The purpose of this work is to describe that 'it is self-evident that consciousness is non-spatial'; that is, 'consciousness can be represented by no spatial structure'. It considers the example of the consciousness of bodily pain, which is stated to be conceptually distinct from its bodily counterpart, i.e. identification of some electrochemical signal in brain, as a self-evident fact. This example is just a matter of illustration and is not meant to be the justification/basis of the self-evident non-spatiality of consciousness, as no self-evident truth needs justification. Further it is argued that a reader's possible denial of the self-evident non-spatiality of consciousness is, in fact, their inability to understand the truth due to the relatively profound concepts involved in it; as a simple self-evident mathematical proposition, like if p implies q and if p is true then q is true, may not be self-evidently comprehensible to a person of extremely poor intellect. The self-evident proposition that 'consciousness is non-spatial' is one of the six self-evident propositions that form the axiomatic/self-evident foundation of the NSTP (Non â Spatial Thinking Process) theory.