great shout of joy and triumph and thank God that there were men who undertook to lead in the struggle. What difference does it make if we ourselves do not reach the uplands? We have given our lives to the enterprise. The world is made happier and humankind better because we have lived. 

At the end of this memorable and touching speech old Senator James Smith, seated alongside of me, pulled me by the coat and, in a voice just above awhisper and with tears in his eyes, said: "That is a great man, Mr. Tumulty. He is destined for great things. "

It did not seem possible on this memorable night that within a few daysthese two Democratic chieftains would be challenging each other andengaging in a desperate struggle to decide the question of Democraticleadership in the state. 

CHAPTER IX

A PARTY SPLIT

All the prophecies and predictions of the political seers and philosophersof New Jersey, many of them of course feeling their own partisan pulse, were annihilated and set adrift by the happenings in New Jersey on thefirst Tuesday in November, 1910. Woodrow Wilson, college professor, man ofmystery, political recluse, the nominee of the most standpat Democraticconvention of many years, had been chosen the leader of the people of thestate by the unprecedented majority of 39, 000, and was wearing the laurelsof victory. The old bosses and leaders chuckled and smiled; they were soonto have a Roman holiday under the aegis of the Wilson Administration. 

There were many surprises in the Wilson victory. The Democrats awoke onthe day after the election to find that they had not only won thegovernorship of the state, but their joy was unbounded to find that theyhad captured the Lower House of the Legislature that would have theelection, under the preferential primary system just adopted, of a UnitedStates senator. Therein lay the fly in the ointment. Never in theirwildest dreams or vain imaginings did the leaders of the Democratic partybelieve that there was the slightest chance even under the most favourablecircumstances of carrying a majority of the vote of the state for theDemocratic choice, James E. Martine, of Plainfield. 

The suggestion that it was possible to elect a Democrat to the UnitedStates Senate was considered a form of political heresy. The nominationfor the Senate had been thrown about the state until torn and tatteredalmost beyond repair; it was finally taken up and salvaged by that sturdyold Democrat of Union County, Jim Martine. Even I had received the offerof the senatorial toga, but the one who brought the nomination to me wasrudely cast out of my office. The question was: What would be the attitudeof the new Democratic leader, Woodrow Wilson, toward the preferentialchoice, Martine? Would the vote at the election be considered as havingthe full virtue and vigour of a solemn referendum or was it to beconsidered as Senator Smith would have it, a sort of practical jokeperpetrated upon the electors? Soon the opinion of the people of the statebegan to express itself in no uncertain way, demanding the carrying out ofthe "solemn covenant" of the election, only to be answered by thechallenge of Senator Smith and his friends to enter the field againstMartine, the choice at the election. 

This business pitchforked the Governor-elect prematurely into the rough-and-tumble of "politics as she is, " not always a dainty game. As I reviewin retrospect this famous chapter of state history, which, because of thesubsequent supreme distinction of one of the parties to the contest, became a chapter in national history, I realize the almost patheticsituation of Mr. Wilson. He had called himself an amateur in politics, andsuch he was in the practical details and involutions of the great Americangame, though in his campaign he had shown himself a master of politicaldebate. In the ordinary course of events he would have been allowed twomonths between his election and inauguration to begin an orderlyadjustment to the new life, to make a gradual transition from the comelyproprieties of an academic chair to the catch-as-catch-can methods of thepolitical wrestling mat, to get acquainted with the men and problems ofthe new career. But the Smith-Martine affair gave birth prematurely to animmediate occasion for a fight. 

As president of Princeton, Doctor Wilson had proved that he was not averseto a fight when a fight was necessary and when it was distinctly hisaffair, but he may well have paused to consider whether the Smith-Martinebusiness was his affair. One of his favourite stories in later years wasof the Irishman who entered a saloon and seeing two men in a tangle offists and writhing legs and bloody heads on the floor at the rear of thesaloon, turned to the barkeeper and asked: "Is this a private fight, orcan anybody git into it?" A more politic man than Woodrow Wilson and oneless sensitive to moral duty, might well have argued that this contest wasthe business of the Legislature, not of the Governor. Many a governor-elect would have avoided the issue on this unquestionably sound legalprinciple, and friends in Princeton were in fact advising Mr. Wilson toprecisely this course, the course of neutrality. It would not be strangeif neutrality, aloofness, had presented a rather attractive picture attimes to Mr. Wilson's mind. Why should he gratuitously take a partisanposition between the factions which would inevitably win for him theenmity of a strong element within the party? Which would also win for himthe unpleasant reputation of ingratitude? For though he had at the firstovertures from Senator Smith and his friends made it as clear as languagecan make anything that he could accept the nomination only with theexplicit understanding that acceptance should establish no obligations ofpolitical favours to anybody, it would be impossible to make it appearthat opposition to Smith's darling desire to become senator was not anungracious return to the man who had led the forces which had nominatedWilson at Trenton. 

On the other hand, there was his distinct pledge to the people during hiscampaign, that if they elected him governor he would make himself theleader of the party, would broadly and not with pettifogging legalisminterpret his constitutional relationship to the Legislature, wouldundertake to assist in legislative action, and not wait supinely for theLegislature to do something, and then sign or veto the thing done. Moreover, he had insisted on the principle of the preferential primary asone means by which the people should participate in their own governmentand convey an expression of their will and purpose to the law-making body. The people had voted for Martine. The fact that Senator Smith had scornedto have his name placed on the ballot, the fact that human imaginationcould picture a stronger senator from New Jersey than genial "Jim" Martinedid not affect the argument. A great majority had voted for Martine andfor nobody else. Was the use of the preferential primary for the firsttime in the selection of a United States senator to be ignored, and allthe arguments that Candidate Wilson and others had made in behalf of thesystem to be taken "in a Pickwickian sense, " as not meaning anything?

There was a real dilemma doubtless much more acutely realized by theGovernor-elect than by the hot-heads, including myself, who were clamorousfor an immediate proclamation of support of Martine, on progressiveprinciples, and for an ultimatum of war-to-the-knife against Smith and theold crowd. 

It seemed as if Mr. Wilson were hesitating and holding off, reluctant toaccept the gage of battle thrown down by the challenge of the Smith wing. The leading Democratic and Independent journals of the state were mostinsistent that immediate proof be given by Governor-elect Wilson of hisleadership and control over the party and that a test should be made as towhich influence, reactionary or progressive, was to control the destiniesof our party in the state. Those of us who had followed the candidatethroughout the campaign and who had been heartened by his progressiveattitude were sorely disappointed at his failure immediately to act. Itwas painfully evident to us that behind the scenes at Princeton the newgovernor's friends, particularly Colonel Harvey, were urging upon himcautious and well-considered action and what mayhap might be called "apolicy of watchful waiting, " picturing to him the insurmountabledifficulties that would lie in his path in case he exercised hisleadership in the matter of Martine's selection to the United StatesSenate. They suggested that the vote for Martine had no binding force;that it was a mere perfunctory expression of preference in the matter ofthe United States senatorship which the Legislature was free to ignore. The only man, therefore, who could make the vote effective was theGovernor-elect himself. What he would do in these circumstances was fordays after the election a matter of perplexing doubt to his many friends. Disappointment and chagrin at the candidate's silence brooded over theranks of the progressives of the state. In my law office in Jersey City Itried to convince those who came to confer with me regarding the matterthat they must be patient; that, ultimately, everything would be all rightand that Doctor Wilson would soon assert his leadership over the party andtake his proper place at the head of those who worked to make thepreferential vote an effective instrumentality. Frankly, though I did notgive expression to my doubts, I was profoundly and deeply disappointed atthe apparently hesitant, uncertain attitude of the Governor-elect. Feelingcertain that popular opinion would be with him in case he decided to leadin this struggle, I was convinced that the delay in announcing hisattitude toward the Smith-Nugent "defi" was dampening the ardour andenthusiasm of many of his friends. 

The progressive Democrats of the state waited with patience the word ofcommand and counsel from the Princeton professor to initiate the fightthat would settle for all time in the state of New Jersey the questionwhether the referendum on the question of the election of United Statessenators should be treated as "a scrap of paper, " or whether it was to beupheld and vindicated by the action of the Legislature. No direct wordcame to me of the Governor-elect's attitude on this vital question. Rumours of his position toward Senator Smith's candidacy filtered "throughthe lines" from Princeton; various stories and intimations that seemed toindicate that the Governor-elect would allow Martine's selection to go bydefault; that he would not interfere in any way to carry out the mandateof the election. 

Things were in this unsatisfactory condition when to my surprise Ireceived a call in my modest Jersey City law offices from the Governor-elect. Knowing him as I know him, I can see that in his deliberate fashionhe was taking testimony from both sides and slowly arriving at his owndecision. Having heard from the cautious who counselled neutrality, he wasnow seeking the arguments of the impetuous who demanded action and wantedit "hot off the bat. " But at that time, not knowing him as I now know him, he seemed, in this interview, to be vacillating between two opinions, forhe did what I have often known him to do subsequently: stated withlucidity the arguments of the other side, and with the air of one quiteopen-minded, without opinions of his own, seemed to seek my arguments inrebuttal. I was sorely disappointed by what then seemed to me his negativeattitude, so unlike the militant debater whom I had come to admire in thecampaign which had recently been brought to a brilliant and victoriousclose. In my youthful impetuosity I felt that we had been deceived in ourman, a bold talker but timid in action. I simply did not then know the manand the mixed elements in him. Later, in close association, I was to seethis phase of him not infrequently, the canny Scot, listening withoutcomment and apparently with mind to let to conflicting arguments while hisown mind was slowly moving to its own position, where it would stand fixedand immovable as Gibraltar. 

Almost as if it were an academic question, with which he had no personalconcern, he propounded the alternatives: Should he lead the fight againstSenator Smith, or should he stand aloof and permit the Legislature to actwithout any suggestion from him? He summarized the arguments of hisfriends at Princeton who were advising him to steer clear of this fightand not permit himself to be drawn into it by young, impetuous people likemyself. He said that certain overtures and suggestions of compromises hadbeen made to him by Senator Smith's friends, to the effect that if hewould not play a leading part in the fight and allow the Legislature toact without interference from him, Senator Smith and his friends in thestate would agree not to oppose his legislative programme at the comingsession. It was further suggested that Senator Smith had the necessaryvotes to elect himself and that it would be futile to attempt to elect JimMartine; and that his intervention in this family quarrel would result ina bitter and humiliating defeat for him at the very outset of hisadministration. When the Governor-elect had concluded this preliminarystatement, I was depressed and disappointed. I did not think there shouldbe a moment's hesitation on his part in at once accepting the challenge sodefiantly addressed to him by the Democratic bosses of the state. 

Frankly, I laid the whole case before him in words to this effect: "Mydear Doctor Wilson, there is no way I can better serve you than by franklydealing with the question. Your friends away off in Princeton probably donot know how for years our party and its destinies have been in the handsof these very men, enemies of liberalism in New Jersey, who by yoursilence or indifference as to the United States senatorship are to begiven a new lease on life. The issue involved in this fight is fundamentaland goes far beyond the senatorship. The action you take will have a far-reaching effect upon our party's fortunes and no one can calculate theeffect it will undoubtedly have on your own political future. In urgingyou not to take part in this fight your friends are acting unwisely. Youcannot afford not to fight and not to have an immediate test of yourleadership in this matter. The question of Mr. Martine's fitness, as yourfriends urge, is not an issue seriously to be considered. 47, 454 votes inthe state have decided that matter and you cannot reverse their verdict. Your friends have placed too much emphasis on Martine's alleged unfitnessand too little on the duty you owe the party and the state as _leader_. "

I called to his attention the fact that men like myself had been heartenedand encouraged by his speeches in the campaign; how we felt that at lastwe had found in him a leader, bold and fearless, and that now, when thefirst real test of leadership came, it appeared that we were to bedisappointed and that by his silence and inaction he would permit SenatorSmith to win and allow Martine, the popular choice, to be defeated, thussetting aside the verdict of the election. He listened intently butwithout comment to all I had to say. Proceeding with my argument, I said:"The people of New Jersey accepted your word and, to employ your ownphrase, 'took a sportsman's chance on you' and they must not bedisappointed. Your failure to make this fight will mean that you have notonly surrendered your leadership as governor in this matter, but by thesame act you will have abdicated your leadership in favour of the OldGuard all along the line. They have set a trap for you, and I know youwill not permit yourself to be caught in it. " In conclusion I said: "Theysay they will support your reform programme. What assurance have you that, having defeated you in this your first big fight, they will not turn onyou and defeat your whole legislative programme? As governor, you have thepower to lead us to a great victory in this vital matter. Exercise it now, and opinion throughout the state will strongly and enthusiasticallysupport you. You have but to announce your willingness to lead and thepeople of the state will rally to your standard. The fight, in any event, will be made and we wish you to lead it. This is really the first step tothe Presidency. That is what is really involved. Not only the people ofNew Jersey but the people of America are interested in this fight. Theyare clamouring for leadership, and I am sure you are the man to lead, andthat you will not fail. "

When the Governor-elect rose to leave my office, he turned to me andasked, still in a non-committal manner, whether in my opinion we could winthe fight in case he should decide to enter upon it. I at once assured himthat while the various political machines of the state would oppose him atevery turn, their so-called organizations were made of cardboard and thatthey would immediately disintegrate and fall the moment he assumedleadership and announced that the fight was on. 

In his own time and by his own processes Mr. Wilson arrived at hisdecision. It was the first of my many experiences of his deliberativeprocesses in making up his mind and of the fire and granite in him afterhe had made his decision. He informed me that he would support Martine anduse all his force, official and personal, to have the Legislature acceptthe preferential primary as the people's mandate. 

With prudence and caution, with a political sense that challenged theadmiration of every practical politician in the state, the Princetonianbegan to set the stage for the preliminary test. There was nothingdramatic about these preliminaries. Quickly assuming the offensive, hewent about the task of mobilizing his political forces in the mostpatient, practical way. No statement to the people of his purposes toaccept the challenge of the Democratic bosses was made by him. Certainthings in the way of accommodation were necessary to be done before thisdefinite step was taken. It was decided that until the Governor-elect hadconferred with the Democratic bosses in an effort to persuade them thatthe course they had adopted was wrong, it would be best not to make animmediate issue by the Governor-elect's announcement. We thought that bytactfully handling Smith and Davis we would be able by this method ofconciliation to convince their friends, at least those in the partyorganization, that we were not ruthlessly bent upon leading a revolt, butthat we were attempting peacefully a settlement that would prevent a splitin our party ranks. 

We were convinced that in the great body of organization Democrats therewere many fine men who resented this attempt of the bosses to force JimSmith again on the party and that there were many who silently wished ussuccess, although they were not free to come to our side in open espousal. Thus we began patiently to build our back-fire in the ranks of theDemocratic organization itself, to unhorse the Essex boss. 

The first thing to carry out the programme was a visit paid to the sickroom of the Democratic boss of the Hudson wing, Bob Davis, who laydangerously ill in his modest home on Grove Street, Jersey City. The visititself of the Governor-elect to the home of the stricken boss had a markedpsychological effect in conciliating and winning over to our side theactive party workers in the Davis machine. To many of the privates in theranks the boss was a veritable hero and they witnessed with pleasure thepersonal visit of the new Governor-elect to the boss at his home andlooked upon it as a genuine act of obeisance and deference to theirstricken leader. They thought this a generous and a big thing to do, andso it naturally turned their sympathies to the Governor-elect. It gavefurther proof to them that the man elected Governor was not "high-browish"or inclined to fight unless he had previously laid all his cards on thetable. We also realized that to have ignored the boss would have been togive strength and comfort to the enemy, and so we deliberately set out tocultivate his friends in a spirit of honourable and frank dealing. Thevisit to the boss was a part of this plan. The meeting between these twomen--one, the Governor-elect and until recently the president ofPrinceton; the other, a Democratic boss, old and battle-scarred--in thelittle sick room of the humble home, was a most interesting affair and attimes a most touching and pathetic one. Both men were frank in dealingwith each other. There was no formality or coldness in the meeting. TheGovernor-elect quickly placed the whole situation before the boss, showinghow the Democratic party had for many years advocated the very system--theelection of United States senators by the people--that the Democraticbosses of the state were now attacking and repudiating. Briefly, hesketched the disastrous effects upon our party and its prestige in thestate and the nation if a Democratic legislature should be the first, after advocating it, to cast it aside in order to satisfy the selfishambition and vanity of one of the Old Guard. In a sincere manly fashion, so characteristic of him, Boss Davis then proceeded to state _his_ case. Briefly, it was this: He had given his solemn promise and had entered intoa gentleman's agreement with Smith to deliver to him the twelvelegislative votes from Hudson. He would not violate his agreement. Laughingly, he said to the Governor-elect: "If the Pope of Rome, of whoseChurch I am a member, should come to this room to urge me to change myattitude, I would refuse to do so. I have given my promise and you wouldnot have me break it, would you, Doctor?" With real feeling and a show ofappreciation of the boss's frankness and loyalty to his friends, theGovernor-elect quickly replied: "Of course, I would not have you breakyour promise, but you must not feel aggrieved if I shall find it necessaryto fight you and Smith in the open for the Hudson votes. " "Go on, Doctor, "said the sick man, "I am a game sport and I am sure that with you therewill be no hitting below the belt. " And thus the first conference betweenthe Governor-elect and the political boss ended. 

Mr. Wilson's next visit was to Senator Smith himself at the Senator's homein Newark, a meeting entirely friendly in character and frank inexpressions of the unalterable determination of the two men, of SenatorSmith not to withdraw from the race, of Doctor Wilson to oppose hiscandidacy and place the issue before the people of the state. SenatorSmith with engaging candour gave Mr. Wilson his strong personal reasonsfor wishing to return to the United States Senate: he said that he hadleft the Senate under a cloud due to the investigations of the Sugar Trustand that for the sake of his children he wanted to reinstate himself inthe Senate. Mr. Wilson expressed his sympathy for this motive, moreappealing than mere personal ambition, but declared that he could notpermit his sympathy as an individual to interfere with his duty as heconceived it, as an official pledged by all his public utterances tosupport progressive principles, among which was the preferential primarysystem, and committed to a course of active leadership in matters whichconcerned the state at large, in which category the selection of a UnitedStates senator certainly fell. He made a personal appeal to the Senatorfor the sake of the party to forego his desire and by a noble act ofrenunciation to win the regard of all the citizens of the state, saying:"Why, Senator, you have it in your power to become instantly, the biggestman in the state. " But the Senator was firm. And so, though the visit wasconducted with the dignity and courtesy characteristic of both men, itended with their frank acknowledgment to each other that from now on thereexisted between them a state of war. 

Returning to Princeton from Newark, the formal announcement of theGovernor's entrance into the fight was made and the contest for thesenatorship and the leadership of the Democratic party was on. Theannouncement was as follows:

 WOODROW WILSON'S CHALLENGE TO THE BOSSES Friday Evening, Dec. 9, 1910. 

 The question who should be chosen by the incoming legislature of the state to occupy the seat in the Senate of the United States which will presently be made vacant by the expiration of the term of Mr. Kean is of such vital importance to the people of the state, both as a question of political good faith and as a question of genuine representation in the Senate, that I feel constrained to express my own opinion with regard to it in terms which cannot be misunderstood. I had hoped that it would not be necessary for me to speak; but it is. 

 I realize the delicacy of taking any part in the discussion of the matter. As Governor of New Jersey I shall have no part in the choice of a Senator. Legally speaking, it is not my duty even to give advice with regard to the choice. But there are other duties besides legal duties. The recent campaign has put me in an unusual position. I offered, if elected, to be the political spokesman and adviser of the people. I even asked those who did not care to make their choice of governor upon that understanding not to vote for me. I believe that the choice was made upon that undertaking; and I cannot escape the responsibility involved. I have no desire to escape it. It is my duty to say, with a full sense of the peculiar responsibility of my position, what I deem it to be the obligation of the Legislature to do in this gravely important matter. 

 I know that the people of New Jersey do not desire Mr. James Smith, Jr. , to be sent again to the Senate. If he should be, he will not go as their representative. The only means I have of knowing whom they do desire to represent them is the vote at the recent primaries, where 48, 000 Democratic voters, a majority of the whole number who voted at the primaries, declared their preference for Mr. Martine, of Union County. For me that vote is conclusive. I think it should be for every member of the Legislature. 

 Absolute good faith in dealing with the people, an unhesitating fidelity to every principle avowed, is the highest law of political morality under a constitutional government. The Democratic party has been given a majority in the Legislature; the Democratic voters of the state have expressed their preference under a law advocated and supported by the opinion of their party, declared alike in platforms and in enacted law. It is clearly the duty of every Democratic legislator who would keep faith with the law of the state with the avowed principles of his party to vote for Mr. Martine. It is my duty to advocate his election--to urge it by every honourable means at my command. 

Immediately the work of organizing our forces for the fight was set inmotion. I had been designated by the Governor-elect to handle the fight inHudson County, the Davis stronghold. Meetings were arranged for at whatwere considered the strategic points in the fight: Jersey City and Newark. The announcement of the Governor-elect's acceptance of the challenge hadgiven a thrill to the whole state and immediately the reaction against theOld Guard's attempt to discredit the primary choice was evident. Thebitterness in the ranks of the contesting factions began to express itselfin charges and counter-charges that were made. Speeches for and againstthe candidates were addressed to the ears of the unwary voter. The statewas soon up in arms. There was no doubt of the attitude of the people. This was made plain in so many ways that our task was to impress thisopinion upon the members of the Legislature, whose vote, in the lastanalysis, would be the determining factor in this contest. While we werelaying down a barrage in the way of organization work and makingpreparations for our meetings throughout the state, the Governor-elect wasconferring nightly with members of the Legislature at the University Clubin New York. From day to day could be observed the rising tide in favourof our cause, and slowly its effect upon the members of the Legislaturewas made manifest. The first meeting in the senatorial contest was held inJersey City. As chairman of the committee, I had arranged the details forthis first speech of the Governor-elect. I had adopted a plan in makingthe arrangements that I felt would remove from the minds of theorganization workers, to whom we desired to appeal, the idea that this wasa revolt or secessionist movement in the ranks of the Democratic party. The committee in charge of the meeting had selected the finest, cleanestmen in our party's ranks to preside over and take part in the meeting. 

There was never such an outpouring of people. Men and women from outsidethe state, and, particularly, men and women from New York and Connecticut, had come all the way to New Jersey to witness this first skirmish in thepolitical upheaval that was soon to take place. The metropolitan dailieshad sent their best men to write up the story and to give a "size-up" ofthe new Governor-elect in fighting action. They were not disappointed. Hewas in rare form. His speech was filled with epigrams that carried thefight home to those upon whom we were trying to make an impression. Whenhe warned his friends not to be afraid of the machine which the bossescontrolled he said, with biting irony: "We do not fear their fortresses[meaning the political machines] that frown and look down upon us fromtheir shining heights. " Smiling deprecatingly and waving his hand, hecontinued: "They are but made of paste-board and when you approach themthey fall at your very touch. "

Ridiculing and belittling the power of the bosses, he called them "wartsupon the body politic. " "It is not, " said the new chief of Democracy, "acapital process to cut off a wart. You don't have to go to the hospitaland take an anaesthetic. The thing can be done while you wait, and it isbeing done. The clinic is open, and every man can witness the operation. "

The meeting was a triumph and strikingly demonstrated the power of brainand fine leadership over brawn and selfish politics. 

The final appeal to the voters on the United States senatorship was madein the heart of the enemy's country, the stronghold of the Smith-Nugentfaction at Newark, New Jersey. The same enthusiastic, whole-souledresponse that characterized the Jersey City meeting was repeated. The samedefiant challenge to the Old Guard was uttered by the new Governor. Sarcasm, bitter irony, delightful humour, and good-natured flings at theOld Guard were found in this his final appeal. In a tone of voice thatcarried the deep emotion he felt, he said, as his final word:

 Do you know what is true of the special interests at this moment! They have got all their baggage packed and they are ready to strike camp over night, provided they think it is profitable for them to come over to the Democratic party. They are waiting to come over bag and baggage and take possession of the Democratic party. Will they be welcome? Do you want them? I pray God we may never wake up some fine morning and find them encamped on our side. 

The response was thrilling. The two meetings just held, one in Jersey Cityand the other in Newark, convinced those of us in charge of the Martinecampaign that we had made the right impression in the state and, havingdeeply aroused the voters, all we had to do was to harvest the crop, theseed of which had been planted in the soil of public opinion by thespeeches the new Governor had made. It was plain that the machine crowdwas stunned and reeling from the frequent and telling blows that had beenso vigorously delivered by him. Suggestions of compromise came from theenemy's ranks, but no armistice would be granted, except upon the basis ofan absolute and unconditional surrender. Offers and suggested proposalsfrom the Old Guard to the Governor-elect were thrust aside as valuelessand not worthy his consideration. There was nothing to do but play for a"knock-out. " Soon the full pressure of the opinion of the state began tobe felt. Members of the Legislature from the various counties began tofeel its influence upon them. Our ranks began to be strengthened byadditions from the other side. The Governor's speeches and his nightlyconferences were having their full effect. The bosses, now in panic, wereeach day borne down by the news brought to them of the innumerabledefections in their quickly dwindling forces. However, the bosses showed abold front and declared that their man had the votes. But their confidencewaned as election day approached. Realizing the fact that we were dealingwith the best-trained minds in the Democratic party, we gave no news tothe outside world of the strength in number of our own ranks, knowing fullwell that if we did so imprudent a thing, the active men in the ranks ofthe enemy would pull every wire of influence and use every method ofthreats and coercion to wean the votes away from us. We "stood pat" andwatched with interest every move made by the other side. In his finalstatement before the joint meeting of the Legislature Smith boldlyannounced his election to the Senate on the strength of the number oflegislative votes pledged to him, but those of us who were in the midst ofthis political melee knew that he was licked and that he was onlywhistling to keep up his courage. 

In the meantime, the Governor-elect had tendered to me the post ofsecretary to the Governor, and I accepted this office which brought meinto more intimate association with him and his plans. 

CHAPTER X

EXIT THE OLD GUARD

The conferences and meetings in preparation for the great senatorial fighthaving been concluded, the scene of activities was transferred to Trenton, where shortly after the Inauguration plans were laid for the final battle. 

Immediately upon the conclusion of the Inaugural ceremonies, the hand-to-hand contests for the great prize and incidentally the leadership of theDemocrats, was on in full swing. At the beginning of the fight the bossescounted upon the active support of the influential Democratic leadersthroughout the state, like Robert S. Hudspeth of Hudson County, JohnstonCornish of Warren County, Edward E. Grosscup of Gloucester County, BarneyGannon and Peter Daley of Middlesex County, old Doctor Barber of WarrenCounty, Otto Wittpenn of Hudson County, Billy French and Judge Westcott ofCamden, Dave Crater of Monmouth, and minor bosses or leaders in south andmiddle Jersey. But in utter amazement they found that we had capturedthese fine pieces of heavy political artillery and that through them wehad acquired and taken over some of the most valuable political salientsin the state. 

A little incident in the campaign is worth reciting. In managing thecampaign I found that for some unaccountable reason the so-called Irishvote of the state was massed solidly behind ex-Senator Smith and in bitteropposition to Governor Wilson. We were constantly coming in contact withthese currents of opposition, and how to overcome them and bring the Irishvote into our fold was the task that devolved upon me as the manager ofMartine's campaign. Seated in my office one day I recalled that yearsbefore I had read in the Congressional Record an account of a speechdelivered in the United States Senate by James Smith, upholding in termsof highest praise the famous Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. The speech in all itsdetails, particularly the argument it contained calling for closerrelations between the United States and Great Britain, was still fresh inmy memory. Evidently Senator Smith and his Irish friends had forgotten it, for he was now trying to mobilize the Irish vote of the state in hisfavour. On re-reading this speech of the old Senator, I smiled withsatisfaction, realizing the campaign use that could be made of it. Afterconsidering the matter carefully, I sent for a devoted friend of mine, afine, clean-cut Irishman, who stood high in the ranks of the Clan-na-Gaeland other Irish societies in our county. After he had read the speech, wediscussed the method of using it, for we felt sure that our Irish friends, when they became acquainted with this speech upon reading it, would notfind themselves in agreement with Smith's attitude toward England and theTreaty. My friend consented to write letters to the leading papers, particularly the Irish papers of the state, setting forth Smith's attitudetoward the Treaty. The effect upon the Irish vote was immediate and soonresolutions began to be adopted by the various Irish societies throughoutthe state, denouncing Smith for having advocated the much-despised "Anglo-Saxon Alliance. "

While I opposed Senator Smith in this contest there was nothing personallyantagonistic in my attitude. We were, I hope, friends throughout theconflict, and many times since then we have discussed the events leadingup to Martine's election to the United States Senate. It was only a fewmonths ago, while seated at a table at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, that the old Senator, genial and debonair as ever, was discussing thefights of the old days, and particularly the events leading up to hisdefeat for the United States senatorship. In discussing the New Jerseycampaign, he told me of the use that had been made by "someone" in theWilson ranks of his Senate speech on the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. He saidthat his reason for making this speech was his sincere desire as an Irish-American to bring about more amicable relations between the United Statesand England, and as I listened to this frank recital I felt that, althoughthe use I had made of his speech was legitimate in the circumstances, there was nothing to be proud of in having exploited the Senator's reallyfine speech for political purposes. 

The State House at Trenton on the night previous to the balloting for thesenatorship was a place of feverish activity. The Essex ex-Chieftain, Smith, kept "open house" in the then famous Room 100 of the Trenton House. The Governor-elect, calm and apparently undisturbed, but anxious and readyfor a contest, quietly moved about the Executive offices attending toofficial matters. 

We felt confident of the result of the vote if the members of theLegislature were left free, but we were certain that every kind ofpressure would be put upon them to change the votes of the wobblers in ourranks. All night long and until four or five o'clock in the morning theGovernor-elect and I remained in the Executive office, keeping in closecontact with our friends both by telephone and personal conference. Senator Smith never knew it, but some of the men close to him andparticipating in his own conferences on this fateful night hourly broughtto us information as to what would be the real line-up of his forces onthe day set for balloting. We found a spy in our own ranks--a leadinglawyer and politician from, my own county--who, while pretending to be ourfriend, was supplying the enemy with what he thought was usefulinformation. We, however, were already aware of this gentleman's duplicityand, although he never suspected it, whenever he left the Executive officehe was followed by a professional detective, who heard and reported to usevery bit of information he had supplied to our political foes. 

On the night before the election the Smith-Nugent leaders had gatheredtheir forces and, headed by a band, paraded through the streets ofTrenton, passing in review before Senator Smith who stood upon the stepsof the Trenton House and greeted them in most generous fashion. Thepurpose of this demonstration was obvious to the Governor-elect and hisfriends. It was simply to give to the arriving legislators an impressionof great strength behind the Smith-Nugent forces. 

On the morning of the balloting the corridors and lobby of the State Housewere crowded with the henchmen of the Essex chieftain. The surfaceindications were that Smith had the necessary number of votes, but tothose of us who were able accurately to analyze the situation it wasapparent that the froth would soon pass away. The parade and thedemonstration of the Nugent followers had deeply impressed some of the menin our ranks, particularly the editor of a Trenton newspaper, who came tothe Executive offices and urged upon the Governor the publication of astatement which he had prepared, filled with grandiloquent phrase, warningthe people of the state that the members of the Legislature were about tobe coerced and threatened by the strong-arm methods of the Smith-Nugentorganization. 

Frankly, the suggestion which this Trenton editor made to the new Governorimpressed him. The Governor made certain changes in the statement and thensent for me to read it, asking my advice upon it. The first test of myofficial connection with the Governor was at hand. Upon reading theeditor's article I saw at once that its issuance would be most unwise, andI frankly said so. My practical and political objection to it, however, was that if published it would give to the people of the state theimpression that our forces were in a panic and that we, were in grave fearof the result. I further argued that it was an attempt at executivecoercion of the Legislature that would meet with bitter resentment. I feltthat we had already won the fight; that the Legislature, which was thejury in the case, was inclined to favour us if we did not seek toinfluence its members by such foolish action as the Trenton editoradvised. The statement was not published. 

I found in this little argument with the new Governor that he was open-minded and anxious for advice and I thereafter felt free to discussmatters with him in the frankest way. 

The first ballot showed Martine leading heavily. In the following ballotshe gained strength at every count. The Legislature adjourned the first daywithout reaching a decision. As we surveyed the field after the firstday's balloting it was clear to us that if we hoped to win the fight wewould have to have Hudson County's legislative vote. The Democratic boss, Bob Davis, had died a few days previous, and had entrusted his affairs tothe hands of a fine, clean-cut, wholesome Irish-American, James Hennessy, then chairman of the Hudson County Democratic Committee. He was one of thesquarest men I ever met in politics and had been an intimate associate ofmy father in the old days in Jersey City. On the day of the finalballoting we were sorely pressed. When it seemed as if we had reached thelimit of our strength, it occurred to me that a final appeal to Hennessyby the Governor might have some effect. We decided to send for Hennessy tocome to the Executive offices. It was clear from his attitude when hearrived that, while his sympathies lay with us, he was bound in honour tocarry out the instructions of his chief and deliver the Hudson County voteto Smith. The Governor, getting very close to him and discussing thecampaign in the most intimate way, told him that if Martine was rejected, the political effect on our party's fortunes would be disastrous; that wewere sure we had the votes and that the next ballot would give proof ofthis, and that it was only a question, to use a campaign phrase, of"getting on the band wagon" and making Martine's nomination unanimous. When the Governor concluded his talk, I turned to Hennessy in the mostfamiliar way, and spoke of the Governor's desire to elect Martine and ofthe unselfish purpose he had in mind and how he, Hennessy, was blockingthe way. I said to him: "You have it in your power to do a big thing. Youmay never have the chance again. " He finally stood up and said to me:"What do you want me to do?" I told him that we wanted him to go to theHudson delegates and give word that the "jig" was up and that they mustthrow their support to Martine. Shortly after this meeting the Hudsondelegation met in caucus and agreed to support Martine. 

When Smith and Nugent heard of this message they practically surrendered. The balloting which began at ten o'clock was a mere formal affair for itwas plainly evident from the changes in the early balloting that Martine'selection was assured. Martine's election was a fact; and Woodrow Wilsonwas the victor in the first battle for the Presidency. 

I have stated that I am not proud of the way I used Senator Smith's speechon the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. We were fighting veterans in the politicalgame, men who knew all the tricks and who did not scruple to play any ofthem. In the rough school of practical politics I had been taught that"you must fight the devil with fire" and that it is as legitimate inpolitics as in war to deceive the enemy about your resources. But weconducted politics on higher levels during the eight years in the WhiteHouse, when my chief, no longer an amateur, taught me, by precept andexample, that effective fighting can be conducted without resort to thetricks and duplicities of those who place political advantage aboveprinciple. Woodrow Wilson made new rules for the game, and they were therules which men of honour adopt when conducting their private business onprinciples of good faith and truth-telling. 

CHAPTER XI

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

The election of Martine having been settled and the preferential votehaving been validated through the courageous handling of a delicatesituation, the new Governor was firmly in the saddle. His leadership hadbeen tested and only the fragments of the Old Guard machine were left. Theroad was thus cleared of all obstacles in his own party that might be putin the way of his programme of constructive legislation. 

Having delivered his first message, which contained a full and detaileddiscussion of his whole programme, he applied himself with great energyand industry to the task of preparing bills for introduction in the Senateand House. Not content with the mere delivery of his message, he puthimself entirely at the disposal of the members of the Legislature andindustriously applied himself to the task of preparation until thefollowing measures: _Regulation of Public Utilities, Corrupt PracticesAct_, _Direct Primaries Act_, and the _Employers' Liability Act_, were inshape to be introduced. 

While his leadership was vindicated as a result of the Smith-Martinefight, the contest had undoubtedly left many bitter scars and enmitieswhich soon manifested themselves in the unfriendly attitude of the Smithmen in the Legislature toward the new Governor and particularly toward hisprogramme of constructive legislation. For awhile after the election ofMartine they seemed subdued and cheerfully resigned to defeat; but whenthe new Governor launched his legislative programme they began eagerly toattack it in many subtle ways. While there were some members of this groupwho honestly opposed the Governor's programme because of theirconservative tendencies, the majority of the opposition were bent upon"putting it to sleep, " because, forsooth, it bore the Wilson label. Thenew Governor quickly grasped the full significance of the situation andopenly challenged the opposition. To accomplish his purpose, he did anunprecedented thing. He invited the Democratic members of the Legislatureto meet him in the Supreme Court Room of the State House and there, faceto face, he laid before them various items of his programme and challengedthe opposition to lay their cards on the table. In the course of thisconference one of the leaders of the Smith-Nugent faction expressed hisdissatisfaction with the whole programme, challenging the new Governor'sright to be present at the conference; even intimating that his presencewas an unconstitutional act which might subject him to impeachment. Thenew Governor, undisturbed by this criticism, turned to the gentleman whohad challenged his right to be present at the conference, and said:

 You can turn aside from the measure if you choose; you can decline to follow me; you can deprive me of office and turn away from me, but you cannot deprive me of power so long as I steadfastly stand for what I believe to be the interests and legitimate demands of the people themselves. I beg you to remember, in this which promises to be an historic conference, you are settling the question of the power or impotence, the distinction or the ignominy of the party to which the people with singular generosity have offered the conduct of their affairs. 

Some of the members of the Legislature came to my office after thisconference and told me of the great speech the Governor had just deliveredand how defiantly he had met the attack of his enemies. This caucus gavean emphatic endorsement of his legislative programme and in a few weeksthe House of Assembly had acted upon it, and the various bills thatconstituted his entire programme were on their way to the RepublicanSenate. How to induce favourable action at the hands of the RepublicanSenate was a problem. There were very few members of the Senate whoseideals and purposes were in agreement with those of the Governor. 

When the bills reached the Senate, the Governor began daily conferenceswith the Republican members of that body, discussing with them the itemsof his programme and urging speedy action upon them. As a part of theprogramme of inducing the Republicans to support him, a friend of mine whowas on the inside of the Republican situation reported to me that it wasthe opinion in the Republican ranks that the new Governor was too much aprofessor and doctrinaire; that he was lacking in good-fellowship andcompanionship; that while the members of the Legislature who had conferredwith him had found him open and frank, they thought there was a coldnessand an austerity about him which held the Governor aloof and preventedthat intimate contact that was so necessary in working out the programmewe had outlined. 

We finally decided that the fault lay in the lack of social intimacybetween the new Governor and the members of the Legislature. In my socialand official contact with Mr. Wilson I always found him most genial andagreeable. When we were at luncheon or dinner at the old Sterling Hotel inTrenton he would never burden our little talks by any weighty discussionof important matters that were pending before him. He entirely forgot allbusiness and gave himself over to the telling of delightful stories. Howto make the real good-fellowship of the man an asset in dealing with themembers of the Senate was a problem. I very frankly told him one day atluncheon that many members of both legislative bodies felt that he was toostiff and academic and that they were anxious to find out for themselvesif there was a more human side to him. In order to give him an opportunityto overcome this false impression we arranged a delightful dinner at theTrenton Country Club, to which we invited both Democratic and Republicanmembers of the Senate. The evening was a delightful one. In the corner ofthe little room where the dinner was served sat three darky musicians whoregaled the little group with fine old southern melodies. It was real funto watch the new Governor's conduct in this environment. He was like a boyout of school. He was no longer the college professor or the cold man ofaffairs. He delighted the members of the Senate who sat about him withamusing stories, witty remarks, and delightful bits of sarcasm. At theclose of the dinner, Senator Frelinghuysen walked over and challenged himto a Virginia Reel. He accepted this invitation and the crowd of men weresoon delighted to see the Somerset senator lead the new Governor out onthe floor and his long legs were soon moving in rhythm with the music. 

[Illustration:

 Telegram. 

 The White House Washington

 3 RN JM 75 Govt. 114pm

 Windsor, Vermont, July 5, 1915

 Hon. Jos. P. Tumulty, The White House, Washington, D. C. 

 ---- is down and out in his newspaper work and desperately in need of employment. Says there is a vacancy as foreign trade adviser in the State Department and also one in the District Play Grounds department. Would be very much obliged if you would see if something can be done for him in either place. His address 221 A. Street, Northeast. 

 Woodrow Wilson. 

 * * * * *

 Dear Tumulty, I want to issue this statement to help Mr. Hoover and his Commission in the splendid work they are doing, and head off mischief-makers (or, rather, one particular mischief-maker who is a little out of his mind) on this side the water. 

 Will you not please read it to Lansing over the phone and, if he has no objection to offer, give it out?

A glimpse at the President's human side. ]

After all, men are just boys, and this bringing together of thesepractical men on so happy and free an occasion did much to convince themembers of the Senate that the new Governor after all was like themselves, a plain, simple man, modestly trying to serve the interests of a greatstate. 

This affair broke the ice, and after that there was a close intimacybetween the Governor and the members of the Legislature, both Democratsand Republicans, and this coöperation soon brought about the enactment ofthe whole Wilson programme. Never before had so comprehensive a programmebeen so expeditiously acted upon by a legislative body. The Legislaturehad convened in January and by the middle of April every campaign pledgethat the Governor had made had been kept, although the Senate with whichhe had to deal was largely Republican. 

As the legislative session progressed it appeared that certain Democraticsenators were reluctant to follow his leadership. Indeed it was alsoapparent that the Republicans were alike unwilling to act favourably uponhis legislative suggestions. In this situation he summoned the Democraticsenators and reminded them of the party pledges in the platform and servednotice that if they did not vote for these measures they would have toexplain to their constituents. He then summoned the Republican senatorsand said to them, in effect, this: "The legislation proposed was promisedin the Democratic platform. That is not your platform. Therefore, you arenot pledged to this action. But if you obstruct the action I shall have totrouble you to go with me to your districts and discuss these matters withyour constituents and tell them why you consider this bad legislation andwhy you resisted it. "

The newspapers of the country soon began to discuss the achievements ofthe Wilson administration in New Jersey and immediately the name of theGovernor began to be mentioned in connection with the Presidency. 

One of the matters of national importance with which he was called upon todeal during this legislative session was the passage of railroad grade-crossing legislation. In response to the agitation that had long existedin New Jersey for the elimination of grade crossings, the Democrats hadinserted a radical plank in their platform in reference to it, and, actingupon this, the Legislature had passed a grade-crossing bill, to which therailroads of the state strenuously objected. It was a matter of thegreatest public interest and importance that for many years had been thesubject of bitter controversies throughout the state. While the bill wasbefore the Governor for consideration, the railroad attorneys had preparedlong, comprehensive briefs attacking the bill as unjust to the railroadsand as containing many features which in their essence were confiscatory. When the bill came before the Governor for final action no one consideredfor a moment the possibility of a veto, first, because of the traditionalattitude of the Democratic party of New Jersey in the matter of gradecrossings; and, secondly, because of the effect a veto would have upon theprogressive thought of the country. I recall very well my discussion withhim in regard to this most important bill. Realizing that he was at thistime looming up as a national figure, and knowing that the Progressives ofthe country were awaiting with keen interest his action on the bill, Ifeared the effect upon his political fortunes that a veto of the billwould undoubtedly have. 

The Baltimore Convention was only a few months away and it was clear to methat no matter how safe and sane were the grounds upon which he would vetothis legislation, his enemies in the Democratic party would charge himwith being influenced by the New Jersey railroad interests who wereengaged in a most vigorous campaign against the passage of thislegislation. In fact, when we came to discuss the matter, I frankly calledthis phase of it to his attention. I tried to make him see the effectssuch a veto would have upon his political fortunes, but he soon made itclear to me that he was unmindful of all such consequences. Afterthoroughly considering the matter, he finally decided to veto the bill. Indiscussing the matter with me, he said: "I realize the unjust andunfortunate inference that will be drawn by my political enemies from aveto of this bill, but the bill, as drawn, is unjust and unfair to therailroads and I ought not to be afraid to say so publicly. I cannotconsider the effect of a veto upon my own political fortunes. If I shouldsign this bill it would mean practically a confiscation of railroadproperty and I would not be worthy of the trust of a single mail in thestate or in the country were I afraid to do my duty and to protect privateproperty by my act. " His attitude toward the bill was clearly set forth inthe veto, part of which is as follows:

 I know the seriousness and great consequence of the question affected by this important measure. There is a demand, well grounded and imperative, throughout the state that some practicable legislation should be adopted whereby the grade crossings of railways which everywhere threaten life and interfere with the convenience of both city and rural communities should as rapidly as possible be abolished. But there is certainly not a demand in New Jersey for legislation which is unjust and impracticable. 

 * * * * *

 The non-enactment of this bill into law will, of course, be a serious disappointment to the people of the state, but it will only concentrate their attention upon the just and equitable way of accomplishing the end in view. I do not believe that the people of the state are in such haste as to be willing to work a gross injustice, either to the railroads or to private owners of property, or to the several communities affected. 

Of course his political enemies made free use of this veto in an effort toinjure him throughout the country in every state campaign where hisfortunes as candidate were involved. As a matter of fact, his veto of thisbill did shock the people of the state, but when they seriously consideredthe matter in all its aspects, they felt that their governor had, atleast, done an honourable and a courageous thing in refusing to approveit. 

Discussion of him as a strong Presidential possibility was steadilygrowing. I had felt a delicacy about talking of this with him, but in awalk that we were accustomed to take along the banks of the Delaware andRaritan Canal between office hours, I, one day, made bold to open, thesubject in this way: "It is evident from the newspapers, Governor, thatyou are being considered for the Presidency. " I could plainly see from theway he met the suggestion that he did not resent my boldness in openingthe discussion. I told him that we were receiving letters at the Executiveoffices from various parts of the country in praise of the programme hehad just put through the legislature. As we discussed the possibilities ofthe Presidential situation, he turned to me in the most solemn way, andputting his hand to his mouth, as if to whisper something, said: "I do notknow, Tumulty, that I would care to be President during the next fouryears. " And then looking around as if he were afraid uninvited ears mightbe listening, he continued: "For the next President will have a war on hishands, and I am not sure that I would make a good war President. " Thisreply greatly excited my curiosity and interest and I said: "With whatnation do you think we will have a war?" Very cautiously he said: "I donot care to name the nation, " and our little talk ended. This statementwas made to me in April, 1911. Was it a prophecy of the war that was toburst upon the world in August, 1914?

CHAPTER XII

COLONEL HARVEY

Upon the completion of the legislative work of the first session of theNew Jersey Legislature the name of Woodrow Wilson quickly forged to thefront as a strong Presidential possibility. Intimate friends, includingWalter Hines Page, afterward United States Ambassador to Great Britain;Cleveland H. Dodge and Robert Bridges, the two latter old friends andclassmates of the Governor in the famous class of '79 at Princeton, setabout by conferences to launch the Presidential boom of their friend, andselected for the task of the actual management of the campaign the youngPrincetonian, William F. McCombs, then an active and rising young lawyerof New York. These gentlemen, and other devoted friends and advisers ofthe Governor, made up the first Wilson contingent, and at once initiated aplan of publicity and organization throughout the country. They arrangedto have the New Jersey Governor visit strategic points in the country tomake addresses on a variety of public questions. Whether Colonel Harveywas behind the scenes as the adviser of this little group I have neverascertained, but _Harper's Weekly_, then edited by the Colonel, was hisleading supporter in the magazine world, carrying the name of thePrincetonian at its mast-head as a candidate for the Presidency. Therewere frequent conferences between the Colonel and the Governor at theExecutive offices, and as a result of these conferences the Wilson boomsoon became a thing to be reckoned with by the Old Guard in control ofparty affairs in the nation. 

Wilson stock from the moment of the adjournment of the Legislature beganto rise, and his candidacy spread with great rapidity, until in nearlyevery state in the Union "Wilson Clubs" were being established. The NewJersey primaries, where again he met and defeated the Smith forces; theOhio primaries, where he split the delegates with the favourite son, Governor Harmon, a distinguished Democrat; and the Wisconsin primaries, atwhich he swept the state, gave a tremendous impetus to the already growingmovement for the "Reform" Governor of New Jersey. 

Everything was serenely moving in the Wilson camp, when like a thunderclapout of a clear sky broke the story of the disagreement between ColonelHarvey, Marse Henry Watterson, and the Governor of New Jersey. I recall myconversation with Governor Wilson on the day following the Harvey-Watterson conference at a New York club. As private secretary to theGovernor, I always made it a rule to keep in close touch with everyconference then being held regarding the political situation, and in thisway I first learned about the Harvey-Watterson meeting which for a fewweeks threatened to destroy all the lines of support that had been builtup throughout the past months of diligent work and organization. 

The Governor and I were seated in a trolley car on our way from the StateCapitol to the railroad station in Trenton when he informed me, in themost casual way and without seeming to understand the possible damage hehad done his own cause, of what followed the conference the previous day. It was like this: the conference had ended and they were leaving the roomwhen Colonel Harvey put his hand on Woodrow Wilson's shoulder and said:"Governor, I want to ask you a frank question, and I want you to give me afrank answer. In your opinion is the support of _Harper's Weekly_ helpingor hurting you?" In telling me of it Woodrow Wilson said: "I was mostembarrassed, and replied: 'Colonel, I wish you had not asked me thatquestion. ' 'Well, what is the answer?' Colonel Harvey insisted pleasantly. 'Why, Colonel, some of my friends tell me it is not helping me in theWest. ' Colonel Harvey said: I was afraid you might feel that way about it, and we shall have to soft-pedal a bit'. " Mr. Wilson was so serenelyunconscious that any offence had been taken that when informed by me alittle later that his name had disappeared from the head of the editorialcolumn of _Harper's Weekly_ he did not connect this with the interview. "Was Colonel Harvey offended?" I asked. "He didn't seem to be, " was theGovernor's answer. 

I immediately scented the danger of the situation and the possibilities ofdisaster to his political fortunes that lay in his reply, and I told himvery frankly that I was afraid he had deeply wounded Colonel Harvey andthat it might result in a serious break in their relations. The Governorseemed grieved at this and said that he hoped such was not the case; thateven after he had expressed himself so freely, Colonel Harvey had beenmost kind and agreeable to him and that they had continued to discuss inthe most friendly way the plans for the campaign and that the littleconference had ended without apparent evidence that anything untoward hadhappened that might lead to a break in their relations. We then discussedat length the seriousness of the situation, and as a result of our talkthe Governor wrote Colonel Harvey and endeavoured to make clear what hehad in mind when he answered the question put to him by the Colonel at theclub conference a few days before, not, indeed, by way of apology, butsimply by way of explanation. This letter to the Colonel and a subsequentone went a long way toward softening the unfortunate impression that hadbeen created by the publication of the Harvey-Watterson correspondence. The letters are as follows:

 (Personal)

 University Club Fifth Avenue and Fifty-Fourth Street December 21, 1911. 

 MY DEAR COLONEL:

 Every day I am confirmed in the judgment that my mind is a one-track road and can run only one train of thought at a time! A long time after that interview with you and Marse Henry at the Manhattan Club it came over me that when (at the close of the interview) you asked me that question about the _Weekly_ I answered it simply as a matter of fact and of business, and said never a word of my sincere gratitude to you for all your generous support, or of my hope that it might be continued. Forgive me, and forget my manners!

 Faithfully, yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

To which letter Colonel Harvey sent the following reply:

 (Personal)

 Franklin Square New York, January 4, 1912. 

 MY DEAR WILSON:

 Replying to your note from the University Club, I think it should get without saying that no purely personal issue could arise between you and me. Whatever anybody else may surmise, you surely must know that in trying to arouse and further your political aspirations during the past few years I have been actuated solely by the belief that I was rendering a distinct public service. 

 The real point at the time of our interview was, as you aptly put it, one simply "of fact and of business, " and when you stated the fact to be that my support was hurting your candidacy, and that you were experiencing difficulty in finding a way to counteract its harmful effect, the only thing possible for me to do, in simple fairness to you, no less than in consideration of my own self-respect, was to relieve you of your embarrassment so far as it lay within my power to do so, by ceasing to advocate your nomination. That, I think, was fully understood between us at the time, and, acting accordingly, I took down your name from the head of the _Weekly's_ editorial page some days before your letter was written. That seems to be all there is to it. Whatever little hurt I may have felt as a consequence of the unexpected peremptoriness of your attitude toward me is, of course, wholly eliminated by your gracious words. 

 Very truly yours, GEORGE HARVEY. 

To Colonel Harvey's letter Governor Wilson replied as follows:

 (Personal)

 Hotel Astor New York, January 11, 1912. 

 MY DEAR COL. HARVEY:

 Generous and cordial as was your letter written in reply to my note from the University Club, it has left me uneasy, because, in its perfect frankness, it shows that I did hurt you by what I so tactlessly said at the Knickerbocker Club. I am very much ashamed of myself, for there is nothing I am more ashamed of than hurting a true friend, however unintentional the hurt may have been. I wanted very much to see you in Washington, but was absolutely captured by callers every minute I was in my rooms, and when I was not there was fulfilling public engagements. I saw you at the dinner but could not get at you, and after the dinner was surrounded and prevented from getting at you. I am in town to day, to speak this evening, and came in early in the hope of catching you at your office. 

 For I owe it to you and to my own thought and feeling to tell you how grateful I am for all your generous praise and support of me (no one has described me more nearly as I would like myself to be than you have); how I have admired you for the independence and unhesitating courage and individuality of your course; and how far I was from desiring that you should cease your support of me in the _Weekly_. You will think me very stupid--but I did not think of that as the result of my blunt answer to your question. I thought only of the means of convincing people of the real independence of the _Weekly's_ position. You will remember that that was what we discussed. And now that I have unintentionally put you in a false and embarrassing position you heap coals of fire on my head by continuing to give out interviews favourable to my candidacy!

 All that I can say is that you have proved yourself very big, and that I wish I might have an early opportunity to tell you face to face how I really feel about it all. With warm regard, Cordially and faithfully, yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

For a while it seemed as if the old relations between the Colonel and theNew Jersey Governor would be resumed, but some unfriendly influence, bentupon the Governor's undoing, thrust itself into the affair, and soon thestory of the Manhattan Club incident broke about the Princetonian's headwith a fury and bitterness that deeply distressed many of Mr. Wilson'sfriends throughout the country. The immediate effect upon his candidacywas almost disastrous. Charges of ingratitude to the "original Wilson man"flew thick and fast. Mr. Wilson's enemies throughout the country took upthe charge of ingratitude and soon the stock of the New Jersey man beganto fall, until his immediate friends almost lost heart. The bad effect ofthe publication of the Harvey-Watterson correspondence and the bitterattacks upon the sincerity of the New Jersey Governor were soonperceptible in the falling away of contributions so necessary to keepalive the campaign then being carried on throughout the country. The"band-wagon" crowd began to leave us and jump aboard the Clark, Underwood, and Harmon booms. 

Suddenly, as if over night, a reaction in favour of Governor Wilson beganto set in. The continued pounding and attacks of the reactionary presssoon convinced the progressives in the ranks of the Democratic party thatWilson was being unjustly condemned, because he had courageously spokenwhat many believed to be the truth. At this critical stage of affairs athing happened which, routed his enemies. One of the leading publicity menof the Wilson forces in Washington, realizing the damage that was beingdone his chief, inspired a story, through his Washington newspaperfriends, that Wilson was being gibbeted because he refused to accept thesupport of Wall Street interests which Harvey and Watterson had offeredhim, and that his refusal to accept their offer was the real cause of thebreak. This new angle of the Harvey-Watterson episode worked a completereversal of opinion. 

The clever work of this publicity man in turning the light on what heconceived to be the real purpose of the Harvey-Watterson conferenceprobably did injustice to these two gentlemen, but at all events it gaveweight to the impression in the minds of many people throughout thecountry that the real reason for the break was Mr. Wilson's refusal to bowthe knee to certain eastern financial interests that were understood to bebehind _Harper's Weekly_. The tide quickly turned against Colonel Harveyand Marse Henry Watterson. Marse Henry, alone in his suite at the NewWillard Hotel at Washington, and the Colonel away off in his tower atDeal, New Jersey, were busily engaged in explaining to the public andattempting, in heroic fashion, to extricate themselves from theunfortunate implications created by the story of the Wilson publicity man. What appeared at first blush to be a thing that would destroy thecandidacy of the New Jersey Governor had been, by clever newspapermanipulation, turned to his advantage and aid. 

When the bitterness and rancour caused by this unfortunate incident hadhappily passed away Colonel Watterson and I met at a delightful dinner atHarvey's Restaurant in Washington and discussed the "old fight. " The youngfellow who had inspired the story which so grievously distressed MarseHenry and Colonel Harvey was present at this dinner. Marse Henry was infine spirits, and without showing the slightest trace of the oldbitterness, rehearsed the details of this now-famous incident in a witty, sportsmanlike, and good-natured way, and at its conclusion he turned to mynewspaper friend and laughingly said: "You damn rascal, you are thescoundrel who sent out the story that Harvey and I were trying to forceWall Street money on Wilson. However, old man, it did the trick. If it hadnot been for the clever use you made of this incident, Wilson never wouldhave been President. "

In a beautiful letter addressed to the President by Marse Henry onSeptember 24, 1914, conveying his expressions of regret at the death ofthe President's first wife, appears the following statement with referenceto the famous Harvey-Watterson controversy:

 I hope that hereafter you and I will better understand one another; in any event that the single disagreeable episode will vanish and never be thought of more. In Paris last winter I went over the whole matter with Mr. McCombs and we quite settled and blotted out our end of it. I very much regret the use of any rude word--too much the characteristic of our rough-and-tumble political combats--and can truly say that I have not only earnestly wished the success of your administration but have sought to find points of agreement, not of disagreement. 

 I am writing as an old man--old enough to be your father--who has the claim upon your consideration that all his life he has pursued the ends you yourself have aimed at, if at times too zealously and exactingly, yet without self-seeking or rancor. 

 Your friend, HENRY WATTERSON. 

The President's acknowledgment of this letter is as follows:

 September 28, 1914. 

 MY DEAR COLONEL WATTERSON:

 Your kind letter has gratified me very deeply. You may be sure that any feeling I may have had has long since disappeared and that I feel only gratified that you should again and again have come to my support in the columns of the _Courier-Journal_. The whole thing was a great misunderstanding. 

 Sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

While the Harvey-Watterson episode ended as above related, there is nodoubt that Woodrow Wilson deeply regretted the whole matter, and, so faras he was concerned, there was no feeling on his part of unfriendliness orbitterness toward Colonel Harvey. Indeed, he felt that Colonel Harvey hadunselfishly devoted himself to his cause in the early and trying days ofhis candidacy, and that Harvey's support of him was untouched by selfishinterests of any kind. In every way he tried to soften the unfortunateimpression that had been made on the country by what many thought was anabrupt, ungracious way of treating a friend. An incident in connectionwith this matter is worth relating:

One day at the conclusion of the regular Tuesday cabinet meeting thePresident and I lingered at the table, as was our custom, and gossipedabout the affairs of the Administration and the country. These discussionswere intimate and frank in every way. 

A note in the social column of one of the leading papers of Washingtoncarried the story that Colonel Harvey's daughter, Miss Dorothy Harvey, wasin town and was a guest at the home of Mrs. Champ Clark. I took occasionto mention this to the President, suggesting that it would be a graciousthing on his part and on the part of Mrs. Wilson to invite Miss Harvey tothe Sayre-Wilson wedding which was scheduled to take place a few dayslater, hoping that in this way an opening might be made for the resumptionof the old relationship between the Colonel and Mr. Wilson. The Presidentappeared greatly interested in the suggestion, saying that he would takeit up with Mrs. Wilson at once, assuring me that it could be arranged. When I saw how readily he acted upon this suggestion, I felt that this wasan opening for a full, frank discussion of his relations with ColonelHarvey. I approached the subject in this way: "For a long time I havewanted to discuss Colonel Harvey with you. There is no doubt, Governor, that this unfortunate episode did not sit well on the stomachs of theAmerican people. Whether you believe it or not, the country resented yourattitude toward your old friend, and out of this incident an impressionhas grown which is becoming stronger with each day, that you pay littleregard to friendship and the obligations that grow out of it. I have beenhoping that in some way the old relationship could be resumed and that youwould feel free at some time in a public way to attest your real feelingfor Colonel Harvey, at least by way of reciprocation for the genuine wayhe stood by you in the old days in New Jersey. " The President looked at mein the most serious way, apparently weighing every word I had uttered, andsaid: "You are right, Tumulty; unfortunate impressions have been created. What can I do for Colonel Harvey to attest in some public way myappreciation of what he did for me in the old days?" I asked why, inasmuchas McCombs had declined the French Ambassadorship, this post might not beoffered to Colonel Harvey, adding that I believed he coveted and wouldappreciate such an appointment. The President said that this was anadmirable suggestion and authorized me to get in touch with Colonel Harveyat once and make him the offer of the French post. 

While my relations with Colonel Harvey were at no time strained, and, infact, up to this day our friendship has been uninterrupted, I thought itwould be more tactful if I should approach him through the junior senatorfrom New York, James O'Gorman. Immediately upon leaving the President Iwent to the Army and Navy Club, where Senator O'Gorman was living, andtold him of my conversation with the President in reference to ColonelHarvey. He was enthusiastic and immediately got in touch with ColonelHarvey at his home at Deal, New Jersey, told him of the President's offer, and asked for a conference. Then a thing happened which completelydestroyed these plans for a reconciliation. The following Sunday aninterview signed by Colonel Harvey, bitterly assailing the President, appeared in the New York _Times_. The fat was in the fire. SenatorO'Gorman and I were silenced. When I approached the President on Mondaymorning to discuss further the matter with him, he said: "I greatly regretthis interview of Colonel Harvey. How can I now with propriety offer himany post? Knowing Harvey as I do, he would be reluctant to take it, forthe country might be of the opinion that he had yielded in his criticismof me by the offer of this appointment, and I could not in honour make theappointment now, for it might appear to the country that by this method Iwas trying to purchase the silence of the Colonel. I am very sorry, indeed, that the plan we discussed has fallen to the ground. "

And thus the efforts of Mr. Wilson to bring about a reconciliation withhis old friend ended in dismal failure. 

CHAPTER XIII

THE "COCKED-HAT" INCIDENT

While Governor Wilson came out of this controversy with the two Colonels, Harvey and Watterson, with flying colours, he was by no means beyond thedanger line. His enemies both within and without the party hotly contestedhis leadership, and the bitterness of the opposition grew in proportion ashis candidacy gained daily advantages. Everything possible was done toblock his progress and to make more difficult his road to the Presidency. Everything he had ever said or written, especially his "History of theAmerican People, " was carefully examined in the hope of finding some wayto discredit him. All the guns of the opposition were turned upon him, butnothing seemed sufficient to block his progress. All the charges, intimations, insinuations, and slanders that were industriously circulatedby his enemies were without effect, and the trained political minds in hisown camp were apprehensive lest his candidacy had reached its climax toolong before the convention. How to maintain the present advantage was theproblem that perplexed them. They were hopefully looking forward to thebenefits that would accrue to their candidate in the round-up ofcandidates at the famous Jackson Day dinner, scheduled for early January, 1912. This dinner was an annual affair and was eagerly looked forward to. It was expected that the leading lights of the Democratic party wouldattend this dinner, including Colonel W. J. Bryan, Champ Clark, OscarUnderwood, ex-Governor Folk of Missouri, Roger Sullivan of Illinois, andthe New Jersey Governor's friends were confident that because of hisability as a public speaker he would make a strong and favourableimpression. They were not disappointed. 

We were awaiting the Jackson Day dinner with great expectations, andcongratulating ourselves that we were now safely "out of the woods, " andthat things would move smoothly for our candidate, when like a bolt from, the blue came the publication of the famous Joline "cocked-hat" letter, which caused another panic in the ranks of the too-optimistic Wilsonforces. 

This letter was written by Mr. Wilson to Mr. Adrian Joline, a Princetonalumnus and prominent New York lawyer at the time of the split in theDemocratic party over the silver question. The letter is as follows:

 Princeton, New Jersey, April 29, 1907. 

 MY DEAR MR. JOLINE:

 Thank you very much for sending me your address at Parsons, Kan. , before the board of directors of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company. I have read it with relish and entire agreement. Would that we could do something, at once dignified and effective, to knock Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat!

 Cordially and sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

The publication of this letter came at a most inopportune time for theWilson candidacy, and how to meet it was one of the most difficultproblems that the Wilson forces had to face. Our enemies were jubilant. They felt that at last they had broken our lines and that we would not beable to "come back. "

At this time I was at the State House at Trenton and I received a telegramfrom the Governor, requesting that I come at once to Washington, where hewas conferring with the leaders of his forces in an effort to find someway to neutralize the bad effects of the Joline cocked-hat story inadvance of the Jackson Day banquet, at which Mr. Bryan would be present. On my arrival in Washington I went to the Willard Hotel and found theGovernor hi a conference with William F. McCombs, Tom Pence, SenatorO'Gorman, and Dudley Field Malone. We discussed the situation fully andthe character of reply the Governor should make by way of explanation ofthe Joline letter. Mr. Josephus Daniels, a friend and associate of Mr. Bryan, was sent to confer with Mr. Bryan in order that Mr. Wilson mighthave a close friend at hand who could interpret the motives which lay backof the Joline letter and impress upon Mr. Bryan the present favourableattitude of Mr. Wilson toward him. Mr. McCombs suggested that the Governoraddress an open letter to Mr. Bryan, voicing his regret over thepublication of this letter and assuring him of his present kindly feelingstoward him. I vigorously opposed Mr. McCombs' suggestion, arguing that noexplanation of the Joline letter could be made to Mr. Bryan that wouldwear the appearance of sincerity, or be convincing, and that the letterhaving been written there was nothing to do to extenuate it in any way andthat the wise thing was to make a virtue of necessity. I suggested that onthe following night, when the Governor was to deliver his address at theJackson Day dinner, he could, in the most generous and kindly way, pay ahandsome tribute to Mr. Bryan for his unselfish service to the Democraticparty throughout the dark years he had been its leader; that I felt thathe would appreciate a tribute of this kind and that he would resent anyexplanation of this incident which would appear to be truckling orapologetic in character. This plan was finally agreed upon. In the verybeginning of his speech, in the most tactful way, Governor Wilson paid atribute to the Great Commoner by saying, as he turned to Mr. Bryan: "Whenothers were faint-hearted, Colonel Bryan carried the Democratic standard. He kept the 'fires burning' which have heartened and encouraged thedemocracy of the country. "

The speech at the Jackson Day dinner was a triumph for Woodrow Wilson. While it was a tempestuous voyage for him, with many dangerous eddies tobe avoided, he emerged from the experience with his prestige enhanced andwith his candidacy throughout the country strengthened. The Bryan-Jolinecrisis was safely passed. In the presence of the newspaper men at thebanquet, Mr. Bryan put his arm around Mr. Wilson's shoulders in anaffectionate way, and thus happily concluded the incident which for a timethreatened to wreck a great enterprise. 

On his return from Washington to Trenton, Governor Wilson told me that Mr. Bryan had bidden him not to worry about the publication of the Jolineletter, saying: "I, of course, knew that you were not with me in myposition on the currency, " and Woodrow Wilson replied: "All I can say, Mr. Bryan, is that you are a great, big man. "

CHAPTER XIV

WILSON AND THE OLD GUARD

Old line politicians, like Roger Sullivan of Illinois and Tom Taggart ofIndiana, were turned to the Princetonian by his notable speech at theJackson Day dinner and now gave sympathetic ear to the New JerseyGovernor's claims for the nomination. An incident which happened at theconclusion of the banquet, as the Governor was on his way to make histrain for New Jersey, illustrates the character of the victory he had wonover difficulties which at the time seemed insurmountable. The oldIllinois leader, Roger Sullivan, greeted the candidate in the mostfriendly way as he left the banquet hall, saying to him as he grasped hishand: "That was a great speech, Governor, " and then, drawing closer tohim, added: "I cannot say to you now just what the Illinois delegationwill do, but you may rely upon it, I will be there when you need me, " Thisremark did not seem of importance at the time, but when we discussed theincident the next day at the Capitol at Trenton we both felt that, at acritical moment of the convention Roger Sullivan could be relied upon tosupport us and to throw the vote of Illinois our way. Sullivan kept hispromise in real, generous fashion. When it seemed as if the BaltimoreConvention was at the point of deadlock, and after the Illinois delegationhad voted many times for Champ Clark, Sullivan threw the full support ofIllinois to the New Jersey Governor, and thus the tide was quickly turnedin favour of Mr. Wilson's candidacy for the Presidency. 

I had often wondered what influence beyond this Jackson Day banquet speechhad induced this grizzly old political warrior to support Woodrow Wilson. Afterward I learned the real cause of it from men who kept in close touchwith the Illinois delegation during the trying days of the BaltimoreConvention. 

Everyone who knew Roger Sullivan knew the great influence which both hisfine wife and devoted son wielded over him. His son, Boetius, a Harvardgraduate, had early become a Wilson devotee and supporter, and thecorrespondence between father, mother, and son, contained a spiriteddiscussion of the availability of the New Jersey man for the Democraticnomination. The interest of Mrs. Sullivan and her son continued throughoutthe days of the Convention, which they both attended, and at the mostcritical moment in the proceedings of the Convention when a point wasarrived at when the Illinois vote was decisive, the Illinois leader left aconference where he was being strongly urged by Mr. Wilson's friends tosupport the New Jersey Governor, to have a final conference with Mrs. Sullivan and their son before he would finally agree to throw his supportto Wilson. 

Everyone at Baltimore knows the result of this conference and how theinner councils of the Sullivan family prevailed. Illinois swung to Wilsonand he was soon nominated. It was said, after the New Jersey man'snomination and election, that he showed base ingratitude to RogerSullivan, the man who more than any other single individual in theConvention had brought about his nomination. Mr. Sullivan's devotedfriends in Illinois were particularly bitter at the apparent coldness ofMr. Wilson toward their friend and idol. The President, as a matter offact, was never unmindful of his obligation to Sullivan for the personallyloyal way he had stood by him at Baltimore, and in every way while he wasPresident he let those associated with him know that Sullivan and hisfriends, wherever it was possible, should be preferred in the matter ofthe distribution of patronage in Illinois. 

The thing, however, which irritated Sullivan's friends and made many ofthem irreconcilable foes of Woodrow Wilson was his apparent unwillingnessto say a good word for Sullivan when he announced his candidacy for theUnited States senatorship of Illinois. This presented an opportunity forPresident Wilson to pay the old debt and "even up" things with Roger. Realizing the delicacy of the situation and how deeply the progressiveelement in the Democratic party throughout the country might misunderstandand even resent his putting his "okeh" on the candidacy of the Illinoisleader for the senatorship, nevertheless, upon considering the matter, hedecided to do so and prepared a generous and wholehearted letter ofendorsement of Sullivan. He felt that as a good sportsman he was bound inhonour to do this for the man whose influence and support, thrown to himat the right moment of the Convention, had brought about his nominationfor the Presidency. But there were other and deeper reasons urging him onto endorse his old friend. He knew how eagerly and earnestly Sullivan hadfought for him at Baltimore and how in doing so he had won the enmity ofthe eastern wing of the Democratic party. The old bosses in the party, like Smith and Murphy, had often twitted Sullivan on his support of Wilsonand threatened reprisals. Sullivan, however, stood like adamant againstthese influences and showed an allegiance to the New Jerseyman whichearned the admiration and affection of every Wilsonite in the country. ThePresident felt confident that should Roger Sullivan be elected to theSenate, he could count upon him to stand by and loyally support him andthe Administration. At this very time the President was beginning torealize in the keenest way the necessity for real, loyal backing in theSenate. Many of the men whom he had personally supported for the Senate inthe various senatorial fights throughout the country, especially those whowere known as progressive senators, like Hardwick and Smith of Georgia, O'Gorman of New York, and Martine of New Jersey, had grown indifferent andwere reluctant to follow his leadership in anything. The so-called OldGuard in the Senate, made up of men like Mark Smith of Arizona, SenatorsMartin and Swanson of Virginia, Ollie James of Kentucky, John SharpWilliams of Mississippi, Joe Robinson of Arkansas, Billy Hughes of NewJersey, Senator Culberson of Texas, Senator Simmons of North Carolina, andSenator Smith of Maryland, contrary to every prophecy and prediction madeby their enemies, stood with the President through every fight in thefinest and handsomest way, never deserting his leadership for a moment. Often he would say to me when we were discussing the senatorial situation:"My head is with the progressives in the Democratic party, but my heart, because of the way they stood by me, is with the so-called Old Guard inthe Senate. They stand without hitching. " He knew that, while RogerSullivan was a conservative, he could be relied upon in every emergency toback him up even to the point of sacrifice. What President Wilson wantedmore than anything else, as he often said, was a team that would work withhim. Sullivan was just this type of man, and beyond everything else hisloyalty had been tested and could be relied upon in every emergency. 

In the light of these circumstances, the President decided finally tothrow his hat in the ring in favour of the boss of Illinois for the UnitedStates senatorship. The letter advocating Sullivan's election was dictatedand signed by the President, and is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 12, 1914. 

 MY DEAR MR. RANEY:

 I have read with the greatest interest the account you were kind enough to send me of the Illinois Democratic State Convention. It is full of fine promise for the party; for it shows all the elements of the party heartily drawing together for a successful campaign; and with this union success is sure to come. 

 You call my attention to the fact that some Democrats are urging voters to cast their ballots for the Progressive candidate for the Senate of the United States rather than for the nominee of the Democratic primaries. You ask me if I approve of this. I do not. I have held myself very strictly to the principle that as a party man I am bound by the free choice of the people at the polls. I have always stood by the result of the primaries; I shall always do so; and I think it the duty of every Democrat to do so who cares for the success and sincerity of his party. Mr. Sullivan has been selected in a fair primary, and therefore he is entitled to the support of his party. 

 Sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 HON. HENRY T. RAINEY, House of Representatives. 

This letter and the contents of it will be a matter of news to Sullivan'sfriends throughout the country. Many, doubtless, will inquire why it wasnot published at the time. The reason it failed to reach the stage ofpublication can in no way be attributed to Woodrow Wilson. He neverrecalled it and the original is in my files. This may be surprising newsto the friends of the dead leader, Roger Sullivan, but it is only fair toMr. Wilson to say that he never hesitated in rushing to the defence of hisold friend in the most generous way. He wrote this letter with the fullrealization of just how much it might personally injure him with theprogressive thought of the country. The letter, after being written andsigned by the President, was held in reserve by me until Sullivan'sfriends in Chicago, those in close touch with his affairs there, felt freeto advise its publication. I was directed by them to release it, but theorder for its release was countermanded by one of the advisers close toSullivan, who telephoned me that it was thought inadvisable to have thePresident come into the campaign in Sullivan's behalf, the reason beingthat the publication of Wilson's letter might arouse the passionateantagonism of Theodore Roosevelt, who was about to begin a tour ofIllinois in behalf of Sullivan's opponent. I was advised later that theindividual with whom I dealt in this matter and upon whose direction theletter was withheld from publication had no authority to act for Sullivanin the matter and that Sullivan and his friends were deeply disappointedat Mr. Wilson's apparent unwillingness to take up the cudgel for his oldfriend. Many times I tried to make clear to Sullivan's friends just whatthe attitude of the President was, but whether I succeeded I do not know. The President, secluded in the White House, away from the madding crowd, never realized the basis of Sullivan's disappointment, for he felt that hehad "gone through" for his friend and had not forgotten for a momentSullivan's advocacy of him at Baltimore, When the news of Sullivan's deathwas brought to him at a time when he, also, was seriously ill, his lipsquivered, great tears stood in his eyes, and turning to Mrs. Wilson, whostood beside his bed, he said: "Roger Sullivan was a wonderful and devotedfriend at Baltimore, " and then, turning to me, he said: "Tumulty, Isincerely hope that you will personally go to Chicago and attend thefuneral and tell Mrs. Sullivan how deeply I grieve over the death of myold friend. "

CHAPTER XV

MR. BRYAN ISSUES A CHALLENGE

The contests for the delegates to the National Convention were on in fullswing throughout the various states. In the early contests, particularlyin the far western states, like Utah, South Dakota, North Dakota, andMontana, the Wilson candidacy, according to primary returns, began to takeon the appearance of a real, robust boom. As the critical days of theConvention approached, evidences of a recession of the favourable tide toWilson began to manifest themselves, particularly in the states ofMassachusetts and Illinois, both of which swung to Clark, with New York inthe offing quietly favouring Champ Clark. It was clear to the campaignmanagers of Wilson that from a psychological standpoint the pivotal stateswere New Jersey and Ohio; New Jersey, because ex-Senator Smith had againchallenged the leadership of Wilson and had notified his friendsthroughout the country that New Jersey could be relied upon to repudiateits governor in an overwhelming fashion. Smith had made deals andcombinations with all the disgruntled elements of the state, and withpowerful financial backing from the so-called interests in New Jersey andNew York and the mighty support of the Hearst newspapers, he was pressingthe New Jersey man closely, until at times it seemed as if he mightsucceed in at least splitting the delegation. The friends of the NewJersey man, therefore, realizing the effect upon the democracy of thecountry of an adverse verdict in his home state, concentrated all possibleforces at this critical point. In the meantime, and before the actualdetermination of the issue in New Jersey, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania swunginto the Wilson column, and the Ohio primaries resulted in a splitdelegation between Wilson and Harmon, in Harmon's home state. All eyeswere, therefore, intently watching New Jersey. A repudiation would bedisastrous, although the old-timers in the Wilson camp tried to encourageus by saying that even though New Jersey might turn against its governor, Grover Cleveland, under similar circumstances in 1892, despite theopposition of his home state, had been nominated and elected President. But, fortunately for us, New Jersey in the handsomest way stood by herfavourite son. The news of New Jersey's endorsement was flashed throughthe country, and there was jubilation in every Wilson camp. The dayfollowing the New Jersey primaries the New York _World_, the greatDemocratic paper, carried a striking editorial under the caption of"WOODROW WILSON FOR PRESIDENT. " The New Jersey primaries and the Ohioresults were great feathers in the caps of the Wilson men, and withenthusiasm and ardour they followed up this advantage. 

As the days for the opening of the Baltimore Convention approached the NewJersey Governor and his family left Princeton for Sea Girt, a delightfulplace along the Atlantic seaboard, where the state of New Jersey hadprovided for its governor an executive mansion, a charming cottage, areplica of General Washington's headquarters at Morristown. With us tothese headquarters, to keep vigil as it were over the New Jersey Governor, went a galaxy of newspaper men, representing the leading papers of thecountry. 

The first, and indeed the most important, situation the candidate wascalled upon to handle at Sea Girt as a preliminary to the Convention washis reply to the now famous Bryan-Parker telegrams, which played soimportant a part in the deliberations and indeed in the character of thewhole Convention--It will be recalled that Mr. Bryan, who was inattendance at the Republican Convention at Chicago as a specialcorrespondent, had telegraphed an identic telegram to each of theDemocratic candidates, Messrs. Clark, Underwood, Wilson, and Harmon, asfollows:

 Chicago, June, 1912. 

 In the interest of harmony, I suggest to the sub-committee of the Democratic National Committee the advisability of recommending as temporary chairman some progressive acceptable to the leading progressive candidates for the Presidential nomination. I take it for granted that no committeeman interested in Democratic success would desire to offend the members of a convention overwhelmingly progressive by naming a reactionary to sound the keynote of the campaign. 

 Eight members of the sub-committee, however, have, over the protest of the remaining eight, agreed upon not only a Reactionary but upon the one Democrat who, among those not candidates for the Presidential nomination, is, in the eyes of the public, most conspicuously identified with the reactionary element of the party. 

 I shall be pleased to join you and your friends in opposing his selection by the full committee or by the Convention. Kindly answer here. 

 W. J. BRYAN. 

I was on my way from New York to Sea Girt when I read a copy of thistelegram in the evening papers. I believe that I grasped the fullsignificance of this move on the part of Mr. Bryan. In fact, I became soanxious about it that I left the train before reaching my destination, inorder to say to Governor Wilson over the 'phone how important I thoughtthe message really was and how cautiously it should be handled. I tried toimpress upon him the importance of the answer he was called upon to maketo Mr. Bryan. He calmly informed me that he had not yet received thetelegram and that he would, of course, give me an opportunity to discussthe matter with him before making his reply. 

It was clear that Mr. Bryan, whose influence in the councils of theDemocratic party at that time was very great, was seeking by this methodto ascertain from leading Presidential candidates like Wilson, Underwood, Clark, and Harmon, just how they felt about the efforts of the New Yorkdelegation, led by the Tammany boss, Charlie Murphy, and the conservativeelement of the Democratic party in the East, to control the Convention andto give it the most conservative and standpat appearance by controllingthe preliminary organization and nominating Alton B. Parker as temporarychairman. For many weeks previous to the Convention it had been rumouredthat that was the programme and that the real purpose which lay behind itwas to unhorse Bryan and to end for all time his control and that of theradicals of the West over the affairs of the Democratic party. It was arecrudescence of the old fight of 1896, between the conservative East andthe radical West--Bryan assuming, of course, the leadership of theradicals of the West, and Charlie Murphy and his group acting as thespokesmen of the conservative East. 

It was clear to me that Bryan anticipated just what replies Underwood, Clark, and Harmon would make to his inquiry. Whether he was certain ofwhat the New Jersey Governor would say in answer to his telegram, I nevercould ascertain. Indeed, many of the New Jersey Governor's supporters wereungenerous enough to say that behind the inquiry lay a selfish purpose;that Mr. Bryan took this method to reestablish his leadership and to placehimself at the forefront of the liberal, progressive forces of theConvention. 

It is clear, as one looks back upon this incident, that a misstep in thehandling of this inquiry from Mr. Bryan might have been fatal to the NewJersey man's candidacy. 

When I arrived at Sea Girt to discuss the matter with Governor Wilson, Iwas surprised to find that he had not even read the telegram, although acopy of it lay upon his desk, and when he did read it and we werediscussing it he did not share my view of its great importance. Inattempting to emphasize its importance I experienced one of the mostdifficult jobs I ever had in the eleven years I was associated withWoodrow Wilson. In vain I tried to impress upon him what I believed to bethe purpose which lay behind the whole business; that his reply woulddetermine the question as to whether he was going to line up with theprogressive element which was strong in the West, or whether he would takesides with those of the conservative East, many of whom were bitterlyopposed to him. He finally informed me that he was in touch with Mr. McCombs, his campaign manager at Baltimore, and that he would not reply toMr. Bryan's telegram until he received some word from the former as towhat his opinion was in regard to handling this difficult matter. I lefthim, after impressing upon him the necessity of early action, lest ourprogressive friends both at Baltimore and throughout the country who wereawaiting word from us should be disappointed by his apparent unwillingnessto take his position with the progressives. 

The newspaper correspondents at Sea Girt, realizing the importance of thecandidate's decision, industriously kept upon our trail to find out whatreply would be made to Mr. Bryan. The direct wire between Baltimore andSea Girt was kept busy with inquiries from our friends as to what attitudewe were taking in the matter. While my relations with McCombs at the timewere of the friendliest sort, I feared that the Eastern environment inwhich he lived, and his attempt to bring Tammany into camp for the NewJersey Governor, would necessarily play a large part in influencing hisjudgment, and I was apprehensive lest Governor Wilson should be too muchinclined to accept Mr. McCombs' final judgment in the matter. 

On June 21, 1912, the following telegram came from Mr. McCombs, as thebasis of a proposed reply to Mr. Bryan by the New Jersey Governor:

 Baltimore, June 21, 1912. 

 HON. WILLIAM J. BRYAN Lincoln, Nebraska. 

 I quite agree with you that the temporary chairman of the Convention should voice the sentiments of the democracy of the nation which I am convinced is distinctly progressive. However, before receiving your telegram I had given the following statement for publication in the Baltimore _Evening Sun_: My friends in Baltimore are on the people's side in everything that affects the organization of the Convention. They are certain not to forget their standards as they have already shown. It is not necessary that I should remind them of these standards from New Jersey and I have neither the right nor the desire to direct the organization of a convention of which I am not even a member. 

 (signed) MCCOMBS

I was greatly disappointed, of course, at the character of reply suggestedby McCombs and argued with the Governor at length on what I consideredwould be the disastrous effects of making a reply such as the onecontained in the above telegram. Clearly, Mr. McCombs' suggested reply wasa rebuke to Mr. Bryan and a bid for the Eastern vote in the convention. Ofcourse, Governor Wilson was most reluctant to disregard the advice ofMcCombs. He felt that he (McCombs) was "on the job" at Baltimore and moreintimately in touch with the situation than he himself could be at SeaGirt. After a long discussion of the matter, the proposed reply preparedby McCombs was ignored and the following telegram was prepared and sent byWoodrow Wilson:

 W. J. BRYAN, Chicago:

 You are quite right. Before hearing of your message I clearly stated my position in answer to a question from the Baltimore Evening Sun. The Baltimore Convention is to be a convention of Progressives, of men who are progressive in principle and by conviction. It must, if it is not to be put in a wrong light before the country, express its convictions in its organization and in its choice of the men who are to speak for it. You are to be a member of the Convention and are entirely within your rights in doing everything within your power to bring that result about. No one will doubt where my sympathies lie and you will, I am sure, find my friends in the Convention acting upon clear conviction and always in the interest of the people's cause. I am happy in the confidence that they need no suggestion from me. 

 (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. 

This reply, more than any other single thing, changed the whole attitudeand temper of the Convention toward Woodrow Wilson. The progressive forcesin it were seeking leadership and Mr. Bryan, by his inquiry, had providedan opportunity, of which. Mr. Wilson took full advantage. 

An interesting incident occurred in connection with this affair. Beingunable to induce the Governor quickly to reply to Mr. Bryan, and realizingthat our friends at Baltimore would expect him to agree with Mr. Bryan, and thus take his place with the progressive element in the Convention, Iwas firmly convinced that he would at the end be found in agreement withMr. Bryan. I, therefore, took the liberty of saying to the newspaper menin our group--those who were favourably disposed to us--that when Mr. Wilson did reply to Mr. Bryan he would be found in harmony with theCommoner's ideas. This unofficial tip was immediately conveyed toBaltimore and our friends, after returning from the Convention, told mehow this piece of inspired information had put heart in our men, and thaton a bulletin board before the Baltimore _Sun_ offices there was postedthe announcement "WILSON AGREES WITH BRYAN" and before it hundreds ofWilson men gathered, cheering the message of the New Jersey Governor. 

The reply of the New Jersey Governor was prepared by him while he wasseated on the side of a little bed in one of the rooms of the Sea Girtcottage. He looked at me intently, holding a pad and pencil in his hands, and then wrote these significant words to Mr. Bryan: "_You are right_. "

I have often wondered what effect on the Convention McCombs' proposedreply, which contained a rebuke to Mr. Bryan, would have had. From thattime on Mr. Bryan was the devoted friend of the New Jersey Governor. Mr. Wilson's reply had convinced the Nebraskan that the Governor was notafraid to accept the issue and that he was in favour of supporting apreliminary organization that was to be progressive both in principle andby conviction. 

McCombs was obsessed with the idea that the New York delegation must bewon; that everything else was negligible compared with that. Therefore hewished Mr. Wilson in his reply to say something that would be consideredby the New York delegation as a public rebuke to Mr. Bryan. I afterwardlearned that McCombs, nervous, incapable of standing the strain andexcitement of the Convention, had retired to a friend's house at Baltimorewhere, after the Woodrow Wilson telegram to William Jennings Bryan, he wasfound in a room, lying across a bed, crying miserably. To the inquiries ofhis friends as to what was the matter with him McCombs replied, weeping, that the Governor had spoiled everything by his telegram to Bryan; thathad the Governor followed his [McCombs'] advice, he could have beennominated. 

The direct wire between the Sea Girt cottage and the Wilson headquartersat Baltimore was kept busy from early morning until late at night. Thetelephone exchange in the cottage was so arranged that a branch telephonewas kept in the little room under the stairway, which constituted a sortof listening post, which permitted me, in accordance with the suggestionof the Governor himself, to listen in on conversations, not by way ofeavesdropping, but in order that we might intelligently confer after eachconversation on the various matters that might have to be decided uponwith reference to the organization of the convention. Many of themomentous questions having to do with the conduct of the Convention werediscussed and settled over this 'phone. The most frequent users of the'phone during these days were Colonel Bryan and Mr. McCombs, our campaignmanager. During the opening days of the Convention I made it my businessto keep in close touch with Baltimore both by conversations over the'phone with the active managers of the Wilson boom and by carefullyreading each morning the news items appearing in the New York _Times_, NewYork _World_, and the Baltimore _Sun_, this last-named paper being one ofthe leading advocates of the Wilson candidacy in the country. 

I was personally, and in some cases intimately, acquainted with thespecial writers on these great journals and knew from previous contactwith them that they were on the "inside" of the situation at Baltimore, and in this way much information was gleaned which proved helpful inkeeping us in touch with the many happenings at the Convention. 

Having successfully passed through the Bryan-Parker crisis, we decidedupon a kind of strategy that would win to our side the various progressiveelements in the Convention. In line with this idea, we suggested to ourmanagers at Baltimore the advisability of putting forward the name ofOllie M. James of Kentucky for permanent chairman of the Convention. Whilehe was a staunch Clark man and a devoted follower of Mr. Bryan, we knew hecould be relied upon to give us a fair deal as the presiding officer ofthe Convention. There was another reason, too. Away off in Sea Girt wegathered the impression that the sober second thought of the Conventionfavoured his selection and that even though we might fail in our attemptto nominate him for this office, our efforts at least in this regard wouldgive the impression to those who looked with favour upon Wilson as theirsecond choice. Another reason was this: We were not afraid to trust ourcause to a Clark man, and Ollie James for many years had been the idol ofconvention crowds. When, upon the conclusion of the Bryan-Parker episode, Mr. Bryan telephoned Sea Girt to discuss with the Governor the matter ofthe chairmanship, he was greatly surprised and pleased to have theGovernor say, in the most hearty way that, upon canvassing the wholesituation, he felt it would be an admirable and just thing to select OllieJames of Kentucky. Mr. Bryan said: "But, Governor Wilson, Mr. James is inthe Convention as a Clark man. " "It does not matter, " was the Governor'sreply. "He is our kind of a fellow, and I am sure my friends can rely uponhim to treat our cause well. " From Mr. Bryan's subsequent conversationsover the telephone it clearly appeared that he was delighted at thesuggestion of his own intimate friend, and it was plain that he was beingconvinced from moves of this kind by the New Jersey Governor that WoodrowWilson was willing to stand or fall with him in attempting to organize theConvention along progressive lines. 

Years after the Convention the senator from Kentucky, who became myclosest and dearest friend, and who distinguished himself as a member ofthe Senate, and who was one of the staunchest defenders of the Presidentand the Administration, told me of the wisdom which he thought lay behindthe suggestion of himself for the chairmanship; that we, at Sea Girt, rightly sensed the situation and that the suggestion of his name had donemore than anything else to convince the men in the Convention of thegenuine character of the New Jersey Governor's progressiveness. We feltthat strategic moves of this kind appealed to the progressive thought inthe Convention and went far to remove the strange impression many of thedelegates had that Wilson was a rank conservative. It was plainlyperceptible that these acts were quickly turning the progressives in theConvention toward our candidate. 

In following these suggestions, we were, in fact, acting independently ofthe New Jersey Governor's advisers at Baltimore. It was plain to be seenthat the battle at Baltimore would finally simmer down to a contestbetween the reactionaries and the progressives, and we decided at Sea Girtthat in every move that was to be made our purpose should be to win theprogressive support in the Convention. McCombs was at no time found inharmony with this action, his principal activities at Baltimore beinggiven over to an attempt to win for the New Jersey Governor the support ofthe conservatives of the East, and, particularly, New York, whose seventy-six votes he thought the great prize of the Convention. 

CHAPTER XVI

THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION

At Sea Girt we kept in close touch with our friends at Baltimore, so thatafter each ballot the New Jersey candidate was apprised of the result. During the trying days and nights of the Convention the only eager andanxious ones in the family group, besides myself, were Mrs. Wilson and theWilson girls. The candidate himself indeed seemed to take only perfunctoryinterest in what was happening at Baltimore. He never allowed a singleballot or the changes those ballots reflected to ruffle or disturb him. Never before was the equable disposition of the man better manifested thanduring these trying days. Only once did he show evidences of irritation. It was upon the receipt of word from Baltimore, carried through the dailypress, that his manager Mr. McCombs was indulging in patronage deals tosecure blocks of delegates. Upon considering this news he immediatelyissued a public statement saying that no one was authorized to make anyoffer of a Cabinet post for him and that those who had done so were actingwithout authority from him. This caused a flurry in the ranks of ourfriends in Baltimore and the statement was the subject of heateddiscussion between the Governor and Mr. McCombs over the telephone. Ofcourse, I did not hear what was said at the other end of the wire, but Iremember that the Governor said: "I am sorry, McCombs, but my statementmust stand as I have issued it. There must be no conditions whateverattached to the nomination. " And there the conversation ended. While thiscolloquy took place I was seated just outside of the telephone booth. Whenthe Governor came out he told me of the talk he had had with McCombs, andthat their principal discussion was the attempt by McCombs and his friendsat Baltimore to exact from him a promise that in case of his nominationWilliam Jennings Bryan should not be named for the post of Secretary ofState; that a great deal in the way of delegates' votes from the Easternstates depended upon his giving this promise. The Governor then said tome: "I will not bargain for this office. It would be foolish for me atthis time to decide upon a Cabinet officer, and it would be outrageous toeliminate anybody from consideration now, particularly Mr. Bryan, who hasrendered such fine service to the party in all seasons. "

The candidacy of the New Jersey Governor gained with each ballot--onlyslightly, however--but he was the only candidate who showed an increasedvote at each stage of the Convention proceedings. The critical period wasreached on Thursday night. In the early afternoon we had receivedintimations from Baltimore that on that night the New York delegationwould throw its support to Champ Clark, and our friends at Baltimore wereafraid that if this purpose was carried out it would result in a stampedeto Clark. We discussed the possibilities of the situation that night afterdinner, but up to ten o'clock, when the Governor retired for the night, New York was still voting for Harmon. I left the Sea Girt cottage and wentout to the newspaper men's tent to await word from Baltimore. Thetelegrapher in charge of the Associated Press wire was a devoted friendand admirer of the New Jersey candidate. There was no one in the tent butthe telegrapher and myself. Everything was quiet. Suddenly the telegraphinstrument began to register. The operator looked up from the instrument, and I could tell from his expression that something big was coming. Hetook his pad and quickly began to record the message. In a tone of voicethat indicated its seriousness, he read to me the following message: "NewYork casts its seventy-six votes for Champ Clark. Great demonstration on. "And then the instrument stopped recording. It looked as if the "jig wasup. " Frankly, I almost collapsed at the news. I had been up for manynights and had had only a few hours' sleep. I left the tent, almost indespair, about eleven o'clock, and returned to the Sea Girt cottage, preparatory to going to my home at Avon, New Jersey. As I was leaving thecottage the Governor appeared at one of the upper windows, clad in hispajamas, and looking at me in the most serious way, said: "Tumulty, isthere any news from Baltimore?" I replied: "Nothing new, Governor. " Whenwe were breakfasting together the next morning, he laughingly said to me:"You thought you could fool me last night when I asked if there was anyword from Baltimore; but I could tell from the serious expression on yourface that something had gone wrong. " This was about the first evidence ofreal interest he had shown in the Baltimore proceedings. 

As will be recalled, the thing that prevented Champ Clark from gatheringthe full benefit which would have come to him from the casting of the NewYork vote in his favour was a question by "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, adelegate from Oklahoma. He said: "Is this convention going to surrenderits leadership to the Tammany Tiger?" This stemmed the tide toward Mr. Clark, and changed the whole face of the Convention. 

It was evident that on Friday night the deadlock stage of the Conventionhad been finally reached. The Wilson vote had risen to 354, and thereremained without perceptible change. It began to look as if the candidacyof the New Jersey Governor had reached its full strength. The franticefforts of the Wilson men to win additional votes were unavailing. Indeed, Wilson's case appeared to be hopeless. On Saturday morning, McCombstelephoned Sea Girt and asked for the Governor. The Governor took up the'phone and for a long time listened intently to what was being said at theother end. I afterward learned that McCombs had conveyed word to theGovernor that his case was hopeless and that it was useless to continuethe fight, and asked for instructions. Whereupon, the followingconversation took place in my presence: "So, McCombs, you feel it ishopeless to make further endeavours?" When McCombs asked the Governor ifhe would instruct his friends to support Mr. Underwood, Mr. Wilson said:"No, that would not be fair. I ought not to try to influence my friends inbehalf of another candidate. They have been mighty loyal and kind to me. Please say to them how greatly I appreciate their generous support andthat they are now free to support any candidate they choose. "

In the room at the time of this conversation between McCombs and the NewJersey Governor sat Mrs. Wilson and myself. When the Governor said toMcCombs, "So you think it is hopeless?" great tears stood in the eyes ofMrs. Wilson, and as the Governor put down the telephone, she walked overto him and in the most tender way put her arms around his neck, saying:

"My dear Woodrow, I am sorry, indeed, that you have failed. " Looking ather, with a smile that carried no evidence of the disappointment orchagrin he felt at the news he had just received, he said: "My dear, ofcourse I am disappointed, but we must not complain. We must be sportsmen. After all, it is God's will, and I feel that a great load has been liftedfrom my shoulders. " With a smile he remarked that this failure would makeit possible for them, when his term as Governor of New Jersey wascompleted, to go for a vacation to the English Lake country--a regionloved by them both, where they had previously spent happy summers. Turningto me, he asked for a pencil and pad and informed me that he would preparea message of congratulation to Champ Clark, saying as he left the room:"Champ Clark will be nominated and I will give you the message in a fewminutes. "

I afterward learned that McCombs was about to release the delegates whenRoger Sullivan, who had been informed of McCombs' message to the NewJersey Governor, rushed over to McCombs and said to him, "Damn you, don'tyou do that. Sit steady in the boat. "

This is the true story of the occurrence so strangely distorted by Mr. McCombs in the book he left for publication after his death, wherein hewould make it appear that Governor Wilson had got in a panic and tried towithdraw from the race; whereas the panic was all in the troubled breastof Mr. McCombs, a physically frail, morally timid person, constitutionallyunfit for the task of conducting such a fight as was being waged inBaltimore. More sturdy friends of Governor Wilson at the Convention werebusy trying to brace up the halting manager and persuade him to continuethe fight, even against the desperate odds that faced them. But for thesestronger natures, among whom were old Roger Sullivan of Illinois and W. G. McAdoo, the battle would have been lost. 

The message of congratulation to Champ Clark was prepared and ready to beput on the wire for transmission to him when the Baltimore Conventionassembled again on Saturday, June 29, 1912. I had argued with the Governorthat despite what McCombs had said to him over the 'phone on the previousday I felt that there was still a great deal of latent strength in theWilson forces in the Convention which was ready to jump into action assoon as it appeared that Champ Clark's case was hopeless. The first balloton Saturday gave weight to my view, for upon that ballot Wilson gainedfifteen or twenty votes, which injected new hope into our forces in theConvention. From that time on Wilson steadily moved forward, and then cameBryan's resolutions, opposing any candidate who received the support ofthe "privilege-hunting" class, and attempting the expulsion of a certainEastern group from the Convention. Pandemonium reigned in the ConventionHall, but the vote upon the resolutions themselves showed the temper ofthe delegates. This made the Clark nomination hopeless. Bryan's role as anexponent of outraged public opinion and as a master of great conventionswas superbly played. When he finally threw his tremendous influence toWilson, the struggle was over. Indiana jumped to Wilson, then Illinois, and the fight was won. Wilson received the necessary two-third vote andwas proclaimed the candidate. 

The progressive element of the Democratic party had triumphed after along, stubborn fight by what at first was a minority in the Convention forenlightened progressivism, with Woodrow Wilson as the standard bearer. Tothose like myself far away from the Convention there was the sense of agreat issue at stake at Baltimore. One old gentleman who visited Sea Girtafter the Convention compared the stand of the Liberals in the Conventionto the handful at Thermopylae; others compared their heroic determinationto the struggle of Garibaldi and his troops. To the outside world it wasplain that a great battle for the right was being waged at Baltimore, under the inspiration of a new leadership. At times it appeared that theraw Wilson recruits would have to surrender, that they could not withstandthe smashing blows delivered by the trained army which the Conservativeshad mobilized. But they stood firm, for there was in the ranks of theLiberal group in the Baltimore Convention an unconquerable spirit, akin tothat of the Crusaders, and a leadership of ardent men who were convincedthat they were fighting, not merely for a man but for a principle whichthis man symbolized. Among these were men like W. G. McAdoo of New York, A. Mitchell Palmer, Joseph Guffey, and Vance McCormick of Pennsylvania, Senator "Billy" Hughes of New Jersey, and Angus McLean of North Carolina. 

Although the Wilson forces were largely made up of "new" men, some of whomhad never before been actively interested in politics, comparatively youngmen like McAdoo, Palmer, McCormick, McLean, Guffey, and old men like JudgeWestcott of New Jersey, yet they were drawn to the light that had dawnedin New Jersey and were eager and anxious to have that light of inspiredleadership given to the nation. Judge Westcott fired the Convention withhis eloquence and brought showers of applause when he quoted at lengthfrom a speech Mr. Wilson had made when president of Princeton, and forwhich he had been hissed, lampooned, and derided by the Princetonopposition. Judge Westcott said:

 Men are known by what they say and do. Men are known by those who hate them and those who oppose them. Many years ago the great executive of New Jersey said: "No man is great who thinks himself so, and no man is good who does not strive to secure the happiness and comfort of others. " This is the secret of his life. This is, in the last analysis, the explanation of his power. Later, in his memorable effort to retain high scholarship and simple democracy in Princeton University, he declared: "The great voice of America does not come from seats of learning. It comes in a murmur from the hills and woods, and the farms and factories and the mills, rolling on and gaining volume until it comes to us from the homes of common men. Do these murmurs echo in the corridors of our universities? I have not heard them. " A clarion call to the spirit that now moves America. Still later he shouted: "I will not cry peace so long as social injustice and political wrong exist in the state of New Jersey. " Here is the very soul of the silent revolution now solidifying sentiment and purpose in our common country. 

Men in the Convention, overwhelmed with the emotion of the great hour andthe vindication of the bold liberal, Woodrow Wilson, bowed their heads andsobbed aloud. The "amateurs" of that convention had met the onslaughts ofthe Old Guard and had won, and thus was brought about, through theirefforts, their courage, and their devotion, the dawn of a new day in thepolitics of the nation. 

CHAPTER XVII

FACING A SOLEMN RESPONSIBILITY

Shortly after the Democratic National Convention I gave a dinner at thenewspaper men's cottage at Sea Girt, to which I invited the Democraticcandidate and the newspaper men, in order that they might be given achance to meet him in the most intimate way and obtain from him what hewas pleased to call the "inside" of his mind. Upon the conclusion of thedinner, the Democratic candidate opened his heart in a little talk of themost intimate and interesting character. It contained not only his viewsof the Presidency, but also a frank discussion of the great problems thatwould confront the next administration. In referring to Mr. Roosevelt, hesaid that he had done a great service in rousing the country from itslethargy, and in that work he had rendered admirable and lasting service, but beyond that he had failed, for he had not, during his administrations, attacked two of the major problems: the tariff and the currency, which he, Wilson, considered to be the heart and centre of the whole movement forlasting and permanent reform in America. Discussing Mr. Roosevelt, hesaid:

 He promised too often the millennium. No public man has a right to go so far afield. You have no right to promise Heaven unless you can bring us to it, for, in making promises, you create too much expectation and your failure brings with it only disappointment and sometimes despair. As a candidate for the Presidency I do not want to promise Heaven unless I can bring you to it. I can only see a little distance up the road. I cannot tell you what is around the corner. The successful leader ought not to keep too far in advance of the mass he is seeking to lead, for he will soon lose contact with them. No unusual expectation ought to be created by him. When messages are brought to me by my friends of what is expected of the next President, I am sometimes terrified at the task that would await me in case I should be elected. For instance, my daughter, who is engaged in social-welfare work in Philadelphia, told me of a visit she paid a humble home in that city where the head of a large family told her that her husband was going to vote for me because it would mean cheaper bread. My God, gentlemen, just think of the responsibility an expectation of that kind creates! I can't reduce the price of bread. I can only strive in the few years I shall have in office to remove the noxious growths that have been planted in our soil and try to clear the way for the new adjustment which is necessary. That adjustment cannot be brought about suddenly. We cannot arbitrarily turn right about face and pull one policy up by the roots and cast it aside, while we plant another in virgin soil. A great industrial system has been built up in this country under the fosterage of the Government, behind a wall of unproductive taxes. Changes must be brought about, first here, then there, and then there again. We must move from step to step with as much prudence as resolution. In other words, we are called upon to perform a delicate operation, and in performing a delicate operation it is necessary for the surgeon who uses the knife to know where the foundation of vitality is, so that in cutting out the excrescence he shall not interfere with the vital tissues. 

 And while we do so we must create by absolute fairness and open- mindedness the atmosphere of mutual concession. There are no old scores to be paid off; there are no resentments to be satisfied; there is no revolution to be attempted. Men of every interest must be drawn into conference as to what it behooves us to do, and what it is possible for us to do. No one should be excluded from the conference except those who will not come in upon terms of equality and the common interest. We deal with great and delicate matters. 

 We should deal with them with pure and elevated purpose, without fear, without excitement, without undue haste, like men dealing with the sacred fortunes of a great country, and not like those who play for political advantage, or seek to reverse any policy in their own behalf. 

CHAPTER XVIII

WILLIAM F. MCCOMBS

The election being over, the President-elect proceeded with the selectionof his Cabinet and with that end in view immediately began thoseconferences with his friends throughout the country in an effort to gatherinformation upon which to base a final selection. All sorts of suggestionsbegan to flow into the Executive offices at Trenton. Tentative slates wereprepared for consideration, and the records and antecedents of the menwhose names appeared on them, were subjected to a searching scrutiny. Every now and then during this period the President-elect would discusswith me the various candidates and ask me to investigate this or thatphase of the character of certain men under consideration. 

One day as we were leaving the Executive offices at Trenton, the Governorsaid: "Tumulty, you have read Gideon Wells's 'Diary of the Civil War', have you not?" I told him that some months before he had generouslypresented me with those three interesting volumes that contained a mostaccurate and comprehensive inside view of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. "Who, " hesaid, "in Wells's discussion of the Lincoln Cabinet reminds you of WilliamF. McCombs?" I replied that, in some respects, William A. Seward, Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State. Not, of course, in the bigness of Seward'smind, for I was not attempting to make any comparison between theintellects of the two men, but in the effort of Seward to dominate Lincolnand thus creating jealousies in other members of the Cabinet that were thecause of continual embarrassment to Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Wilson turned to meand said: "You are absolutely right, and that is one reason why I have notseriously considered the claims of Mr. McCombs for a Cabinet post. I amsure that if I did put him in my Cabinet, I should find him interferingwith the administration of the other departments in the same way thatSeward sought to interfere, for instance, with the Treasury Departmentunder Salmon P. Chase. McCombs is a man of fine intellect, but he is neversatisfied unless he plays the stellar role, and I am afraid he cannot workin harness with other men and that I should never get any real team workfrom him. There is another serious objection to McCombs for a place in myCabinet. A few days ago he boldly informed me that he desired to have thepost of Attorney General. When I asked him why he preferred to be AttorneyGeneral, he informed me that, being a lawyer, the Attorney Generalshipwould help him professionally after his term of office expired. What asurprising statement for any man to make! Why, Tumulty, many of thescandals of previous administrations have come about in this way, Cabinetofficers using their posts to advance their own personal fortunes. It mustnot be done in our administration. It would constitute a grave scandal toappoint such a man to so high an office. "

It has often been charged by Mr. McCombs' friends that Mr. Wilson showed alack of appreciation of his services and an utter disregard of the finethings McCombs did in his behalf. Those of us who were on the inside andwitnessed the patience of Woodrow Wilson in handling this most difficultperson know how untrue such statements are. I personally know that duringthe trying days preceding the election most of Mr. Wilson's time was givenover to straightening out McCombs and attempting to satisfy his mind thatneither Mr. McAdoo, Colonel House, nor any other friends of Mr. Wilsonwere seeking to unhorse him and to take his place in the candidate'saffections. Never did any man show greater patience than did WoodrowWilson in his attitude toward McCombs. The illness of McCombs during thecampaign fed fuel to the fires of his naturally jealous disposition. Hesuspected everybody; trusted no one, and suspected that the President'sfriends were engaged in a conspiracy to destroy him. Of course, it is truethat Mr. Wilson refused to give him the post of Attorney General which hegreatly coveted, for reasons I have fully stated above; but at the verytime when McCombs' friends were saying that the President had ignored himand failed to offer him any place in his administration, the President hadalready tendered McCombs his choice of two of the most importantdiplomatic posts at his disposal--the Ambassadorship to Germany and theAmbassadorship to France. An interesting incident in connection with theoffer of the French post to McCombs and his acceptance of it is worthrelating. 

The President arrived in Washington on the third of March and went to theShoreham Hotel. McCombs had already received Mr. Wilson's offer of theFrench Ambassadorship, and on the night of the third of March he concludedhe would accept it. He sent a messenger to the Shoreham Hotel with hisletter of acceptance. Before the arrival of McCombs' letter at theShoreham the President had retired for the night, and the message wasinserted under the door of his room. However, it seems that shortly aftersending the message of acceptance McCombs changed his mind and sent afriend to the Shoreham to recover the letter, and at twelve o'clock atnight I found him outside of the President's room on his knees, busilyengaged in digging out McCombs' letter of acceptance from underneath thedoor. 

From that time on, with every changing wind, McCombs would first acceptand then reject the offer of the French post. By his vacillation heprevented the appointment of an Ambassador to France for four months. Hehad easy access to the President and saw him frequently. As he left theWhite House after calling on the President one day, Mr. Wilson showedsharp irritation and said to me: "If McCombs would only discuss somebodyelse for office save himself I would be more interested. "

That the offer of the French post was made by the President and rejectedby McCombs is evidenced by the following letter, addressed to thePresident by McCombs, under date of April 3, 1913:

 WILLIAM F. MCCOMBS COUNSELLOR AT LAW 96 Broadway & 6 Wall Street New York

 April 3, 1913. 

 My Dear Mr. President:

 Since I saw you on Saturday, I have been making continuous efforts to dispose of my affairs so that I might accept your very flattering offer. I have been in touch with Tumulty from day to day to find out whether my delay was embarrassing you in any way, and he told me it was not. 

 Of course, I did not want to inconvenience you. As I have told you before, my difficulty in accepting the post has lain in the adjustments of my financial affairs here and in the forming of a connection which would continue, in some degree, my practice. The clientèle which any lawyer has is very largely personal to himself, and it is almost impossible to arrange that the affairs of such a clientèle be handled by others. This is the difficulty under which I have labored. 

 After intimations to my clients, I find my absence would, in their view, be prejudicial to their interests and that they would each seek separate counsel. This would mean my return to New York without any clientèle whatsoever and a new start. After the statement which you so kindly issued, it occurred to me that I might make an arrangement under which my affairs could be handled. I am convinced now that it is impossible, and that I must remain here to maintain myself. During the past two years I have been compelled to neglect my business to a very large extent, and I feel that it is absolutely essential for me to recoup. In view of the very great honor of the French post, I was quite willing to sacrifice almost anything. I now know that the sacrifice would be complete. 

 I was sorry to see in the New York papers of yesterday, under Washington date line, that I had accepted the embassy. It has placed me in a most embarrassing position, and has caused general comment of vacillation. I cannot imagine how the fact that I was re-considering became public. The press clippings I get in the matter are most annoying to me, and must be to you. I suppose the only thing to say in the matter is that my position is the same as it was when my statement was given out in Washington. 

 Let me again thank you very deeply for the great honor you have conferred upon me. I sincerely wish it were within my power to accept. It is such a thing as rarely comes in a man's lifetime. 

 Believe me as ever, Always yours to command, WM. F. MCCOMBS. 

 HON. WOODROW WILSON, The White House, Washington, D. C. 

[Illustration: A letter from the man who could not make up his mind[Transcriber's note: the illustration contains a reproduction of theabove-quoted letter. ]]

Even after McCombs had declined the French post, as recited in the aboveletter to the President, he continued to vacillate, and addressed thefollowing telegrams and cables to me in regard to the FrenchAmbassadorship:

 New York, April 4, 1913. 

 HON. JOS. P. TUMULTY, Washington, D. C. 

 Confidentially, expect to come tomorrow. Please suspend on matter until I see you. 

 W. F. M. 

 * * * * *

 New York April 25, 1913. 

 JOS. P. TUMULTY, Washington, D. C. 

 Confirm understanding that nothing be done for the present and nothing sent in. 

 W. F. M

 * * * * *

 Sagaponac, N. Y. , May 3, 1913. Radio S. S. _Olympic_. 

 JOS. P. TUMULTY, White House, Washington, D. C. 

 Will cable about time sending name in when I reach Paris in _acceptance_ our understanding. 

 W. F. M. 

 * * * * *

 Paris, Via French, May 13, 1913. 

 JOS. P. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 Have been ill, improving. Cable you Thursday in matter. 

 W. F. M. 

 * * * * *

 Paris, June 1, 1913. 

 J. P. TUMULTY, Washington. 

 Some better. Operation doubtful. Question delayed a few days. 

 W. F. M. 

Then came the following cable to the President from Col. E. M. House:

 Paris, June 12, 1913. 

 THE PRESIDENT Washington. 

 Damon [code name for McCombs] requests me to say that after he sees present incumbent tomorrow he will cable you. He is much improved. 

 E. M. HOUSE. 

 * * * * *

 Paris, June 18, 1913. 

 JOS. P. TUMULTY, Washington. 

 Am sending conclusive message through usual channel so you get it tomorrow morning. This confirms message today which was incomplete. Hope everything will be o. K. 

 Mc. 

 * * * * *

 Paris, July 6, 1913. 

 J. P. TUMULTY, Washington. 

 Accept if no previous arrangement cable at once care Monroe Banquier Paris. 

 W. 

 * * * * *

 Paris, July 7, 1913. 

 TUMULTY, Washington. 

 Better wait a little or leave out for another strictly confidential. 

 W. 

By this last message McCombs meant that the President had better wait alittle for him to make up his mind, or to select another for the Frenchpost, which the President refused to do. 

The kindest explanation of Mr. McCombs' distorted and entirely untruthfulstory is that his sensitive mind had brooded so long on fancied injuriesthat he had come to believe that what he deposed was true. He wassensitive to a pathological degree, jealous, suspicious of everybody, andconsumed with ambition to appear as the sole maker of President Wilsonpolitically. He is dead, and it would have been pleasanter to keep silentabout him. I should have remained silent had he not left his embitteredmanuscript in the hands of friends, with directions to publish it afterhis death, when those whom he attacks in its various chapters would feel ahesitancy about challenging his statements and attempting in any way toasperse his memory. That he was abnormal was known to all who came intointimate contact with him during the campaign and after. His suspicionsand spites manifested themselves in ways so small that he would have beenlaughable had he not been pitiable. The simple fact is that both thenomination and the election of Governor Wilson were in spite of Mr. McCombs, not because of him. Mr. McCombs was ill during most of thecampaign, which had to be directed by the assistant chairman, Mr. McAdoo, with all possible embarrassing interference from the chairman's sick room. 

The full force of McCombs' petty spite, malice, and jealousy was expendedupon Mr. William G. McAdoo of New York, who at the time had established ahigh reputation for his courage and intrepidity in building the famousManhattan and Hudson tunnels. Mr. McAdoo, in the early days of WoodrowWilson's candidacy, took his place at the fore-front of the Wilson forces. At the time of his espousal of the Wilson cause he was the only leader inthe New York financial world ready and courageous enough to take up thecudgels for Mr. Wilson. His influence thrown to the Wilson sidestrengthened the Wilson cause in every part of the country. Everyintimation that reached McCombs during the campaign that Mr. McAdoo, asvice-chairman of the National Committee, was engaged in doing this or thatthing in connection with his duties as vice-chairman, was alwayscalculated to stir anew the fires of envy and jealousy which seemed alwaysburning in the breast of McCombs. 

I was in close touch with Mr. Wilson and all the phases of his campaign atthe time, and on several occasions was asked to act as mediator in thedifferences between Mr. McAdoo and Mr. McCombs, and I am, therefore, in aposition calmly to analyze and assess the reasons for McCombs' implacablehatred of Mr. McAdoo. I found that the motives which actuated McCombs wereof the pettiest and meanest sort. At their base lay the realization thatMr. McAdoo had, by his gallant and helpful support of Mr. Wilson, won hisadmiration and deep respect, and now everything must be done by McCombsand his friends to destroy Mr. McAdoo in the estimation of the Democraticcandidate for the Presidency. In the efforts put forth by McCombs and hisfriends to destroy Mr. Wilson's high opinion of Mr. McAdoo everycontemptible and underhanded method was resorted to. Mr. McAdoo reacted tothese unfair attacks in the most kindly and magnanimous way. Never for asingle moment did he allow the McCombs campaign against him to stand inthe way of Woodrow Wilson's advancement to the Presidency. 

During the whole time that Mr. McCombs was engaged in his vendetta, Mr. McAdoo was generous, gallant, big, and forgiving, even suggesting to theDemocratic candidate, in my presence, that it might be wiser for him(McAdoo) to withdraw from the campaign, so that "things at headquartersmight run easier and more smoothly. " Mr. Wilson would not by any act ofhis permit the sniping methods of McCombs to be rewarded in the withdrawalof McAdoo from his campaign. 

After the election and when it was certain that McAdoo was being seriouslyconsidered for the post of Secretary of the Treasury, McCombs' jealousybegan to exert itself in the most venomous way. He tried to persuade Mr. Wilson that the selection of Mr. McAdoo for the post of Secretary of theTreasury would be too much a recognition of the Wall Street point of view, and would be considered a repudiation of McCombs' leadership in theNational Committee. 

The campaign of McCombs to prevent the nomination of Mr. McAdoo for a postin the Cabinet failed utterly. His poison brigade then gathered at theShoreham Hotel in Washington on the day of the Inauguration and, attempting to reform their broken lines, now sought to prevent hisconfirmation at the hands of the Senate. Every agency of opposition thatMcCombs could invoke to accomplish this purpose was put into action, butlike all his efforts against Mr. McAdoo they met with failure. Mr. McAdoowas confirmed and took his place as Secretary of the Treasury, where hisconstructive genius in matters of finance was soon brought into play, andunder his magnificent leadership the foundation stones of the FederalReserve system were laid, the fruitage of which is now being realized inevery business throughout the country. 

Frequent conferences were held at Princeton with reference to theselection of the President's Cabinet, and in these conferences ColonelHouse and I participated. At a luncheon at the Sterling Hotel at TrentonMr. Bryan was offered the post of Secretary of State. 

On the first of March the post of Secretary of War was still open. It hadbeen offered to Mr. A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania and had beendeclined by him for an unusual reason. The President requested Mr. Palmerto meet him at Colonel House's apartment in New York. When the Presidenttendered him the position of Secretary of War, Mr. Palmer frankly told thePresident that he was a Quaker and that the tenets of his religionprevented his acceptance of any position having to do with the conduct ofwar. The President tried to overcome these scruples, but his efforts wereunavailing. The President then telephoned me and informed me of Palmer'sdeclination and asked if I had any suggestion regarding the vacancy in hisCabinet. I told him that I was anxious to see a New Jersey man occupy aplace at his Cabinet table, and we discussed the various possibilitiesover the 'phone, but without reaching any definite conclusion. I informedthe President that I would suggest the name of someone within a few hours. I then went to the library in my home in New Jersey and in looking overthe _Lawyers' Diary_ I ran across the name of Lindley Garrison, who at thetime was vice-chancellor of the state of New Jersey. Mr. Garrison was aresident of my home town and although I had only met him casually and hadtried a few cases before him, he had made a deep impression upon me as ahigh type of equity judge. 

I telephoned the President-elect that night and suggested the name ofLindley Garrison, whose reputation as a distinguished judge of theChancery Court was known to the President-elect. He was invited to Trentonthe next day and without having the slightest knowledge of the purpose ofthis summons, he arrived and was offered the post of Secretary of War inMr. Wilson's Cabinet, which he accepted. 

CHAPTER XIX

THE INAUGURATION

A presidential inauguration is a picturesque affair even when the weatheris stormy, as it frequently is on the fourth of March in Washington. It isa brilliant affair when the sun shines bright and the air is balmy, ashappened on March 4, 1913, when Woodrow Wilson took the oath of office atnoon, delivered his inaugural address a few minutes later, reviewed theparade immediately after luncheon, and before nightfall was at his desk inthe White House transacting the business of the Government. To the popularimagination Inauguration Day represents crowds and hurrahs, brass bandsand processions. The hotels, restaurants, and boarding houses ofWashington overflow with people from all parts of the country who havecome to "see the show. " The pavements, windows, and housetops alongPennsylvania Avenue from the east front of the Capitol to the western gateof the White House are crowded with folk eager to see the procession withits military column and marching clubs. From an improvised stand in frontof the White House, surrounded by his friends, the new President reviewsthe parade. 

Every four years the newspaper boys describe Inauguration Day, but I amnot aware of any novelist who has put it in a book. Why not? It offersmaterial of a high order for literary description. "Human interest"material also in abundance, not merely in the aspects of the retiring andincoming Presidents with their respective retinues of important officials, but in the comedies and tragedies of the lesser figures of the motleypolitical world. Familiar faces vanish, new faces appear--especially whena change of administration brings a change of party control. An evacuatingcolumn of ousted and dejected office-holders, prophesying nationaldisaster at the hands of parvenus, meets an advancing column of would-beoffice-holders rejoicing in general over their party's success andpalpitantly eager for individual advantage. As in life, so in Washingtonon Inauguration Day, humour and pathos mingle. Inauguration Day is thebeginning of a period of uprooting and transplanting. 

So it was when the Democrats came into office on March 4, 1913, aftersixteen years of uninterrupted Republican control and for only the thirdtime in the fifty-two years since Buchanan had walked out of the WhiteHouse and Lincoln had walked in. Hungry Democrats flocked to Washington, dismayed Republicans looked on in silence or with sardonic comment. Democratic old-timers who had been waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for"something to turn up" through long lean years, mingled in the hotellobbies with youths flushed with the excitement of a first experience Inthe political game and discussed the "prospects, " each confident that hewas indispensable to the new administration. Minor officeholders who had, so they said, been political neutrals during the past administration, anxiously scanned the horizon for signs that they would be retained. "Original Wilson men" from various parts of the country were introducingthemselves or being introduced by their friends. And there were thethousands, with no axes to grind, who had come simply to look on, or toparticipate in a long-postponed Democratic rejoicing, or to wish the newPresident Godspeed for his and the country's sake. It is not my businessin a book wholly concerned with the personal side of Woodrow Wilson'spolitical career to attempt a description of Inauguration Day, with itsclamours and its heartaches and its hopes. To the new President the daywas, as he himself said, not one of "triumph" but of "dedication. " For himthe occasion had a significance beyond the fortunes of individuals andparties. Something more had happened than a replacement of Republicans byDemocrats. He believed that he had been elected as a result of a stirringof the American conscience against thinly masked "privilege" and, areawakening of American aspiration for government which should more nearlymeet the needs of the plain people of the country. He knew that he wouldhave to disappoint many a hungry office-seeker, whose chief claim topreferment lay in his boast that he "had always voted the Democraticticket. " Among the new President's first duties would be the selection ofmen to fill offices and, of course, in loyalty to his party, he would givepreference to Democrats, but it did not please him to think of this interms of "patronage" and "spoils. " With the concentration of a purposefulman he was anxious chiefly to find the best people for the variousoffices, those capable of doing a day's work and those who could sense theopportunities for service in whole-hearted devotion to the country'scommon cause. His inaugural address met the expectations of thoughtfulhearers. It was on a high plane of statesmanship, uncoloured bypartisanship. It was the announcement of a programme in the interest ofthe country at large, with the idea of trusteeship strongly stressed. There was nothing very radical in the address: nothing to terrify thosewho were apprehensive lest property rights should be violated. ThePresident gave specific assurance that there would be due attention to"the old-fashioned, never-to-be-neglected, safeguarding of property, " buthe also immediately added "and of individual right. " Legitimate propertyclaims would be scrupulously respected, but it was clear that they whoconceived that the chief business of government is the promotion of theirprivate or corporate interests would get little aid and comfort from thisadministration. The underlying meaning of the President's progressivismwas clear: the recovery of old things which through long neglect or misusehad been lost, a return to the starting point of our Government, government in the interest of the many, not of the few: "Our work is awork of restoration"; "We have been refreshed by a new insight into ourlife. "

A deep humanity pervaded the message. To the thoughtful hearer it musthave been clear that the President's mind was more occupied with themasses than with special classes. He was not hostile to the classes. Hewas simply less interested in them. He suggested a social as well as apolitical programme: "Men and women and children" must be "shielded intheir lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of greatindustrial and social processes which they cannot alter, control, orsingly cope with. " "The first duty of law is to keep sound the society itserves. " Such was the first utterance of the President who in a few weekswas to appear as the champion, not of the special interests, native andforeign, in Mexico, but of the fifteen million Mexican people, gropingblindly, through blood and confusion, after some form of self-government, and who in a few years was to appear as the champion of small nations andthe masses throughout the world in a titanic struggle against the oldprinciples of autocracy. 

Mingled with the high and human tone of it all was a clear and itemizedforecast of proposed legislation: a revised tariff, a federal reservebanking system, a farmers' loan bank. And all who knew Woodrow Wilson'srecord in New Jersey were aware that the Executive would be the leader inthe enactment of legislation. The executive and legislative branches ofthe Government in this administration would, all informed people knew, bein partnership in the promotion of an enterprise as practical as it wasinspiring. 

After Chief Justice White administered the oath of office, the Presidentread the brief address, of which the following are the concluding words:

 This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward- looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me!

CHAPTER XX

MEXICO

Many grave matters inherited from the Taft regime pressed upon the newAdministration for immediate solution. One of the most serious was thesituation in Mexico, growing out of the revolution against the MaderoGovernment which broke out in Mexico City on February 9, 1913. The murderof ex-President Madero and Vice-President Suarez, and the usurpation ofpresidential authority by General Victoriano Huerta, Minister of ForeignAffairs, and the general industrial and social chaos of Mexico, made itnecessary for the new administration, only a month in power, quickly toact and to declare its policy with reference to the question then pendingas to the recognition of the provisional government, the head of which wasHuerta. After becoming "President" of Mexico, the usurper had brazenlyaddressed the following telegram to President Taft: "I have overthrown theGovernment and, therefore, peace and order will reign, " and boldlyasserted a claim to recognition by the Government of the United States. This was the state of affairs in Mexico when President Wilson wasinaugurated. The duly-elected President of Mexico, Francisco Madero, hadbeen overthrown by a band of conspirators headed by Huerta. Were thefruits of the hard-won fight of the Mexican masses against the arbitraryrule of the favoured few to be wasted? President Wilson answered thisquestion in his formal statement of March 12, 1913, eight days after hisinauguration. With respect to Latin-American affairs, he said:

 One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two continents. I earnestly desire the most cordial understanding and cooperation between the peoples and leaders of America, and, therefore, deem it my duty to make this brief statement:

 "Coöperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican governments everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. .. . _We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. _"

Two considerations animated the President in the formulation of hisMexican policy and compelled his adherence in it throughout hisadministration, namely:

_The firm conviction that all nations, both the weak and the powerful, have the inviolable right to control their internal affairs. 

The belief, established from the history of the world, that Mexico willnever become a peaceful and law-abiding neighbour of the United Statesuntil she has been permitted to achieve a permanent and basic settlementof her troubles without outside interference. _

Steadfastly, Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize Huerta as the ProvisionalPresident of Mexico. He said: "Huerta, the bitter, implacable foe ofeverything progressive and humane in Mexico, boldly defending theprivileges of the old scientifico group which he represented, openlydefied the authority of the United States and sneered at the much-ridiculed policy of 'watchful waiting' proclaimed by the newadministration, and laughed to scorn the high idealism which lay behindit. " To him the declaration of the American President that "we can have nosympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advancetheir own personal interests or ambition" was a mere gesture, too puerileto be seriously considered. 

While Huerta in Mexico was blatantly denouncing this benevolent policy ofcoöperation and helpfulness, aid and comfort were rendered the usurper bythe jingoistic criticisms of the President's enemies in the United StatesCongress and throughout the country, many of whom, urged on by the oilinterests, in their mad delirium, cried out for a blood-and-iron policytoward Mexico. Resisting the American interests in Mexico was a part ofthe President's task. Those who cried loudest for intervention were theywho had land, mineral, and industrial investments in Mexico. The "vigorousAmerican policy" which they demanded was a policy for personal enrichment. It was with this phase of the matter in mind that the President said: "Ihave to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United Statesand not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico. "

But the new President, having mapped out the course he was to follow, acourse fraught with a great deal of danger to his administration, seekingto bring about the moral isolation of Huerta himself, calmly moved on, apparently unmindful of the jeers and ridicule of his critics in Americaand elsewhere. "I am willing, " he said, "no matter what my personalfortunes may be, to play for the verdict of mankind. Personally, it willbe a matter of indifference to me what the verdict on the 7th of Novemberis, provided I feel any degree of confidence that when a later jury sits Ishall get their judgment in my favour. Not my favour personally--whatdifference does that make?--but my favour as an honest and conscientiousspokesman of a great nation. "

What an utterly foolish thing, said his critics, it is to attempt in thisday to oust a Mexican dictator by mere rhetoric and high-sounding phrases!

When Wilson said: "The situation must be given a little more time to workitself out in the new circumstances; I believe that only a little whilewill be necessary. .. . We must exercise the self-restraint of a reallygreat nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it, " hisenemies smugly shrugged their shoulders and said, with disgust: "Well, what's the use? what can you expect from a dreamer of dreams, a meredoctrinaire? Doesn't Wilson, the historian, know that force and forcealone can bring that grizzly old warrior Huerta to his senses?"

What was the President seeking to do in proclaiming his policy of"watchful waiting"? He was merely seeking to establish in Pan-Americanaffairs the principle that no president of a South American republic whocame to power by usurpation and assassination should receive, while he waspresident, the recognition of the United States. This doctrine was notonly good statesmanship, but it was likewise sound in morals. 

It was disheartening to find bitter criticism of this policy from theoutside, and depressing to find the enemies of watchful waiting "boringfrom within" through his own Cabinet officers. Lindley Garrison, his ownSecretary of War, had no sympathy for this idealistic policy. His onlyantidote for what was happening in Mexico was force and intervention andhe honourably urged this view upon the President, but without succeedingin bringing about the consummation so dear to his heart. 

 And one denies, and one forsakes, and still unquestioning he goes, who has his lonely thoughts. 

But the President stood firm in his resolve that the people of Mexicoshould not be punished for the malefactions of their usurping president, and steadily, against great odds, he moved forward to vindicate hispolicy, unmindful of the jeers and criticisms of his enemies. The heart ofthat policy he eloquently exposed when he said: "I am more interested inthe fortunes of oppressed men, pitiful women and children, than in anyproperty rights whatever. The people of Mexico are striving for the rightsthat are fundamental to life and happiness--fifteen million oppressed men, overburdened women, and pitiful children in virtual bondage in their ownhome of fertile lands and inexhaustible treasure! Some of the leaders ofthe revolution may often have been mistaken and violent and selfish, butthe revolution itself was inevitable and is right. The unspeakable Huertabetrayed the very comrades he served, traitorously overthrew thegovernment of which he was a trusted part, impudently spoke for the veryforces that had driven his people to rebellion with which he had pretendedto sympathize. The men who overcame him and drove him out represent atleast the fierce passion of reconstruction which lies at the very heart ofliberty; and so long as they represent, however imperfectly, such astruggle for deliverance, I am ready to serve their ends when I can. Solong as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of theUnited States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to any one whoobtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence. "

But the President's policy of watchful waiting did win. The days of theHuerta regime slowly wended their uneasy way. Huerta suspended the MexicanConstitution and, having imprisoned half of the Mexican Congress, proceeded to administer the Government as an arbitrary ruler. Slowly butsurely he began to feel the mighty pressure of the unfriendly Governmentof the United States upon him. Still defiant, he sought to unite behindhim the Mexican people, hoping to provoke them to military action againstthe United States. To hold his power he was willing to run the risk ofmaking his own country a bloody shamble, but President Wilson had themeasure of the tyrant Huerta from the beginning, and soon his efforts toisolate him began to bear fruit. Even now his bitter critics gave alistening ear to the oft-repeated statement of the American President, asif it contained the germ of a prophecy:

 The steady pressure of moral force will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemy--and how much more handsomely and with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honour!

Little by little the usurper was being isolated. By moral pressure everyday his power and prestige were perceptibly crumbling. His collapse wasnot far away when the President declared: "We shall not, I believe, beobliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. " The campaign of WoodrowWilson to force Huerta finally triumphed. On July 15th, Huerta resignedand departed from Mexico. Wilson's humanity and broad statesmanship hadwon over the system of cruel oppression for which the "unspeakable Huerta"had stood. 

During the Huerta controversy a thing happened which aggravated theMexican affair, and which culminated in the now-famous Tampico incident. 

On April 9, 1914, a paymaster of the United States steamship _Dolphin_landed at the Iturbide bridge at Tampico with a whaleboat and boat's crewto obtain supplies needed aboard the _Dolphin. _ While loading thesesupplies the paymaster and his men were arrested by an officer and squadof the army of General Huerta. Neither the paymaster nor any of the boat'screw were armed. The boat flew the United States flag both at the bow andstern. Two of the men were in the boat when arrested and hence were takenfrom United States "soil. " Admiral Mayo, senior American officer stationedoff Tampico, immediately demanded the release of the sailors. Release wasordered after the paymaster and the sailors had been detained about anhour. Not only did Admiral Mayo demand the release of the sailors butinsisted on a formal apology by the Huerta Government consisting of atwenty-one-gun salute to the flag. 

During the critical days following the refusal of Huerta to accede toAdmiral Mayo's request the State Department was notified that there wouldarrive at Vera Cruz the German steamship _Ypirango_ about to deliver toHuerta 15, 000, 000 rounds of ammunition and 500 rapid-fire guns. 

About 2. 30 o'clock in the morning of the 21st day of April, 1914, thetelephone operator at the White House called me at my home, and rousing mefrom bed, informed me that the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, desired tospeak to me at once upon a very urgent and serious matter. I went to thetelephone and was informed by Mr. Bryan that he had just received awireless informing him that the German steamship _Ypirango, _ carryingmunitions would arrive at Vera Cruz that morning about ten o'clock andthat he thought the President ought to be notified and that, in hisopinion, drastic measures should at once be taken to prevent the deliveryof these munitions to the Customs House at Vera Cruz. While Mr. Bryan andI were talking, Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, got on the wireand confirmed all that Mr. Bryan had just told me. Soon the President wason the 'phone, and in a voice indicating that he had just been arousedfrom sleep, carried on the following conversation with Messrs. Bryan, Daniels, and myself: Mr. Bryan reported to him the situation at Vera Cruzand informed him of the receipt of the wireless:

"Mr. President, I am sorry to inform you that I have just received awireless that a German ship will arrive at Vera Cruz this morning at teno'clock, containing large supplies of munitions and arms for the Mexicansand I want your judgment as to how we shall handle the situation. "

Replying to Mr. Bryan, the President said: "Of course, Mr. Bryan, youunderstand what drastic action in this matter might ultimately mean in ourrelations with Mexico?"

Mr. Bryan said, by way of reply:

"I thoroughly appreciate this, Mr. President, and fully considered itbefore telephoning you. " For a second there was a slight pause and thenthe President asked Mr. Daniels his opinion in regard to the matter. 

Mr. Daniels frankly agreed with Mr. Bryan that immediate action should betaken to prevent the German ship from landing its cargo. Without amoment's delay the President said to Mr. Daniels:

"Daniels, send this message to Admiral Fletcher: '_Take Vera Cruz atonce_'. "

As I sat at the 'phone on this fateful morning, away from the hurly-burlyworld outside, clad only in my pajamas, and listened to this discussion, the tenseness of the whole situation and its grave possibilities of warwith all its tragedy gripped me. Here were three men quietly gatheredabout a 'phone, pacifists at heart, men who had been criticized andlampooned throughout the whole country as being anti-militarist, nowwithout hesitation of any kind agreeing on a course of action that mightresult in bringing two nations to war. They were pacifists no longer, butplain, simple men, bent upon discharging the duty they owed their countryand utterly disregarding their own personal feelings of antagonism toevery phase of war. 

After Mr. Bryan and Mr. Daniels had left the telephone the President said:"Tumulty, are you there? What did you think of my message?" I replied thatthere was nothing else to do under the circumstances. He then said: "It istoo bad, isn't it, but we could not allow that cargo to land. The Mexicansintend using those guns upon our own boys. It is hard to take action ofthis kind. I have tried to keep out of this Mexican mess, but we are nowon the brink of war and there is no alternative. "

Discussing this vital matter that morning with the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Army and Navy, I could visualize the possible tragedy of the wholeaffair. I pictured the flagship of Admiral Fletcher with its fine cargo ofsturdy young marines, riding serenely at anchor off Vera Cruz, and thoseaboard the vessel utterly unmindful of the message that was now on its waythrough the air, an ominous message which to some of them would be aportent of death. When the President concluded his conversation with mehis voice was husky. It indicated to me that he felt the solemnity of thewhole delicate business he was now handling, while the people of America, whose spokesman he was, were at this hour quietly sleeping in their beds, unaware and unmindful of the grave import of this message which wasalready on its way to Vera Cruz. 

When I arrived at the White House the next morning I found the newspapercorrespondents attached to the Executive offices uninformed of what hadhappened in the early morning, but when I notified them that the Presidenthad ordered Admiral Fletcher at 2. 30 o'clock in the morning to take VeraCruz, they jumped, as one man, to the door, to flash this significant newsto the country and the world. 

With Huerta's abdication Venustiano Carranza took hold, but the Mexicantroubles were not at an end. The constant raiding expeditions of Villaacross the American border were a source of great irritation andthreatened every few days a conflagration. While Villa stood with Carranzaas a companion in arms to depose Huerta, the _"entente cordiale"_ was atan end as soon as Huerta passed off the stage. With these expeditions ofVilla and his motley crew across the border our relations with ourneighbour to the south were again seriously threatened. With Villacarrying on his raids and Carranza always misunderstanding the purpose andattitude of our Government and spurning its offer of helpful cooperation, difficulties of various sorts arose with each day, until popular opinionbecame insistent in its demand for vigorous action on the part of theAmerican President. Every ounce of reserve patience of the President wascalled into action to keep the situation steady. How to do it, with manyincidents happening each day to intensify and aggravate an already acutesituation, was the problem that met the President at every turn. At thistime the President was the loneliest figure in Washington. 

 Grotesque uncertain shapes infest the dark And wings of bats are heard in aimless flight; Discordant voices cry and serpents hiss, No friendly star, no beacon's beckoning ray. 

Even the members of his own party in the Senate and House were leftwithout an apology or excuse for the seeming indifference of the Presidentto affairs in Mexico. Day after day from outraged senators would comevigorous demands for firm action on the part of America, insistent thatsomething radical be done to establish conditions of peace along oursouthern borders. From many of them came the unqualified demand forintervention, so that the Mexican question should be once and for allsettled. 

[Illustration:

 Dear Tumulty, Can't talk less than half an hour to save his life, and when he is through he has talked on so many different subjects that I never can remember what he said. It is literally impossible for me with the present pressure upon me to see him, and I hope you will ask him if he can't submit a memorandum. 

 The President. C. L. S. 

 Dear Tumulty:

 I should like to see Mr. ---- but just now it does not seem possible because I know he is a gentleman who needs a good deal of sea room. I am taking his suggestions up with the Secretary of the Navy. 

 The President. C. L. S. 

Dealing with bores. ]

In the Cabinet, the Secretary of War, the vigorous spokesman of theCabinet group, demanding radical action in the way of intervention, wasinsisting that we intervene and put an end to the pusillanimous rule ofCarranza and "clean up" Mexico. Even I, who had stood with the Presidentduring the critical days of the Mexican imbroglio, for a while grew fainthearted in my devotion to the policy of watchful waiting. To me, theattack of Villa on Columbus, and the killing of some of our soldiers whileasleep, was the last straw. The continuance of this impossible situationalong the border was unthinkable. To force the President's hand, ifpossible, I expressed my feelings in the following letters to him:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 March 15, 1916. 

 MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I have been thinking over what we discussed this morning with reference to the Mexican situation. I am not acting on impulse and without a full realization, I hope, of everything that is involved. I am convinced that we should pursue to the end the declared purpose announced by you last Friday and endorsed by Congress and the people of the United States of "getting Villa. " If the _de facto_ government is going to resist the entrance of our troops, a new situation will be presented. I feel that you ought to advise Congress at the earliest possible moment of what the situation really is in order to secure its support and cooperation in whatever action is needed to accomplish the purpose you have in mind. To retrace our steps now would be not only disastrous to our party and humiliating to the country, but would be destructive of our influence in international affairs and make it forever impossible to deal in any effective way with Mexican affairs. 

 Your appeal to Congress ought to deal with this matter in an affirmative way, asking for the requisite power which you may feel assured will be granted you in ungrudging fashion. 

 My apology for writing you is my distress of mind and my deep interest in everything that affects you and your future and, I hope, the country's welfare. I would not be your friend if I did not tell you frankly how I feel. 

 Faithfully, TUMULTY. 

 THE PRESIDENT, The White House. 

 * * * * *

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 June 24, 1916. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 The Mexican authorities admit that they have taken American soldiers and incarcerated them. The people feel that a demand should be made for their immediate release, and that it should not take the form of an elaborate note. Only firmness and an unflinching insistence upon our part will bring the gentlemen in Mexico City to their senses. 

 If I were President at this moment, or acting as Secretary of State, my message to Carranza would be the following:

 "Release those American soldiers or take the consequences. "

 This would ring around the world. 

 Faithfully, TUMULTY. 

 THE PRESIDENT, The White House. 

After reading these letters, the President sent for me one day to visitwith him in his study, and to discuss "the present situation in Mexico. "As I sat down, he turned to me in the most serious way and said: "Tumulty, you are Irish, and, therefore, full of fight. I know how deeply you feelabout this Columbus affair. Of course, it is tragical and deeplyregrettable from every standpoint, but in the last analysis I, and not theCabinet or you, must bear the responsibility for every action that is tobe taken. I have to sleep with my conscience in these matters and I shallbe held responsible for every drop of blood that may be spent in theenterprise of intervention. I am seriously considering every phase of thisdifficult matter, and I can say frankly to you, and you may inform theCabinet officers who discuss it with you, that '_there won't be any warwith Mexico if I can prevent it_, ' no matter how loud the gentlemen on thehill yell for it and demand it. It is not a difficult thing for apresident to declare war, especially against a weak and defenceless nationlike Mexico. In a republic like ours, the man on horseback is always anidol, and were I considering the matter from the standpoint of my ownpolitical fortunes, and its influence upon the result of the nextelection, I should at once grasp this opportunity and invade Mexico, forit would mean the triumph of my administration. But this has never been inmy thoughts for a single moment. The thing that daunts me and holds meback is the aftermath of war, with all its tears and tragedies. I camefrom the South and I know what war is, for I have seen its wreckage andterrible ruin. It is easy for me as President to declare war. I do nothave to fight, and neither do the gentlemen on the Hill who now clamourfor it. It is some poor farmer's boy, or the son of some poor widow awayoff in some modest community, or perhaps the scion of a great family, whowill have to do the fighting and the dying. I will not resort to waragainst Mexico until I have exhausted every means to keep out of thismess. I know they will call me a coward and a quitter, but that will notdisturb me. Time, the great solvent, will, I am sure, vindicate thispolicy of humanity and forbearance. Men forget what is back of thisstruggle in Mexico. It is the age-long struggle of a people to come intotheir own, and while we look upon the incidents in the foreground, let usnot forget the tragic reality in the background which towers above thiswhole sad picture. The gentlemen who criticize me speak as if America wereafraid to fight Mexico. Poor Mexico, with its pitiful men, women, andchildren, fighting to gain a foothold in their own land! They speak of thevalour of America. What is true valour? I would be just as much ashamed tobe rash as I would to be a coward. Valour is self-respecting. Valour iscircumspect. Valour strikes only when it is right to strike. Valourwithholds itself from all small implications and entanglements and waitsfor the great opportunity when the sword will flash as if it carried thelight of heaven upon its blade. "

As the President spoke, his eyes flashed and his lips quivered with thedeep emotion he felt. It was the first time he had unburdened himself andlaid bare his real feelings toward Mexico. Rising from his chair, hewalked toward the window of his study, the very window out of whichLincoln had looked upon the Potomac and the hills of Virginia during thecritical days of the Civil War when he was receiving bad news about thedefeat of the Northern army. Continuing his talk, he said: "Tumulty, someday the people of America will know why I hesitated to intervene inMexico. I cannot tell them now for we are at peace with the great powerwhose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the present terriblecondition of affairs in Mexico. German propagandists are there now, fomenting strife and trouble between our countries. Germany is anxious tohave us at war with Mexico, so that our minds and our energies will betaken off the great war across the sea. She wishes an uninterruptedopportunity to carry on her submarine warfare and believes that war withMexico will keep our hands off her and thus give her liberty of action todo as she pleases on the high seas. It begins to look as if war withGermany is inevitable. If it should come--I pray God it may not--I do notwish America's energies and forces divided, for we will need every ounceof reserve we have to lick Germany. Tumulty, we must try patience a littlelonger and await the development of the whole plot in Mexico. "

Did not the publication of the famous Zimmerman note show that Germanintrigue was busy in Mexico?

 Berlin, January 19, 1917. 

 On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to keep neutral with the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance with Mexico on the following basis: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. 

 You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan, suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. 

 Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months. 

 ZIMMERMAN. 

 TO GERMAN MINISTER VON ECKHARDT, Mexico City. 

In the President's Flag Day address, delivered at Washington on June 14, 1917, appeared the following:

 They [meaning Germany] sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into an hostile alliance with her; and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion _from the Foreign Office at Berlin_. 

As the storm of ridicule and criticism of his policy of watchful waitingbeat fiercely upon him, I often wondered if he felt the petty meannesswhich underlay it, or was disturbed or dispirited by it. As the unkindblows fell upon him, thick and fast from every quarter, he gave noevidence to those who were close to him of any irritation, or of the deepanger he must have felt at what appeared to be a lack of sympathy on thepart of the country toward the idealistic policy in the treatment ofMexican affairs. Never for a single moment was he driven from the coursehe had mapped out for himself. He had given his heart and soul to a greathumane task and he moved toward its consummation amid a hurricane ofprotests and criticisms. 

There was a time, however, when I thought he displayed chagrin anddisappointment at the obstacles placed in his path in settling the affairsof Mexico. It was in a little speech delivered at the Brooklyn Navy Yardon the occasion of the burial of the Marines who fell at Vera Cruz. Thefollowing paragraph contained a note of sadness and even depression. Perhaps, in the following words, he pictured his own loneliness and utterdejection:

 I never went into battle; I never was under fire; but I fancy there are some things just as hard to do as to go under fire. I fancy that it is just as hard to do your duty when men are sneering at you as when they are shooting at you. When they shoot at you, they can only take your natural life; when they sneer at you, they can wound your living heart, and men who are brave enough, steadfast enough, steady in their principles enough, to go about their duty with regard to their fellow-men, no matter whether there are hisses or cheers, men who can do what Rudyard Kipling in one of his poems wrote, "Meet with triumph and disaster and treat those two imposters just the same, " are men for a nation to be proud of. Morally speaking, disaster and triumph are imposters. The cheers of the moment are not what a man ought to think about, but the verdict of his conscience and of the consciences of mankind. 

CHAPTER XXI

PANAMA TOLLS

In an introduction to "The Panama Canal Tolls Controversy, " edited by HughGordon Miller and Joseph C. Freehoff, Mr. Oscar S. Straus wrote: "There isno more honourable chapter in the highly creditable history of thediplomacy of our country than the repeal of the Panama Tolls Act under thepresent administration. Being a controversy affecting our internationalrelations, it is gratifying that, aside from the leadership of thePresident, the repeal was effected not solely by the party in power, butby the help of leaders in all three parties, rising above the plane ofpartisan politics to the higher reaches of broad statesmanship, guided bya scrupulous regard for our international character in accord with 'adecent respect for the opinions of mankind, ' as expressed in theDeclaration of Independence. " President Wilson himself, after therepealing act had been passed, remarked, "When everything else about thisAdministration has been forgotten, its attitude on the Panama Tolls treatywill be remembered as a long forward step in the process of making theconduct between nations the same as that which obtains between honourableindividuals dealing with each other, scrupulously respecting theircontracts, no matter what the cost. "

In making his recommendations to Congress he, almost with high disdain, ignored legal technicalities and diplomatic quibbles and took high moralground. Said he, "The large thing to do is the only thing we can afford todo, a voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere quoted andmisunderstood. We ought to reverse our action without raising the questionwhether we were right or wrong, and so once more deserve our reputationfor generosity and for the redemption of our every obligation withoutquibble or hesitation. "

An act passed in 1912 had exempted American coastwise shipping passingthrough the Canal from the tolls assessed on other vessels, and theBritish Government had protested against this on the ground that itviolated the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, which had stipulated that theCanal should be open to the vessels of all nations "on terms of entireequality. " Other nations than England had an interest in this question, and there was a suspicion that some of them were even more keenly if notmore heavily interested; but England took the initiative, and the struggleto save the exemption was turned, in the United States, into ademonstration by the Irish, Germans, and other anti-British elements. Innate hostility to England and coastwise shipping interests formed thebackbone of the opposition to any repeal of this exemption, but the TaftAdministration had held that the exemption did not conflict with thetreaty (on the ground that the words "all nations" meant all nationsexcept the United States), and British opposition to the fortification ofthe Canal, as well as the attitude of a section of the British pressduring the Canadian elections of 1911, had created a distrust of Britishmotives which was heightened by the conviction of many that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty had been a bad bargain. 

It was understood early in President Wilson's Administration that hebelieved the exemption was in violation of the treaty, but not untilOctober did he make formal announcement that he intended to ask Congressto repeal it. The question did not come into the foreground, however, until March 5, 1914, when the President addressed this request to Congressin ominous language, which to this day remains unexplained. "Nocommunication I addressed to Congress, " he said, "has carried with it moregrave and far-reaching implications to the interests of the country. "After expressing his belief that the law as it stood violated the treatyand should be repealed as a point of honour, he continued: "I ask this ofyou in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall notknow how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearerconsequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure. "

The first word I received that the President contemplated addressingCongress, asking for the repeal of Panama Tolls, came about in this way: Iwas notified after dinner one evening that the President wished to conferwith me in his study. When I arrived at the White House Mrs. Wilson met meand informed me of the plan which the President had in mind with referenceto this matter and of his decision to issue a statement that night whichwould be carried in the newspapers the following morning, and of hisdetermination to address Congress, asking for a repeal of the PanamaTolls. Mrs. Wilson showed considerable excitement over the President'sproposed step when she discussed the matter with me as I arrived at theWhite House. She said she had argued with the President and had tried topersuade him that if he intended to do so unusual a thing that now was theinopportune moment for it for the reason that it would create a partycrisis and probably a split, the result of which we could not foresee. When I went into the President's study, he read me the announcement he hadprepared for the papers. The full significance and the possible dangerwhich lay in the proposed move that the President was about to make struckme at once. Frankly I put the whole political situation in the countrybefore him as it would be affected by his attitude in this matter, sayingto him that the stand he was about to take would irritate large blocks ofIrish, Germans, and other anti-British elements in the country, and thatwe might expect that the leaders in our own party, the heads of thevarious committees, like Fitzgerald of Appropriations, Underwood of theWays and Means, and Clark, the Speaker of the House, would be found insolid opposition, and that, at a time when we needed every bit of strengthto put our party programme of domestic legislation into effect, it seemedto me unwise to inject this matter, which could only be a disturbingelement, into our party's councils. In discussing the matter with me, after I had presented the objections to it, which I did with great feelingand probably some irritation, he said: "I knew the view you would take ofit, but, unfortunately, every argument you lay before me in opposition tothe programme I have outlined in this statement is purely a partisan oneand one whose value I cannot recognize at this time. I must not count theeffect of a move of this kind upon my own personal political fortunes. Iam the trustee of the people and I am bound to take cognizance of the factthat by reason of our attitude on Panama Tolls our treaties arediscredited in every chancellery of Europe, where we are looked upon as anation that does not live up to its plighted word. We may have made a verybad bargain with England on Panama Tolls, but it will be all the morecredit to us if we stand by an agreement even when it entails a sacrificeon our part. The men who were parties to this treaty, like Joseph Choate, all agree that we have been indulging in hair-splitting and that we havedone a great injustice to England. I ought not, therefore, to be afraid, because of the antagonisms that will be created, to do my duty and risk mypolitical future if necessary in righting a great wrong. We cannot expectto hold the friendship of the world, especially of England, France, andJapan, if we are to treat agreements not as inviolable contracts, but asmere matters of convenience, whose plain terms are to be ignored whenmatters of expediency dictate. I know that the Irish, through the Hearstnewspapers, will cry out that I have surrendered to England, that I amattempting to hand over to Europe a quasi-control over the Panama Canal. As a matter of fact, we are in bad by reason of our attitude on PanamaTolls with various leading nations of Europe, and some unforeseencontingency may arise where it will be found that the reason for theirwithdrawal of friendship for us was our petty attitude in this matter. Irealize, as you urge, that the leaders of our party will be found inopposition, but I must forget this and try to work the matter out so thatat least I shall have cleared my skirts and have done what is possible forme to do to right a great wrong. "

When the President concluded his statement I put before him the possiblereaction against his administration and him personally which might bereflected in the returns of the Congressional elections to be held thatyear. He replied by saying: "I have calculated every element in thesituation and I have concluded where the path of duty lies. If we begin toconsider the effect upon our own political fortunes of every step we takein these delicate matters of our foreign relations, America will be setadrift and her word questioned in every court in Europe. It is importantthat every agreement that America subscribes her name to shall be carriedout in the spirit of those who negotiated it. "

On March 5, 1914, the President addressed Congress and asked for a repealof Panama Tolls and immediately the fierce fires of party opposition beganto burn. His party leaders expressed their opposition to the repeal inopen, honourable, and vigorous fashion and the fight was on. Now that theleading Democrats in the Senate and House had left us, it was necessaryfor us to reorganize our forces at once. This task devolved upon me and Iimmediately got in touch with younger men of the House, like MitchellPalmer, Judge Covington, and that sturdy Republican from Minnesota, FredStevens, and over night we had a militant organization in the trenches, prepared to meet the onslaught of our enemies. 

The President was adamant under the bitterest criticism. His attitudebrought down on him a shower of personal abuse and vituperation from Irishorgans and from a group of newspapers which presently were to appear asthe chief supporters of Germany. The arguments against the repeal wereunusually bitter, and even though Elihu Root, leading Republican senator, in a brilliant and effective speech took his stand by the President andagainst the recent Republican Administration, partisan criticism seizedupon the opening. Nevertheless, the tolls exemption was repealed in Juneand the events of July and August, 1914, and especially after VonBethmann-Hollweg stood up in the German Reichstag and characterized thetreaty between Germany and Belgium as a mere scrap of paper, gave acertain satisfaction to those who stood by the President for the sanctityof treaties. 

Sir Edward Grey, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, commentingupon the action in the House of Commons said: "It has not been done toplease us, or in the interest of good relations, but I believe from a muchgreater motive--the feeling that a government which is to use itsinfluence among nations to make relations better must never, when theoccasion arises, flinch or quail from interpreting treaty rights in astrictly fair spirit. "

CHAPTER XXII

REFORMING THE CURRENCY

I have bitterly resented at times the imputation and charge that WoodrowWilson is so egotistical, self-willed, and so wedded to his own ideas thathe not only does not invite suggestion from the outside but that heresents it and refuses to be guided by it. 

I feel that my daily intimacy with him for eleven years gives me the rightto speak frankly in the matter. Of course, like every great man, he isfirmly set in his opinions. He holds and cleaves to them with a passionatedevotion and tenacity but only after the fullest consideration of all thefacts and information upon which he bases a final conviction. Time andagain I have seen him gallantly retreat under the fire of a betterargument in a matter that he had been previously disposed to favour. 

And what of his attitude toward those who came to the Executive offices toargue with him on some vital matter in which he had formed what appearedto be an unalterable judgment? Never did he assume the unfriendly orunyielding attitude of the doctrinaire or the man of a single idea. Irecall a case in point. He was discussing the revenue situation withRepresentative Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, at a time when it was thesubject of bitter controversy in the ranks of the Democratic party. ThePresident and Mr. Kitchin held radically divergent views on this matter;the President sought to lead the party in one direction and Mr. Kitchinopenly pursued an opposite course. I was present at this conference. Nowarm friendship existed between these two men; but there was never anyevidence of hostility in the President's attitude toward Mr. Kitchin. Helistened politely and with patience to every argument that Mr. Kitchinvigorously put forward to sustain his contention in the matter, and tookwithout wincing the sledgehammer blows often dealt by Mr. Kitchin. ThePresident replied to Mr. Kitchin's arguments in an open, frank manner andinvited him to the fullest possible discussion of the matter. 

I recall the conclusion of this interview, when it seemed that, havingdriven the President from point to point, Mr. Kitchin was the victor. There was no disappointment or chagrin evident in the President's manneras he faced Mr. Kitchin to accept his defeat. He met it in truesportsmanlike fashion. At the conclusion of Mr. Kitchin's argument thePresident literally threw up his hands and said, quietly, without showinga trace of disappointment: "I surrender, Mr. Kitchin. You have beaten me. I shall inform my friends on the Hill that I was mistaken and shallinstruct them, of course, to follow you in this matter. "

I could crowd this chapter with similar incidents, but it would be a workof supererogation. 

Never before was Mr. Wilson's open-minded desire to apply in practice theprinciple of common counsel better illustrated than in his handling of theimportant work in connection with the establishment of the Federal ReserveAct, the keystone of the great arch of the Democratic Administration. Itwas the first item in his programme to set business free in America and toestablish it upon a firm and permanent basis. He aptly said to me, when hefirst discussed the basic reason for the legislation, he wished not onlyto set business free in America, but he desired also to take away fromcertain financial interests in the country the power they had unjustlyexercised of "hazing" the Democratic party at every Presidential election. 

Shortly after the Presidential election in 1912, while he was burdenedwith the responsibilities of the Executive office at Trenton, New Jersey, he began, in collaboration with that fine, able, resourceful Virginian, Representative Carter Glass, then chairman of the Banking and CurrencyCommittee of the House, the preparation of the Federal Reserve Banking andCurrency Act. For hours at the Executive office in Trenton the VirginiaCongressman conferred with the Governor of New Jersey over the preliminarydrafts of this most vital piece of legislation. For days the work ofpreparation was carried on, so that when Mr. Wilson arrived in Washingtonto take up the duties of the Presidency, the Banking and Currency Bill wasin shape and ready for immediate introduction in the Senate and House. 

Looking back over the struggle that ensued from the time this measure wasintroduced into the Senate and House, I often wonder if the people "backhome, " especially the various business interests of the country, who havebeen saved from financial disaster by this admirable and wholesome pieceof legislation, ever realized the painstaking labour and industry, nightand day, which Woodrow Wilson, in addition to his other multitudinousduties, put upon this task. Could they but understand the character of theopposition he faced even in his own party ranks, and how in the midst ofone of Washington's most trying summers, without vacation or recreation ofany kind, he grappled with this problem in the face of stubbornopposition, they would, perhaps, be willing to pay tribute to theearnestness and sincerity of this man who finally placed upon the statutebooks one of the greatest constructive pieces of legislation of half acentury. Having given his heart to this important task, whose enactmentinto law was a boon to business and established for the first time inAmerica a "Democracy of Credit, " as he was pleased to call it, herelentlessly pursued his object until senators and representatives yieldedto his insistent request for the enactment of this law, not under thestress of the party whip, but through arguments which he passionatelypresented to those who sought his counsel in this matter. 

During this time I gladly accepted the President's invitation to spend thesummer with him at the White House, where I occupied the bedroom that hadbeen used as Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet Room, and where Mr. Lincoln had signedhis famous Emancipation Proclamation. My presence, during that summer, asa member of the President's family, gave me a good opportunity to see himin action in his conferences in regard to the Federal Reserve Act. Neverwas greater patience, forbearance, or fortitude, shown by a chiefexecutive under such trying circumstances. Day after day, when it seemedas if real progress was being made, unexpected opposition would developand make it necessary to rebuild our shattered lines, until finally thebill was out of the House and on its way to the Senate. 

Its arrival in the Senate was but the beginning of what appeared an almostinterminable struggle. The President's stalwart adviser in the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, was always at hand to rally and give encouragement to ourforces, many of whom at times were in despair over the prospects of thebill. The leaders of the opposition on the committee were Senator Root onthe Republican side and Senators O'Gorman and Reed on the Democratic. 

It seemed at times as if they had succeeded in blocking an agreement onthe Conference Report. At last word was brought to the President byRepresentative Glass that the opposition of these gentlemen might succeedin killing the bill. The President up to this time, although fightingagainst great odds, showed no impatience or petulancy, but the messagebrought by Mr. Glass was the last straw. Looking at Mr. Glass, with a showof fire and in a voice that indicated the impatience he felt, thePresident said: "Glass, have you got the votes in the committee tooverride these gentlemen [meaning O'Gorman and Reed]?" Glass replied thathe had. "Then, " said the President, "outvote them, damn them, outvotethem!"

Mr. McAdoo came to the White House a few days later to make a report aboutthe situation in the Senate, with reference to the Federal Reserve Act. His report was most discouraging as to the final passage of the bill. Hesaid that his information from the Hill was that the leaders of theopposition in the Senate were bent upon a filibuster and that theprobabilities were that the Senate would finally adjourn without anyaction being taken on the Federal Reserve Act. 

This conversation took place on the White House portico, which overlooksthe beautiful Potomac and the hills of Virginia. It was one of the hottestdays in June, a day which left all of us who were about the President lowin spirit. Only those who know the depressing character of Washington'smidsummer heat can understand the full significance of this statement. ThePresident on this occasion was seated in an old-fashioned rocker, attiredin a comfortable, cool-looking Palm Beach suit. Mr. McAdoo reported thesituation in detail and said that, in his opinion, it was hopeless to tryto do more with the bill: that an impasse had been reached between theSenate and the House. The President quickly interrupted Mr. McAdoo, saying, with a smile: "Mac, when the boys at Princeton came to me and toldme they were going to lose a football game, they always lost. We must notlose this game; too much is involved. Please say to the gentlemen on theHill who urge a postponement of this matter that Washington weather, especially in these days, fully agrees with me and that unless finalaction is taken on this measure at this session I will immediately callCongress in extraordinary session to act upon this matter. " Thischallenge, brought to the Hill by Mr. McAdoo, quickly did the job and thebill was soon on its way to the White House. 

Mr. Wilson conducted the conferences in this matter with friends and foesalike with a quiet mastery and good temper diametrically contrary to thereports sedulously circulated for political purposes, that he wasautocratic and refused to cooperate with the members of the Senate andHouse in an effort to pass legislation in which the whole country wasinterested. 

We have only to recall the previous attempts made by formeradministrations to legislate upon the currency question, especially theefforts of the Harrison and Cleveland administrations, to understand andappreciate the difficulties that lay in the path of Woodrow Wilson in hisefforts to free the credit of the country from selfish control and to pushthis vital legislation to enactment. Previous attempts had always resultedin failure and sometimes in disaster to the administrations in control atthe time. The only evidences of these frequent but abortive efforts topass currency legislation were large and bulky volumes containing thehearings of the expensive Monetary Commission that had been set up bySenator Aldrich of Rhode Island. As an historian and man of affairs, Woodrow Wilson realized the difficulties and obstacles that lay in hispath in attempting to reform the currency, but he was not in the leastdaunted by the magnitude of the task which confronted him. He movedcautiously forward and pressed for early action at the first session ofthe Congress following his inauguration. He realized that with the passageof the tariff legislation, which always acts as a business depressant, itwas necessary at the same time to have the stimulus the Currency Billwould afford when enacted into law. The split of '96 in the Democraticranks over the money question was an additional reason for cautious andwell-considered action if the Federal Reserve Bill was to become areality. 

The presence of Mr. Bryan in the Cabinet and his well-known views on thisquestion were strong reasons for watchful and careful prevision. It wasobvious to Mr. Wilson from the outset that insurmountable difficulties layin his path, but he brushed them aside as if they were inconsequential. 

In the Committee on Banking and Currency, in both the Senate and House, were many ardent and devoted friends of Mr. Bryan, who thought that hisradical views on the money question could be used as a rallying point foropposition to the President's plan for currency reform. But those whocounted on Mr. Bryan's antagonism were doomed to disappointment andfailure, for while it is true that Mr. Bryan found serious objections tocertain parts of the bill, when these were eliminated he moved forwardwith the President in the most generous fashion and remained with himuntil the Federal Reserve Act was made part of the law of the land. 

It was in a conference with members of the Banking and Currency Committeethat I first saw the President in action with the gentlemen of the Senateand House. He had invited the Democratic members of the Banking andCurrency Committee to confer with him in the Cabinet Room in the WhiteHouse offices. From my desk in an anteroom I heard all the discussions ofthe bill. There was full, open discussion of the bill in all its phases atthis conference in which were collected the conservatives of the East, theradicalists of the West, and those who came to be known as the "corntassel" representatives of the South, all holding widely divergent viewsand representing every shade of opinion, some of it sharply antagonisticto the President's views. Some of the members were openly hostile to thePresident, even in a personal way, particularly one representative fromthe South, and some of the questions addressed to the President wereungracious to the verge of open insult. It was an exasperating experience, but Mr. Wilson stood the test with patience, betraying no resentment toimpertinent questions, replying to every query with Chesterfieldian graceand affability, parrying every blow with courtesy and gentleness, gallantly ignoring the unfriendly tone and manifest unfairness of some ofthe questions, keeping himself strictly to the merits of the discussion, subordinating his personal feelings to the important public business underconsideration, until all his interrogators were convinced of his sincerityand fair-mindedness and some were ashamed of their own ungracious bearing. 

It was clear to me as I watched this great man in action on this tryingoccasion that in the cause he was defending he saw, with a visionunimpaired and a judgment unclouded by prejudice or prepossessions, farbeyond the little room in which he was conferring. He saw the varied andpressing needs of a great nation labouring now under a currency systemthat held its resources as if in a strait-jacket. He saw in the oldmonetary system which had prevailed in the country for many years aprolific breeder of panic and financial distress. He saw the farmer of theWest and South a plaything of Eastern financial interests. And thus, underthe leadership of Woodrow Wilson was begun the first skirmish in the greatbattle to free the credit of the country from selfish control, a movementwhich led to the establishment of a financial system that ended for alltime the danger or possibility of financial panic. 

There was an interesting incident in connection with the handling of thecurrency legislation that brought about what threatened to be the firstrift in the President's Cabinet. It concerned Mr. Bryan's attitude ofopposition to certain features of the bill as drafted by the Banking andCurrency Committee of the House. My connection with this particular affairarose in this way: In the early stages of the discussion of the FederalReserve Act, and while Mr. Glass's committee was considering the matter, amessenger from the White House informed me that the President wished toconfer with me in his study. As I walked into the room, I saw at once fromhis general attitude and expression that something serious was afoot andthat he was very much distressed. Turning around in his chair he said: "Itbegins to look as if W. J. B. [he thus referred to Mr. Bryan] and I havecome to the parting of the ways on the Currency Bill. He is opposed to thebank-note feature of the bill as drawn. We had a long discussion about thematter after Cabinet meeting to-day. In thoroughly kindly way Mr. Bryaninformed me that he was opposed to that feature of the bill. Of course, you know, W. J. B. And I have never been in agreement on the moneyquestion. It is only fair, however, to say that in our discussion Mr. Bryan conducted himself in the most generous way, and I was deeply touchedby his personal attitude of friendliness toward me. He even went so far asto say that in order that I might not be embarrassed in the handling ofthe bill, he was willing to resign and leave the country and make nopublic criticism of the measure. In the meantime, Mr. Bryan has promisedto say nothing to any one about the matter until he has a furtherdiscussion with me. "

The President then frankly discussed with me the effect of the possibleresignation of Mr. Bryan. The President suggested that I drop in on Mr. Bryan very soon and if possible casually invite a discussion of theFederal Reserve Act, telling Mr. Bryan of his [the President's] interestsin it, and how much he appreciated Mr. Bryan's personal attitude towardhim. 

I realized the seriousness and delicacy of the situation I was asked tohandle, and, being on the friendliest terms with Mr. Bryan, I telephonedhim and invited myself to his home--the old Logan Mansion, a beautifulplace in the northwest part of Washington. I found Mr. Bryan alone when Iarrived. We went at once to his library and, in a boyish way, he showed mea picture which the President had autographed for him only a few daysprevious. As we stood before this picture Mr. Bryan gave expression to hissincere admiration and affection for the President. He related, with deepfeeling, how much Mr. Bryan had enjoyed his contact and officialcompanionship with him and how he had come to have a very deep affectionfor him. As we turned away from the picture, he grew serious and began thediscussion of the very thing the President and I had conferred on only afew hours before. He freely discussed his differences with the Presidentover the Federal Reserve Act, and asked me the direct question: "Who fromWall Street has been discussing this bill with the President? I am afraidthat some of the President's friends have been emphasizing too much theview of Wall Street in their conferences with the President on this bill. "I frankly told Mr. Bryan that this imputation did a great injustice to thefine men with whom the President conferred on the matter of banking reformand that I was certain that the President's only intimate advisers in thismatter were Mr. McAdoo, Senator Owen of Oklahoma, and Mr. Glass ofVirginia, and that I personally knew that in their discussions thePresident never argued the point of view of the Eastern financialinterests. Mr. Bryan was reassured by my statement and proceeded to laybefore me his objections to the character of the currency issue providedfor in the bill. He then took from the library shelves a volume containingall the Democratic National platforms and read excerpts from them bearingupon the question of currency reform. He soon convinced me that there wasgreat merit in his contention. Before leaving him, I told him of myinterview with the President and how deeply distressed he [the President]was that Mr. Bryan was not disposed to support him in the matter of theFederal Reserve Act. It was evident that Mr. Bryan felt a keen sympathyfor the President and that he was honestly trying to find a way out of hisdifficulties that would enable him to give the President his whole-heartedsupport. He showed real emotion when I disclosed to him the personalfeelings of the President toward him, and I feel sure I left him in a moreagreeable frame of mind. I told him that I would talk with the President, Mr. McAdoo, and Mr. Glass and report to him on the following day. 

I returned to the President's study and reported to him in detail theresults of my conference with Mr. Bryan. I called his attention to Mr. Bryan's criticism of the bill and then ventured the opinion that Mr. Bryan, according to the traditional policy of the Democratic party, wasright in his attitude and that I felt that he [Mr. Wilson] was wrong. Fora moment the President showed a little impatience with this statement andasked me to point out to him where the party in the National platforms hadever taken the view Mr. Bryan indicated in his discussion with me. I thenshowed him the book Mr. Bryan had given me, containing the Democraticplatforms, and he read very carefully plank after plank on the currency. He finally closed the book, placed it on his desk, and said: "I amconvinced there is a great deal in what Mr. Bryan says. " We then discussedways of adjusting the matter. I finally suggested that the President allowme to talk with Mr. Glass and place before him Mr. Bryan's position andthat he have Mr. Glass confer with Secretary McAdoo and Senator Owen. Thiswas arranged. I had no way of ascertaining just what took place at thisconference, but after the Cabinet meeting on the following Tuesday Mr. Bryan walked around to where the President was sitting, and said to him:"Mr. President, we have settled our differences and you may rely upon meto remain with you to the end of the fight. " The President thanked himcordially, and thus the first break in the Cabinet line was averted. 

CHAPTER XXIII

RENOMINATED

As the days of the 1916 Convention at St. Louis approached, it was aforegone conclusion that there would be no serious contender against thePresident for the nomination and that he would win the prize by apractically unanimous vote. While at times the friends of Mr. Bryan andMr. Clark were hopeful that the President might withdraw from the contest, after the Democrats at the Convention were assured that the President wasready to accept a renomination, the field was made clear for the settingof the Convention stage to accomplish that end. 

It was thought that the St. Louis Convention would be a trite affair; thatthere would be no enthusiasm in it. This anticipation arose from the ideaexpressed by many of the devoted friends of the Democratic party, that thecause of Democracy in 1916 was little less than hopeless. Much of thisfeeling came from the inordinately high estimate which many placed uponMr. Justice Hughes both as a candidate and as a campaigner. Indeed, manyDemocrats who had canvassed the national situation felt that without acontinuation of the split in the ranks of the Republican party the road toDemocratic success was indeed a hard and difficult one to travel. 

There is no doubt that in the opinion of the country Mr. Justice Hugheswas the strongest man the Republicans could put forward. The fact that hewas resigning from the Supreme Court bench and that he had a remarkablyprogressive record as Governor of New York added a glamour and prestige tothis nomination. I, myself, never lost confidence, however, in our abilityto win. The Congressional elections of 1914, when the Democratic majorityin the House was reduced to thirty-five, had dispirited Democratic friendsthroughout the country and made them feel that the nomination at St. Louiswould be a purely formal matter and without fruitful results. 

In a letter addressed to Colonel Harvey in 1914 I had expressed theopinion that the reduced Democratic majority in the Congressionalelections of 1914, which was being construed as an apparent defeat of theparty, was not a final judgment upon the work of the President and theachievements of his administration; that it was not a reversalirretrievable in character; that it should not depress the Democraticworkers throughout the country, and that the field of conquest for theDemocratic party in 1916 _was the West and the Pacific coast_. A calmanalysis of the election results in 1914 convinced me that if thePresidential election of 1916 was to be won, our efforts for victory hadto be concentrated upon a cultivation of sentiment throughout the West infavour of the Democratic cause. 

My letter to Colonel Harvey is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 November 7, 1914. 

 DEAR COLONEL HARVEY:

 Now that the clouds have cleared away, let me send you just a line or two expressing an opinion of last Tuesday's election. 

 It is my feeling that we are making unmistakable gains in sections of the country where Democratic hopes never ran high before this time. Note the results in the states of Utah, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, South Dakota, North Dakota, Washington and California. It now appears from the returns, regardless of what the Eastern papers may say, that our majority in the House will be approximately from thirty-five to forty; that our majority in the Senate will be sixteen. 

 We have elected for the first time in the history of the Democratic party, so far as I can recall, Democratic Senators in the great Republican States of California, Wisconsin and South Dakota. The gains we have made in the West, along the Pacific coast, are mighty interesting and show a new field of conquest for the Democratic party in 1916. To elect a congress, retaining a majority of the party in power, after a revision of the tariff, is unprecedented. Once before it happened, in 1897, after the passage of the Dingley Tariff Act when the Republican majority was reduced from 47 to 10. We are not in the least bit disturbed by the situation. We have for the first time elected Democratic Congressmen from the states of Utah, Washington, South Dakota and North Dakota. 

 With best wishes, I am, Cordially and sincerely yours, J. P. TUMULTY, Secretary To The President. 

 COLONEL GEORGE HARVEY, Hotel Chamberlain, Old Point Comfort, Virginia. 

While the Democratic Convention was in session at St. Louis the Presidentremained in the White House, keeping in close touch by direct telephoniccommunication with affairs there. 

What at first appeared to be an ordinary and rather spiritless conventionwas quickly turned into a most enthusiastic and fervent one by the notablespeeches of Governor Glynn, of New York, the temporary chairman of theConvention, and Senator Ollie M. James, of Kentucky, the permanentchairman. 

The key-note speech delivered by Governor Glynn, contained this ringingdefense of the President's policy of neutrality:

 "This policy may not satisfy those who revel in destruction and find pleasure in despair. It may not satisfy the fire-eater or the swashbuckler but it does satisfy those who worship at the altar of the god of peace. It does satisfy the mothers of the land at whose hearth and fireside no jingoistic war has placed an empty chair. It does satisfy the daughters of the land from whom bluster and brag have sent no loving brother to the dissolution of the grave. It does satisfy the fathers of this land and the sons of this land who will fight for our flag, and die for our flag when Reason primes the rifle, when Honor draws the sword, when Justice breathes a blessing on the standards they uphold. "

And Senator James in a masterly oration paid this splendid tribute toWoodrow Wilson:

 "Four years ago they sneeringly called Woodrow Wilson the school- teacher; then his classes were assembled within the narrow walls of Princeton College. They were the young men of America. To-day he is the world teacher, his class is made up of kings, kaisers, czars, princes, and potentates. The confines of the schoolroom circle the world. His subject is the protection of American life and American rights under international law. The saving of neutral life, the freedom of the seas, and without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun, without the shedding of a single drop of blood, he has wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded above a battlefield an acknowledgment of American rights and an agreement to American demands. "

These eloquent utterances prepared the way for the great slogan of the1916 campaign: "_He kept us out of war. _"

The President himself never used that slogan, however. From the firstdeclaration of hostilities in Europe he realized the precarious positionof the United States and the possibility that, whether we would or not, wemight be swept into the conflict. As early as August, 1914, he expressedhis anxious apprehension that "something might occur on the high seaswhich would make our neutrality impossible. " He emphatically believed atthat time that America's neutrality would best serve the interests of theworld; he respected the American tradition of noninterference in Europeanquarrels; with his almost mystic ability to assess and understand theopinion of the people of the country at large he knew that the Americanpeople did not want war; in his comparative seclusion he read the mind ofAmerica clearer than did the "mixers" of the Pullman smoking compartmentswho mistook the clamour for intervention among certain classes along thenorth Atlantic seaboard for the voice of America at large; while theGerman rape of Belgium stirred his passionate indignation, he knew thatthere was no practical means by which the United States could stop it, that we could not immediately transport armies to the theatre of war, andthat public opinion, especially in the West and South, was not preparedfor active intervention; and in addition to all this he was genuinely, notmerely professedly, a passionate lover of peace. But with all this he, realizing the magnitude of the war, had already glimpsed its widersignificance, which caused him to say later that "this is the last war ofits kind, or of any kind that involves the world, that the United Statescan keep out of. The business of neutrality is over. " He saw that if thewar should continue long, as it promised to do, our participation might beinevitable and the American tradition of isolation for ever destroyed bycircumstances beyond human control. With patience mingled with firmness, he trod his difficult path, doing all he could to keep us from gettinginvolved without sacrificing fundamental principles of human and nationalrights, but he neither believed nor pretended to believe that he couldgive guaranties for the future. Nor did any of those who were closest tohim make rash promises. For instance, the Cabinet officers who activelyparticipated in the campaign were careful to say in their speeches that hehad done all that a president could honourably do to keep us out of warand that he could be depended upon to continue in the future the samecourse so long as it should prove humanly possible, for "peace" was notmerely a word on his lips but a passion in his heart, but that neither henor any other mortal could "look into the seeds of time" and say whatwould be and what would not be. The event was on the knees of the gods. Those who spoke with responsibility adhered strictly to the tense of theverb, the past tense: "kept. " None rashly used, explicitly or byimplication, the future tense: "will keep. " In strictest truth theyrecited what had been, and, from their knowledge of the President'scharacter and convictions, said that he would not be driven into war bythe clamour of his critics, that he would refrain from hostility so longas it was humanly and honourably possible to refrain. 

[Illustration:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 CORNISH, N. H. , August 6, 1915

 Dear Tumulty:

 Thank you for sending me the editorials from the World and from Life. You don't need to have me tell you that I say Amen to everything that Life says in the article "Tumulty and Rome. " The attitude of some people about this irritates me more than I can say. It is not only preposterous, but outrageous, and of course you know it never makes the slightest impression on me. 

 Always Affectionately yours, (signed) Woodrow Wilson

 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty, Secretary to the President. 

Showing the President's confidence in and loyalty toward his secretary. ]

The President had sent Secretary of War Baker to the Convention torepresent him before the various committees and to collaborate with theCommittee on Resolutions in the preparation of a suitable platform. 

Shortly after Mr. Baker's arrival in St. Louis the question of theattitude of the Convention and the party toward the "hyphen" vote came upfor consideration, and there were indications that certain members of theCommittee on Resolutions were inclined to ignore the matter of the hyphenand to remain silent on this grave issue. 

While the Committee on Resolutions was meeting at St. Louis, it wasreported to me by Mr. Henry C. Campbell, one of the editors of theMilwaukee _Journal_, and a devoted friend, that the Democratic party, through its representatives on the Committee on Resolutions, was engagedin "pussyfooting" on the hyphen issue and that this would result in bitterdisappointment to the country. At the time of the receipt of thistelephone message from St. Louis the President was away from town for aday and I called his attention to it in the following letter:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 June 13, 1916. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 It is clear, as the editorial appearing in this morning's New York _World_ says, that the "hyphenate vote is a definite factor that cannot be discredited"; and that from the activities of the German- American Alliance every effort, as their own supporters declare, should be made to elect Justice Hughes. That there is abundant proof of this is clear, so that he who runs may read. This is evident from the attitude of the German-American press, and from the statements of professional German agitators, and from the campaign that has been carried on against you from the very beginning. 

 I have not read the platform to be proposed by you. The only part that I have any knowledge of is that which you read to me over the telephone some nights ago; that had to do with the question of Americanism. 

 Frankly, your mention of Americanism is on all fours with the declarations found in the Bull Moose and regular Republican platforms. The characteristic of all these references to Americanism is vagueness and uncertainty as to what is really meant. I believe that the time has come when the Democratic party should set forth its position on this vital matter in no uncertain terms. Efforts will soon be made, from stories now appearing in the newspapers, by professional German- Americans, to dominate our Convention, either in an effort to discredit you or to have embodied in the platform some reference to the embargo question, or a prohibition against the sale of munitions of war. We ought to meet these things in a manly, aggressive and militant fashion. It is for that reason that I suggest an open letter to the chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, setting forth your position in this matter so that the Convention may know before it nominates you the things for which you stand. Mr. Baker at the Convention will doubtless know when the representatives of the German- American Alliance make their appearance, asking for consideration at the hands of the Committee of their resolutions. As soon as they do, it appears to me to be the time for you to strike. 

 I discussed this matter over the telephone yesterday with Mr. Henry C. Campbell, one of our devoted friends, and editor of the Milwaukee _Journal_. Mr. Frank Polk, Counsellor of the State Department, who was at the Convention, tells me that he was discussing this matter with Mr. Nieman, of the Milwaukee _Journal_, and that Mr. Nieman made the statement that both parties were "pussyfooting" and that he would not support the Democratic party unless its attitude in this matter was unequivocal. When Mr. Campbell discussed this matter with me over the telephone, I told him to send me a telegram, setting forth what he thought ought to find lodgment in the platform, by way of expressing our attitude in the matter. This morning I received the attached telegram from Senator Husting, expressing Mr. Campbell's and Mr. Nieman's views. The part I have underlined I think should be expressed in less emphatic language. 

 The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to urge you as strongly as I can to address at once an open letter to the chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, expressing fully your views in the matter. 

 TUMULTY. 

As a result of the Husting telegram, the President wired Secretary Baker, insisting upon a definite and unequivocal repudiation of the hyphen vote. The President's "fighting" telegram to Baker which contained the substanceof Husting's telegram resulted in the insertion in the platform of thefollowing plank:

 Whoever, actuated by the purpose to promote the interest of a foreign power, in disregard of our own country's welfare or to injure this Government in its foreign relations or cripple or destroy its industries at home, and whoever by arousing prejudices of a racial, religious or other nature creates discord and strife among our people so as to obstruct the wholesome processes of unification, is faithless to the trust which the privileges of citizenship repose in him and is disloyal to his country. We, therefore, condemn as subversive of this nation's unity and integrity, and as destructive of its welfare, the activities and designs of every group or organization, political or otherwise, that has for its object the advancement of the interest of a foreign power, whether such object is promoted by intimidating the Government, a political party, or representatives of the people, or which is calculated and tends to divide our people into antagonistic groups and thus to destroy that complete agreement and solidarity of the people and that unity of sentiment and purpose so essential to the perpetuity of the nation and its free institutions. We condemn all alliances and combinations of individuals in this country of whatever nationality or descent, who agree and conspire together for the purpose of embarrassing or weakening the Government or of improperly influencing or coercing our public representatives in dealing or negotiating with any foreign power. We charge that such conspiracies among a limited number exist and have been instigated for the purpose of advancing the interests of foreign countries to the prejudice and detriment of our own country. We condemn any political party which in view of the activity of such conspirators, surrenders its integrity or modifies its policy. 

There is no doubt that for a while after the Convention at Chicago whichnominated Mr. Hughes there was deep depression in the ranks of our partythroughout the country, the opinion being that the former Supreme CourtJustice was an invincible foe. I had engaged in sharp controversies withmany of my friends, expressing the view that Mr. Hughes would not only bea sad disappointment to the Republican managers, but that in hiscampaigning methods he would fall far short of the expectations of hismany Republican friends. 

Previous to the nomination of Mr. Hughes the President was his cordialadmirer and often spoke to me in warm and generous terms of the work ofMr. Hughes as Governor of New York, which he admired because of itsprogressive, liberal character. Previous to the Republican Convention, heand I had often discussed the possible nominee of the RepublicanConvention. The President, for some reason, could not be persuaded thatMr. Justice Hughes was a serious contender for the nomination and oftenexpressed the opinion that the idea of a nomination for the Presidency wasnot even remotely in the thoughts of the then Justice of the SupremeCourt. I did not share this view. Although the newspaper men who conferredwith Justice Hughes from day to day at his home in Washington informed meof the Judge's feelings toward the nomination for the Presidency, I wasalways strongly of the opinion that the Justice was in no way indifferentto the nomination and that he was not inclined to go out of his waypublicly to resent the efforts that his friends were making to land it forhim. When I expressed the opinion to the President, that as a matter offact Mr. Justice Hughes was a candidate and was doing nothing outwardly toexpress his disapproval of the efforts being made by his friends, thePresident resented my statements. 

There was a warm feeling of friendship on the part of all the members ofthe President's family toward Mr. Justice Hughes, and at the Sayrewedding, held in the White House, one of Justice Hughes' sons had played aprominent part. Owing to the personal feelings of friendship of the wholeWilson family for Mr. Hughes, the curt character of the Justice's letterof resignation to the President deeply wounded the President and themembers of his family who had been Mr. Hughes' stout defenders andsupporters. 

I recall that on the day Mr. Hughes was nominated, and after the news ofhis nomination was published throughout the country, there came to theExecutive offices a coloured messenger, bearing the following abrupt noteto the President:

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

 June 10, 1916. 

 TO THE PRESIDENT:

 I hereby resign the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 

 I am, Sir, Respectfully yours, CHARLES E. HUGHES. 

When I brought this letter of resignation to the White House the Presidentwas in conference with that sturdy Democrat from Kentucky, Senator OllieM. James. When the President read the letter and observed its rather harshcharacter he was deeply wounded and disappointed. When he showed it toSenator James, the Senator read it and advised that by reason of itscharacter the President ought not to dignify it by any acknowledgment. ThePresident turned quickly to the Kentucky statesman and said: "No, my dearSenator, the President of the United States must always do the gentlemanlything. "

The President replied to Mr. Hughes in the following note:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 June 10, 1916. 

 DEAR MR. JUSTICE HUGHES:

 I am in receipt of your letter of resignation and feel constrained to yield to your desire. I, therefore, accept your resignation as Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to take effect at once. 

 Sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 HON. CHARLES E. HUGHES, Washington, D. C. 

On the first of August, 1916, I prepared the following memorandum whichexplained my feelings regarding the campaign of 1916 and what appeared tome to be the weakness of the Republican party and the strength of our owncandidacy:

 One of the principal arguments upon which the Republican managers lay great stress in favour of Hughes' candidacy is his strength as a campaigner as evidenced in his Youngstown speech delivered years ago in a campaign in which Mr. Bryan was the leader of the Democratic hosts. The strength of that speech lies in its cool analysis of the attitude of a great emotional orator [Bryan] on public questions at a time when the Democracy was advocating economic principles of doubtful strength and virtue. In other words, the position of Justice Hughes in that campaign was that of attacking an economic principle which had cut the Democratic party in two. 

 The position of Hughes as a candidate in this the [1916] campaign will be radically different for he will have to face a candidate representing a united party; one whose power of analysis is as great as Hughes', and to this will be added this feature of strength in the Democratic candidate--the power of appeal to the emotional or imaginative side of the American people. Added to this will be the strength of conviction in urging his cause that comes to a man who has passed through a world crisis amid great dangers and who has brought to consummation substantial (not visionary) achievements unparalleled in the political history of the country. He will not speak to the country as the representative of a party divided in its counsels or as a dreamer or doctrinaire, but rather will he stand before the country as the practical idealist, defending, not apologizing for, every achievement of his administration. 

 In his Youngstown speech, Justice Hughes found no difficulty in attacking the economic theories of Bryan. In this attack he not only had the sympathy of his own party but there came to him the support of many Democrats. In this campaign he will have to attack achievements and not principles of doubtful virtue. _I predict that the trip of Hughes to the West will be a disastrous failure. _

When Justice Hughes' Western trip was announced, there was consternationin the ranks of the Democratic party, especially those Democrats with whomI came in contact in Washington. They declared that he would make atremendous impression on the West and that he would destroy that greatsalient, and make it impossible for the Democrats to make any gains there. 

In a letter which I addressed to Mr. Raymond T. Baker, Director of theMint, I expressed the opinion that Mr. Hughes' Western trip would prove asdistinct a disappointment to his friends as had his speech of acceptance. The letter is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 August 4, 1916. 

 DEAR RAY:

 You have rightly sensed the feelings of the East as to the Hughes speech of acceptance, and I was indeed glad to know from your telegram, which came as welcome news from you, that the sentiment that the speech was a hit-and-miss affair was well nigh universal throughout the West. 

 There is no apparent slump that I can find here in Democratic ranks; the same buoyancy and optimism which pervaded the whole Washington atmosphere while you were here still predominate. 

 _My belief is that Hughes' trip to the West will prove another distinct disappointment to his friends. _ A candidate following the path of expediency as exemplified by Hughes will find himself in an unenviable position in the West, merely criticizing, finding fault, and setting forth no policy of a constructive character. 

 _As I told you and the boys some weeks ago, Mr. Hughes is going to prove a distinct disappointment as a candidate. _ He is so eager for the office that he will follow any path that may lead to it, even though it may be the rough path of expediency. We face the foe unafraid, and will soon have our big guns trained upon the frowning fortresses of the enemy. They look formidable at this time, but as we approach them it is my belief that they will be found to be made of cardboard and will fall at the touch of the President's logic and the record of his great achievements. 

 Sincerely yours, TUMULTY. 

 MR. RAYMOND T. BAKER, Oakland, California. 

CHAPTER XXIV

THE ADAMSON LAW

Between the Democratic Convention and the time of his departure for hissummer home at Long Branch, New Jersey, the President was engaged inWashington in completing the most important items of his legislativeprogramme, including the Income Tax, Child Labour Law, and the AdamsonEight-Hour Law. 

A disastrous strike, involving the whole system of railroadtransportation, now seemed imminent. At this critical juncture thePresident intervened. On August 13th he invited the disputants, beforereaching any final decision, to confer with him personally at Washington. His intervention evoked general expressions of relief and approval. 

At these conferences the railway men stood firm for an eight-hour day. Therailway managers refused these demands. How to meet this grave situation, which if not checked might have resulted in giving Germany a victory, wasone of the pressing problems that confronted the President that criticalsummer. Not only were American business interests involved in this matter, but the Allied governments of western Europe, then in the throes of thegreat war, were no less anxious, for a railroad strike would have meant acutting off of the supplies to the Allied forces that were so much neededat this important juncture. 

The President sent for the Brotherhood representatives and for themanagers, to confer with him at the White House, and suggested arbitrationby way of settling the controversy. The labour leaders, conscious of theirstrength, refused to arbitrate. The railroad managers were equallyobdurate. I well remember the patience of the President at theseconferences day after day. He would first hold conferences with theBrotherhood representatives and then with the railroad managers; but hisefforts were unavailing. It is regrettable that the men on both sides wereindifferent to the President's appeal and apparently unmindful of theconsequences to the country that would inevitably follow a nation-widestrike. 

I remember what he said to me as he left the Green Room at the conclusionof his final conference with the heads of the Brotherhoods. Shaking hishead in a despairing way, he said: "I was not able to make the slightestimpression upon those men. They feel so strongly the justice of theircause that they are blind to all the consequences of their action indeclaring and prosecuting a strike. I was shocked to find a peculiarstiffness and hardness about these men. When I pictured to them thedistress of our people in case this strike became a reality, they satunmoved and apparently indifferent to the seriousness of the whole badbusiness. I am at the end of my tether, and I do not know what further todo. "

His conferences with the managers were equally unproductive of result. Gathered about him in a semicircle in his office, they were grim anddetermined men, some of them even resentful of the President's attempt tosuggest a settlement of any kind to prevent the strike. I shall neverforget his last appeal to them. I sat in a little room off the Cabinetroom and could hear what went on. Seated about him were the heads of allthe important railroads in the country. Looking straight at them, he said:"I have not summoned you to Washington as President of the United Statesto confer with me on this matter, for I have no power to do so. I haveinvited you merely as a fellow-citizen to discuss this great and criticalsituation. Frankly, I say to you that if I had the power as President Iwould say to you that this strike is unthinkable and must not be permittedto happen. What I want you to see, if you will, is the whole picture thatpresents itself to me and visualize the terrible consequences to thecountry and its people of a nation-wide strike at this time, both asaffecting our own people and in its effect upon the Allied forces acrossthe sea. For a moment I wish you to forget that I am President, and let usas fellow-citizens consider the consequences of such action. A nation-widestrike at this time would mean absolute famine and starvation for thepeople of America. You gentlemen must understand just what this means. Will your interests be served by the passions and hatreds that will flowfrom such an unhappy condition in the country? If this strike shouldoccur, forces will be released that may threaten the security ofeverything we hold dear. Think of its effect upon the people of thiscountry who must have bread to eat and coal to keep them warm. They willnot quietly submit to a strike that will keep these things of life awayfrom them. The rich will not suffer in case these great arteries of tradeand commerce are temporarily abandoned, for they can provide themselvesagainst the horror of famine and the distress of this critical situation. It is the poor unfortunate men, and their wives and children, who willsuffer and die. I cannot speak to you without a show of emotion, for, myfriends, beneath the surface in America there is a baneful seething whichmay express itself in radical action, the consequences of which no man canforesee. In asking your cooperation to settle this dispute I am butstriving, as we stand in the shadow of a great war, to keep these forcesin check and under control. "

Getting closer to the men, and lowering his voice, he said: "The Alliesare fighting our battle, the battle of civilization, across the way. Theycannot 'carry on' without supplies and means of sustenance which therailroads of America bring to them. I am probably asking you to make asacrifice at this time, but is not the sacrifice worth while because ofthe things involved? Only last night I was thinking about this war and itsfar-reaching effects. No man can foresee its extent or its evil effectsupon the world itself. It is a world cataclysm, and before it ends it mayunsettle everything fine and wholesome in America. We of America, althoughwe are cut off from its terrible sweep, cannot be unmindful of theseconsequences, for we stand in the midst of it all. We must keep our ownhouse in order so that we shall be prepared to act when action becomesnecessary. Who knows, gentlemen, but by to-morrow a situation will arisewhere it shall be found necessary for us to get into the midst of thisbloody thing? You can see, therefore, that we must go to the very limit toprevent a strike that would bring about a paralysis of these arteries oftrade and commerce. If you will agree with me in this matter, I willaddress Congress and frankly ask for an increase of rates and doeverything I can to make up for the loss you may sustain. I know that thethings I ask you to do may be disagreeable and inconvenient, but I am notasking you to make a bloody sacrifice. Our boys may be called upon anyminute to make that sacrifice for us. "

On August 29, 1916, the President appeared before a joint session of theCongress and recommended immediate legislation to avert the impendingstrike. Following this, the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commissionof the House, Mr. Adamson, of Georgia, brought in a bill, now known as theAdamson Eight-Hour Law, which, after several unsuccessful attempts bymembers of the House and Senate to amend it, was signed by the Presidenton September 5th. 

CHAPTER XXV

GERMAN PROPAGANDA

Early in January, 1916, German sympathizers throughout the country began adrive on both Houses of Congress for the passage of a resolution warningor forbidding Americans to travel on passenger ships belonging to citizensor subjects of the belligerent nations. Petitions of various kinds, demanding vigorous action in this matter, began to pour in upon us at theWhite House from various parts of the country. While these petitions weresigned by many devoted, patriotic Americans, it was clear to those of uswho were on the inside of affairs that there lay back of this movement asinister purpose on the part of German sympathizers in this country togive Germany full sway upon the high seas, in order that she might bepermitted to carry on her unlawful and inhuman submarine warfare. Thismovement became so intense that leading Democratic and Republican senatorsand representatives soon became its ardent advocates, until it looked asif the resolution might pass with only a small minority found inopposition to it. Those of us who were in the Executive offices, andintimately associated with the President, kept in close touch with thesituation on Capitol Hill and were advised that the movement for theresolution was in full swing and that it could not be checked. Aresolution was finally introduced by Representative McLemore, of Texas, and quickly received the support of Senator Gore of Oklahoma, and SenatorStone of Missouri, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Whatthe attitude of the President should be toward it was the subject ofdiscussion between the President, two of his Cabinet officers, and myself, after a session of the Cabinet early in February, 1916. 

The President was advised by the Cabinet officers with whom he conferredregarding the matter that it would be a hopeless task on his part toattempt to stem the tide that was now running in favour of the passage ofthe McLemore resolution, and that were he to attempt to prevent itspassage it might result in a disastrous defeat of his leadership, thatwould seriously embarrass him on Capitol Hill and throughout the nation. 

At the conclusion of this conference the President asked me whether myinformation about affairs on Capitol Hill and the attitude of the membersof the House and Senate toward the McLemore resolution was in accord withthe information he had just received from his Cabinet officers. I told himthat it was, but that so far as I was concerned I did not share theopinion of the Cabinet officers and did not agree with the advice whichthey had volunteered, to the effect that it would be useless for him tothrow down the gage of battle to those who sought to pass the McLemoreresolution. I informed him that regardless of what the attitude of thoseon Capitol Hill was toward the resolution, he could not afford to allowthe matter to pass without a protest from him, and that, indeed, he couldafford to be defeated in making a fight to maintain American rights uponthe high seas. The discussion between the President, the Cabinet officers, and myself became heated. They were reluctant to have the President gointo the fight, while I was most anxious to have him do so. Evidently, what I said made an impression upon the President and he asked me, as ourconference was concluded, to let him have as soon as possible a memorandumcontaining my views upon the subject. 

Shortly after the conference, Senator Stone, chairman of the Committee onForeign Relations of the Senate, asked for an appointment with thePresident, to confer with him on the next morning, February 25th, regarding the McLemore resolution. I suggested to the President thatinasmuch as Senator Stone was to see him in the morning it would be wiseand prudent if, in answer to his letter asking for an appointment, thePresident should frankly state his views with reference to the proposedresolution. The President acted upon this suggestion and the letter wasimmediately dispatched to Senator Stone. 

My letter to the President, advising him of the situation, was as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 February 24, 1916. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 What I have heard since leaving you this morning confirms me in my belief that now is the time (before the night passes) to set forth your position to the country on the McLemore resolution in terms that no one can misunderstand. In the last hour I have talked with Speaker Clark, Senator Pittman, and Mr. Sims of Tennessee, and have received impressions from them which lead me to conclude: first, that the consideration of this resolution cannot much longer be postponed, as Speaker Clark so informed me, although Congressman Doremus and Senator Pittman say the situation on the hill is quieting down. I am more than convinced that underlying this resolution is a purpose to discredit your leadership, for the forces that are lined up for this fight against you are the anti-preparedness crowd, the Bryan-Kitchen-Clark group, and some of the anti-British Senators like Hoke Smith and Gore. Therefore, I cannot urge you too strongly at once to send an identic letter to both Representative Flood, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House, and Senator Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The letter, in my opinion, should embody the following ideas:

 First, explain in the frankest fashion just what Secretary Lansing attempted to obtain when he suggested to the Entente nations an agreement on the arming of merchantmen, how this government was informed by Germany of her intention to destroy armed merchantmen without giving the passengers a moment of warning, and how, in order to stave off such a contingency, we tried as the friend and in the interest of humanity to get an agreement between both sides that would bring submarine warfare within the bounds of international law. 

 Second, explain that a possible adjustment of this matter is in process of negotiation right now, and that, of course, while we cannot change international law upon our own initiative, we are still of the hope that some general agreement among the belligerents may eventually be obtained. Explain how embarrassing such a resolution as the McLemore one will be to negotiations now being threshed out between the executive branches of the Government charged with the conduct of foreign relations, and foreign governments. 

 Third, then say that in the absence of any general agreement, the United States cannot yield one inch of her rights without destroying the whole fabric of international law, for in the last analysis this is what is involved. To yield one right to-day means another to- morrow. We cannot know where this process of yielding on the ground of convenience or expediency may lead us. These laws are the product of centuries. Our forefathers fought to establish their validity, and we cannot afford for the sake of convenience when our very life is threatened, to abandon them on any ground of convenience or expediency. 

 Fourth, to pass such a resolution at this time would seriously embarrass the Department of State and the Executive in the conduct of these most delicate matters at a time when everything is being done to bring about a peaceful solution of these problems. 

 Fifth, might you not diplomatically suggest, in your letter to Senator Stone, that to pass favorably upon a resolution of this kind at this time would be showing lack of confidence in the Government, and particularly in its Chief Executive?

 The morning papers have outlined the details of the opposition among the Democrats. The afternoon papers are repeating the same thing with emphasis on the fact that Joe Cannon, Jim Mann, and Lodge are going to support you. I would suggest that you insert the following in your letter to Senator Stone:

 "I think that not only would such a vote on this resolution be construed as a lack of confidence in the executive branch of the Government in this most delicate matter but if the division continues as I am informed within the ranks of the Democratic party, it will be difficult for me to consider that the majority party speaks the will of the nation in these circumstances and as between any faction in my party and the interests of the nation, I must always choose the latter, irrespective of what the effect will be on me or my personal fortunes. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without admitting and conceding her own impotency as a nation and the surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world. "

 Sincerely, TUMULTY. 

The letter of the President to Senator Stone was published in the morningpapers of February 25, 1916, and is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 February 25, 1916. 

 MY DEAR SENATOR:

 I very warmly appreciate your kind and frank letter of to-day, and feel that it calls for an equally frank reply. You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amid difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. 

 The course which the central European powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future. 

 But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should very unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honour no choice as to what our own course should be. 

 For my own part I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honour and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation, indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this government has attempted and everything that it has accomplished during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile. 

 It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world. 

 I am speaking, my dear Senator, in deep solemnity, without heat, with a clear consciousness of the high responsibilities of my office and as your sincere and devoted friend. If we should unhappily differ, we shall differ as friends, but where issues so momentous as these are involved we must, just because we are friends, speak our minds without reservation. 

 Faithfully yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 SENATOR WILLIAM J. STONE, United States Senate. 

The publication of the letter of the President to Senator Stone worked acomplete reversal of opinion on the Hill. 

Quickly the effect of the President's letter was seen, and the McLemoreresolution was overwhelmingly defeated. 

Early in August, 1916, the President took up his residence at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, and began the preparation of his speech of acceptance. Heforwarded me a draft of this speech which brought from me the followingcomment upon it:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 August 22, 1916. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I think the failure to bring out the hyphen question in your speech of acceptance will be vigorously criticized even by our loyal friends. Mr. Hughes will soon be compelled to speak out on this question. Roosevelt's speeches in the main will force him to do this. You might open the subject in that part of your speech in which you discuss neutrality, showing the embarrassments under which you have laboured in trying to keep the Nation at peace. After discussing these embarrassments, consisting of plots against our industries, etc. , could you not introduce a sentence like this?: "While I am the candidate of the Democratic party, I am above all else an American citizen. I neither seek the favour nor fear the wrath of any alien element in America which puts loyalty to any foreign power first. "

 As to Huerta: I believe your reference to him could be strengthened. I think you ought to bring out the fact that the work of assassination shall never receive the endorsement, so far as you are concerned, of this American Republic. I suggest the following: "The United States will refuse, so long as that power remains with me, to extend the hand of welcome to one who gains power in a republic through treachery and bloodshed. " (This is not only sound statesmanship but good morals. ) "No permanency in the affairs of our sister republics can be attained by a title based upon intrigue and assassination. "

 Respectfully, TUMULTY. 

The President, always welcoming advice, approved and embodied some ofthese suggestions in his speech of acceptance. 

It has often been said by unfair critics that Mr. Wilson was so tenaciousof his own opinion and views that he resented suggestions from the outsidein any matter with which he was called upon to deal. 

As an intimate associate of his for eleven years, I think I was in aposition to find out and to know how unfair the basis of this criticismreally was. In my contact with public men I never met a more open-mindedman; nor one who was more willing to act upon any suggestion that hadmerit in it. I have seen him readily give up his own views and often yieldto the influence of a better argument. I always felt free in every publicmatter that he discussed and in every attitude which he took on publicquestions frankly to express my own opinion and openly to disagree withhim. In his speeches and public statements he had no pride of opinion, nordid he attempt to hold his friends off at arms' length when they hadsuggestions of any kind to make. 

[Illustration:

 Dear Tumulty, Here is the expurgated stuff. Do what you please with it. 

 W. W. 

 * * * * *

 19 Nov. , 1916. 

 Dear Tumulty, Here is the message. I wish you would read it and give me your impression of it. 

 And please keep it very carefully from any eyes but your own. It is still in provisional shape only, and there are a number of points I am still keeping under advisement. 

 Faithfully, (signed) W. W. 

 * * * * *

 17 May, 1916. 

 THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. 

 Dear Tumulty, Thank you for the memorandum about peace suggestions. I have read it very carefully and find my own thoughts travelling very much the same route. You may be sure I am doing a great deal of serious thinking about it all. 

 Faithfully, (signed) W. W. 

Some insights into day-to-day affairs at the White House]

In these reminiscences I am including my letters to him, embodyingsuggestions of various kinds, many of which he acted upon and many ofwhich he rejected, in order that proof may be given of the fact, thatdespite what his critics may say, he not only did not resent suggestions, but openly invited them. 

CHAPTER XXVI

WILSON VERSUS HUGHES

After the delivery of the speech of acceptance on September 2nd quietruled over the Wilson camp at Shadow Lawn. This lull in the matter ofpolitics was intensified by the President's absence from Shadow Lawnbecause of the death of his only sister, which called him away and for awhile took his mind and his energies from the discussion of politics. 

On September 11th, the state elections in Maine were carried by theRepublicans. The total vote was the largest ever cast in Maine in a stateelection. The Republican majorities ranged from 9, 000 to 14, 000. There hadbeen a vigorous contest in Maine by both parties and the Republicans weregreatly heartened by the result in the hope that "as goes Maine so goesthe Union. "

There is no doubt that the result in Maine, which many Democrats were ofthe opinion was a forecast of the results throughout the nation inNovember, had a depressing effect. The Republicans accepted it as aharbinger of victory and the Democrats as an indication of defeat. On thenight of the Maine elections I kept close to the telephone at theExecutive offices and engaged in conferences with two or three practicalpoliticians from New Jersey. It was interesting to watch the effects ofthe returns from Maine upon these men. When the returns, as complete as wecould get them at twelve o'clock on the night of September 11th, came in, James Nugent, one of the leading politicians of Essex County, New Jersey, who was in the room, took from my desk a copy of the "World Almanac", andreferring to the returns of previous elections, said: "Of course, theRepublicans will hail this as a great victory, but if they will sit downand analyze the gains they have made, they will find no comfort in them, for to me they indicate a Democratic victory in November. If the Democratsmake proportionate gains in other states, you can absolutely count upon aDemocratic victory in 1916. "

This prophecy was verified by the results of the election of November 7th. 

It was difficult and almost impossible between the date of the speech ofacceptance and the first of October to revive interest in the Democraticcampaign and to bring about a renewal of hope of success that had almostbeen destroyed by the psychological results of the Maine election. 

Frequent demands were made upon us at the Executive offices at Asbury Parkto get busy and to do something. "Wilson was not on the front page andHughes was busily engaged in campaigning throughout the West. " But thePresident in his uncanny way knew better than we the psychological momentto strike. He went about his work at the Executive offices and gave to uswho were closely associated with him the impression that nothing unusualwas afoot and that no Presidential campaign was impending. I made frequentsuggestions to him that he be up and doing. He would only smile and calmlysay: "The moment is not here. Let them use up their ammunition and then wewill turn our guns upon them. "

The psychological moment came, and the President took full advantage ofit. One afternoon in September the President telephoned me at theExecutive offices at Asbury Park to have the newspaper men present for aconference that afternoon; that he would give out a reply to a telegram hehad received. With the newspaper group, I attended this conference. Itappeared that an Irish agitator named Jeremiah O'Leary, who had beenorganizing and speaking against the President and trying to array theIrish vote against him, wrote an offensive letter to the President, calling attention to the results of the Maine elections and to the NewJersey primaries, and to his anticipated defeat in November. The Presidenthanded to the newspaper men the following reply to O'Leary:

 I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them. 

This sharp and timely rebuke to the unpatriotic spirit to which O'Learygave expression won the hearty and unanimous approval of the country tothe President. Nothing like this bold defiance came from Hughes until afew days before the election. 

The Democratic campaign, within twenty-four hours after the publication ofthe O'Leary telegram, was on again in full swing. 

At this same newspaper conference the President, who had not seen thenewspaper group since his arrival at Long Branch, discussed the campaign, so that they might have what he called the "inside of his mind. " Hiscriticism of the campaign that Justice Hughes was conducting containedbitter irony and, sarcasm. Evidently, the petty things to which Mr. Hugheshad adverted in his campaign speeches by way of criticizing the Presidentand his administration had cut the President to the quick. One of thenewspaper men asked him what he thought of Mr. Hughes' campaign, and helaughingly replied: "If you will give that gentleman rope enough he willhang himself. He has forgotten many things since he closeted himself onthe bench, and he will soon find himself out of touch with the spirit ofthe nation. His speeches are nothing more or less than blank cartridgesand the country, unless I mistake the people very much, will place a trueassessment upon them. "

The newspaper men left this conference heartened by the reply he had madeto O'Leary and with the firm conviction that the Democratic candidate wasjust "playing" with Hughes and would pounce upon him at the psychologicalmoment. 

In the delivery of the campaign speeches at Shadow Lawn each Saturdayafternoon President Wilson took full advantage of the swing toward theDemocratic side which was manifest after the publication of the famousO'Leary telegram. While the Republican candidate was busily engaged ininvading the West in his swing around the circle, the Democratic candidateeach week from his porch at Shadow Lawn was delivering sledge-hammer blowsat the Republican breastworks. As the Republican candidate in an effort towin the West was heaping maledictions upon Dr. E. Lester Jones, the headof the Geodetic Survey, a Wilson appointee, the President calmly moved on, ripping to pieces and tearing to shreds the poor front behind which theRepublican managers were seeking to win the fight. 

Mr. Hughes campaigned like a lawyer, Mr. Wilson like a statesman. Mr. Hughes was hunting small game with bird shot, Mr. Wilson trained heavyartillery on the enemies' central position. The essential differencebetween the two men and the operations of their minds was made clear inthe campaign. No one would wish to minimize the unusual abilities of Mr. Hughes, but they are the abilities of an adroit lawyer. He makes "points. "He pleases those minds which like cleverness and finesse. He deals withinternational affairs like an astute lawyer drawing a brief. But has heever quickened the nation's pulse or stirred its heart by a singleutterance? Did he ever make any one feel that behind the formalities oflaw, civil or international, he detected the heartbeats of humanity whomlaw is supposedly designed to serve? Mr. Wilson was not thinking of Mr. Hughes, but perhaps he was thinking of the type of which Mr. Hughes is aneminent example when he said in Paris: "This is not to be a lawyers'peace. "

Every speech of President Wilson's was, to use a baseball phrase, a homerun for the Democratic side. They were delivered without much preparationand were purely extemporaneous in character. The Republican oppositionsoon began to wince under the smashing blows delivered by the Democraticcandidate, and outward proof was soon given of the fear and despair thatwere now gathering in the Republican ranks. With a few short trips to theWest, and his final speech at Long Branch, President Wilson closed hiscampaign, with Democratic hopes on the rise. 

The happenings of Election Day, 1916, will long linger in my memory. I wasin charge of the Executive offices located at Asbury Park, while thePresident remained at Shadow Lawn, awaiting the news of the first returnsfrom the country. The first scattered returns that filtered in to theExecutive offices came from a little fishing town in Massachusetts earlyin the afternoon of Election Day, which showed a slight gain for thePresident over the election returns of 1912. Then followed early driftsfrom Colorado and Kansas, which showed great Wilson gains. Those of us whowere interested in the President's cause were made jubilant by these earlyreturns. Every indication, though imperfect, up to seven o'clock on thenight of the election, forecasted the President's reëlection. 

In the early afternoon the President telephoned the Executive offices toinquire what news we had received from the country and he was apprised ofthe results that had come in up to that time. Then, quickly, the tideturned against us in the most unusual way. Between seven and nine o'clockthe returns slowly came in from the East and Middle West that undeniablyshowed a drift away from us. 

About nine-thirty o'clock in the evening I was seated in my office, when anoise outside in the hallway attracted my attention and gave me theimpression that something unusual was afoot. The door of my office openedand there entered a galaxy of newspaper men connected with the White Houseoffices, led by a representative of the New York _World_, who held in hishands a bulletin from his office, carrying the news of Hughes' election. The expression in the men's faces told me that a crisis was at hand. The_World_ man delivered his fateful message of defeat for our forces, without explanation of any kind. To me the blow was stunning, for the NewYork _World_ had been one of our staunchest supporters throughout thewhole campaign and yet, I had faith to believe that the news carried inthe bulletin would be upset by subsequent returns. Steadying myself behindmy desk, I quickly made up my mind as to what my reply should be to the_World_ bulletin and to the query of the newspaper men whether we wereready to "throw up the sponge" and concede Hughes' election. Concealingthe emotion I felt, I dictated the following statement, which was flashedthrough the country:

 When Secretary Tumulty was shown the _World_ bulletin, conceding Hughes' election, he authorized the following statement: "Wilson will win. The West has not yet been heard from. Sufficient gains will be made in the West and along the Pacific slope to offset the losses in the East. "

Shortly after the flash from the _World_ bulletin was delivered to me, conceding Hughes' election, the President again telephoned me from LongBranch to find out the latest news of the election. From what he said hehad already been apprised by Admiral Grayson of the bulletin of the NewYork _World_. Every happening of that memorable night is still fresh in mymemory and I recall distinctly just what the President said and howphilosophically he received the news of his apparent defeat. Laughingly hesaid: "Well, Tumulty, it begins to look as if we have been badly licked. "As he discussed the matter with me I could detect no note of sadness inhis voice. In fact, I could hear him chuckle over the 'phone. He seemed totake an impersonal view of the whole thing and talked like a man fromwhose shoulders a great load had been lifted and now he was happy andrejoicing that he was a free man again. When I informed him of the driftsin our favour from other parts of the country and said that it was tooearly to concede anything, he said: "Tumulty, you are an optimist. Itbegins to look as if the defeat might be overwhelming. The only thing I amsorry for, and that cuts me to the quick, is that the people apparentlymisunderstood us. But I have no regrets. We have tried to do our duty. " Sofar as he was concerned, the issue of the election was disposed of, out ofthe way and a settled thing. That was the last telephone message betweenthe President and myself until twenty-four hours later, when the tideturned again in our favour. 

An unusual incident occurred about 8:30 o'clock in the evening, shortlyafter my talk with the President. I was called to the telephone and toldthat someone in New York wished to speak to me on a highly importantmatter. I went to the 'phone. At the other end in New York was anindividual who refusing to give his name, described himself as a friend ofour cause. I thought he was one of the varieties of crank, with whom I hadbeen accustomed to deal at the White House on frequent occasions during mylife there; but there was something about his talk that convinced me thathe was in close touch with someone in authority at Republicanheadquarters. In his first talk with me, and in subsequent talks duringthe night of the election and on the following day, there was a warning tous, in no way, or by the slightest sign, to give up the fight, or toconcede Hughes' election. He said: "Early returns will naturally runagainst Wilson in the East, particularly in Illinois and Iowa, " andintimated to me that the plan at Republican headquarters would be toexaggerate these reports and to overwhelm us with news of Republicanvictories throughout the country. Continuing his talk he said: "The Wilsonfight will be won in the West. I shall keep you advised of what ishappening in Republican headquarters. I can only tell you that I will_know_ what is happening and you may rely upon the information I shallgive you. "

All night long the loyal newspaper men and I kept vigil at the Executiveoffices. As I read over the bulletins that came to me, particularly thosefrom Republican headquarters in New York, I was quick to notice thatalthough the Republican managers were blatantly proclaiming to the countrythat the fight was over, for some reason or other, the Republicancandidate, Mr. Hughes, who was at his headquarters at the Hotel Astor, wassilent. 

Just about this time there was another message from the mysteriousstranger in New York. The message, as I recall it, was as follows: "They[meaning the Republican managers] are trying to induce Hughes to claim theelection, but he is unwilling to make an announcement and is asking forfurther returns. You boys stand pat. Returns that are now coming in areworrying them. Don't be swept off your feet by claims from Republicanheadquarters. I know what is happening there. "

Shortly after this telephone message came a bulletin from Republicanheadquarters, stating that the Republican managers were then in conferencewith Mr. Hughes and that a statement from Mr. Hughes would soon beforthcoming. This unusual coincidence convinced me that the man who wastelephoning me either was on the inside of affairs at Republicanheadquarters, or had an uncanny way of knowing just what the managers weredoing. 

Up to eleven o'clock every bit of news ran against us. Finally, theBrooklyn _Eagle_, a supporter of the President, and then the New York_Times_, our last line of defense, gave way and conceded Hughes' election, but the unterrified Democrats at the Executive offices stood out againstany admission of defeat. 

The mysterious stranger was again on the wire, saying that there wasconsternation in the Republican ranks; that George Perkins had justconferred with National Chairman Willcox and had left Willcox's room, shaking his head and saying to one of the attachés of headquarters, that"things were not looking well. " A few minutes later a bulletin came fromRepublican headquarters confirming the story the mysterious stranger hadjust told over the 'phone. 

All the while I was keeping in touch with our headquarters in New YorkCity, and about 10:30 o'clock Robert W. Woolley, the publicity man of theDemocratic National Committee, 'phoned me and advised me not to concedeanything and assured me that the returns from the West, now coming ingreater drifts, indicated Wilson's reelection. 

When I left the telephone booth, David Lawrence, the Washingtoncorrespondent of the New York _Evening Post_, who a few weeks before hadpredicted, in a remarkable article, the election of Wilson, and who was myfriend and co-labourer during that night (in conjunction with Mr. L. AmesBrown, a noted newspaper man of Washington, connected with the DemocraticNational Committee) conferred with me, and from a table he had preparedshowed me how the small states of the West, which the returns indicatedwere now coming into the Wilson column, would elect the Democraticcandidate, and that under no circumstances must we, by any chance, in anystatement, concede the election of Hughes. 

All night long telephone messages, very brief, would come from themysterious stranger in New York, and quickly there would follow bulletinsfrom Republican headquarters confirming everything that he said. Thesemessages came so rapidly that I was soon convinced that this individual, whoever he was, had the real inside of the Republican situation. Soconvinced was I that I followed up my statement of the early evening withadditional statements, claiming the election for Mr. Wilson. 

Just about the break of day on Wednesday morning, as David Lawrence, AmesBrown, and my son Joe, were seated in my office, a room which overlooked awide expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, we were notified by Democraticheadquarters of the first big drift toward Wilson. Ohio, which in theearly evening had been claimed by the Republicans, had turned to Wilson byan approximate majority of sixty thousand; Kansas followed; Utah wasleaning toward him; North Dakota and South Dakota inclining the same way. The Wilson tide began to rise appreciably from that time on, until stateafter state from the West came into the Wilson column. At five o'clock inthe morning the New York _Times_ and the New York _World_ recanted andwere now saying that the election of Mr. Hughes was doubtful. 

Without sleep and without food, those of us at the Executive offices keptclose to the telephone wire. We never left the job for a minute. The lastmessage from the mysterious stranger came about one o'clock, the dayfollowing the election, when he 'phoned me that, "George Perkins is now atRepublican headquarters and is telephoning Roosevelt and will soon leaveto inform Roosevelt that, to use his own words, 'the jig is up, ' and thatWilson is elected. " Shortly after, from Republican headquarters came abulletin saying: "George Perkins is on his way to confer with Mr. Roosevelt. "

Some months after the election the mysterious stranger came to the WhiteHouse offices, and without identifying himself, informed me that he wasthe individual who on the night of the election had kept me in touch withRepublican headquarters, and then astounded me by telling me that in somemysterious way, which he did not disclose, he had succeeded in breaking inon the Republican National Committee wire and had listened in on everyconversation that had passed between Willcox, Hughes, George Perkins, Harvey, and Theodore Roosevelt himself during the night of the electionand the day following. 

Mr. Wilson arose the morning after the election, confident that he hadbeen defeated. He went about his tasks in the usual way. The first newsthat he received that there had been a turn in the tide came from hisdaughter, Margaret, who knocked on the door of the bathroom while thePresident was shaving and told him of the "Extra" of the New York _Times_, saying that the election was in doubt, with indications of a Wilsonvictory. The President thought that his daughter was playing a practicaljoke on him and told her to "tell that to the Marines, " and went on abouthis shaving. 

When the President and I discussed the visit of his daughter, Margaret, tonotify him of his reëlection, he informed me that he was just beginning toenjoy the reaction of defeat when he was notified that the tide had turnedin his favour. This will seem unusual, but those of us who were close tothe man and who understood the trials and tribulations of the Presidency, knew that he was in fact for the first time in four years enjoying thefreedom of private life. 

Mr. Wilson's imperturbability on election night was like that of sturdyGrover Cleveland, though temperamentally the men were unlike. Mr. Cleveland used to tell his friends how in 1884 he had gone to bed earlynot knowing who was elected, and how he learned the news of his electionnext morning from his valet, after having first made inquiries about thestate of the weather. In 1892 Mr. Cleveland, his wife, and two friendsplayed a quiet game of cards while the returns were coming in. In recitingthese reminiscences, the old warrior used to say that he never couldunderstand the excitement of candidates on election nights. "The fight isall over then, " he would say, "and it is merely a matter of counting theballots. " Mr. Wilson preserved the same calmness, which appeared almostlike indifference. In 1912 he sat in the sitting room of his littlecottage in Cleveland Lane in Princeton quietly reading from one of hisfavourite authors and occasionally joining in the conversation of Mrs. Wilson and a few neighbours who had dropped in. In a rear room there was atelegraphic ticker, an operator, and some newspaper boys who at intervalswould take an especially interesting bulletin in to Mr. Wilson, who wouldglance at it casually, make some brief comment, and then return to hisbook. One of the guests of the evening who read in a newspaper next day arather melodramatic and entirely imaginative account of the scene, said:"The only dramatic thing about the evening was that there was nothingdramatic. "

CHAPTER XXVII

NEUTRALITY

While President Wilson was giving his whole thought and effort to thesolution of exacting domestic tasks, the European war broke upon him andthus turned his attention and study to the age-long and complicatedpolitical struggle between Germany, France, and England. 

Fully conscious from the very beginning of the difficulties that lay inhis path, he was aware of the eventualities the war now beginning mightlead to. As a profound student of history he saw with a clear vision thenecessity of neutrality and of America remaining disentangled in every wayfrom the embroilments of Europe. To the people of the country it at firstappeared that the war was one more in a long series of European quarrelsand that we must play our part in the great conflict as mere spectatorsand strictly adhere to the American policy of traditional aloofness andisolation, which had been our immemorial custom and habit. Although wewere bound to maintain a policy of isolation, Woodrow Wilson from thebeginning foresaw its futility, and afterward gave expression to thisconviction in a campaign speech in 1916, when he said:

 This is the last war [meaning the World War] of its kind or of any kind that involves the world that the United States can keep out of. I say that because I believe that the business of neutrality is over; not because I want it to be over, but I mean this, that war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. 

He knew how difficult it would be to keep a people so variouslyconstituted strictly neutral. No sooner was his proclamation of neutralityannounced than the differences in points of view in racial stocks began tomanifest themselves in language both intemperate and passionate, until hisadvice to his country "to be neutral in fact as well as in name" became adead and spiritless thing. 

I have often been asked if the policy of neutrality which the Presidentannounced, and which brought a fire of criticism upon him, represented hisown personal feelings toward the European war, and whether if he had beena private citizen, he would have derided it as now his critics wereengaged in doing. 

As an intimate associate of Woodrow Wilson during the whole of theEuropean war, and witnessing from day to day the play of his feelings, especially after the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, I am certainthat had he been free to do so he would have yielded to the impulse ofchampioning a cause that in his heart of hearts he felt involved thecivilization of the world. But it was his devotion to the idea oftrusteeship that held him in check, and the consciousness that in carryingout that trusteeship he had no right to permit his own passionate feelingsto govern his public acts. 

It would have been a dramatic adventure to accept Germany's assault onBelgium as a challenge to the humane interest of America, but theacceptance would have been only a gesture, for we were unable to transportarmies to the theatre of war in time to check the outrage. Such actionwould have pleased some people in the East, but the President knew thatthis quixotic knight errantry would not appeal to the country at large, particularly the West, still strongly grounded in the Washingtoniantradition of non-interference in European quarrels. 

Colonel Roosevelt himself, who subsequently attacked so strongly the"pusillanimity" of the Administration's course, said on September 23, 1914:

 A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to invoke our assistance in the time of their dreadful need. What action our government can or will take I know not. It has been announced that no action can be taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other. 

It was not the policy of a weakling or a timid man. It was the policy of aprudent leader and statesman, who was feeling his way amid dangers and whoas an historian himself knew the difficulties of an imprudent orincautious move. 

I recall the day he prepared his neutrality proclamation. At the end ofone of the most strenuous days of his life in Washington, he left theExecutive offices where he was engaged in meeting and conferring withsenators and congressmen, and I found him comfortably seated under an elmtree, serenely engaged with pad and pencil in preparing his neutralityproclamation, which was soon to loose a fierce storm of opposition andridicule upon him. He and I had often discussed the war and its effectupon our own country, and one day in August, 1914, just after the GreatWar had begun, he said to me: "We are going through deep waters in thedays to come. The passions now lying dormant will soon be aroused and mymotives and purposes at every turn will soon be challenged until therewill be left but few friends to justify my course. It does not seem clearnow, but as this war grows in intensity it will soon resolve itself into awar between autocracy and democracy. Various racial groups in America willseek to lead us now one way and then another. We must sit steady in theboat and bow our heads to meet the storm. "

Bound as he was by the responsibilities of trusteeship to adhere to apolicy of neutrality, personally he saw that the inevitable results wouldbe only bitter disappointment. "We cannot remain isolated in this war, " hesaid, "for soon the contagion of it will spread until it reaches our ownshores. On the one side Mr. Bryan will censure the Administration forbeing too militaristic, and on the other we will find Mr. Rooseveltcriticizing us because we are too pacifist in our tendencies. "

Dr. William E. Dodd, in his book "Woodrow Wilson and His Work, " has sensedthe complicated situation in which the President found himself: "TheBritish blockade, becoming more effective every day, barred the way ofAmerican goods to Germany and even neutral countries. Hoke Smith and ascore of southern senators and representatives urged him to protestagainst the blockade. Representatives of the packers of Chicago and thefarmers of the Northwest urged him to open the way to hungry markets fortheir goods. He made his fight during the autumn of 1914 and 1915 againstall the more drastic phases of the British blockade, against Britishinterference with our cargoes for neutral ports. " Every artificial devicefor increasing our trade with neutral countries was suggested by those whosought his aid and counsel in the matter. Cotton of all the commoditieswas the hardest hit. When a friend from Georgia urged action by thePresident to help in the matter of cotton, the President tried to impressupon him that, with the World War in progress, the law of supply anddemand was deeply affected and that the sales of cotton were necessarilyrestricted by reason of the closure of certain markets to our goods. Thisfriend, in urging his views upon the President, said: "But you, Mr. President, can suspend the law of supply and demand. " The Presidentresponded fey saying: "If I did, Judge, and you ran your head up againstit, you might get hurt. "

Every sympathizer with Germany pursued the President relentlessly withinsistent demand that England should be brought to book for theunreasonable character of the blockade which she was carrying on againstour commerce on the high seas. The President in every diplomatic waypossible pressed America's claims against England, but these demands didnot satisfy the German sympathizers throughout the country who covertlysought to bring about a real breach between the two countries. Even I feltthat we should go further in our demands upon England than the Presidentseemed willing to go. 

The pressure upon us at the White House for satisfaction at the hands ofEngland grew more intense with each day. I recall a conversation I hadwith the President shortly before the Congressional elections when thePresident's political enemies were decrying his kind treatment of Englandand excoriating him for the stern manner in which he was holding Germanyto strict accountability for her actions. This conversation was held whilewe were on board the President's train on our way to the West. Afterdinner one evening I tactfully broached the subject of the Britishblockade and laid before the President the use our enemies were making ofhis patient action toward England. My frank criticism deeply aroused him. Replying to me he pitilessly attacked those who were criticizing him for"letting up on Great Britain. " Looking across the table at me he said: "Iam aware of the demands that are daily being made upon me by my friendsfor more vigorous action against England in the matter of the blockade; Iam aware also of the sinister political purpose that lies back of many ofthese demands. Many senators and congressmen who urge radical actionagainst England are thinking only of German votes in their districts andare not thinking of the world crisis that would inevitably occur shouldthere be an actual breach at this time between England and America overthe blockade. " Then looking squarely at me, he said: "I have gone to thevery limit in pressing our claims upon England and in urging the BritishForeign Office to modify the blockade. Walter Page, our Ambassador toEngland, has placed every emphasis upon our insistence that something bedone, and something will be done, but England, now in the throes of agreat war crisis, must at least be given a chance to adjust these matters. Only a few days ago Mr. Page wrote me a most interesting letter, describing the details of a conference he had had with Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, to discuss our protests against the Britishblockade. Mr. Page described the room in which the conference was held, onthe wall of which was hung as a memorial the fifteen-million-dollar checkwith which Great Britain paid the _Alabama_ claims in the Civil War. Mr. Page pointed to this _Alabama_ check and said: 'If you don't stop theseseizures, Sir Edward, some day you will have your entire room papered withthings like that. ' Sir Edward replied: 'That may be so, but we will payevery cent. Of course, many of the restrictions we have laid down andwhich seriously interfere with your trade are unreasonable. But Americamust remember that we are fighting her fight, as well as our own, to savethe civilization of the world. You dare not press us too far!'" Turning tome, the President said: "He was right. England is fighting our fight andyou may well understand that I shall not, in the present state of theworld's affairs, place obstacles in her way. Many of our critics suggestwar with England in order to force reparation in these matters. War withEngland would result in a German triumph. No matter what may happen to mepersonally in the next election, I will not take any action to embarrassEngland when she is fighting for her life and the life of the world. Letthose who clamour for radical action against England understand this!"

While the critics of the President were busily engaged in embarrassing and"hazing" him at every point and insisting upon a "show-down" with GreatBritain over the blockade, the world was startled on May 7, 1915, by thenews of the sinking of the _Lusitania_, off the coast of Ireland, resulting in the loss of many American lives. A few days later came thenews that the German people were rejoicing at the fine stroke of thesubmarine commander in consummating this horrible tragedy. 

The President's critics who, a few days before, were assailing him for hissupposed surrender to England, were now demanding an immediate declarationof war against Germany, but not for a moment did the President waverbefore these clamorous demands. To such an extent did he carry thisattitude of calmness and steadiness of purpose that on "the outside" thepeople felt that there was in him a heartlessness and an indifference tothe deep tragedy of the _Lusitania_. At my first meeting with him I triedto call to his attention many of the tragic details of the sinking of thegreat ship in an effort to force his hands, so to speak, but he quicklychecked what appeared to be my youthful impetuosity and said: "Tumulty, itwould be much wiser for us not to dwell too much upon these matters. " Whenhe uttered this admonition there was no suggestion of coldness about him. In fact, he seemed to be deeply moved as I adverted to some of the factssurrounding this regrettable and tragic affair. At times tears stood inhis eyes, and turning to me he said: "If I pondered over those tragicitems that daily appear in the newspapers about the _Lusitania_, I shouldsee red in everything, and I am afraid that when I am called upon to actwith reference to this situation I could not be just to any one. I darenot act unjustly and cannot indulge my own passionate feelings. "

Evidently he saw that his turning away from the topic in this apparentlyindifferent way did not sit well with me. Quickly he understood mydissatisfaction and said: "I suppose you think I am cold and indifferentand little less than human, but, my dear fellow, you are mistaken, for Ihave spent many sleepless hours thinking about this tragedy. It has hungover me like a terrible nightmare. In God's name, how could any nationcalling itself civilized purpose so horrible a thing?"

At the time we were discussing this grave matter we were seated in thePresident's study in the White House. I had never seen him more serious orcareworn. I was aware that he was suffering under the criticism that hadbeen heaped upon him for his apparent inaction in the matter of the_Lusitania_. Turning to me he said: "Let me try to make my attitude inthis matter plain to you, so that you at least will try to understand whatlies in my thoughts. I am bound to consider in the most careful andcautious way the first step I shall take, because once having taken it Icannot withdraw from it. I am bound to consider beforehand all the factsand circumstances surrounding the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and tocalculate the effect upon the country of every incautious or unwise move. I am keenly aware that the feeling of the country is now at fever heat andthat it is ready to move with me in any direction I shall suggest, but Iam bound to weigh carefully the effect of radical action now based uponthe present emotionalism of the people. I am not sure whether the presentemotionalism of the country would last long enough to sustain any action Iwould suggest to Congress, and thus in case of failure we should be leftwithout that fine backing and support so necessary to maintain a greatcause. I could go to Congress to-morrow and advocate war with Germany andI feel certain that Congress would support me, but what would the countrysay when war was declared, and finally came, and we were witnessing all ofits horrors and bloody aftermath. As the people pored over the casualtylists, would they not say: 'Why did Wilson move so fast in this matter?Why didn't he try peaceably to settle this question with Germany? Whycould he not have waited a little longer? Why was he so anxious to go towar with Germany, yet at the same time why was he so tender of thefeelings of Great Britain in the matter of the blockade?' Were I to adviseradical action now, we should have nothing, I am afraid, but regrets andheartbreaks. The vastness of this country; its variegated elements; theconflicting cross-currents of national feelings bid us wait and withholdourselves from hasty or precipitate action. When we move against Germanywe must be certain that the whole country not only moves with us but iswilling to go forward to the end with enthusiasm. I know that we shall becondemned for waiting, but in the last analysis I am the trustee of thisnation, and the cost of it all must be considered in the reckoning beforewe go forward. "

Then leaning closer to me, he said: "It will not do for me to act as if Ihad been hurried into precipitate action against Germany. I must answerfor the consequences of my action. What is the picture that lies beforeme? All the great nations of Europe at war, engaged in a death grapplethat may involve civilization. My earnest hope and fervent prayer has beenthat America could withhold herself and remain out of this terrible messand steer clear of European embroilments, and at the right time offerherself as the only mediating influence to bring about peace. We are theonly great nation now free to do this. If we should go in, then the wholecivilized world will become involved. What a pretty mess it would be!America, the only nation disconnected from this thing and now she issurrendering the leadership she occupies and becomes involved as othernations have. Think of the tragedy! I am not afraid to go to war. No manfit to be President of this nation, knowing the way its people wouldrespond to any demand that might be made upon them, need have fears ordoubts as to what stand it would finally take. But what I fear more thananything else is the possibility of world bankruptcy that will inevitablyfollow our getting into this thing, Not only world chaos and bankruptcy, but all of the distempers, social, moral, and industrial, that will flowfrom this world cataclysm. No sane man, therefore, who knows the dangerouselements that are abroad in the world would, without feeling out everymove, seek to lead his people without counting the cost anddispassionately deliberating upon every move. "

In a speech delivered at Helena, Montana, he frankly spoke of the "breakdown" of neutrality in these words:

 In the Providence of God, the leadership of this nation was intrusted to me during those early years of the war when we were not in it. I was aware through many subtle channels of the movements of opinion in this country, and I know that the thing that this country chiefly desired, the thing that you men out here in the West chiefly desired and the thing that of course every loving woman had at her heart, was that we should keep out of the war, and we tried to persuade ourselves that the European business was not our business. We tried to convince ourselves that no matter what happened on the other side of the sea, no obligation of duty rested upon us, and finally we found the currents of humanity too strong for us. We found that a great consciousness was welling up in us that this was not a local cause, that this was not a struggle which was to be confined to Europe, or confined to Asia, to which it had spread, but that it was something that involved the very fate of civilization; and there was one great nation in the world that could not afford to stay out of it. There are gentlemen opposing the ratification of this treaty who at that time taunted the Administration of the United States that it had lost touch with its international conscience. They were eager to go in, and now that they have got in, and are caught in the whole network of human conscience, they want to break out and stay out. We were caught in this thing by the action of a nation utterly unlike ourselves. What I mean to say is that the German nation, the German people, had no choice whatever as to whether it was to go into that war or not, did not know that it was going into it until its men were summoned to the colours. I remember, not once, but often, that while sitting at the Cabinet table in Washington I asked my colleagues what their impression was of the opinion of the country before we went into the war, and I remember one day one of my colleagues said to me: "Mr. President, I think the people of the country would take your advice and do what you suggested. " "Why, " I said, "that is not what I am waiting for; that is not enough. If they cannot go in with a whoop there is no use of their going in at all. I do not want them to wait on me. I am waiting on them. I want to know what the conscience of this country is speaking. I want to know what purpose is arising in the minds of the people of this country with regard to this world situation. " When I thought I heard that voice, it was then that I proposed to the Congress of the United States that we should include ourselves in the challenge that Germany was giving to mankind. 

On May 10, 1915, he made a speech in Philadelphia, which contained theregrettable and much-criticized phrase, "Too proud to fight. "Unfortunately, the headlines of the papers carried only the phrase, "Tooproud to fight, " and little or no attention was paid to the context of thespeech in which the phrase was lodged. As a matter of fact, there wasnothing unusual about the character of this speech. The phrase, "Too proudto fight, " was simply expressive of the President's policy since theoutbreak of the war. It was not a new thought with him. Some weeks beforehe had said the same thing, only in different words, in a speech deliveredat a banquet of the Associated Press in New York: "My interest in theneutrality of the United States is not a petty desire to keep out oftrouble. I am interested in neutrality because there is something so muchgreater to do than fight. There is a distinction awaiting this nation thatno nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and mastery. " The phrase, "Too proud to fight, " was simplyexpressive of the idea that was close to his heart: a reliance upon meansof settling our difficulties with Germany other than a resort to war. Onour way to Philadelphia on the day of the delivery of this speech I read acopy of it which the President handed to me, and when I ran across thephrase, "Too proud to fight, " I scented the political danger in it andwarned him, but he declined to be admonished because he was confident inthe moral strength of his position, namely, that self-mastery is sometimesmore heroic than fighting, or as the Bible states it, "He that ruleth hisown spirit is greater than he that taketh a city, " and trusted the peopleto understand his full meaning. The President himself was so above thepetty tricks by which politicians wrest words from their context and forceupon them unfavourable meaning that he sometimes incautiously played intothe hands of this type of foe. Nor did he fully realize that his gift formaking striking and quotable phrases added to the danger. It was anunfortunate phrase, "Too proud to fight, " but none who thoughtfully readthe context with unprejudiced mind could fail to see the moral grandeur ofthe President's position. 

CHAPTER XXVIII

PREPAREDNESS

The feelings of the people throughout the country began to be aroused asthey witnessed the outlawry of Germany in ruthlessly attacking andwantonly interfering with American commerce on the high seas. Theagitation for preparedness to meet a critical world situation was on infull swing. Congress and the President were harassed by conflictingdemands from every side immediately to "put our house in order" and to setAmerica safely on the road to national preparedness. Theodore Rooseveltwas clamorously demanding universal compulsory military service and wasably aided by General Wood and Admiral Peary, who urged the adoption ofconscription. Secretary of War Garrison and Senator Chamberlain, ofOregon, were converted to this radical movement and unwittingly becamepart and parcel of the Roosevelt-Wood preparedness propaganda. Thesegentlemen could see only the direct route to the accomplishment of thepurpose they had in mind and were alike unmindful of the difficulties andobstacles that lay in the President's path. To them it appeared that allit was necessary for the President to do was boldly to announce hisprogramme of preparedness and serenely to await its approval at the handsof Congress. They were unmindful of the difficulties of the situation andof the consummate tact that Would be required on the part of the Presidentto induce Congress to turn away from the old volunteer system and to putinto effect at once a system that overnight would transform America intoan armed camp. The President was bound to consider the stern actualitiesof the situation and to withhold himself as far as possible from a toovigorous insistence on any programme of preparedness that was nottraditionally, fundamentally American. It was a case of honest men seeingthe same thing in the same way but differing as to the practicable meansof accomplishing it. The President early realized that the volunteersystem was unsuited to our present needs and that it could not be quicklyturned into an active force to answer emergencies, but he was certain, also, that the people of the country must be convinced of this before theywould agree to cut themselves away from the volunteer system under whichprevious American wars had been fought to a successful conclusion. ThePresident felt that the old volunteer system was antiquated and not to beconsidered, but the duty lay upon him to convince the leaders of theSenate and House and the people that this was a fact. This was no easytask to accomplish. Haste or impetuous action on his part in advocatingconscription could only, in his opinion, delay matters and embarrass thevery purpose that lay in his mind. 

While Roosevelt and Garrison were criticizing Congressional inaction, thePresident's mind was "open and to let" on the question of what constitutedthe best means of putting America in a state of actual and aggressivepreparedness. As President, he was bound to take cognizance of the deep-seated antagonism on the part of the American people to any system ofmilitary preparedness that had a compulsory feature as its basic element. It was the President's opinion that the people of a country so big andvaried as America had to be convinced by alternative methods as to what, in the last analysis, was the best means of preparing the country againstaggression. 

While he was convinced that we had to be prepared and ready to meet anyemergency, he was not to be rushed in the matter and was keeping his mindopen to find the best and most practical method of accomplishing what hethought the average opinion of the country demanded in the way ofpreparedness. 

I had often discussed the matter with the President and, watching theagitation for preparedness from the side-lines, had stated my views inletters reading in part as follows:

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 In my opinion, there is left to the Republican party but two available issues for the campaign of 1916, --the tariff and the question of national defense. How we are to meet the enemy on these questions is a subject which we ought thoroughly to consider and discuss in the coming months. 

 As to National Defense: In this matter we must have a sane, reasonable and workable programme. That programme must have in it, the ingredients that will call forth the hearty support of, first, the whole Cabinet (and particularly the Secretary of War); second, the leaders of the party in the Senate and House; third, the rank and file of Democrats in both Houses; fourth, the Army and the Navy; and last but not least, the great body of the American people. 

 Successfully to carry through this programme will tax your leadership in the party to the last degree. On the eve of the campaign of 1916, your attitude and accomplishment in this matter will be accepted by the country as the final test of your leadership and will be of incalculable psychological importance to the party; and, therefore, in the carrying out of this programme we cannot afford to hesitate or to blunder, because as election day approaches trivial mistakes will be magnified and exaggerated by the opposition, to the hurt and injury of our party and your prestige as leader. 

 TUMULTY. 

 THE PRESIDENT, Cornish, New Hampshire. 

 * * * * *

 MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I cannot impress upon you too forcibly the importance of an appeal to the country at this time on the question of preparedness. No matter what the character of the information is that you are receiving, I have it from all sources that there is no enthusiasm on the "hill" for preparedness, and that the country itself is indifferent because of its apparent inability to grasp the importance and full significance of this question. This indifference arises out of two things: first, the attitude of the pacifists whose feelings have been nurtured by the preachings of Mr. Bryan; second, the attitude of those in the country who believe in preparedness and who are frightened because of the big talk of Roosevelt and others on their plan for military conscription. 

 There is no doubt how the body of the American people feel on this question of preparedness. You can, therefore, with much greater reason, address them on this question and with greater force and earnestness. I am afraid if you delay in this matter, it will be too late to act, because our enemies are already busy and active. 

 If some unfortunate thing should arise in international affairs or in Mexico within the next few weeks and announcement came then that you were to make an appeal to the country, it would appear as an anti- climax and an attempt upon your part to retrieve yourself. Now is the psychological moment to make your plea for national defense and incidentally to discuss Mexico and our foreign relations. In other words, you must ask the country to accept your leadership or the leadership of others who can't lead. Your voice is the only responsible voice in America that can speak with certainty, authority, and calmness as to the need for preparedness. There is no doubt of the will of a large majority of our people, but it lacks articulate expression. I am sure they will not fail to respond. 

 TUMULTY. 

Upon conferring with the President in the matter of preparedness, I foundthat he had been slowly and patiently revolving the whole matter in hisown mind and was then considering the advisability of taking a directmessage to the people concerning the situation and was only awaiting thepsychological moment to strike. 

On January 27, 1916, the President commenced his tour of the North andMiddle West, assuming the leadership of the movement for preparedness thathad been started by his opponents, and called the attention of the countryto the critical world situation and to the necessity that America "put herhouse in order. " In St. Louis he declared that America must havecomparably the greatest navy in the world. It was noticeable in hisspeeches that he never employed the term "universal military service" andthat he was careful to explain that there was to be no militarism in thecountry. 

When the President returned from his preparedness tour, he found himselfat the centre of conflicting views as to method; on the one hand, Representative Hay of the Military Affairs Committee, advocated the use ofthe National Guard as the new army; on the other hand, Secretary Garrisonadvocated an increase of the Regular Army to 142, 000 men and a new"continental army" of 400, 000 men, with reserves of state militia. It wasthe recurrent conflict between the Army and Congress, between the militarydepartment's desire for a strong force and Congress' fear of "militarism. "The Garrison plan met with decided opposition in the House, and upon thePresident's refusal to lend support to his Secretary of War in theprogramme he had outlined in his report of 1915, Mr. Garrison resigned. Immediately all the enemies of the President centred about the retiringSecretary and proclaimed him a very much abused official. The letter whichthe President addressed to Secretary Garrison is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 January 17, 1916. 

 MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

 I am very much obliged to you for your letters of January twelfth and January fourteenth. They make your views with regard to adequate measures of preparation for national defence sharply clear. I am sure that I already understood just what your views were, but I am glad to have them restated in this succinct and striking way. You believe, as I do, that the chief thing necessary is, that we should have a trained citizen reserve and that the training, organization and control of that reserve should be under immediate federal direction. 

 But apparently I have not succeeded in making my own position equally clear to you, though I feel sure that I have made it perfectly clear to Mr. Hay. It is that I am not irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of providing the nation with such a reserve and am cordially willing to discuss alternative proposals. 

 Any other position on my part would indicate an attitude towards the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives which I should in no circumstances feel at liberty to assume. It would never be proper or possible for me to say to any committee of the House of Representatives that so far as my participation in legislation was concerned they would have to take my plan or none. 

 I do not share your opinion that the members of the House who are charged with the duty of dealing with military affairs are ignorant of them or of the military necessities of the nation. On the contrary, I have found them well informed and actuated with a most intelligent appreciation of the grave responsibilities imposed upon them. I am sure that Mr. Hay and his colleagues are ready to act with a full sense of all that is involved in this great matter both for the country and for the national parties which they represent. 

 My own duty toward them is perfectly plain. I must welcome a frank interchange of views and a patient and thorough comparison of all the methods proposed for obtaining the objects we all have in view. So far as my own participation in final legislative action is concerned, no one will expect me to acquiesce in any proposal that I regard as inadequate or illusory. If, as the outcome of a free interchange of views, my own judgment and that of the Committee should prove to be irreconcilably different and a bill should be presented to me which I could not accept as accomplishing the essential things sought, it would manifestly be my duty to veto it and go to the country on the merits. But there is no reason to anticipate or fear such a result, unless we should ourselves take at the outset the position that only the plans of the Department are to be considered; and that position, it seems to me, would be wholly unjustifiable. The Committee and the Congress will expect me to be as frank with them as I hope they will be with me, and will of course hold me justified in fighting for my own matured opinion. 

 I have had a delightfully frank conference with Mr. Hay. I have said to him that I was perfectly willing to consider any plan that would give us a national reserve under unmistakable national control, and would support any scheme if convinced of its adequacy and wise policy. More he has not asked or desired. 

 Sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON, Secretary of War. 

It was clear from the President's letter and the attitude of SecretaryGarrison that there was to be no meeting of minds between the Presidentand his Secretary of War on the matter of preparedness. Their views couldnot be reconciled, and when the President refused to support Garrison'sprogramme, hook, line, and sinker, the Secretary tendered his resignation, which the President under the circumstances readily accepted. Immediatelythe friends of Garrison declared that the Administration had lost itsstrongest man and that it was now on the way to destruction. Neither thePresident nor his many friends, however, were disturbed by these direfulpredictions of disaster; and as the people pondered the President's letterof acceptance of Mr. Garrison's resignation, wherein he showed his ownmind was open to the best method of preparing the country and that Mr. Garrison showed petulance and impatience in handling the matter--thesober, second thought of the country readily and quickly came to thePresident's support in the belief that the dogmatic attitude of theSecretary of War, instead of helping, was embarrassing nationalpreparedness. 

Garrison had rendered distinguished service to the Administration and hadwon many friends, especially the newspaper group of Washington, by hisopen, frank method of dealing with public questions; but unfortunately forhim he was swept off his feet by the unstinted praise that came to himfrom Republican journals throughout the country whenever it appeared thathe was taking an attitude--especially in the two questions of majorimportance, preparedness and Mexico--that seemed to be at variance withthe Administration's point of view. 

When the President's letter to Garrison was read and the contents fullyunderstood it showed Garrison autocratic and unyielding, and the Presidentopen-minded and willing to adopt any plan for preparedness that seemed tobe workable. The gentle rebuke of Mr. Garrison contained in thePresident's statement that he did not share Mr. Garrison's opinion thatthe members of the House charged with the duty of dealing with militaryaffairs "are ignorant of them or of the military necessities of thenation, " completely won to the President the support of the members ofthat committee and put the President in the position of asking for andobtaining their hearty cooperation and support. Garrison's resignation, which at first blush appeared to be disastrous to the Administration, wassoon turned to its advantage, with the result that a national defence actwas passed during the summer. It was a compromise measure but it addedvery greatly to the military power of the country. In addition, it gavegreat powers to the President over the railroads in the event of war andauthorized the establishment of a council of national defence. 

Of course, the enemies of the President interpreted the episode as anotherexample of his inability to cooperate with "strong men" and continued inthe next breath to repeat their accusations that he was autocratic in hisdealings with Congress, ignoring their own inconsistency. It was preciselybecause the President respected the constitutional prerogatives of theCongress, and Mr. Garrison did not, that the break came. 

Every method of propaganda was resorted to to force the hand of thePresident in the matter of preparedness and to induce him to advocate andsupport a programme for universal military service put forth by theNational Security League, whose backers and supporters throughout thecountry were mainly Republicans. Publicity on a grand scale, publicmeetings and great parades throughout the country were part of thispropaganda. While many sincere, patriotic men and women, without realizingthe politics that lay behind it, aided in this movement, it was easy tosee that back of it was a sinister political purpose to embarrass and, ifpossible, to force the hand of the President. One of the leaders of thismovement was General Wood, who established, with the permission of the WarDepartment, the famous Plattsburg Camp. It will be recalled that this wasthe stage from which Mr. Roosevelt, on an occasion, freely gave expressionto his views of bitter antagonism to the President for his seeminglyslothful attitude in urging his views on Congress with reference to thepreparedness programme. One of the favourite methods of rousing thepeople, to which the National Security League resorted, was demonstrationsthroughout the country in the form of preparedness parades. It was clearto us at the White House that these parades were part of an organizedmovement to "agitate" in favour of a radical programme of preparedness. The President and I had often discussed these demonstrations. One day Iasked him if they were embarrassing him in any way and he said that theywere not, but that they might affect opinion throughout the country insuch a way as unreasonably to influence Congress for legislation soradical in its character as to be unnecessary and burdensome to thetaxpayers of the country. 

Our Republican opponents on the outside were claiming great politicalresults from these demonstrations and felt sure they were a mighty forcein embarrassing and weakening the President. It was finally suggested tothe President that he ought to embrace the first opportunity presented tohim of leading in one of the parades himself. Shortly after, the Districtof Columbia parade took place, and the President, upon my initiative, wasinvited to lead it. The effect of the President's personal participationin this parade and in the New York parade held subsequently was quicklyevident. As soon as the moving pictures throughout the country began tofeature the President leading the demonstrations, these parades becameless frequent and finally obsolete. By getting into the "front line" thePresident had cleverly outwitted his enemies and took command of theforces in the country demanding preparedness. 

CHAPTER XXIX

THE GREAT DECLARATION

In October, 1916, during the Presidential campaign, while the Presidentwas at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, Ambassador Gerard, at the President'sinvitation, paid a visit to him and reported in detail the generalsituation in Germany as to the submarine warfare. He said that therestrictions as to submarines imposed by Germany's acceptance of thePresident's ultimatum after the Sussex affair, were growing burdensome andintolerable to the military and naval masters of Germany and that theywere bringing all kinds of pressure to bear upon the leaders of the CivilGovernment, notably Von Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Minister Von Jagow, to repudiate the undertaking. From the critical situation in Germany, arising out of the controversy over the question of unrestricted submarinewarfare, which Ambassador Gerard laid before him, the President wasconvinced that we were now approaching a real crisis in our relations withGermany and that unless peace could be quickly obtained, the Europeanstruggle would soon enter upon a phase more terrible than any in thepreceding two years, with consequences highly dangerous to the interestsof our country. The passionate wish and deep desire of the President fromthe beginning was that we could keep aloof and by conserving our energiesand remaining neutral, hold ourselves in reserve as the only mediatinginfluence for peace; but with each passing week some untoward eventbrought about by the ruthlessness of Germany made the prospect for theinterposition of America's influence daily more unlikely. 

The following memorandum prepared by me on January 4, 1916, of aconversation between the President and myself, shortly after the sinkingof the _Persia_ by a submarine, imperfectly sets forth his idea withreference to war with Germany:

 About ten minutes to ten o'clock this morning I had a very interesting conversation with the President at the White House, my purpose being to bring to him the atmosphere of Washington and the country as far as I could ascertain with reference to the sinking of the _Persia_ by a submarine. The other purpose of my visit was to warn him that Senator Stone might induce him to make some admission with reference to his attitude which might embarrass the President in the future. 

 The President looked very well after his trip and seemed to be in a fine mood, although it was plainly evident that the _Persia_ affair rested heavily upon him. My attitude toward this matter was for action, and action all along the line. This did not seem to meet with a very hearty response from the President. He informed me that it would not be the thing for us to take action against any government without our government being in possession of all the facts. I replied that that was my attitude, but I thought there should be action and vigorous action as soon as all the facts were ascertained. He agreed with me in this. When I began to tell him about the attitude of the country and the feeling in the country that there was a lack of leadership, he stiffened up in his chair and said: "Tumulty, you may as well understand my position right now. If my rejection as President depends upon my getting into war, I don't want to be President. I have been away, and I have had lots of time to think about this war and the effect of our country getting into it, and I have made up my mind that I am more interested in the opinion that the country will have of me ten years from now than the opinion it may be willing to express to- day. Of course, I understand that the country wants action, and I intend to stand by the record I have made in all these cases, and take whatever action may be necessary, but I will not be rushed into war, no matter if every last Congressman and Senator stands up on his hind legs and proclaims me a coward. " He continued, speaking of the severance of diplomatic relations, --"You must know that when I consider this matter, I can only consider it as the forerunner of war. I believe that the sober-minded people of this country will applaud any efforts I may make without the loss of our honour to keep this country out of war. " He said that if we took any precipitate action right now, it might prevent Austria from coming across in generous fashion. 

The President, ten months later, was re-elected, on the slogan, "_He keptus out of War_. " If it was possible to continue at peace on terms thatwould protect and conserve our national honour, he was determined to doso. I recall how passionately he laid before Senator Tillman of SouthCarolina, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, his desire to keepthe nation out of war. At the conclusion of the talk with the Senator, hesaid: "But, Senator, it rests with Germany to say whether we shall remainat peace. " Turning to the President, Senator Tillman said: "You are right, Mr. President, we must not go around with a chip on our shoulder. I am forpeace, but I am not for peace at any damn price. " This was reallyexpressive of the President's attitude. He earnestly desired peace, but hewas not willing to remain at peace at the price of the nation's honour. 

Early in May, 1916, the President and I had conferred regarding theEuropean situation and had discussed the possibility of our suggesting toboth sides that they consider the United States as a mediating influenceto bring about a settlement. Early in May, 1916, I had addressed thefollowing letter to the President with reference to the matter:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 May 16, 1916. 

 MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

 As I have discussed with you on frequent occasions, it seems to me that the time is now at hand for you to act in the matter of _Peace_. The mere process of peace negotiations may extend over a period of months. Why should we wait until the moment of exhaustion before ever beginning a discussion? Everybody admits that the resources of the nations involved cannot last through another year without suffering of an untold character. It is now May. Let us assume that everybody accepts your offer. It would be physically impossible to get commissioners from various parts of the world, including Japan, in less than two months. Then the discussion would perhaps last until the fall, no matter what conclusion might be reached. Therefore, allowing for the time that might be consumed in persuading all the parties that the time is now ripe, the whole business will require almost a year in itself, during which time the hostilities would be continuing and certainly the chance of getting a truce would be better after the discussion had been in progress for some time. Similarly, as the time for the winter campaign approached, the inducement to agree on a truce on any terms would become more powerful each day. 

 Let us look at it from the point of view of postponement. If we waited until the fall and the negotiations stretched out through the winter, the temptation for making new drives in the spring, with the preparations made throughout the winter, would incline the militaristic element in the various countries involved to block peace negotiations. _It seems, therefore, that the time to act is now when these drives are spending their force. _

 As to the Procedure:

 It seems that no belligerent should be put in the position by your note of weakening or of suing for peace, for we must keep in mind the pride and sensibilities of all. The initiative must be ours--to all nations, on equal terms. One way to do this would be to send a note, saying that from the German note and from statesmen representing the Entente powers the Government of the United States assumes that the belligerent powers are willing at least to discus suggestions for peace, each only reserving to itself liberty of action. The United States can, therefore, announce that it is willing to meet at The Hague a commission sent by the respective governments to discuss means for making peace, _and for establishing a world court or international tribunal to safeguard the peace of the world after the close of the war_. 

 In the latter, namely, _world peace_, the United States has a direct interest. The United States can in the note assume that commissioners will meet with it and hopes to be advised if there is any feeling to the contrary. 

 My idea is to go ahead with the plan on the theory that all the belligerents are in accord with the idea, so that in answering our note they will not have accepted anything but our proposals to discuss, first, the suggestion of peace, and, secondly, the idea of a world court. 

 The President should say, in order to elicit the sympathy of the world and mankind in general, that the note of the United States suggesting a meeting between the powers will be made public within a few days and after its receipt by the respective powers. This will give each government not only its own public opinion to reckon with, but the public opinion of the civilized world. The nation that objects to a discussion of peace will by no means be in an enviable position. 

 I hope you will read the article I am sending you by Mr. Strunsky, "Post Impressions, " especially that part I have indicated in the margin. It is from this article that I got the idea of suggesting the alternative proposition of a world court. Your note setting forth your position in this matter should be an appeal to the heart and to the conscience of the world. 

 TUMULTY. 

Evidently the President seriously had been considering this very matter aswas shown by the following reply to my note:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 Thank you for the memorandum about peace suggestions. I have read it very carefully and find my own thoughts travelling very much the same route. You may be sure I am doing a great deal of serious thinking about it all. 

 Faithfully, W. W. 

The President, through the State Department and various instrumentalitiesto which he had access for information, was keeping in touch with theGerman situation and understood from the beginning what the German gamewas with reference to peace, and to the various offers which he wasmaking. He knew that the German peace offers were merely an attempt on thepart of the civil government of Germany to avert a resumption ofruthlessness at sea; that they were mere gestures on the part of theGerman Government made to bolster up the morale of the German people andthat these German offers did not indicate the real desire for peace onequitable terms, as subsequent events showed, but that they were the termsof peace of a nation which thought itself the victor, and, therefore, in aposition ruthlessly to dictate a final settlement. 

Many of the advisers of the President suggested that he should ignorethese offers. But the President was wiser than those around him inaccepting the German bid at its face value, and he finally called uponGermany to state the practical terms upon which she was willing toconsider a settlement for peace. There was another reason for thePresident's patience. Foreseeing an inevitable crisis with Germany overthe frequent sinking of our ships, he was fully conscious that he couldnot draw the whole country with him in aggressive action if before he tookthe step leading to war he had not tried out every means of peace. Whilehis enemies denounced his meekness and apparent subservience to Germandiplomacy, and while some went so far as to characterize his conduct ascowardly, he serenely moved on and forced Germany to a show-down. He notonly asked Germany to state her terms, but he frankly asked the Allies togive to the world their statement of what they considered the basis ofpeace. 

One of the phrases in his note to the Allies which caused great irritationwas that "neither side had stated the object for which the war had beenstarted. " While he was criticized for this at the time, it did just whathe intended it to do. It forced Germany openly to avow what she believedto be the basis of peace, and gave the Allies their chance, as if theywere being forced to do it by the American President, to say what theythought would be a just settlement. 

In the latter part of January Germany announced to the United States thatshe was going to begin, on February first, unrestricted submarine warfarein the zone around the British Isles, and undertook to specify the routewhich a restricted number of American ships might take through this zone. 

I vividly recall the day the Associated Press bulletin reached the WhiteHouse. I took it immediately to the President who was at his desk in hisprivate office. As I entered, he looked up from his writing, casualinquiry in his eyes. Without comment I laid the fateful slip of paper onhis desk, and silently watched him as he read and then re-read it. Iseemed to read his mind in the expressions that raced across his strongfeatures: first, blank amazement; then incredulity that even Germany couldbe guilty of such perfidy; then gravity and sternness, a sudden graynessof colour, a compression of the lips and the familiar locking of the jawwhich always characterized him in moments of supreme resolution. Handingthe paper back to me, he said in quiet tones: "This means war. The breakthat we have tried so hard to prevent now seems inevitable. "

On February 4th, he addressed Congress, announcing the severance ofdiplomatic relations with Germany, and stating his hope that Germany wouldpause before it was too late. On February 26th, the steamship. _Aneona_, with Americans on board, was sunk, and on the next day the Presidentaddressed Congress, suggesting the proclamation of armed neutrality as afinal effort to apply pressure to the Government of Germany, to show thatthe United States was in earnest and would protect its rights againstlawless attacks at sea; but these measures failed. Germany seemed bentupon a break with us, and on April 6, 1917, in response to a memorableaddress delivered by the President on April second, the Congress of theUnited States declared solemnly that a state of war existed between theUnited States and the Imperial German Government. 

In concluding his war message, the President said:

 It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. 

I accompanied the President to Capitol Hill on the day of the delivery ofhis war message, and on that fateful day I rode with him from the Capitolback to the White House, the echo of applause still ringing in my ears. 

For a while he sat silent and pale in the Cabinet Room. At last he said:"Think what it was they were applauding" [he was speaking of the peoplewho were lined along the streets on his way to the Capitol]. "My messageto-day was a message of death for our young men. How strange it seems toapplaud that. "

That simple remark is one key to an understanding of Woodrow Wilson. Allpoliticians pretend to hate and to dread war, but Woodrow Wilson reallyhates and dreads it in all the fibres of his human soul; hates it anddreads it because he has an imagination and a heart; an imagination whichshows his sensitive perception the anguish and the dying which warentails; a heart which yearns and aches over every dying soldier andbleeds afresh with each new-made wound. 

I shall never forget that scene in the Cabinet Room between the Presidentand myself. He appeared like a man who had thrown off old burdens only toadd new ones. 

It was apparent in his talk with me that he felt deeply wounded at thecriticism that for months had been heaped upon him for his seemingunwillingness to go to war with Germany. As he discussed the step he hadjust taken, it was evident to me that he keenly felt the full solemnityand tragedy of it all. Turning to me, he said: "Tumulty, from the verybeginning I saw the end of this horrible thing; but I could not movefaster than the great mass of our people would permit. Very few understoodthe difficult and trying position I have been placed in during the yearsthrough which we have just passed. In the policy of patience andforbearance I pursued I tried to make every part of America and the variedelements of our population understand that we were willing to go anylength rather than resort to war with Germany. As I told you months ago, it would have been foolish for us to have been rushed off our feet and tohave gone to war over an isolated affair like the _Lusitania_. But now weare certain that there will be no regrets or looking back on the part ofour people. There is but one course now left open to us. Our consciencesare clear, and we must prepare for the inevitable--a fight to the end. Germany must be made to understand that we have rights that she mustrespect. There were few who understood this policy of patience. I do notmean to say this in a spirit of criticism. Indeed, many of the leadingjournals of the country were unmindful of the complexities of thesituation which confronted us. "

The President then took out of his pocket an old and worn newspaperclipping, saying: "I wish to read you an analysis of my position and mypolicy by a special writer for the _Manchester Guardian_, who seemed, without consulting me or ever conferring with me, to know just what I amdriving at. "

This special writer, commenting upon the Wilson policy, had said:

 Mr. Wilson's patience, now derided and criticized, will inevitably be the means by which he will lead his people by easy stages to the side of the Allies. By his methods of patience and apparent subservience to Germany, he will convince the whole American people that no other course save war is possible. This policy of Wilson's, now determined on, will work a complete transformation in his people. It will not evidence itself quickly or overnight. The moral preachment of Wilson before and after war will be the cause that will finally bring his people to the side of the Allies. 

Again turning to me, the President said: "Our course from this time on isclear. The whole business of war that we are now engaged upon is fraughtwith the gravest difficulties. There will be great enthusiasm in thecountry from this day. I trust it will not slacken or weaken as thehorrors of the war and its tragedies are disclosed. Of course our motiveswill be misconstrued, our purposes misunderstood; some of our best friendswill misinterpret what we seek to do. In carrying on the war we will beobliged to do certain unusual things, things that will interfere with thelives and habits of our people, which will bring down upon us a storm ofcriticism and ridicule. Our life, therefore, until this thing is over, andGod only knows when it will be over, will be full of tragedy andheartaches. "

As he spoke, he was no longer Woodrow Wilson, the protagonist of peace, but Woodrow Wilson, the stern warrior, now grimly determined to pursue thegreat cause of America to the end. 

The President continued talking to me. He said: "It has not been easy tocarry these burdens in these trying times. From the beginning I saw theutter futility of neutrality, the disappointment and heartaches that wouldflow from its announcement, but we had to stand by our traditional policyof steering clear of European embroilments. While I have appeared to beindifferent to the criticism which has been my portion during thesecritical days, a few have tried to understand my purpose and havesympathized throughout with what I sought to do. "

Then, as he lowered his voice, he said: "There is a fine chap inSpringfield, Massachusetts, editor of a great paper there, who understoodmy position from the beginning and who has sympathized with me throughoutthis whole business. " For a moment he, paused, and then went on: "I wantto read you the letter I received from this fine man. " As he read, theemotion he felt at the tender sympathy which the words conveyed grippedhim. The letter is as follows:

 Springfield, Massachusetts, March 28, 1917. 

 MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 In acknowledging your very kind and appreciative note of March 22nd, I must say at once that the note has given me the greatest possible pleasure. I prize this word from you all the more because after the political experience and conflicts of the past few years, I am conscious of a very real yet peculiar feeling of having summered and wintered with you, in spite of the immeasurable and rather awful distance that separates our respective places in the life and work of our time. Your note, for the moment, suddenly annihilates the distance and brings to me what I recognize as a very human touch. 

 There is summering and wintering to come, --with more wintering perhaps than we shall enjoy;--even so, I shall hope to be of timely service, as opportunity favours me. 

 I have the honour to be your admirer and friend. 

 Most sincerely, (Signed) WALDO L. COOK. 

"That man understood me and sympathized. " As he said this, the Presidentdrew his handkerchief from his pocket, wiped away great tears that stoodin his eyes, and then laying his head on the Cabinet table, sobbed as ifhe had been a child. 

CHAPTER XXX

CARRYING ON

The critics of the President will ask the question: "What was thePresident doing to prepare the country for war, which to him seemedinevitable?" From the inside, and without the blare of trumpets, he wasquietly engaged in conferring with the heads of the Army and Navydepartments. Indeed, from the minute the third _Lusitania_ note wasdispatched, actual preparations for war were begun. Immediately upon thedispatch of the note, the following statement was issued from the WhiteHouse, under date of July 21, 1916. 

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 July 21, 1916. 

 The President in association with the heads of departments, regardless of present-day conditions or controversies, has long been giving a great deal of consideration to the preparation of a reasonable and adequate naval programme, which he intends to propose to Congress at the proper time. 

 That is one of the things he is now considering in the quiet of Cornish. He feels, now that the note has been dispatched, that it is best, for the time being, to drop the discussion of it as far as he is concerned and is turning to questions of permanent national policy. 

 Of course, he realizes that he must have the best practical advice obtainable in this matter and is seeking for it from every available source. In fact, it is known that the best minds of the various departments of the Government, both of the Army and the Navy, are now and have been at work on these important matters for some time; that is, he is seeking advice from the men in those departments who have been most directly in touch with the new conditions of defence that have been evolved out of modern experience. He not only wishes advice from those who have a knowledge of actual modern conditions of warfare, but he is seeking light from those who are able to understand and comprehend the altered conditions of land and naval warfare. He wishes the Navy to stand upon an equality with the most efficient and serviceable. 

 As to the Army, it is known here that he is preparing to incorporate in his next message to Congress a programme in regard to the development and equipment of the Army and a proper training of the citizens of the United States to arms which, while in every way consistent with American traditions and national policy, will be of such a character as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical mind. In this matter he is working with the Secretary of War and his professional associates, who, it is understood, have reached some very definite conclusions on these exceedingly important matters. He is anxious to have a programme that will be definite and positive, and wishes to have the information in hand before laying the matter before the committees of the Senate and the House. 

 Contemporaneously with this statement was issued the following, which wasprepared by the President, but issued over my name, the full significanceof which was not apparent at the time:

 The note [Third _Lusitania_ note] having been dispatched, the President felt that it was best to drop further discussion of the matter for the present, as far as he was concerned. He will be free now to devote his time to a full consideration of a matter that the country has for a long time been thoughtful of, that is a reasonable programme of national defense. Of course, this programme will be considered regardless of present-day conditions. 

 It is known that the President has been considering this important matter in all its aspects, and has been in touch with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy regarding it. It is also known in official circles here that the President had taken steps before leaving for Cornish to instruct the Army and Navy departments to make ready for his consideration a careful programme of national defense in preparation for the presentation of his views to Congress at the proper time. 

 He desires to have the programme based on the most practicable lines obtainable from the departments and it is said that the best minds in the departments are at present at work on the subject. He hopes that the programme will express the best traditions of the country and not lose sight of modern experience. He is anxious to have a programme that will be definite and positive, and wishes to have the information in hand before laying the matter before the committees of the Senate and the House. 

On July 21, 1915, he addressed the following letters to the Secretary ofWar and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 July 21, 1915. 

 MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

 I have been giving scarcely less thought than you yourself have to the question of adequate preparation for national defense, and I am anxious, as you know, to incorporate in my next message to Congress a programme regarding the development and equipment of the Army and a proper training of our citizens to arms which, while in every way consistent with our traditions and our national policy, will be of such a character as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical mind. 

 I know that you have been much in conference with your professional associates in the department and that you have yourself come to some very definite conclusions on these exceedingly important matters. I shall be away from Washington for a few days, but I would be very much obliged if you would be kind enough to prepare for me a programme, with estimates, of what you and the best-informed soldiers in your counsels think the country ought to undertake to do. I should like to discuss this programme with you at as early a time as it can be made ready. Whether we can reasonably propose the whole of it to the Congress immediately or not we can determine when we have studied it. The important thing now is to know and know fully what we need. Congress will certainly welcome such advice and follow it to the limit of its opportunity. 

 Cordially and faithfully yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

 HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON, Secretary Of War. 

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 July 21, 1915. 

 MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

 I have been giving, as I am sure you have also, a great deal of thought to the matter of a wise and adequate naval programme to be proposed to the Congress at its next session, and I would like to discuss the whole subject with you at the earliest possible date. 

 But first we must have professional advice. I would be very much obliged to you if you would get the best minds in the department to work on the subject: I mean the men who have been most directly in contact with actual modern conditions, who have most thoroughly comprehended what the Navy must be in the future in order to stand upon an equality with the most efficient and most practically serviceable. I want their advice, a programme by them formulated in the most definite way. Whether we can reasonably propose the whole of it to the Congress immediately or not we can determine when we have studied it. The important thing now is to know fully what we need. Congress will certainly welcome such advice and follow it to the limit of its opportunity. 

 It should be a programme planned for a consistent and progressive development of this great defensive arm of the nation and should be of such a kind as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical man. 

 I shall return to Washington in a few days and shall be glad to take this important matter up with you at your early convenience. 

 Cordially and faithfully yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 HON. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy. 

Immediately after the war message there arose an insistent demand for acoalition cabinet. It was the beginning of the Republican drive for whatwas called a bi-partisan government. Republicans chose to forget theexperiences of England and France under their coalition cabinets, and whenthe President refused to act upon the suggestion, the impression wassubtly conveyed to the unthinking that the President's refusal arose fromhis dislike of counsel and coöperation, and his unwillingness to share theresponsibilities and glories of the war with people outside his own party. 

As an historian, the President knew the troubles of Washington with acoalition cabinet, Lincoln's embarrassments from Cabinet members not ofhis own party, McKinley's sagacious refusal in 1898 to form a coalitioncabinet. He also knew human nature; knew that with the best intentions, men sometimes find it difficult to work whole-heartedly with a leader of apolitical party not their own. He could not risk a chance of division, inhis own official family in the face of the common enemy. 

The President looked upon the agitation for a coalition cabinet as apartisan effort to hamper and embarrass his administration, and so hecoldly turned away from every suggestion that looked toward theestablishment of a cabinet of the kind suggested by his too-solicitousRepublican friends. 

The following note which I addressed to the President and his reply, bearupon the subject:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 The newspaper men asked me this morning what the attitude of the Administration was toward the proposed super-cabinet. I hedged as much as I could, but I asked if it was not the same proposition that came up some months ago, advocated by Senator Weeks, in a new disguise--if it was not the same kind of a commission that had harassed Mr. Lincoln. I think we ought to let our attitude be known unofficially for the guidance of men who wish to help us. If we do nothing at this time to let it be known, it would seem that our opposition to this kind of legislation had been silenced by the furore over the fuel order. In other words, we ought to show by our attitude that the tantrums on the Hill are making no impression on us whatever. 

 TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 Of course, I am opposed to the idea of a "super-cabinet, " and regard it as nothing more nor less than a renewal of the perpetual effort of the Republicans to force representation in the Administration. Republicans of the finest sort and of the finest capacity are working for and with the Administration on all hands and there is no need whatever for a change at the head of the administering departments. I am utterly opposed to anything of the sort and will never consent to it. You will know how to create the impression on the minds of the newspaper men that I regard it as merely a partisan effort to hamper and embarrass the Administration. 

 THE PRESIDENT. 

There were many misgivings in the minds of the people when war wasdeclared in April, 1917, and the nation embarked upon the most gigantic ofall its wars, under the leadership of a college professor, a doctrinaire, who did not believe in war as a method of permanently solvinginternational problems, and a Secretary of War who was an avowed pacifist. There was another matter which greatly disturbed the peace of mind of theaverage American. The political party that was conducting the struggle wasthe Democratic party, the party of the plain folk, of the average men andwomen of America. Our Republican friends had so cleverly "advertised"their conduct of the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, that manypeople in the country felt that the Republican party, because of itsleading minds and the business genius of its masters, was the onlypolitical organization that could be depended upon successfully to carryon a great war. 

Colonel Roosevelt's diary, first made public on September 28, 1921, throwsinteresting light on Republican claims of efficient management byRepublicans of the Spanish-American War. Under date of May 7, 1898, theColonel, then a lieutenant-colonel, recorded in his diary: "The delays andstupidity of the Ordnance Department surpass belief. The Quartermaster'sDepartment is better, but bad. The Commissary Department is good. There isno management whatever in the War Department. Against a good nation weshould be helpless, " and these animadversions are reiterated in subsequententries. Interesting comments from the greatest of contemporaryRepublicans on the divine right of the Republican party to conduct allAmerican wars and transact all other American business of importance. Butdoubtless the Colonel had forgotten all this in 1917, and many other goodAmericans had also forgotten what was notorious in 1898 and the ineptitudeof the Republican War Department, which, as Lieutenant-Colonel Rooseveltsaid under date of May 21, 1898, had "no head, no energy, nointelligence. " But the old myth sedulously cultivated by Republicanscontinued in 1917, that only Republicans are fit to govern, no matter howbadly they govern. Direful prophecies and predictions of disaster to thecountry by reason of the Democratic auspices under which the war was to beconducted were freely made. 

It is an unpleasant fact that some of the leading Republicans in theSenate and the House harboured for the President a partisan and personalhatred which made the wish father to the thought. Yet the expected did nothappen, to the amazement and chagrin of the Republican enemies of thePresident. No other war was attended with so little scandal and withgreater expedition. The cause was plain. It was the magnificent andaggressive leadership of Woodrow Wilson exerting itself all along theline, and that leadership was based upon certain fundamental resolutionswhich had been taking form in the President's mind for many monthsprevious to his appearance before Congress asking for the passage of a wardeclaration. They were as follows: (1) There was to be no "politics" inthe conduct of the war; (2) no political generals would be selected; (3)every ounce of energy and force in the nation was to be put back of theheads of the Army and the Navy in a supreme effort to make our influence, moral and physical, quickly felt. Every effort was made to cut out scandaland to put an absolute embargo on the activities of army speculators, contractors, and profiteers. 

Speaking to me one day about the conduct of the war, shortly after thedelivery of his war message, he said: "We must not in our conduct of thiswar repeat the scandals of the Civil and the Spanish-American wars. Thepolitics of generals and admirals must be tabooed. We must find the besttrained minds that we can get and we must back them up at every turn. Ourpolicy must be 'the best man for every job, ' regardless of his politicalaffiliations. This must be the only test, for, after all, we are thetrustees of the boys whose lives will be spent in this enterprise of war. "

This was not an easy policy to pursue. Every kind of harassing demand camefrom Democratic senators and representatives to induce the President torecognize political considerations in the conduct of the war, the argumentbeing that after all the responsibility for its conduct resting with theDemocrats, the administration of the war ought to be under Democratictutelage throughout. But the President was firm--in his resolve to see thewar through to the end without political considerations. The politicalpredilections of generals, admirals, and war workers of every kind wasignored. 

Mr. Creel by furnishing a list of Republicans appointed by the Presidentto conspicuous office has disproved the charge against the President ofniggard partisanship. Although the President would not tolerate acoalition cabinet, he gave to Republicans all manner of opportunities toshare in the conduct and the credit of the war. I quote from Mr. Creel:

 The search for "the best man for the place" was instituted without regard to party, faction, blood strain, or creed, and the result was a composite organization in which Democrats, Republicans, and Independents worked side by side, partisanship forgotten and service the one consideration. 

 It stood recognized as a matter of course that the soldier selected to command our forces in France might well develop into a presidential possibility, yet this high place was given without question to Gen. John J. Pershing, a life-long Republican and the son-in-law of Senator Warren, one of the masters of the Republican machine. 

 Admiral William S. Sims, a vociferous Republican, was sent to English waters in high command, and while Secretary Daniels was warned at the time that Sims's partisanship was of the kind that would not recognize the obligations of loyalty or patriotism, he waved the objection aside out of his belief that Sims was "the best man for the job". 

 For the head of the Aircraft Board, with its task of launching America's great aviation programme, Mr. Howard E. Coffin, a Republican, was selected and at his right hand Mr. Coffin placed Col. Edward A. Deeds, also a Republican of vigour and regularity. 

 It is to be remembered also that when failure and corruption were charged against the Aircraft Board, the man appointed by the President to conduct the highly important investigation was Charles E. Hughes. 

 Three Assistant Secretaries of War were appointed by Mr. Baker--Mr. Benedict Crowell, a Cleveland contractor; Doctor F. E. Keppel, dean of Columbia University, and Emmet J. Scott, formerly Booker Washington's secretary--and all three were Republicans. Mr. E. R. Stettinius of the J. P. Morgan firm and a Republican was made special assistant to the Secretary of War and placed in charge of supplies, a duty that he had been discharging for the Allies. Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, after his unfortunate experience in shipbuilding, was given a second chance and put in the War Department as an assistant Chief of staff. The Chief of Staff himself, Gen. Peyton C. March, was a Republican no less definite and regular than General Goethals. Mr. Samuel McRoberts, president of the National City Bank and one of the pillars of the Republican party, was brought to Washington as chief of the procurement section in the Ordnance Section, with the rank of brigadier-general, Maj. Gen. E. H. Crowder was appointed Provost- Marshal-General, although his Republicanism was well known, and no objection of any kind was made when General Crowder put Charles B. Warren, the Republican National Committeeman from Michigan, in charge of appeal cases, a position of rare power. 

 The Emergency Fleet Corporation was virtually turned over to Republicans under Charles M. Schwab and Charles Piez. Mr. Vance McCormick, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was made chairman of the War Trade Board, but of the eight members the following five were Republicans: Albert Strauss of New York, Alonzo E. Taylor of Pennsylvania, John Beaver White, of New York, Frank C. Munson of New York, and Clarence M. Woolley of Chicago. 

 The same conditions obtained in the Red Cross. A very eminent Republican, Mr. H. P. Davison, was put in supreme authority, and on the Red Cross War Council were placed ex-President Taft; Mr. Charles D. Norton, Mr. Taft's secretary while President; and Mr. Cornelius N. Bliss, former treasurer of the Republican National Committee. Not only was Mr. Taft thus honoured, but upon the creation of a National War Labour Board the ex-President was made its chairman and virtually empowered to act as the administration's representative in its contact with industry. 

 Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, a Republican of iron regularity, was placed in charge of the War Savings Stamps Campaign, and when Mr. McAdoo had occasion to name Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury he selected Prof. L. S. Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania and Mr. H. C. Leffingwell of New York. 

 Harry A. Garfield, son of the Republican President, was made Fuel Administrator, and Mr. Herbert Hoover, now a candidate for President, on a platform, of unadulterated Republicanism, was nominated as head of the Food Administration. 

 The Council of National Defense was an organization of high importance and one of tremendous influence from a partisan standpoint, yet its executive body was divided as follows: Republicans--Howard E. Coffin, Julius Rosenwald, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Dr. Franklin Martin, Walter S. Gifford, Director; Democrats--Daniel Willard and Bernard M. Baruch; Independent--Samuel Gompers. 

No sooner had the war begun than the preliminary war work of the Presidentbegan to bear fruit. 

Within a month from the declaration of war the traditional policy of thenation was reversed, by the enactment of the Selective Service Act. A vastmachinery of registration was created that ran without a hitch, and onJune 5th more than 10, 000, 000 men were registered quickly and efficiently. 

Thirty-two encampments--virtual cities, since each had to house 40, 000men--were built in ninety days from the driving of the first nail, complete in every municipal detail, a feat declared impossible, and whichwill stand for all time as a building miracle. 

In June, scarcely two months after the President's appearance beforeCongress, General Pershing and his staff reached France, and on July 3rdthe last of four groups of transports landed American fighting men in thehome of La Fayette and Rochambeau. On October 10th our soldiers went onthe firing-line. 

Training camps for officers started in June, and in August there weregraduated 27, 341 successful aspirants, ready to assume the tasks ofleadership. 

In a notable speech, confidential in character, the President on the 8thday of April, 1918, addressed the foreign correspondents at the WhiteHouse concerning "our resolutions" and "actions in the war. " The speechwas as follows:

 I am very glad to have this opportunity to meet you. Some of you I have met before, but not all. In what I am going to say I would prefer that you take it in this way, as for the private information of your minds and not for transmission to anybody, because I just want, if I may, in a few words to create a background for you which may be serviceable to you. I speak in confidence. 

 I was rendered a little uneasy by what Mr. Lloyd George was quoted as having said the other day that the Americans have a great surprise in store for Germany. I don't know in what sense he meant that, but there is no surprise in store. I want you to know the sequence of resolves and of actions concerning our part in the war. Some time ago it was proposed to us that we, if I may use the expression feed our men into the French and English armies in any unit that might be ready-- companies or regiments or brigades--and not wait to train and coordinate the larger units of our armies before putting them into action. My instinctive judgment in the face of that proposition was that the American people would feel a very much more ardent interest in the war if their men were fighting under their own flag and under their own general officers, but at that time, which was some months ago, I instructed General Pershing that he had full authority whenever any exigency that made such a thing necessary should occur to put the men in any units or in any numbers or in any way that was necessary-- just as he is doing. What I wanted you to know was that that was not a new action, that General Pershing was fully instructed about that all along. 

 Then, similarly with regard to the impression that we are now going to rush troops to Europe. Of course, you cannot rush any faster than there is means of rushing and, what I have said recently is what I have said all along, that we are getting men over there just as fast as we can get them ready and as quickly as we can find the ships to transport them. We are doing that now and we have been doing it all along. Let me point out some of the circumstances: Our first programme was to send over ninety thousand men a month, but for several months we were sending over only thirty thousand--one third of the programme. Why? Not because we didn't have the men ready, not even because we didn't have the means of transportation, but because--and there is no criticism of the French Government involved in this--because the ports assigned to us for landing couldn't take care of the supplies we had to send over. We had to send materials and engineers, and workmen, even, over to build the docks and the piers that would be adequate to handle the number of men we sent over, because this was happening: We began with the ninety-thousand programme and the result was that cargo ships that we needed were lying in those ports for several weeks together without being unloaded, as there was no means of unloading them. It was bad economy and bad practice from every point of view to have those ships lying there during a period when they could have made two or three voyages. There is still this difficulty which I am afraid there is no means of overcoming rapidly, that the railroad communication between those ports and the front is inadequate to handle very large bodies of men. You may notice that General Pershing recommended that Christmas boxes should not be sent to the men. That sounded like a pretty hard piece of advice, but if you could go to those ports and see those Christmas boxes which are still there, you would know why he didn't want them sent. There was no means of getting them to the front. Vast accumulations of these gifts were piled up there with no means of storing them adequately even. 

 I just wanted to create for you this picture, that the channels have been inevitably choked. Now we believe that, inasmuch as the impediments on the other side are being largely removed, we can go ahead with the original programme and add to it in proportion as the British can spare us the tonnage, and they are going to spare us the tonnage for the purpose. And with the extra tonnage which the British are going to spare us we will send our men, not to France but to Great Britain, and from there they will go to the front through the channel ports. You see that makes a new line where the means of handling them are already established and where they are more abundant than they are at the French ports. Now, I want to say again that none of this involves the least criticism of the French authorities, because I think they have done their very best in every respect, but they couldn't make ports out of hand, they couldn't build new facilities suddenly, and their man power was being drawn on in very much larger proportion than our man power. Therefore, it was perfectly proper that we should send men over there and send materials to make the means of handling the troops and the cargoes more expeditiously. 

 I want you gentlemen to realize that there was no wave-like motion in this thing so far as our purpose and preparation are concerned. We have met with delays, of course, in production, some of which might have been avoided and ought to have been avoided, and which are being slowly corrected, but apart from that the motive power has been back of this thing all the time. It has been the means of action that has oscillated, it has been sometimes greater and sometimes less than was necessary for the programme. 

 I for my own part don't like the idea of having surprises. I would like the people to be surprised if we didn't do our duty, but not surprised that we did do it. Of course, I don't mean that Mr. Lloyd George meant that we would surprise everybody by doing our duty, but I don't just know how to interpret his idea of it, because I have said the same thing to the British representatives all along as I informally expressed it to Lord Reading, that we had been and always would be doing our damnedest, and there could not be a more definite American expression of purpose than that. 

 As to another matter (I am just giving you things to think about and not things to say, if you will be kind enough to take it that way). That speech I made on Saturday I hope was correctly understood. We are fighting, as I understand it, for justice to everybody and are ready to stop just as soon as justice to everybody is everybody's programme. I have the same opinion privately about, I will not say the policy, but the methods of the German Government that some gentlemen have who see red all the time, but that is not a proper part of my thought. My thought is that if the German Government insist that the thing shall be settled unjustly, that is to say by force, then of course we accept that and will settle it by force. Whenever we see sincere symptoms of their desire to settle it by justice, we will not only accept their suggestions but we will be glad and eager to accept them, as I said in my speech. I would be ashamed to use the knock-down and drag-out language; that is not the language of liberty, that is the language of braggadocio. For my part, I have no desire to march triumphantly into Berlin. If they oblige us to march triumphantly into Berlin, then we will do it if it takes twenty years. But the world will come to its senses some day, no matter how mad some parts of it may be now, and this is my feeling, that we ought when the thing is over to be able to look back upon a course which had no element in it which we need be ashamed of. So it is so difficult in any kind of a speech, this kind or any other, to express two things that seem to be going in opposite directions that I wasn't sure that I had succeeded in expressing them on Saturday--the sincere willingness to discuss peace whenever the proposals are themselves sincere and yet at the same time the determination never to discuss it until the basis laid down for the discussion is justice. By that I mean justice to everybody. Nobody has the right to get anything out of this war, because we are fighting for peace if we mean what we say, for permanent peace. No injustice furnishes a basis for permanent peace. If you leave a rankling sense of injustice anywhere, it will not only produce a running sore presently which will result in trouble and probably war, but it ought to produce war somewhere. The sore ought to run. It is not susceptible to being healed except by remedying the injustice. Therefore, I for my part wouldn't want to see a peace which was based upon compelling any people, great or small, to live under conditions which it didn't willingly accept. 

 If I were just a sheer Machiavelli and didn't have any heart but had brains, I would say: "If you mean what you say and are fighting for permanent peace, then there is only one way to get it, whether you like justice or not. " It is the only conceivable intellectual basis for it, because this is not like the time, years ago, of the Congress of Vienna. Peoples were then not willing, but so speechless and unorganized and without the means of self-expression, that the governments could sit on their necks indefinitely. They didn't know how to prevent it. But they are wide awake now and nobody is going to sit comfortably on the neck of any people, big or little, and the more uncomfortable he is who tries it, the more I am personally pleased. So that I am in the position in my mind of trying to work out a purely scientific proposition: "What will stay put?"

 A peace is not going to be permanent until that principle is accepted by everybody, that, given a political unit, every people has the right to determine its own life. That, gentlemen, is all I have to say to you, but it is the real inside of my mind, and it is the real key to the present foreign policy of the United States which for the time being is in my keeping. I hope it will be useful to you, as it is welcome to me to have this occasion of telling you what I really think and what I understand we are really doing. 

CHAPTER XXXI

THE PEN IS MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD

During this time the President was constantly on guard at the Executiveoffices, never for a moment out of touch with the situation. He was theintimate associate of the men who were his co-labourers on the variousboards that had been set up to prosecute the work of the war. He seemed toknow what was going on in every phase. His evenings were given toexamination of the long dispatches that came from diplomatic and consularrepresentatives of America at the various capitals of Europe, apprisinghim of the developments of the great war. 

One of the most effective measures for weakening the enemy was the methodof attacking the Central Powers from within by propaganda designed toincite the masses to rebellion and to drive wedges between Germany andAustria. As George Creel says, "The projectile force of the President'sidealism, its full military value may be measured by the fact that betweenApril 6 and December 8, 1917, sixteen States, great and small, declaredwar against Germany, or severed diplomatic relations with her. From thevery first the Allies accepted the President as their spokesman. " It wasunder the influence of Woodrow Wilson's clear vision and magic power ofstatement that the true significance of the war became clear. At first ithad seemed a war of nations, and the belligerents had eagerly publishedofficial documents, Red Books, White Books, Yellow Books, and so forth, through all the colours of the spectrum, to show who had "started thewar. " The question of who began it became after a while quite secondary tothe question of the fundamental principles at stake in the contest whichwas no longer a national conflict, but a world war, waged to the deathbetween two irreconcilable views of the relationship of government toindividuals, the autocratic view on the one hand, on the other thedemocratic. It was one man who brought the fundamental principle of thedivision into the clear light. A contemporary writer has said that themagical effect of Woodrow Wilson's utterances on all the Allies was due, not to his rhetoric but to his sublime gift of seeing and stating aprofound truth after which others had been only groping. That is theprophet's power, to voice the latent, inarticulate aspirations of themultitude. Proof of the value of the President's method of attacking theCentral Powers from within by propaganda was disclosed in GeneralLudendorff's and Von Tirpitz's revelations. In Ludendorff's opinion, thePresident's note to Germany had forced the Central Empires to yield to thePresident. Ludendorff says:

 In his answer to our second note, Wilson gave us nothing; he did not even tell us whether the Entente took its stand on the Fourteen Points. He demanded, however, the suspension of the submarine campaign, stigmatized our conduct of the war in the west as a violation of international law, and once again sought to meddle with intimate questions of our domestic politics. 

Speaking again of the answer to one of the Wilson notes, Ludendorff says:

 The answer to Wilson was dispatched on the 20th of October. The submarine campaign was abandoned. This concession to Wilson was the deepest blow to the army, and especially to the navy. The injury to the morale of the fleet must have been immeasurable. The Cabinet had thrown up the sponge. 

On October 23rd, President Wilson sent the following peremptory message tothe Germans:

 It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the purpose of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is still unimpaired. If the United States must deal with the military masters and monarchical authorities now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid. 

In discussing this and the other Wilson notes, Ludendorff says that theyhad dealt a vital blow at the heart of militaristic Germans and finallyloosed the grip they held on the German people. This entire situation isbest expressed in Ludendorff's own words:

 On October 23rd or 24th Wilson's answer arrived. It was a strong answer to our cowardly note. This time he had made it quite clear that the armistice conditions must be such as to make it impossible for Germany to resume hostilities, and to give the powers allied against her unlimited power to settle themselves the details of the peace accepted by Germany. In my view, there could no longer be doubt in any mind that we must continue the fight. I felt quite confident that the people were still to be won over to this course. 

 On the evening of the 24th, shortly after leaving Spa for Berlin, there was brought to me the following proclamation already signed by the Field Marshal, which expressed the views prevailing at G. H. Q. On the third Wilson note. It appeared essential that G. H. Q. In its dealings with Berlin should take up a definite stand to the note in order to eliminate its ill effects on the army. The telegram to the Army ran thus:

 "For the information of all troops: Wilson says in his answer that he is ready to propose to his allies that they should enter into armistice negotiations; but that the armistice must render Germany so defenseless that she cannot take up arms again. He will only negotiate with Germany for peace if she concedes all the demands of America's associates as to the internal constitutional arrangements of Germany; otherwise, there is no choice but unconditional surrender. 

 "_Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. _ It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers. It proves that our enemies' desire for our destruction, which let loose the war in 1914, still exists undiminished. It proves, further, that our enemies use the phrase 'peace of justice' merely to deceive us and break our resistance. Wilson's answer can thus be nothing for us soldiers but a challenge to continue our resistance with all our strength. 

 "When our enemies know that no sacrifices will achieve the rupture of the German front, then they will be ready for a peace which will make the future of our country safe for the broad masses of our people. 

 "At the front, October 24th, 10 P. M. "

This proclamation which was signed by Field Marshal Von Hindenburg waslater signed by Ludendorff. It resulted in the Kaiser's immediate ordersfor a special conference at which both of these officials were dismissedfrom the Imperial German army. 

Von Tirpitz in his Memoirs laid stress on the effect of the Wilsonsubmarine notes. Ludendorff declares in his book that the "Wilsonpropaganda" that found root in Berlin and finally grew there eventuallyconvinced the German people that it was not they themselves, but theGovernment and militarism that the United States was warring against. _This was the seed of dissension that ruined German morale at home. _

_Tirpitz declared that the beginning of the end came when in answer to thePresident's_ Sussex _note, "We showed the world that we were going downbefore America. "_

Probably the most enlightening chapter of either book is that containingTirpitz's contention that the influence of the Wilson submarine notesresulted in Japan's stronger and more active alliance with the Allies. Inthis connection Von Tirpitz says:

 Only the transmitting to Germany of the threatening notes of President Wilson, when he inveighed against my submarine campaign during the latter stages of the war, prevented Japan from coming to us in a great Germano-Japanese alliance, which would have ended the war at once. 

The overtures of the Pope, in August, 1917, were rejected and again theattention of the world was arrested by the masterly leadership of theAmerican President. On August 16, 1917, I addressed the following letterto the President with reference to the offers of peace made by HisHoliness Pope Benedict XV:

 The White House, Washington, 16 August, 1917. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I do not believe that the proposals the Pope has submitted should lead us into a statement as to the terms of peace beyond that which the President has already given expression to in his address in the Senate and in his Russian note. In these two documents are discussed the fundamentals of international peace. Some of these fundamentals the Pope recognizes in his statement to the belligerents. To go beyond a discussion of these now might lead to a conflict of opinion even among our own allies (for instance, France hopes for the return of Alsace Lorraine; Russia, for Constantinople, etc. ). 

 When the President said in his address of April second, last, that we were not making war on the German people, I believe he set the stage for the abdication of the Kaiser. And I think our whole note in reply to the Pope should be so framed that this idea would always be kept in the forefront of our discussion so as to bring home to the people of Germany the distrust and utter contempt in which the ruling powers of Germany are held by the peoples of the world. 

 Our note in reply to the Pope should, I believe, embody the following ideas:

 "First--More important now than the terms of peace are the spirit and character of the nations who wish to end the war. 

 "Second--How can any international agreement to bring an end to the conflict be discussed until those who brought it about can be made to realize the inviolability of treaty obligations?

 "Third--Attack the good faith of the ruling powers of Germany, calling attention to the fact that Germany brought on the war; that Germany invaded Belgium; that Germany ravished France, sank the _Lusitania_, ravished the women and children of the conquered territories; that Germany decreed submarine warfare, and 'erected barbarism into a religion. 

 "Fourth--And the democratic nations of the world are asked to confide their future and the future of the world to a nation that believes that force of arms should be substituted for the moral force of right. In other words, the ruling powers of Germany must purge themselves of contempt before they shall be given the hearing that the Pope feels they are entitled to. "

 This form of reply will, I am sure, rouse the people of Germany to a realization of the situation which confronts them, for there is abundant evidence that they are gradually arriving at the conclusion that the Kaiser no longer represents them or their ideals. 

 In other words, what I should like to see the President do is not to discuss in extenso our terms of peace but rather confine himself to a general attack upon the lack of good faith on the part of Germany in all of her dealings with us. 

 TUMULTY. 

On August 27, 1917, the President, through, his Secretary of State, addressed the following reply to the Pope:

 TO HIS HOLINESS BENEDICTUS XV, POPE:

 In acknowledgment of the communication of Your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

 Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires: it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it. 

 His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the _status quo ante bellum_, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved. 

 It is manifest that no part of this programme can be carried out successfully unless the restitution of the _status quo ante_ furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long- cherished principles of international action and honour; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood--not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose: but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling. 

 To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the newborn Russia to intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

 Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or, embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people who have themselves suffered all things in this war which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments --the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination. 

 The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied. 

 The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people--rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind. 

 We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranty of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guaranties treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace. 

 ROBERT LANSING, Secretary of State of the United States. 

CHAPTER XXXII

COLONEL ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL WOOD

It will be recalled that early in the war Colonel Roosevelt called at theWhite House to confer with the President regarding his desire to lead abrigade to the other side. I recall distinctly every fact of that meeting. I was seated a few feet away in the Red Room of the White House at thetime these two men were conferring. Nothing could have been pleasanter ormore agreeable than this meeting. They had not met since they werepolitical opponents in 1912, but prior to that they had had two or threefriendly visits with each other. Mr. Wilson had once lunched with ColonelRoosevelt at Sagamore Hill, and when the Colonel was President, he and hisparty had been luncheon guests of President and Mrs. Wilson of PrincetonUniversity on the occasion of an Army and Navy game played on thePrinceton gridiron. 

They met in the White House in the most friendly fashion, told each otheranecdotes, and seemed to enjoy together what the Colonel was accustomed tocall a "bully time. "

The object of the Colonel's call was discussed without heat or bitterness. The President placed before the Colonel his own ideas regarding Mr. Roosevelt's desire to serve, and the attitude of the General Staff towardthe volunteer system, a system that would have to be recognized if theColonel's ambition was to be realized. As a matter of fact, instead ofbeing moved by any ill will toward the Colonel, the inclination of thePresident was to overrule the recommendation of the General Staff and urgethat the Colonel be granted permission to go over seas. The salutations atthe end of the conference were most friendly and the Colonel, on his wayout, stopped in to see me. He slapped me on the back in the most friendlyway, and said: "By Jove, Tumulty, you are a man after my own heart! Sixchildren, eh? Well now, you get me across and I will put you on my staff, and you may tell Mrs. Tumulty that I will not allow them to place you atany point of danger. "

Some weeks later, I received the following letter from Colonel Roosevelt:

 Oyster Bay, Long Island, N. Y. April 12, 1917. 

 MY DEAR MR. TUMULTY:

 That was a fine speech of Williams. I shall write him and congratulate him. 

 Now, don't forget that it might be a very good thing to have you as one of my commissioned officers at Headquarters. You could do really important work there, and tell Mrs. Tumulty and the six children, that this particular service would probably not be dangerous. Come, sure!

 Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 

 MR. JOSEPH P. TUMULTY, Secretary to the President, Washington, D. C. 

After the Colonel departed, the President in a boyish way said: "Well, andhow did the Colonel impress you?" I told the President of the veryfavourable impression the Colonel had made upon me by his buoyancy, charmof manner, and his great good nature. The President replied by saying:"Yes, he is a great big boy. I was, as formerly, charmed by hispersonality. There is a sweetness about him that is very compelling. Youcan't resist the man. I can easily understand why his followers are sofond of him. "

[Illustration: Colonel Roosevelt sent this letter to Mr. Tumulty shortlyafter his one and only call upon President Wilson at the White House. [Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the letter from Rooseveltquoted above. ]]

It was, therefore, with real pain that the President read the account ofthis interview as contained in John J. Leary's book entitled "Talks withT. R. , " containing many slighting references made by the Colonel to thePresident. It appears that Mr. Leary accompanied the Colonel to the WhiteHouse and immediately upon the conclusion of the conference was therecipient of a confidential statement of the Colonel's impression of thePresident. The account in Mr. Leary's book is as follows:

 I found that, though I had written plainly enough, there was confusion in his [Wilson's] mind as to what I wanted to do. I explained everything to him. He seemed to take it well, but--remember I was talking to Mr. Wilson. 

 * * * * *

 Tumulty, by way of a half joke, said he might go to France with me. I said: 'By Jove, you come right along! I'll have a place for you. ' I would, too, but it wouldn't be the place he thinks. It is possible he might be sent along as sort of a watchdog to keep Mr. Wilson informed as to what was being done. He wouldn't be, though. He'd keep his distance from headquarters except when he was sent for. 

 * * * * *

 He [Wilson] has promised me nothing definitely, but as I have said, if any other man than he talked to me as he did, I would feel assured. If I talked to another man as he talked to me it would mean that that man was going to get permission to fight. But I was talking to Mr. Wilson. His words may mean much, they may mean little. He has, however, left the door open. 

Of course, what ultimately happened is clear to everyone, civilian andsoldier, who pauses a moment to reflect; as plans for the conduct of thewar matured, it became continually clearer that it must be a professionalwar, conducted by professionals with complete authority over subordinates. There could be no experimenting with volunteer commanders, no matter howgreat their valour, how pure their motives, or how eminent their positionsin the nation. To make an exception of Colonel Roosevelt would have beento strike at the heart of the whole design. Military experts and themajority of Congressional opinion were at one in this matter, thoughCongress put upon the President the responsibility of making the finaldecision, together with whatever obloquy this would entail. It was purelyas a step in the interest of waging the war with greatest effectivenessthat the President announced the decision adverse to the Colonel's wishes. Personally it would have been pleasanter for the President to grant theColonel's request, but President Wilson has never adopted "the easiestway. "

A great deal of criticism was heaped upon the President for what appearedto the outside as his refusal to send General Leonard Wood to France. Although a fierce storm of criticism beat upon him, the Presidentdisplayed no resentment, nor, indeed, did he seem to notice what hiscritics were saying. 

As a matter of fact, the President played no part in the movement to keepGeneral Wood from realizing his ambition to lead his division to France. Mr. George Creel in his book, "The War, The World and Wilson, " hassuccinctly summarized this incident; has told how the name of General Wooddid not appear in any of the lists of officers received from GeneralPershing; how the President took this as a plain indication that GeneralPershing did not desire General Wood in France (the absence of so eminenta name from the lists was certainly not an oversight 011 the part of theCommanding General in France); how President Wilson was determined tosupport General Pershing in every detail so long as General Pershing inthe President's opinion was meeting the requirements of the greatresponsibility laid upon him; how the President was insistent that GeneralPershing should not be embarrassed by political considerations of any kindin the discharge of his great military duty; how the unfortunate featureof the whole matter was that the recall of General Wood did not come until"after he had taken his brigade to New York preparatory to sailing for theother side"; how "General March treated the circumstance as one ofmilitary routine entirely, utterly failing to realize its politicalimportance"; how "instead of informing General Wood at once that he hadnot been chosen to go to France, General March followed the establishedprocedure and waited for the completion of the training period beforeissuing orders to the division commanders"; how "General Wood left CampFunston in advance of his division and without waiting to receive hisorders"; how General March sent these orders to New York; how "inconsequence there was an appearance of eleventh-hour action, an effect ofjerking General Wood from the very deck of the transport"; how "GeneralWood carried his complaint to the President and was told plainly that thelist would not be revised in the personal interest of any soldier orpolitician. "

I discussed the matter with General Wood immediately upon the conclusionof his conference with the President. Walking into my office after hisinterview, the General informed me that his talk with the President wasmost agreeable and satisfactory and that he was certain, although thePresident did not intimate it to him, that the reason for his being heldin America could not be attributed to the President. Turning to me, theGeneral said: "I know who is responsible for this. It is that manPershing. " I assured the General that there was nothing in the President'sattitude toward him that was in the least degree unfriendly, and remindedhim how the President had retained him as Chief of Staff when he assumedoffice in 1913. The General, very much to my surprise, intimated that backof Pershing's attitude toward him was political consideration. I tried toreassure him and, indeed, I resented this characterization of GeneralPershing as an unjust and unwarranted imputation upon the Commander of theAmerican Expeditionary Forces. 

I myself felt that General Wood was being unfairly treated, although I didnot admit this to him in our interview. I took the liberty of saying thisto the President over the telephone from my house that evening. I tried toconvince the President that there was a feeling rapidly spreadingthroughout the country that Wood was being unfairly treated and that itwas not just that the Administration, which I knew was blameless in thematter, should be compelled to bear the responsibility of the whole thingand pay what I was certain would be a great price in the loss of popularesteem. 

The President in his reply to my statement showed irritation at what Isaid in General Wood's behalf, and used very emphatic language inconveying to me the idea that he would not interfere in having the list, upon which General Wood's name appeared, revised. I urged that if GeneralWood was not to be sent to France, he should be given a chance to go toItaly. Our conversation over the telephone in reference to the Wood matterwas as follows: "I trust, Governor, that you can see your way clear tosend General Wood either to France or to Italy. "

Without a moment's hesitation, the President said: "I am sorry, but itcannot be done. "

Whereupon, I said: "It is not fair that the Administration should becarrying the burden of this whole affair. If General Pershing or theGeneral Staff is responsible for holding General Wood in this country, surely they have good reason, and the public ought to be apprised of it, and thus remove the suspicion that we are playing politics. "

The President quickly interrupted me and said: "I am not at all interestedin any squabble or quarrel between General Pershing and General Wood. Theonly thing I am interested in is winning this war. I selected GeneralPershing for this task and I intend to back him up in every recommendationhe makes. "

When I tried to emphasize the feeling of dissatisfaction throughout thecountry over the Wood incident, he replied that the responsibility ofwinning the war was upon General Pershing and himself and not upon thecritics who thought that General Wood was being badly treated. I thensaid: "But it is not fair to you to have it said that by reason of somefeeling that you may have against Wood you are keeping him on this side. "

The President replied: "I am sorry, but I do not care a damn for thecriticism of the country. It would not be fair to Pershing if I tried toescape what appears to be my responsibility. I do not intend to embarrassGeneral Pershing by forcing his hand. If Pershing does not make good, Iwill recall him, but it must not be said that I have failed to support himat every turn. "

His attitude toward Wood and Roosevelt was consistently maintained, insupporting the General Staff and the War Department throughout the war. The only thing that seemed to interest him was how quickly and effectivelyto do the job and to find the man who could do it. 

CHAPTER XXXIII

WILSON, THE WARRIOR

The President had but one object: to throw all the nation's energy intothe scale for the defeat of Germany. Because he did not bluster and voicedaily hymns of hate against Germany, he was singularly misunderstood bysome of his fellow-citizens, who, in their own boiling anger against theenemy, would sometimes peevishly inquire: "Does he really hate Germany?"The President was too much occupied with deeds to waste time in word-vapouring. By every honourable means he had sought to avoid the issue, buta truculent and fatuous foe had made war necessary, and into that war thepeace-loving President went with the grim resolution of an iron warrior. In his attitude before and during the war his motto might have been thefamiliar words of Polonius:

 Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but being in, Bear't, that the opposed may beware of thee. 

Occasionally, as at Baltimore, on April 6, 1918, the public heard from himbrief, ringing speeches of warlike resolution:

 Germany has once more said that force and force alone shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is therefore but one response possible from us. Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish Dominion down in the dust. 

Months after hostilities had ended, there appeared from time to time inthe newspapers, without his or my knowledge of proposed publication, utterances of his to military men during the conflict which showed hiswarrior heart and his extraordinary ability to grasp a technical militaryproblem such as his dispatch to Admiral Sims, his address to the officersof the Atlantic Fleet, and his interview with Marshal Joffre in the WhiteHouse. Perhaps it is not generally known that Mr. Wilson, who hasconstantly read and loved the philosophic poetry of Wordsworth, has alsobeen an intense admirer of Shakespeare's warrior-hero, Henry the Fifth, and has frequently read aloud to friends, with exclamations of admiration, the stirring speeches of Henry in the Shakespearean play. 

The cable message to Admiral Sims is as follows:

 FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ADMIRAL SIMS, American Embassy, London, July 5, 1917. 

 _Strictly confidential_. 

 From the beginning of the war, I have been greatly surprised at the failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's great naval superiority in an effective way. In the presence of the present submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of panic. Every plan we suggest they reject for some reason of prudence. In my view, this is not a time for prudence but for boldness even at the cost of great losses. In most of your dispatches you have quite properly advised us of the sort of aid and cooperation desired from us by the Admiralty. The trouble is that their plans and methods do not seem to us efficacious. I would be very much obliged to you if you would report to me, confidentially, of course, exactly what the Admiralty has been doing, and what they have accomplished, and add to the report your own comments and suggestions, based upon independent thought of the whole situation, without regard to the judgments of any one on that side of the water. The Admiralty was very slow to adopt the protection or convoy and it is not now, I judge [protecting] convoys on adequate scale within the danger zone, seeming to keep small craft with the grand fleet. The absence of craft for convoy is even more apparent on the French coast than on the English coast and in the Channel. I do not see how the necessary military supplies and supplies of food and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in any other way within the next few months than under adequate convoy. There will presently not be ships or tankers enough and our shipbuilding plans may not begin to yield important results in less than eighteen months. I believe that you will keep these instructions absolutely and entirely to yourself, and that you will give me such advice as you would give if you were handling and if you were running a navy of your own. 

 (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. 

For sheer audacity, there is not much that can be compared with hisaddress to the officers of the Atlantic Fleet on August 11, 1917:

 Now, the point that is constantly in my mind, gentlemen, is this: This is an unprecedented war and, therefore, it is a war in one sense for amateurs. Nobody ever before conducted a war like this and therefore nobody can pretend to be a professional in a war like this. Here are two great navies, not to speak of the others associated with us, our own and the British, outnumbering by a very great margin the navy to which we are opposed and yet casting about for a war in which to use our superiority and our strength, because of the novelty of the instruments used, because of the unprecedented character of the war, because, as I said just now, nobody ever before fought a war like this, in the way that this is being fought at sea, or on land either, for that matter. The experienced soldier--experienced in previous wars--is a back number so far as his experience is concerned; not so far as his intelligence is concerned. His experience does not count, because he never fought a war as this is being fought, and therefore he is an amateur along with the rest of us. Now, somebody has got to think this war out. Somebody has got to think out the way not only to fight the submarine, but to do something different from what we are doing. 

 We are hunting hornets all over the farm and letting the nest alone. None of us know how to go to the nest and crush it; and yet I despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when I know where the nest is and know that the nest is breeding hornets as fast as I can find them. I am willing for my part, and I know you are willing because I know the stuff you are made of--I am willing to sacrifice half the navy Great Britain and we together have to crush out that nest, because if we crush it the war is won. I have come here to say that I do not care where it comes from, I do not care whether it comes from the youngest officer or the oldest, but I want the officers of this navy to have the distinction of saying how this war is going to be won. The Secretary of the Navy and I have just been talking over plans for putting the planning machinery of the Navy at the disposal of the brains of the Navy and not stopping to ask what rank those brains have, because, as I have said before and want to repeat, so far as experience in this kind of war is concerned we are all of the same rank. I am not saying that I do not expect the admirals to tell us what to do, but I am saying that I want the youngest and most modest youngster in the service to tell us what we ought to do if he knows what it is. Now I am willing to make any sacrifice for that. I mean any sacrifice of time or anything else. I am ready to put myself at the disposal of any officer in the Navy who thinks he knows how to run this war. I will not undertake to tell you whether he does or not, because I know that I do not, but I will undertake to put him in communication with those who can find out whether his idea will work or not. I have the authority to do that and I will do it with the greatest pleasure. 

 * * * * *

 We have got to throw tradition to the wind. Now, as I have said, gentlemen, I take it for granted that nothing that I say here will be repeated and therefore I am going to say this: Every time we have suggested anything to the British Admiralty the reply has come back that virtually amounted to this, that it had never been done that way, and I felt like saying: "Well, nothing was ever done so systematically as nothing is being done now. " Therefore I should like to see something unusual happen, something that was never done before; and inasmuch as the things that are being done to you were never done before, don't you think it is worth while to try something that was never done before against those who are doing them to you. There is no other way to win, and the whole principle of this war is the kind of thing that ought to hearten and stimulate America. America has always boasted that she could find men to do anything. She is the prize amateur nation of the world. Germany is the prize professional nation of the world. Now when it comes to doing new things and doing them well, I will back the amateur against the professional every time, because the professional does it out of the book and the amateur does it with his eyes open upon a new world and with a new set of circumstances. He knows so little about it that he is fool enough to try to do the right thing. The men that do not know the danger are the rashest men, and I have several times ventured to make this suggestion to the men about me in both arms of the service. Please leave out of your vocabulary altogether the word "prudent. " Do not stop to think about what is prudent for a moment. Do the thing that is audacious to the utmost point of risk and daring, because that is exactly the thing that the other side does not understand, and you will win by the audacity of method when you cannot win by circumspection and prudence. I think that there are willing ears to hear this in the American Navy and the American Army because that is the kind of folk we are. We get tired of the old ways and covet the new ones. 

 So, gentlemen, besides coming down here to give you my personal greeting and to say how absolutely I rely on you and believe in you, I have come down here to say also that I depend on you, depend on you for brains as well as training and courage and discipline. 

When Marshal Joffre visited the President in the spring of 1917, he wassurprised, as he afterward said to Secretary Daniels, "to find thatPresident Wilson had such a perfect mastery of the military situation. Hehad expected to meet a scholar, a statesman, and an idealist; he had notexpected to meet a practical strategist fully conversant with all themilitary movements. 

"In answer to my question as to whether it would be feasible to send inadvance of his army the general who was to command American troops inFrance, the President said at once that it could be arranged. "

The President and Marshal Joffre considered together a number of technicalmilitary problems. General Joffre gave the President his expert opinion asto what should be done in every instance and was surprised at thepromptness with which in each case the President said: "It shall be done. "

A little incident at the White House at the luncheon given by thePresident to the members of the Democratic National Committee throws lightupon the fighting qualities of the man. He asked Mr. Angus W. McLean, awarm and devoted friend from North Carolina, who was seated near him atthe table, what the Scots down in North Carolina were saying about thewar. Mr. McLean replied he could best answer the question by repeatingwhat a friend of the President's father and an ardent admirer of thePresident had said about the President's attitude a few days previous. "Iam afraid our President is not a true Scot, he doesn't show the fightingspirit characteristic of the Scots. " The President promptly replied: "Youtell our Scotch friend, McLean, that he does not accurately interpret thereal Scottish character. If he did, he would understand my attitude. TheScotsman is slow to begin to fight but when once he begins he never knowswhen to quit. "

Two capital policies which contributed enormously to the winning of thewar received their impulse from Woodrow Wilson--the unification of commandof the Allied armies on the western front and the attack of submarines attheir base in the North Sea. On November 18, 1918, Colonel House let it beknown in London that he had received a cable from President Wilson statingemphatically that the United States Government considered unity of planand control between the Allies and the United States to be essential inorder to win the war and achieve a just and lasting peace. 

It was Woodrow Wilson, a civilian, who advised, urged, and insisted that amine barrage be laid across the North Sea to check German submarineactivities at their source. Naval experts pronounced the plan impossible:it would take too long to lay the barrage, and, when laid, it would nothold. A great storm would sweep it away. But the President insisted thatthe thing could be done, and that nothing else could check the submarinedevastation amounting by July, 1917, to 600, 000 tons a month of destroyedshipping. The President's audacity and persistence prevailed, and it isnot too much to say that his plan ended the submarine menace. 

It will be recalled that European newspapers carried a story of a farewellreception to Mr. Bonar Law, in which he paid his compliments to his chief, Mr. Lloyd George, saying, in substance, that he had seen Lloyd Georgediscouraged only once. It was on the morning when the news came of thegreat German offensive in March, 1918. Mr. Lloyd George told Mr. Bonar Lawthat morning that only a vast increase in American reinforcements couldsave the Allies. A cable was immediately framed, asking Mr. Wilson to sendthe number of reinforcements necessary. Mr. Bonar Law stated in his speechthat an affirmative answer was received from Mr. Wilson the same day. 

A prominent Englishman, discussing the President's work in connection withthe war, while criticizing what he characterized as the President'signorance of European conditions, said: "I feel ashamed to be criticizingPresident Wilson for anything when I remember his practical services inprosecuting the war. No other man in any country gave such firm andinstant support to every measure for making operations effective. Hisdecisions were fearless and prompt and he stood by them like a rock. Insending troops promptly and in sending plenty of them, in cooperating inthe naval effort, in insisting on the unity of command under Foch, inbacking the high command in the field, and in every other practical detailMr. Wilson had big, clear conceptions and the courage to carry them out. "

Those who were critical of the President's conduct of the war forget theringing statement that came from Lloyd George when the great offensive wason, when he said: "The race is now between Von Hindenburg and Wilson. " AndWilson won. 

The most important speech made by the President during the war wasdelivered at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, on September 27, 1918, opening the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan. 

I recall a talk the President had with me on the way to New York on theafternoon of the delivery of this speech when he requested me to read themanuscript. As he gave it to me he said: "They [meaning the Allies] willnot like this speech, for there are many things in it which will displeasethe Imperialists of Great Britain, France, and Italy. The world must beconvinced that we are playing no favourites and that America has her ownplan for a world settlement, a plan which does not contain the germs ofanother war. What I greatly fear, now that the end seems inevitable, isthat we shall go back to the old days of alliances and competing armamentsand land grabbing. We must see to it, therefore, that there is not anotherAlsace-Lorraine, and that when peace finally comes, it shall be apermanent and a lasting peace. We must now serve notice on everybody thatour aims and purposes are not selfish. In order to do this and to make theright impressions, we must be brutally frank with friends and foes alike. "

As we discussed the subject matter of this momentous speech, I gatheredfrom the President's statements to me that he clearly foresaw the end ofthe war and of the possible proposal for a settlement that might be madeby the Allies. Therefore, he felt it incumbent upon him frankly to discussAmerica's view of what a just and lasting settlement should be. As oneexamines this speech to-day, away from the excitement of that criticalhour in which it was delivered, he can easily find in it statements andutterances that must have caused sharp irritation in certain chancelleriesof Europe. In nearly every line of it there was a challenge to EuropeanImperialism to come out in the open and avow its purposes as to peace. Many of the Allied leaders had been addressing their people on the matterof peace; now they were being challenged by an American president to placetheir cards face up on the table. An examination of the speech, in thelight of subsequent events, reëmphasizes the President's pre-vision:

 At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual states. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course. 

 The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

 Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

 Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

 Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

 Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

 Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

 No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They _are_ issues of it; and they must be settled--by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. 

 That is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with. 

 * * * * *

 As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be wilfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as time and circumstance have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline. 

 And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purposes of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken. 

 I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they were seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms--only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded. 

 But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get someone to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary as was unity of command in the battlefield, and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed for ever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing. 

When I had read the speech, I turned to the President and said: "Thisspeech will bring Germany to terms and will convince her that we play nofavourites and will compel the Allies openly to avow the terms upon whichthey will expect a war settlement to be reached. In my opinion, it meansthe end of the war. " The President was surprised at the emphasis I laidupon the speech, but he was more surprised when I ventured the opinionthat he would be in Paris within six months discussing the terms of thetreaty. The Washington _Post_, a critic of the President, characterizedthis speech, in an editorial on September 29, 1918, as "a marvellousintellectual performance, and a still more marvellous exhibition of moralcourage. "

CHAPTER XXXIV

GERMANY CAPITULATES

Germany had begun to weaken, and suddenly aware of the catastrophe thatlay just ahead, changed her chancellor, and called upon the President foran armistice upon the basis of the Fourteen Points. The explanation ofGermany's attitude in this matter was simply that she knew she was beatenand she recognized that Wilson was the only hope of a reasonable peacefrom the Berlin point of view. Germany professed to be a liberal and wasasking Wilson for the "benefit of clergy. "

On the 6th day of October, 1918, the following note from Prince Max ofBaden was delivered to the President by the Secretary of State:

 The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the programme laid down by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed, the German Government requests the President of the United States of America to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air. 

 (Signed) MAX, Prince Of Baden, Imperial Chancellor. 

The President was not surprised when the offer of peace came for on allsides there was abundant evidence of the decline of Germany and of theweakening of her morale. The President felt that Germany, being desperate, it would be possible for him, when she proposed a settlement, like thatproposed by Prince Max, to dictate our own terms, and to insist thatAmerica would have nothing to do with any settlement in which the Kaiseror his brood should play a leading part. I stated to him that the basis ofour attitude toward Germany should be an insistence, in line with hisspeech of September 27, 1918, wherein he said:

 We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they were without honour and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot come to terms with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement. 

At the time of the receipt of Prince Max's note by the State Department, on October 5, 1918, the President was in New York, staying at the Waldorf-Astoria, preparatory to attending a concert given by the Royal ItalianGrenadiers. A message from the Army Intelligence Department, conveyed tome by General Churchill, at the Knickerbocker Hotel, in New York, where Iwas staying, was the first word we had of Germany's desire for anarmistice. General Churchill read me the German proposal over the 'phoneand I carried it to the President, who was in conference with ColonelHouse at the Waldorf. The offer of Germany was so frank and unequivocal inseeming to meet the terms of the President's formal proposals of peace, that when Colonel House read it to the President, he turned and said:"This means the end of the war. " When I was interrogated as to my opinion, I replied that, while the German offer of peace seemed to be genuine, inmy opinion no offer from Germany could be considered that bore theHohenzollern-Hapsburg brand. For a moment this seemed to irritate thePresident, and he said: "But, at least, we are bound to consider in themost serious way any offer of Germany which is practically an acceptanceof my proposals of peace. " There our first discussion regarding the Germanpeace offer ended. 

At the conclusion of this talk I was invited to take dinner with thePresident and Colonel House and with the members of the President'sfamily, but the matter of the note which we had just received weighed soheavily upon me that my digestive apparatus was not in good working order, and yet the President was seemingly unmindful of it, and refused to permitthe evening to be interfered with because of the note, attending theconcert and apparently enjoying every minute of the evening, andapplauding the speeches that were made by the gentlemen who addressed us. 

After the concert began, I left the Presidential box and, following ahabit I had acquired since coming to the Executive offices, I conferredwith the newspaper men in our party, endeavouring to obtain from them, without expressing any personal opinion of my own, just how they felttoward the terms proposed in the Max note. I then called up the StateDepartment and discussed the note with Mr. Polk, expressing the sameopinion to him that I had already expressed to the President, to theeffect that we could not accept a German offer which came to us under theauspices of the Hohenzollerns. Upon the conclusion of the concert, we leftthe Metropolitan Opera House, I accompanying the President to the Waldorf. As I took my place in the automobile, the President leaned over to Mrs. Wilson and whispered to her the news of the receipt of the German note. Then, turning to me, he said: "Have you had any new reaction on the notesince I last talked with you?" I told him I had not, but that what I hadlearned since talking with him earlier in the evening had only confirmedme in the opinion that I had already expressed, that it would not be rightor safe for us to accept the German proposals. When we arrived at theWaldorf it was 12:30 A. M. And the President asked me to his rooms, andthere, for an hour and a half, we indulged in a long discussion of theGerman offer. As was usual with the President in all these importantmatters, his mind was, to use his own phrase, "open and to let. "

I emphasized the idea that we could not consider a peace proposal in whichthe Kaiser and his brood played a part, and that the only proffer we couldconsider must come from the German people themselves; that in his Mexicanpolicy he had proclaimed the doctrine that no ruler who came to power bymurder or assassination would ever receive the recognition of the UnitedStates; that we must broaden the morality which underlay this policy, andby our attitude say to the European rulers who started this war, thatguilt is personal and that until they had purged themselves from theresponsibility of war, we could not consider any terms of peace that camethrough them. 

The next day the President left for Cleveland Dodge's home on the Hudson, with Colonel House and Doctor Grayson. I remained in New York at theKnickerbocker Hotel, busily engaged in poring over the newspaper files tofind out what the editorial attitude of the country was toward the Germanproposal of peace, and in preparing a brief on the whole matter for thePresident's consideration. Before Colonel House left, I again impressedupon him my view of the note and my conviction that it would be adisastrous blunder for us to accept it. 

The President returned to Washington in the early afternoon, Colonel Houseaccompanying him. I was eager and anxious to have another talk with himand was given an opportunity while in the President's compartment in thetrain on our way back to Washington. As I walked into the compartment, thePresident was conferring with Colonel House, and as I took a seat, thePresident asked me if I still felt that the German proposal should berejected. I replied, that, if anything, I was stronger in the judgment Ihad already expressed. He said: "But it is not an easy matter to turn awayfrom an offer like this. There is no doubt that the form of it may be opento objection, but substantially it represents the wishes of the Germanpeople, even though the medium through which it may be conveyed is anodious and hateful one, but I must make up my own mind on this and I mustnot be held off from an acceptance by any feeling of criticism that maycome my way. The gentlemen in the Army who talk about going to Berlin andtaking it by force are foolish. It would cost a million American lives toaccomplish it, and what lies in my thoughts now is this: If we can acceptthis offer, the war will be at an end, for Germany cannot begin a new one, and thus we would save a great deal of bloodshed. "

I remember, as I pointed out to him the disappointment of the people werehe to accept the German offer, he said: "If I think it is right to acceptit, I shall do so regardless of consequences. As for myself, I can go downin a cyclone cellar and write poetry the rest of my days, if necessary. "He called my attention to the fact that John Jay, who negotiated thefamous treaty with Great Britain, was burned in effigy and AlexanderHamilton was stoned while defending the Jay Treaty on the steps of theTreasury Building in New York City. I pointed out to him that there was nocomparison between the two situations; that our case was already made upand that to retreat now and accept this proposal would be to leave intactthe hateful dynasty that had brought on the war. 

As was his custom and habit, he was considering all the facts and everyviewpoint before he finally took the inevitable step. 

Never before was the bigness of the President shown better than in thisdiscussion; never was he more open-minded or more anxious to obtain allthe facts in the grave situation with which he was called upon to deal. Inthe action upon which his mind was now at work he was not thinking ofhimself or of its effect upon his own political fortunes. All through thediscussion one could easily see the passionate desire of the man to bringthis bloody thing of war honourably to an end. 

Mr. Edward N. Hurley furnishes me with a characteristic anecdote connectedwith a session of the War Conference Board, which Mr. Hurley calls "one ofthe most historic conferences ever held at the White House. "

"The question, " says Mr. Hurley, "was whether the President would bejustified in agreeing to an armistice. Many people throughout the countrywere demanding an insistence upon unconditional surrender. Very littlenews was coming from abroad. " Mr. Hurley says that the President met theConference Board with the statement: "Gentlemen, I should like to get anexpression from each man as to what he thinks we should or should not doregarding an unconditional surrender or an armistice. " Mr. Hurley saysthat "every man at the meeting except one was in favour of an armistice. "After the President had ascertained the opinpn of each he said in a quietway: "I have drawn up a tentative note to Germany which I should like tosubmit for your approval. " After the paper had been passed Around onemember of the Board said: "Mr. President, I think it would be betterpolitics if you were to change this paragraph"--indicating a particularparagraph in the document. The President replied, in what Mr. Hurley calls"a slow and deliberate manner": "I am not dealing in politics, I amdealing in human lives. "

While the President was engaged in conference with Colonel House, Iaddressed a letter to him, as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 October 8, 1918. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I do not know what your attitude is toward the late German and Austrian offers. The record you have made up to this time, however, is so plain that in my judgment there can be only one answer and that is an absolute and unqualified rejection of these proposals. 

 There is no safer counsellor in the country than the Springfield _Republican_. Speaking of the peace programme of the new German Chancellor, the _Republican_ says:

 "It [referring to the offer of Prince Max] does not meet the minimum requirements for the opening of negotiations. These have been variously stated, but in general may be reduced to restitution, reparation and guarantees. Under none of these heads has Germany yet come even measurably near meeting the plain requirements of the Allies, which have not been reduced in defeat and will not be increased with victory. Take, for example, the question of Belgium, now that Germany knows it cannot be kept, it makes a merit of giving it up, but beyond that Prince Maximilian is not authorized more than to say that 'an effort shall also be made to reach an understanding on the question of indemnity'. .. . What is needed first of all from Germany is a clear, specific and binding pledge in regard to the essential preliminaries. It does not advance matters an inch for the Chancellor, like Baron Burian, to offer to take President Wilson's points as a 'basis' for negotiations, They will make a first-rate basis, but only when Germany has offered definite preliminary guarantees. "

 I beg to call your attention to another editorial in the Springfield _Republican_, entitled "Why Germany Must Surrender, " hereto attached. 

 Speaking of Germany's promises, I mention still another editorial from the Springfield _Republican_ which concludes by saying, "Even Mr. Wilson is not so simple-minded as the Kaiser may once have thought him to be. "

 It is the hand of Prussianism which offers this peace to America. As long ago as last June you exposed the hollowness of peace offered under such conditions as are now set forth by the German Chancellor. Referring to the German Government, you said: "It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand. "

 In your speech of September 27th, you said:

 "We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they were without honour and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest We cannot 'come to terms' with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement. " Certainly, the German people are not speaking through the German Chancellor. It is the Kaiser himself. He foresees the end and will not admit it. He is still able to dictate conditions, for, in the statement which appeared in the papers yesterday, he said: "It will only be an honourable peace for which we extend our hand. "

 The other day you said: "We cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. " If this were true then, how can we accept this offer now? Certainly nothing has happened since that speech that has changed the character of those in authority in Germany. Defeat has not chastened Germany in the least. The tale of their retreat is still a tale of savagery, for they have devastated the country and carried off the inhabitants; burned churches, looted homes, wreaking upon the advancing Allies every form of vengeance that cruelty can suggest. 

 In my opinion, your acceptance of this offer will be disastrous, for the Central Powers have made its acceptance impossible by their faithlessness. 

 TUMULTY. 

While the President was conferring with Secretaries Lansing, Daniels, Baker, and Colonel House, I addressed the following letter to PresidentWilson and a practically identic letter to Colonel House:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 7 October, 1918. 

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 Since I returned, every bit of information that comes to me is along one line and that is, that an agreement in which the Kaiser is to play the smallest part will be looked upon with grave suspicion and I believe its results will be disastrous. In my opinion, it will result in the election of a Republican House and the weakening, if not impairing of your influence throughout the world. I am not on the inside and so I do not know, but I am certain that Lloyd George and Clemenceau will take full advantage of this opportunity in declaring that, so far as they are concerned, they are not going to sit down at the Council Table with William the Second, and you may be put in a position before the world, by your acceptance of these conditions, of seeming to be sympathetic with the Kaiser and his brood. 

 May not Germany be succeeding in splitting the Allies by this offer, just as Talleyrand succeeded, at the Congress of Vienna, in splitting the allies who had been victorious over Napoleon? You cannot blot out the record you have made in your speeches, which in every word and line showed a distrust of this particular autocracy, with which you are now asked to deal. Have you considered the possibility that as soon as Germany read your New York speech of September 27th, knowing, as they did, that it was neither palatable to the Allies nor in accordance with that which they had hitherto stood for, promptly accepted your attitude as a means of dividing the Entente at a critical moment and robbing her of the benefits of the military triumph? Did not Talleyrand do the very same thing to them, as the representative of defeated France, when he sided with Russia and Prussia as against England and thus made possible the return of Napoleon?

 I realize the great responsibility that rests upon the President. In any other matter, not so vital as this, you could be wrong and time would correct it, but in a thing like this, when you are dealing with a question which goes to the very depths of international action and world progress, you are at the parting of the ways. If you wish to erect a great structure of peace, you must be sure and certain that every brick in it, that every ounce of cement that goes in it is solid and lasting, and above all, you must preserve your prestige for the bigger moments to come. 

 Sincerely, TUMULTY

Upon the conclusion of the conference, I had a talk with Colonel House andSecretaries Daniels, Lansing, and Baker, and again urged the necessity ofa refusal on the part of the President to accept the German peace terms. Secretary Lansing informed me that the President had read my letter to theconference and then said: "We will all be satisfied with the action thePresident takes in this matter. "

While at luncheon that afternoon, the President sent for me to come to theWhite House. I found him in conference with Secretary Lansing, ColonelHouse, and Mr. Polk. The German reply was discussed and I was happy when Ifound that it was a refusal on the part of the President to accept theGerman proposal. 

The gist of the President's reply was a demand from him of evidence of atrue conversion on the part of Germany, and an inquiry on the part of thePresident in these words:

"Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government accepts theFourteen Points?" "Do the military men of Germany agree to withdraw alltheir armies from occupied territories?", and finally: "The Presidentwishes to know whether the Chancellor speaks for the old group who haveconducted the war, or does he speak for the liberated peoples of Germany?"

Commenting upon the receipt of the President's reply to the Germans, AndréTardieu says:

 It is a brief reply which throws the recipients into consternation they cannot conceal. No conversation is possible, declares the President, either on peace or on an armistice until preliminary guarantees shall have been furnished. These are the acceptation pure and simple of the bases of peace laid down on January 8, 1918, and in the President's subsequent addresses; the certainty that the Chancellor does not speak only in the names of the constituted authorities who so far have been responsible for the conduct of the war; the evacuation of all invaded territories. The President will transmit no communication to his associates before having received full satisfaction on these three points. 

What must be the thought of those partisans in America who were crying outagainst the preliminary course of the President in dealing with Germany, who read this paragraph from Tardieu's book as to the impressions made inFrance and Germany by the notes which the President from week to weekaddressed to the Germans with reference to the Armistice?

Again Tardieu says:

 Then comes the thunderbolt. President Wilson refuses to fall into the trap and, crossing swords in earnest, presses his attack to the utmost in the note of October 14. A mixed commission for evacuation? No! These are matters which like the Armistice itself "must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Governments. " Besides no armistice is possible if it does not furnish "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of its allies. " Besides, no armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they still persist in. " Finally, no armistice so long as the German nation shall be in the hands of military power which has disturbed the peace of the world. As to Austria-Hungary, Germany has no interest therein and the President will reply directly. In a single page the whole poor scaffolding of the German Great General Staff is overthrown. The Armistice and peace are not to be the means of delaying a disaster and of preparing revenge. On the main question itself the reply must be Yes or No!

In the books of Ludendorff and Hindenburg we see the shattering effect ofthe President's answer upon the German military mind. Whatevermisunderstanding and misrepresentation of the President's position theremight be in his own country, whatever false rumours spread by party maliceto the effect that he had entered into negotiations with Germany withoutthe knowledge of the Allies and was imposing "soft" terms on Germany toprevent a march to Berlin, the German commanders were under no illusions. They knew that the President meant capitulation and that in his demand hehad the sanction of his European associates. 

Says Ludendorff:

 This time he made it quite clear that the Armistice conditions must be such as to make it impossible for Germany to resume hostilities and to give the powers allied against her unlimited power to settle themselves the details of the peace accepted by Germany. In my view, there could no longer be doubt in any mind that we must continue the fight. 

Said Hindenburg in an order "for the information of all troops, " an ordernever promulgated:

 He [Wilson] will negotiate with Germany for peace only if she concedes all the demands of America's allies as to the internal constitutional arrangements of Germany. .. . Wilson's answer is a demand for unconditional surrender. It is thus unacceptable to us soldiers. 

In André Tardieu's book we read that from October 5th, the day whenGermany first asked for an armistice, President Wilson remained in dailycontact with the European governments, and that the American Governmentwas in favour of writing into the Armistice harsher terms than the Alliesthought it wise to propose to the Germans. It will be recalled that thepopular cry at the time was "On to Berlin!" and an urgent demand upon thepart of the enemies of the President on Capitol Hill that he should standpat for an unconditional surrender from Germany; that there should be nosoft peace or compromise with Germany, and that we should send oursoldiers to Berlin. At the time we discussed this attitude of mind ofcertain men on the Hill, the President said: "How utterly foolish this is!Of course, some of our so-called military leaders, for propaganda purposesonly, are saying that it would be more advantageous for us to decline theoffer of Germany and to go to Berlin. They do not, however, give ourpeople any estimate of the cost in blood and money to consummate thisenterprise. "

The story was also industriously circulated that Marshal Foch wasdemurring to any proposition for a settlement with Germany. 

It appears now that in the negotiations for the Armistice Colonel House, representing the President's point of view in this vital matter, askedthis fundamental question of Foch: "Will you tell us, Marshal, purely froma military point of view and without regard to any other condition, whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or sign the Armistice asoutlined here?" Marshal Foch replied: "The only aim of war is to obtainresults. If the Germans sign an armistice now upon the general lines wehave just determined, we shall have obtained the results we asked. Ouraims being accomplished, no one has the right to shed another drop ofblood. "

It was said at the time that the President was forcing settlement upon themilitary leaders of the Allies. General Foch disposed of this by saying, in answer to a question by Colonel House and Lloyd George: "The conditionslaid down by your military leaders are the very conditions which we oughtto and could impose after the success of our further operations, so thatif the Germans accept them now, it is useless to go on fighting. "

It was all over, and the protagonist of the grand climax of the huge dramawas Woodrow Wilson, the accepted spokesman of the Allies, the Nemesis ofthe Central Powers, who by first isolating them through his moral appealto the neutral world was now standing before them as the stern monitor, demanding that they settle not on their terms, but on his terms, which theAllies had accepted as their terms. 

I shall never forget how happy he looked on the night of the Armisticewhen the throngs surged through Pennsylvania Avenue, in Washington, andhe, unable to remain indoors, had come to the White House gates to lookon, in his face a glow of satisfaction of one who realizes that he hasfought for a principle and won. In his countenance there was an expressionnot so much of triumph as of vindication. 

As a light ending to a heavy matter, I may say here that when theArmistice terms were finally accepted, the President said: "Well, Tumulty, the war's over, and I feel like the Confederate soldier General John B. Gordon used to tell of, soliloquizing on a long, hard march, during theCivil War: 'I love my country and I am fightin' for my country, but ifthis war ever ends, I'll be dad-burned if I ever love another country. '"

CHAPTER XXXV

APPEAL FOR A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS

The President's appeal to the country of October 24, 1918, asking for theelection of a Democratic Congress, brought down upon him a storm ofcriticism and ridicule. Many leading Democrats who had strongly urged anappeal by the President as a necessary and proper thing in the usual warsituation which confronted him, as the criticism directed toward it grewmore bitter, turned away from it and criticized what they said was theineptitude and lack of tact of the President in issuing it. As a matter offact, opinion in the Democratic ranks as to the wisdom and necessity of ageneral appeal was unanimous prior to the issuance of the statement. Whatthe President was seeking to do when he asked the support of the countrythrough the election of a Democratic Congress was to prevent dividedleadership at a moment when the President's undisputed control was anecessity because of the effect a repudiation of his administration wouldwork upon the Central Powers. He realized that the defeat of hisadministration in the midst of the World War would give aid and comfort tothe Central Powers, and that the Allied governments would themselvesinterpret it as a weakening of our war power and while the enemy would bestrengthened, our associates would be distressed and disheartened. 

He looked upon it, therefore, not as a partisan matter but as a matterinvolving the good faith of America. 

At previous elections the White House had been inundated with requestsfrom particular senators and congressmen, urging the President to writeletters in their behalf, and this had resulted in so much embarrassment tothe Chief Executive that as the critical days of the November elections of1918 approached, the President was forced to consider a more general and, if possible, a more diplomatic method of handling this difficultsituation. The gentlemen who criticized the appeal as outrageouslypartisan evidently forgot that for months Will Hays, chairman of theRepublican National Committee, had been busily engaged in visiting variousparts of the country and, with his coadjutors in the Republican NationalCommittee, openly and blatantly demanding an emphatic repudiation of theAdministration from the country. 

The President and I discussed the situation in June, 1918, and I was askedby him to consider and work out what might be thought a tactful, effectiveplan by which the President, without arousing party rancour or bitterness, might make an appeal to the country, asking for its support. I consideredthe matter, and under date of June 18, 1918, I wrote him a letter, part ofwhich was given over to a discussion of the way the matter mightdiscreetly be handled:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 June 18, 1918. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I think the attitude of the leaders of the Republican party, as reflected in the speeches of Will Hays, National Chairman, and Senator Penrose, on Saturday last, will give you the opportunity at the psychological moment to strike and to define the issue in this campaign. I think for the present our policy should be one of silence and even a show of indifference to what the leaders on the other side, Messrs. Hay and Penrose, are saying and doing. This will, no doubt, embolden them to make rash statements and charges and by the time you are ready to make your general appeal, the whole country will realize how necessary it is for you frankly to ask for the reelection of the Democratic Congress. In a speech on Friday night, delivered at Philadelphia, in urging the election of a Republican Congress, Will Hays said: "We will bring the Government back to the limitations and principles of the Constitution in time of peace and establish policies which will again bind up the wounds of war, renew our prosperity, administer the affairs of government with the greatest economy, enlarge our strength at home and abroad, etc. .. . "

 Senator Penrose at the same time urging a Republican Congress said: "Let us keep up an efficient Republican organization in Pennsylvania and all through the United States, and make a successful Republican contest at every opportunity in every congressional district and at the next Presidential election, and endeavour to assure the election of Republican candidates. "

 I think these speeches will give you an opportunity some time in September or October frankly to state just what your attitude is toward the coming campaign, and thus lay before the country what the Republicans hope to gain by bringing about the election of a Republican Congress. I would suggest that some man of distinction in the country write you a letter, calling your attention to partisan speeches of this character, emphasizing the parts I have mentioned, and ask your opinion with reference to the plan of the Republican party to regain power. In other words, we ought to accept these speeches charging incompetency and inefficiency as a challenge, and call the attention of the country to the fact that the leadership of the Republican party is still reactionary and standpat, laying particular emphasis on what the effect in Europe would be of a divided leadership at this time. I think a letter along the lines of the Indiana platform which I suggested a few weeks ago would carry to the country just the impression we ought to make. This letter should be issued, in my opinion, some time in September or October. 

[Illustration:

 In view of the unprecedented record or this Congress, doesn't the President wish to make some statement?

 The Secretary. C. L. S. 

 (Transcriber's note: also contains two manuscript letters. )

Incidents in the daily routine at the White House. ]

While it would seem from a reading of my confidential letter to thePresident that we were engaged in preparing the way for an appeal, we weresimply doing what other administrations had done. 

Some time after this the President communicated with Colonel House, andwhen I next discussed the matter with the President, he informed me thathe and Colonel House had finally agreed that the thing to do was franklyto come out without preliminaries of any kind and boldly ask for theelection of a Democratic Congress. I told him that I thought the method Ihad proposed for bringing him into the discussion was one that would bemost effective and would cause least resentment; but he was firm in hisresolve to follow the course he finally pursued. He was of the opinionthat this was the open and honourable way to ask for what he thought wouldbe a vote of confidence in his administration. 

It has often been stated that in this matter the President had acted uponthe advice of Postmaster General Burleson, and many of those individualsthroughout the country who criticized the President's appeal, pointed anaccusing finger at General Burleson and held him responsible for what theysaid were the evil consequences of this ill-considered action. Simply byway of explanation, it can be truthfully said, in fairness to GeneralBurleson, that he had nothing to do with the appeal and that he had neverbeen consulted about it. 

These facts are now related by me not by way of apology for what thePresident did, for in openly appealing to the country he had manyhonourable precedents, of which the gentlemen who criticized him wereevidently ignorant. As Mr. George Creel, in his book, "The War, the World, and Wilson, " says: "In various elections George Washington pleaded for'united leadership, ' and Lincoln specifically urged upon the people theunwisdom of 'swapping horses in midstream. '"

In a paragraph in Herndon's "Life of Lincoln, " I find the followingappeal:

 He did his duty as President, and rested secure in the belief that he would be reflected whatever might be done for or against him. The importance of retaining Indiana in the column of Republican States was not to be overlooked. How the President viewed it, and how he proposed to secure the vote of the state is shown in the following letter written to General Sherman:

 Executive Mansion, Washington, September 19, 1864. 

 MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN:

 The State election of Indiana occurs on the 11th of October and the loss of it to the friends of the Government would go far toward losing the whole Union cause. The bad effect upon the November election, and especially the giving the State Government to those who will oppose the war in every possible way, are too much to risk if it can be avoided. The draft proceeds, notwithstanding its strong tendency to lose us the State. Indiana is the only important State voting in October whose soldiers cannot vote in the field. Anything you can safely do to let her soldiers or any part of them go home and vote at the State election will be greatly in point. They need not remain for the Presidential election, but may return to you at once. This is in no sense an order, but is merely intended to impress you with the importance to the army itself of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the judge of what you can safely do. 

 Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. 

Mr. Creel shows that the precedents established by Washington and Lincolnwere followed by Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft:

 In a speech delivered at Boone, Iowa, October 11, 1898, President McKinley pleaded for a Republican Congress in these words:

 This is no time for divided councils. If I would have you remember anything I have said in these desultory remarks, it would be to remember at this critical hour in the nation's history we must not be divided. The triumphs of the war are yet to be written in the articles of peace. 

In the same year Theodore Roosevelt, argued for a Republican Congress asfollows:

 Remember that whether you will or not, your votes this year will be viewed by the nations of Europe from one standpoint only. They will draw no fine distinctions. A refusal to sustain the President this year will, in their eyes, be read as a refusal to sustain the war and to sustain the efforts of our peace commission to secure the fruit of war. Such a refusal may not inconceivably bring about a rupture of the peace negotiations. It will give heart to our defeated antagonists; it will make possible the interference of those doubtful neutral nations who in this struggle have wished us ill. 

Ex-President Benjamin Harrison besought the people to "stand behind thePresident, " saying:

 If the word goes forth that the people of the United States are standing solidly behind the President, the task of the peace commissioners will be easy, but if there is a break in the ranks--if the Democrats score a telling victory, if Democratic Senators, Congressmen, and governors are elected--Spain will see in it a gleam of hope, she will take fresh hope, and a renewal of hostilities, more war, may be necessary to secure to us what we have already won. 

When Colonel Roosevelt himself became President, he followed the usualprecedent without even the excuse of a war emergency. In a letter datedAugust 18, 1906, to James E. Watson, he wrote:

 If there were only partisan issues involved in this contest, I should hesitate to say anything publicly in reference thereto. But I do not feel that such is the case. On the contrary, I feel that all good citizens who have the welfare of America at heart should appreciate the immense amount that has been accomplished by the present Congress, organized as it is, and the urgent need of keeping this organization in power. To change the leadership and organization of the House at this time means to bring confusion to those who have been successfully engaged in the steady working out of a great and comprehensive scheme for the betterment of our social, industrial, and civic conditions. Such a change would substitute a purposeless confusion, a violent and hurtful oscillation between the positions of the extreme radical and the extreme reactionary for the present orderly progress along the lines of a carefully thought out policy. 

Is it not clear in the light of the events that followed the repudiationof the President and his administration in 1918 that he was justified byreason of the unusual circumstances of a great world war, in asking for a"team" that would work in cooperation with him? Some of those who mostindignantly criticized him for his partisan appeal attacked him and themeasures which he recommended for the peace of the world with apartisanship without parallel in the history of party politics. Some whomost bitterly condemned what he did gave the most emphatic proof that whathe did was necessary. Nor can they honestly defend themselves by sayingthat their partisan attacks on the treaty were justifiable reprisal. Before he ever made his appeal they were doing all in their power toundermine his influence at home and abroad, and he knew it. The appeal wasno reflection on Republicans as such, nor any minimization of the heroicservice rendered in the war by Republicans and Democrats alike in thefighting and civilian services, but the President knew that Republicansorganized in party opposition in Congress would not assist but obstructthe processes of peace-making under his leadership. And all the world nowknows that his judgment was correct. It will be interesting to read thePresident's appeal to the country, written by him on the typewriter:

 _My Fellow Countrymen:_ The Congressional elections are at hand. They occur in the most critical period our country has ever faced or is likely to face in our time. If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourself unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil, but my power to administer the great trust assigned me by the Constitution would be seriously impaired should your judgment be adverse, and I must frankly tell you so because so many critical issues depend upon your verdict. No scruple of taste must in grim times like these be allowed to stand in the way of speaking the plain truth. 

 I have no thought of suggesting that any political party is paramount in matters of patriotism. I feel too keenly the sacrifices which have been made in this war by all our citizens, irrespective of party affiliations, to harbour such an idea. I mean only that the difficulties and delicacies of our present task are of a sort that makes it imperatively necessary that the nation should give its undivided support to the Government under a unified leadership, and that a Republican Congress would divide the leadership. 

 The leaders of the minority in the present Congress have unquestionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-Administration. At almost every turn, since we entered the war, they have sought to take the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing. This is no time either for divided counsel or for divided leadership. Unity of command is as necessary now in civil action as it is upon the field of battle. If the control of the House and Senate should be taken away from the party now in power, an opposing majority could assume control of legislation and oblige all action to be taken amidst contest and obstruction. 

 The return of a Republican majority to either House of the Congress would, moreover, certainly be interpreted on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership. Spokesmen of the Republican party are urging you to elect a Republican Congress in order to back up and support the President, but even if they should in this way impose upon some credulous voters on this side of the water, they would impose on no one on the other side. It is well understood there as well as here that the Republican leaders desire not so much to support the President as to control him. The peoples of the Allied countries with whom we are associated against Germany are quite familiar with the significance of elections. They would find it very difficult to believe that the voters of the United States had chosen to support their President by electing to the Congress a majority controlled by those who are not in fact in sympathy with the attitude and action of the Administration. 

 I need not tell you, my fellow countrymen, that I am asking your support not for my own sake or for the sake of a political party, but for the sake of the nation itself, in order that its inward unity of purpose may be evident to all the world. In ordinary times I would not feel at liberty to make such an appeal to you. In ordinary times divided counsels can be endured without permanent hurt to the country. But these are not ordinary times. If in these critical days it is your wish to sustain me with undivided minds, I beg that you will say so in a way which it will not be possible to misunderstand either here at home or among our associates on the other side of the sea. I submit my difficulties and my hopes to you. 

[Illustration: The President's appeal for a Democratic Congress, as he wrote it on his typewriter and with his corrections. [Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the first page of theabove-quoted letter. ]]

In an address at the White House to members of the Democratic NationalCommittee, delivered February 28, 1919, which was never published, thePresident expressed his own feelings with reference to the defeat of theDemocratic party at the Congressional elections a few months before. Discussing this defeat, he said:

 Personally, I am not in the least discouraged by the results of the last Congressional election. Any party which carries out through a long series of years a great progressive and constructive programme is sure to bring about a reaction, because while in the main the reforms that we have accomplished have been sound reforms, they have necessarily in the process of being made touched a great many definite interests in a way that distressed them, in a way that was counter to what they deemed their best and legitimate interests. So that there has been a process of adaptation in the process of change. There is nothing apparently to which the human mind is less hospitable than change, and in the business world that is particularly true because if you get in the habit of doing your business a particular way and are compelled to do it in a different way, you think that somebody in Washington does not understand business, and, therefore, there has been a perfectly natural reaction against the changes we have made in the public policies of the United States. In many instances, as in the banking and currency reform, the country is entirely satisfied with the wisdom and permanency of the change, but even there a great many interests have been disappointed and many of their plans have been prevented from being consummated. So that, there is that natural explanation. And then I do not think that we ought to conceal from ourselves the fact that not the whole body of our partisans are as cordial in the support of some of the things that we have done as they ought to be. 

 You know that I heard a gentleman from one of the southern States say to his Senator (this gentleman was himself a member of the State Legislature)--he said to his Senator: "We have the advantage over you because we have no publication corresponding with the _Congressional Record_ and all that is recorded in our state is the vote, and while you have always voted right we know what happened in the meantime because we read the _Congressional Record_. " Now, with regard to a great many of our fellow partisans in Washington, the _Congressional Record_ shows what happened between the beginning of the discussion and the final Vote, and our opponents were very busy in advertising what the _Congressional Record_ disclosed. And to be perfectly plain, there was not in the minds of the country sufficient satisfactory evidence that we had supported some of the great things that they were interested in any better than the other fellows. The voting record was all right and the balance in our favour; but they can show a great many things that discount the final record of the vote. 

 Now, I am in one sense an uncompromising partisan. Either a man must stand by his party or not. Either he has got to play the game or he has got to get out of the game, and I have no more sufferance for such a man than the country has. Not a bit. Some of them got exactly what was coming to them and I haven't any bowels of compassion for them. They did not support the things they pretended to support. And the country knew they didn't, --the country knew that the tone of the cloakroom and the tone of the voting were different tones. Now, I am perfectly willing to say that I think it is wise to judge of party loyalty by the cloakroom, and not by the vote and the cloakroom was not satisfactory. I am not meaning to imply that there was any kind of blameworthy insincerity in this. I am not assessing individuals. That is not fair. But in assessing the cause of our defeat we ought to be perfectly frank and admit that the country was not any more sure of us than it ought to be. So that we have got to convince it that the ranks have closed up and that the men who constitute those ranks are all on the war-path and mean the things they say and that the party professes. That is the main thing. 

 Now, I think that can be accomplished by many processes. Unfortunately, the members of Congress have to live in Washington, and Washington is not a part of the United States. It is the most extraordinary thing I have ever known. If you stay here long enough you forget what the people of your own district are thinking about. There is one reason on the face of things. The wrong opinion is generally better organized than the right opinion. If some special interest has an impression that it wants to make on Congress it can get up thousands of letters with which to bombard its Senators and Representatives, and they get the impression that that is the opinion at home and they do not hear from the other fellow; and the consequence is that the unspoken and uninsisted-on views of the country, which are the views of the great majority, are not heard at this distance. If such an arrangement were feasible I think there ought to be a Constitutional provision that Congressmen and Senators ought to spend every other week at home and come back here and talk and vote after a fresh bath in the atmosphere of their home districts and the opinions of their home folks. 

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE GREAT ADVENTURE

As we conferred together for the last time before the President leftWashington for the other side, I had never seen him look more weary orcareworn. It was plain to me who had watched him from day to day since theArmistice, that he felt most keenly the heavy responsibility that now layupon him of trying to bring permanent peace to the world. He was notunmindful of the criticism that had been heaped upon him by his enemies onthe Hill and throughout the country. The only thing that distressed him, however, was the feeling that a portion of the American people were of theopinion that, perhaps, in making the trip to Paris there lay back of it adesire for self-exploitation, or, perhaps, the idea of garnering certainpolitical advantages to himself and his party. If one who held thisungenerous opinion could only have come in contact with this greatlyoverworked man on the night of our final talk and could understand thehandsome, unselfish purpose that really lay behind his mission to Franceand could know personally how he dreaded the whole business, he wouldquickly free himself of this opinion. Discussing the object of the tripwith me in his usually intimate way, he said: "Well, Tumulty, this tripwill either be the greatest success or the supremest tragedy in allhistory; but I believe in a Divine Providence. If I did not have faith, Ishould go crazy. If I thought that the direction of the affairs of thisdisordered world depended upon our finite intelligence, I should not knowhow to reason my way to sanity; but it is my faith that no body of menhowever they concert their power or their influence can defeat this greatworld enterprise, which after all is the enterprise of Divine mercy, peaceand good will. "

As he spoke these fateful words, he clearly foresaw the difficulties anddangers and possible tragedy of reaction and intrigue that would soonexert themselves in Paris, perhaps to outwit him and if possible toprevent the consummation of the idea that lay so close to his heart: thatof setting up a concert of powers that would make for ever impossible awar such as we had just passed through. Indeed, he was ready to riskeverything--his own health, his own political fortunes, his place inhistory, and his very life itself--for the great enterprise of peace. "This intolerable thing must never happen again, " he said. 

No one more than Woodrow Wilson appreciated the tragedy of disappointmentthat might eventually follow out of his efforts for peace, but he waswilling to make any sacrifice to attain the end he had so close to hisheart. 

He realized better than any one the great expectations of the Americanpeople. Discussing these expectations with Mr. Creel, who was to accompanyhim, he said: "It is to America that the whole world turns to-day, notonly with its wrongs but with its hopes and grievances. The hungry expectus to feed them, the homeless look to us for shelter, the sick of heartand body depend upon us for cure. All of these expectations have in themthe quality of terrible urgency. There must be no delay. It has been soalways. People will endure their tyrants for years, but they tear theirdeliverers to pieces if a millennium is not created immediately. Yet, youknow and I know that these ancient wrongs, these present unhappinesses, are not to be remedied in a day or with a wave of the hand. What I seem tosee--with all my heart I hope that I am wrong--is a tragedy ofdisappointment. "

The President and I had often discussed the personnel of the PeaceCommission before its announcement, and I had taken the liberty ofsuggesting to the President the name of ex-Secretary of State Elihu Root. The President appeared to be delighted with this suggestion and asked meto confer with Secretary Lansing in regard to the matter. I conferred withMr. Lansing, to whom the suggestion, much to my surprise, met with heartyresponse. At this conference Mr. Lansing said that he and the Presidentwere attempting to induce some members of the Supreme Court--I think itwas either Mr. Justice Day or Chief Justice White--to make the trip toParis as one of the Commission; but that they were informed that ChiefJustice White was opposed to the selection of a Supreme Court Judge toparticipate in any conference not connected with the usual judicial workof the Supreme Court. 

After this conference I left for New York, there to remain with my fatherwho lay seriously ill, and when I returned to the White House thePresident informed me that he and Mr. Lansing had had a further conferencewith reference to the Root suggestion and that it was about concluded thatit would be inadvisable to make Mr. Root a member of the Commission. ThePresident felt that it would be unwise to take Mr. Root, fearing that thereputation which Mr. Root had gained of being rather conservative, if notreactionary, would work a prejudice toward the Peace Commission at theoutset. 

Mr. Taft's name was considered, but it was finally decided not to includehim among the commissions to accompany the President. 

The personnel of the Commission, as finally constituted, has been muchcriticized, but the President had what were for him convincing reasons foreach selection: he had formed a high opinion of Col. E. M. House's abilityto judge clearly and dispassionately men and events; Mr. Robert Lansing asSecretary of State was a natural choice; Mr. Henry White, a Republicanunembittered by partisanship, had had a life-long and honourableexperience in diplomacy; General Tasker Bliss was eminently qualified toadvise in military matters, and was quite divorced from the politics ofeither party. The President believed that these gentlemen would cooperatewith him loyally in a difficult task. 

I quote from Mr. Creel:

 The truly important body--and this the President realized from the first--was the group of experts that went along with the Commission, the pick of the country's most famous specialists in finance, history, economics, international law, colonial questions, map-making, ethnic distinctions, and all those other matters that were to come up at the Peace Conference. They constituted the President's arsenal of facts, and even on board the _George Washington_, in the very first conference, he made clear his dependence upon them. "You are in truth, my advisers, " he said, "for when I ask you for information I will have no way of checking it up, and must act upon it unquestioningly. We will be deluged with claims plausibly and convincingly presented. It will be your task to establish the truth or falsity of these claims out of your specialized knowledges, so that my positions may be taken fairly and intelligently. "

 It was this expert advice that he depended upon and it was a well of information that never failed him. At the head of the financiers and economists were such men as Bernard Baruch, Herbert Hoover, Norman Davis, and Vance McCormick. As head of the War Industries Board, in many respects the most powerful of all the civil organizations called into being by the war, Mr. Baruch had won the respect and confidence of American business by his courage, honesty, and rare ability. At his side were such men as Frank W. Taussig, chairman of the Tariff Commission; Alex Legg, general manager of the International Harvester Company; and Charles McDowell, manager of the Fertilizer and Chemical departments of Armour & Co. --both men familiar with business conditions and customs in every country in the world; Leland Summers, an international mechanical engineer and an expert in manufacturing, chemicals, and steel; James C. Pennie, the international patent lawyer; Frederick Neilson and Chandler Anderson, authorities on international law; and various others of equal calibre. 

 Mr. Hoover was aided and advised by the men who were his representatives in Europe throughout the war, and Mr. McCormick, head of the War Trade Board, gathered about him in Paris all of the men who had handled trade matters for him in the various countries of the world. 

 Mr. Davis, representing the Treasury Department, had as his associates Mr. Thomas W. Lament, Mr. Albert Strauss, and Jeremiah Smith of Boston. 

 Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, president of the College of the City of New York, went with the President at the head of a brilliant group of specialists, all of whom had been working for a year and more on the problems that would be presented at the Peace Conference. Among the more important may be mentioned: Prof. Charles H. Haskins, dean of the Graduate School of Harvard University, specialist on Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium; Dr. Isaiah Bowman, director of the American Geographical Society, general territorial specialist; Prof. Allyn A. Young, head of the Department of Economics at Cornell; George Louis Beer, formerly of Columbia, and an authority on colonial possessions; Prof. W. L. Westermann, head of the History Department of the University of Wisconsin and specialist on Turkey; R. H. Lord, professor of History at Harvard, specialist on Russia and Poland; Roland B. Dixon, professor of Ethnography at Harvard; Prof. Clive Day, head of the Department of Economics at Yale, specialist on the Balkans; W. E. Lunt, professor of History at Haverford College, specialist on northern Italy; Charles Seymour, professor of History at Yale, specialist on Austria-Hungary; Mark Jefferson, professor of Geography at Michigan State Normal, and Prof. James T. Shotwell, professor of History at Columbia. These groups were the President's real counsellors and advisers and there was not a day throughout the Peace Conference that he did not call upon them and depend upon them. 

No man ever faced a more difficult or trying job than the President, whenhe embarked upon the _George Washington_ on his voyage to the other side. The adverse verdict rendered against the President in the Congressionalelections was mighty dispiriting. The growing bitterness and hostility ofthe Republican leaders, and the hatred of the Germans throughout thecountry, added more difficulties to an already trying situation. Americahad seemed to do everything to weaken him at a time when united strengthshould have been behind him. Again I quote from Mr. Creel:

 On November 27th, five days before the President's departure, Mr. Roosevelt had cried this message to Europe, plain intimation that the Republican majority in the Senate would support the Allies in any repudiation of the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points:

 "Our allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at this time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by them. The newly elected Congress comes far nearer than Mr. Wilson to having a right to speak the purposes of the American people at this moment. Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and his five complementary points and all his utterances every which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted as expressive of the will of the American people. 

 "He is President of the United States. He is a part of the treaty- making power; but he is only a part. If he acts in good faith to the American people, he will not claim on the other side of the water any representative capacity in himself to speak for the American people. He will say frankly that his personal leadership has been repudiated and that he now has merely the divided official leadership which he shares with the Senate. "

 What Mr. Roosevelt did, in words as plain as his pen could marshal, was to inform the Allies that they were at liberty to disregard the President, the League of Nations, and the Fourteen Points, and that the Republican party would stand as a unit for as hard a peace as Foch chose to dictate. 

As the President left his office on the night of his departure for NewYork, preparatory to sailing for the other side, he turned to me and said:"Well, Tumulty, have you any suggestions before I leave?" "None, my dearGovernor, " I replied, "except to bid you Godspeed on the great journey. "Then, coming closer to me, he said: "I shall rely upon you to keep me intouch with the situation on this side of the water. I know I can trust youto give me an exact size-up of the situation here. Remember, I shall befar away and what I will want is a frank estimate from you of the state ofpublic opinion on this side of the water. That is what I will find myselfmost in need of. When you think I am putting my foot in it, please say sofrankly. I am afraid I shall not be able to rely upon much of the adviceand suggestions I will get from the other end. "

Before the President left he had discussed with me the character of thePeace Conference, and after his departure I kept him apprised by cable ofopinion in this country. Appendix "A", which contains this cabledcorrespondence shows how he welcomed information and suggestion. 

[Illustration:

 The Secretary thinks the President would like to read this letter. 

 (Manuscript: Thank you, what's his game? W. W. 

 Dear Tumulty

 I have not sufficient confidence in the man. 

 W. W. )

 Dear Tumulty, There is absolutely nothing new in Root's speech and I do not see any necessity to answer it. Certainly I would not be willing to have so conspicuous a representative of the Administration as Mr. Colby take any notice of it. Let me say again that I am not willing that answers to Republican speakers or writers should emanate from the White House or the Administration. 

 The President. C. L. S. 

Some characteristic White House memoranda]

As my duty held me in Washington, I am dependent upon others, especiallyMr. Creel and Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, a member of the President's officialfamily, for a connected narrative of events in Europe. 

Speaking of his attitude in the trials that confronted the President onthe other side, Mr. Baker said:

 No one who really saw the President in action in Paris, saw what he did in those grilling months of struggle, fired at in front, sniped at from behind--and no one who saw what he had to do after he came home from Europe in meeting the great new problems which grew out of the war--will for a moment belittle the immensity of his task, or underrate his extraordinary endurance, energy, and courage. 

 More than once, there in Paris, going up in the evening to see the President, I found him utterly worn out, exhausted, often one side of his face twitching with nervousness. No soldier ever went into battle with more enthusiasm, more aspiration, more devotion to a sacred cause than the President had when he came to Paris; but day after day in those months we saw him growing grayer and grayer, grimmer and grimmer, with the fighting lines deepening in his face. 

 Here was a man 63 years old--a man always delicate in health. When he came to the White House in 1913, he was far from being well. His digestion was poor and he had a serious and painful case of neuritis in his shoulder. It was even the opinion of so great a physician as Dr. Weir Mitchell, of Philadelphia, that he could probably not complete his term and retain his health. And yet such was the iron self-discipline of the man and such was the daily watchful care of Doctor Grayson, that instead of gradually going down under the tremendous tasks of the Presidency in the most crowded moments of our national history, he steadily gained strength and working capacity, until in those months in Paris he literally worked everybody at the Peace Conference to a stand-still. 

 It is so easy and cheap to judge people, even presidents, without knowing the problems they have to face. So much of the President's aloofness at Paris, so much of his unwillingness to expend energy upon unnecessary business, unnecessary conferences, unnecessary visiting-- especially the visitors--was due directly to the determination to husband and expend his too limited energies upon tasks that seemed to him essential. 

 As I say, he worked everybody at the Peace Conference to a standstill. He worked not only the American delegates, but the way he drove the leisurely diplomats of Europe was often shameful to see. Sometimes he would actually have two meetings going on at the same time. Once I found a meeting of the Council of the Big Four going on in his study, and a meeting of the financial and economic experts--twenty or thirty of them--in full session upstairs in the drawing room--and the President oscillating between the two. 

 It was he who was always the driver, the initiator, at Paris: he worked longer hours, had more appointments, granted himself less recreation, than any other man, high or low, at the Peace Conference. For he was the central figure there. Everything headed up in him. 

 Practically all of the meetings of the Council of Four were held in his study in the Place des États-Unis. This was the true capitol of the Peace Conference; here all the important questions were decided. Everyone who came to Paris upon any mission whatsoever aimed first of all at seeing the President. Representatives of the little, downtrodden nationalities of the earth--from eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa--thought that if they could get at the President, explain their pathetic ambitions, confess their troubles to him, all would be well. 

While the President was struggling in Europe, his friends in America hadcause for indignation against the course adopted by the Republicanobstructionists in the Senate, which course, they saw, must have a seriousif not fatal effect upon developments overseas. Occurrences on both sidesof the Atlantic became so closely interwoven that it is better not toseparate the two narratives, and as Mr. Creel, upon whose history I havealready drawn, tells the story with vigour and a true perception of thesignificance of events, I quote at length from him:

 The early days of February, 1919, were bright with promise. The European press, seeming to accept the President's leadership as unshakable, was more amiable in its tone, the bitterness bred by the decision as to the German colonies had abated. Fiume and the Saar Basin had taken discreet places in the background with other deferred questions, and the voice of French and English and Italian liberalism was heard again. On February 14th the President reported the first draft of the League constitution--a draft that expressed his principles without change--and it was confirmed amid acclaim. It was at this moment, unfortunately, that the President was compelled to return to the United States to sign certain bills, and for the information of the Senate he carried with him the Covenant as agreed upon by the Allies. 

 We come now to a singularly shameful chapter in American history. At the time of the President's decision to go to Paris the chief point of attack by the Republican Senators was that such a "desertion of duty" would delay the work of government and hold back the entire programme of reconstruction. Yet when the President returned for the business of consideration and signature, the same Republican Senators united in a filibuster that permitted Congress to expire without the passage of a single appropriation bill. This exhibition of sheer malignance, entailing an ultimate of confusion and disaster, was not only approved by the Republican press, but actually applauded. 

 The draft of the League Constitution was denounced even before its contents were known or explained. The bare fact that the document had proved acceptable to the British Empire aroused the instant antagonism of the "professional" Irish-Americans, the "professional" German- Americans, the "professional" Italian-Americans, and all those others whose political fortunes depended upon the persistence and accentuation of racial prejudices. Where one hyphen was scourged the year before a score of hyphens was now encouraged and approved. In Washington the President arranged a conference with the Senators and Representatives in charge of foreign relations, and laid the Covenant frankly before them for purposes of discussion and criticism. The attitude of the Republican Senators was one of sullenness and suspicion, Senator Lodge refusing to state his objections or to make a single recommendation. Others, however, pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not expressly provided that the League should have no authority to act or express a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to withdraw from the League was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. 

 The President, in answer, gave it as his opinion that these points were already covered satisfactorily in the Covenant, but that he would be glad to make the language more explicit, and entered a promise to this effect. Mr. Root and Mr. Taft were also furnished with copies of the Covenant and asked for their views and criticism, and upon receipt of them the President again gave assurance that every proposed change and clarification would be made upon his return to Paris. On March 4th, immediately following these conferences, and the day before the sailing of the President, Senator Lodge rose in his place and led his Republican colleagues in a bold and open attack upon the League of Nations and the war aims of America. The following account of the proceedings is taken from the _Congressional Record_:

 _Mr. Lodge_: Mr. President, I desire to take only a moment of the time of the Senate. I wish to offer the resolution which I hold in my hand, a very brief one:

 Whereas under the Constitution it is a function of the Senate to advise and consent to, or dissent from, the ratification of any treaty of the United States, and no such treaty can become operative without the consent of the Senate expressed by the affirmative vote of two thirds of the Senators present; and

 Whereas owing to the victory of the arms of the United States and of the nations with whom it is associated, a Peace Conference was convened and is now in session at Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace; and

 Whereas a committee of the Conference has proposed a constitution for the League of Nations and the proposal is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration; Now, therefore, be it

 Resolved by the Senate of the United States in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to treaties, That it is the sense of the Senate that while it is their sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States; and be it

 Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and that the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should be then taken up for careful and serious consideration. 

 I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of this resolution. 

 _Mr. Swanson_: I object to the introduction of the resolution. 

 _Mr. Lodge_: Objection being made, of course I recognize the objection. I merely wish to add, by way of explanation, the following: The undersigned Senators of the United States, Members and Members- Elect of the Sixty-sixth Congress, hereby declare that, if they had had the opportunity, they would have voted for the foregoing resolution:

 Henry Cabot Lodge James E. Watson Philander C. Knox Thomas Sterling Lawrence Y. Sherman J. S. Frelinghuysen Harry S. New W. G. Harding George H. Moses Frederick Hale J. W. Wadsworth, Jr. William E. Borah Bert M. Fernald Walter E. Edge Albert B. Cummins Reed Smoot F. E. Warren Asle J. Gronna Frank B. Brandegee Lawrence C. Phipps William M. Calder Selden P. Spencer Henry W. Keyes Hiram W. Johnson Boies Penrose Charles E. Townsend Carroll S. Page William P. Dillingham George P. McLean I. L. Lenroot Joseph Irwin France Miles Poindexter Medill McCormick Howard Sutherland Charles Curtis Truman H. Newberry L. Heisler Ball

 I ought to say in justice to three or four Senators who are absent at great distances from the city that we were not able to reach them; but we expect to hear from them to-morrow, and if, as we expect, their answers are favourable their names will be added to the list. 

 A full report of this action was cabled to Europe, as a matter of course, and when the President arrived in Paris on March 14th, ten days later, he was quick to learn of the disastrous consequences. The Allies, eagerly accepting the orders of the Republican majority, had lost no time in repudiating the President and the solemn agreements that they had entered into with him. The League of Nations was not discarded and the plan adopted for a preliminary peace with Germany was based upon a frank division of the spoils, the reduction of Germany to a slave state, and the formation of a military alliance by the Allies for the purpose of guaranteeing the gains. Not only this, but an Allied army was to march at once to Russia to put down the Bolshevists and the Treaty itself was to be administered by the Allied high command, enforcing its orders by an army of occupation. The United States, as a rare favour, was to be permitted to pay the cost of the Russian expedition and such other incidental expenses as might arise in connection with the military dictatorship that was to rule Europe. 

 While primarily the plan of Foch and the other generals, it had the approval of statesmen, even those who were assumed to represent the liberal thought of England being neck-deep in the conspiracy. 

 Not a single party to the cabal had any doubt as to its success. Was it not the case that the Republican Senators, now in the majority, spoke for America rather than the President? Had the Senators not stated formally that they did not want the League of Nations, and was the Republican party itself not on record with the belief that the Allies must have the right to impose peace terms of their own choosing, and that these terms should show no mercy to the "accursed Hun"? . .. The President allowed himself just twenty-four hours in which to grasp the plot in all its details, and then he acted, ordering the issuance of this statement:

 "The President said to-day that the decision made at the Peace Conference in its Plenary Session, January 25, 1919, to the effect that the establishment of a League of Nations should be made an integral part of the Treaty of Peace, is of final force and that there is no basis whatever for the reports that a change in this decision was contemplated. "

 . .. On March 26th, it was announced, grudgingly enough, that there would be a league of nations as an integral part of the Peace Treaty. It was now the task of the President to take up the changes that had been suggested by his Republican enemies, and this was the straw that broke his back. There was not a single suggested change that had honesty back of it. The League was an association of sovereigns, and as a matter of course any sovereign possessed the right of withdrawal. The League, as an international advisory body, could not possibly deal with domestic questions under any construction of the Covenant. No power of Congress was abridged, and necessarily Congress would have to act before war could be declared or a single soldier sent out of the country. Instead of recognizing the Monroe Doctrine as an American policy, the League legitimized it as a world policy. The President, however, was bound to propose that these plain propositions be put in kindergarten language for the satisfaction of his enemies, and it was this proposal that gave Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and their associates a new chance for resistance. All of the suggested changes were made without great demur until the question of the Monroe Doctrine was reached, and then French and English bitterness broke all restraints. Why were they expected to make every concession to American prejudice when the President would make none to European traditions? They had gone to the length of accepting the doctrine of Monroe for the whole of the earth, but now, because American pride demanded it, they must make public confession of America's right to give orders. No! A thousand times no! It was high time for the President to give a little consideration to French and English and Italian prejudices--time for him to realize that the lives of these governments were at stake as well as his own, and that Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Sonnino had parliaments to deal with that were just as unreasonable as the Congress of the United States. If the President asked he must be willing to give. 

 As if at a given signal, France renewed her claim for the Rhine Valley and the Saar Basin; Italy clamoured anew for Fiume and the Dalmatian coast; and Japan, breaking a long silence, rushed to the fore with her demand for Shantung in fee simple and the right of her nationals to full equality in the United States. 

Around this time the President fell suddenly ill and took to his bed. Thatthe illness was serious is evidenced by the following letter which DoctorGrayson wrote me:

 Paris, 10 April 1919. 

 DEAR MR. TUMULTY:

 While the contents of this letter may possibly be somewhat out of date by the time it reaches you, nevertheless you may find something in it of interest. 

 This has been one of the most complexing and trying weeks of my existence over here. The President was taken violently sick last Thursday. The attack was very sudden. At three o'clock he was apparently all right; at six he was seized with violent paroxysms of coughing, which were so severe and frequent that it interfered with his breathing. He had a fever of 103 and a profuse diarrhoea. I was at first suspicious that his food had been tampered with, but it turned out to be the beginning of an attack of influenza. That night was one of the worst through which I have ever passed. I was able to control the spasms of coughing but his condition looked very serious. Since that time he has been gradually improving every day so that he is now back at work--he went out for the first time yesterday. This disease is so treacherous, especially in this climate, that I am perhaps over- anxious for fear of a flare-back--and a flare-back in a case of this kind often results in pneumonia. I have been spending every minute of my time with him, not only as physician but as nurse. Mrs. Wilson was a perfect angel through it all. 

 Sincerely, CARY T. GRAYSON. 

Continuing the narrative Mr. Creel writes:

 On April 7th, the President struggled to his feet and faced the Council in what everyone recognized as a final test of strength. There must be an end to this dreary, interminable business of making agreements only to break them. An agreement must be reached once for all. If a peace of justice, he would remain; if a peace of greed, then he would leave. He had been second to none in recognizing the wrongs of the Allies, the state of mind of their peoples, and he stood as firmly as any for a treaty that would bring guilt home to the Germans, but he could not, and would not, agree to the repudiation of every war aim or to arrangements that would leave the world worse off than before. The _George Washington_ was in Brooklyn. By wireless the President ordered it to come to Brest at once. 

 The gesture was conclusive as far as England and France were concerned. Lloyd George swung over instantly to the President's side, and on the following day Le Temps carried this significant item:

 "Contrary to the assertions spread by the German press and taken up by other foreign newspapers, we believe that the Government has no annexationist pretensions, openly or under cover, in regard to any territory inhabited by a German population. This remark applies peculiarly to the regions comprised between the frontier of 1871 and the frontier of 1814. "

 Again, in the lock of wills, the President was the victor, and the French and English press, exhausted by now, could only gasp their condemnation of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. 

The statement of Mr. David Hunter Miller, the legal adviser of theAmerican Peace Commission, with reference to the debate on the MonroeDoctrine, in which the President played the leading part, is conclusive onthis point. Mr. Miller speaks of the President's devotion to the MonroeDoctrine in these words:

 But the matter was not at an end, for at the next meeting, the last of all, the French sought by amendment to obtain some definition, some description of the Monroe Doctrine that would limit the right of the United States to insist upon its own interpretation of that Doctrine in the future as in the past. The French delegates, hoping for some advantage for their own proposals, urged such a definition: and at that last meeting I thought for a moment, in despair, that President Wilson would yield to the final French suggestion, which contained only a few seemingly simple words: but he stood by his position through the long discussion, and the meeting and the proceedings of the Commission ended early in the morning in an atmosphere of constraint and without any of the speeches of politeness customary on such an occasion. 

Of all the false reports about the President's attitude none was moreerroneous than the combined statements that he was lukewarm about theMonroe Doctrine and that he declined to ask for or receive advice fromeminent Americans outside of his own party. 

In Appendix "B" there will be found a series of letters and cablemessages, too long for insertion in the chapter, which will support thestatement that he not only listened to but had incorporated in theCovenant of the League of Nations suggestions from Mr. Taft, includingimportant reservations concerning the Monroe Doctrine, and suggestionsfrom Mr. Root as to the establishment of an International Court ofJustice. 

Former-President Taft had intimated to me a desire to make certainsuggestions to Mr. Wilson, and, upon my notification, Mr. Wilson cabled methat he would "appreciate Mr. Taft's offer of suggestions and wouldwelcome them. The sooner they are sent the better. " Whereupon, Mr. Taft'ssuggestions were cabled to the President together with Mr. Taft'sstatement that, "My impression is that if the one article already sent, onthe Monroe Doctrine, be inserted in the Treaty, sufficient Republicans whosigned the Round Robin would probably retreat from their position and votefor ratification so that it would carry. If the other suggestions wereadopted, I feel confident that all but a few who oppose any league wouldbe driven to accept them and to stand for the League. "

Mr. Taft's recommendations were in substance incorporated in the Covenantof the League of Nations. 

Emphasizing further the President's entire willingness to confer withleading Republicans, even those outside of official relationship, on March27, 1919, Mr. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, dispatched to Secretary ofState Lansing, for the President, proposed amendments offered by Mr. Rootto the constitution of the League of Nations, involving the establishmentof a Court of Justice. Immediately upon receipt of Mr. Polk's cable, thePresident addressed to Colonel House, a member of the Peace Commission, the following letter, marked "Confidential. "

 Paris. March 30, 1919. 

 MY DEAR HOUSE:

 Here is a dispatch somewhat belated in transmission stating Mr. Root's ideas as to amendments which should be made to the Covenant. I think you will find some of these very interesting. Perhaps you have already seen it. 

 In haste. 

 Affectionately yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 COLONEL E. M. HOUSE, Hotel Crillon, Paris. 

A comparison of the suggestions presented by Mr. Taft and Mr. Root, whichwill be found in the Appendix, with the existing Covenant of the League ofNations, will readily convince any person desiring to reach the truth ofthe matter, that all the material amendments proposed by these eminentRepublicans which had any essential bearing on the business in hand wereembodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations as brought back byPresident Wilson. 

CHAPTER XXXVII

WILSON--THE LONE HAND

It has often been said by certain gentlemen who were associated withPresident Wilson on the other side that he was unyielding and dogmatic, that he insisted upon playing a "lone hand, " that he was secretive andexclusive, and that he ignored the members of the Peace Commission and theexperts who accompanied him to the Conference. 

Contrary to this criticism, after an uninterrupted, continuous, and mostintimate association with him for eleven years, an association whichbrought me into close contact with him in the most delicate crises throughwhich his administration and the nation passed, a time which threw uponthe Chief Executive of the nation a task unparalleled in the history ofthe world, I wish to say that there is no franker or more open-minded man, nor one less dogmatic in his opinion than Woodrow Wilson. In him thedesire for information and guidance is a passion. Indeed, the only thinghe resents is a lack of frankness upon the part of his friends, and no manis more ready courageously to act and to hold to his opinions after he hasobtained the necessary information upon, which he bases his position. Itis his innate modesty and a certain kind of shyness that people mistakefor coldness and aloofness. He is not a good fellow in the ordinary senseof that term. His friendship does not wear the cheap or tawdry trappingsof the politician, but there is about it a depth of genuineness andsincerity, that while it does not overwhelm you, it wins you and holdsyou. But the permanent consideration upon which this friendship is basedis sincerity and frankness. 

No man ever worked under greater handicaps than did Woodrow Wilson atParis. Repudiated by his own people in the Congressional elections;harassed on every side and at every turn by his political enemies, hestill pursued the even tenor of his way and accomplished what he had inmind, against the greatest odds. 

In the murky atmosphere of the Peace Conference, where every attitude ofthe President was grossly exaggerated, in order that his prestige might belessened, it was not possible to judge him fairly, but it is now possiblein a calmer day to review the situation from afar through the eyes ofthose who were actual participants with him in the great assembly, onlookers, as it were, who saw every move and witnessed every play of thePeace Conference from the side lines, and who have not allowed pettymotives to warp their judgments. 

This testimony, which forms part of "What Really Happened in Paris, "edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, comes from gentlemen whowere his friends and co-labourers and who daily conferred with him uponthe momentous questions that came up for consideration at the PeaceConference. 

Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, a member of the great banking house of J. P. Morgan& Company, one of the representatives of the United States Treasury withthe American Commission to Negotiate Peace, gives the lie to the unfaircriticisms uttered about the President, to the effect that he wasexclusive, secretive, and refused to confer with those associated withhim. Mr. Lamont in speaking of the President's attitude throughout thePeace Conference said:

 I am going to take this opportunity to say a word, in general, as to President Wilson's attitude at the Peace Conference. He is accused of having been unwilling to consult his colleagues. I never saw a man more ready and anxious to consult than he. He has been accused of having been desirous to gain credit for himself and ignore others. I never saw a man more considerate of those of his co-adjutors who were working immediately with him, nor a man more ready to give them credit with the other chiefs of state. Again and again would he say to Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau: "My expert here, Mr. So-and-So, tells me such-and-such, and I believe he is right. You will have to argue with him if you want me to change my opinion. " President Wilson undoubtedly had his disabilities. Perhaps, in a trade, some of the other chiefs of state could have "out-jockeyed" him; but it seldom reached such a situation, because President Wilson, by his manifest sincerity and open candour, always saying precisely what he thought, would early disarm his opponents in argument. President Wilson did not have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of the work himself, studying until late at night papers and documents that he should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was, by all odds, the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to delegate more of his work was not due to any inherent distrust he had of men--and certainly not any desire to "run the whole show" himself-- but simply to his lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on a large scale. In execution, we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; and inability, mind you, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any one of us volunteered or insisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted. Throughout the Peace Conference, Mr. Wilson never played politics. I never witnessed an occasion when I saw him act from unworthy conception or motive. His ideals were of the highest, and he clung to them tenaciously and courageously. Many of the so-called "Liberals" in England have assailed Mr. Wilson bitterly because, as they declare, he yielded too much to their own Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and to Mr. Clemenceau. But could he have failed to defer to them on questions in which no vital principle was involved? I well remember his declaration on the question, whether the Allies should refuse, for a period of five years during the time of France's recuperations to promise Germany reciprocal tariff provisions. What Mr. Wilson said to Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau was this: "Gentlemen, my experts and I both regard the principle involved as an unwise one. We believe it will come back to plague you. But when I see how France has suffered, how she has been devastated, her industries destroyed--who am I to refuse to assent to this provision, designed, wisely or unwisely, to assist in lifting France again to her feet. "

The question has often been asked, whether the President freely consultedhis experts on the other side, or ignored them. The experience of thegentlemen who conferred with him is the best refutation of thisinsinuation against the President. Charles Homer Haskins, Chief of theDivision of Western Europe, a member of the American Peace Conference, answers this question in these words:

 The President was anxious to have the exact facts before him in every situation. Doubtless, there were a number of occasions when he could not consult with experts at a particular moment, but, in general, the President sought such advice, although he naturally had to use his own judgment whether that advice was to be adopted in any particular case. 

Answering this same question, Mr. Douglas Wilson Johnson, Chief of theDivision of Boundary Geography, and a member of the Peace Commission, says:

 Whenever we, in our capacity as specialists, thought we had found something that the President ought to know about, and believed we could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could ask for a personal conference with him. He was, of course, a very busy man because, unlike the experts who usually had only one problem to consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial problems but in addition with all the problems bearing on the League of Nations, the economic problems, and many other aspects of the peace. Despite this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked for personal conferences with the President on this and certain other problems, he never failed to respond immediately with an appointment. He had a private wire and on occasion he would call us at the Crillon to make appointments on his own initiative or to secure papers, maps, or other documents that he needed in his studies. I will not forget that in one instance he called me on the telephone late at night in my bedroom, asking for some papers which I had promised to supply him, and which had not reached him with sufficient promptness. You can judge from this that he kept closely in touch with the problems he was called upon to consider. 

Another question that has been asked is: Did the President have anintimate knowledge of the complicated questions that came before him likethe Adriatic problem, for instance? That criticism was answered by Mr. Douglas Wilson Johnson in these words:

 In answer to that question I will say that the President kept in constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic problem, not only through the memoranda furnished by the experts but in other ways. I can assure you that there was sent to him a voluminous quantity of material, and I want to say that when we had personal discussions with him upon the question it immediately became apparent that he had studied these memoranda most carefully. _It is only fair to say that of the details and intricacies of this most difficult problem the President possessed a most astonishing command. _

It has also been said that the President in his attitude toward Germanywas ruthless, and yet we have the testimony of Mr. Isaiah Bowman, ChiefTerritorial Adviser of the Peace Commission who, in answer to the directquestion: "Was there not a time when it looked as if the Peace Conferencemight break up because of the extreme policy of one of the Allies?" said:"Yes, there were a number of occasions when the Peace Conference mighthave broken up. Almost anything might have happened with so many nationsrepresented, so many personalities and so many experts--perhaps half athousand in all! Owing to the fact that President Wilson has been chargedon the one hand with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the otherhand that he had always been soft with the Germans, particularly withBulgaria, let us see just how soft he was! On a certain day three of uswere asked to call at the President's house, and on the following morningat eleven o'clock we arrived. President Wilson welcomed us in a verycordial manner. I cannot understand how people get the idea that he iscold. He does not make a fuss over you, but when you leave you feel thatyou have met a very courteous gentleman. You have the feeling that he isfrank and altogether sincere. He remarked: 'Gentlemen, I am in trouble andI have sent for you to help me out. The matter is this: the French wantthe whole left bank of the Rhine. I told M. Clemenceau that I could notconsent to such a solution of the problem. He became very much excited andthen demanded ownership of the Saar Basin. I told him I could not agree tothat either because it would mean giving 300, 000 Germans to France. 'Whereupon President Wilson further said: 'I do not know whether I shallsee M. Clemenceau again. I do not know whether he will return to themeeting this afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the PeaceConference will continue. M. Clemenceau called me a pro-German andabruptly left the room. I want you to assist me in working out a solutiontrue to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to France, and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a reasonablesolution. I want to be fair to M. Clemenceau and to France, but I cannotconsent to the outright transfer to France of 300, 000 Germans. ' A solutionwas finally found--the one that stands in the Treaty to-day. "

Among the unfair things said about the President during the last campaignand uttered by a senator of the United States, was that the Presidentpromised Premier Bratiano of Rumania to send United States troops toprotect the new frontiers. Mr. Charles Seymour, a member of the AmericanPeace Commission, answers this charge in the following way:

 The evidence against it is overwhelming. The stenographic notes taken during the session indicate that nothing said by President Wilson could be construed into a promise to send United States troops abroad to protect frontiers. The allegation is based upon the report of the interpreter, Mantoux, and a book by a journalist, Dr. E. W. Dillon, called "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, " M. Mantoux, though a brilliant and cultivated interpreter, whose work enormously facilitated the progress of the Conference, did not take stenographic notes and his interpretations sometimes failed to give the exact meaning of the original. Doctor Dillon's evidence is subject to suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip, and replete with errors of fact. The stenographic report, on the other hand, is worthy of trust. I have heard the President on more than one occasion explain to M. Clemenceau and Lloyd George _that if troops were necessary to protect any troubled area, they must not look to the United States for assistance, for public opinion in this country would not permit the use of American forces_. 

Even Mr. Lansing himself in his book testified to the open-mindedness andcandour of the President in these words:

 It had always been my practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candour and to disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a general belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to resent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him so during the years we had been associated. Except in a few instances he listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavoured to value them correctly. 

No men ever winced less under the criticism or bitter ridicule of hisenemies than did Woodrow Wilson. Whether the criticism was directed at himor at some member of his Cabinet, or, mayhap, at a subordinate likemyself, for some act, statement, or even an indiscretion, he bore up underthe criticism like a true sportsman. I remember how manfully he met thestorm of criticism that was poured upon him after the issuance of thefamous Garfield Fuel Order. He courageously took the responsibility forthe issuance of the order and stood by Doctor Garfield to the last. 

It will be recalled what a tremendous impression and reaction the Garfieldorder caused when it was published throughout the country. Many about thePresident were greatly worried and afraid of the disastrous effect of itupon the country. Cabinet officers rushed in upon him and endeavoured topersuade him to recall it and even to repudiate Garfield for having issuedthe order without consulting the Cabinet, but their remonstrances fellunheeded upon the President's ears. I remember at the time that I wrotethe President regarding the matter and called his attention to whatappeared to me to be the calamitous results of the issuance of the FuelOrder. 

My letter to the President is as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 17 January, 1918. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 At twelve o'clock last night, Mr. Lincoln of the New York World called me out of bed by telephone to notify me that the Fuel Administration had issued a drastic order shutting down the factories of the country for five days, etc. 

 I do not know about the details of the order. I assume of course that it was necessary because of the tremendous shortage throughout the country. But what I am afraid of is that my own readiness to accept this assumption may not be shared by people outside. In other words, has the groundwork been laid for this radical step? Do the people know how much coal we have on hand and what the real shortage is? Have they not been led to believe that our chief ill was transportation and that by subjecting themselves to hardships by cutting down trains, etc. , enough cars have been provided to carry coal?

 In other words, I am afraid the country will want to be shown that the step just taken was absolutely necessary and if this cannot be proved, I greatly fear the consequences upon the morale of the people. I am so afraid that it will weaken their confidence in any action the Government may take hereafter which depends for its execution on the voluntary cooperation of the people. Again, it seems to me unjust that all industries are put on the same footing. It is a difficult thing I know to distinguish between the essential and non-essential industries, but I am sure the country will understand if such a distinction is made of, for instance, institutions that make pianos and talking machines and candy and articles that are not immediately necessary for our life, were cut down altogether and things necessary to our sustenance kept. 

 Sincerely yours, TUMULTY

 THE PRESIDENT

[Illustration: An inside view of a well-remembered national crisis. [Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the above-quoted letter. ]]

The President's reply, written on his own typewriter, is as follows:

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 Of course, this is a tremendous matter and has given me the deepest concern, but I really think this direct road is the road out of difficulties which never would have been entirely remedied if we had not taken some such action. We must just bow our heads and let the storm beat. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

Even to Mr. James M. Beck, a prominent Republican lawyer and one of hisbitterest opponents and critics, he showed a tolerance and magnanimitythat were worthy of the man himself. It appears that Mr. Beck was invitedto confer at the White House on a matter having to do with the war, andthe question was presented to the President by Mr. Creel as to whether thePresident considered Mr. Beck _persona non grata_. The President at oncesent me the following note:

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 Mr. James M. Beck expressed some hesitation about coming with the committee which Creel has organized and which is coming to see me on Monday afternoon, because he was not sufficiently _persona grata_ at the White House. I think his criticism and his whole attitude before we went into the war were abominable and inexcusable, but I "ain't harbouring no ill will" just now and I hope that you will have the intimation conveyed to him through Mr. Creel or otherwise that he will be welcomed. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

While the President was busily engaged in France in laying the foundationstones of peace, his partisan enemies were busily engaged in destroyingthe things he held so dear, and had industriously circulated the storythat the mission to France was a mere political one, that the purpose backof it was personal exploitation, or an attempt on the part of thePresident to thrust himself into the councils of the Democratic party asan active and aggressive candidate for a third term. The President'sattitude in this matter, his fear that talk of this kind would embarrassthe League of Nations, is disclosed by the following correspondence:

 Received at the White House, June 2, 1919. 

 Paris. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 Have just read the editorial in the Springfield _Republican_, discussing "_Wilson the Third Term and the Treaty_, " and would very much value your opinion with regard to the situation as it analyzes it. Please talk with Glass, Secretary Baker, Secretary Wilson, and Cummings and let me know what your opinion is and what theirs is. _We must let nothing stand in the way of the Treaty and the adoption of the League. _ I will, of course, form no resolution until I reach home but wish to think the matter out in plenty of time. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 2 June, 1919. 

 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

 Cummings on campaign trip covering Middle West and coast. Will be away six weeks. My own opinion is that it would be unwise at this time to act upon suggestion contained in Springfield _Republican_ editorial. [The editorial suggested that the President withdraw his name from consideration in connection with a third term. ] This is not the time to say anything about your attitude toward matter discussed in editorial because there is a depression in our ranks and a feeling that our prospects for 1920 are not bright. Republicans would say you had retreated under the threat of defeat and the cause of the League of Nations would be weakened instead of strengthened. The issue of the League of Nations is so clear-cut that your attitude toward a third term at present is not a real cause of embarrassment. In fact, I can see great advantage to be gained for the ratification of the League by giving the impression that you are seriously considering going to the country on the League of Nations. Am strongly of belief, as you know, that you should not under any circumstances consider or accept nomination for third term. In this matter I have very few supporters in our party. A trip I just made to Illinois and St. Louis over Decoration Day convinces me that a big drive will be made to induce you to allow your name to be used again. The Presidency for another four years would not add one whit to the honour that will be yours and the place of dignity that you will occupy in the hearts of our people when the League of Nations is consummated and your present term expires. 

 Upon your return to this country and with a clearer perception of what you are trying to do, there will come a turn of the tide in our favour. Many factors not now very clear are leading in that direction. The Republicans by the selection of Penrose have made the Republican party again the stand-pat party of America and their failure, which will become more evident as the days pass, to correct abuses that some months ago they called grave, will prove more and more the strength and value of Democratic policies. 

 Prosperity now sweeping in from coast and Middle West will soon be upon us. Even business which turned away from us in last campaign in the hope that Excess Profit Tax and other burdensome taxes would be reduced, will soon find out how fatuous and futile is the Republican policy. Many Progressive leaders will soon come to the front and will take up the work left undone by Roosevelt. My opinion, therefore, is that what action you take in this matter should await the turn of the tide so that as the hopes of Democracy rise and success for 1920 looks more promising than it does to-day, then that time in my opinion will offer the psychological moment for you to say what really is in your heart about a third term and thus help not only the party but the League of Nations. Therefore, until the psychological moment comes, the politic thing to do is to keep "mum" about this matter and await the happenings of the future. 

 TUMULTY. 

A clear, inside view of the feeling of the man toward the Treaty, his deepheart interest in it, and his characterization of the opposition weredisclosed in a speech delivered by him to the members of the DemocraticNational Committee at the White House on February 28, 1919. This speech isnow published for the first time, and is as follows:

 The real issue of the day, gentlemen, is the League of Nations, and I think we must be very careful to serve the country in the right way with regard to that issue. We ought not, as I know you already feel from the character of the action you have just taken--we ought not even to create the appearance of trying to make that a party issue. And I suggested this to Mr. Cummings and the others who sat by me: I think it would be wise if the several National Committeemen were to get in touch with their state organizations upon returning home and suggest this course of action--that the Democratic state organizations get into conference with the Republican state organizations and say to them: "Here is this great issue upon which the future peace of the world depends; it ought not to be made a party issue or to divide upon party lines; the country ought to support it regardless of party (as you stated in your resolution); now we propose to you that you pass resolutions supporting it, as we intend to do, and we will not anticipate you in the matter if you agree to that policy; let us stand back of it and not make a party issue of it. " Of course, if they decline, then it is perfectly legitimate, it seems to me, for the Democratic organization if it pleases to pass resolutions, framing these resolutions in as non-partisan language as is possible, but nevertheless doing what citizens ought to do in matters of this sort. But not without first making it a matter of party record that it has made these approaches to the Republican organizations and has proposed this similarity of action. In that way we accomplish a double object. We put it up to them to support the real opinion of their own people and we get instructed by the resolutions, and we find where the weak spots are and where the fighting has to be done for this great issue. Because, believe me, gentlemen, the civilized world cannot afford to have us lose this fight. I tried to state in Boston what it would mean to the people of the world if the United States did not support this great ideal with cordiality, but I was not able to speak when I tried fully to express my thoughts. I tell you, frankly, I choked up; I could not do it. The thing reaches the depth of tragedy. There is a sense in which I can see that the hope entertained by the people of the world with regard to us is a tragical hope--tragical in this sense, that it is so great, so far-reaching, it runs out to such depths that we cannot in the nature of things satisfy it. The world cannot go as fast in the direction of ideal results as these people believe the United States can carry them, and that is what makes me choke up when I try to talk about it--the consciousness of what they want us to do and of our relative inadequacy. And yet there is a great deal that we can do, and the immediate thing that we can do is to have an overwhelming national endorsement of this great plan. If we have that we will have settled most of the immediate political difficulties in Europe. The present danger of the world--of course, I have to say this in the confidence of this company--but the present danger in this world is that the peoples of the world do not believe in their own governments. They believe these governments to be made up of the kind of men who have always run them, and who did not know how to keep them out of this war, did not know how to prepare them for war, and did not know how to settle international controversies in the past without making all sorts of compromising concessions. They do not believe in them, and therefore they have got to be buttressed by some outside power in which they do not believe. Perhaps it would not do for them to examine us too narrowly. We are by no means such ideal people as they believe us to be, but I can say that we are infinitely better than the others. We do purpose these things, we do purpose these great unselfish things; that is the glory of America, and if we can confirm that belief we have steadied the whole process of history in the immediate future; whereas if we do not confirm that belief I would not like to say what would happen in the way of utter dissolution of society. 

 The only thing that that ugly, poisonous thing called Bolshevism feeds on is the doubt of the man on the street of the essential integrity of the people he is depending on to do his governing. That is what it feeds on. No man in his senses would think that a lot of local Soviets could really run a government, but some of them are in a temper to have anything rather than the kind of thing they have been having; and they say to themselves: "Well, this may be bad but it is at least better and more immediately in touch with us than the other, and we will try it and see whether we cannot work something out of it. "

 So that our immediate duty, not as Democrats, but as American citizens, is to concert the most powerful campaign that was ever concerted in this country in favour of supporting the League of Nations and to put it up to everybody--the Republican organizations and every other organization--to say where they stand, and to make a record and explain this thing to the people. 

 In one sense it does not make any difference what the Constitution of the League of Nations is. This present constitution in my judgment is a very conservative and sound document. There are some things in it which I would have phrased otherwise. I am modest enough to believe that the American draft was better than this, but it is the result of as honest work as I ever knew to be done. Here we sat around the table where there were representatives of fourteen nations. The five great powers, so-called, gave themselves two delegates apiece and they allowed the other nine one delegate apiece. But it did not count by members--it counted by purpose. 

 For example, among the rest was a man whom I have come to admire so much that I have come to have a personal affection for him, and that is Mr. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, as genuine a friend of man as ever lived and as able a friend honest people ever had, and a man on whose face a glow comes when you state a great principle, and yet who is intensely practical and who was there to insist that nothing was to be done which would put the small nations of the world at the disposal of the big nations. So that he was the most influential spokesman of what may be called the small powers as contrasted with the great. But I merely single him out for the pleasure of paying him this tribute, and not because the others were less earnest in pursuing their purpose. They were a body of men who all felt this. Indeed, several of them said this to us: "The world expects not only, but demands of us that we shall do this thing successfully, and we cannot go away without doing it. " There is not a statesman in that conference who would dare to go home saying that he had merely signed a treaty of peace no matter how excellent the terms of that treaty are, because he has received if not an official at least an influential mandate to see to it that something is done in addition which will make the thing stand after it is done; and he dare not go home without doing that. So that all around that table there was coöperation--generous coöperation of mind to make that document as good as we could make it. And I believe it is a thoroughly sound document. There is only one misleading sentence in it--only one sentence that conveys a wrong impression. That can, I dare say, be altered, though it is going to be extremely difficult to set up that fourteen-nation process again as will have to be done if any alteration is made. 

 The particular and most important thing to which every nation that joins the League agrees is this: That it won't fight on any question at all until it has done one of two things. If it is about a question that it considers suitable for arbitration it will submit it to arbitration. You know, Mr. Taft and other serious advocates of this general idea have tried to distinguish between justiciable and non- justiciable subjects, and while they have had more or less success with it, the success has not been satisfactory. You cannot define expressly the questions which nations would be willing to submit to arbitration. Some question of national pride may come in to upset the definition. So we said we would make them promise to submit every question that they considered suitable to arbitration and to abide by the result. If they do not regard it as suitable for arbitration they bind themselves to submit it to the consideration of the Executive Council for a period not exceeding six months, but they are not bound by the decision. It is an opinion, not a decision. But if a decision, a unanimous decision, is made, and one of the parties to the dispute accepts the decision, the other party does bind itself not to attack the party that accepts the opinion. Now in discussing that we saw this difficulty. Suppose that Power B is in possession of a piece of territory which Power A claims, and Power A wins its claim so far as the opinion of the Executive Council is concerned. And suppose that the power in possession of the territory accepts the decision but then simply stands pat and does nothing. It has got the territory. The other party, inasmuch as the party that has lost has accepted the decision, has bound itself not to attack it and cannot go by force of arms and take possession of the country. In order to cure that quandary we used a sentence which said that in case--I have forgotten the phraseology but it means this--in case any power refuses to carry out the decision the Executive Council was to consider the means by which it could be enforced. Now that apparently applies to both parties but was intended to apply to the non-active party which refuses to carry it out. And that sentence is open to a misconstruction. The Commission did not see that until after the report was made and I explained this to the General Conference. I made an explanation which was substantially the same as I have made to you, and that this should be of record may be sufficient to interpret that phrase, but probably not. It is not part of the Covenant and possibly an attempt ought to be made to alter it. 

 But I am wandering from my real point. My point is that this is a workable beginning of a thing that the world insists on. There is no foundation for it except the good faith of the parties, but there could not be any other foundation for an arrangement between nations. 

 The other night after dinner Senator Thomas, of Colorado, said: "Then after all it is not a guarantee of peace. " Certainly not. Who said that it was? If you can invent an actual guarantee of peace you will be a benefactor of mankind, but no such guarantee has been found. But this comes as near being a guarantee of peace as you can get. 

 I had this interesting experience when the Covenant was framed. I found that I was the only member of the Committee who did not take it for granted that the members of the League would have the right to secede. I found there was a universal feeling that this treaty could be denounced in the usual way and that a state could withdraw. I demurred from that opinion and found myself in a minority of one, and I could not help saying to them that this would be very interesting on the other side of the water, that the only Southerner on this conference should deny the right of secession. But nevertheless it is instructive and interesting to learn that this is taken for granted; that it is not a covenant that you would have to continue to adhere to. I suppose that is a necessary assumption among sovereign states, but it would not be a very handsome thing to withdraw after we had entered upon it. The point is that it does rest upon the good faith of all the nations. Now the historic significance of it is this:

 We are setting up right in the path that German ambition expected to tread a number of new states that, chiefly because of their newness, will for a long time be weak states. We are carving a piece of Poland out of Germany's side; we are creating an independent Bohemia below that, an independent Hungary below that, and enlarging Rumania, and we are rearranging the territorial divisions of the Balkan States. We are practically dissolving the Empire of Turkey and setting up under mandatories of the League of Nations a number of states in Asia Minor and Arabia which, except for the power of the mandatories, would be almost helpless against any invading or aggressive force, and that is exactly the old Berlin-to-Bagdad route. So that when you remember that there is at present a strong desire on the part of Austria to unite with Germany, you have the prospect of an industrial nation with seventy or eighty millions of people right in the heart of Europe, and to the southeast of it nothing but weakness, unless it is supported by the combined power of the world. 

 Unless you expect this structure built at Paris to be a house of cards, you have got to put into it the structural iron which will be afforded by the League of Nations. Take the history of the war that we have just been through. It is agreed by everybody that has expressed an opinion that if Germany had known that England would go in, she never would have started. What do you suppose she would have done if she had known that everybody else would have gone in? Of course she would never have started. If she had known that the world would have been against her, this war would not have occurred; and the League of Nations gives notice that if anything of that sort is tried again, the world will be against the nation that tries it, and with that assurance given that such a nation will have to fight the world, you may be sure that whatever illicit ambitions a nation may have, it cannot and will not attempt to realize them. But if they have not that assurance and can in the meantime set up an infinite network of intrigue such as we now know ran like a honeycomb through the world, then any arrangement will be broken down. This is the place where intrigue did accomplish the disintegration which made the realization of Germany's purposes almost possible. So that those people will have to make friends with their powerful neighbour Germany unless they have already made friends with all the rest of the world. So that we must have the League of Nations or else a repetition of the catastrophe we have just gone through. 

 Now if you put that case before the people of the United States and show them that without the League of Nations it is not worth while completing the treaty we are making in Paris, then you have got an argument which even an unidealistic people would respond to, and ours is not an unidealistic people but the most idealistic people in the world. Just let them catch the meaning which really underlies this and there won't be any doubt, as to what the response will be from; the hearts and from the judgments of the people of the United States. 

 I would hope, therefore, that forgetting elections for the time being we should devote our thought and our energies and our plans to this great business, to concert bi-partisan and non-partisan action, and by whatever sort of action, to concert every effort in support of this thing. I cannot imagine an orator being afforded a better theme, so trot out your orators and turn them loose, because they will have an inspiration in this that they have never had before, and I would like a guarantee that the best vocabulary they can mobilize won't be equal to the job. It surpasses past experience in the world and seems like a prospect of realizing what once seemed a remote hope of international morale. And you notice the basis of this thing. It guarantees the members of the League, guarantees to each their territorial integrity and political independence as against external aggression. 

 I found that all the other men around the conference table had a great respect for the right of revolution. We do not guarantee any state against what may happen inside itself, but we do guarantee against aggression from the outside, so that the family can be as lively as it pleases, and we know what generally happens to an interloper if you interfere in a family quarrel. There was a very interesting respect for the right of revolution; it may be because many of them thought it was nearer at hand than they had supposed and this immediate possibility breathed a respect in their minds. But whatever the reason was, they had a very great respect for it. I read the Virginia Bill of Rights very literally but not very elegantly to mean that any people is entitled to any kind of government it pleases and that it is none of our business to suggest or to influence the kind that it is going to have. Sometimes it will have a very riotous form of government, but that is none of our business. And I find that that is accepted, even with regard to Russia. Even conservative men like the representatives of Great Britain say it is not our business to dictate what kind of government Russia shall have. The only thing to do is to see if we can help them by conference and suggestion and recognition of the right elements to get together and not leave the country in a state of chaos. 

 It was for that reasonable purpose that we tried to have the Conference at a place I had never heard of before--a place called Prinkipos. I understand it is a place on the Bosphorus with fine summer hotels, etc. , and I was abashed to admit that I had never heard of it--but having plenty of house room, we thought that we could get the several Russian elements together there and see if we could not get them to sit down in one room together and tell us what it was all about and what they intended to do. The Bolshevists had accepted, but had accepted in a way that was studiously insulting. They said they would come, and were perfectly ready to say beforehand that they were ready to pay the foreign debt and ready to make concessions in economic matters, and that they were even ready to make territorial readjustments, which meant, "we are dealing with perjured governments whose only interest is in striking a bargain, and if that is the price of European recognition and cooperation, we are ready to pay it. "

 I never saw anybody more angered than Mr. Lloyd George, who said: "We cannot let that insult go by. We are not after their money or their concessions or their territory. That is not the point. We are their friends who want to help them and must tell them so. " We did not tell them so because to some of the people we had to deal with the payment of the foreign debt was a more interesting and important matter, but that will be made clear to them in conference, if they will believe it. But the Bolshevists, so far as we could get any taste of their flavour, are the most consummate sneaks in the world. I suppose because they know they have no high motives themselves, they do not believe that anybody else has. And Trotsky, having lived a few months in New York, was able to testify that the United States is in the hands of capitalists and does not serve anybody else's interests but the capitalists'. And the worst of it is, I think he honestly believes it. It would not have much effect if he didn't. Having received six dollars a week to write for a socialistic and anarchistic paper which believed that and printed it, and knowing how difficult it is to live on nothing but the wages of sin, he believes that the only wages paid here are the wages of sin. 

 But we cannot rescue Russia without having a united Europe. One of my colleagues in Paris said: "We could not go home and say we had made peace if we left half of Europe and half of Asia at war--because Russia constitutes half of Europe and Siberia constitutes half of Asia. " And yet we may have to go home without composing these great territories, but if we go home with a League of Nations, there will be some power to solve this most perplexing problem. 

 And so from every point of view, it is obvious to the men in Paris, obvious to those who in their own hearts are most indifferent to the League of Nations, that we have to tie in the provisions of the Treaty with the League of Nations because the League of Nations is the heart of the Treaty. It is the only machinery. It is the only solid basis of masonry that is in the Treaty, and in saying that I know that I am expressing the opinion of all those with whom I have been conferring. I cannot imagine any greater historic glory for the party than to have it said that for the time being it is thinking not of elections, but of the salvation of the plain people of the world, and the plain people of the world are looking to us who call ourselves Democrats to prove to the utmost point of sacrifice that we are indeed Democrats, with a small d as well as a large D, that we are ready to put the whole power and influence of America at the disposal of free men everywhere in the world no matter what the sacrifice involved, no matter what the danger to the cause. 

 And I would like, if I am not tiresome, to leave this additional thought in your mind. I was one of the first advocates of the mandatory. I do not at all believe in handing over any more territory than has already been handed over to any sovereign. I do not believe in putting the people of the German territories at the disposition, unsubordinated disposition, of any great power, and therefore I was a warm advocate of the idea of General Smuts--who, by the way, is an extraordinary person--who propounded the theory that the pieces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the pieces of the Turkish Empire and the German colonies were all political units or territorial units which ought to be accepted in trust by the family of nations, and not turned over to any member of the family, and that therefore the League of Nations would have as one of its chief functions to act as trustee for these great areas of dismembered empires. And yet the embarrassing moment came when they asked if the United States would be willing to accept a mandatory. I had to say off-hand that it would not be willing. I have got to say off-hand that in the present state of American opinion, at any rate, it wants to observe what I may call without offense Pharisaical cleanliness and not take anything out of the pile. It is its point of pride that it does not want to seem to take anything even by way of superintendence. And of course they said: "That is very disappointing, for this reason" (The reason they stated in as complimentary terms as I could have stated it myself): "You would be the most acceptable mandatory to any one of these peoples, and very few of us, if any, would be acceptable. " They said that in so many words, and it would greatly advance the peace of the world and the peace of mind of Europe if the United States would accept mandatories. I said: "I am perfectly willing to go home and stump the country and see if they will do it, " but I could not truthfully say off-hand that they would, because I did not know. Now what I wanted to suggest is this: Personally, and just within the limits of this room, I can say very frankly that I think we ought to. I think there is a very promising beginning in regard to countries like Armenia. The whole heart of America has been engaged for Armenia. They know more about Armenia and its sufferings than they know about any other European area; we have colleges out there; we have great missionary enterprises, just as we have had Robert College in Constantinople. That is a part of the world where already American influence extends, a saving influence and an educating and an uplifting influence. Colleges like Beirut in Syria have spread their influence very much beyond the limits of Syria, all through the Arabian country and Mesopotamia and in the distant parts of Asia Minor, and I am not without hope that the people of the United States would find it acceptable to go in and be the trustee of the interests of the Armenian people and see to it that the unspeakable Turk and the almost equally difficult Kurd had their necks sat on long enough to teach them manners and give the industrious and earnest people of Armenia time to develop a country which is naturally rich with possibilities. 

 Now the place where they all want us to accept a mandate most is at Constantinople. I may say that it seems to be rather the consensus of opinion there that Constantinople ought to be internationalized. So that the present idea apparently is to delimit the territory around Constantinople to include the Straits and set up a mandate for that territory which will make those Straits open to the nations of the world without any conditions and make Constantinople truly international--an internationalized free city and a free port--and America is the only nation in the world that can undertake that mandate and have the rest of the world believe that it is undertaken in good faith that we do not mean to stay there and set up our own sovereignty. So that it would be a very serious matter for the confidence of the world in this treaty if the United States did not accept a mandate for Constantinople. 

 What I have to suggest is that questions of that sort ought to be ventilated very thoroughly. This will appeal to the people of the United States: Are you going to take advantage of this and not any of the burden? Are you going to put the burden on the bankrupt states of Europe? For almost all of them are bankrupt in the sense that they cannot undertake any new things. I think that will appeal to the American people: that they ought to take the burdens--for they are burdens. Nobody is going to get anything out of a mandatory of Constantinople or Armenia. It is a work of disinterested philanthropy. And if you first present that idea and then make tentative expositions of where we might go in as a mandatory, I think that the people will respond. If we went in at Constantinople, for example, I think it is true that almost all the influential men who are prominent in the affairs of Bulgaria and were graduates of Robert College would be immediately susceptible to American interests. They would take American guidance when they would not take any other guidance. 

 But I wish I could stay home and tackle this job with you. There is nothing I would like to do so much as really to say in parliamentary language what I think of the people that are opposing it. I would reserve the right in private to say in unparliamentary language what I think of them, but in public I would try to stick to parliamentary language. Because of all the blind and little, provincial people, they are the littlest and most contemptible. It is not their character so much that I have a contempt for, though that contempt is thoroughgoing, but their minds. They have not got even good working imitations of minds. They remind me of a man with a head that is not a head but is just a knot providentially put there to keep him from ravelling out, but why the Lord should not have been willing to let them ravel out I do not know, because they are of no use, and if I could really say what I think about them, it would be picturesque. But the beauty of it is that their ignorance and their provincialism can be made so perfectly visible. They have horizons that do not go beyond their parish; they do not even reach to the edges of the parish, because the other people know more than they do. The whole impulse of the modern time is against them. They are going to have the most conspicuously contemptible names in history. The gibbets that they are going to be executed on by future historians will scrape the heavens, they will be so high. They won't be turned in the direction of heaven at all, but they will be very tall, and I do not know any fate more terrible than to be exhibited in that future catalogue of the men who are utterly condemned by the whole spirit of humanity. If I did not despise them, I would be sorry for them. 

 Now I have sometimes a very cheering thought. On the fifth of March, 1921, I am going to begin to be an historian again instead of an active public man, and I am going to have the privilege of writing about these gentlemen without any restraints of propriety. The President, if my experience is a standard, is liable some day to burst by merely containing restrained gases. Anybody in the Senate or House can say any abusive thing he pleases about the President, but it shocks the sense of propriety of the whole country if the President says what he thinks about them. And that makes it very fortunate that the term of the President is limited, because no president could stand it for a number of years. But when the lid is off, I am going to resume my study of the dictionary to find adequate terms in which to describe the fatuity of these gentlemen with their poor little minds that never get anywhere but run around in a circle and think they are going somewhere. I cannot express my contempt for their intelligence, but because I think I know the people of the United States, I can predict their future with absolute certainty. I am not concerned as to the ultimate outcome of this thing at all, not for a moment, but I am concerned that the outcome should be brought about immediately, just as promptly as possible. So my hope is that we will all put on our war paint, not as Democrats but as Americans, get the true American pattern of war paint and a real hatchet and go out on the war path and get a collection of scalps that has never been excelled in the history of American warfare. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII

JAPAN--SHANTUNG

One of the settlements embodied in the Versailles Treaty upon which theenemies of the President in this country concentrated their fires of wrathand hatred against the President was the so-called Shantung settlement. The partisan enemies of the President, realizing the irreconcilableantagonism of certain of our people to the Japanese, did everything theycould to intensify this antagonism, picturing the President as one who hadconceded something to Japan at the expense of helpless China. 

Not love of China, but hatred of Woodrow Wilson led partisan Republicans, without careful investigation of the actual situation, to seize on theShantung affair as an opportunity to embarrass the President. Theignorances and prejudices of many of our people on the subject of Chinaplayed into the hands of those Republicans, whose main object was toinjure the President and defeat the Treaty. Very few sought to understandthe settlement or to ascertain the facts that formed the historicbackground of it. 

These facts were clearly set forth by the President himself in a speechdelivered at Los Angeles, California, on September 20, 1919. The Presidentsaid:

 Let me recall some circumstances which probably most of you have forgotten. I have to go back to the year 1898, for it was in March of that year that these cessions which formerly belonged to Germany were transferred to her by the Government of China. What had happened was that two German missionaries in China had been murdered. The Central Government at Peking had done everything that was in its power to do to quiet the local disturbances, to allay the local prejudice against foreigners which led to the murders, but had been unable to do so, and the German Government held them responsible, nevertheless, for the murder of the missionaries. It was not the missionaries that the German Government was interested in. That was a pretext. Germany insisted that, because this thing had happened for which the Peking Government could not really with justice be held responsible, a very large and important part of one of the richest provinces of China should be ceded to her for sovereign control, for a period of 99 years, that she should have the right to penetrate the interior of that province with a railway, and that she should have the right to exploit any ores that lay within 30 miles either side of that railway. She forced the Peking Government to say that they did it in gratitude to the German Government for certain services which she was supposed to have rendered but never did render. That was the beginning. I do not know whether any of the gentlemen who are criticizing the present Shantung settlement were in public affairs at that time or not, but I will tell you what happened, so far as this Government was concerned. 

 One of the most enlightened and humane presidents we have ever had was at the head of the Government--William McKinley, a man who loved his fellow men and believed in justice--and associated with him was one of our ablest secretaries of state--Mr. John Hay. The state of international law was such then that they did not feel at liberty to make even a protest against these concessions to Germany. Neither did they make any protest when, immediately following that, similar concessions were made to Russia, to Great Britain, and to France. It was almost immediately after that that China granted to Russia the right of the possession and control of Port Arthur and a portion of the region of Talienwan. Then England, not wishing to be outdone, although she had similar rights elsewhere in China, insisted upon a similar concession and got Weihaiwei. Then France insisted that she must have a port, and got it for 99 years. Not against one of those did the Government of the United States make any protest whatever. They only insisted that the door should not be shut in any of these regions against the trade of the United States. You have heard of Mr. Hay's policy of the open door. That was his policy of the open door-- not the open door to the rights of China, but the open door to the goods of America. I want you to understand, my fellow countrymen, I am not criticizing this because, until we adopt the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is an unfriendly act for any government to interfere in the affairs of any other unless its own interests are immediately concerned. The only thing Mr. McKinley and Mr. Hay were at liberty to do was to call attention to the fact that the trade of the United States might be unfavourably affected and insist that in no circumstances it should be. They got from all of these powers the promise that it should not be a promise which was more or less kept. Following that came the war between Russia and Japan, and at the close of that war Japan got Port Arthur and all the rights which Russia enjoyed in China, just as she is now getting Shantung and the rights her recently defeated enemy had in China--an exactly similar operation. That peace that gave her Port Arthur was concluded, as you know, on the territory of the United States--at Portsmouth, N. H. Nobody dreamed of protesting against that. Japan had beaten Russia. Port Arthur did not at that time belong to China; it belonged for the period of the lease to Russia, and Japan was ceded what Japan had taken by the well-recognized processes of war. 

 Very well, at the opening of this war, Japan went and took Kiauchow and supplanted Germany in Shantung Province. The whole process is repeated, but repeated with a new sanction. In the meantime, after this present war began, England and France, not at the same time, but successively, feeling that it was essential that they should have the assistance of Japan on the Pacific, agreed that if Japan would go into this war and take whatever Germany had in the Pacific she should retain everything north of the equator which had belonged to Germany. That treaty now stands. That treaty absolutely binds Great Britain and France. Great Britain and France can not in honour, having offered Japan this inducement to enter the war and continue her operations, consent to an elimination of the Shantung provision from the present treaty. Very well, let us put these gentlemen who are objecting to the Shantung settlement to the test. Are they ready to fight Great Britain and France and Japan, who will have to stand together, in order to get this province back for China? I know they are not, and their interest in China is not the interest of assisting China, but of defeating the Treaty. They know beforehand that a modification of the Treaty in that respect cannot be obtained, and they are insisting upon what they know is impossible; but if they ratify the Treaty and accept the Covenant of the League of Nations they do put themselves in a position to assist China. They put themselves in that position for the very first time in the history of international engagements. They change the whole faith of international affairs, because after you have read the much-debated Article 10 of the Covenant, I advise you to read Article 11. Article 11 says that it shall be the friendly right of any member of the League to call attention at any time to anything, anywhere, that threatens to disturb the peace of the world or the good understanding between nations upon which the peace of the world depends. That in itself constitutes a revolution in international relationships. Anything that affects the peace of any part of the world is the business of every nation. It does not have simply to insist that its trade shall not be interfered with; it has the right to insist that the rights of mankind shall not be interfered with. Not only that, but back of this provision with regard to Shantung lies, as everybody knows or ought to know, a very honourable promise which was made by the Government of Japan in my presence in Paris, namely, that just as soon as possible after the ratification of this treaty they will return to China all sovereign rights in the Province of Shantung. Great Britain has not promised to return Weihaiwei; France has not promised to return her part. Japan has promised to relinquish all the sovereign rights which were acquired by Germany for the remaining 78 of the 99 years of the lease, and to retain only what other governments have in many other parts of China, namely, the right to build and operate the railway under a corporation and to exploit the mines in the immediate neighbourhood of that railway. In other words, she retains only the rights of economic concessionaries. Personally, I am frank to say that I think all of these nations have invaded some of the essential rights of China by going too far in the concessions which they have demanded, but that is an old story now, and we are beginning a new story. In the new story we all have the right to balk about what they have been doing and to convince them, by the pressure of the public opinion of the world, that a different course of action would be just and right. I am for helping China and not turning away from the only way in which I can help her. Those are the facts about Shantung. 

Of all the important decisions of the Peace Conference, none worried thePresident so much as that relating to the Shantung settlement, and in aspeech at Des Moines, on September 6, 1919, he expressed hisdissatisfaction in the following words:

 There is the settlement, which you have heard so much discussed, about that rich and ancient province of Shantung in China. I do not like that settlement any better than you do, but these were the circumstances: In order to induce Japan to cooperate in the war and clear the Pacific of the German power, England, and subsequently France, bound themselves without any qualifications to see to it that Japan got anything in China that Germany had and that Japan would take it away from her, upon the strength of which promise Japan proceeded to take away Kiauchow and occupy the portions of Shantung Province which had been ceded by China for a term of years to Germany. The most that could be got out of it was that in view of the fact that America had nothing to do with it, the Japanese were ready to promise that they would give up every item of sovereignty which Germany would otherwise have enjoyed in Shantung Province and return it without restriction to China, and that they would retain in the province only the economic concessions such as other nations already had elsewhere in China--though you do not hear anything about that--concessions in the railway and the mines which had become attached to the railway for operative purposes. But suppose that you say that is not enough. Very well, then, stay out of the Treaty, and how will that accomplish anything? England and France are bound and cannot escape their obligation. Are you going to institute a war against Japan and France and England to get Shantung back for China? That is an operation which does not commend itself to the present generation. 

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, in his book "What Wilson Did in Paris, " says:

 Of all the important decisions at the Peace Conference none worried the President so much as that relating to the disposition of the Shantung peninsula--and none, finally, satisfied him less. Not one of the problems he had to meet at Paris, serious as they all were, did he take more personally to heart than this. He told me on one occasion that he had been unable to sleep on the previous night for thinking of it. 

 Those last days before the Treaty was finished were among the hardest of the entire Conference. As I have said before, the most difficult and dangerous problems had inevitably been left to the last, and had all to be finally settled in those crowded days of late April. 

 Consider, for a moment, the exact situation at Paris on April 29th, when the Japanese-Chinese crises reached the explosive point. 

 It was on that very day that the German delegates were coming morosely into Versailles, ready for a treaty that was not yet finished. The Three--for Orlando had then withdrawn from the Conference--had been gradually lengthening their sessions, the discussions were longer and more acrimonious. They were tired out. Only six days before, on April 23rd, the High Council had been hopelessly deadlocked on the Italian question. The President had issued his bold message to the world regarding the disposition of Fiume and the Italian delegation departed from Paris with the expectation that their withdrawal would either force the hands of the Conference, or break it up. 

 While this crisis was at its height the Belgian delegation, which had long been restive over the non-settlement of Belgian claims for reparations, became insistent. They had no place in the Supreme Council and they were worried lest the French and British--neither of whom could begin to get enough money out of Germany to pay for its losses--would take the lion's share and leave Belgium unrestored. The little nations were always worried at Paris lest the big ones take everything and leave them nothing! Very little appeared in the news at the time concerning the Belgian demands, but they reached practically an ultimatum: if Belgium were not satisfied she also would withdraw from the Conference and refuse to sign the Treaty. 

 It was at this critical moment that the Chinese-Japanese question had to be settled. It had to be settled because the disposition of German rights in China (unlike Italian claims in the Adriatic) had to go into the German Treaty before it was presented to Brockdorff Rantzau and his delegates at Versailles; and because the Japanese would not sign the Treaty unless it was settled. The defection of Japan, added to that of Italy and the possible withdrawal of Belgium, would have made the situation desperate. 

 The two principal things that Japan wanted at the Peace Conference were: first, a recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations of the "equality of the nations and the just treatment of their nationals"; and, second, the recognition of certain rights over the former German concessions in China (Shantung. )

 After a struggle lasting all through the Conference, Japan had finally lost out, in the meeting of the League of Nations Commission on April 11th, in her first great contention. She was refused the recognition of racial or even national equality which she demanded although a majority of the nations represented on the League of Nations Commission agreed with her that her desire for such recognition was just and should find a place in the Covenant. .. . 

 Few people realize how sharply the Japanese felt this hurt to their pride: and few people realize the meaning of this struggle, as a forerunner of one of the great coming struggles of civilization--the race struggle. .. . 

 Having lost out in their first great contention the Japanese came to the settlement of their second demand with a feeling of irritation but with added determination. The Japanese delegates were the least expressive of any at the Conference: they said the least: but they were the firmest of any in hewing to the line of their interests and their agreements. It must not be forgotten also, in all fairness, that the Japanese delegates, not less than the British, French, and American, had their own domestic political problems, and opposition, and that there was a powerful demand in Japan that, while all the other nations were securing some return for their losses and sacrifices in the war, Japan should also get some return. 

 At the same time Japan was in a stronger position than any other of the Allied and Associated Powers except the United States. She had been little hurt, and much strengthened by the war. She was far distant from danger; she did not need the League of Nations as much as did the countries of Europe; and, more than anything else, she occupied a strong legal status, for her claims were supported by treaties both with China and the Allies; and she was, moreover, in a position, if she were rendered desperate, to take by force what she considered to be her rights if the Allies refused to accord them. 

 At a dark moment of the war, the spring of 1917, the British and French, in order to sharpen Japanese support of the allied cause, made private agreements to sustain the claims of Japan at the Peace Conference to German rights in Shantung. It thus happened, in the Council of Three, for Orlando had then gone home, that two of the powers, Great Britain and France, were bound by their pledged word to Japan. Indeed, the British argued that they felt themselves indebted to the Japanese not only as a long-friendly ally but for helping to keep the Pacific free of the enemy while Australian troops were being transported to Europe and thus relieving a great burden for the British fleet. It must not be forgotten that China was also bound by the Treaty and Notes of 1915 and the Notes of 1918 with Japan-- although China vigorously asserted that all of these agreements were entered into upon her part under coercion by Japan. In fact, one of the Chinese delegates at Paris had actually signed one of the agreements which he was now asking the Conference to overthrow. 

 It was not only this wire entanglement of treaties which Mr. Wilson found in his advance, but it must be said, in all frankness, that, in opposing Japan's demands for economic privileges and a "sphere of influence" in China, he was also opposing a principle which every other strong nation at the Conference believed in and acted upon, if not in China, then elsewhere in the world. Japan asserted that she was only asking for the rights already conceded to other nations. Japan was thus in a very strong position in insisting upon her claims, and China in a very weak position. 

 In this crisis Mr. Wilson was face to face with difficult alternatives. If he stood stiffly for immediate justice to China, he would have to force Great Britain and France to break their pledged word with Japan. Even if he succeeded in doing this, he still would have had to face the probability, practically the certainty, that Japan would withdraw from the Conference and go home. This would not only keep Japan out of the League, but it would go far toward eventually disrupting the Peace Conference, already shaken by the withdrawal of Italy and the dangerous defection of Belgium. Such a weakening of the Peace Conference and of the Alliance of the Great Powers would have the immediate effect of encouraging the Germans not to sign the Treaty and of holding off in the hope that the forces of industrial unrest then spreading all over Europe might overwhelm France or Italy. It would also have a highly irritating effect upon all the bolshevist elements in Europe--increasing uncertainty, and the spread of anarchical conditions. With Japan out of the association of western nations there was also the possibility, voiced just at this time in both French and British newspapers, that she would begin building up alliances of her own in the East--possibly with Germany and Russia. Indeed, if the truth were told, this was probably the most important consideration of all in shaping the final decision. It was the plain issue between the recrudescence, in a new and more dangerous form, of the old system of military alliances and balances of power, and the new system of world organization in a league of nations. It was the militaristic Prussian idea against the American Wilsonian idea. 

 No statesman probably ever had a more difficult problem presented to him than did Mr. Wilson upon the momentous 29th of April, 1919. At that moment three things seemed of extreme importance if anything was to be saved out of the wreckage of the world. The first was a speedy peace, so that men everywhere might return to the work of production and reconstruction and the avenues of trade everywhere be opened. Peace and work! The second was of supreme importance--keeping the great Allies firmly welded together to steady a world which was threatened with anarchy. It was absolutely necessary to keep a going concern in the world! The third was to perpetuate this world organization in a league of nations: this the most important of all, for it had reference to the avalanche of new problems which were just ahead. 

 If the Conference were broken up, or even if Italy remained out, and Japan went out, these things would be impossible. On the other hand, if the Allies could be kept firmly together, peace established, and a league of nations brought into being, there was a chance of going forward with world reconstruction on the broadest lines, and of the full realization of the principles of justice laid down in the Armistice terms and accepted by all nations. The Treaty, after all, is no final settlement; it is only one step in the great process of world reconstruction. 

 It was with all these considerations in view that the Shantung settlement was made by the Council of Three sitting in the President's house in the Place des États-Unis--with the Japanese in full agreement. 

 This settlement was in two parts, the first set forth in the Treaty itself, and the second a special agreement of the three Great Powers with Japan. I find that this fact is not clear to many people, who look for the entire settlement in the Treaty itself. 

 Under sections 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty all the rights at Kiauchow and in Shantung Province formerly belonging to Germany are transferred without reservation to Japan. This conforms broadly with the various treaties, and gives a proud nation what it considered its full rights. 

 On the other hand, the Japanese delegates at the Conference, on behalf of their government, made a voluntary agreement "to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao. "

 Under this agreement, by which Japan makes an unqualified recession of the sovereign rights in Shantung to China, she also agrees to remove all Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula "at the earliest possible time. "

 Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are already possessed by one or two great powers and the whole future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations, by the provisions of which the territorial integrity and political independence of China will be insured. 

 If the President had risked everything in standing for the immediate and complete realization of the Chinese demands, and had broken up the Conference upon that issue, it would not have put Japan either politically or economically out of China. Neither our people nor the British would go to war with Japan solely to keep her out of Shantung. The only hope of China in the future--and Wilson looks not only to the removal of the sphere of influence which Japan controls but to the removal of all other spheres of foreign influence in China--is through a firm world organization, a league of nations in which these problems can be brought up for peaceful settlement. .. . "The settlement, of course, was a compromise: a balance of considerations. It was the problem of the President, all through the Conference, when to 'accommodate' and when to use decided policies. 'The wisdom of the statesman, ' said Cavour (quoted by Thayer in his admirable 'Life'), 'consists in discerning when the time has come for the one or the other. '"

 "The Shantung decision is about as good a settlement as could be had out of a dirty past. "

Even I felt bitterly critical of what seemed to me to be the President'ssurrender to Japan in the matter of Shantung. But when he returned andtold me the whole story and explained the complicated and delicate worldsituation which confronted him, I agreed with him that he had obtained outof a bad mess the best possible settlement. 

In addition to the various cabled messages which passed between thePresident and myself, which will be found in Appendix "C, " was thefollowing:

 Received at The White House, Washington, April 30, 1919. 

 Paris TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 The Japanese-Chinese matter has been settled in a way which seems to me as satisfactory as could be got out of the tangle of treaties in which China herself was involved, and it is important that the exact facts should be known. I therefore send you the following for public use at such time as the matter may come under public discussion. In the Treaty all the rights at Kiao-Chau and in Shantung Province belonging to Germany are to be transferred without opposition to Japan, but Japan voluntarily engages, in answer to the questions put in Conference, that it will be her immediate policy to _Quote_ hand back the surveyed peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtau. Owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose. The police force will be composed of Chinese and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese government _End quote_. 

 It was understood in addition that inasmuch as the sovereign rights receded to China were to be unqualified, all Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula should be withdrawn at the earliest possible time. Japan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are possessed by one or two other great powers and are only too common in China, and the future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and political independence. I find a general disposition to look with favour upon the proposal that at an early date throughout the mediation of the League of Nations all extraordinary foreign rights in China and all spheres of influence should be abrogated by the common consent of all the nations concerned. I regard the assurances given by Japan as very satisfactory in view of the complicated circumstances. Please do not give out any of the above as a quotation from me, but use it in some other form for public information at the right time. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

CHAPTER XXXIX

IRELAND

To one standing on the side-lines in the capital of the nation andwitnessing the play of the ardent passions of the people of the Irishrace, demanding that some affirmative action be taken by our government tobring about the realization of the right of self-determination forIreland, it seemed as if the American President, Woodrow Wilson, who firstgave utterance to the ideal of self-determination for all the oppressedpeoples of the world, was woefully unmindful of the age-long struggle thatIrishmen had been making to free their own beloved land from Britishdomination. But to those, like myself, who were on the inside of affairs, it was evident that in every proper and legitimate way the AmericanPresident was cautiously searching for efficient means to advance thecause of self-government in Ireland and to bring about a definite andsatisfactory solution of this complicated problem. 

Embarrassed as he was by a delicate diplomatic situation, which to a greatextent governed his conduct, he was not free openly to espouse the causeof Ireland. To have done so would have been to add difficulties to analready chaotic world situation. He was compelled in what he was seekingto do for Ireland to move quietly and by informal conferences impressivelyto lay the case of Ireland before those who sought his counsel in thematter. Unfortunately, these quiet methods of helpfulness which he broughtto the task were the things that drew the fire of criticism and evendistrust of many men of the Irish race in America, who in their passionatedevotion to the cause which lay so close to their hearts could see only adirect route to accomplishing what they had in mind. 

Long before the European war the President and I had often discussed theIrish cause and how to make his influence felt in a way that would bringresults without becoming involved in diplomatic snarls with Great Britain. He was of the opinion that the Irish problem could not be settled byforce, for the spirit of Ireland, which for centuries had been demandingjustice, was unconquerable. He pointed out to me on many occasions when wediscussed this delicate matter, that the policy of force and reprisalwhich the English Government had for centuries practised in had butstrengthened the tenacious purpose of the Irish people and had onlysucceeded in keeping under the surface the seething dissatisfaction ofthat indomitable race. 

I recall that at the conclusion of one of our talks after a Cabinetmeeting, shaking his head as if he despaired of a settlement, thePresident said: "European statesmen can never learn that humanity can bewelded together only by love, by sympathy, and by justice, and not byjealousy and hatred. " He was certain that the failure of England to findan adjustment was intensifying feeling not only in our own country, butthroughout the world, and that the agitation for a settlement would spreadlike a contagion and would inevitably result in a great national crisis. 

An interesting comment on the President's attitude toward the Irishquestion appears in an article in the _Atlantic Monthly_ for October, 1921. The article is by Joseph Fort Newton, in his series, "Preaching inLondon. " The comment is as follows:

 To-day a distinguished London minister told me a story about the President, for which he vouches. He had it from the late Sylvester Horne--Member of Parliament and minister of Whitefield's Chapel--who had known the President for years before he was elevated to his high office. Home happened to be in America--where he was always a welcome guest--before the war, shortly after the President was inaugurated, and he called at the White House to pay his respects. In the course of the talk, he expressed satisfaction that the relations between England and America would be in safe hands while the President was in office. The President said nothing, and Horne wondered at it. Finally he forced the issue, putting it as a question point-blank. The President said, addressing him in the familiar language of religious fellowship: "Brother Horne, one of the greatest calamities that has befallen mankind will come during my term of office. It will come from Germany. Go home and settle the Irish question, and there will be no doubt as to where America will stand. "

In discussing the matter with me, he said: "The whole policy of GreatBritain in its treatment of the Irish question has unfortunately beenbased upon a policy of fear and not a policy of trusting the Irish people. How magnificently the policy of trust and faith worked out in the case ofthe Boers. Unfortunately, the people of Ireland now believe that the basisof England's policy toward them is revenge, malice, and destruction. Youremember, Tumulty, how the haters of the South in the days ofreconstruction sought to poison Lincoln's mind by instilling into iteverything that might lead him in his treatment of the South toward apolicy of reprisal, but he contemptuously turned away from everysuggestion as a base and ignoble thing. Faith on the part of Great Britainin the deep humanity and inherent generosity of the Irish people is theonly force that will ever lead to a settlement of this question. Englishstatesmen must realize that in the last analysis force never permanentlysettles anything. It only produces hatreds and resentments that make asolution of any question difficult and almost impossible. I have tried toimpress upon the Englishmen with whom I have discussed this matter thatthere never can be a real comradeship between America and England untilthis issue is definitely settled and out of the way. "

Many times in informal discussions with British representatives that cameto the White House the President sought to impress upon them the necessityfor a solution, pointing out to them how their failure was embarrassingour relations with Great Britain at every point. I am sure that if hecould with propriety have done so, Woodrow Wilson would long ago havedirectly suggested to Great Britain a settlement of the Irish question, but, unfortunately, serious diplomatic obstacles lay in the way of an openespousal of the Irish cause. He was sadly aware that under internationallaw no nation has the right to interest itself in anything that directlyconcerns the affairs of another friendly nation, for by the traditions ofdiplomacy such "interference" puts in jeopardy the cordial relations ofthe nations involved in such controversy. 

Long before he became president, Woodrow Wilson had eloquently declaredhis attitude with reference to self-government for Ireland and had openlyespoused the cause of Irish freedom. In a speech delivered at NewBrunswick, New Jersey, on October 26, 1910, he said:

 Have you read the papers recently attentively enough to notice the rumours that are coming across the waters? What are the rumours? The rumours are that the English programme includes, not only self- government for Ireland, but self government for Scotland, and the drawing together in London or somewhere else of a parliament which will represent the British Empire in a great confederated state upon the model, no doubt, of the United States of America, and having its power to the end of the world. What is at the bottom of that programme? At the bottom of it is the idea that no little group of men like the English people have the right to govern men in all parts of the world without drawing them into real substantial partnership, where their voice will count with equal weight with the voice of other parts of the country. 

 This voice that has been crying in Ireland, this voice for home rule, is a voice which is now supported by the opinion of the world; this impulse is a spirit which ought to be respected and recognized in the British Constitution. It means not mere vague talk of men's rights, men's emotions, and men's inveterate and traditional principles, but it means the embodiment of these things in something that is going to be done, that will look with hope to the programme that may come out of these conferences. 

 If those who conduct the Government of Great Britain are not careful the restlessness will spread with rapid agitation until the whole country is aflame, and then there will be revolution and a change of government. 

In this speech he plainly indicated that his plan for the settlement ofthe Irish question was the establishment of some forum to which the causeof Ireland might be brought, where the full force of the public opinion ofthe world, including the United States, could be brought to play in avigorous and whole-hearted insistence upon a solution of this world-disturbing question. 

As we read the daily papers, containing accounts of the disturbances inIreland, what a prophetic vision underlay the declaration contained in thespeech of Woodrow Wilson in 1910!

 If those who conduct the Government of Great Britain are not careful the restlessness will spread with rapid agitation until the whole country is aflame, and then there will be revolution and a change of government. 

I recall his passionate resentment of the attitude and threats of SirEdward Carson, leader of the Unionist forces in the British Parliament, when he read the following statement of Carson carried in the AmericanPress, after the passage of Home Rule through the House of Lords: "In theevent of this proposed parliament being thrust upon us, we solemnly andmutually pledge ourselves not to recognize its authority. I do not caretwo pence whether this is treason or not. "

Discussing Carson's utterance the President said: "I would like to be inMr. Asquith's place. I would show this rebel whether he would recognizethe authority of the Government or flaunt it. He ought to be hanged fortreason. If Asquith does not call this gentleman's bluff, the contagion ofunrest and rebellion in Ireland will spread until only a major operationwill save the Empire. Dallying with gentlemen of this kind who openlyadvocate revolution will only add to the difficulties. If those inauthority in England will only act firmly now, their difficulties will belessened. A little of the firmness and courage of Andrew Jackson wouldforce a settlement of the Irish question right now. "

The President did not agree with the friends of Irish freedom in Americathat coercive methods put upon England through the instrumentality of theUnited States could accomplish anything. When he left for the other sideto take part in the Peace Conference, the future of Ireland was much inhis thoughts, but his solution of the problem lay in the establishment ofa forum under the League of Nations before which not only the cause ofIreland but the cause of any oppressed people might be brought to thejudgment of mankind. 

Ireland's affairs were always in the background of the President'sthoughts and he welcomed conversations with those who were in a positionto offer helpful suggestions. I append a correspondence, intimate incharacter and now for the first time "exposed to the public view, " betweenthe President, Mr. Sidney Brooks, a noted English writer, and myself:

 Friday, April 20, 1917. 

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 After several months in America I am now returning to England, returning, I need not say, in a very happy mood and with the consciousness that the relations between our two countries are at length set fair. There is nothing nearer to my heart than improving them, and I believe I see how they could be improved and particularly how the last great obstacle to their betterment--I mean, of course, Ireland--could be lessened, if not removed. I should very greatly value an opportunity of setting before you some views I have formed on the matter, if an opportunity could be found before the arrival of the British Commission. 

 I leave Washington on Sunday and sail for England on the following Saturday, but not, I trust, without being able to pay you my respects and say my adieux in person. 

 Believe me, dear Mr. President, Yours very sincerely, SIDNEY BROOKS. 

 THE PRESIDENT, The White House. 

In forwarding this letter to the President, I accompanied it by thefollowing note:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 April 20, 1917. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 I just had a little talk with Sidney Brooks who says he has been in correspondence with Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe with reference to the Home Rule question. He believes that just a little push by you in your private talk with Mr. Balfour would put over home rule. He says if you could bring home to Balfour the amount of American public sentiment which favours it and how a denial of it is working to the disadvantage of England in this country, it would make a great impression. He says after the war there will of course be a great and generous cooperation between England and this country; but that there will never be genuine cooperation between the people of America and the people of England until the Irish question is settled. 

 Sincerely yours, TUMULTY. 

The President replied to me in the following note:

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 Confidentially (for I beg that you will be careful not to speak of or intimate this), I have been doing a number of things about this which I hope may bear fruit. 

 THE PRESIDENT. 

Mr. John D. Crimmins, a leading Irish sympathizer, addressed the followingletter to the President:

 Washington, D. C. , April 28, 1917. 

 MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 The press this morning leads to the impression that at some timely hour, in your own manner, you will have a word on the Irish problem that at this moment appears to be near solution. 

 It would be most timely and would have the heartfelt gratitude of millions of people in this and other lands who have long hoped, and many prayed, for Ireland as a small nation to have autonomy, thereby establishing peace with England and among English-speaking people. Then if an emergency should arise there would be all for one and one for all. Mr. President, you have gone a long step in that direction in declaring the rights of small nations--another step may be the means of reaching the goal for the Irish people. 

 Faithfully yours, JOHN D. CRIMMINS. 

 His Excellency, Woodrow Wilson. 

The President read this letter with a great deal of interest and sent methe following note, evidencing his sincere interest in all that Mr. Crimmins had said:

 DEAR TUMULTY:

 You are right about Mr. Crimmins having been a good friend, but I don't like to write any letters on this subject at present. I would appreciate it very much if you would assure him of my interest and of your knowledge of the fact that I am showing in every way I possibly can my sympathy with the claim of Ireland for home rule. 

 THE PRESIDENT. 

On December 3, 1919, Bishop Shahan, of the Catholic University, addresseda letter to the President in behalf of the rector and faculties of theCatholic University of America with reference to the question of HomeRule, to which the President replied:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 3 December, 1919. 

 MY DEAR BISHOP SHAHAN:

 Allow me to acknowledge your letter of November 30th written in behalf of the rector and faculties of the Catholic University of America, and to say that it will be my endeavour in regard to every question which arises before the Peace Conference to do my utmost to bring about the realization of the principles to which your letter refers. The difficulties and delicacy of the task are very great, and I cannot confidently forecast what I can do. I can only say that I shall be watchful of every opportunity to insist upon the principles I have enunciated. 

 Cordially and sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 The Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. 

On December 3, 1918, he addressed a letter to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, ofMontana, as follows:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 3 December, 1919. 

 MY DEAR SENATOR:

 I appreciate the importance of a proper solution of the Irish question and thank you for the suggestions of your letter of yesterday. Until I get on the other side and find my footing in delicate matters of this sort I cannot forecast with any degree of confidence what influence I can exercise, but you may be sure that I shall keep this important interest in mind and shall use my influence at every opportunity to bring about a just and satisfactory solution. 

 I greatly value the expressions of your confidence and feel very much strengthened by them. 

 With the best wishes, Cordially and sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 Hon. Thomas J. Walsh, United States Senate. 

While the President was in Paris, I constantly kept him in touch with thesituation in this country, and that he was interested in bringing to theattention of the Peace Conference the cause of Ireland is made clear bythe following cables that were exchanged between us. 

On June 7, 1919, I cabled Admiral Grayson, for the President as follows:

 The White House, Washington, 7 June, 1919. 

 You cannot overestimate real intensity of feeling behind Irish question here. It is growing every day and is not at all confined to Irishmen. The passage of resolution of sympathy with almost unanimous vote in Senate last night is but a slight evidence of interest here. I wish the President could do just a little for I fear reaction here upon League of Nations. If this situation could be straightened out, it would help a great deal. 

 TUMULTY. 

The President himself replied to this cable, showing the depth of hisinterest in the matter:

 Paris, 8 June, 1919. 

 I have tried to help in the Irish matter, but the extraordinary indiscretion of the American delegation over here has almost completely blocked everything. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

On June 9, 1919, I received a further cable from the President, asfollows:

 Paris, 9 June, 1919. 

 The American Committee of Irishmen have made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to render the assistance we were diligently trying to render in the matter of bringing the Irish aspirations to the attention of the Peace Conference. By our unofficial activity in the matter we had practically cleared the way for the coming of the Irish Representatives to Paris when the American Commission went to Ireland and behaved in a way which so inflamed British opinion that the situation has got quite out of hand, and we are utterly at a loss how to act in the matter without involving the Government of the United States with the Government of Great Britain in a way which might create an actual breach between the two. I made an effort day before yesterday in this matter which shows, I am afraid, the utter futility of further efforts. I am distressed that the American Commission should have acted with such extreme indiscretion and lack of sense, and can at the moment see nothing further to do. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

To this cable I replied as follows:

 The White House, Washington, 9 June, 1919. 

 Thanks for message about Ireland, Hope you will not allow indiscretions of American Commission to influence your judgment against Ireland. Lloyd George's mistakes in handling this will be his undoing, for it has in it the elements of a revolution. It is our own political situation here and the fate of the Treaty itself that concern me. In this country the Irish are united in this matter and in every large city and town are carrying on a propaganda, asking that Ireland be given the right of self-determination. George Creel, in a powerful article yesterday in the newspapers, said: _Quote_ The question of Ireland cannot be ignored, either in honour or decency _End quote_. I trust you can say a word. Could you not ask that Irish delegates be given a chance to present their case to the Conference?

 TUMULTY. 

On June 25, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President:

 General Maurice, in wonderful article in New York _Times_ on League of Nations, says about Ireland: _Quote_ One obvious need to complete the process of bringing all nations together is that we should show that we know what America did in the war, but there is another obvious need, which presents greater difficulties. We must have a policy in regard to Ireland, which we can explain to the American people. At present Ireland threatens to reopen all the rifts which comradeship in the war is closing _End quote_. 

 The New York Evening _Post_ of last night prints the following editorial:

 _Quote_ Self-Government for the Irish people, short of independence, is a right and a necessity, and it is a satisfaction that once more a movement is under way for the establishment of Ireland on the basis which logic and history have determined--a dominion on an equal footing with the other dominions under the British crown _End quote_. 

 Frankly, this represents the opinion of the average man in America, without regard to race or religion. The arrival of De Valera in America is going to intensify the feeling and the Republicans will take full advantage of it. Now that the League of Nations is on its feet, we should take the lead in this matter. It would do more toward bringing about a real comradeship between England and America than anything that could happen. I think that the situation in Africa, India, and the seriousness of the situation in Canada, will inevitably force England to consider these matters. It is in anticipation of this that I am anxious to have you play a leading part in this situation. It would do much to make the League of Nations a living, vital force in the affairs of the world. There are no boundary lines between free peoples any more. 

 TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

 TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 Paris, June 27, 1919. 

 I entirely agree with the general tenor of your cable of the twenty- fifth about the Irish question and I firmly believe when the League of Nations is once organized it will afford a forum not now available for bringing the opinion of the world and of the United States in particular to bear on just such problems. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

Of course, the thing which lay close to Woodrow Wilson's heart was thesetting up of the League of Nations. Unless England and France shouldconsent to the establishment of a league as part of a world settlement, any solution of the Irish question through the influence of world opinionwas not in the reckoning. The wise, prudent thing, therefore, to do wasfirst to establish a world court before which the cause of any oppressedpeoples might be brought. This is just what he had in mind and what hesucceeded in doing. To have thrust a settlement of Ireland's affairs intothe foreground of the Peace Conference and to have made it a _sine quanon_ would have been futile and foolish and might have resulted indisaster. Unfortunately, the friends of Irish freedom, deprecating andbitterly resenting well-considered methods like this, were desirous ofhaving the matter thrust into the early conferences at Paris. ThePresident knew that England would never consent to this and would resentany attempt on his part to carry out idea. If the President had done so, England would undoubtedly have withdrawn from the Conference and thus thegreat cause of the League of Nations, which formed the foundation stoneupon which the Armistice was based, would have gone by the board. ThePresident was looking far beyond a mere recognition of the Irish Republic. He was seeking to accomplish its security and guarantee its permanencythrough the instrumentality of a world court like the League of Nations. What would it have availed Ireland to have been granted Dominiongovernment or independence unless contemporaneously with the grant therewas set up an instrumentality that would guarantee and protect it? Theonly thing upon which the Peace Conference functioned was the settlementof the affairs of those nations affected by the war. 

Why didn't Wilson bring Ireland's cause to the attention of the PeaceConference? was the query which frequently reached us at the White House. The President in his Western speeches discussed this matter in thefollowing way:

"It was not within the privilege of the Conference of peace to act uponthe right of self-determination of any peoples except those which had beenincluded in the territories of the defeated empires--that is to say, itwas not then within their power--but the moment the Covenant of the Leagueof Nations is adopted it becomes their right. If the desire for self-determination of any people in the world is likely to affect the peace ofthe world or the good understanding between nations it becomes thebusiness of the League; it becomes the right of any member of the Leagueto call attention to it; it becomes the function of the League to bringthe whole process of the opinion of the world to bear upon that verymatter. 

"Article XI is the favourite article in the Treaty so far as I amconcerned. It says that every matter which is likely to affect the peaceof the world is everybody's business; that it shall be the friendly rightof any nation to call attention of the League to anything that is likelyto affect the peace of the world or the good understanding betweennations, upon which the peace of the world depends, whether that matterimmediately concerns the nation drawing attention to it or not. In otherwords, at present we have to mind our own business, under the rules ofdiplomacy and established custom. Under the covenant of the League ofNations we can mind other people's business, and anything that affects thepeace of the world, whether we are parties to it or not, can by ourdelegates be brought to the attention of mankind. We can force a nation onthe other side of the globe to bring to that bar of mankind any wrong thatis afoot in that part of the world which is likely to affect the goodunderstanding between nations, and we can oblige them to show cause why itshould not be remedied. There is not an oppressed people in the worldwhich cannot henceforth get a hearing at that forum, and you know what ahearing will mean if the cause of those people is just. The one thing thatthose doing injustice have most reason to dread is publicity anddiscussion. At present what is the state of international law andunderstanding? No nation has the right to call attention to anything thatdoes not directly affect its own affairs. If it does, it cannot only betold to mind its own business, but it risks the cordial relationshipbetween itself and the nation whose affairs it draws under discussion;whereas, under Article XI, which I had the honour of advocating, the verysensible provision is made that the peace of the world transcends all thesusceptibilities of nations and governments, and that they are obliged toconsent to discuss and explain anything which does affect the goodunderstanding between nations. "

Sir Frederick Pollock, in his valuable work on the League of Nations, comments pointedly on this privilege:

 Various Irish writers, including some who deserve serious attention, have raised the question whether the standing problem of Irish autonomy can come before the League of Nations. There is only one way in which this could happen--namely, that the Government of the United States should declare Irish-American sympathy with unsatisfied nationalist claims in Ireland to be capable of disturbing good understanding between Great Britain and the United States. That is a possible event if a solution is not reached within a reasonable time, but it is more likely that a confidential intimation from the United States would not only precede a formal reference to the Council, but avoid the necessity for it. 

 The friends of Ireland in this country have often asked me the question:"Would Woodrow Wilson have intervened in behalf of Ireland?"

 I can answer this question only by saying that Ireland has never had atruer friend than Woodrow Wilson. From the day that we went to war it hasbeen his steadfast purpose to induce the Government of England to settlethe Irish question justly and permanently. His statesmanlike approach to asettlement of the problem is the only one that holds hope of success. 

 As I completed this chapter, an article appeared in a Washingtonnewspaper apparently confirmatory of the President's foresight, showingthat by September, 1921, Mr. De Valera had arrived at the same view. Thearticle seems to show Mr. De Valera as insisting that the BritishGovernment grant Ireland membership in the League of Nations as one of theguarantees of autonomy. 

 As for myself, I believe that Ireland is going to be free in company withthe rest of the world and in accordance with a new world order which shallfunction through the machinery for justice and liberty which is providedfor in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and is provided for nowhereelse. 

CHAPTER XL

PROHIBITION

One of the things for which the Wilson Administration was held to "strictaccountability" was the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the FederalConstitution, establishing nation-wide prohibition. 

Unfair critics of the President, in their foolish attempt to charge theAdministration with every unusual happening in the eight years ofDemocratic control, had stated that the President was the real motiveforce that lay back of the movement to establish the Eighteenth Amendmentas part of the fundamental law of the country. As a matter of fact, duringthe discussion of this amendment in the Senate and House, the Presidentmaintained toward it an attitude of absolute neutrality. While he was anardent advocate of temperance, he felt that Congress in enforcing theamendment by the passage of the Volstead Act, so extreme and unreasonablein character, had gone a long way toward alienating the support of everytemperance-loving citizen in the country, and that certain of itsprovisions had struck at the foundation of our government by its arbitraryinterference with personal liberty and freedom. He felt that the practicalunanimity with which the Eighteenth Amendment was supported arose from anation-wide resentment against abuses by the American saloon and theeconomic evils that had grown out of the unorganized liquor traffic. Hefelt that it was unreasonable for Congress, in the Volstead Act, todeclare any beverage containing an excess of one half of one per cent. Ofalcohol intoxicating and that to frame a law which arbitrarily placesintoxicating and non-intoxicating beverages within the same classificationwas openly to invite mental resentment against it. He was of the opinionthat it required no compromise or weakening of the Eighteenth Amendment inorder to deal justly and fairly with the serious protests that followedthe enactment into law of the Volstead Act. He was, therefore, in favourof permitting the manufacture and sale, under proper governmentalregulations, of light wines and beers, which action in his opinion wouldmake it much easier to enforce the amendment in its essential particularsand would help to end the illicit traffic in liquor which the Volstead Actfostered by its very severity. This would put back of the enforcement ofthe Eighteenth Amendment the public sentiment always necessary to theexecution of laws. Satisfied with a reasonable recognition of their rightsto personal liberty and control of their personal habits, he believed thatthe American people would be the readier to turn their attention to thegrave issues of reconstruction and steadier in meeting these issues whichwould test to the utmost our capacity for progressive self-government. 

Time and time again when we discussed the Volstead Act, he would say: "Thewrong way of doing the right thing. You cannot regulate the morals andhabits of a great cosmopolitan people by placing unreasonable restrictionsupon their liberty and freedom. All such attempts can only end in failureand disappointment. In the last analysis, in these matters that seek toregulate personal habits and customs, public opinion is the greatregulator. "

In New Jersey, where he served as governor, the liquor question had beenfor many years a burning issue and had been thrust into everygubernatorial campaign up to the time when Woodrow Wilson as governor tookhold of the situation. Many political futures had been wrecked and wastedby ambitious politicians who tried to "pussyfoot" on this issue. But therewas no shying away from it by Woodrow Wilson. When the question waspresented to him by the ardent advocates of the Anti-Saloon League earlyin his administration as governor, without evasion of any kind, he statedhis views in the following letter addressed to the head of the Anti-SaloonLeague:

 Executive Office, Trenton, New Jersey. 

 I am in favour of local option. I am a thorough believer in local self-government and believe that every self-governing community which constitutes a social unit should have the right to control the matter of the regulation or the withholding of licenses. 

 But the questions involved are social and moral, not political, and are not susceptible of being made parts of a party programme. Whenever they have been made the subject matter of party contests, they have cut the lines of party organization and party action athwart, to the utter confusion of political action in every other field. They have thrown every other question, however important, into the background and have made constructive party action impossible for long years together. 

 So far as I am myself concerned, therefore, I can never consent to have the question of local option made an issue between political parties in this state. My judgment is very clear in this matter. I do not believe that party programmes of the highest consequence to the political life of the state and the nation ought to be thrust to one side and hopelessly embarrassed for long periods together by making a political issue of a great question that is essentially non- political, non-partisan, moral and social in its nature. 

Holding these views, that the liquor question was one which was"essentially non-political, non-partisan, moral and social in itsnature, " the President refused by any act of his to influence publicopinion when the Eighteenth Amendment was up for consideration in theSenate and House. 

He deeply resented and strenuously opposed the passage of war-timeprohibition as uncalled for and unnecessary. In his opinion, it was not afood-conservation measure, but an out-and-out attempt by the anti-saloonforces to use the war emergency to declare the country "dry" byCongressional action. There was another reason for his attitude ofopposition to war-time prohibition. He believed with an embargo placedupon beer, the consumption of whiskey, of which there were large stocks inthe country, would be stimulated and increased to a great extent. In thisopinion he was supported by Mr Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator. In aletter of May 28, 1918, to Senator Sheppard, the leader of the prohibitionforces in the Senate, he explained his opposition to war-time prohibitionin these words:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

 May 28, 1918. 

 HON. MORRIS SHEPPARD, United States Senate. 

 MY DEAR SENATOR:

 I was very much distressed by the action of the House. I do not think that it is wise or fair to attempt to put such compulsion on the Executive in a matter in which he has already acted almost to the limit of his authority. What is almost entirely overlooked is that there were, as I am informed, very large stocks of whiskey in this country, and it seems to me quite certain that if the brewing of beer were prevented entirely, along with all other drinks, many of them harmless, which are derived from food and food stuffs, the consumption of whiskey would be stimulated and increased to a very considerable extent. 

 My own judgment is that it is wise and statesmanlike to let the situation stand as it is for the present, until at any rate I shall be apprised by the Food Administration that it is necessary in the way suggested still further to conserve the supply of food and food stuffs. The Food Administration has not thought it necessary to go any further than we have in that matter already gone. 

 I thank you most cordially, Senator, for your kindness in consulting me in this matter, which is of very considerable importance, and has a very distinct bearing upon many collateral questions. 

 Cordially and sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

War-time prohibition was ingenuously made part of the AgriculturalAppropriation Bill, which contained many items necessary for the effectiveprosecution of the war. So strongly did the President feel about thematter, that I am frank to say that if war-time prohibition had stoodalone and was disconnected from any other bill, I believe it would havebeen vetoed. 

After the Armistice, agitation at once began, inspired by the "dry"advocates throughout the country, to prolong war-time prohibition, but thePresident felt that the object and purpose of war-time prohibition, if anyever existed, having been served, it was only right, proper, and fair thatthere should be an immediate repeal of it, and that only resentment andrestlessness throughout the country would follow the attempt to prolongwar-time prohibition beyond the time provided in the statute which createdit. 

It was unfortunate that the "dry" advocates did not see the thing throughthe eyes of the President. Apparently not fully satisfied with the victorythey had won through the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, they soughtto push the advantage thus gained still further, and through war-timeprohibition to establish their policy of restriction as a permanent policyof the country. Realizing that prohibition as a permanent policy and byconstitutional amendment had been definitely established in aconstitutional way, the President was reluctant to take a stand that wouldeven in spirit be a violation of this, but he also felt that the "dry"advocates were simply using a war crisis ruthlessly to press forward theirviews and to cajole vacillating congressmen into supporting it because itwas known as a "dry" measure. In a letter which I addressed to thePresident on September 7, 1918, I strongly urged the veto of theAgricultural Appropriation Bill containing war-time prohibition:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 September 7, 1918. 

 MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

 In the discussion we had a few days ago with reference to the pending "dry" legislation, I tried to emphasize the fact that under the Food Control Law you had the power to do what Congress is now seeking to do in a way that will cause great irritation. Your action of yesterday fixing December first as the day on which the prohibition of the manufacture of beer is to take place, I believe, strengthens what I said. Your action and the action of the Senate a day or two ago in giving you the right to establish zones about shipyards and munitions plants again shows the unnecessary character of this legislation. You are, therefore, now in a strong position to veto this legislation as unnecessary and unwarranted. 

 In view of all of this, I wish to emphasize the dangers, both of a political and industrial character, that confront us should we agree to go forward with those who favour legislation of this radical and restricted character. Even the most ardent prohibitionists fear the reactionary effect of this legislation upon the pending constitutional amendment. I am afraid of its effects upon the voters of our party in the large centres of population throughout the country, and of the deep resentment from all classes that is bound to follow. 

 In matters of legislation that seek to regulate the morals and habits of the people, the average American feels the only safe course to follow is the method set forth in the Constitution for the regulation of these vital matters. The proponents of this measure agree that it is not a conservation measure, but that it is an out-and-out attempt to declare the country "dry. " In my opinion, it is mob legislation, pure and simple. 

 The danger of submitting quietly to any class legislation that has its basis in intolerance, especially at a time like this where the emotions of people can be whipped into a fury, is obvious. Your strength in the country comes from the feeling on the part of the people that under no circumstances can you be "hazed" by any class. If you yield in this instance, similar demands from other sources will rise to harass and embarrass you. 

 The viewpoint of the gentlemen on the Hill in charge of this bill is provincial. They have no idea of the readjustments that will have to come in the finances of our largest cities and municipalities through the country. Tax rates are bound to go up. Increased taxation in large cities, coming at a time when federal taxes are growing more burdensome, is bound to play a large part in the opinion of the people, and we cannot escape our responsibility if we seem to be afraid to oppose legislation of this kind. Our policy in every matter at this time should be one based upon magnanimity and tolerance toward every class and interest in the country. 

Under date of May 9, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President whowas then in Paris:

 I sincerely hope you will consider the advisability of raising the embargo on beer. The most violent reaction has taken place throughout the country since the enactment of this law, especially in the larger cities. It is not, I assure you, the result of brewery propaganda. It comes from many of the humbler sort who resent this kind of federal interference with their rights. We are being blamed for all this restrictive legislation because you insist upon closing down all breweries and thus making prohibition effective July first. The country would be more ready to accept prohibition brought about by Constitutional amendment than have it made effective by Presidential ukase. The psychological effect of raising this embargo would be of incalculable benefit to America in every way at this time. The Springfield _Republican_ says, _Quote_ The establishment of national prohibition by Federal statute, through the mere act of Congress, does not appeal to one as so desirable as the establishment of national prohibition by the direct action of three fourths of the states _End Quote_. The war-time Prohibition Law, according to the text of the Act, was enacted for the purpose of conserving the man-power of the nation and to increase the efficiency in the production of arms, munitions, ships, and for the Army and Navy. 

 The New York _World_, in an editorial, says: _Quote_ This war-time prohibition act is breeding social, industrial, and economic discontent every day. What makes it still more infamous is that under its provisions the rich man, because he has money, can accumulate for his personal consumption whatever stocks of wines and liquors he pleases, but the workingman, because he cannot afford to lay in a supply of anything, is deprived even of a glass of beer with his evening meal. There has never been another such measure of outrageous class and social discrimination on the statute books of the United States. It should never have been enacted by Congress. It should never have been signed by the President. If it is not repealed it is bound to cause more trouble than any other piece of Federal legislation since the Fugitive Slave Act _End Quote_. 

 By taking vigorous action in this matter, you would do more for the cause of real temperance and hearten those people who feel the sting of the wave of intolerance which is now spreading over the country than anything you could think of. I wish I could meet you face to face and try to impress upon you the utter necessity for this action. You will have to take action soon. 

 TUMULTY. 

On May 12, 1919, I received the following cable from the President:

 Paris. 

 TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 Please ask the Attorney General to advise me what action I can take with regard to removing the ban from the manufacture of drink and as to the form the action should take. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

On May 12, 1919, I replied to this cable as follows:

 White House, Washington, May 12, 1919. 

 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, France. 

 Have consulted Attorney General with regard to removing ban upon manufacture of alcoholic liquor. Am in receipt of a letter from him in which he says: _Quote_ The only action you can take until demobilization may be determined and proclaimed, will be to issue a public statement or send a message to Congress declaring that since the purpose of the Act has been entirely satisfied, nothing prevents your lifting the ban on the manufacture and sale of beer, wine, or other intoxicating malt or vinous liquors except the limitations imposed by the Act which maintains it in force until demobilization is terminated after the conclusion of the war. _End Quote_

 TUMULTY. 

On May 20, 1919, in a message to Congress, the President made thefollowing recommendation with reference to war-time prohibition:

 The demobilization of the military forces of the country has progressed to such a point that it seems to me entirely safe now to remove the ban upon the manufacture and sale of wines and beers, but I am advised that without further legislation I have not the legal authority to remove the present restrictions. I therefore recommend that the Act approved November 21, 1918, entitled "an Act to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the purposes of the Act, entitled 'An Act to provide further for the national security and defense by stimulating agriculture and facilitating the distribution of agricultural products, and for other purposes, ' be amended and repealed in so far as it applies to wines and beers. "

Congress refused to act upon the President's recommendation. 

Under date of June 27, 1919, I sent the following cable to the President:

 There are only four days left until nation-wide prohibition becomes effective and the country will go on a whiskey basis unless you act to suspend it. Everything that has happened in the last few weeks confirms the views I expressed to you in May excepting that added force has been given to every argument made, especially by the action of the American Federation of Labour whose membership almost unanimously voted at its convention for lifting the ban. The action of Canada in lifting the ban is regarded by the country as significant. Workingmen and common people all over the country cannot understand why light wines and beer cannot be permitted until the Constitutional amendment becomes effective. Only this week the Pennsylvania Legislature voted to legalize two and three-quarters per cent, beer and light wines. Similar action will follow in other states. The consensus of opinion in the press is that if prohibition is to be effective, it might better be by action of three quarters of the states rather than by Presidential proclamation for which you alone and our party would bear the responsibility. The prohibitionists in Congress are fearful that the enforcement of wartime prohibition will cause a harmful reaction on real prohibition, and I believe that they are secretly in favour of your lifting the ban for this reason. Demobilization figures officially announced by the War Department show that the number of troops now remaining in service is practically only the number of troops in the Regular Army. Samuel Gompers, Mary Roberts Rinehart, Mrs. Douglass Robinson, sister of the late Theodore Roosevelt, Miss Gertrude Atherton, Frank S. Goodnow, president of Johns Hopkins University, and Cardinal Gibbons out in strong statement favouring retention of beer and light wines. If you do not intend to lift the ban on July first, you can announce your intention to suspend it as soon as the War Department notifies you demobilization is accomplished which, the best opinion says, will be August first. The feeling all over the country is one of harmful uncertainty and I strongly recommend that a definite announcement, of some nature which will clear the atmosphere, be made. 

 TUMULTY. 

On June 28, 1919, I again cabled the President, as follows:

 The White House, Washington, 28 June, 1919. 

 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

 Received your message saying that you do not intend to lift the ban. The Republicans have been industriously spreading the story throughout the country that you in fact have power under the Act of November 21, 1918, to lift the ban. I think it important, wise, and politic, therefore, for you to make a statement which we can issue from the White House along the following lines: _Quote_ I am convinced that I have no legal power at this time in the matter of the ban of liquor. Under the Act of November 21, 1918, my power to take action is restricted. The Act provides that after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President, it shall be unlawful, etc. This law does not specify that the ban shall be lifted with the signing of peace but with the termination of the demobilization of the troops, and I cannot say that that has been accomplished. My information from the War Department is that there are still a million men in the service under the emergency call. It is clear, therefore, that the failure of Congress to act upon the suggestion contained in my message of the 20th of May, 1919, asking for a repeal of the Act of November 21, 1918, so far as it applies to wines and beers, makes it impossible to act in this matter at this time. Of course when demobilization is terminated, my power to act without congressional action will be exercised _End quote_. 

 TUMULTY. 

The President replied to my cables as follows:

 Paris, June 28, 1919. 

 TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

 Please issue following statement: I am convinced that the Attorney General is right in advising me that I have no legal power at this time in the matter of the ban on liquor. Under the act of November, 1918, my power to take action is restricted. The act provides that after June 30, 1919, until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President, it shall be unlawful, etc. This law does not specify that the ban shall be lifted with the signing of peace but with the termination of the demobilization of the troops and I cannot say that that has been accomplished. My information from the War Department is that there are still a million men in the service under the emergency call. It is clear therefore that the failure of Congress to act upon the suggestion contained in my message of the twentieth of May, 1919, asking for a repeal of the Act of November 21, 1918, so far as it applies to wines and beers makes it impossible to act in this matter at this time. When demobilization is terminated my power to act without congressional action will be exercised. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

When the Volstead Act reached the President, he found, upon examining it, that it in no way repealed war-time prohibition, and so he vetoed it. 

In vetoing it, he admonished Congress, that "in all matters having to dowith the personal habits and customs of large numbers of people, we mustbe certain that the established processes of legal change are followed. Inno other way can the salutary object sought to be accomplished by greatreforms of this character be made satisfactory and permanent. "

The House of Representatives with its overwhelming "dry" majority passedthe Volstead Act over the President's veto. The President clearly foresawthe inevitable reaction that would follow its passage and its enforcementthroughout the country. 

As the days of the San Francisco Convention approached, he felt that itwas the duty of the Democratic party frankly to speak out regarding thematter and boldly avow its attitude toward the unreasonable features ofthe Volstead enforcement act. In his conferences with the Democraticleaders he took advantage of every opportunity to put before them thenecessity for frank and courageous action. So deep were his convictionsabout this vital matter, that it was his intention, shortly after thepassage of the Volstead Act over his veto, to send a special message toCongress regarding the matter, asking for the repeal of the Volstead Actand the passage of legislation permitting the manufacture and sale oflight wines, or at least a modification of the Volstead Act, changing thealcoholic content of beer. 

Upon further consideration of the matter it was agreed that it would beunwise to ask for any change at the hands of a congress that had sooverwhelmingly expressed its opinion in opposition to any suchmodification. We, therefore, thought it wise to conserve our energies andto await the psychological moment at the Convention for putting forwardthe President's programme. 

A few days before the Convention the President delivered to a trustedfriend a copy of a proposed "wet" plank, and asked his friend to submit itto the Committee on Resolutions at the Convention in San Francisco. Thetentative draft of the plank was as follows:

 We recognize that the American saloon is opposed to all social, moral, and economic order, and we pledge ourselves to its absolute elimination by the passage of such laws as will finally and effectually exterminate it. But we favour the repeal of the Volstead Act and the substitution for it of a law permitting the manufacture and sale of light wines and beer. 

Evidently, the trusted friend who had this matter in charge felt that the"dry" atmosphere of the Convention was unfavourable and so the President'splank, prepared by himself, was not even given a hearing before theCommittee on Resolutions. 

CHAPTER XLI

THE TREATY FIGHT

Upon his return home from Paris, the President immediately invited, inmost cordial fashion, the members of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee to confer with him at the White House. Some of those whoreceived the invitation immediately announced that as a conditionprecedent to their acceptance they would insist that the conference shouldnot be secret in character and that what would happen there should bedisclosed to the public. The President quickly accepted the conditionsproposed by the Republican senators and made a statement from the WhiteHouse that the conditions which the conferees named were highly acceptableto him and that he was willing and anxious to give to the public astenographic report of everything that transpired. 

In view of subsequent history, the conversation between the President andSenator Harding about the distinction between "legal" and "moral"obligations, which was interesting at the time, takes on an addedinterest. Said Senator Harding: "If there is nothing more than a moralobligation on the part of any member of the league, what avail articles Xand XI?"

_The President_: Why, Senator, it is surprising that that question shouldbe asked. If we undertake an obligation, we are bound in the most solemnway to carry it out. 

_Senator Harding_: If you believe there is nothing more to this than amoral obligation, any nation will assume a moral obligation on its ownaccount. Is it a moral obligation? The point I am trying to get at is:Suppose something arises affecting the peace of the world, and the counciltakes steps as provided here to conserve or preserve, and announces itsdecision, and every nation in the League takes advantage of theconstruction that you place upon these articles and says: "Well, this isonly a moral obligation, and we assume that the nation involved does notdeserve our participation or protection, " and the whole thing amounts tonothing but an expression of the league council. 

_The President_: There is a national good conscience in such a matter. Ishould think that was one of the most serious things that could possiblyhappen. When I speak of a legal obligation, I mean one that specificallybinds you to do a particular thing under certain sanctions. That is alegal obligation, and, if I may say so, has a greater binding force; onlythere always remains in the moral obligation the right to exercise one'sjudgment as to whether it is indeed incumbent upon one in thosecircumstances to do that thing. In every moral obligation there is anelement of judgment. In a legal obligation there is no element ofjudgment. 

Never before did the President show himself more tactful or more brilliantin repartee. Surrounded by twenty or thirty men, headed by Senator Lodge, who hated him with a bitterness that was intense, the President, withquiet courtesy, parried every blow aimed at him. 

No question, no matter how pointed it was, seemed to disturb his serenity. He acted like a lawyer who knew his case from top to bottom, and who hadconfidence in the great cause he was representing. His cards were franklylaid upon the table and he appeared like a fighting champion, ready tomeet all comers. Indeed, this very attitude of frankness, openness, sincerity, and courtesy, one could see from the side-lines, was a cause ofdiscomfort to Senator Lodge and the Republicans grouped about him, and onecould also see written upon the faces of the Democratic senators in thatlittle room a look of pride that they had a leader who carried himself sogallantly and who so brilliantly met every onslaught of the enemy. ThePresident anticipated an abrupt adjournment of the conference with acourteous invitation to luncheon. Senator Lodge had just turned to thePresident and said: "Mr. President, I do not wish to interfere in any way, but the conference has now lasted about three hours and a half, and it ishalf an hour after the lunch hour. " Whereupon, the President said: "Willnot you gentlemen take luncheon with me? It will be very delightful. "

It was evident that this invitation, so cordially conveyed, broke the iceof formality which up to that time pervaded the meeting, and like boys outof school, forgetting the great affair in which they had all playedprominent parts, they made their way to the dining room, the Presidentwalking by the side of Senator Lodge. Instead of fisticuffs, as some ofthe newspaper men had predicted, the lion and the lamb sat down togetherat the dining table, and for an hour or two the question of theratification of the Treaty of Versailles was forgotten in the telling ofpleasant stories and the play of repartee. 

Although, at this conference of August 19, 1919, the President had franklyopened his mind and heart to the enemies of the Treaty, the oppositioninstead of moderating seemed to grow more intense and passionate. ThePresident had done everything humanly possible to soften the opposition ofthe Republicans, but, alas, the information brought to him from the Hillby his Democratic friends only confirmed the opinion that the oppositionto the Treaty was growing and could not be overcome by personal contact ofany kind between the President and members of the Foreign RelationsCommittee. 

It is plain now, and will become plainer as the years elapse, that theRepublican opposition to the League was primarily partisan politics and arooted personal dislike of the chief proponent of the League, Mr. Wilson. His reëlection in 1916, the first reëlection of an incumbent DemocraticPresident since Andrew Jackson, had greatly disturbed the Republicanleaders. The prestige of the Republican party was threatened by thisDemocratic leader. His reception in Europe added to their distress. Forthe sake of the sacred cause of Republicanism, this menace of Democraticleadership must be destroyed, even though in destroying it the leadersshould swallow their own words and reverse their own former positions onworld adjustment. 

An attempt was made by enemies of the President to give the impression tothe country that an association of nations was one of the "fool ideas" ofWoodrow Wilson; that in making it part of his Fourteen Points, he wasgiving free rein to his idealism. As a matter of fact, the idea did notoriginate with Woodrow Wilson. If its American origin were traced, itwould be found that the earliest supporters of the idea were Republicans. 

I remember with what reluctance the President accepted the invitation ofthe League to Enforce Peace, tendered by Mr. Taft, to deliver an addresson May 27, 1916, at the New Willard Hotel, Washington, a meeting at whichone of the principal speakers was no less a personage than Senator HenryCabot Lodge, with Mr. Taft presiding. For many months the President hadbeen revolving this idea in his mind and for a long time he was reluctantto accept any invitation that would seem to give approval to the idea. Hepatiently waited to make a complete survey of the whole world situation, to be convinced that the permanent participation of the United States inworld affairs was a necessity if peace was to be secured. 

It was not an easy thing to draw the President away from the traditionalpolicy of aloofness and isolation which had characterized the attitude ofthe United States in all international affairs. But the invitation todiscuss universal peace, urged upon the President by ex-President WilliamH. Taft, was finally accepted. 

In that speech he said: "We are participants, whether we would or not, inthe life of the world, and the interests of all nations are our own;henceforth, there must be a common agreement for a common object, and atthe heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoplesand of mankind. We believe these fundamental things: First, that everypeople has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the samerespect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity thatgreat and powerful nations expect and insist upon. [This idea wassubstantially embodied in Article X]; and third, that the world has aright to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its originin aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. "

These statements were uttered in the presence of Senator Lodge andapplauded by Mr. Taft and his Republican associates gathered at thebanquet. 

The President, continuing his address, then gave expression to his viewsregarding the means to attain these ends. He was convinced that thereshould be an "universal association of the nations to maintain theinviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common use of allnations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary totreaty agreements or without warning and full submission of the causes tothe opinion of the world--a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity andpolitical independence. " And he ventured to assert, in the presence ofSenator Lodge, who afterward became the leader of the opposition to thesevery ideas, "that the United States is willing to become a partner in anyfeasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objectsand make them secure against violation. "

Woodrow Wilson believed that the League of Nations was the first modernattempt to prevent war by discussion in the open and not behind closeddoors or "within the cloistered retreats of European diplomacy. " To himthe League of Nations was the essence of Christianity. Yet when he took upthe advocacy of the League of Nations, Senator Lodge, the spokesman of theRepublican party at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace, became theleader in bitter opposition to it. 

Senator Lodge at this very dinner on May 27, 1916, delivered the followingaddress:

 I know, and no one, I think, can know better than one who has served long in the Senate, which is charged with an important share of the ratification and confirmation of all treaties; no one can, I think, feel more deeply than I do the difficulties which confront us in the work which this league--that is, the great association extending throughout the country, known as the League to Enforce Peace-- undertakes, but the difficulties cannot be overcome unless we try to overcome them. I believe much can be done. Probably it will be impossible to stop all wars, but it certainly will be possible to stop some wars, and thus diminish their number. The way in which this problem must be worked out must be left to this league and to those who are giving this great subject the study which it deserves. I know the obstacles. I know how quickly we shall be met with the statement that this is a dangerous question which you are putting into your argument, that no nation can submit to the judgment of other nations, and we must be careful at the beginning not to attempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise when we speak of anything which seems to involve an alliance, but I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace. 

 It was a year ago in delivering the chancellor's address at Union College I made an argument on this theory, that if we were to promote international peace at the close of the present terrible war, if we were to restore international law as it must be restored, we must find some way in which the united forces of the nations could be put behind the cause of peace and law. I said then that my hearers might think that I was picturing a Utopia, but it is in the search of Utopias that great discoveries are made. Not failure, but low aim, is the crime. This league certainly has the highest of all aims for the benefits of humanity, and because the pathway is sown with difficulties is no reason that we should turn from it. 

Theodore Roosevelt, in his Nobel Prize thesis, also expressed himself asfollows, with reference to an association of nations:

 The one permanent move for obtaining peace which has yet been suggested with any reasonable chance of obtaining its object is by an agreement among the great powers, in which each should pledge itself not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back with force the decision of that common tribunal. The great civilized nations of the world which do not possess force, actual or immediately potential, should combine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteousness. 

Upon the President taking up the League of Nations fight, Senator Lodgedrew away from it as if in fear and trembling and began discussing ourresponsibilities abroad, evidencing a complete change of heart. He nolonger asked Americans to be generous and fearless, but said:

 The hearts of the vast majority of mankind would beat on strongly without any quickening if the League were to perish altogether. 

The first objection to the League of Nations, urged by Senator Lodge, wasthat it involved the surrender of our sovereignty. There is a strikinganalogy between the argument of Senator Lodge and those put forth bygentlemen in Washington's day who feared that the proposed Constitutionwhich was designed to establish a federal union would mean danger, oppression, and disaster. Mr. Singletary of Massachusetts, Mr. Lowndes ofSouth Carolina, Mr. Grayson of Virginia, even Patrick Henry himself, foresaw the virtual subjugation of the States through a Constitution whichat that time was often called the Treaty between the Thirteen States. 

As Senator Brandegee and others contended that the Covenant of the Leagueof Nations was a "muddy, murky, and muddled document, " so Mr. Williams ofNew York, in 1788, charged "ambiguity" against the proposed Constitution, saying that it was "absolutely impossible to know what we give up and whatwe retain. "

Mandates and similar bogies had their counterpart in Washington's day. George Mason, fearful like Senator Sherman of Illinois in a later day, "apprehended the possibility of Congress calling in the militia of Georgiato quell disturbances in New Hampshire. "

The attitude of George Washington in his day was very similar to that ofWoodrow Wilson. Writing to Knox, on August 19, 1797, he said: "I am fullypersuaded it [meaning the Federal Constitution] is the best that can beobtained at this time. And, as a constitutional door is open for amendmenthereafter, our adoption of it, under the present circumstances of theunion, is in my opinion desirable. " And of the opponents of the proposedConstitution he said, "The major part of them will, it is to be feared, begoverned by sinister and self-important motives. "

The storm centre of the whole fight against the League was the oppositionpersonally conducted by Senator Lodge and others of the Republican partyagainst the now famous Article X. The basis of the whole Republicanopposition was their fear that America would have to bear someresponsibility in the affairs of the world, while the strength of WoodrowWilson's position was his faith that out of the war, with all its bloodand tears, would come this great consummation. 

It was the President's idea that we should go into the League and bear ourresponsibilities; that we should enter it as gentlemen, scorningprivilege. He did not wish us to sneak in and enjoy its advantages andshirk its responsibilities, but he wanted America to enter boldly and notas a hypocrite. 

With reference to the argument made by Senator Lodge against our goinginto the League, saying that it would be a surrender of Americansovereignty and a loss of her freedom, the President often asked thequestion on his Western trip: How can a nation preserve its freedom exceptthrough concerted action? We surrender part of our freedom in order tosave the rest of it. Discussing this matter one day, he said: "One cannothave an omelet without breaking eggs. By joining the League of Nations, anation loses, not its individual freedom, but its selfish isolation. Theonly freedom it loses is the freedom to do wrong. Robinson Crusoe was freeto shoot in any direction on his island until Friday came. Then there wasone direction in which he could not shoot. His freedom ended whereFriday's rights began. "

There would have been no Federal Union to-day if the individual statesthat went to make up the Federal Union were not willing to surrender thepowers they exercised, to surrender their freedom as it were. 

Opponents of the League tried to convey the impression that under ArticleX we should be obliged to send our boys across the sea and that in thatevent America's voice would not be the determining voice. 

Lloyd George answered this argument in a crushing way, when he said:

 We cannot, unless we abandon the whole basis of the League of Nations, disinterest ourselves in an attack upon the existence of a nation which is a member of that league and whose life is in jeopardy. That covenant, as I understand it, does not contemplate, necessarily, military action in support of the imperilled nation. It contemplates economic pressure; it contemplates support for the struggling people; and when it is said that if you give any support at all to Poland it involves a great war, with conscription and with all the mechanism of war with which we have been so familiar in the last few years, that is inconsistent with the whole theory of the covenant into which we have entered. We contemplated other methods of bringing pressure to bear upon the recalcitrant nation that is guilty of acts of aggression against other nations and endangering their independence. 

The Republicans who attacked the President on Article X had evidentlyforgotten what Theodore Roosevelt said about the one effective move forobtaining peace, when he urged: "The nations should agree on certainrights that should not be questioned, such as territorial integrity, theirrights to deal with their domestic affairs, and with such matters as whomthey should admit to citizenship. " They had, also, evidently forgottenthat Mr. Taft said: "The arguments against Article X which have been mostpressed are those directed to showing that under its obligations theUnited States can be forced into many wars and to burdensome expeditionaryforces to protect countries in which it has no legitimate interest. Thisobjection will not bear examination. "

Mr. Taft answered the question of one of the Republican critics if ArticleX would not involve us in war, in the following statement:

How much will it involve us in war? Little, if any. In the first place, the universal boycott, first to be applied, will impose upon most nationssuch a withering isolation and starvation that in most cases it will beeffective. In the second place, we'll not be drawn into any war in whichit will not be reasonable and convenient for us to render efficient aid, because the plan of the Council must be approved by our representatives, as already explained. In the third place, the threat of the universalboycott and the union of overwhelming forces of the members of the League, if need be, will hold every nation from violating Article X, and ArticlesXII, XIII, and XV, unless there is a world conspiracy, as in this war, inwhich case the earliest we get into the war, the better. 

Evidently Mr. Taft did not look upon Article X as the bugaboo that Mr. Lodge pretended it was, for he said:

Article X covers the Monroe Doctrine _and extends it to the world_. TheLeague is not a super-sovereign, but a partnership intended to secure tous and all nations only the sovereignty we can properly have, i. E. , sovereignty regulated by the international law and morality consistentwith the same sovereignty of other nations. The United States is not underthis constitution to be forced into actual war against its will. ThisLeague is to be regarded in conflict with the advice of Washington onlyfrom a narrow and reactionary viewpoint. 

Mr. Herbert Hoover, now a member of Mr. Harding's Cabinet, in a speechdelivered on October 3, 1919, answering the argument that America would becompelled to send her boys to the other side, said:

 We hear the cry that the League obligates that our sons be sent to fight in foreign lands. Yet the very intent and structure of the League is to prevent wars. There is no obligation for the United States to engage in military operations or to allow any interference with our internal affairs without the full consent of our representatives in the League. 

And further discussing the revision of the Treaty, Mr. Hoover said:

 I am confident that if we attempt now to revise the Treaty we shall tread on a road through European chaos. Even if we managed to keep our soldiers out of it we will not escape fearful economic losses. If the League is to break down we must at once prepare to fight. Few people seem to realize the desperation to which Europe has been reduced. 

CHAPTER XLII

THE WESTERN TRIP

Tentative plans for a Western trip began to be formed in the White Housebecause of the urgent insistence from Democratic friends on the Hill thatnothing could win the fight for the League of Nations except a directappeal to the country by the President in person. 

Admiral Grayson, the President's physician and consistent friend, who knewhis condition and the various physical crises through which he had passedhere and on the other side, from some of which he had not yet recovered, stood firm in his resolve that the President should not go West, evenintimating to me that the President's life might pay the forfeit if hisadvice were disregarded. Indeed, it needed not the trained eye of aphysician to see that the man whom the senators were now advising to makea "swing around the circle" was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Morethan once since his return from the Peace Conference I had urged him totake a needed rest; to get away from the turmoil of Washington andrecuperate; but he spurned this advice and resolved to go through to theend. 

No argument of ours could draw him away from his duties, which nowinvolved not only the fight for the ratification of the Treaty, but thethreatened railway strike, with its attendant evils to the country, andadded administrative burdens growing out of the partisanship fight whichwas being waged in Congress for the ostensible purpose of reducing thehigh cost of living. 

One day, after Democratic senators had been urging the Western trip, Itook leave to say to the President that, in his condition, disastrousconsequences might result if he should follow their advice. But hedismissed my solicitude, saying in a weary way: "I know that I am at theend of my tether, but my friends on the Hill say that the trip isnecessary to save the Treaty, and I am willing to make whatever personalsacrifice is required, for if the Treaty should be defeated, God onlyknows what would happen to the world as a result of it. In the presence ofthe great tragedy which now faces the world, no decent man can count hisown personal fortunes in the reckoning. Even though, in my condition, itmight mean the giving up of my life, I will gladly make the sacrifice tosave the Treaty. "

He spoke like a soldier who was ready to make the supreme sacrifice tosave the cause that lay closest to his heart. 

As I looked at the President while he was talking, in my imagination Imade a comparison between the man, Woodrow Wilson, who now stood before meand the man I had met many years before in New Jersey. In those days hewas a vigorous, agile, slender man, active and alert, his hair butslightly streaked with gray. Now, as he stood before me discussing thenecessity for the Western trip, he was an old man, grown grayer andgrayer, but grimmer and grimmer in his determination, like an old warrior, to fight to the end. 

There was another whose heroism was no less than his, Mrs. Wilson. She hassince referred to the Western trip as "one long nightmare, " though in thesmiling face which she turned upon the crowds from Columbus to San Diegoand back to Pueblo none could have detected a trace of the anxiety thatwas haunting her. She met the shouting throngs with the same reposefuldignity and radiant, friendly smile with which she had captivated thepeople of England, France, Italy, and Belgium. 

At home and abroad she has always had a peculiar power to attract thepopulace, though she herself has never craved the spotlight. Like herhusband, she finds home more congenial, and, like him, she prefers not tobe written about. 

In her husband's career she has played a notable rôle, the more noblebecause self-effacing. She has consistently disavowed intention toparticipate actively in public affairs, and yet in many a crisis she, outof her strong intelligence and sagacity, has been able to offer timely, wise suggestion. No public man ever had a more devoted helpmeet, and nowife a husband more dependent upon her sympathetic understanding of hisproblems. The devotion between these two has not been strengthened, forthat would be impossible, but deepened by the President's long illness. Mrs. Wilson's strong physical constitution, combined with strength ofcharacter and purpose, has sustained her under a strain which must havewrecked most women. When the strong man broke, she nursed him as tenderlyas a mother nurses a child. 

Mrs. Wilson must have left the White House for that ill-omened journeywith a sinking heart, for she knew, none better, that her husband wassuffering from accumulated fatigue, and that he should be starting on along vacation instead of a fighting tour that would tax the strength of anathlete in the pink of condition. For seven practically vacationless yearshe had borne burdens too great for any constitution; he had conducted hiscountry through the greatest of all wars; he had contended, at timessingle-handed, in Paris with the world's most adroit politicians; he hadthere been prostrated with influenza, that treacherous disease whichusually maims for a time those whom it does not kill, and he had not givenhimself a chance to recuperate; he had returned to America to engage inthe most desperate conflict of his career with the leaders of theopposition party; and now, when it was clear even to his men friends, andmuch clearer to the intuition of a devoted wife, that nature was cryingout for rest, he was setting out on one of the most arduous programmes ofpublic speaking known even in our country, which is familiar with thesestrenuous undertakings. Mrs. Wilson's anxieties must have increased witheach successive day of the journey, but not even to we of the immediateparty did she betray her fears. Her resolution was as great as his. 

When the great illness came she had to stand between him and the peril ofexhaustion from official cares, yet she could not, like the morefortunately obscure, withdraw her husband from business altogether andtake him away to some quiet place for restoration. As head of the nationhe must be kept in touch with affairs, and during the early months of hisillness she was the chief agent in keeping him informed of publicbusiness. Her high intelligence and her extraordinary memory enabled herto report to him daily, in lucid detail, weighty matters of state broughtto her by officials for transmission to him. At the proper time, when hewas least in pain and least exhausted, she would present a clear, oralresume of each case and lay the documents before him in orderlyarrangement. 

As woman and wife, the first thought of her mind and the first care of herheart must be for his health. Once at an acute period of his illnesscertain officials insisted that they must see him because they carriedinformation which it was "absolutely necessary that the President of theUnited States should have, " and she quietly replied: "I am not interestedin the President of the United States. I am interested in my husband andhis health. "

With loving courage she met her difficult dilemma of shielding him as muchas possible and at the same time keeping him acquainted with things hemust know. When it became possible for him to see people she, in counselwith Admiral Grayson, would arrange for conferences and carefully watchher husband to see that they who talked with him did not trespass too longupon his limited energy. 

When it became evident that the tide of public opinion was setting againstthe League, the President finally decided upon the Western trip as theonly means of bringing home to the people the unparalleled worldsituation. 

At the Executive offices we at once set in motion preparations for theWestern trip. One itinerary after another was prepared, but upon examiningit the President would find that it was not extensive enough and wouldsuspect that it was made by those of us--like Grayson and myself--who weresolicitious for his health, and he would cast them aside. All theitineraries provided for a week of rest in the Grand Canyon of theColorado, but when a brief vacation was intimated to him, he was obduratein his refusal to include even a day of relaxation, saying to me, that"the people would never forgive me if I took a rest on a trip such as theone I contemplate taking. This is a business trip, pure and simple, andthe itinerary must not include rest of any kind. " He insisted that therebe no suggestion of a pleasure trip attaching to a journey which heregarded as a mission. 

As I now look back upon this journey and its disastrous effects upon thePresident's health, I believe that if he had only consented to include arest period in our arrangements, he might not have broken down at Pueblo. 

Never have I seen the President look so weary as on the night we leftWashington for our swing into the West. When we were about to board ourspecial train, the President turned to me and said: "I am in a nice fix. Iam scheduled between now and the 28th of September to make in theneighbourhood of a hundred speeches to various bodies, stretching all theway from Ohio to the coast, and yet the pressure of other affairs upon meat the White House has been so great that I have not had a single minuteto prepare my speeches. I do not know how I shall get the time, for duringthe past few weeks I have been suffering from daily headaches; but perhapsto-night's rest will make me fit for the work of tomorrow. "

No weariness or brain-fag, however, was apparent in the speech atColumbus, Ohio. To those of us who sat on the platform, including thenewspaper group who accompanied the President, this speech with itsbeautiful phrasing and its effective delivery seemed to have beencarefully prepared. 

Day after day, for nearly a month, there were speeches of a similar kind, growing more intense in their emotion with each day. Shortly after we leftTacoma, Washington, the fatigue of the trip began to write itself in thePresident's face. He suffered from violent headaches each day, but hisspeeches never betrayed his illness. 

In those troublous days and until the very end of our Western trip thePresident would not permit the slightest variation from our dailyprogramme. Nor did he ever permit the constant headaches, which would haveput an ordinary man out of sorts, to work unkindly upon the members of hisimmediate party, which included Mrs. Wilson, Doctor Grayson, and myself. He would appear regularly at each meal, partaking of it only slightly, always gracious, always good-natured and smiling, responding to every callfrom the outside for speeches--calls that came from early morning untillate at night--from the plain people grouped about every station andwatering place through which we passed. Even under the most adversephysical conditions he was always kind, gentle, and considerate to thoseabout him. 

I have often wished, as the criticisms of the Pullman smoking car, thecloak room, and the counting house were carried to me, picturing thePresident's coldness, his aloofness and exclusiveness, that the criticscould for a moment have seen the heart and great good-nature of the mangiving expression to themselves on this critical journey. If they couldhave peeped through the curtain of our dining room, at one of the eveningmeals, for instance, they would have been ashamed of theirmisrepresentations of this kind, patient, considerate, human-hearted man. 

When he was "half fit, " an expression he often used, he was the bestfellow in the little group on our train--good-natured, smiling, full ofanecdotes and repartee, and always thinking of the comforts and pleasureof the men gathered about him. The illness of a newspaper man, or of oneof the messengers or conductors, or attachés of the train was a call toservice to him, and one could find the President in one of the littlecompartments of the train, seated at the bed of a newspaper man or someattaché who had been taken ill on the trip. There is in the President asincere human sympathy, which is better than the cheap good-fellowshipwhich many public men carefully cultivate. 

It was on the Western trip, about September 12th, while the President, with every ounce of his energy, was attempting to put across the League ofNations, that Mr. William C. Bullitt was disclosing to the Committee onForeign Relations at a public hearing the facts of a conference betweenSecretary Lansing and himself, in which Mr. Bullitt declared that Mr. Lansing had severely criticized the League of Nations. 

The press representatives aboard the train called Mr. Bullitt's testimonyto the President's attention. He made no comment, but it was plain fromhis attitude that he was incensed and distressed beyond measure. Here hewas in the heart of the West, advancing the cause so dear to his heart, steadily making gains against what appeared to be insurmountable odds, andnow his intimate associate, Mr. Lansing, was engaged in sniping andattacking him from behind. 

On September 16th, Mr. Lansing telegraphed the following message to thePresident:

 On May 17th, Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons with which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most everyone did, but that was probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to have peace as soon as possible. 

When the President received this explanation from Mr. Lansing, he sent forme to visit with him in his compartment. At the time I arrived he wasseated in his little study, engaged in preparing his speech for thenight's meeting. Turning to me, with a deep show of feeling, he said:"Read that, and tell me what you think of a man who was my associate onthe other side and who confidentially expressed himself to an outsider insuch a fashion? Were I in Washington I would at once demand hisresignation! That kind of disloyalty must not be permitted to gounchallenged for a single minute. The testimony of Bullitt is aconfirmation of the suspicions I have had with reference to thisindividual. I found the same attitude of mind on the part of Lansing onthe other side. I could find his trail everywhere I went, but they wereonly suspicions and it would not be fair for me to act upon them. But herein his own statement is a verification at last of everything I havesuspected. Think of it! This from a man whom I raised from the level of asubordinate to the great office of Secretary of State of the UnitedStates. My God! I did not think it was possible for Lansing to act in thisway. When we were in Paris I found that Lansing and others were constantlygiving out statements that did not agree with my viewpoint. When I hadarranged a settlement, there would appear from some source I could notlocate unofficial statements telling the correspondents not to take thingstoo seriously; that a compromise would be made, and this news, or rathernews of this kind, was harmful to the settlement I had already obtainedand quite naturally gave the Conference the impression that Lansing andhis kind were speaking for me, and then the French would say that I wasbluffing. "

I am convinced that only the President's illness a few days laterprevented an immediate demand on his part for the resignation of Mr. Lansing. 

That there was no real devotion on the part of Mr. Lansing for thePresident is shown by the following incident. 

A few days after the President returned from the West and lay seriouslyill at the White House, with physicians and nurses gathered about his bed, Mr. Lansing sought a private audience with me in the Cabinet Room. Heinformed me that he had called diplomatically to suggest that in view ofthe incapacity of the President we should arrange to call in the Vice-President to act in his stead as soon as possible, reading to me from abook which he had brought from the State Department, which I afterwardlearned was "Jefferson's Manual, " the following clause of the UnitedStates Constitution:

 In case of the removal of the President from office, or his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve upon the Vice-President. 

Upon reading this, I coldly turned to Mr. Lansing and said: "Mr. Lansing, the Constitution is not a dead letter with the White House. I have readthe Constitution and do not find myself in need of any tutoring at yourhands of the provision you have just read. " When I asked Mr. Lansing thequestion as to who should certify to the disability of the President, heintimated that that would be a job for either Doctor Grayson or myself. Iimmediately grasped the full significance of what he intimated and said:"You may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the WhiteHouse on the broad of his back I will not be a party to ousting him. Hehas been too kind, too loyal, and too wonderful to me to receive suchtreatment at my hands. " Just as I uttered this statement Doctor Graysonappeared in the Cabinet Room and I turned to him and said: "And I am surethat Doctor Grayson will never certify to his disability. Will you, Grayson?" Doctor Grayson left no doubt in Mr. Lansing's mind that he wouldnot do as Mr. Lansing suggested. I then notified Mr. Lansing that ifanybody outside of the White House circle attempted to certify to thePresident's disability, that Grayson and I would stand together andrepudiate it. I added that if the President were in a condition to know ofthis episode he would, in my opinion, take decisive measures. That endedthe interview. 

It is unnecessary to say that no further attempt was made by Mr. Lansingto institute ouster proceedings against his chief. 

I never attempted to ascertain what finally influenced the action of thePresident peremptorily to demand the resignation of Mr. Lansing. My ownjudgment is that the demand came as the culmination of repeated acts ofwhat the President considered disloyalty on Mr. Lansing's part while inParis, and that the situation was aggravated by Mr. Lansing's notes toMexico during the President's illness. 

When I received from the President's stenographer the letter to Mr. Lansing, intimating that his resignation would not be a disagreeable thingto the President, I conferred with the President at once and argued withhim that in the present state of public opinion it was the wrong time todo the right thing. At the time the President was seated in his invalidchair on the White House portico. 

Although physically weak, he was mentally active and alert. Quickly hetook hold of my phrase and said, with a show of the old fire that I hadseen on so many occasions: "Tumulty, it is never the wrong time to spikedisloyalty. When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my back. I am on myfeet now and I will not have disloyalty about me. "

When the announcement of Lansing's resignation was made, the flood-gatesof fury broke about the President; but he was serene throughout it all. When I called at the White House on the following Sunday, I found himcalmly seated in his bathroom with his coloured valet engaged in the notarduous task of cutting his hair. Looking at me with a smile in his eye, he said: "Well, Tumulty, have I any friends left?" "Very few, Governor, " Isaid. Whereupon he replied: "Of course, it will be another two days'wonder. But in a few days what the country considers an indiscretion on mypart in getting rid of Lansing will be forgotten, but when the sober, second thought of the country begins to assert itself, what will stand outwill be the disloyalty of Lansing to me. Just think of it! Raised andexalted to the office of Secretary of State, made a member of the PeaceCommission, participating in all the conferences and affixing hissignature to a solemn treaty, and then hurrying to America and appearingbefore the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to repudiate the verything to which he had given his assent. "

During the illness of the President his political enemies sought to conveythe impression that he was incapacitated for the duties of his office. Asone who came in daily contact with him I knew how baseless were theseinsinuations. As a matter of fact, there was not a whole week during hisentire illness that he was not in touch with every matter upon which hewas called to act and upon which he was asked to render judgment. TheWhite House files contain numerous memoranda showing his interest in allmatters to which department heads felt it incumbent to call his attentionduring his illness. One of the most critical things upon which he passedwas the question of the miners' strike, which resulted in the beginningfrom an injunction suit by the Attorney General, Mr. Palmer, to restrainthe miners from carrying out their purpose to strike. This was one of themost critical situations that arose during his illness and with which hedaily kept in touch. 

Uncomplainingly the President applied himself to the difficult tasks ofthe Western trip. While the first meeting at Columbus was a disappointmentas to attendance, as we approached the West the crowds grew in numbers andthe enthusiasm became boundless. The idea of the League spread and spreadas we neared the coast. Contrary to the impression in the East, thePresident's trip West was a veritable triumph for him and was sosuccessful that we had planned, upon the completion of the Western trip, to invade the enemy's country, Senator Lodge's own territory, the NewEngland States, and particularly Massachusetts. This was our plan, fullydeveloped and arranged, when about four o'clock in the morning ofSeptember 26, 1919, Doctor Grayson knocked at the door of my sleepingcompartment and told me to dress quickly, that the President was seriouslyill. As we walked toward the President's car, the Doctor told me in a fewwords of the President's trouble and said that he greatly feared it mightend fatally if we should attempt to continue the trip and that it was hisduty to inform the President that by all means the trip must be cancelled;but that he did not feel free to suggest it to the President withouthaving my cooperation and support. When we arrived at the President'sdrawing room I found him fully dressed and seated in his chair. With greatdifficulty he was able to articulate. His face was pale and wan. One sideof it had fallen, and his condition was indeed pitiful to behold. QuicklyI reached the same conclusion as that of Doctor Grayson, as to thenecessity for the immediate cancellation of the trip, for to continue it, in my opinion, meant death to the President. Looking at me, with greattears running down his face, he said: "My dear boy, this has neverhappened to me before. I felt it coming on yesterday. I do not know whatto do. " He then pleaded with us not to cut short the trip. Turning to bothof us, he said: "Don't you see that if you cancel this trip, Senator Lodgeand his friends will say that I am a quitter and that the Western trip wasa failure, and the Treaty will be lost. " Reaching over to him, I took bothof his hands and said: "What difference, my dear Governor, does it makewhat they say? Nobody in the world believes you are a quitter, but it isyour life that we must now consider. We must cancel the trip, and I amsure that when the people learn of your condition there will be nomisunderstanding. " He then tried to move over nearer to me to continue hisargument against the cancellation of the trip; but he found he was unableto do so. His left arm and leg refused to function. 

I then realized that the President's whole left side was paralyzed. Looking at me he said: "I want to show them that I can still fight andthat I am not afraid. Just postpone the trip for twenty-four hours and Iwill be all right. "

But Doctor Grayson and I resolved not to take any risk, and an immediatestatement was made to the inquiring newspaper men that the Western tripwas off. 

Never was the President more gentle or tender than on that morning. Suffering the greatest pain, paralyzed on his left side, he was stillfighting desperately for the thing that was so close to his heart--avindication of the things for which he had so gallantly fought on theother side. Grim old warrior that he was, he was ready to fight to thedeath for the League of Nations. 

In the dispatches carried to the country, prepared by the fine newspapermen who accompanied us on the trip, it was stated that evidences of abreakdown on the part of the President were plainly visible in the speechhe delivered at Pueblo. 

I had talked to him only a few minutes before the delivery of that speech, and the only apparent evidence that he was approaching a breakdown was inhis remark to me that he had a splitting headache, and that he would haveto cut his speech short. As a matter of fact, this last speech he made, atPueblo, on September 25, 1919, was one of the longest speeches deliveredon the Western trip and, if I may say so, was one of the best and mostpassionate appeals he made for the League of Nations. 

Many things in connection with the Pueblo meeting impressed themselvesupon me. In the peroration of the speech he drew a picture of his visit onDecoration Day, 1919, to what he called a beautiful hillside near Paris, where was located the cemetery of Suresnes, a cemetery given over to theburial of the American dead. As he spoke of the purposes for which thosedeparted American soldiers had given their lives, a great wave of emotion, such as I have never witnessed at a public meeting, swept through thewhole amphitheatre. As he continued his speech, I looked at Mrs. Wilsonand saw tears in her eyes. I then turned to see the effect upon some ofthe "hard-boiled" newspaper men, to whom great speeches were ordinarythings, and they were alike deeply moved. Down in the amphitheatre I sawmen sneak their handkerchiefs out of their pockets and wipe the tears fromtheir eyes. The President was like a great organist playing upon the heartemotions of the thousands of people who were held spell-bound by what hesaid. 

It is possible, I pray God it may not be so, that the speech at Pueblo wasthe last public speech that Woodrow Wilson will ever make, and I, therefore, take the liberty of introducing into this story the concludingwords of it:

 What of our pledges to the men that lie dead in France? We said that they went over there not to prove the prowess of America or her readiness for another war but to see to it that there never was such a war again. It always seems to make it difficult for me to say anything, my fellow citizens, when I think of my clients in this case. My clients are the children; my clients are the next generation. They do not know what promises and bonds I undertook when I ordered the armies of the United States to the soil of France, but I know, and I intend to redeem my pledges to the children; they shall not be sent upon a similar errand. 

 Again, and again, my fellow citizens, mothers who lost their sons in France have come to me and, taking my hand, have shed tears upon it not only, but they have added: "God bless you, Mr. President!" Why, my fellow citizens, should they pray God to bless me? I advised the Congress of the United States to create the situation that led to the death of their sons. I ordered their sons overseas. I consented to their sons being put in the most difficult parts of the battle line, where death was certain, as in the impenetrable difficulties of the forest of Argonne. Why should they weep upon my hand and call down the blessings of God upon me? Because they believe that their boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the immediate and palpable objects of the war. They believe, and they rightly believe, that their sons saved the liberty of the world. They believe that wrapped up with the liberty of the world is the continuous protection of that liberty by the concerted powers of all the civilized world. They believe that this sacrifice was made in order that other sons should not be called upon for a similar gift--the gift of life, the gift of all that died-- and if we did not see this thing through, if we fulfilled the dearest present wish of Germany and now dissociated ourselves from those alongside whom we fought in the war, would not something of the halo go away from the gun over the mantelpiece, or the sword? Would not the old uniform lose something if its significance? These men were crusaders. They were going forth to prove the might of justice and right, and all the world accepted them as crusaders, and their transcendent achievement has made all the world believe in America as it believes in no other nation organized in the modern world. There seems to me to stand between us and the rejection or qualification of this treaty the serried ranks of those boys in khaki, not only those boys who came home, but those dear ghosts that still deploy upon the fields of France. 

 My friends, on last Decoration Day I went to a beautiful hillside near Paris, where was located the cemetery of Suresnes, a cemetery given over to the burial of the American dead. Behind me on the slopes was rank upon rank of living American soldiers, and lying before me on the levels of the plain was rank upon rank of departed American soldiers. Right by the side of the stand where I spoke there was a little group of French women who had adopted those graves, had made themselves mothers of those dear ghosts by putting flowers every day upon those graves, taking them as their own sons, their own beloved, because they had died in the same cause--France was free and the world was free because America had come! I wish some men in public life who are now opposing the settlement for which these men died could visit such a spot as that. I wish that the thought that comes out of those graves could penetrate their consciousness. I wish that they could feel the moral obligation that rests upon us not to go back on those boys, but to see the thing through, to see it through to the end and make good their redemption of the world. For nothing less depends upon this decision, nothing less than the liberation and salvation of the world. 

 Now that the mists of this great question have cleared away, I believe that men will see the trust, eye to eye and face to face. There is one thing that the American people always rise to and extend their hand to, and that is the truth of justice and of liberty and of peace. We have accepted that truth and we are going to be led by it, and it is going to lead us, and through us the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace such as the world never dreamed of before. 

CHAPTER XLIII

RESERVATIONS

On June 25, 1919, I received from President Wilson the following cabledmessage:

 My clear conviction is that the adoption of the treaty by the Senate with reservations will put the United States as clearly out of the concert of nations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay out would be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects of the United States, and to go in would give her a leading place in the affairs of the world. Reservations would either mean nothing or postpone the conclusion of peace, so far as America is concerned, until every other principal nation concerned in the treaty had found out by negotiation what the reservations practically meant and whether they could associate themselves with the United States on the terms of the reservations or not. 

 WOODROW WILSON. 

The President consistently held to the principle involved in thisstatement. To his mind the reservations offered by Senator Lodgeconstituted a virtual nullification on the part of the United States of atreaty which was a contract, and which should be amended through freediscussion among all the contracting parties. He did not argue or assumethat the Covenant was a perfected document, but he believed that, like ourAmerican Constitution, it should be adopted and subsequently submitted tonecessary amendment through the constitutional processes of debate. He wasunalterably opposed to having the United States put in the position ofseeking exemptions and special privileges under an agreement which hebelieved was in the interest of the entire world, including our owncountry. Furthermore, he believed that the advocacy for reservations inthe Senate proceeded from partisan motives and that in so far as there wasa strong popular opinion in the country in favour of reservations itproceeded from the same sources from which had come the pro-Germanpropaganda. Before the war pro-German agitation had sought to keep us outof the conflict, and after the war it sought to separate us in interestand purpose from other governments with which we were associated. 

By his opposition to reservations the President was seeking to preventGermany from taking through diplomacy what she had been unable to get byher armies. 

The President was so confident of the essential rightness of the Leagueand the Covenant and of the inherent right-mindedness of the Americanpeople, that he could not believe that the people would sanction eitherrejection or emasculation of the Treaty if they could be made to see theissue in all the sincerity of its motives and purposes, if partisan attackcould be met with plain truth-speaking. It was to present the case of thepeople in what he considered its true light that he undertook the Westerntour, and it was while thus engaged that his health broke. Had he keptwell and been able to lead in person the struggle for ratification, hemight have won, as he had previously by his determination and convictionbroken down stubborn opposition to the Federal Reserve system. 

So strong was his faith in his cause and the people that even after hefell ill he could not believe that ratification would fail. What hisenemies called stubbornness was his firm faith in the righteousness of thetreaty and in the reasonableness of the proposition that the time to makeamendments was not prior to the adoption of the Treaty and by one nation, but after all the nations had agreed and had met together for sober, unpartisan consideration of alterations in the interest of all thecontracting parties and the peace and welfare of the world. 

Even when he lay seriously ill, he insisted upon being taken in hisinvalid chair along the White House portico to the window of my outeroffice each day during the controversy in the Senate over the Treaty. There day after day in the coldest possible weather I conferred with himand discussed every phase of the fight on the Hill. He would sit in hischair, wrapped in blankets, and though hardly able, because of hisphysical condition, to discuss these matters with me, he evidenced inevery way a tremendous interest in everything that was happening in theCapitol that had to do with the Treaty. Although I was warnedby Doctor Grayson and Mrs. Wilson not to alarm him unduly by bringingpessimistic reports, I sought, in the most delicate and tactful way Icould, to bring the atmosphere of the Hill to him. Whenever there was anindication of the slightest rise in the tide for the League of Nations asmile would pass over the President's face, and weak and broken though hewas, he evidenced his great pleasure at the news. Time and time againduring the critical days of the Treaty fight the President would appearoutside my office, seated in the old wheel chair, and make inquiryregarding the progress of the Treaty fight on Capitol Hill. 

One of the peculiar things about the illness from which the Presidentsuffered was the deep emotion which would stir him when word was broughtto him that this senator or that senator on the Hill had said some kindthing about him or had gone to his defense when some political enemy wasengaged in bitterly assailing his attitude in the Treaty fight. Neverwould there come from him any censure or bitter criticism of those whowere opposing him in the fight. For Senator Borah, the leader of theopposition, he had high respect, and felt that he was actuated only bysincere motives. 

I recall how deeply depressed he was when word was carried to him that thedefeat of the Treaty was inevitable. On this day he was looking more wearythan at any time during his illness. After I had read to him a memorandumthat I had prepared, containing a report on the situation in the Senate, Idrew away from his wheel chair and said to him: "Governor, you are lookingvery well to-day. " He shook his head in a pathetic way and said: "I amvery well for a man who awaits disaster, " and bowing his head he gave wayto the deep emotion he felt. 

A few days later I called to notify him of the defeat of the Treaty. Hisonly comment was, "They have shamed us in the eyes of the world. "Endeavouring to keep my good-nature steady in the midst of a tryingsituation, I smiled and said: "But, Governor, only the Senate has defeatedyou. The People will vindicate your course. You may rely upon that. " "Ah, but our enemies have poisoned the wells of public opinion, " he said. "Theyhave made the people believe that the League of Nations is a greatJuggernaut, the object of which is to bring war and not peace to theworld. If I only could have remained well long enough to have convincedthe people that the League of Nations was their real hope, their lastchance, perhaps, to save civilization!"

I said, by way of trying to strengthen and encourage him at this, one ofthe critical moments of his life--a moment that I knew was one of despairfor him--"Governor, I want to read a chapter from the third volume ofyour 'History of the American People, ' if it will not tire you. " Hegraciously gave his assent and I took from under my arm the volumecontaining an account of the famous John Jay treaty, in the defense ofwhich Alexander Hamilton was stoned while he stood defending it on thesteps of the New York City Hall. There was, indeed, a remarkablesimilarity between the fight over the John Jay treaty and the VersaillesTreaty. I read an entire chapter of Woodrow Wilson's "History of theAmerican People, " including the passage:

 Slowly the storm blew off. The country had obviously gained more than it had conceded, and tardily saw the debt it owed Mr. Jay and to the administration, whose firmness and prudence had made his mission possible. But in the meantime things had been said which could not be forgotten. Washington had been assailed with unbridled license, as an enemy and a traitor to the country; had even been charged with embezzling public moneys during the Revolution; was madly threatened with impeachment, and even with assassination; and had cried amidst the bitterness of it all that "he would rather be in his grave than in the presidency. "

 The country knew its real mind about him once again when the end of his term came and it was about to lose him. He refused to stand for another election. His farewell address, with its unmistakable tone of majesty and its solemn force of affection and admonition, seemed an epitome of the man's character and achievements, and every man's heart smote him to think that Washington was actually gone from the nation's counsels. 

When I concluded reading this chapter, the President's comment was, "It ismighty generous of you to compare my disappointment over the Treaty withthat of Washington's. _You have placed me in mighty good company. _"

CHAPTER XLIV

WILSON--THE HUMAN BEING

There is no one who wishes to feel the camaraderie of life, "the familiartouch, " more than Woodrow Wilson; but it seems that it cannot be so, andthe knowledge that it could not saddened him from the outset of his publiccareer. 

I remember a meeting between us at the Governor's Cottage at Sea Girt, NewJersey, a few hours after the news of his nomination for the Presidencyhad reached us from Baltimore in 1912. In this little talk he endeavouredin an intimate way to analyze himself for my benefit. "You know, Tumulty, "he said, "there are two natures combined in me that every day fight forsupremacy and control. On the one side, there is the Irish in me, quick, generous, impulsive, passionate, anxious always to help and to sympathizewith those in distress. " As he continued his description of himself, hisvoice took on an Irish brogue, "And like the Irishman at the DonnybrookFair, always willin' to raise me shillalah and to hit any head whichstands firninst me. Then, on the other side, " he said, "there is theScotch--canny, tenacious, cold, and perhaps a little exclusive. I tellyou, my dear friend, that when these two fellows get to quarrelling amongthemselves, it is hard to act as umpire between them. "

For every day of my eleven years' association with Woodrow Wilson I haveseen some part of these two natures giving expression to itself. I havewitnessed the full play of the Irish passion for justice and sympathy forthe under-dog, the man whom he was pleased to call the "average man, "whose name never emerges to the public view. I have seen the full tide ofIrish passion and human sympathies in him flow at some story of injusticewhich I had called to his attention; that Irish sympathy in him expresseditself not dramatically, but in some simple, modest way; an impulse tolift someone, to help an unfortunate person in distress. That sympathymight be expressed in the presence of some father, seeking pardon at thehands of the President in behalf of a wayward son, or some mother pleadingfor the release of a loved one, or it would show itself in full sway, asit often did, when I called his attention to some peculiar case that hadevoked my sympathy and pity. And again I saw the Scotch in him--strict, upstanding, intractable, and unrelenting. I saw the Scotch rise in himwhen an attempt would be made by personal friends to influence his actionwhere it was evident to him there was at the base of it some hint ofpersonal privilege, of favouritism on grounds of friendship. I saw thefull sweep of that Scotch tenacity during the war, in the very midst ofthat bloody thing, at a time when bitter ridicule and jeers were hisportion. Throughout it he was calm, imperturbable, undisturbed by thefrenzied passions of the moment. 

I saw him express the Irish sense of gratitude in a striking way in theWhite House, in my presence, as the result of a conference, in which theparticipants were the President and Senators Stone and Reed, both ofMissouri. 

The incident arose out of Senator Reed's failure to get the President toagree to appoint an intimate friend of Reed's postmaster of St. Louis. Charges, many of them unfounded, had been made to the Postmaster General'soffice against the Reed candidate and, although Reed had made many appealsto Postmaster General Burleson to send the appointment of his friend tothe President for his approval, Burleson refused to do so, and Reedthereupon brought his case to the President. I remember how generous andcourteous the President was in his treatment of Reed and Stone on thisoccasion. Senator Stone, in his usual kindly way, walked over to thePresident and putting his hand on his shoulder, said: "Now, Mr. President, I want you to do this favour for my friend, Jim Reed. Jim is a damned goodfellow. " The President laughingly replied, "Why, Senator, you just knowthat there is nothing personal in my attitude in this matter. I have nodesire to injure or humiliate Senator Reed, but the Postmaster General hasrefused to recommend the appointment of the Senator's friend for the St. Louis postmastership. " The President then turned to Senator Reed and said, "Senator, I will tell you what I will do for you. I will allow you to nameany other man, outside of the one whose name you have already suggested, and I will appoint him at once without making any inquiry or investigationwhatever as to his qualifications. This I will do in order to convince youthat I have no personal feeling whatever toward you in this matter. " ButSenator Reed continued to argue for the appointment of his friend. ThePresident was adamant. Senator Stone and Senator Reed then turned awayfrom the President and made their way to my office which was adjoiningthat of the President. It was plain that the two Senators were deeplydisappointed and highly displeased with the President. As the Presidentopened the door for the Senators to make their entrance into my roomSenator Reed turned to the President again and in the most emphatic way, said, "Mr. President, Senator Stone told me before I came to see you thatyou were not a cold man and that you were a good fellow. It was upon thathypothesis that I took the liberty of appealing to you personally inbehalf of my friend. " Senator Reed then continued, and in the mosteloquent short speech I have ever heard, said, "They tell me that beforeyou became governor of New Jersey you had a fight at Princeton with theTrustees of that University. You better than any one else in this countryknow what it is to have a pack of enemies at your heels. This is what ishappening in my friend's case. My enemies in Missouri have conspired todestroy this man because he has been my friend and has fought my battlesfor me. This man whom I have asked you to appoint has been my campaignmanager. He has visited my home; we have been life-long friends, and Iwill stake my life upon his reputation and upon his standing. But becausehe has been my friend he is now to be punished and now by your action youwill complete the conspiracy that is afoot to defeat and destroy him. "

The President then said, "But, Senator, I have tried to convince you thatthere is nothing personal in my attitude and that I will appoint any otherman you may name. " Whereupon Senator Reed said, "If God Almighty himselfasked me to surrender in this fight for my friend, I would not do it. Ithink I know you well enough to know that in the fight you had for yourideals and your friends at Princeton, you would not have surrendered toanybody. I am fighting now for the reputation and the character of myfriend, and you ought not to ask me to surrender him to his executioners. "

The President was standing with his arms folded while the Senator wasaddressing him and was evidently deeply touched by Reed's appeal. As Reedconcluded his eloquent speech in behalf of his friend quickly thePresident reached out his hand to Reed and said, "Senator, don't surrenderyour friend; stick by him to the end and I will appoint him. " Whereupon heturned from the Senators, walked over to the telephone which stood on mydesk, called up the Postmaster General and directed him to send over tothe White House at once the appointment of Senator Reed's friend for thepostmastership at St. Louis. The Postmaster General protested but wasoverruled by the President. As the two Senators left my room, SenatorStone said to Senator Reed, "By God, Jim, I told you so. There is a greatman and a true friend. I told you he was a regular fellow. "

It has been said by the enemies of Woodrow Wilson that he was ungrateful, that he never appreciated the efforts of his friends in his behalf, andthat when it came to the question of appointments he was unmindful of bigobligations to them. 

The following letter is so characteristic of the man that I beg leave tointroduce it:

 The White House, Washington D. C. 

 April 14, 1916. 

 MY DEAR DAVIES:

 Thank you for having let me read this letter again. 

 There is one thing that distresses me. The implication of Mr. Alward's letter is (or would seem to one who did not know the circumstance to be) that I had not shown my gratitude for all the generous things he did in promoting my candidacy. Surely he does not feel that. Is it not true that I appointed him to the office he now holds? that I did so with the greatest pleasure as gratifying his own personal wish, and that the office itself has afforded him an opportunity of showing his real quality and mettle to the people of his state in the performance of duties for which he is eminently qualified? And have I not tried, my dear Davies, in every possible way to show my warm and sincere appreciation and my loyal friendship both to you and to him? It distresses me to find any other implication even latent between the lines, and the inference left to be drawn is that if I should not appoint him to the Federal Bench, it would be virtually an act of ingratitude on my part. I am sure he cannot soberly mean that, for it is so far from just. 

 It seems to me my clear duty to do in this case as in all others, the thing which commends itself to my judgment after the most careful consideration as the wisest and best thing, both for the interests of the Bench and the interests of the party. 

 Always, with real affection, Faithfully yours, WOODROW WILSON. 

 Hon. Joseph E. Davies, Federal Trade Commission. 

On one of the most critical days of the war, when Lloyd George was cryingout in stentorian tones from across the sea that the war was now a racebetween Von Hindenburg and Wilson, a fine old Southern gentleman appearedat my office at the White House, dressed in an old frock coat and wearinga frayed but tolerably respectable high hat. He was the essence ofrefinement and culture and seemed to bring with him to the White House abreath of the old Southland from which he had come. In the most courteousway he addressed me, saying, "Mr. Secretary, I am an old friend of thePresident's father, Doctor Wilson, and I want to see Woodrow. I have notseen the boy since the old days in Georgia, and I have come all the way uphere to shake him by the hand. "

So many requests of a similar nature came to my desk during the criticaldays of the war and at a time when the President was heavily burdened withweighty responsibilities that I was reluctant to grant the old man'srequest and was about to turn him away with the usual excuse as to thecrowded condition of the President's calendar, etc. , when the old mansaid, "I know Woodrow will see me for his father and I were old friends. "He then told me a story that the President had often repeated to me abouthis father. It seems that the old gentleman who was addressing me was on ahot summer's day many years ago sitting in front of a store in thebusiness street of Augusta, Georgia, where the President's father waspastor of the Presbyterian Church, when he sighted the parson, in an oldalpaca coat, seated in his buggy driving a well-groomed gray mare, andcalled out to him, "Doctor, your horse looks better groomed thanyourself. " "Yes, " replied Doctor Wilson dryly as he drove on, "I take careof my horse; my congregation takes care of me. "

I knew that if I repeated this story to the President it would be the opensesame for the old man. I excused myself and quickly made my way to theCabinet Room where the President was holding a conference with the Cabinetmembers. After making my excuses to the Cabinet for my interruption, Iwhispered into the President's ear that there was an old man in my officewho knew his father very well in the old days in Georgia and that hewanted an opportunity to shake hands with him. I then said to thePresident, "He told me the old horse story, the one that you have oftentold me. I am sure that he is an old friend of your father's. " This struckthe President's most tender spot, for many times during the years of ourassociation the President had regaled me with delightful stories of hisfather and of the tender, solicitous way in which his father had cared forhim. One of the passions of President Wilson's life was his love for andrecollection of that old father, himself a man of remarkable force ofcharacter and intellect. Turning to the members of the Cabinet, thePresident said, "Gentlemen, will you please excuse me for a few minutes?"When I told the fine old chap that the President would see him at once healmost collapsed. Then, fixing himself up, rearranging his old frock coat, taking his high hat in hand, striking a statesmanlike posture, he walkedinto the President's office. No words passed between the two men for a fewseconds. The old man looked silently at the President, with pride andadmiration plainly visible in his eyes, and then walked slowly toward thePresident and took both his hands. Releasing them, he put one of his armsaround the President's shoulder and looking straight into the President'seyes, he said, "Woodrow, my boy, your old father was a great friend ofmine and he was mighty proud of you. He often told me that some day youwould be a great man and that you might even become President. " While theold man was addressing him the President stood like a big bashfulschoolboy, and I could see that the old man touched the mystic chord ofmemories that were very sweet and dear to the President. Removing his armfrom about the President's shoulder, the old man said, "Well, well, Woodrow, what shall I say to you?" Then, answering his own question, hesaid, "I shall say to you what your dear old father would have said werehe here: 'Be a good boy, my son, and may God bless you and take care ofyou!'"

The President said nothing, but I could see that his lips were quivering. For a moment he stood still, in his eyes the expression of one whoremembers things of long ago and sacred. Then he seemed, as with aneffort, to summon himself, and his thoughts back to the present, and I sawhim walk slowly toward the door of the Cabinet Room, place one hand on theknob, with the other brush his handkerchief across his eyes. I saw himthrow back his shoulders and grow erect again as he opened the door, and Iheard him say in quiet, steady tones, "I hope you will pardon theinterruption, gentlemen. "

The popular cry of the unthinking against Woodrow Wilson in the early daysof his administration was that he was a pacifist and unwilling to fight. The gentlemen who uttered these unkind criticisms were evidently unmindfulof the moral courage he manifested in the various fights in which he hadparticipated in his career, both at Princeton University, where he servedas president, and as governor of New Jersey, in challenging the "oldguard" of both parties to mortal combat for the measures of reform whichhe finally brought to enactment. They also forgot the moral courage whichhe displayed in fighting the tariff barons and ha procuring the enactmentof the Underwood tariff, and of the fine courage he manifested indecentralizing the financial control of the country and bringing about theFederal Reserve Act, which now has the whole-hearted approval of thebusiness world in America and elsewhere, but which was resisted in themaking by powerful interests. 

I do not wish to make an invidious comparison between Woodrow Wilson andhis predecessors in the White House, but if one will examine the politicalhistory of this country, he will find that very few Presidents had eversucceeded, because of the powerful interests they were compelled toattack, in finally putting upon the statute books any legislation thatcould control the moneyed interests of the country. The reform of thetariff and the currency had been the rocks upon which many administrationshad met disaster. 

Nearly every adviser about Woodrow Wilson, even those who had hadexperience in the capital of the nation, warned him that he might, after along fight, succeed in reforming the tariff, but that his efforts wouldfail if he attempted to pass a bill that would establish currency reform. But the President allowed nothing to stand in the way of the establishmentof the Federal Reserve system without which the financing of the greatestwar in the history of the world would have been impossible. It was hiscourage and his persistency that provided the first uniform and harmonioussystem of banking which the United States has ever had. 

If Woodrow Wilson had accomplished nothing more than the passage of thisFederal Reserve Act, he would have been entitled to the gratitude of thenation. This Act supplied the country with an elastic currency controlledby the American people. Panics--the recurring phenomena of disaster whichthe Republican party could neither control nor explain--are now but amemory. Under the Republican system there was an average of one bankfailure every twenty-one days for a period of nearly forty years. Afterthe passage of the Federal Reserve system there were, in 1915, four bankfailures; in 1916 and 1917, three bank failures; in 1918, one bankfailure; and in 1919, no bank failures at all. 

Woodrow Wilson is not a showy fighter, but he is a tenacious and acourageous one. 

A little story came to me at the White House, illustrating alike thecalmness and the fighting quality of Woodrow Wilson. The incident happenedwhile he was a student at the University of Virginia. It appears that someof the University boys went to a circus and had got into a fight with thecircus men and been sadly worsted. They called a meeting at "wash hall, "as they termed it. Many of the boys made ringing speeches, denouncing thebrutality and unfairness of the circus people and there was muchexcitement. It was then moved that all the boys present should proceed tothe circus and give proper battle, to vindicate the honour of the college. Just before the motion was put a slim, black-haired, solemn youth arosefrom his seat in the rear of the hall, and walking up the aisle, requesteda hearing. He stated that perhaps he was being forward, because he was a"first-year" man, in asking to be heard; that he felt that the action ofthe circus men deserved the severest condemnation; that it was a naturalimpulse to want to punish cowardly acts and to "clean up" the show; butthat it was lawlessness they were about to engage in; that it would bringdisgrace on the college, as well as on the state and the Southland; morethan this, many of the showmen would be armed with clubs, knives, andpistols, and if the boys did go, some of them might not come back aliveand others might be maimed or crippled for life. He then paused, butresuming, said, "However, if my views do not meet with your approval; ifyou decide to go as a body, or if a single man wants to go to fight, Ishall ask to go with him. "

Was not his attitude in this incident characteristic of his dealing withGermany? He was patient with Germany and stood unmoved under the bitterestcriticism and ridicule; but when he found that patience was no longer avirtue, he went into the war in the most ruthless way and punished Germanyfor her attempt to control the high seas. 

I recall my own antagonism to him in New Jersey when I was engaged, as nowcertain of his enemies are engaged, in attacking him, and I recall how myopposition abated and altogether disappeared by the recital by one of hisfriends to me one day of the controversy among the Princeton Trustees thatarose over the now-famous Proctor gift. I was discussing the Princetonprofessor with this old friend one day and I said to him that I suspectedthat Wall Street interests were back of his candidacy for thegovernorship. My friend said, "Tumulty, you are wrong. There is nounwholesome interest or influence back of Wilson. I tell you he is a finefellow and if he is elected governor, he will be a free man. " He thencited the instance of the Princeton fight over the Proctor gift. It willbe recalled that Mr. Proctor bequeathed to Princeton University a largesum of money, but attached certain conditions to the gift that had to dowith the policy or internal control of the University. The gift was madeat a time when Princeton was in sore need of funds. President Wilson, in aprolonged fight, bitterly waged by some who had been his close personalfriends, persuaded the Board of Trustees to vote, by a narrow margin, forrejection of the gift on the grounds that a great educational institutioncould not afford to have its internal policies dictated by purchase on thepart of a rich man. By his position he alienated from his leadership manyof the wealthy, influential Princeton alumni, especially in the largerEastern cities, but he stood like a rock on the principle that theeducational policy of a college must be made by those authorized to makeit and not changed at the bidding of wealthy benefactors. This was aconvincing answer to my attack upon the Princeton professor. 

This same moral courage was given free play on many an occasion during ourintimacy. It was made manifest in the famous Panama Tolls fight, at a timewhen he was warned that a fight made to rectify mistakes in the matter ofPanama tolls would destroy his political future. 

He was always a fair fighter and a gentleman throughout every contest heengaged in. Many unkind and untrue things were said about Woodrow Wilsonfrom the time he entered politics, but there is one charge that has neverbeen made against him and that is the charge of untruthfulness or "hittingbelow the belt. " No one in the country during his eight years at the WhiteHouse ever charged him with making an untrue statement. No politician orstatesman ever said that Wilson had broken a promise, though many havecomplained that he would not make promises. 

In the matter of promises I never met a man who was so reluctant to give apromise, especially in the matter of bestowing office upon willingcandidates. I have known him on many occasions to make up his mind formonths in advance to appoint a certain man and yet he would not say so tohis most intimate friends who urged it. Speaking to me one day about thematter of promises, he said, "The thing to do is to keep your mind openuntil you are bound to act. Then you have freedom of action to change yourmind without being charged with bad faith. "

One reason for the charge made against him of coldness and "politicalingratitude" was that he steadfastly refused to barter public offices forpolitical support. He is by instinct, as well as by conviction, utterlyopposed to the "spoils system. " He considers government the people'sbusiness to be conducted as such and not as a matter of personal exchangeof political favours. Nor can those who failed to get from him what theyfancied their political services earned, complain truthfully that theywere deceived by him into supposing that he shared their own opinion oftheir deserts. Frequently they had explicit warning to the contrary. Therewas the case of Jim Smith and the New Jersey machine, for instance. Whenthose gentlemen paid the president of Princeton University an unsolicitedcall to suggest that he be candidate for the Democratic nomination for thegovernorship of New Jersey, Mr. Wilson, after thanking them for thecompliment, with disconcerting directness asked, "Gentlemen, why do youwant me as the candidate?" They replied, because they believed he could beelected and they wanted a Democratic governor. He asked why they believedhe could be elected, he who had never held any public office. Theyanswered that the people of New Jersey would have confidence in him. "Precisely, " said Mr. Wilson; "they will have confidence in me becausethey will believe that I am free of the political entanglements which havebrought distress to New Jersey, because they are tired of politicalbargain and sale, because they want their government delivered back intotheir hands. They want a government pledged to nobody but themselves. Now, don't you see, gentlemen, that if I should consider your flatteringsuggestion, I must be what the people think I am. I must be free toconsider nothing but their interests. There must be no strings tied toyour proposal. I cannot consider it an obligation of returned personalfavours to any individual. We must clearly understand that we are actingin the interest of the people of New Jersey and in the interest of nobodyelse. " If the self-constituted committee thought this merely handsometalk without specific meaning, they had only themselves to thank for theirsubsequent predicament. They found he meant exactly what he said. 

There has never been a public man in America with a profounder faith inpopular government, or a stronger conviction that the bane of freegovernment is secret bargaining among those ambitious to trade publicoffice for private benefits. Mr. Wilson could no more pay for politicalsupport from public offices than he could pay for it from the publictreasury. He abhors all forms of political favoritism including nepotism. He not only would not appoint kinsmen to office; he would discountenancetheir appointment by others. He resisted the efforts of well-meaningfriends to have his brother, Mr. Joseph R. Wilson, Jr. , who had rendered asubstantial service to the 1912 campaign by his effective work as atrained journalist, elected secretary of the United States Senate, sayingthat his brother in this position would inevitably be misunderstood, wouldbe thought a spy on the Senate to report matters to the President. Hisson-in-law, Mr. Francis B. Sayre, is by profession a student ofinternational law, a professor of the subject in Harvard University, andas such was employed by Colonel House on the research committeepreparatory to the Paris Conference. Mr. Sayre assumed he was to go toParis, but the President set his personal veto on this, saying that itwould not do for the President's son-in-law to be on a list of those whowere going abroad at the public expense. When Mr. Sayre asked if he couldnot go and pay his own expenses, the President replied, "No, because itwould not be believed that you had really paid your own expenses. " Mr. Sayre, respecting the President's views, did not press the claim. 

If it has appeared that the President has sometimes "leaned backward" inthese matters, it is because of his strong conviction that politicianshave leaned too far forward in using public office for private rewards, abad system toward which the President's attitude may be stated in Hamlet'simpatient injunction to the players, "Oh, reform it altogether!"

My experiences with him, where one could witness the full play of theScotch and Irish strains in him, came particularly in the matter of thenumerous pardon cases and the applications for Executive Orders, placingthis man or that woman under the classified civil service. The latter wereonly issued in rare instances and always over the protest of the CivilService Commission. In many of these applications there was a greatheartache or family tragedy back of them and to every one of them he gavethe most sympathetic consideration. 

I remember his remark to me one day when I was urging him to sign anExecutive Order in behalf of a poor woman, the widow of an old soldier. After I had argued with him for a time he turned to me and said, "Everyunfortunate person in distress seems to come to me for relief, but I mustnot let my sympathies get the best of me, it would not be right to dothese things upon any basis of sympathy. " Although I stood rebuked, theorder was signed. It was a thing urged against him in the last campaign, that he held the record for the number of Executive Orders issued by him. His Scotch nature would also assert itself on many occasions. While I wasliving with the President at the White House one summer, on a night afterdinner we engaged in the discussion of an article which appeared thatmonth in one of the popular magazines of the country. In this articleWoodrow Wilson was portrayed as a great intellectual machine. Turning tome, he said, "Tumulty, have you read that article? What do you think ofit?" I said that I thought in many respects it was admirable. "I don'tagree with you at all, " he said. "It is no compliment to me to have itsaid that I am only a highly developed intellectual machine. Good God, there is more in me than that!" He then said, rather sadly, "Well, I wantpeople to love me, but I suppose they never will. " He then asked me thisquestion, "Do you think I am cold and unfeeling?" I replied, "No, my dearGovernor, I think you are one of the warmest hearted men I ever met. "

And when I say this of Woodrow Wilson I mean it. I hope I have all of thegenerous tendencies of my race and that I know a great heart when I seeits actions. I could not have been associated with him all these years, witnessing the great heart in action, without having full faith in what Inow say. No man of all my acquaintance, with whom I have discussed life inall of its phases and tragedies, at least those tragedies that stalked inand out of the White House, was more responsive, more sympathetic, andmore inclined to pity and help than Woodrow Wilson. His eyes would fillwith tears at the tale of some unfortunate man or woman in distress. Itwas not a cheap kind of sympathy. It was quiet, sincere, but always fromthe heart. The President continued talking to me--and now he spoke as thecanny Scot--"I am cold in a certain sense. Were I a judge and my own sonshould be convicted of murder, and I was the only judge privileged to passjudgment upon the case, I would do my duty even to the point of sentencinghim to death. It would be a hard thing to do but it would be my solemnduty as a judge to do it, but I would do it, because the state cannot bemaintained and its sovereignty vindicated or its integrity preservedunless the law is strictly enforced and without favour. It is the businessof the judge to uphold it and he must do it to the point of everysacrifice. If he fails, justice fails, the state falls. That looks cold-blooded, doesn't it? But I would do it. " Then his voice lowered and hesaid, "Then, after sentencing my own son to death, I would go out and dieof a broken heart, for it would surely kill me. "

That is one key to the character of the man that was revealed before myown eyes in the years of our intimacy. 

It showed itself on many other occasions. It was his idea of the duty ofthe trustee, the judge, the guardian. 

I remember a visit that two very warm friends from the Pacific Coast madeto him, both of whom had worked night and day for his cause in the greatstate of the Golden West. 

Their son had been convicted and was incarcerated in the Federal Prison. They had every personal reason for feeling that a mere appeal on theirpart on behalf of this son would be a winning one, for their friendshipwith the President was one of long standing and most affectionate incharacter. I can see him now, standing in the centre of the room, with thetwo old people grouped about him, shaking his head and saying, "I wish Icould do it, but I must not allow personal consideration to influence mein the least. I know it is hard for you to believe that I will turn awayfrom your request, but the only basis upon which you make it is ourfriendship. I would be doing an injustice to many a boy like yours who hassimilarly offended and for whom no one is able to speak or approach me inthe intimate contact which is your privilege. Please do not think me cold-hearted, but I cannot do it. "

I remember one of the last pardon cases we handled in the White House wasthat of an old man, charged with violating the banking laws and sentencedto imprisonment. I pleaded with the President to pardon the old man; theAttorney General had recommended it, and some of the warm-hearted membersof the President's family had gone to him and sought to exert theirinfluence in behalf of the old man. It seemed as if everything was movingsmoothly and that the old man might be pardoned, until the familyinfluence was brought to bear. It was the last pardon case I brought tohis attention before the fall of the curtain on March fourth. I went tohim, and said, "My dear Governor, I hope you will close your officialcareer here by doing an act of mercy. " He smiled at me and I thought Icould see the prison gates open for the old man, but when I mentioned thename in the case, the President stiffened up, stopped smiling, and lookingat me in the coldest way, said, "I will not pardon this man. Certainmembers of my family to whom I am deeply devoted, as you know, have soughtto influence my judgment in this matter. They have no right to do it. Ishould be unworthy of my trust as President were I to permit familyinterference of any kind to affect my public actions, because very fewpeople in the country can exert that kind of influence and it must not betolerated. " The case was closed; the pardon refused. 

He often spoke to me in the frankest way of his personal appearance; howhe looked and appeared and of the "old Scotch face, " as he called it, which gave him the appearance of what Caesar called a "lean and hungrylook. " Speaking at the annual banquet of the Motion Picture Board ofTrade, he discussed his personal appearance in this way:

"I have sometimes been very much chagrined in seeing myself in a motionpicture. I have wondered if I really was that kind of a 'guy. ' Theextraordinary rapidity with which I walked, for example, the instantaneousand apparently automatic nature of my motion, the way in which I produceduncommon grimaces, and altogether the extraordinary exhibition I made ofmyself sends me to bed very unhappy. And I often think to myself that, although all the world is a stage and men and women but actors upon it, after all, the external appearance of things are very superficial indeed. "

He knew that his facial expression gave one the impression that he was acold and canny Scot. In repose one would get that impression, but whenthat old Scotch face took on a winning smile it was most gracious andappealing. One of his favourite limericks was:

 For beauty I am not a star, There are others more handsome by far. But my face I don't mind it, For I am behind it, It's the people in front that I jar. 

Behind the cold exterior and beneath the "gleam of the waters" there was awarm, generous heart. I have often thought of the character discussed byIsrael Zangwill in his book "The Mantle of Elijah. " These lines, in myopinion, draw a perfect picture of Woodrow Wilson as I knew him:

Speaking of Allegra's father Zangwill said:

"With him freedom was no nebulous figure, aureoled with shining rhetoric, blowing her own trumpet, but Free Trade, Free Speech, Free Education. Hedid not rail against the Church as the enemy, but he did not count on itas a friend. His Millennium was earthly, human; his philosophy sunny, untroubled by Dantesque depths or shadows; his campaign unmartial, constitutional, a frank focussing of the new forces emergent from the slowdissolution of Feudalism and the rapid growth of a modern world. Towardssuch a man the House of Commons had an uneasy hostility. He did not playthe game. Whig and Tory, yellow and blue, the immemorial shuffling ofCabinet cards, the tricks and honours--he seemed to live outside them all. He was no clubman in 'The best club in England. ' He did not debate forargument's sake or to upset Ministers. He was not bounded by the walls ofthe Chamber nor ruler from the Speaker's chair; the House was resentfullyconscious it had no final word over his reputation or his influence. Hestood for something outside it, something outside himself, somethinglarge, vague, turbulent, untried, unplumbed, unknown--the People. "

A little incident illustrating the warmth of the heart of Woodrow Wilsonand the sympathetic way he manifested his feeling came to me in a letterreceived at the White House in 1920 from a Red Cross nurse, who wasstationed at the Red Cross Base Hospital at Neuilly, France. An excerptfrom it follows:

 I might interest you to recite an incident within my own personal knowledge that proves the depths of his sympathy--his sincerity. I was one of the unit of Red Cross Workers who went to France to help our soldiers blinded in battle. I was at the time of this incident stationed at the Red Cross Base Hospital No. I at Neuilly. After a visit of the President and Mrs. Wilson to the hospital, one of my charges, a totally blind private to whom Mr. Wilson had spoken, said to me: "Miss Farrell, I guess the President must be very tired. " I said, "Why do you think that, Walter?" "Well, because, " replied the soldier, "he laughed and joked with all the other fellows but was so quiet when he talked with me and just said, 'Honourable wound, my boy, ' so low I could hardly hear him. But say, " continued Walter, "look at my hand please and see if it is all there, will you? The President sure has some hand and he used it when he shook hands. I'll say. "

 The fact was, Walter was the first blind soldier the President had met in France and knowing from experience the appeal the blind make to our emotions, I knew the President was so touched that he was overcome and couldn't joke further--he was scarcely able to manage the one remark and could not trust himself to venture another, 'Twas with tears in his eyes and a choking voice that he managed the one. Both he and Mrs. Wilson wept in that blind ward. 

As a political fighter, he was gallant and square. No one ever heard himcall an opponent a name or knew him unworthily to take advantage of anopponent. 

Illustrative of the magnanimous attitude of the President toward hispolitical enemies was the striking incident that occurred a few weeksbefore the close of the last Presidential campaign, 1920. Early oneafternoon two Democratic friends called upon me at the Executive officesand informed me that they could procure certain documents that would go along way toward discrediting the Republican campaign and that they couldbe procured for a money consideration. They explained the character of thedocuments to me and left it to me to say what I considered a fair pricefor them. They explained the serious nature of these documents, and it wascertainly a delicate situation for me to handle and embarrassed megreatly. I was reluctant to offend these gentlemen, and yet I was certainfrom what they said that the documents, as they explained them to me, eventhough they might discredit the Republican campaign, were not of acharacter that any party of decent men ought to have anything to do with. When the gentlemen told me the name of the person who claimed to havethese damaging papers in his possession, I at once recalled that we had inthe files of the White House certain letters that could be used todiscredit this very man who claimed to possess these incriminatingdocuments. I thought it wise, therefore, to listen politely to thesegentlemen until I could get a chance to confer with the President. I didthis at once. 

At this time the President was lying ill in his sick room at the WhiteHouse. The nurse raised him up in the bed and I explained the wholesituation to him, saying to him that it was my opinion that the Democraticparty ought not to have anything to do with such a matter and that Ithought we should at once apprise the Republican managers of the plan thatwas afoot to discredit by these unfair means the Republican candidate andcampaign. When I told the President of the character of these documentsthat had been offered to me he was filled with indignation and said, "Ifwe can't win this fight by fair means, we will not attempt to win it byunfair means. You have my authority to use whatever files we have againstthis party who would seek unfairly to attack the Republican nominee andyou must at once notify the Republican managers of the plan proposed andexplain the whole situation to them. Say to the Attorney General that hemust place at the disposal of Mr. Harding and his friends every officer hehas, if necessary, to disclose and overcome this plot. I am sure thatGovernor Cox will agree with me that this is the right and decent thing todo. "

Acting upon the President's suggestion, I at once called upon a certainRepublican senator from the West, now a member of President Harding'sCabinet, and told him of the proposed plot that was afoot to discredit theRepublican campaign. I told him I was acting upon the express authority ofthe President. He expressed his high appreciation of the information I hadbrought him and informed me that he would place the matter in our handswith the utmost confidence in us to handle it honourably. 

It ought to be said here that upon investigation, personally made bymyself, I found that there was nothing in this whole matter that in theslightest degree reflected upon the honour or the integrity or highstanding of President Harding. 

One of the things for which President Wilson was unduly censured shortlyafter he took office was the recognition he gave to his political enemiesin the Democratic party. The old-line politicians who had supported him in1912 could not understand why the loaves and fishes were dealt out tothese unworthy ones. Protests were made to the President by some of hisclose personal friends, but he took the position that as the leader of theparty he was not going to cause resentment and antagonisms by seeming toclassify Democrats; that as leader of his party he had to recognize allfactions, and there quickly followed appointments of Clark men, Underwoodmen, Harmon men, all over the country. A case in point illustrates thebigness of the President in these matters--that of George Fred Williams asMinister to Greece. In the campaign of 1912 Mr. Williams had travelled upand down the state of Massachusetts making the bitterest sort of attacksupon Woodrow Wilson. I remember how I protested against this appointment. The President's only reply was that George Fred Williams was an eccentricfellow, but that he believed he was thoroughly honest. "I have no fault tofind, Tumulty, with the men who disagree with me and I ought not topenalize them when they give expression to what they believe are honestopinions. "

I have never seen him manifest any bitterness or resentment toward evenhis bitterest, most implacable enemies. Even toward William RandolphHearst, whose papers throughout the country have been his most unrelentingfoes, he never gave expression to any ill feeling or chagrin at the unfairattacks that were made upon him. I remember a little incident that showsthe trend of his feelings in this regard, that occurred when we werediscussing the critical Mexican situation. At this time the Hearst paperswere engaged in a sensational propaganda in behalf of intervention inMexico. The President said to me, "I heard of a delightful remark thatthat fine old lady, Mrs. Phoebe Hearst, made with reference to what shecalled her 'big boy Willie. ' You know, " he continued, "Mrs. Hearst doesnot favour intervention in Mexico and it was reported to me that shechided her son for his flaming headlines urging intervention, and told himthat unless he behaved better she would have to take him over her knee andspank him. "

The President has one great failing, inherent in the very character of theman himself, and this is his inborn, innate modesty--his unwillingness todramatize the part he played in the great events of the war, so that theplain people of the country could see him and better understand him. Thereis no man living to-day who has a greater power of personal appeal or whois a greater master in the art of presenting ideals, facts, and argumentsthan Woodrow Wilson. As his secretary for nearly eleven years, I was oftenvexed because he did not, to use a newspaper phrase, "play up" better, buthe was always averse to doing anything that seemed artificially contrivedto win applause. Under my own eyes, seated in the White House offices, Ihave witnessed many a great story walk in and out but the President alwaysadmonished us that such things must not be pictured or capitalized in anyway for political purposes; and thus every attempt we made to dramatizehim, as Colonel Roosevelt's friends had played him up, was immediatelyplaced under the Presidential embargo. 

His unwillingness to allow us in the White House to "play him up" as theleading actor in this or that movement was illustrated in the followingway: On July 1, 1919, a cable reached the White House from His Holiness, Pope Benedict, expressing the appreciation of His Holiness for themagnificent way in which the President had presented to the PeaceConference the demands of the Catholic Church regarding Catholic missions, and conveying to the President his thanks for the manner in which thePresident had supported those demands. The cable came at a time whencertain leaders of my own church, the Roman Catholic Church, werecriticizing and opposing the President for what they thought was his anti-Catholic attitude. I tried to induce the President to allow me to givepublicity to the Pope's cable, but he was firm in his refusal. The cablefrom the Pope and the President's reply are as follows:

 Rome, The Vatican. 1 July, 1919. 

 TO HIS EXCELLENCY, Doctor Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States. 

 EXCELLENCY:

 Monsignor Carretti, upon his return from Paris, hastened to inform us with what spirit of moderation Your Excellency examined the demands regarding the Catholic Missions which we presented to the Peace Conference, and with what zeal Your Excellency subsequently supported these demands. We desire to express to you our sincere gratitude and at the same time we urge Your Excellency to be good enough to employ your great influence, also, in order to prevent the action, which according to the Peace Treaty with Germany it is desired to bring against the Kaiser and the highly placed German commanders. This action could only render more bitter national hatred and postpone for a long time that pacification of souls for which all nations long. Furthermore, this trial, if the rules of justice are to be observed, would meet insurmountable difficulties as may be seen from the attached article from the _Osservatore Romano_, which deals exclusively with the trial of the Kaiser, the newspaper reserving right to treat in another article the question of the trial of the generals. 

 It pleases us to take advantage of this new occasion to renew to Your Excellency the wishes which we entertain for your prosperity and that of your family, as well as for the happiness of the inhabitants of the Confederation of the United States. 

 (Signed) BENEDICTUS PP. XV. 

 * * * * *

 The White House, Washington, D. C. 

 15 August, 1919. 

 YOUR HOLINESS:

 I have had the pleasure of receiving at the hands of Monsignor Cossio the recent letter you were kind enough to write me, which I now beg to acknowledge with sincere appreciation. Let me assure you that it was with the greatest pleasure that I lent my influence to safeguarding the missionary interests to which you so graciously refer, and I am happy to say that my colleagues in the Conference were all of the same mind in this wish to throw absolute safeguards around such missions and to keep them within the influences under which they had hitherto been conducted. 

 I have read with the gravest interest your suggestion about the treatment which should be accorded the ex-Kaiser of Germany and the military officers of high rank who were associated with him in the war, and beg to say that I realize the force of the considerations which you urge. I am obliged to you for setting them so clearly, and shall hope to keep them in mind in the difficult months to come. With much respect and sincere good wishes for your welfare, Respectfully and sincerely yours, (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. 

 His Holiness, Pope Benedict XV. 

[Illustration: Correspondence with the Pope(Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the two above-quotedletters. )]

There was something too fine in his nature for the dramatics and theposturings of the political game, as it is usually played. He is a veryshy man, too sincere to pose, too modest to make advances. He craves thelove of his fellow-men with all his heart and soul. People see only hisdignity, his reserve, but they cannot see his big heart yearning for thelove of his fellow-men. Out of that loving heart of his has come thepassion which controlled his whole public career--the passion for justice, for fair dealing, and democracy. 

Never during the critical days of the war, when requests of all kindspoured in upon him for interviews of various sorts, did he lose his good-nature. Nor did he show that he was disturbed when various requests camefrom this or that man who claimed to have discovered some scientific meansof ending the war. 

The following letter to his old friend, Mr. Thomas D. Jones of Chicago, ischaracteristic of his feeling toward those who claimed to have made such ascientific discovery:

 The White House, Washington, 25 July 1917. 

 My dear friend:

 It was generous of you to see Mr. Kenney and test his ideas. I hope you derived some amusement from it at least. I am afraid I have grown soft-hearted and credulous in these latter days, credulous in respect to the scientific possibility of almost any marvel and soft-hearted because of the many evidences of simple-hearted purpose this war has revealed to me. 

 With warmest regard, Cordially and faithfully yours, (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. 

Nor did the little things of life escape him, as is shown by the followingletter to Attorney General Gregory:

 The White House, Washington, 1 October, 1918. 

 MY DEAR GREGORY:

 The enclosed letter from his wife was handed to me this morning by a rather pitiful old German whom I see occasionally looking after the flowers around the club house at the Virginia Golf Course. I must say it appeals to me, and I am sending it to you to ask if there is any legitimate way in which the poor old fellow could be released from his present restrictions. 

 In haste, Faithfully yours, (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. 

[Illustration: An evidence of the tender-heartedness which Mr. Tumultyclaims for the President. (Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the above-quoted letter. )]

I recall a day when he sat at his typewriter in the White House, preparingthe speech he was to deliver at Hodgensville, Kentucky, in connection withthe formal acceptance of the Lincoln Memorial, built over the log cabinbirthplace of Lincoln. When he completed this speech, which I consider oneof his most notable public addresses--perhaps in literary form, his best--he turned to me and asked me if I had any comment to make upon it. I readit very carefully. I then said to him, "Governor, there are certain linesin it that might be called a self-revelation of Woodrow Wilson. " Thelines that I had in mind were:

 I have read many biographies of Lincoln; I have sought out with the greatest interest the many intimate stories that are told of him, the narratives of nearby friends, the sketches at close quarters, in which those who had the privilege of being associated with him have tried to depict for us the very man himself "in his habit as he lived"; but I have nowhere found a real intimate of Lincoln. I nowhere get the impression in my narrative or reminiscence that the writer had in fact penetrated to the heart of his mystery, or that any man could penetrate to the heart of it. That brooding spirit had no real familiars. I get the impression that it never spoke out in complete self-revelation, and that it could not reveal itself complete to any one. It was a very lonely spirit that looked out from underneath those shaggy brows, and comprehended men without fully communing with them, as if, in spite of all its genial efforts at comradeship, it dwelt apart, saw its visions of duty where no man looked on. There is a very holy and very terrible isolation for the conscience of every man who seeks to read the destiny in the affairs for others as well as for himself, for a nation as well as for individuals. That privacy no man can intrude upon. That lonely search of the spirit for the right perhaps no man can assist. 

To Woodrow Wilson the business of government was a solemn thing, to whichhe gave every ounce of his energy and his great intellectual power. NoPresident in the whole history of America ever carried weightierresponsibilities than he. Night and day, with uncomplaining patience, hewas at his post of duty, attending strictly to the pressing needs of thenation, punctiliously meeting every engagement, great or small. Indeed, noman that I ever met was more careless about himself or thought less ofvacations for the purpose of rest and recuperation. 

There are three interesting maps which show the mileage covered byPresidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. These maps show the statestraversed by each of the Presidents. Great black smudges show the trailcovered by President Roosevelt, which included every state in the Union, and equally large black marks show the territory covered by PresidentTaft, but only a thin line shows the peregrinations and wanderings ofPresident Wilson. The dynamic, forceful personality of Mr. Roosevelt, which radiated energy, charm, and good-nature, and the big, vigorous, lovable personality of Mr. Taft, put the staid, simple, modest, retiringpersonality of the New Jersey President, Mr. Wilson, at a tremendousdisadvantage. Into the atmosphere created by these winning personalitiesof Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft the personality of Mr. Wilson did not easilyfit, and he realized it, when he said to me one day, "Tumulty, you mustrealize that I am not built for the dramatic things of politics. I do notwant to be displayed before the public, and if I tried it, I should do itbadly. "

Without attempting to belittle the great achievements of former Presidentsof the United States, particularly Roosevelt, it is only fair to say that, comparing the situations which confronted them with those that metPresident Wilson from the very beginning of his incumbency, their jobswere small. As a genial Irishman once said to me, "Hell broke loose whenWilson took hold. " Every unusual thing, every extraordinary thing, seemedto break and break against us. From the happening of the Dayton flood, which occurred in the early days of the Wilson Administration, down to themoment when he laid down the reins of office, it seemed as if the world inwhich we lived was at the point of revolution. Unusual, unprecedented, andremarkable things began to happen, things that required all the patience, indomitable courage, and tenacity of the President to hold them steady. The Mexican situation, left on our door-step, was one of the great burdensthat he carried during his administration. Then came the fight for therevision of the tariff, the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, all items that constituted the great programme of domestic reform whichemanated from the brain of Woodrow Wilson, and then in the midst of it allcame the European war, the necessity for neutrality, the criticism whichwas heaped upon the President for every unusual happening which hiscritics seemed to think called for intervention of the United States inthis great cataclysm. It was not a time for the camaraderie and good-fellowship that had characterized the good old days in which Mr. Rooseveltserved as President. 

And yet no man was less exclusive in dealing with the members of theSenate and House. In preparing the Federal Reserve Act in collaborationwith Senator Glass, he was constantly in touch with the members of theSenate Banking and Currency Committee, in an endeavour to make clear theroad for the passage of this important piece of constructive legislation. Constant demands were made upon his time and he gave of his energy and ofthe small reserve of strength that he had uncomplainingly and without aprotest. No rest, no recreation, no vacation intervened. Every measurethat he sought to press to enactment was the challenge to a great fight, as, for instance, the tariff, the currency, the rural credits, and thePanama tolls acts. 

I have often been asked whether anger or passion ever showed itself in thePresident, and I am reminded of a little incident that happened at theWhite House during one of those conferences with the newspaper men, which, before the days of the war, and for a long time afterward, took place inthe Executive offices. At the time of this particular conference, thePresident's first wife lay seriously ill at the White House, and storieswere carried in the various newspapers exaggerating the nature of herillness, some of them going so far as to say she was suffering from thisor from that disease. At the very time these stories were appearing in thenewspapers there were also articles that his daughter, Margaret, wasengaged to marry this man or that man. The President came to the newspapermen's conference this morning fighting mad. It was plain that somethingserious was afoot. Taking hold of the back of the chair, as if tostrengthen himself for what he had to say, he looked squarely at thenewspaper men and said, "I hope that you gentlemen will pardon me for apersonal word this morning. I have read the stories that have appeared incertain newspapers of the country, containing outrageous statements aboutthe illness of my wife and the marriage of my daughter. I realize that asPresident of the United States you have a perfect right to say anythingyou damn please about me, for I am a man and I can defend myself. I knowthat while I am President it will be my portion to receive all kinds ofunfair criticism, and I would be a poor sport if I could not stand upunder it; but there are some things, gentlemen, that I will not tolerate. You must let my family alone, for they are not public property. I acquitevery man in this room of responsibility for these stories. I know thatyou have had nothing to do with them; but you have feelings and I havefeelings, even though I am President. My daughter has no brother to defendher, but she has me, and I want to say to you that if these stories everappear again I will leave the White House and thrash the man who dares toutter them. "

A little letter came to my notice in which the President replies to an oldfriend in Massachusetts who had asked him to attempt to interpret himself:

 MY DEAR FRIEND:

 You have placed an impossible task upon me--that of interpreting myself to you. All I can say in answer to your inquiry is that I have a sincere desire to serve, to be of some little assistance in improving the condition of the average man, to lift him up, and to make his life more tolerable, agreeable, and comfortable. In doing this I try hard to purge my heart of selfish motives. It will only be known when I am dead whether or not I have succeeded. 

 Sincerely your friend, WOODROW WILSON. 

CHAPTER XLV

THE SAN FRANCISCO CONVENTION

During the winter of 1919-1920 President Wilson was the target of viciousassaults. Mrs. Wilson and Admiral Grayson with difficulty curbed hiseagerness to take a leading hand in the fight over the Peace Treaty in theSenate, and to organize the Democratic party on a fighting basis. It wasnot until after the Chicago Convention had nominated Mr. Harding andenunciated a platform repudiating the solemn obligations of the UnitedStates to the rest of the world that the President broke his silence ofmany months. Because he had something he wanted to say to the country heasked me to send for Louis Seibold, a trusted friend and an experiencedreporter, then connected with the New York _World_. When Mr. Seiboldarrived in Washington on the Tuesday following Mr. Harding's nomination, the President talked unreservedly and at length with him, discussed theRepublican Convention, characterized its platform as "the apotheosis ofreaction, " and declared that "it should have quoted Bismarck and Bernhardirather than Washington and Lincoln. " During the two days of Mr. Seibold'svisit to the White House he had abundant opportunity to observe thePresident's condition of health which had been cruelly misrepresented byhostile newspapers. Mr. Seibold found him much more vigorous physicallythan the public had been given to understand and mentally as alert andaggressive as he had been before his illness. Mr. Seibold's article, whichby the way was regarded as a journalistic classic and for which ColumbiaUniversity awarded the author the Pulitzer prize for the best example ofnewspaper reporting of the year, exposed the absurd rumours about thePresident's condition and furnished complete evidence of his determinationto fight for the principles to establish which he had struggled sovaliantly and sacrificed so much. 

As the days of the San Francisco Convention approached those of us whowere intimately associated with the President at the White House werewarned by him that in the Convention fight soon to take place we must playno favourites; that the Convention must be, so far as the White House wasconcerned, a free field and no favour, and that our attitude of "handsoff" and strict neutrality must be maintained. Some weeks before theConvention met the President conferred with me regarding the nominations, and admonished me that the White House must keep hands off, saying that ithad always been charged in the past that every administration sought touse its influence in the organization of the party to throw the nominationthis way or that. Speaking to me of the matter, he said, "We must make itclear to everyone who consults us that our attitude is to be impartial infact as well as in spirit. Other Presidents have sought to influence thenaming of their successors. Their efforts have frequently brought aboutscandals and factional disputes that have split the party. This must nothappen with us. We must not by any act seek to give the impression that wefavour this or that man. "

This attitude was in no way an evidence of the President's indifference tothe nominee of the Convention, or to what might happen at San Francisco. He was passionately anxious that his party's standard bearer should win atthe election if for no other reason than to see his own policies continuedand the League of Nations vindicated. 

There was another and personal reason why he insisted that no White Houseinterference should be brought into play for any particular nominee. Hisson-in-law, Mr. William G. McAdoo, was highly thought of in connectionwith the nomination, and therefore the President felt that he must be morethan ordinarily strict in insisting that we keep hands off, for anythingthat savoured of nepotism was distasteful to him and, therefore, he"leaned backward" in his efforts to maintain a neutral position in thePresidential contest and to take no part directly or indirectly that mightseem to give aid and comfort to the friends of his son-in-law. While Mr. McAdoo's political enemies were busily engaged in opposing him on theground of his relationship to the President, as a matter of fact, thePresident was making every effort to disassociate himself and hisadministration from the talk that was spreading in favour of McAdoo'scandidacy. While every effort was being made by Mr. McAdoo's enemies togive the impression that the Federal machine was being used to advance hiscandidacy, the President was engaged wholly in ignoring Mr. McAdoo'scandidacy. 

Every family visit which Mr. McAdoo and his wife, the President'sdaughter, paid the White House, was distorted in the newspaper reportscarried to the country into long and serious conferences between thePresident and his son-in-law with reference to Mr. McAdoo's candidacy. Iknow from my own knowledge that the matter of the nomination was neverdiscussed between the President and Mr. McAdoo. And Mr. McAdoo's realfriends knew this and were greatly irritated at what they thought was thegross indifference on the part of the President to the political fortunesof his own son-in-law. So meticulously careful was the President that noone should be of the opinion that he was attempting to influence things inMr. McAdoo's behalf, that there was never a discussion even between thePresident and myself regarding Mr. McAdoo's candidacy, although we hadcanvassed the availability of other Democratic candidates, as well as theavailability of the Republican candidates. 

I had often been asked what the President's attitude would be toward Mr. McAdoo's candidacy were he free to take part in the campaign. My onlyanswer to these inquiries was that the President had a deep affection andan admiration for Mr. McAdoo as a great executive that grew stronger witheach day's contact with him. He felt that Mr. McAdoo's sympathies, likehis own, were on the side of the average man; and that Mr. McAdoo was aman with a high sense of public service. 

And while the President kept silent with reference to Mr. McAdoo, thebasis of his attitude was his conviction that to use his influence toadvance the cause of his son-in-law was, in his opinion, an improper useof a public trust. 

That he was strictly impartial in the matter of Presidential candidateswas shown when Mr. Palmer, the Attorney General, requested me to convey amessage to the President with reference to his [Palmer's] candidacy forthe nomination, saying that he would be a candidate and would so announceit publicly if the President had no objection; or that he would resignfrom the Cabinet if the announcement would embarrass the President in anyway, and that he would support any man the President saw fit to approvefor this great office. 

I conveyed this message to the President and he requested me to notify Mr. Palmer that he was free to do as he pleased, that he had no personalchoice and that the Convention must be left entirely free to act as itthought proper and right and that he would gladly support the nominee ofthe Convention. 

Mr. Homer S. Cummmgs, the permanent chairman of the Convention, SenatorGlass of Virginia, and Mr. Colby, Secretary of State, called upon thePresident at the White House previous to taking the train for SanFrancisco to inquire if the President had any message for the Conventionor suggestion in the matter of candidates or platforms. He informed themthat he had no message to convey or suggestions to offer. 

Thus, to the end, he maintained this attitude of neutrality. He nevervaried from this position from the opening of the Convention to itsconclusion. There was no direct wire between the White House and the SanFrancisco Convention, although there were frequent long-distance telephonecalls from Colby, Cummings, and others to me; never once did the Presidenttalk to any one at the Convention. At each critical stage of theConvention messages would come from someone, urging the President to saysomething, or send some message that would break the deadlock, but noreply was forthcoming. He remained silent. 

There came a time when it looked as if things at the Convention hadreached an impasse and that only the strong hand of the President couldbreak the deadlock. 

I was informed by long-distance telephone that the slightest intimationfrom the President would be all that was necessary to break the deadlockand that the Convention would nominate any one he designated. 

[Illustration:

 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

 26 September 1920. 

 My dear Governor:

 I think I have found a suitable way to begin our attack if you care to take part in this campaign. The whole country is filled with the poison spread by Lodge and his group and it has to do principally with the attacks made upon you for failing to consult anyone about possible changes in the Treaty and your reluctance toward suggesting to your associates on the other side changes of any kind. 

 George Creel and I have examined the cables that passed between you and Mr. Taft and we have prepared a statement which is attached to this letter. This statement, with the Taft cables will be a knockout (I know that Mr. Taft is already preparing a book on the Treaty which will carry these cables) and will clear the air and show how contemptible our enemies have been in circulating stories. We have carefully gone over the Covenant and find that nearly every change suggested by Mr. Taft was made and in come cases you went further than he asked. 

 George Creel is of the opinion that the statement should come from the White House. 

 Sincerely, (signed) Tumulty

 * * * * *

 Dear Tumulty, I have read your letter of September twenty-sixth with a sincere effort to keep an open mind about the suggestions you make, but I must say that it has not changed my mind at all. No answers to Harding of any kind will proceed from the White House with my consent. 

 It pleases me very much that you and Creel are in collaboration on material out of which smashing answers can be made, and I beg that you will press those materials on the attention of the Speakers' Bureau of the National Committee. It is their clear duty to supply those materials in turn to the speakers of the campaign. If they will not, I am sorry to say I know of no other course that we can pursue, The President. C. L. S. 

An inside view of the Cox campaign]

I conveyed this information to the President. He shook his head. This toldme that he would not act upon my suggestion and would in no way interferewith the Convention. To the end he steered clear of playing the part ofdictator in the matter of the nomination. That he took advantage of everyoccasion to show that he was playing an impartial hand is shown by thedocuments which follow. The Associated Press had carried a story to theeffect that Senator Glass had notified certain delegates that Governor Coxwas persona non grata to the President. When Governor Cox's friends got meon the long-distance telephone and asked me if there was any foundationfor such a story and after Governor Cox himself had talked with me overthe 'phone from Columbus, I addressed the following note to the President:

 4 July, 1920. 

 DEAR GOVERNOR:

 Simply for your information:

 Governor Cox just telephoned me from Columbus. He felt greatly aggrieved at the statement which it is claimed Glass gave out last night, and which he says prevented his nomination. He says that Glass made the statement that the President had said that "Governor Cox would not be acceptable to the Administration. "

 He says he has been a loyal supporter of the Administration and has asked no favours of it. He also says that Mr. Bryan has been attacking him in the most relentless way and that Mr. Bryan's antagonism toward him became particularly aggravated since the Jackson Day dinner, when the Governor went out of his way to disagree with Mr. Bryan in the matter of the Lodge reservations. 

 He thinks, whether he himself is nominated or not, this action of Glass's has hurt the Democratic chances in Ohio. He says he does not ask for any statement from the Administration, but he would leave it to the President's sense of justice whether or not he has been treated in fairness. 

 Sincerely, TUMULTY. 

The President read my note and immediately authorized me to issue thefollowing statement:

 The White House, Washington, 4 July, 1920. 

 When a report was brought to Secretary Tumulty's attention of rumours being circulated in San Francisco that the President had expressed an opinion with reference to a particular candidate, he made the following statement:

 "This is news to me. I had discussed all phases of this convention with the President and had been in intimate touch with him during its continuance, and I am positive that he has not expressed an opinion to any one with reference to a particular candidate for the Presidency. It has always been his policy to refrain from taking any stand that might be construed as dictation. "

The proceedings of the Convention finally resulted in the nomination ofGovernor Cox. The President expressed his great pleasure at the nominationfor Governor Cox had long been a devoted friend and admirer of his, and hewas certain that he would not desert him on the issue so close to hisheart--the League of Nations. 

When Governor Cox visited the White House and conferred with thePresident, the Governor assured the President that he intended to stand byhim. The President showed deep emotion and expressed his appreciation toGovernor Cox. Governor Cox afterward told me that no experience of hislife had ever touched him so deeply as that through which he had justpassed at the White House. He spoke of the modesty of the President, hissimplicity and the great spiritual purpose that lay back of his advocacyof the League of Nations. Turning to me, he said, "No man could talk toPresident Wilson about the League of Nations and not become a crusader inits behalf. " Governor Cox may have entered the White House that day as apolitician. He left it as a crusader, ready to fight for the cause. 

As the campaign progressed we attempted to induce the President to issueweekly statements from the White House, but after long consideration heconcluded that in view of the Republican strategy of trying to make himpersonally, instead of Governor Cox and the League of Nations, the issue, it would be better tactics for him to remain silent. He broke his silenceonly once, a week before the election, in a message to the peopleinsisting upon the League of Nations as the paramount issue of thecampaign. 

It was really touching when one conferred with him to find him so hopefulof the result. Time and time again he would turn to me and say, "I do notcare what Republican propaganda may seek to do. I am sure that the heartsof the people are right on this great issue and that we can confidentlylook forward to triumph. "

I did not share his enthusiasm, and yet I did not feel like sendingreports to him that were in the least touched with pessimism because ofthe effect they might have upon his feelings. 

Then came the news of Governor Cox's defeat and with it the news of thedefeat of the solemn referendum on the League of Nations. 

The loneliest place in the country on election night is the White HouseOffice, especially when the tide of opinion throughout the country isrunning strongly against you. I have noticed the difference in theatmosphere of the place and in the crowds that come to congratulate and torejoice when you are winning and the few loyal ones that remain with youthroughout the night of defeat. It takes a stout heart to withstand theatmosphere of the White House on election night. 

The first reports from the country were overwhelming, and there was nospot in the country where we could look for hope and consolation. In theearly hours of the evening I sent whatever few optimistic reports I couldget to the President, so that at least he would not feel the full weightof the blow on election night. His intimate friends had told me that theyfeared the effect of defeat upon his health; but these fears weregroundless and never disturbed me in the least, for I had been with him inmany a fight and I was sure that while he would feel the defeat deeply andthat it would go to his heart, its effect would only be temporary. 

My feeling in this regard was justified for in my talk with him the dayafter the election no bitterness was evident. He said, "They havedisgraced us in the eyes of the world. The people of America haverepudiated a fruitful leadership for a barren independence. Of course, Iam disappointed by the results of the election for I felt sure that agreat programme that sought to bring peace to the world would arouseAmerican idealism, and that the Nation's support would be given to it. Itis a difficult thing, however, to lead a nation so variously constitutedas ours quickly to accept a programme such as the League of Nations. Theenemies of this enterprise cleverly aroused every racial passion andprejudice, and by poisonous propaganda made it appear that the League ofNations was a great Juggernaut which was intended to crush and destroyinstead of saving and bringing peace to the world. The people will have tolearn now by bitter experience just what they have lost. There will, ofcourse, be a depression in business for the isolation which America covetswill mean a loss of prestige which always in the end means a loss ofbusiness. The people will soon witness the tragedy of disappointment andthen they will turn upon those who made that disappointment possible. "

[Illustration:

 THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. 

 20 October 1920. 

 My Dear Governor:

 Of course nothing will be done in the Root matter, according to your suggestion to me of this morning; but I feel it my duty to advise you that nearly all the reports from the men whose judgment and opinion are usually good are to the effect that unless you will intervene and take a more active interest in the campaign, the Administration will be repudiated at the election. 

 There is a slight drift towards Cox, but unless you take advantage of it and speed it up, there is very little hope. 

 The President. 

 * * * * *

 The White House, Washington

 (Manuscript: Of course I will help. I was under the impression that I was helping. But I will do it at my own time and in my own way. W. W. )

Further light on the Cox campaign. ]

When I intimated to him that the Cox defeat might in the long run prove ablessing, he rebuked me at once by saying: "I am not thinking of thepartisan side of this thing. It is the country and its future that I amthinking about. We had a chance to gain the leadership of the world. Wehave lost it, and soon we will be witnessing the tragedy of it all. "

After this statement to me with reference to the result of the election, he read to me a letter from his old friend, John Sharp Williams, UnitedStates senator from Mississippi, a letter which did much to bolster andhearten him on this, one of the most trying days of his life in the WhiteHouse. The letter follows:

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 God didn't create the world in one act. I never expected that we would win in the United States the first battle in the campaign for a league of nations to keep the peace of the world. Our people were too "set" by our past history and by the _apparent_ voice of the Fathers in an opposite course, a course of isolation. This course was hitherto the best for accomplishing the very purpose we must now accomplish by a seemingly contrary course. We must now begin the war in earnest. We will win it. Never fear, the stars in their courses are fighting with us. The League is on its feet, learning to walk, Senate coteries willy-nilly. 

 As for the vials of envy and hatred which have been emptied on your head by all the un-American things, aided by demagogues who wanted their votes and got them, abetted by yellow journals, etc. , these lines of Byron can console you:

 "There were two cats in Kilkenny They fit and fit until of cats there weren't any. "

 This is almost a prophecy of what will happen now between Borah, Johnson & Co. And Root, Taft & Co. , with poor Lodge mewing "peace" when there is no peace--except a larger peace outside their horizon. They have been kept united by hatred of you, by certain foreign encouragements, and by fear of the Democratic party. With the necessity to act, to do something, the smouldering fire of differences will break forth into flame. Conserve your health. Cultivate a cynical patience. _Give them all the rope you can. _ Now and then when they make too big fools of themselves, throw in a keynote veto--not often-- never when you can give them the benefit of the doubt and with it responsibility. They have neither the coherence nor the brains to handle the situation. Events will work their further confusion, events in Europe. God still reigns. The people can learn, though not quickly. 

 With regards, (Signed) JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS. 

One would think that after the election the President would show aslackening of interest in the affairs of the nation; that having beenrepudiated by a solemn referendum, he would grow indifferent and listlessto the administrative affairs that came to his desk. On the contrary, sofar as his interest in affairs was concerned, one coming in contact withhim from day to day after the election until the very night of March 3rdwould get the impression that nothing unusual had happened and that histerm of office was to run on indefinitely. 

One of the things to which he paid particular attention at this time wasthe matter of the pardon of Eugene V. Debs. The day that therecommendation for pardon arrived at the White House, he looked it overand examined it carefully, and said: "I will never consent to the pardonof this man. I know that in certain quarters of the country there is apopular demand for the pardon of Debs, but it shall never be accomplishedwith my consent. Were I to consent to it, I should never be able to lookinto the faces of the mothers of this country who sent their boys to theother side. While the flower of American youth was pouring out its bloodto vindicate the cause of civilization, this man, Debs, stood behind thelines, sniping, attacking, and denouncing them. Before the war he had aperfect right to exercise his freedom of speech and to express his ownopinion, but once the Congress of the United States declared war, silenceon his part would have been the proper course to pursue. I know there willbe a great deal of denunciation of me for refusing this pardon. They willsay I am cold-blooded and indifferent, but it will make no impression onme. This man was a traitor to his country and he will never be pardonedduring my administration. "

CHAPTER XLVI

THE LAST DAY

I was greatly concerned lest the President should be unable by reason ofhis physical condition to stand the strain of Inauguration Day. Indeed, members of his Cabinet and intimate friends like Grayson and myself hadtried to persuade him not to take part, but he could not by any argumentbe drawn away from what he believed to be his duty--to join in theinauguration of his successor, President-elect Harding. The thought thatthe people of the country might misconstrue his attitude if he shouldremain away and his firm resolve to show every courtesy to his successorin office were the only considerations that led him to play his part tothe end. When I arrived at the White House early on the morning of the 4thof March, the day of the inauguration, I found him in his study, smilingand gracious as ever. He acted like a boy who was soon to be out of schooland free of the burdens that had for eight years weighed him down to thebreaking point. He expressed to me the feeling of relief that he wasexperiencing now that his term of office was really at an end. I recalledto him the little talk we had had on the same day, four years before, uponthe conclusion of the ceremonies incident to his own inauguration in 1917. At the time we were seated in the Executive office. Turning away from hisdesk and gazing out of the window which overlooked the beautiful WhiteHouse lawn and gardens, he said: "Well, how I wish this were March 4, 1921. What a relief it will be to do what I please and to say what Iplease; but more than that, to write my own impressions of the things thathave been going on under my own eyes. I have felt constantly a personaldetachment from the Presidency. The one thing I resent when I am notperforming the duties of the office is being reminded that I am Presidentof the United States. I feel toward this office as a man feels toward agreat function which in his working hours he is obliged to perform butwhich, out of working hours, he is glad to get away from and resume thequiet course of his own thought. I tell you, my friend, it will be greatto be free again. "

On this morning, March 4, 1921, he acted like a man who was happy now thathis dearest wish was to be realized. As I looked at Woodrow Wilson, seatedin his study that morning, in his cutaway coat, awaiting word of thearrival of President-elect Harding at the White House, to me he was everyinch the President, quiet, dignified; ready to meet the duties of thetrying day upon which he was now to enter, in his countenance a calmnobility. It was hard for me to realize as I beheld him, seated behind hisdesk in his study, that here was the head of the greatest nation in theworld who in a few hours was to step back into the uneventful life of aprivate citizen. 

A few minutes and he was notified that the President-elect was in the BlueRoom awaiting his arrival. Alone, unaided, grasping his old blackthornstick, the faithful companion of many months, his "third leg, " as heplayfully called it, slowly he made his way to the elevator and in a fewseconds he was standing in the Blue Room meeting the President-elect andgreeting him in the most gracious way. No evidence of the trial of pain hewas undergoing in striving to play a modest part in the ceremonies wasapparent either in his bearing or attitude, as he greeted the President-elect and the members of the Congressional Inaugural Committee. He was anill man but a sportsman, determined to see the thing through to the end. President-elect Harding met him in the most kindly fashion, showing himthe keenest consideration and courtesy. 

And now the final trip to the Capitol from the White House. The ride tothe Capitol was uneventful. From the physical appearance of the two menseated beside each other in the automobile, it was plain to the casualobserver who was the out-going and who the in-coming President. In theright sat President Wilson, gray, haggard, broken. He interpreted thecheering from the crowds that lined the Avenue as belonging to thePresident-elect and looked straight ahead. It was Mr. Harding's day, nothis. On the left, Warren Gamaliel Harding, the rising star of theRepublic, healthy, vigorous, great-chested, showing every evidence in histanned face of that fine, sturdy health so necessary a possession in orderto grapple with the problems of his country. One, the man on the right, abattle-scarred veteran, a casualty of the war, now weary and anxious tolay down the reins of office; the other, agile, vigorous, hopeful, andfull of enthusiasm for the tasks that confronted him. Upon the face of theone were written in indelible lines the scars and tragedies of war; onthat of the other, the lines of confidence, hope, and readiness for thefray. 

The Presidential party arrived at the Capitol. Woodrow Wilson tookpossession of the President's room. Modestly the President-elect took aseat in the rear of the room while President Wilson conferred withsenators and representatives who came to talk with him about bills inwhich they were interested, bills upon which he must act before the oldclock standing in a corner of the room should strike the hour of twelve, noon, marking the end of the official relationship of Woodrow Wilson withthe affairs of the Government of the United States. It was about eleven-thirty. Senators and congressmen of both parties poured into the office tosay good-bye to the man seated at the table, and then made their way overto congratulate the President-elect. 

It was a few minutes before twelve o'clock. The weary man at the table wasstill the President, still the ruler of a great people, the possessor fora little while longer, just a little while longer, of more power than anyking in Christendom. 

Presently there appeared at the door a gray-haired man of imperiousmanner. Addressing the President in a sharp, dry tone of voice, he said:"Mr. President, we have come as a committee of the Senate to notify youthat the Senate and House are about to adjourn and await your pleasure. "The spokesman for the committee was Henry Cabot Lodge, the distinguishedsenator from Massachusetts, the implacable political foe of the man he wasaddressing. 

It was an interesting study to watch the face and manner of Woodrow Wilsonas he met the gaze of Senator Lodge who by his attacks had destroyed thegreat thing of which the President had dreamed, the thing for which he hadfought and for which he was ready to lay down his life. It appeared for asecond as if Woodrow Wilson was about to give full sway to the passionateresentment he felt toward the man who, he believed, had unfairly treatedhim throughout the famous Treaty fight. But quickly the shadow ofresentment passed. A ghost of a smile flitted across his firm mouth, andsteadying himself in his chair, he said in a low voice: "Senator Lodge, Ihave no further communication to make. I thank you. Good morning. "

Senator Lodge and the committee withdrew from the room. I looked at theclock in the corner. A few minutes more and all the power which the wearyman at the table possessed would fall from his shoulders. All left theroom except the President, Mrs. Wilson, Admiral Grayson, and myself. 

The old clock in the corner of the room began to toll the hour of twelve. Mechanically I counted, under my breath, the strokes: "One, two, three, "on through "twelve, " and the silent room echoed with the low vibration ofthe last stroke. 

Woodrow Wilson was no longer President. By the votes of the Americanpeople he had been returned to the ranks of his fellow countrymen. A greatwarrior had passed from the field, a leading actor had made his exit. Thedearest wish of his political enemies had at last been realized. Theprayers of his devoted friends that he would live to see the eight yearsof his administration through, had been answered. His own bearing andattitude did not indicate that anything unusual had happened. 

Quickly Woodrow Wilson, now the private citizen, turned to make his way tothe elevator, leaning on his cane, the ferrule striking sharply on thestone pavement as he walked; but his spirit was indomitable. A few minutesbefore all interest had been centred upon him. Now but a few loyal friendsremained behind. Interest was transferred to the scene being enacted a fewfeet away in the Senate Chamber, the induction into office of Vice-President Coolidge. By the time we reached the elevator, the briefceremony in the Senate Chamber had ended, and the multitude outside werecheering Mr. Harding as he appeared at the east front of the Capitol todeliver his inaugural address. We heard the United States Marine Bandplaying "Hail to the Chief. " For a few seconds I looked toward thereviewing stand. The new President, Warren G. Harding, was taking hisplace on the stand amid the din and roar of applause. He was the focus ofall eyes, the pivot around which all interest turned. Not one of thethousands turned to look at the lonely figure laboriously climbing intothe automobile. The words of Ibsen flashed into my mind:

 The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone. 

THE END

APPENDIX "A"

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 10 December, 1918. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, France. 

Stories that you have agreed to sinking of German ships have caused greatdeal of unfavourable comment here. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 16 December, 1918. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, C/O American Embassy, Paris, France. 

Most popular note in this country in your speech are the words _Quote_ Wemust rebuke acts of terror and spoliation and make men everywhere awarethat they cannot be ventured upon without certainty of just punishment_End Quote. _

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 21 December, 1918. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

If it is America's intention to back up the Allies in sinking Germanships, the idea is so vague in this country that there ought to be a greatdeal of elucidation if the President intends to take this stand. Hope thePresident will be more definite than he has been in speeches in referenceto League of Nations and freedom of the seas. His enemies here and abroadhope that he will particularize so that they can attack him. People of theworld are with him on general principles. They care little for details. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

 _Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 22 December, 1918. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, American Embassy, Paris. 

Springfield _Republican _editorially gives expression to fear thatPresident may be made captive by Allied Imperialism and says _Quote_ Theconditions and atmosphere which now envelop him may be calculated to fillhis mind with doubts as to the wisdom of his previous views and to exposehim to the peril of vacillation, compromise, and virtual surrender ofvital principles _End Quote_. Country deeply pleased by impression Mrs. Wilson has made abroad. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 24 December, 1918

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Care Of American Embassy, Paris, France. 

Stories appearing here stating in effect that you intend to appeal topeople of Europe bound to do great deal of harm. My affectionate ChristmasGreetings to Mrs. Wilson and you. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 31 December, 1918. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris, France. 

Clemenceau's speech, wherein he advocated a world settlement based uponthe old balance of power ideas, demonstrates necessity for and wisdom ofyour trip, and has set stage for final issue between balance of power andLeague of Nations. If America fails now, socialism rules the world and ifinternational fair-play under democracy cannot curb nationalisticambitions, there is nothing left but socialism upon which Russia andGermany have already embarked. You can do nothing more serviceable thanwithout seeming to disagree with Clemenceau, drive home in your speechesdifferences between two ideals, one, the balance of power meanscontinuance of war; other, concert of nations means universal peace. Onehas meant great standing armies with larger armaments and burdensometaxation, consequent unrest and bolshevism. If the statesmanship atVersailles cannot settle these things in the spirit of justice, bolshevismwill settle them in a spirit of injustice. The world is ready for theissue. Clemenceau has given you great chance; this country and whole worldwill sustain you. Country ready to back you up when you ask for itssupport. Everything fine here. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 6 January, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Hope you will consider the suggestion for your return trip. Your personalcontact with peoples of Europe has done much to help your programme. Ourpeople will be with your programme, but it (the programme) must bepersonally conducted. If you return here without reception or ovation, public opinion on other side liable to misunderstand. The time of yourreturn (in my opinion) is the hour for you to strike in favour of Leagueof Nations. Lodge and leading Republicans constantly attacking, exceptingTaft, who is daily warning them of political dangers of their oppositionto your programme. Could you not consider stopping upon your return atPort of Boston instead of New York. The announcement of your stopping atBoston would make ovation inevitable throughout New England and wouldcentre attack on Lodge. You have not been to New England in six years. Itwould be a gracious act and would help much. It would strengthen League ofNations movement in House and Senate and encourage our friends in Senateand House and throughout country. Our people just as emotional as peopleof Europe. If you return without reception, Lodge and others will construeit as weakness. If the people of our country could have seen you as peopleof Europe, our situation would be much improved, especially result of lastNovember would have been different. My suggestion would be speech atFaneuil Hall, Boston; speech in Providence, New Haven, New York andreception upon return to Washington, to be participated in by returningsoldiers. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 6 January, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

The attitude of the whole country toward trip has changed. Feelinguniversal that you have carried yourself magnificently through criticalsituations, with prestige and influence greatly enhanced here and abroad. The criticisms of the cloak-room statesmen have lost their force. Irealize difficulties still to be met, but have no doubt of result. Tripadmitted here by everybody to be wonderful success. Last week with perilsof visit to Vatican most critical. The whole psychology favours thesuccess of your trip. The peoples of Europe and the United States with youfor League of Nations and against settlements based upon balance of power. Opinion here is that cards are stacked against you. My own opinion yourinfluence so great in Europe that European leaders cannot stand in yourway. Now is the critical moment and there must be no wasting away of yourinfluence in unnecessary delay of conference. Hearts of the peoples of theworld for League of Nations and they are indifferent to its actual terms. They are against militarism and for any reasonable plan to effectuatepeace. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 13 January 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT, Paris. 

In past two weeks the trend of newspaper dispatches from Paris hasindicated a misunderstanding of your general attitude towards problemspending at peace conference. One newspaper cablegram says today thatFrance, Italy and Great Britain have agreed to subordinate your league ofnations programme to the need for counteracting bolshevism and collectingdamages from Germany. Another a few days ago reported that Clemenceau hadmade headway with his insistence upon maintenance of balance of power. Still another outlined victory of Great Britain in her opposition tofreedom of seas, stating that you had abandoned your position in responseto arguments of France, supporting Great Britain. Similar stories wouldgive impression that you were yielding, although we are aware that some ofthe suggestions for compromise are probably your own. Situation couldeasily be remedied if you would occasionally call in the three pressassociation correspondents who crossed on _George Washington_ with you, merely giving them an understanding of the developments as they occur andasking them not to use information as coming from you, but merely fortheir own guidance. It would show wisdom of various compromises as well ascircumstances of such compromises. Proposal of Lloyd George that theRussian Bolshevik be invited to send peace delegates to Paris producedvery unfavourable impression everywhere. It is denounced here as amazing. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 16 January 1919. 

REAR ADMIRAL CARY T. GRAYSON, Care of President Wilson, Paris. 

American newspapers filled with stories this morning of critical characterabout rule of secrecy adopted for Peace Conference, claiming that thefirst of the fourteen points has been violated. In my opinion, ifPresident has consented to this, it will be fatal. The matter is soimportant to the people of the world that he could have afforded to go anylength even to leaving the conference than to submit to this ruling. Hisattitude in this matter will lose a great deal of the confidence andsupport of the people of the world which he has had up to this time. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, January 16, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Your cable about misunderstandings concerning my attitude toward problemscreated by the newspaper cablegrams concerns a matter which I admit I donot know how to handle. Every one of the things you mention is a fable. Ihave not only yielded nothing but have been asked to yield nothing. Thesemanoeuvres which the cablegram speaks of are purely imaginary. I cannotcheck them from this end because the men who sent them insist on havingsomething to talk about whether they know what the facts are or not. Iwill do my best with the three press associations. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, January 17, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Distressed to hear of your illness. Beg that you will make it your chiefduty to take care of yourself and get well. All unite in most affectionatemessages. Everything going well here. Very few of the troubles spoken ofby the newspapers are visible to me on the spot. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, January 21, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

The issue of publicity is being obscured by the newspaper men and we havewon for the press all that is possible or wise to win, namely, completepublicity for real conferences. Publicity for the conversations I amholding with the small group of the great powers will invariably break upthe whole thing, whereas the prospects for agreement are now, I shouldsay, very good indeed. Delighted that you are up and beg that you will notexpose yourself or exert yourself too soon. Affectionate messages from usall. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 29 January, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Notice in morning papers discussion with reference to disposition ofGerman colonies. Call your attention to speech of British Premierdelivered in January as follows: _Quote_ with regard to German colonies, Ihave repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of aconference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes of thenative inhabitants. The general principle of national self-determinationtherefore is applicable in their cases as in those of the occupiedEuropean territories _End quote_. I believe that Balfour made a similarstatement. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris_. 

Received at White House, Washington, March 15, 1919. 

President's Residence, ParisTUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

The Plenary Council has positively decided that the League of Nations isto be part of the Peace Treaty. There is absolutely no truth in report tothe contrary. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 16 March 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Believe your most critical time in setting forward America's position atconference has come. Opposition to League growing more intense from day today. Its bitterness and pettiness producing reaction. New polls throughoutcountry indicate strong drift toward league. League of Nations and justpeace inseparable. Neither half can stand alone. Know you will not bedrawn away from announced programme to incorporate League covenant intreaty. You can afford to go any length in insisting upon this. There isno doubt of your success here and abroad. The real friends of aconstructive peace have not begun to fight. Everything fine here. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 25 March, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

There is great danger to you in the present situation. I can see signsthat our enemies here and abroad would try to make it appear that you areresponsible for delay in peace settlement and that delay has increasedmomentum of bolshevism and anarchy in Hungary and Balkans. Canresponsibility for delay be fixed by you in some way?

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cable From the Associated Press at Paris. _

Paris, March 27, 1919. 

President Wilson to-day issued the following statement:

_Quote_ in view of the very surprising impression which seems to exist insome quarters, that it is the discussions of the commission on the leagueof nations that are delaying the final formulation of peace, I am veryglad to take the opportunity of reporting that the conclusions of thiscommission were the first to be laid before the plenary conference. 

They were reported on February 14, and the world has had a full month inwhich to discuss every feature of the draft covenant then submitted. 

During the last few days the commission has been engaged in an effort totake advantage of the criticisms which the publication of the covenant hasfortunately drawn out. A committee of the commission has also had theadvantage of a conference with representatives of the neutral states, whoare evidencing a very deep interest and a practically unanimous desire toalign themselves with the league. 

The revised covenant is now practically finished. It is in the hands of acommittee for the final process of drafting, and will almost immediatelybe presented a second time to the public. 

The conferences of the commission have invariably been held at times whenthey could not interfere with the consultation of those who haveundertaken to formulate the general conclusions of the conference withregard to the many other complicated problems of peace, so that themembers of the commissions congratulate themselves on the fact that nopart of their conferences has ever interposed any form of delay _Endquote_. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 25 March, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

St. Louis _Republic_ of Saturday reporting speech of Senator Reedreferring to provision naming members of League says: _Quote_ he told ofwhat he called a secret protocol and intimated that Germany is included inthis secret protocol _End quote_. Advise whether or not there is anysecret protocol such as Senator claims or of any character, attached toLeague Covenant. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris_. 

Received at White House, Washington, March 27, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Statement that there is any sort of secret protocol connected with orsuggested in connection with the League of Nations is absolutely false. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, March 28, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Stories here this morning that amendment for Monroe Doctrine and racialdiscrimination to be excluded from covenant causing a great deal ofuneasiness. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, March 30, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

In an editorial entitled _Treat or Fight_, Springfield _Republican_ says:_Quote_ It is plain that the Allies dare not commit themselves to anavowed war on the soviets and that it is not possible for the Allies withthe world in its present temper to take the position that the existence ofthe soviet form of government in any country constitutes a casus belli;that the world would recoil from the proposal to begin a new series of warwith so dubious an object; that Russia should be left to manage her ownaffairs _End Quote_. Editorial disagreed with policy of French Governmenttowards Russia and soviets. Calls attention to disastrous results offoreign intervention during French Revolution, Editorial further says:_Quote_ Impossible to fight revolution in one place and be at peaceelsewhere. If Allies mean to fight Hungary because it has set up a sovietform of government and allied itself to Russia they will have to fightRussia. If they fight Russia they will have to fight the Ukraine. Such awar would mean the end of the League of Nations. It is plain that theAllies dare not commit themselves to an avowed war on the Soviets _EndQuote_. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, March 30, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Dispatches from Simonds and others prove stories of weeks ago were mostoptimistic now touched with deep pessimism. Simonds in article on Saturdaysays: Quote No common objective in council; no dominating influence;drifting, etc. End Quote. I fear your real position in council notunderstood here and that lack of publicity strengthening many falseimpressions. The responsibility attaching to those associated with you, including France and England, when they accepted Fourteen Points evidentlylost sight of by them. Do not know what your real situation is, but itappears to me that Germany is not prepared to accept the kind of peacewhich is about to be offered, or if she does accept, with its burdensomeconditions, it means the spread of bolshevism throughout Germany andcentral Europe. It seems to me that you ought in some way to reassert yourleadership publicly. I know the danger, but you cannot escaperesponsibility unless you do so. Now is the moment in my opinion to strikefor a settlement permanent and lasting. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 2 April, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

The proposed recognition of Lenine has caused consternation here. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 4, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Am still confident that President will win. Encountering difficulties;situation serious. President is the hope of the world more than ever, andwith his courage, wisdom, and force he will lead the way. Have you anysuggestions as to publicity or otherwise?

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 4, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

The President took very severe cold last night; confined to bed. Do notworry; will keep you advised. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 5, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

We are naturally disappointed at progress being made but not discouraged. Hopeful everything will turn out all right. Will advise you if anythingdefinite develops. The President is better this morning but confined tobed. No cause for worry. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 5, 1919. 

GRAYSON, % President Wilson, Paris. 

In my opinion the President must in some dramatic way clear the air ofdoubts and misunderstandings and despair which now pervade the whole worldsituation. He must take hold of the situation with both hands and shake itout of its present indecision, or political sabotage and scheming willtriumph. Only a bold stroke by the President will save Europe and perhapsthe world. That stroke must be made regardless of the cries andadmonitions of his friendly advisers. He has tried to settle the issue insecret; only publicity of a dramatic kind now can save the situation. Thisoccasion calls for that audacity which has helped him win in every fight. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 6, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

The President says the situation here is extremely complex and intricate, but seems to be improving and he expects to have it in hand this week, butif necessary will act according to your suggestions. The President isconfined to bed but steadily improving. Thanks for your telegram. 

Grayson. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 8, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

President attended conference in his study this afternoon. Situation showssome improvement. President has ordered _George Washington_ to proceedhere immediately. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, April 9, 1919. 

GRAYSON, Care President Wilson, Paris. 

The ordering of the _George Washington_ to return to France looked uponhere as an act of impatience and petulance on the President's part and notaccepted here in good grace by either friends or foes. It is considered asan evidence that the President intends to leave the Conference if hisviews are not accepted. I think this method of withdrawal most unwise andfraught with the most dangerous possibilities here and abroad, because itputs upon the President the responsibility of withdrawing when thePresident should by his own act place the responsibility for a break ofthe Conference where it properly belongs. The President should not puthimself in the position of being the first to withdraw if his 14 pointsare not accepted. Either he should put himself in the position of beingthe one who remained at the Conference until the very last, demanding theacceptance of his 14 principles. Nothing should be said about his leavingFrance, but he ought when the time and occasion arrive to re-state hisviews in terms of the deepest solemnity and yet without any ultimatumattached and then await a response from his associates. In other words, let him by his acts and words place his associates in the position ofthose who refuse to continue the Conference because of their unwillingnessto live up to the terms of the Armistice. Then the President can return tothis country and justify his withdrawal. He cannot justify his withdrawalany other way. Up to this time the world has been living on stories comingout of Paris that there was to be an agreement on the League of Nations. Suddenly out of a clear sky comes an order for the _George Washington_ andunofficial statements of the President's withdrawal. A withdrawal at thistime would be a desertion. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 9 April, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

A great number of your friends here fear that the interposition of UnitedStates in matter of indemnity and reparation which is a paramount questionwith European nations and only of indirect interest to us will solidifythe opposition of England, France, Italy, and Belgium to a league ofnations. Our friends believe that any necessary sacrifices to assure aleague of nations should be made. Your supporters would be happy if youcould throw upon the other nations the burden of exacting indemnities andat the same time win their support to a league of nations. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, 10 April, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

President made good progress to-day by hammering ahead with his own force. His health is improving; out for a short drive this afternoon; firstouting since last Thursday. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 10, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Have shown your message to the President. From your side of the water yourpoints are well taken, but he has formed his ideas through immediatecontact with actual conditions on this side of the world. .. . More progresshas been made in the last two days than has been made for the last twoweeks. Am spending all the time I can in guiding correspondents andshowing them every attention. I confer with Grasty every day. ThePresident is working too hard following his recent illness. To know thatthings are going on and not properly handled, and yet be responsible forthem, causes him more worry and anxiety and does more harm than actualparticipation. This is a matter that worries me. If his health ca hold outI am still confident he will win handsomely. Am keeping as cheerful afront as possible over here. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 12, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

So far as it is possible to tell amidst complexity of selfish intereststhings seem to be slowly clearing. President sends you his love and sayskeep stiff upper lip. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, April 24, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House. 

Thank you for your cable about Industrial Board. On the whole I think theyhave got into a blind alley, but I am glad you are going to obtain Hines'opinion. _Do not give yourself any concern about secret treaties. You maybe sure I will enter into none. _

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 30 April, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Beg to call your attention to following editorial from Springfield_Republican_. _Quote_ The critical period in the peacemaking has beenreached when progress can win over reaction the very least of victoriesonly by a resolute stand of the most commanding figure in Paris. Franceand England cannot desert the President without branding themselves ashypocrites and ingrates. Worse things could happen than for the Presidentto come home without a peace treaty, leaving Europe to wallow in the mireof national rivalries and hates to which reaction would sentence it forall time. There is no compelling reason why America should sign a treatythat would merely perpetuate ancient feuds and make new wars a certainty. Our chief interest in the Conference at Paris, as the President declaredat Manchester, is the peace of the world. Unless that can be madereasonably sure, with Europe's sincere cooperation, the time is near when'pack up and come home' will be America's only policy _End Quote_. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 8 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

In your cable you spoke of forwarding message to Congress. Have you madeup your mind as to what you will discuss? Would like to suggest certainthings I believe vital. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

Received at White House, Washington, May 9, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Happily there is no mystery or privacy about what I have promised theGovernment here. I have promised to propose to the Senate a supplement inwhich we shall agree, subject to the approval of the Council of the Leagueof Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France in case ofunprovoked attack by Germany, thus merely hastening the action to which weshould be bound by the Government of the League of Nations. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 22 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Great demonstration New York last night, addressed by Hughes, to protestkillings in Poland, Galicia, Roumania and elsewhere. Feeling in thismatter growing more intense throughout the country. Cannot something bedone? It is evident that Germany is doing everything to separate theAllies. A great many newspapers in this country are worried lest you becarried away by the pleadings of Germany for a _Quote_ softer peace _EndQuote_. I know you will not be led astray. There is an intense feeling inthe Senate in favour of the publication of the terms of the Treaty. Cananything be done to straighten this out?

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 23 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Mr. Taft in signed article this morning says: _Quote_ Find it hard tobelieve that President Wilson sent sympathetic note to women who plead forHuns _End Quote_. I think this matter of sufficient importance to becleared up from this side. There is great deal of unrest here owing totalk in newspapers of return of German ships to Great Britain. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, May 24, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

I think our friends in the Senate ought to be furnished very frankly withthe following reason, which seems to me quite convincing, for not atpresent publishing the complete treaty: namely, that if our discussion ofthe treaty with the Germans is to be more than a sham and a form it isnecessary to consider at least some of the details of the treaty assubject to reconsideration and that, therefore, it would be a tacticalblunder to publish the details as first drafted, notwithstanding the factthat there is no likelihood that they will be departed from in anysubstantial way. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, May 25, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

No one need have any concern about the return of the German ships in ourpossession. Full understanding has been reached about them. As for Mr. Taft's criticism, I am quite willing to be responsible for any sympatheticreply I make to appeals on behalf of starving women and children. Pleasegive following message to Glass: You may take it for granted that I willsign the Urgent Deficiency Bill and go forward with the plans you mentionin your cable. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 26 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Every Republican member of new Foreign Relations Committee openly opposedto treaty, a majority in favour of its amendment. Every Democratic memberof Committee, including Thomas, for treaty and against separation. Thereis a decided reaction evident against the League, caused, in my opinion, by dissatisfaction of Irish, Jews, Poles, Italians, and Germans. Republicans taking full advantage and liable, in order to garnerdisaffected vote, to make absolute issue against League, Reactionintensified by your absence and lack of publicity from your end andconfusion caused by contradictory statements and explanations of _Quote_so-called compromises _End Quote_. Simonds' article appearing in certainAmerican newspapers Sunday, admirable, explaining reasons for Saar Valleyand French pact and other controversial matters. 

There is a tremendous drive against League, resembling German propaganda, backed by Irish and Jews. Irish openly opposing; Jews attacking alongcollateral lines. Could not Lansing or perhaps White, because he is aRepublican, or yourself inspire publicity or give interview explaining--officially or unofficially--the following matters:

 _First_--America's attitude toward publication of terms of Treaty, along lines of your last cable to me. 

 _Second_--That the fourteen points have not been disregarded. 

 _Third_--The underlying reason for French pact emphasizing the point as Simonds' says _Quote_ That French pact is merely an underwriting of the League of Nations during the period necessary for that organization not merely to get to work, but to become established and recognized by all nations _End quote_. 

I am not at all disturbed by this reaction--it was inevitable. Theconsummation of your work in the signing of the Treaty will clear the airof all these distempers. Your arrival in America, your address to theCongress and some speeches to the country will make those who oppose theLeague to-day feel ashamed of themselves. The New York _World_ had a verygood editorial favouring the mandatory of Turkey. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, June 16, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

If Germans sign the Treaty we hope to get off the first of next week, about the 24th or 25th. It is my present judgment that it would be amistake to take any notice of the Knox amendment. The whole matter willhave to be argued from top to bottom when I get home and everything willdepend upon the reaction of public opinion at that time. I think that ourfriends can take care of it in the meantime and believe that one of theobjects of Knox and his associates is to stir me up, which they have notyet done. I may nevertheless take the opportunity to speak of the Leagueof Nations in Belgium. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 21 June, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

The fight against the League in Knox resolution faces utter collapse. Rootand Hayes here advising Republican leaders. I learned that Root isadvising Republicans to vote for the League with reservations. He isadvising Republicans to concentrate their forces upon a resolution ofratification, which would contain specific reservations on the MonroeDoctrine, immigration, tariff, and other purely American questions. Ibelieve that this is the course the Republicans will finally adopt. Aconfidant of Mr. Taft's yesterday wanted to know from me what yourattitude was in this matter, saying that Mr. Taft might favour thisreservation plan. I told him I had no knowledge on the subject. It is athing that you might consider. To me it looks like cowardice. 

The American Federation of Labour adopted a resolution favouring theLeague of Nations by a vote of twenty-nine thousand seven hundred fiftyagainst four hundred twenty. Andrew Furuseth led the fight against it. Theresolution supporting the League contained a reservation in favour of homerule for Ireland. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, Washington, June 23, 1919. 

TUMULTY, Washington. 

My clear conviction is that the adoption of the Treaty by the Senate withreservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert ofnations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay outwould be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects ofthe United States, and to go in would give her the leadership of theworld. Reservations would either mean nothing or postpone the conclusionof peace, so far as America is concerned, until every other principalnation concerned in the Treaty had found out by negotiation what thereservations practically meant and whether they could associate themselveswith the United States on the terms of the reservations or not. Moreover, changes in the Treaty seem to me to belong to the powers of negotiationwhich belong to the President and that I would be at liberty to withdrawthe Treaty if I did not approve of the ratifications. I do not think itwould be wise for me to wait here for the appropriation bills. I hope tosail on the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth and suggest that you considerthe plan of sending a vessel to meet me. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

 _Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, June 23, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Your cable concerning reservations in ratification would make finestatement for the public. The country would stand back of you in this. CanI use it in this way or can I at least furnish copies to Senator Hitchcockand Mr. Taft? If you allow me to make public use of it may I change_Quote_ leadership of the world _End Quote_ to _Quote_ a notable place inthe affairs of the world _End Quote_. This in order to avoid possibilityof hurting feelings of other nations. Now is time to issue statement ofthis kind as Lodge has practically withdrawn Knox resolution and opponentsseem to be concentrating on _Quote_ reservations _End Quote_. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

June 25, 1919. 

I am quite willing that you should make public use of my cable to youabout reservations by the Senate in regard to the treaty, with this changein the sentence to which you call my attention:

_Quote_ And to go in would give her a leading place in the affairs of theworld, _End Quote_ omitting also the last sentence about changes belongingto power to negotiate treaties. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

June 25, 1919. 

Secretary Tumulty to-day gave out a message which he had received from thePresident, as follows:

My clear conviction is that the adoption of the Treaty by the Senate withreservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert ofnations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay outwould be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects ofthe United States, and to go in would give her a leading place in theaffairs of the world. Reservations would either mean nothing or postponethe conclusion of peace, so far as America is concerned, until every otherprincipal nation concerned in the treaty had found out by negotiation whatthe reservations practically meant and whether they could associatethemselves with the United States on the terms of the reservations or not. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram from Grasty to New York_ Times

June 29, 1919. 

Aboard the _Oklahoma_. 

President's sailing from Brest most auspicious. Most beautiful weather andpromise of more of same. President and Mrs. Wilson showed no ill effectsfrom strenuous activities of past few days and while both formed sincereattachment for France, they are glad to turn faces homeward. Contrary tosome reports current in America he is in excellent health. While elementof novelty which entered his reception on arrival last Decemberdisappeared, there was deeper feeling manifested toward him last night inParis than ever before. Thousands of _Quote_ Vive Wilson _End Quote_ camefrom French heart and continuous ovation. Paris showed popular recognitionof leadership of American in securing peace. One very old Frenchman sprangin front of President's carriage in Champs Élysées and shouted in English:_Quote_ Mr. Wilson, thank you for peace _End Quote_. That was the keynoteand same sentiment was echoed in thousands of ways. Although owing todifferent American viewpoints, Wilson has been frequently antagonisticduring this month, at end relations with other governments' heads mostcordial. Lloyd George came over to Place des États-Unis last night andtold President _Quote_ You've done more to bring English-speaking peopletogether than ever before done by any man _End Quote_. Clemenceau lookedas if losing his best friend when he said Good Bye in Invalides Station. Many representatives of smaller nations have expressed to me within pastfew days hope that President be able to return to Europe and continue hiswork of reconciliation and reconstruction, which they said nobody else inposition to do or able to do so well. 

GRASTY. 

APPENDIX "B"

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 16 March, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Former President Taft asks if he may cable to you direct, for yourconsideration only, some suggestions about which he has been thinking agreat deal and which he would like to have you consider. He said thatthese suggestions do not look to the change of the structure of theLeague, the plan of its action or its real character, but simply toremoving objections in minds of conscientious Americans, who are anxiousfor a league of nations, whose fears have been roused by suggestedconstructions of the League which its language does not justify and whosefears could be removed without any considerable change of language. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram--Paris. _

Received at White House, March 18, 1919. 

In reply to your number sixteen, appreciate Mr. Taft's offer ofsuggestions and would welcome them. The sooner they are sent the better. You need give yourself no concern about my yielding anything with regardto the embodiment of the proposed convention in the Treaty. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 18 March, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Following from Wm. H. Taft:

_Quote_ If you bring back the Treaty with the League of Nations in it, make more specific reservations of the Monroe Doctrine, fix a term for theduration of the League and the limit of armament, require expresslyunanimity of action in Executive Council and Body of Delegates, and add toArticle XV a provision that where the Executive Council of the Body ofDelegates finds the difference to grow out of an exclusively domesticpolicy, it shall recommend no settlement, the ground will be completelycut from under the opponents of the League in the Senate. Addition toArticle XV will answer objection as to Japanese immigration as well astariffs under Article XXI. Reservation of the Monroe Doctrine might be asfollows:

 Any American state or states may protect the integrity of American territory and the independence of the government whose territory it is, whether a member of the League or not, and may, in the interests of American peace, object to and prevent the further transfer of American territory or sovereignty to any European or non-American power. 

Monroe Doctrine reservation alone would probably carry the treaty butothers would make it certain. (signed) Wm. H. Taft _End Quote_. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 21 March, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

The following letter from Hon. Wm. H. Taft. _Quote_ I have thought perhapsit might help more if I was somewhat more specific than I was in thememorandum note I sent you yesterday, and I therefore enclose anothermemorandum _End Quote_. 

 _Duration of the Covenant_

 Add to the Preamble the following:

 _Quote_ From the obligations of which any member of the League may withdraw after July 1, 1829, by two years' notice in writing, duly filed with the Secretary General of the League _End Quote_. 

 _Explanation_

 I have no doubt that the construction put upon the agreement would be what I understand the President has already said it should be, namely that any nation may withdraw from it upon reasonable notice, which perhaps would be a year. I think, however, it might strengthen the Covenant if there was a fixed duration. It would completely remove the objection that it is perpetual in its operation. 

 _Duration of Armament Limit_

 Add to the first paragraph of Article VIII, the following:

 _Quote_ At the end of every five years, such limits of armament for the several governments shall be reëxamined by the Executive Council, and agreed upon by them as in the first instance _End Quote_. 

 _Explanation_

 The duration of the obligation to limit armament, which now may only be changed by consent of the Executive Council, has come in for criticism. I should think this might thus be avoided, without in any way injuring the Covenant. Perhaps three years is enough, but I should think five years would be better. 

 _Unanimous Action by the Executive Council or Body of Delegates_

 Insert in Article IV, after the first paragraph, the following:

 _Quote_ Other action taken or recommendations made by the Executive Council or the Body of Delegates shall be by the unanimous action of the countries represented by the members or delegates, unless otherwise specifically stated _End Quote_. 

 _Explanation_

 Great objection is made to the power of the Executive Council by a majority of the members and the Body of Delegates to do the things which they are authorized to do in the Covenant. In view of the specific provision that the Executive Council and the Body of Delegates may act by a majority of its members as to their procedure, I feel confident that, except in cases where otherwise provided, both bodies can only act by unanimous vote of the countries represented. If that be the right construction, then there can be no objection to have it specifically stated, and it will remove emphatic objection already made on this ground. It is a complete safeguard against involving the United States primarily in small distant wars to which the United States has no immediate relation, for the reason that the plan for taking care of such a war, to be recommended or advised by the Executive Council, must be approved by a representative of the United States on the Board. 

 _Monroe Doctrine_

 Add to Article X. 

 (a) _Quote_ A state or states of America, a member or members of the League, and competent to fulfil this obligation in respect to American territory or independence, may, in event of the aggression, actual or threatened, expressly assume the obligation and relieve the European or non-American members of the League from it until they shall be advised by such American state or states of the need for their aid _End Quote_. 

 (b) _Quote_ Any such American state or states may protect the integrity of any American territory and the sovereignty of the government whose territory it is, whether a member of the League or not, and may, in the interest of American peace, object to and prevent the further transfer of American territory or sovereignty to any European or non-American power _End Quote_. 

 _Explanation_

 Objection has been made that under Article X, European governments would come to America with force and be concerned in matters from which heretofore the United States has excluded them. This is not true, because Spain fought Chili, in Seward's time, without objection from the United States, and so Germany and England instituted a blockade against Venezuela in Roosevelt's time. This fear could be removed, however, by the first of the above paragraphs. Paragraph (b) is the Monroe Doctrine pure and simple. I forwarded this in my first memorandum. It will be observed that Article X only covers the integrity and independence of members of the League. There may be some American countries which are not sufficiently responsible to make it wise to invite them into the League. This second paragraph covers them. The expression _Quote_ European or non-American _End Quote_ is inserted for the purpose of indicating that Great Britain, though it has American dominion, is not to acquire further territory or sovereignty. 

 _Japanese Immigration and Tariffs_

 Add to Article XV. 

 _Quote_ If the difference between the parties shall be found by the Executive Council or the Body of Delegates to be a question which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction and polity of one of the parties, it shall so report and not recommend a settlement of the dispute _End Quote_. 

 _Explanation_

 Objection is made to Article XV that under its terms the United States would be found by unanimous recommendation for settlement of a dispute in respect to any issue foreign or domestic; that it therefore might be affected seriously, and unjustly, by recommendations forbidding tariffs on importations. In my judgment, we could only rely on the public opinion of the world evidenced by the Body of Delegates, not to interfere with our domestic legislation and action. Nor do I think that under the League as it is, we covenant to abide by a unanimous recommendation. But if there is a specific exception made in respect to matters completely within the domestic jurisdiction and legislation of a country, the whole criticism is removed. The Republican senators are trying to stir up anxiety among Republicans lest this is to be a limitation upon our tariff. The President has already specifically met the objection as to limitation upon the tariff when the Fourteen Points were under discussion. Nevertheless in this respect to the present language of the Covenant, it would help much to meet and remove objections, and cut the ground under senatorial obstruction. 

 _Prospect of Ratification_

 My impression is that if the one article already sent, on the Monroe Doctrine, be inserted in the Treaty, sufficient Republicans who signed the Round Robin would probably retreat from their position and vote for ratification so that it would carry. If the other suggestions were adopted, I feel confident that all but a few who oppose any league would be driven to accept them and to stand for the League. 

 (End letter)

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 28 March, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Following just received from Mr. Taft: _Quote_ Venture to suggest toPresident that failure to reserve Monroe Doctrine more specifically inface of opposition in Conference will give great weight to objection thatLeague as first reported endangers Doctrine. It will seriously embarrassadvocates of League, it will certainly lead to Senate amendments embodyingDoctrine and other provisions in form less likely to secure subsequentacquiescence of other nations than proper reservation now. Deems some kindof Monroe Doctrine amendment now to Article Ten vital to acceptance ofLeague in this country. I say this with full realization thatcomplications in Conference are many and not clearly understood here. Astrong and successful stand now will carry the League _End Quote_. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

_Letter from Mr. Taft. _

New York, N, Y. , April 10, 1919. 

MY DEAR MR. TUMULTY:

We are very much troubled over the report that the Monroe Doctrineamendment to the Covenant is being opposed by England and Japan. Will yoube good enough to send the enclosed to the President? We had a meeting to-day of the Executive Council of the League to Enforce Peace. Doctor Lowelland I, at the instance of the League, will be glad to have this matterpresented directly to the President by cable. 

Sincerely yours, WM. H. TAFT. 

HON. JOSEPH P. TUMULTY, Secretary To The President, The White House, Washington, D. C. Enclosure. 

 * * * * *

_Cablegram_

The White House, Washington, 13 April, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

Following is sent at the request of Mr. Taft: _Quote_ Friends of theCovenant are seriously alarmed over report that no amendment will be mademore specifically safeguarding Monroe Doctrine. At full meeting ofExecutive Committee of League to Enforce Peace, with thirty members fromeighteen states present, unanimous opinion that without such amendment, Republican senators will certainly defeat ratification of Treaty becausepublic opinion will sustain them. With such amendment, Treaty will bepromptly ratified. 

(Signed) WILLIAM H. TAFT A. LAWRENCE LOWELL _End Quote_

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

March 27, 1919. 

_Admission--Paris. _

For Secretary Lansing from Polk. 

Following are proposed amendments to the Constitution of the League ofNations which have been drafted by Mr. Root:

_First Amendment_: Strike out Article XIII, and insert the following: Thehigh contracting powers agree to refer to the existing Permanent Court ofArbitration at The Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed atthe Second Hague Conference when established, or to some other arbitraltribunal, all disputes between them (including those affecting honour andvital interests) which are of a justiciable character, and which thepowers concerned have failed to settle by diplomatic methods. The powersso referring to arbitration agree to accept and give effect to the awardof the Tribunal. 

Disputes of a justiciable character are defined as disputes as to theinterpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as tothe existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breachof any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of thereparation to be made for any such breach. 

Any question which may arise as to whether a dispute is of a justiciablecharacter is to be referred for decision to the Court of Arbitral Justicewhen constituted, or, until it is constituted, to the existing PermanentCourt of Arbitration at The Hague. 

_Second Amendment_. Add to Article XIV the following paragraphs:

The Executive Council shall call a general conference of the powers tomeet not less than two years or more than five years after the signing ofthis convention for the purpose of reviewing the condition ofinternational law, and of agreeing upon and stating in authoritative formthe principles and rules thereof. 

Thereafter regular conferences for that purpose shall be called and heldat stated times. 

_Third Amendment_. Immediately before the signature of the AmericanDelegates, insert the following reservation:

Inasmuch as in becoming a member of the League the United States ofAmerica is moved by no interest or wish to intrude upon or interfere withthe political policy or internal administration of any foreign state, andby no existing or anticipated dangers in the affairs of the Americancontinents, but accedes to the wish of the European states that it shalljoin its power to theirs for the preservation of general peace, therepresentatives of the United States of America sign this convention withthe understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed toimply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditionalattitude towards purely American questions, or to require the submissionof its policy regarding such questions (including therein the admission ofimmigrants) to the decision or recommendation of other powers. 

_Fourth Amendment_. Add to Article X the following:

After the expiration of five years from the signing of this convention anyparty may terminate its obligation under this article by giving one year'snotice in writing to the Secretary General of the League. 

_Fifth Amendment_. Add to Article IX the following:

Such commission shall have full power of inspection and verificationpersonally and by authorized agents as to all armament, equipment, munitions, and industries referred to in Article VIII. 

_Sixth Amendment_. Add to Article XXIV the following:

The Executive Council shall call a general conference of members of theLeague to meet not less than five nor more than ten years after thesigning of this convention for the revision thereof, and at that time, orat any time thereafter upon one year's notice, any member may withdrawfrom the League. 

POLK, Acting. 

 * * * * *

The first suggestion made by Mr. Root is not only substantially expressedin Article XIII of the Treaty, but almost literally, in its very text, appears in this section of the Covenant. 

Mr. Root's proposition that "the high contracting powers agree to refer tothe existing permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague or to the courtof arbitral Justice proposed at the Second Hague, when established, or tosome other arbitral tribunal, all disputes between them, " etc. This isactually done by Article 13, the reference being not to the Hague or tothe proposal of the Second Hague Convention, but to a court of arbitration"agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any conventionexisting between them. "

As will readily be seen, Mr. Root's definition of "disputes of justiciablecharacter" is embodied literally in Article XIII of the Covenant, Mr. Root's exact language having been appropriated at the Peace Commission. 

Mr. Root's second proposed amendment provided for calling "a generalconference of the powers to meet in not less than two years, or more thanfive years, after the signing of this convention for the purpose ofreviewing the condition of international law and of agreeing upon andstating in authoritative form the principles and rules thereof. "

In Article XIX of the Covenant it is provided that the Assembly meet fromtime to time to engage in "the consideration of international conditionswhose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. " If it may besaid that this provision of Article XIX does not make it mandatory uponthe council to meet at fixed periods, for the purpose of reviewinginternational conditions, on the other hand it may be urged that itempowers the Assembly to advise such a review at any time, and the Councilto make such review at any time and as often as the necessities mightpermit. "The consideration of international conditions" certainlycomprehends a review of international law and a rectification of itsimperfections, so that substantially the whole of this suggestion by Mr. Root is in the Covenant. 

The third amendment of the Covenant suggested by Mr. Root is exceedinglyinteresting in several particulars. Those who would invoke the aid andsympathy of the Government of the United States in the effort for Irishfreedom will observe that Mr. Root herein precludes the United States fromhaving any interest in, or wish to intrude upon or interfere with, thepolitical policy of the internal administration of any foreign state. Contrast this with Article XI of the Covenant, which President Wilson in aspeech on the Pacific coast said was peculiarly his own and in which it isdeclared to be the friendly right of any member of the League to bring tothe attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whateveraffecting international relations which threaten to disturb the internalpeace or understanding between nations, and if this may be regarded asoutside the question, let it go, and turn to another significant phrasecontained in Mr. Root's suggested amendment. It will be noted that nowherein his suggested modifications of the Covenant does Mr. Root suggest anyalteration whatsoever of Article X, as it stands. On the contrary, in Mr. Root's third suggested amendment he proposed to put the United Statesdefinitely on record as acceding "to the wish of the European states thatthis nation shall join its powers to theirs for the preservation ofgeneral peace. "

The final proposition contained in Mr. Root's proposed third amendment isbroadly cared for in Article XXI of the Covenant relating to the MonroeDoctrine, and by implication in paragraph 8 of Article XV, which prohibitsany recommendation by the Council as to the settlement of the matterssolely within the domestic jurisdiction of any member of the League. 

It may, furthermore, be stated that the President cheerfully agreed to areservation presented by Mr. Hitchcock, of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, even more specifically withholding all domestic questions fromthe jurisdiction of the League. 

Mr. Root's fourth suggested amendment proposed to permit any member of theLeague to terminate its obligations, under Article X, by giving one year'snotice of its desire. While no such modification of Article X was made, the much broader right was given to any nation to renounce all of itsobligations to the League and to terminate its membership of the Leagueupon two years' notice at any time after joining. 

The fifth suggested amendment by Mr. Root, proposing a modification ofArticle IX, by empowering a commission to inspect and verify, eitherpersonally or by authorized agents, all armaments, equipment, munitions, and industries relating to the manufacture of war material, does notappear to have been adopted, nor can any one rationally insist that it wasessential to accept this suggestion. Article IX provides for theappointment of a permanent commission to advise the Council of theexecution of those provisions of the Covenant. Relating to armament, equipment, munitions, etc. , in the military and naval branches ofindustry. 

A sane interpretation of this article would imply that the commission haspower to inspect and verify facts, because in no other way could itpossibly function. 

Mr. Root's sixth proposed amendment makes it mandatory upon the ExecutiveCouncil of the League to call a general conference of members to meet notless than five years or more than ten years after the signing of theCovenant for purposes of revision, etc. This modification of the Covenantwas not made, but the fact that it was omitted by no manner of meansprecludes the exercise of that particular function by the Council. WithoutMr. Root's amendment it is perfectly competent for the Council to convenesuch a meeting of the members of the League at any time. It might do thisin less time than five years, or it might postpone the doing of it for tenyears or a longer period. 

APPENDIX "C"

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

24 April, 1919. 

PRESIDENT WILSON, Paris. 

As we see it from this distance, the selfish designs of Japan are asindefensible as are those of Italy. The two situations appear to paralleleach other in their bearing upon the fate of weak and helpless nations. Would it not be an opportune time to cast another die, this one in thedirection of Japan, that the whole world may know once and for all whereAmerica stands upon this, the greatest issue of the peace we are trying tomake? Now is the time to use your heavy artillery and emphasize the dangerof secret treaties and selfish designs of certain big nations. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

Received at The White House, Washington, 11:48 A. M. 

April 26, 1919. 

Paris. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Am very grateful for your message of approval about the Japanese business. It has warmed my heart mightily. The difficulties here would have beenincredible to me before I got here. Your support kept me in heart. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

26 April, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

It appears to me from this end that the Japanese demands will soon produceanother crisis. If such a crisis arises, I hope you will in any statementyou make emphasize again America's purpose and her unwillingness toconsent to any imperialistic peace. The whole country will be with you inthis matter as never before. I think that your Italian statement was thebeginning of a real peace and a real league of nations. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

Received at The White House, Washington, April 29, 1919. 

Paris. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Situation still difficult. President putting up great fight against odds. Japanese claims now under discussion. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

Paris. 

Received at The White House, Washington. April 30, 1919. 

TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Japanese situation hanging by a thread. They are in conference now. Theseare terrible days for the President physically and otherwise. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

Received at The White House, Washington, May 1, 1919. 

Paris. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

The solution of the Kiauchau question is regarded here both generally andby special friends of China, like Charles R. Crane, as remarkablyfavourable and fortunate considering its rotten and complicated past andthe tangle of secret treaties in which she was enmeshed and from which shehad to be extricated. It is regarded as a wonderful victory for thePresident. The Japanese themselves admit that they have made far greaterconcessions than they had even dreamed would be required of them. TheChinese agreed that they have great confidence in their interests beingsafeguarded in every way and they appreciate that the League of Nationseventually will look after them. 

GRAYSON. 

 * * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

1 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

I have not made use of the Japanese statement but am keeping my ear to theground and waiting. My feeling is that an attempt to explain thecompromise when no demand is made, would weaken our position instead ofstrengthening it. I will therefore do nothing about the Japanese matterunless you insist. It would help if I could unofficially say: First, thedate of your probable return to this country; Second, whether tour countryto discuss the League of Nations is possible. The adoption of the labourprogramme as part of the peace programme is most important, but not enoughemphasis is being placed upon it. Could you not make a statement of somekind that we could use here, showing the importance of this programme ashelping toward the stabilization of labour conditions throughout theworld?

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

2 May, 1919. 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris. 

Sympathetic editorial New York _World_ reference Japanese settlement. Ihave not given out statement as yet. It does not look now as if any wouldbe necessary. 

TUMULTY. 

 * * * * *

Received at The White House, Washington, 2 May, 1919. 

London. TUMULTY, White House, Washington. 

Am perfectly willing to have you use your discretion about the use youmake of what I sent you about the Chinese-Japanese settlement. Sorry Icannot predict the date of my return though I think it will be by Junefirst. Am expecting to make a tour of the country but even that isimpossible to predict with certainty. 

WOODROW WILSON. 

 * * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

4 May, 1919. 

GRAYSON, Care President Wilson, Paris. 

Papers here very critical of Japanese settlement. Chinese statement givengreat publicity. 

TUMULTY.